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THE

LIGHT OF NATURE

PURSUED.

BY ABRAHAM TUCKER, ESQ.

WITH

SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

BY

SIR H. P. ST. JOHN MILDMAY, BART. M.P.

COMPLETE IN TWO VOLUMES.

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SOME ACCOUNT

OF

THE LIFE

OF

ABRAHAM TUCKER, Esq.

I HAVE often heard it lamented by admirers of Mr. Tucker's writings, that no account has been hitherto given to the world of his private life: and it has been suggested to me that in offering a new edition of the "Light of Nature" to the public, some biographical sketch would be expected at my hands.

I regret my inability to comply with these suggestions so fully as my inclination, and the unfeigned respect, veneration, and gratitude which I feel towards the memory of Mr. Tucker would dispose me to do.

The life of a man devoted to study and retirement, to the investigation of metaphysical truth, and the practice of religious duties, can indeed hardly be expected to afford much in the detail to amuse or interest the public: and the uniform regularity of the life of the author of the "Light of Nature" was certainly interrupted by few extraordinary occurrences. But instruction might possibly be afforded and example held out to future excellence, by tracing the several incidents which may be supposed to have influenced the mind and genius of such an author, to have given the original bent to his course of study, and turned his thoughts into that channel in which they continued to flow. I am, however, enabled to add nothing upon these points to the short history which Mr. Tucker has given of the disposition and progress of his own mind, in the following passage:—

"My thoughts," he says, "have taken a turn from my earliest youth towards searching into the foundations and measures of right and wrong; my love for retirement has furnished me with continual leisure, and the exercise of my reason has been my daily employment."

The account which I am about to give of the most important events of his life, (if any events can be said to be important of a life so retired and undiversified,) is necessarily rendered more imperfect by the loss of a near relation, "Mrs. Judith Tucker," by whom alone I could have been furnished with materials for a fuller statement.

All that I now offer to the public is collected from what I can remember to have heard from her, when alive, from some biographical notes which she left behind her, and from some scattered hints and notices which

Mr. Tucker's own papers supply. And however otherwise unimportant or uninteresting the narrative may be, I have preferred to leave it so, rather than to embellish it with anything for which I had not the most indisputable authority, and am contented that it should pretend to no other merit than that which would have been esteemed its greatest recommendation by him whose life it is intended to commemorate, a strict and faithful adherence to the truth.

The family of Mr. Tucker is of Somersetshire extraction, but he was himself born in London on the second of September, 1705. His father, who appears to have been a merchant of some eminence in the city, married Judith, daughter of Abraham Tillard, Esq. and died in his son's infancy, leaving him to the guardianship of his uncle, Sir Isaac Tillard, a man remarkable for the purity of his morals and the austere integrity of his character. Of the memory of this relation Mr. Tucker, to the latest hour of his life, never failed to speak with extreme affection and gratitude, frequently observing that he was indebted for every principle of honour, benevolence, and liberality which he possessed, to the indefatigable pains and bright example of his uncle. It appears, however, that although Mr. Tucker might be greatly obliged to Sir Isaac Tillard for the early seeds of those moral principles with which his conduct and writings were afterwards so eminently tinctured; he did not probably receive much assistance from him in the usual accomplishments of modern education: I have frequently heard him say, that when called on, as a boy, to pay a periodical compliment to some distant relations, he was invariably referred by his guardian to St. Paul's Epistles, as the most complete model of epistolary correspondence.

Mr. Tucker was educated in a school at Bishop's Stortford, which he quitted in 1721, and was entered a gentleman commoner at Merton College, where it appears that he devoted the principal part of his time to metaphysical and mathematical pursuits. During his residence in the University, he found means in the intervals of leisure from more serious application, to make himself complete master of the French and Italian languages, and to acquire a considerable proficiency in music, for which he possessed great natural talents.

About the year 1724, he went into chambers in the Inner Temple, where for some time he applied very closely to the law, in which he acquired such a degree of knowledge as enabled him to conduct with advantage the management of his own affairs, and frequently to render very essential service to his friends and neighbours; but his fortune not requiring the aid of a profession, to the pursuit of which neither his constitution nor his inclination were adapted, he was never called to the bar. While he continued at the Temple, he commonly passed the vacation in tours through different parts of England or Scotland, and once made a summer excursion into France and Flanders.

In 1727, he purchased Betchworth Castle, near Dorking, an ancient seat of the Browns, and formerly part of the extensive possessions of the Earl of Arundel. As this purchase was considerable, and included a large tract of landed property, Mr. Tucker immediately set about acquiring every sort of information that is generally thought necessary to the advantageous management of land. With his usual industry he committed to paper a great variety of remarks which he either had made himself, collected from his neighbours and tenants, or selected from different authors, both ancient and modern, who have treated on rural economy.

In 1736, Mr. Tucker married Dorothy, daughter of Edward Barker, of East Betchworth, Cursitor Baron of the Exchequer, and Receiver of the Tenths. By this lady, who died in 1754, he had two daughters: Judith, who survived him, inherited his estates, and died unmarried in 1795, and Dorothea Maria, who in 1763 married Sir Henry Paulet St. John, Baronet, of Dogmersfield Park, in Hamphire, and died in 1768, leaving no issue but the writer of these remarks.

As my grandfather had always lived with his wife on terms of the tenderest harmony and affection, he was severely afflicted by her death. As soon as the first excess of his grief was somewhat mitigated, he occupied himself in collecting together all the letters that had passed between them at periods when they were accidentally separated from each other, which he transcribed twice over, under the title of "The Picture of Artless Love." One copy he gave to Mr. Barker, his father-in-law, and the other he kept, and frequently read over to his daughters.

His active mind, after this event, became engaged in the education of his children, to whom he himself taught French and Italian: he also instructed them in many other branches of science which he thought might, in future, contribute to their advantage or amusement: but he was, above all, careful to instil into their minds the purest principles of morality, benevolence, and religion.

In the year 1755, at the request of a friend, he worked up some materials that were sent him, into the form of a pamphlet, under the title of "The Country Gentleman's Advice to his Son on the Subject of Party Clubs." This little tract I have seen, though it has long since been out of print. It seems to have been dictated by no party feelings, even in the person by whom the materials were compiled, but generally cautions young men against engaging in political societies in which their passions are liable to be inflamed, and, from the zeal and enthusiasm of the moment, their honour often pledged to support measures which their cooler reason and reflection disapprove.

Mr. Tucker had no turn for politics: he was very strongly solicited, on several occasions, to offer himself as a representative for the county in which he resided, to which situation both his landed property and his private character gave him the best pretensions. This he uniformly refused. He was once only prevailed on to attend a county meeting at Epsom, where party ran very high, and though he took no active part in the proceedings there, he was introduced into a ludicrous ballad, where he is described, with several other gentlemen of respectability and talents, as confounded by the superior powers and eloquence of the Whigs of that day, Sir Joseph Mawbey and Humphrey Cotes. This circumstance afforded to Mr. Tucker abundant matter for humorous animadversion, and whenever politics were the subject of conversation he seldom failed to advert to the ill success of his only essay in public life; and was so much amused with the figure he made in verse, that he set the ballad to music.

From the papers which Mr. Tucker left behind him, it does not appear that previous to the year 1755, he had any thoughts of the work which he afterwards completed, nor has the former editor, nor have I, been able to ascertain from what circumstance he was first induced to undertake it. About the year 1756, however, he began "The Light of Nature Pursued."

He made several sketches of the plan of his work, (one of which he afterwards printed in the shape of a dialogue,) before he finally decided on the method he should pursue; and after he had ultimately arranged and

digested his materials, he twice transcribed the whole copy in his own hand. Conscious of the defects in his style, he had it in contemplation, as he says himself, to have revised and corrected in some degree the most inharmonious and inelegant passages in the work, before he sent it to the press, though for various reasons assigned in his Introduction, he never accomplished his design.

To qualify himself, however, for appearing before the public as an Author, he had employed a considerable portion of his time, previous to his great undertaking, in studying, with the utmost accuracy, the most elegant Greek and Latin classics, in order, (as far as it is possible in the more advanced periods of life,) to supply the defects of early education: and he actually took the pains of translating the most admired pieces of Cicero, Demosthenes, Pliny, &c. several times over.

Of these studies many have been thrown aside and destroyed, but I am still in possession of such a collection as is sufficient to show that Mr. Tucker's industry and perseverance have been very rarely surpassed.

He published the first specimen of his work in 1763, under the title of "Freewill," which seems to have been a selection from four octavo volumes, which he afterwards printed in 1765, under the fictitious name of "Edward Search." Why he assumed a feigned name, I am ignorant, but I am disposed to ascribe it altogether to his disinclination to attract public notice. The remainder of the work was edited by his daughter, from a manuscript, and published with the real name of the Author, some time after his decease.

At a late period of life he printed, but did not publish, a little tract on vocal sounds, wherein he attempts, very ingeniously, with the aid of a few additional letters, to fix the pronunciation of the whole alphabet in such a manner that the sound of any word may be conveyed on paper as easily as by the voice. This little treatise was composed in support of certain positions which he had advanced at a literary meeting of some of his friends, and on which a difference of opinion had arisen. Having occasion in the course of this work to speak of the Hexameter metre, he expresses his conviction, "that the English is as capable of that mode of versification as the Greek or Latin languages." To exemplify this opinion, he subjoins a hasty attempt of his own, from which it may not be thought foreign to my present purpose to insert a very short extract. The Classical Reader will immediately perceive that it is a literal translation of part of Virgil's account of the Pythagorean doctrine.

> A spirit eternal penetrates through earth, sky, and ocean,
> Mounts to the moon's lucid orb, and stars in countless abundance;
> One soul all matter invigorates, gives life to the system,
> O'er each particular member diffuses alertness;
> Thence men and all animals sprung forth, beasts and feathered fowl,
> And whatever monsters swarm through the watery kingdom.
> &c. &c. &c.

Mr. Tucker also published, probably at an earlier period, a pamphlet entitled, "Man in quest of Himself, by Cuthbert Comment," in reply to some strictures that appeared in a note on Search's Freewill, in the Monthly Review of July, 1763. In the latter end of it he explains his view in the publication, namely, "in reply to a doctrine advanced, that the mind and material elements fluctuate and change into one another; which seems a revival of the old atheistical notion, that a perceptive and active being may be formed of senseless and inert principles."

Mr. Tucker, though by no means of an athletic form, or a robust constitution, possessed great bodily activity. He always rose early in the morning to pursue his literary labours. During the winter months, he commonly burnt a lamp in his chamber for the purpose of lighting his own fire. After breakfast he returned again to his studies, for two or three hours, and passed the remainder of the morning in walking, or in some rural exercise. As he was remarkably abstemious, he lost but little time at the table, but usually spent the early part of the evening in summer in walking over his estate, collecting information on all agricultural subjects from his tenants, and committing the result of their practical experience to paper. In winter he completed the regular measure of his exercise, by traversing his own apartment, and after accomplishing the distance he had allotted to himself, he employed the remainder of the afternoon in reading to his daughters. In London, where he resided some months every year, his time was apportioned, nearly in the same manner, between study and relaxation; and he commonly devoted much of his evenings to the society of his friends, relations, and fellow-collegians, among whom he was particularly distinguished for his dexterity in the Socratic method of disputation. His walks were chiefly directed to the transaction of any incidental business, always choosing rather to execute his own commissions, even of the most trivial nature, than to entrust them to a third person. This singularity arose from the construction of his mind, which was rarely satisfied without some object in view; and when no inducement presented itself, he would sometimes walk from Great James Street, where he resided, to St. Paul's or to the Bank, to see, as he would good-humouredly observe, what it was o'clock.

Mr. Tucker lived in habits of considerable intimacy, when in town, with a near relation who had a house in the same street. This was Mr. James Tillard, a gentleman highly distinguished by his classical attainments and general knowledge; and who was one of the numerous authors of that time who opposed by their writings the opinions of Bishop Warburton.

It does not appear that his intimacy with Mr. Tillard, during the progress of this controversy, led Mr. Tucker to take any part in the dispute, though I am disposed to believe that he thought lightly of some opinions of the learned prelate, from an admirable specimen of sarcastic humour which I met with in one of his private letters, in evident reference to a passage in the Bishop's work on the Divine Legation of Moses.

His incessant application gradually weakened his eyes, and, at length, brought on cataracts, which increased so much in consequence of a fever in 1771, that he could no longer amuse himself by reading, and soon afterwards became totally blind.

This affliction, the greatest that could befall a man of his pursuits, he not only bore with composure and resignation, but with the utmost cheerfulness, being frequently much diverted with the mistakes into which his infirmity betrayed him.

His favourite object, however, was not abandoned in consequence of this calamity, his mechanical ingenuity enabling him to direct the construction of a machine which guided his hand, and helped him to write so legibly that his productions were easily transcribed by an amanuensis.

It was at this period that the amiable character of his daughter had occasion to display itself. It would be impossible to do justice to the filial affection, to the nice and unwearied attentions, by which she contrived to mitigate the weight of her father's misfortune. She transcribed the whole of his vo-

luminous work for the press: and so entirely did she devote her time, like Milton's daughter, to those pursuits which would make her most useful to her father, that she applied herself to the study of the Greek language, in which she made such a proficiency as to be enabled to preserve to her father, during the remainder of his life, an intercourse with his favourite authors, of which his misfortune must otherwise have deprived him.

During Mr. Tucker's blindness, he completed the latter volumes of the "Light of Nature;" but before the necessary arrangement of their publication were concluded, he was seized, in 1774, with an illness which proved fatal; and he died, as he had lived, with perfect calmness and resignation.

Having thus stated the few particulars I have been enabled to select from the manuscripts in my possession, relative to the Life of the Author of the "Light of Nature," I shall venture to offer a very few observations on the edition which I have thought it my duty to publish.

To attempt any commentary on the work itself, would be presumptuous on my part; the most ample testimony has already been given to the original genius, the moral excellence, the benevolence, and the perspicuity of the Author, by many of the most enlightened men of the present age. Some of them, with that spirit of liberality which accompanies pre-eminent talents, have openly acknowledged the assistance which they have derived from Mr. Tucker's researches.

I have thought it incumbent on me, as his sole surviving representative, to reprint his work, in consequence of the various applications which have been made to me on account of the increased demand for it, and the scarcity of the remaining copies.

It has indeed been suggested to me, that an abridgment of the whole of these volumes might have been more acceptable to the world at large, or that the bulk might have been conveniently reduced by the omission of the most abstruse and metaphysical parts, without injury to the general argument and essential object of the work.

Feeling, however, the great difficulty that must attend such an abridgment or selection, and conscious of my own insufficiency for the undertaking, and entertaining moreover some scruples as to the right of an editor to compress or curtail the work of his Author according to his own notions of convenience or improvement,—I have judged it most expedient, on mature consideration, to republish it as it came from the pen of Mr. Tucker.

I am aware that the immediate connection between the various subjects treated on in the work, may not appear obvious to many of Mr. Tucker's readers, and that something in the nature of an analysis of the general scheme of the Author would have been extremely desirable. I was indeed in hopes to have offered some observations on this head to the public, from the pen of Sir James M'Intosh, had not the pressure of professional engagements interfered.

It will be observed, that I have ventured to restore a Chapter [Word, or Logos] which treats on a point, that has been thought, by the most able Commentators on the New Testament, to be involved in much doubt and obscurity. I am aware, that in this instance, I expose myself to the censure of many of Mr. Tucker's warmest admirers, by whom I may be accused of something more than indiscretion, in submitting opinions to the public eye, which the prudence and good sense of his immediate successor had thought it wise to suppress in the former edition. I must, however, observe, with the most sincere veneration for the memory of the person to

whom I have had frequent occasion to allude, that the circumstances under which the work is now sent to the press, are widely different from those under which it made its first appearance.

Whether the Author, when he published the fragment on Freewill, had it in contemplation to extend his materials to the present length of the work, or whether he found himself gradually led on as he pursued his subject, must remain a doubt. His earliest production is unquestionably the most abstruse of all his works, nor did the four volumes he published before his death meet with that encouragement from the public which they have since been thought to deserve. Their title was unfortunate, and contributed to raise prejudices against them. At the time of the publication many fanciful theories were afloat on subjects of religious controversy: these had disgusted the public, and a work professing in its title-page to pursue the Light of Nature might be reasonably suspected as unfavourable to the doctrines of Revelation. On this ground, therefore, it was thought advisable by the respectable authorities with whom the late Editor consulted when she printed the posthumous works of her father, to suppress a part of them which did not appear essential to the general scheme of the Author, and might tend to confirm the prejudice raised by the title. But the motive which operated most strongly on the mind of the late Mrs. Tucker, on this occasion, was her conviction that her father was strictly and conscientiously attached to the doctrines of the Church of England, and she was cautious of hazarding anything which might expose his principles to an opposite construction, and which, she was aware, would be eagerly caught at by those who differed from the established persuasion.

Such were the motives which influenced the conduct of the former Editor, in suppressing a Chapter which treats on the construction of the four first verses in the Gospel according to St. John. Her objections to its publication, however judicious at that moment, have now lost much of their weight. The prejudices excited by the title have vanished on the world becoming acquainted with the contents. The religious and moral principles of the Author have stood the test of public investigation, and no longer remain open to misapprehension. The sentiments, the doctrines, the arguments, and the illustrations in every part of the work are equally those of Mr. Tucker, and the particular Chapter of which I am speaking was prepared in his own hand-writing for the press. The great and benevolent object of the Author was the establishment and promulgation of truth: his conjectures (for they are no more,) on this abstruse point, should they prove satisfactory, may lead to that desirable end, by their publication: should they be thought otherwise, it can reflect no discredit on his memory, to have hazarded an unsuccessful opinion on a subject which the most learned and enlightened men have acknowledged themselves unequal to explain.

H. P. St. JOHN MILDMAY, M. P.

"I do not know of any work in the shape of a philosophical treatise that contains so much good sense so agreeably expressed. The character of the work is, in this respect, altogether singular. To the ingenuity and closeness of the metaphysician, he unites the practical knowledge of the man of the world, and the utmost sprightliness, and even levity of imagination. He is the only philosopher who appears to have had his senses always *about him*, or to have possessed the enviable faculty of attending at the same time to what was passing in his own mind, and what was going on without him. No difficulty ever escapes his penetration; every view of his subject, every consequence of his principles, is stated and examined with scrupulous exactness."—HAZLITT.

* * * * * * *

"There is one work to which I owe so much, that it would be ungrateful not to confess the obligation: I mean the writings of the late Abraham Tucker, Esq. part of which were published by himself, and the remainder since his death, under the title of the 'Light of Nature Pursued, by Edward Search, Esq.' I have found in this writer more original thinking and observation upon the several subjects that he has taken in hand, than in any other, not to say in all others put together. His talent also for illustration is unrivalled."—PALEY.

THE

LIGHT OF NATURE PURSUED.

INTRODUCTION.

Religion and Morality, being of universal concern to persons of all conditions and denominations, as well with regard to their present happiness as their future expectations, have always engaged the thoughts of such as were disposed to think seriously upon anything; and the minds of men being variously turned, that natural fondness which attaches every one to the decisions of his own judgment, especially in matters nearly affecting his interest, has given birth to innumerable disputes among the learned in all ages; from whence great disorders and mischiefs have frequently arisen among the rest of mankind. But though contention has never ceased, nor is ever likely to cease, yet the particular subjects exciting it from time to time have often changed: one set having divided the ancient philosophers, another the doctors in the reign of school divinity, and another the several sects of Christians at and after the reformation.

All these old topics of litigation are now happily laid aside, or lie dormant in the closets of the studious, where they are treated of as matters of speculation, giving no disturbance to the world in general. The principal, or perhaps only question agitated with any degree of warmth and earnestness in these times and countries, seems to be, Whether Reason alone be sufficient to direct us in all parts of our conduct, or, Whether Revelation and supernatural aids be necessary. For upon this hinge the merits of our present religious disputes chiefly turn, rather than upon external evidence, which one may observe always carries more or less weight with men, according as they are prepossessed either in favour or prejudice of the doctrines enforced thereby; nor indeed would deserve regard at all without prospect of some advantage to accrue from the result. For, were a Revelation proposed which should offer nothing more than we could discover by our own sagacity, or attain by common industry, nobody would think it worth while to be at any trouble either in recommending or entering upon an examination of its authenticity.

Upon this question, concerning the sufficiency of Reason, many treatises are written, and much thrown out in the pulpits and in private conversation: nor would means be neglected of interesting the populace in the dispute, which from a dispute would then become a quarrel and occasion of civil commotions, did not our laws wisely provide for the maintenance of peace and good order by restraining the fiery zeal of some and wanton licentiousness of others. While the contest stands thus confined within the limits of argumentation, no very mischievous consequences can ensue. We need

not fear truth should lie long overwhelmed under the sophisms of falsehood: it will always rise at last triumphant over the strongest opposition; or rather, like gold, which comes brighter and purer out of the furnace, will get clear of that rust and dross that gathers upon the soundest doctrine by too long quiet. When men are all of a mind they grow careless, seldom giving themselves the trouble to enter into the grounds of what passes current by universal consent: or else graft their own airy imaginations upon the solid substance. But the vigilance of an adversary suffers no foreign mixtures that will not stand the strictest scrutiny: and his misrepresentations give occasion for what remains, to be fully explained and more clearly understood.

But how great advantages soever may accrue from controversy, it is attended by no less inconvenience. It draws off men's attention from the main end of Religion, which is to make them better, by leading them insensibly into a persuasion that orthodoxy on one hand, and freedom from bigotry on the other, is to stand in lieu of all the practical duties of life: it destroys that mutual good-will and esteem from whence the benefits of society chiefly result; and it cuts off half the means of improvement, by shutting our eyes against the clearest truths and most shining examples presented by those of whom we have received an ill impression. For it is no uncommon thing to combat an opinion or vilify an action of the person we dislike, merely because they are his, without once considering the merits of either.

Wherefore, the worst kind of disputing is that which proceeds solely in the spirit of opposition, tending to overthrow but not to establish: for there is scarce any system so bad as not to be better than none at all. He that pulls down his neighbour's house does him a diskindness, however inconvenient soever it were, unless he furnishes him with a plan and materials for building one more commodious. Let every man by my consent offer whatever he thinks beneficial to the public; we stand obliged to him for his good intentions, however ineffectual they may prove, or how much soever we may perceive him mistaken; provided he does not meddle with the opinions of others until he finds them standing directly athwart his way; then indeed disputation becomes necessary, but it is never desirable, nor perhaps ever excusable, unless when absolutely necessary.

In order to avoid this disagreeable necessity as long as possible, it seems advisable to begin with building upon ground that nobody claims or that we all possess in common: I mean, by working upon principles universally agreed to, and gathering all the conclusions they will afford that may be serviceable to the world, and wherein everybody may acquiesce without prejudice to his favourite tenets. For there are many inducements to prudence, to honesty, to benevolence, to industry, acknowledged by persons of all persuasions; and if these were improved to the utmost, much good might be done to mankind, both towards advancing their knowledge and regulating their behaviour, before we need touch upon any controversial matters.

This method appears likely to render the benefit of our endeavours more extensive, because, being looked upon as a common friend, we shall be heard favourably by all: nor is it impossible that our interposition may bring the contending parties into better humour with one another, rendering them more candid, more open to conviction, by showing they agree already in many respects themselves were not aware of. If we can trace out a resemblance of each other's features in their own, they may consider them

as marks of a relationship, and abate of that shyness which makes every one averse to whatever comes from a stranger or an alien. Perhaps, too, it may tend considerably towards shortening disputes; for as no difference can be voided unless by premises whereto both sides will assent, the more of these can be collected, the firmer they are established, and the readier they lie at hand, there will remain the less to do afterwards towards determining matters in debate.

Now there is one tract of ground claimed by none as his peculiar property, namely, so much as lies within the province of reason. Both believer and unbeliever will admit that there are certain truths and certain duties discoverable by our own care and sagacity, that our reason is of some use to us, and that we ought to make the best use of it in our power. This therefore is what I purpose to attempt, to try what may be done by the exercise of our reason, either for the advancement of knowledge or guidance of our conduct, without pretending to determine beforehand whether we may furnish ourselves this way with everything for which we have occasion, without embracing or rejecting what other helps may be afforded us from elsewhere. Since it is allowed on all hands that reason may do something for us, let us avail ourselves of that something she is capable of, be it little or be it much; this surely will not indispose us against receiving further benefits from supernatural assistance, if any such are to be had. Such an attempt cannot justly offend either party: for if reason be sufficient, what can we do better than listen attentively to her voice? and if she be not sufficient, how can this be better evidenced than by putting her upon the trial, in order to see what she contains? If we shall find her anywhere at a nonplus, or her stores exhausted and our wants still remaining unsupplied, we shall the more readily recur to supplies afforded from another treasury.

But who is able to ransack all the stores of reason, or compute the exact amount of the riches she possesses? For my part, I am far from fancying myself equal to the task; nor do I imagine it can be performed by and single person, but must be completed, if ever, by the successive endeavours of many; and on this very plea I found my justification. For although what can be managed by a few, we choose to entrust only with consummate masters in the business, yet in works requiring numbers to execute them, an indifferent workman may be admitted to give a helping hand. It is the duty of every one to serve the public in such way for which he is best fitted, how slender soever his ability may be; and this is the only way wherein I have any chance of making myself useful. I have neither constitution nor talents for active life, neither strength nor fund of spirits for hard study, nor been bred to any profession: but my thoughts have taken a turn from my earliest youth towards searching into the foundations and measures of right and wrong; whatever nature gave me has been cultivated by a careful education, and improved further by as much application as I could bear the fatigue of; my love of retirement has furnished me with continual leisure, and the exercise of my reason has been my daily employment: the service therefore I am to do must flow from this exercise or not at all. And it must arise from the exercise not the strength of my reason: I pretend to no sagacity capable of striking out uncommon discoveries, my dependance must rest solely upon my care and vigilance, which keep me constantly upon the watch for such sparks of light as occur from time to time spontaneously: the coldness of my natural temperament inclines me to caution and sus-

picion, so I do not hastily embrace the most striking ideas until having turned them again and again in my thoughts, in order to discern the genuine rays of truth from the flashy meteors of delusion: whatever of the former I can gather, I preserve diligently, laying them by in store against any further use that may be made of them. For I am a kind of miser in knowledge, attentive to every little opportunity of gain. Though my income be small, I lose nothing of what comes to hand; all I can scrape, I place out at interest, still accumulating the interest upon the principal, as well knowing that this is the only way for one of moderate talents to raise a fortune.

Let not any man expect extraordinary strokes of penetration from me: I shall present him with nothing but what he may have had within his view before: I pretend only to remind him of things that may have slipped his memory, or point out to him objects that may have escaped his notice: if I shall offer him anything new, it will be not more than he would have found naturally resulting from things he knows already, had he held them as steadily under contemplation, or placed them together in the same situation, as I do. Therefore I do not presume to dictate or impose my notions upon others, nor desire any more regard or attention than one would readily give to any common person, upon matters wherein he has been constantly conversant from his childhood; nor even here do I wish my word might be taken any farther than shall appear reasonable in the judgment of the hearer.

Many efforts have been made, as well by ancients as moderns, for investigating the principles of reason and establishing a solid structure of morality; and though they have all fallen short of the end proposed, yet have they not entirely failed of success. The foundations indeed have not yet been discovered or laid open to the view and satisfaction of all men; but much of the covering that obscured them has been from time to time removed, and the hollowness of many spots whereon great labour used to be wasted has been made appear. Mr. Locke in particular has contributed not a little to facilitate the increase of knowledge, by pointing out the sources and channels from whence it must be derived, and clearing away that incumbrance of innate ideas, real essences, and such like rubbish, that obstructed the searches of the studious formerly; so that the reasonings of men are become more accurate, more solid, and if one may so say, more reasonable, than they were before. I cannot expect to run such lengths as he has done; but if I may advance one little step further in the way that he leads, or suggest a single hint that may be improved by some abler hand for the real benefit of mankind, I shall not think that I have laboured in vain nor lived in vain. Whatever I may be able to do, I stand indebted to Mr. Locke for, having learned from him which way to direct my observation, and how to make use of what I observe. I should be proud of being thought to resemble him, not as a copy but an imitation, endeavouring to catch the spirit of my original, and then letting that spirit operate in its own manner. Every one has something in his air and gait peculiar to himself; and if he goes to tread scrupulously in the steps or assume the gestures of another, he will move awkwardly and make very little progress.

But how high a veneration soever I may have for Mr. Locke, it does not rise to an implicit faith, leaving me at liberty to dissent from him in some few instances; and as this happens very seldom, I am not sorry it does happen at all, because it assures me that in other particulars I am not drawn by the influence of a great name but by the force of conviction. In matters of science, another may prepare the evidences and place them in their proper light and order, but the decision ought always to be a man's own. But I

am never better pleased than when a difference, seemingly wide at first, lessens by degrees, and at length vanishes upon a nearer inspection, and entering more thoroughly into his ideas; because then I find my judgment tallied with his, even before I knew of it myself.

And I receive the like proportionable satisfaction upon the like occasion with respect to the opinions of others; for I have so little the spirit of contradiction, that I do not willingly disagree with anybody even in points of speculation, but endeavour at all possible means of reconcilement. I have too great a deference for the understandings of others, to believe they ever embrace naked error uncovered with truth: therefore presume the worst set of tenets must contain a mixture of something that is right, or else they would not have gained credit. The business then is to separate the sterling from the dross, or rather restore it to its original purity. For however chimerical the transmutation of metals may have proved, there is a transmutation of truth into falsehood: many propositions by expositions, qualifications, or restrictions, may be made either true or false: perhaps most of the impositions upon mankind have been introduced into the world by the perverse use of this art. If, then, I can transmute a mischievous opinion back again into its primitive innocence, and I have sometimes succeeded beyond expectation, I may lawfully use it as current coin, and reckon it as a part of my stock in knowledge. My door stands open to receive whatever valuable comes in from all quarters; and as different wares are deemed contraband by different powers, I am forced, in defence of my property, to fight by turns on opposite sides of the same question; not as a Drawcansir, hewing down both friend and foe, but as a mediator, labouring to reconcile jarring interests. By this practice of joining in alliance with various parties, I take a tincture of those among whom I converse; so that it will be no wonder if I should be found hereafter adopting the sentiments, or talking in the strain of an enthusiast, a bigot, a visionary, a sensualist, a freethinker, a sceptic; yet, I hope, without inconsistency or wavering of opinion.

Nor can anybody justly take scandal hereat. Those who place all in a freedom of thought, will not surely blame me for giving a latitude to my thoughts, and following whithersoever my judgment shall lead me: I will not trouble them with anything I shall judge trifling, or of no use, or that has not stood the test of my own examination. If I shall sometimes seem to shake the main pillars of morality as well as religion, it will be only when I conceive them slid off their proper basis upon the loose earth, in order to restore them: in this case it is necessary to undermine the ground whereon they stand, to make room for the levers whereby they may be raised to a bottom where they may remain for ever firm and immoveable; nor shall I attempt to remove any until I have found a place fitter for their reception and support. Those who maintain an established form of doctrine can receive no injury from me. For whenever I consort with them, as they may expect from my conformable temper will frequently happen, they will have in me a competent witness to the reasonableness of their doctrines, against whom no exception can be taken for prejudice or partiality. And if I shall run into extravagances, they may draw an argument from thence, to show the danger of trusting to our natural strength alone: for if one who has constantly paid his court to reason from his childhood, has had a liberal education and continual leisure, and examined every thing with coolness, care, and impartiality, yet misses of his aim and bewilders himself in mazes, or lies entangled in absurdities, how

can it be expected, that the common herd of mankind, without preparation, without thirst of knowledge, without command of their time, immersed in business, pleasures, or passions, and driven forcibly along by the torrent of example, should ever strike out a complete rule of conduct or system of opinion, without some better guidance than that of their own sagacity?

Since, then, my attempt can draw no ill consequences, and should it do no good will do no hurt, I may proceed without fear or scruple to such exercise of my reason as I am capable of making. But reason cannot work without materials, which must be fetched from nature; and not all nature neither, for the greatest part of her stores lie beyond our reach. Of what stand within our ken, some we discern by immediate intuition, others we gather by inference and long deductions of reasoning. It seems expedient then to begin with the things lying nearest to us, these being the premises which must help us to investigate others more remote. Now what is nearer to a man than himself, his sensations, thoughts, and actions? These, therefore, I purpose to examine in the first place, rather than hunt after abstract notions or essences of good or evil; which can only be discovered, if ever, from a careful observation of the former. In natural philosophy, the experimental method is now universally preferred before the hypothetic, as the surer and more effectual: the like method may be practised in morality, with this only difference, that there is no occasion to make experiments on purpose; for everything we see, or hear, or feel, or do in our ordinary converse or common occurrences of life, are so many experiments whereon to build our conclusions. From hence we may best discover our own nature, as we can best discover the nature of bodies from their operation; and by diligently observing what we do, how we come to act in such or such manner, together with the consequences and effects of our actions, we shall be likely to lay the surest measures for our conduct, and attain the clearest knowledge of what we ought to do.

Some have supposed with Plato, that moral and other qualities have an existence of their own, distinct from that of the substances whereto they belong; that they may be clearly apprehended independently of the subject possessing them; that they are eternal and immutable, whereas all other things fluctuate and vary, changing their forms perpetually; therefore that science must stand firmest which is built upon such an immoveable foundation. I shall not stay now to examine the truth of this assertion: it is enough to observe, that whatever independent existence may belong to qualities, we can only come to the knowledge of them by the substances wherein they inhere: nature exhibits nothing abstracted to our view; the abstract must be learned from the concrete. We should never have known what whiteness was, had we not seen something white; nor hardness, had we not felt something hard. So neither could we have known what justice or goodness were, had we not seen the actions of men, and observed how their sentiments influence their behaviour. Besides, how solid a science soever may be erected on ideal qualities, it rests in speculation only, and contributes nothing to our better accommodation, unless relating to such qualities wherein mankind has some concern; and what are of this kind can only be ascertained by experience and observation.

From these sources, therefore, we must fetch our materials, and when we have gotten competent store of them, I am so far from being an enemy to abstract reasonings, that I shall pursue them as far as can be desired, keeping an eye all along upon use, and correcting my theory from time to time by a reference to facts.—I am rather apprehensive of incurring censure

by pursuing them too far, or seeming to have forgotten or lost sight of the main subject proposed; for I may probably spend a great deal of time in metaphysical disquisitions before I mention a word either of morality or religion. But the knowledge of religion and morality arises from the knowledge of ourselves; at least, in my own private meditations I have always found, that whenever I have endeavoured to trace them to their first principles, they have led me to consider the nature of the mind. This then we may look upon as the groundwork and foundation; and he that would have a firm superstructure must allow sufficient time for laying the foundation well. While this is doing, we work underground: you see we are very busy, but to what purpose is not so readily visible: nothing appears useful, nothing convenient, nothing serviceable for the purposes of life. Have but patience until we come above ground, and then, perhaps, you will see a plan arising that promises something habitable and commodious, and which could not have stood secure without the pains we have been taking underneath. Let it be observed further, that my architecture partakes of the military as well as the civil kind: I am not only to build houses, churches, and markets, for the accommodation of life, but fortifications too for repelling the attacks of an invader: and this must be done substantially and begun early, for it will be too late to think of making our outworks after the assailants have opened their trenches.

Perhaps I may enter deeper into metaphysical niceties than I should have deemed requisite or allowable had not others done the like before me; not that the authority of example justifies whatever we can find a precedent for, but the practice of others renders some things indispensable which were needless in themselves. The profession of arms is an honourable, useful, and necessary profession; yet if all the world would agree to live without soldiers, there would be no occasion for soldiers in the world at all: but since neighbouring nations will keep their standing armies, we must do the like, or shall lie liable to perpetual insults and invasions. So likewise the common notices of our understanding might sufficiently answer all the purposes we could expect from them, would all men agree to follow them attentively: but since we shall meet with persons every now and then who will be drawing us aside from the plain road of common sense into the wilds of abstraction, it is expedient for us to get acquainted with the country beforehand, to examine the turnings and windings of the labyrinth, or else they will mislead and perplex us strangely. We have but one of these two ways to secure ourselves against their artifices: either by resolving never to meddle with any subtilties at all, or by going through with them. The same rule holds good here as we find given in poetry,—Drink deep, or taste not the Castalian spring; for a large draught will often allay the intoxication brought on by a small one. Wherefore your dabblers in metaphysics are the most dangerous creatures breathing; they have just abstraction enough to raise doubts that never would have entered into another's head, but not enough to resolve them.

The science of abstruse learning, when completely attained, is like Achilles' spear, that healed the wounds it had made before; so this knowledge serves to repair the damage itself had occasioned; and this perhaps is all it is good for: it casts no additional light upon the paths of life, but disperses the clouds with which it had overspread them before: it advances not the traveller one step on his journey, but conducts him back again to the spot from whence he had wandered. Thus the land of philosophy contains partly an open champaign country, passable by every common under-

standing, and partly a range of woods, traversable only by the speculative, and where they too frequently delight to amuse themselves. Since then we shall be obliged to make incursions into this latter tract, and shall probably find it a region of obscurity, danger, and difficulty, it behoves us to use our utmost endeavours for enlightening and smoothing the way before us.

There seems to be no likelier method of answering this purpose than that of Plato, if one could be so happy as to copy him: I mean, in his art of illustrating and exemplifying abstruse notions by the most familiar instances taken from common life, though sometimes of the lowest and basest kind. We find him indeed rebuked, particularly in the Hippias, or Dialogue upon Beauty, for introducing earthen crocks and pitchers into discourses upon philosophy: and if the plainness of ancient times could not endure such vulgar images, what quarter can we expect for them in this nice and refined age? But when one cannot do as one would, one must be content with what one can: I shall pay so much respect to my contemporaries, as never to offend their delicacy willingly; therefore shall choose such illustrations as may appear fashionable and courtly, as well as clear and luminous, wherever I have the option; but where I want skill to compass both, shall hope for indulgence, if I prefer clearness and aptness before neatness and politeness, and fetch comparisons from the stable or the scullery, when none occur suitable to my purpose in the parlour or the drawing-room.

With respect to ornament of style, I would neither neglect nor principally pursue it, esteeming solidity of much higher import than elegance, and the latter valuable only as it renders the other more apparent. I pretend to but one quality of the good orator, that of being more anxious for the success of his cause than of his own reputation: but having observed that the same matter meets a different reception according to the manner wherein it is conveyed, and that ornaments properly disposed, and not overloaded, make the substance more intelligible and inviting, I am desirous of putting my arguments into the handsomest dress I can furnish, not for the sake of show, but in order to gain them a more ready and more favourable admittance; with the same view as a surgeon desires to have the finest polish upon his lancets, not for the beauty of the instruments, but that they may enter the easier and pierce the surer.

As for the laying down of my plan, and choice of the methods to be taken in pursuit of it, those of course will be left to my own management, who may be supposed better acquainted with the nature and particulars of my design than a stranger. Therefore my reader, if I have any, will please to suspend his judgment upon the several parts until he has taken a view of the whole; and even then I hope will not hastily pronounce every thing superfluous, or tedious, or too refined, which he finds needless to himself; for I am to the best of my skill to accommodate every taste, and provide, not only for the quick, the reasonable, and the easy, but for the dull, the captious, and the profound.

There is the better encouragement to try the strength of reason upon the subject of morality, because many judicious persons, Mr. Locke for one, have pronounced it capable of demonstration equally with mathematics: but how much soever morality may be demonstrable in its own nature, the demonstration has hitherto been found impracticable, being prevented, I conceive, by one main obstacle Mr. Locke has pointed out, that is, because the ideas and terms belonging to it are more indistinct, unsettled, and variable, than those of number or measure. The difference between ninety-

nine and a hundred is discernible to everybody, and as well known as that between a hundred and a thousand; no man calls that an inch which another calls an ell; nor does the same man sometimes conceive a yard to contain three feet and sometimes four. But the case is far otherwise in the language of ethics: if one receives contrary commands from two persons to each of whom he owes an obligation, who can determine the preference where the obligations bear so near a proportion as ninety-nine to a hundred? What this man esteems an honour, the next accounts a disgrace; and if the same person were asked his idea of virtue, freewill, obligation, justice, or favour, it is odds but he will vary in his notions at different times, nor ever be able to fix upon a definition, himself will always abide by. Since then we see what it is that hinders our moral and metaphysical reasonings from proceeding with the same justness as our mathematical, let us endeavour to remove the impediment by fixing a steady and determinate sense to our terms; for so far as we can compass this, so near shall we approach towards the certainty of demonstration; and I am persuaded that in cases of the highest importance we may often arrive, if not at mathematical demonstration, yet at a degree of evidence that shall command as full and merit as unreserved an assent.

This persuasion will lead me now and then to bestow more time than I could wish upon the signification of words: such disquisitions, I fear, may appear tedious and irksome to many, notwithstanding that no pains in my power shall be spared to make them easy, smooth, and palatable; but I hope to find excuse in the absolute necessity of the thing. For without accuracy of language it is impossible to convey a chain of close reasoning to others, or even to be sure of carrying it on unbroken ourselves; because we must always deliver our conceptions by words, and for the most part we think in words, that is, when we would recall an idea to our minds, the word expressive of it generally occurs first to usher it in; but if the word should have shifted its meaning without our perceiving it, as too frequently happens, we shall run a hazard of drawing conclusions without a consequence.

There is not the same danger in mathematics, because the terms there employed are either peculiar to that science, or such as constantly carry the same precise idea upon all common occasions, as relating to objects under cognizance of our senses. But ethics being chiefly, and metaphysics entirely, conversant in ideas of reflection, of which we have greater multitudes than words to express them, we are necessitated to use the same mark for various significations: as in scoring at cards, where the counters stand sometimes for units, sometimes for threes, fives, tens, or fifties, according to their positions, or according to the game, be it whist, cribbage, or piquet. And yet the ideas in our reflection being fleeting and transitory, passing to and fro, present before us this moment, and gone the next, we have no other method of fixing them than by annexing them to particular words. It is true the studious often affect to employ technical terms, hoping thereby to escape the confusion incident to the language of the vulgar: but these, being all either common words restrained to a particular sense, or else derived from words of general currency, partake in some measure of the slippery and changeable quality of their primitives: nor can even the thoughtful always agree with one another, or maintain a consistency with themselves, in the application of their terms.

Wherefore in these sciences philology must go along with philosophy, not as a partner or companion, but as an attendant or handmaid. For the knowledge of things is our principal aim, and criticism no further than

shall be found expedient to secure our meditations against confusion, and our discourses against misapprehension. I may think myself entitled to the liberty others have taken of coining new words, or extending, restraining, or a little altering the signification of old ones; but shall never use this liberty so long as I can do without it. I would rather make it my business to distinguish the various senses belonging to words already current, as they stand in different expressions, or are employed upon different occasions: if this could be sufficiently remarked and borne in mind, it would prevent mistakes as effectually as if every idea had a particular name appropriated to itself alone.

I shall need great indulgence with respect to the manner of my performance, wherein I fear will be found a degree of wildness and deviation from the ordinary rules of composition: I was the less scrupulous in adhering to them during the course of my work, as depending upon a subsequent revisal for setting matters to rights, but upon trial I perceive that correction is not my talent: I have made some few additions in the first part, as of two entire chapters, the first and the twentyfourth, the beginning sections in that of the vehicles, the visit to Stahl in the vision, and the six concluding sections of the last chapter; but for the rest, am forced to give out the first running off with very little alteration. This disappointment falls the lighter, because what amendments I had hoped to make, would have tended only to the better look and appearance of the work, for which I am much less solicitous than for the substance. I do not pretend insensibility to reputation; but my first and principal wish is to be of some little service to my fellow-creatures by suggesting some observations which they may improve to their advantage; and my greatest concern to avoid doing hurt by misleading into notions of dangerous tendency. Under this caution I must warn the reader against judging too hastily upon the last chapter of this volume, for I should be very sorry to have him take his idea of virtue from the very exceptionable figure wherein she is represented there. But he will please to observe that I proceed solely upon the view of human nature, without any consideration of Religion or another world, and will expect no completer edifice than can be erected upon such scanty bottom: and that he may not sit down with a notion of my believing the plan of morality ought to lie upon no other ground, I entreat his attention to the two concluding sections of that chapter; from whence he may augurate that I have a larger scheme in reserve, whereon my building will make a very different appearance from what he sees it here; and possibly it may be shown in good time that I had my reasons for drawing this imperfect sketch before I proceeded to designs more extensive.

I shall now begin to work upon my foundation, which was proposed to be laid in human nature; and having taken the line and plummet in hand, shall look for directions in the contemplation of the mind, the manner and causes of action, the objects affecting us, and their several ways of operation.

THE

LIGHT OF NATURE PURSUED.

HUMAN NATURE.

CHAP .I

FACULTIES OF THE MIND.

WHOEVER considers the frame and constitution of Man, must observe that he consists of two parts, Mind and Body. And this division holds equally good, whatever opinion we may entertain concerning the nature of the mind; for, be it an immaterial substance, be it a harmony, or be it a certain configuration of corporeal particles, at all events it does not extend to the whole of the human composition. There are several things within us which cannot belong to the mind under any notion we may conceive of it; such as the bones, the muscles, the sinews, the blood, the humours, and even the limbs and organs of sensation, because, by losing some of these, we lose nothing of our mind: when an arm is cut off, or an eye beat out, though the man become less perfect, the mind remains entire as before; the harmony is not dissolved, the mental compound disunited, or the spiritual substance destroyed.

How variously soever we may think of the mind, every one will readily acknowledge the body to be a very complicated machine, containing muscles, tendons, nerves, organs of motion, organs of sensation, and a multitude of other inferior parts. But with these we have no immediate concern; our purpose being principally to consider the mind, but the body with its members no further than as they concur with the mind or serve as instruments in the performance of its operations.

2. Now in pursuit of this inquiry we shall find it requisite to distinguish between the faculties of the mind and the faculties of the man, of whom the mind is only a part. For in all compounds there are some properties belonging to the parts separately, and others resulting from the composition or joint action of the united parts. Thus, he that should describe the first mover in one of those curious pieces of workmanship made to exhibit various appearances by clock-work, would speak untruly in saying it had the properties of showing the time of the day or year, rising and setting of the luminaries, courses of the planets, concert of the Muses, or dance of the beasts after Orpheus, for these are all properties of the machine: the part under consideration has no other property than to gravitate, if it be a weight, or to expand, if it be a spring; and this single quality of gravitation or elasticity produces the various movements above mentioned, according to the several works whereto at different times it is applied.

In like manner we hear of many faculties ascribed to man, such as

walking, handling or speaking, hearing, seeing or feeling, which manifestly do not belong to the mind, since it can exercise none of them without aid of the body: we can neither walk without legs, handle without arms, nor speak without a tongue; neither hear without ears, see without eyes, nor touch without fingers. But though the mind has some share in the performance of all these actions, yet the faculties it exerts are not so various as the operations it produces: for it is by one and the same faculty of the mind that we walk, handle, or speak, and by one and the same faculty that we hear, see, or touch; which faculty produces different effects according to the different bodily organs whereto it is applied.

Nevertheless, there is this difference observable with respect to the mind itself, that upon some occasions, as in walking, handling, speaking, it affects and acts upon the body; on others, as hearing, seeing, feeling, it is itself affected and acted upon by the body. Hence we reasonably gather that the mind possesses two faculties; one by which we perform whatever we do, and another by which we discern whatever presents itself to our apprehension The former has usually been styled the Will, and the latter the Under standing.

3. Faculty is the same as Power, or rather a particular sort of power; being generally appropriated to those powers only which belong to animals. We get our idea of power, says Mr. Locke, from the changes we see made in things by one another; upon seeing gold melted by the fire, we consider a quality in the fire of changing the gold from a solid into a fluid state; and upon seeing wax blanched by the sun, we conceive the sun must have a quality to alter the colour of the wax. But the same quality working upon different subjects does not always produce the like effect, therefore, that it ever does, appears owing to some quality in the subject whereon it operates: thus, if gold melts in the fire, not only the fire must have a quality of melting, but the gold likewise a quality of being melted; if wax blanches in the sun, it is not enough that the sun possesses a quality of blanching, but there must be a quality of being blanched in the wax. The qualities of fire remain the same, whether you throw gold or clay into it; yet upon casting in the latter no liquefaction will ensue, solely for want of the quality of being liquified in this latter. These qualities are called Powers in the writings of the studious, and distinguished into two kinds by the epithets of active and passive powers; both of which must concur in producing every alteration that happens, to wit, an active power in the agent to work the change, and a passive in the recipient to undergo it.

According to this distinction it will appear that of the two faculties of the mind before spoken of, one is active and the other passive: for on every exertion of our Will, the mind causes some motion, change of situation, or alteration of the subject it acts upon; and in every exercise of our understanding, the mind passes either from a state of insensibility to a state of discernment, or from one kind of discernment to another, as from sights to sounds, or tastes or reflections, according to the variety of objects that act upon it.

4. We readily enough conceive ourselves active in the exertions of our Will, but by the common turn of our language we seem to claim an activity in the exercises of our understanding too; for we generally express them by active verbs, such as to discern, to see, to observe, and apply the passives of those very verbs to the objects when we say they are discerned, seen, observed; all which carry an import of something done by ourselves and something suffered by the objects from us. Yet a very little

consideration may show us, that in all sensations at least the objects are agents and ourselves the patients. For what is sight but an impression of things visible upon our eyes and by them conveyed to the mind? what is sound but the percussion of air upon our ears and thence transmitted through the like conveyance? In all these cases the sensations are caused by bodies without us, and are such as the respective bodies are fitted to produce: the mind can neither excite nor avoid nor change them in any manner; it can neither see blue in a rose nor hear the sound of a trumpet from a drum, but remains purely passive to take whatever happens to it from external objects. Nor is the case different in hunger and thirst, the pleasant feel of health or uneasiness of distempers, though proceeding from internal causes; for nobody can doubt of these sensations being raised by the humours or some parts of our body, which though within the man yet lie without the mind; and, therefore, with respect to that are truly external agents.

5. Thus it appears evidently that we are passive in sensation of every kind: but the matter is not quite so plain in the business of reflection, which the mind seems to carry on entirely upon its own fund, without aid of the body, without intervention of the senses or impression of any thing external, acting solely and immediately in and upon itself.

Yet supposing the mind acts in this manner, it does not prove the understanding to be active herein, it proves only that the mind is both agent and patient at once. As a man who after holding his right hand to the fire claps it upon his left, although active in the motion of one hand, is nevertheless passive in feeling warmth with the other; for whatever power he may have to move his hands, it would signify nothing if he had no feeling. So admitting that the mind furnishes its own thoughts in and from itself, although it acts in producing the thoughts, nevertheless is it passive in discerning them when produced; for whatever power it may have to generate reflections, all will avail nothing without a power of discernment.

But we may justly question whether the supposition above made be true in fact, whether the same thing ever does act wholely and solely upon itself, or whether the notion of action does not require two substances, one to act and the other to be acted upon. I know we are often said to perform actions upon ourselves, as when Cato slew himself at Utica; but he did it with a sword, therefore his action was exerted upon that, and he was passive in receiving the wound made by the sword. And if a mother, upon the loss of her child, beats her breast in despair, neither is this an acting of one thing upon itself, although she uses no instrument; for every compound is one in imagination only, in nature and reality it is as many things as the component parts it contains: because the hand which strikes and the breast which suffers are parts of the same woman, therefore we may say she beats herself; but consider them separately, and the hand will appear as individually and numerically distinct from the breast as if they had belonged to different persons. And if we transfer our expression from the whole to the parts, we shall find ourselves obliged to change the form of it: for though we may say the woman beats herself, we cannot say the same either of the hand or the breast. In short, it seems to me difficult to frame a conception of any one individual thing acting immediately and directly upon itself, or without some instrument or medium intervening between the power exerted and effect produced thereby.

6. But this abstruse reasoning from the nature and essence of action

may not satisfy everybody, as it may not be understood by some and not agreed to by others; the conceptions of men, in their abstract notions especially, being widely different. Let us therefore consider what passes in our minds in the work of reflection, in order to try whether we can gather any lights towards determining the question from experience. And this will furnish us with numberless instances wherein reflections intrude upon the mind whether we will or no: a recent loss, a cruel disappointment, a sore vexation, an approaching enjoyment, a strong inclination, an unexpected success, often force themselves upon our thoughts against our utmost endeavours to keep them out. Upon all these occasions the mind shows evident marks of passiveness, the Will wherein its activity lies being strongly set a contrary way: it suffers violence, and that violence must be offered by something else, for it cannot be suspected here of acting upon itself, the action produced being directly opposite to that it would have, and the state whereinto it is thrown the very reverse of what it wishes: when it wishes content, it is overwhelmed with anxiety and disquiet like a torrent; and when it would rest in calmness, passion, expectation and impatience rush upon it like an armed giant.

7. The same experience testifies of other reflections coming upon us without though not against our Will. How many fancies, conceits, transactions, observations, and I may say, arguments, criticisms and measures of conduct, shoot into our thoughts without our seeking? If we go abroad on one errand, another suddenly occurs; visiting such a friend, buying such a trifle, seeing such a sight that lies opportunely in our way. When a man coming off from a journey throws himself carelessly into an easy chair, and being desirous of nothing but rest, falls into a reverie, what a variety of objects pass muster in his imagination! The prospects upon the road, occurrences happening to him, his acquaintance at home, their faces, characters, conversations, histories, what he has seen, what he has done, what he has thought on during his journey or at other times. His mind remaining all the while half asleep, for though the understanding wakes, the Will in a manner doses, without preference of one thing before another, without attention to any particular part of the scene, but suffering all to come and go as it happens. Can the mind in this indolent posture be said to act upon itself when it does not act at all? Yet ideas innumerable are produced, which must necessarily proceed from the act of some other agent extrinsic to the mind and individually distinct from it.

8. Let us now consider voluntary reflection, such as recollecting, studying, meditating, reasoning, deliberating, and the like, wherein the mind from time to time calls upon the thoughts it wants, and is if ever both agent and patient in the same act. Yet even here, if we examine the matter closely, we shall find that the mind does not call up all our thoughts directly by its own immediate command, but seizes on some clue whereby it draws in all the rest. In meditation, though we choose our subject, we do not choose the reflections from time to time occurring thereupon. In reasoning, we seek after some conclusion which we cannot obtain without help of the premises; or hit upon some discovery, a stranger to our thoughts before, and therefore not under our obedience. Deliberation and investigation are like the hunting of a hound; he moves and sniffs about by his own activity, but the scent he finds is not laid, nor the trail he follows drawn by himself. The mind only begins a train of thinking or keeps it in one particular track, but the thoughts introduce

one another successively. I believe few persons, how well acquainted soever with Virgil, can repeat the second line of his Æneid without beginning with the first: we see here the second line brought to our remembrance, not by the mind, but by the first line, which therefore must be deemed a distinct agent or instrument employed by the mind in bringing the second to our memory. Whoever will carefully observe what he does when he sets himself down to study, may perceive that he produces none of the thoughts passing in his mind, not even that which he uses as the clue to bring in all the others; he first withdraws his attention from sensible objects, nor does he then instantly enter upon his work; some little time must be given for reflection to begin its play, which presently suggests the purpose of his inquiries to his remembrance and some methods of attaining it; that which appears most likely to succeed, he fixes his contemplation upon, and follows whithersoever that shall lead, or checks his thoughts from time to time when he perceives them going astray, or stops their course if he finds it ineffectual, and watches for its falling into some new train; for imagination will be always at work, and if restrained from roving in all that variety of sallies it would make of its own accord, it will strike into any passages remaining open. Therefore we may compare our student to a man who has a river running through his grounds which divides into a multitude of channels: if he dams up all the rest, the stream will flow in the one he leaves open; if he finds it breaking out into side branches, he can keep it within bounds by stopping up the outlets; if he perceives the course it takes ineffectual for his purpose, he can throw a mound across, and let it overflow at any gap he judges convenient. The water runs by its own strength without any impulse from the man, and whatever he does to it, will find a vent somewhere or other: he may turn, alter or direct its motion, but neither gave nor can take it away. So it is with our thoughts, which are perpetually working so long as we wake, and sometimes longer, beyond our power to restrain: we may control them, divert them into different courses, conduct them this way or that, as we deem requisite, but can never totally prevent them from moving. Which shows they have a motion of their own independent of the mind, and which they do not derive from its action, nor will lay aside upon its command.

9. We may remark further that the mind cannot always call up those thoughts which for the most part lie ready to appear at our summons. How often do we endeavour in vain to recollect a name, a transaction, a circumstance, we know extremely well? How often do we try to study without effect, to deliberate with various success, and perplex ourselves with difficulties we have heretofore made nothing of? Sometimes we find ourselves totally incapable of application to any thing; sometimes unapt for one kind of exercise but ready at another: mathematics, ethics, history, poetry, business, amusements, have their several seasons wherein the thoughts run more easily into each of them than any other way. Which affords a strong presumption that the mind employs some instrument, which when not at hand or unfit for service it cannot work at all, nor pursue the train of thought it attempts.

The more narrowly we examine our procedure in all exercises of the understanding, the more firmly we shall be persuaded that the mind uses a medium by whose ministry it obtains what it wants. Both in sensation and reflection of our own procuring, the mind acts upon the medium and that again acts upon the mind: for as in reading we only open the book,

but the page presents the words contained in it to our sight: so in thinking we set our imagination to work, which exhibits appearances to our discernment.

10. If we go about to examine what those mediums are we find so necessary to the mind, it will presently occur that the ideas floating in our imagination are to be ranked among the mediums: and it may be worth while to bestow a little consideration upon these ideas.

We use idea sometimes for the very discernment the mind has of some object or thought passing in review before it, and sometimes more properly for the thing or appearance so discerned. It is obvious that when I speak of ideas as mediums, I must understand them in the latter sense; not as effects produced in the understanding, but as causes immediately producing them.

Idea is the same as image, and the term imagination implies a receptacle of images: but image being appropriated by common use to visible objects, could not well be extended to other things without confusion; wherefore learned men have imported the Greek word idea, signifying image or appearance, to which, being their own peculiar property, they might affix as large a signification as they pleased. For the image of a sound or of goodness would have offended our delicacy, but the idea of either goes down glibly: therefore idea is the same with respect to things in general as image with respect to objects of vision.

In order to render the notion of ideas clearer, let us begin with images. When a peacock spreads his tail in our sight, we have a full view of the creature with all his gaudy plumage before us: the bird remains at some distance, but the light reflected from him paints an image upon our eyes, and the optic nerves transmit it to the sensory. This image, when arrived at the ends of the nerves, becomes an idea and gives us our discernment of the animal; and after the bird is gone out of view, we can recal the idea of him to perform the same office as before, though in a duller and fainter manner. So when the nightingale warbles, the sound reaches our ears, and passing through the auditory nerves, exhibits an idea affecting us with the discernment of her music: and after she has given over singing, the same idea may recur to our remembrance or be raised again by us at pleasure. In like manner our other senses convey ideas of their respective kinds, which recur again to our view long after the objects first exciting them have been removed.

These ideas having entered the mind, intermingle, unite, separate, throw themselves into various combinations and postures, and thereby generate new ideas of reflection, strictly so called, such as those of comparing, dividing, distinguishing, of abstraction, relation, with many others: all which remain with us as a stock for our further use upon future occasions.

11. Here perhaps I shall be put in mind that I have before supposed two substances necessarily concurring in every action, one to act, and the other to be acted upon; and thereupon asked whether I conceive ideas to be substances. To which I answer, No: but as such answer will seem to imply a contradiction, the only agents in the business of reflection being ideas which nevertheless are not substances, I shall be called upon to reconcile it.

For which purpose I shall have recourse again to the image employed before. When we look upon a peacock, what is that image conveyed to us considered in the several stages through which it passes? Not any thing brought away by the light from the bird, and thrown in upon us

through our organs, but a certain disposition of the rays striking upon our eyes, a certain configuration of parts arising in our retina, or a certain motion excited thereby in our optic nerves: which disposition, configuration, and motion, are not substances, but accidents in ancient dialect, or modifications according to modern philosophers. But accident or modification cannot exist by itself, it must have some substance to inhere in or belong to, which substance is indeed the agent upon all occasions. Nevertheless we commonly ascribe the action to the modification, because what kind it shall be of depends entirely upon that: for the same rays, the same retina, the same nerves, differently modified by the impulse of external objects, might have served to convey the image of an owl or a bear, or any other animal to our discernment. Therefore that last substance, whatever it be, which immediately gives us the sensation, is the agent acting upon our mind in all cases of vision: and in like manner that something so or so modified which presents to our discernment, is the agent in all cases of mental reflection, which modification we call our idea: but because we know nothing more of the substance than the operation it performs, therefore if we would speak to be understood, we can say no otherwise than that the idea is the thing we discern.

What those substances are whereof our ideas are the modification, whether parts of the mind as the members are of our body, or contained in it like wafers in a box, or enveloped by it like fish in water, as many expressions current in use might lead us to imagine, whether of a spiritual, corporeal, or middle nature between both, I need not now ascertain; nor indeed can I until the sequel of our inquiries in the progress of this work shall by degress have brought us better acquainted with some particulars relating to them. All I mean at present to lay down is this. That in every exercise of the understanding, that which discerns is numerically and substantially distinct from that which is discerned: and that an act of understanding is not so much our own proper act as the act of something else operating upon us.

12. After all that has been said, I think we may look upon the passivity of the understanding as fully established. But active power alone, says Mr. Locke, is properly power: and however men of thought and reading may suppose two powers necessary to effect every alteration, an active in the agent to work the change, and a passive in the recipient to undergo it; men of common apprehensions cannot find this power in the latter. If they see one man beat another, they readily enough discern a power in him that beats, but they cannot so easily conceive the other's defeat owing to his power of being beaten, which they rather look upon as weakness and defect of power. So when they see gold melt in the fire, they ascribe the melting to an inability in the gold to resist the force of fire, as stone or clay, or other fixed bodies might do, which have a stronger power to hold their parts together.

If Faculty be derived from Facility, it implies active power, and that in the highest degree; for if I with much ado can heave up a huge folio upon an upper shelf, my servant who can toss it up with facility must have a much greater degree of strength; and probably this term was pitched upon to denote the surprising agility and readiness shown by the mind upon most occasions, as well of acting as discerning. The term Faculty I believe has been generally applied by most men to the understanding, nor do I wonder it should, because we do not minutely consider

the progress of action nor the stages through which it passes; therefore when we observe the same action beginning and ending in the same thing, and do not take notice of any medium or instrument employed to carry it on, we naturally conceive the same thing acting upon itself. But there is a distinction between an immediate and a remote effect: I never denied that the mind acts upon itself remotely, I know it does so very frequently both in procuring sensation and reflection. For what is reading, hearkening, singing, tasting a sweetmeat, warming our hands at the fire, but sensations excited in the mind from something done by itself? When we read, the opening the book, turning to the proper page, running our eyes along the lines, and fixing our attention thereupon, are our own acts; and the sight of the words and sense of the author conveyed thereby are of our own discernment. When we study, it is we ourselves who put our imagination into a posture for thinking, and the reflections, determination, or discovery resulting therefrom, are effects produced in ourselves.

Besides that the measure of our understandings gives scope to the range of our wills; men of duller apprehension cannot perform many things which those of quicker apprehensions can: perhaps the difference really lies in the instrument we have to use, but is commonly supposed in the mind itself. Therefore the extent of our active powers depending upon the sensibility of our understanding, this is deemed a part of them, and denominated by the same appellation; for being found to have a share in the performance of our actions, because they could not be performed without it, it lays claim to the title of an active power.

Thus we see the mind invested according to common conception with two powers; but in philosophical strictness, and in propriety of speech, if we may take Mr. Locke's judgment of that propriety, it has only one power, namely the Will, and one capacity, namely the Understanding. Yet as I find them both sometimes termed powers, as well by Mr. Locke as by other writers upon this subject, I shall comply with the prevailing custom, and make no scruple to speak of our passive power and acts of the understanding, as I see no inconvenience therein; having already declared my opinion that they are truly passions of the mind, and acts of something else.

13. But I cannot be quite so complaisant with respect to names given the faculties, as I apprehend great mischiefs arising therefrom; for being terms of common currency we shall find it very difficult, perhaps impossible, at all times to disjoin them from the sense generally affixed to them by custom: which frequently ascribes acts that do not belong to them, or acts of one to the other, or complicated acts wherein both concur jointly to either singly.—By which means we shall run a great hazard of perplexing ourselves, and talking unintelligibly to others, or what is worse, of making syllogisms with four terms, and thereby leading both into mistakes.

Observe how men express themselves as well in their serious discourses as in their ordinary conversation, and you will see them appropriating the term understanding to that knowledge, skill, or judgment, resulting from experience in particular things: as when they talk of understanding such a language, of a divine understanding the Scriptures, a lawyer the statutes, a painter colours, or a mealman the different goodness of corn in a market. If any one asks, Sir, do you understand this paragraph in a book, he does not mean Can you read it, but Do you know the sense of it? if he asks whether you understand the bell, he does not inquire whether you hear it, but whether it rings to breakfast or chapel.—Whereas

seeing the letters of a paragraph and hearing the sound of a bell are acts of the faculty as much as understanding the drift of them: and the same objects convey their sensations to the novice, if his senses be perfect, as fully though not so usefully as to the man of skill. When we improve or enlarge our understanding by learning, we do nothing to our faculty, for that we must take as nature gave it us; nor can any application increase or diminish our natural talents; we can only lay in a larger stock of materials for them to work upon. Like a man who cuts down a wood to extend his prospect, he does nothing to his eyes nor encreases their power of vision, but only opens a larger field for them to expatiate in.

So what we call exercises of our understanding are in reality exercises of our reason, not the single act of either, but the joint work of both faculties; such as reading, composing, deliberating, contriving, and the like, wherein the mind employs both her powers and certain instruments besides in a series of actions tending to some end proposed. Whereas every notice of our senses, every wild imagination, every start of fancy, every transient object or thought exercises our faculty. What need divines and philosophers exhort us perpetually to use our understandings? Their admonitions were superfluous if they meant the faculty, for this we use without ceasing while awake, nor can we choose but do so. The little master playing at pushpin uses his faculty, for that discovers to him the situation of the pins, and thereby directs his fingers how to shove one across another. When Miss Gawky lolls out at window for hours together to see what passes in the street, she uses her faculty all the while; for by that she discerns the coaches going by, a woman wheeling potatoes in a barrow, or a butcher's apprentice with a dog carrying his empty tray before him. How oddly would it sound to say this pretty trifler makes as much use of her understanding as the laborious patriot, who spends his time and himself in contriving schemes for the public good? Yet we cannot deny her this honour if we speak of the faculty, for both equally furnish that with constant employment. How shall we take these expressions, A man of no understanding, or That has lost his understanding? for the veriest idiot or madman, if he can see and hear and remember and fancy, possesses the faculty of discerning objects in such manner as his senses convey them or his imagination represents them.

14. So likewise the term Will in common acceptation stands for something very different from our active power, as appears evidently by our frequently talking of doing things unwillingly or against our Wills: for the mind has one only active power whereby it brings to pass whatever it performs, nor is it possible to do any one thing without exerting that; therefore it would be highly absurd to talk of acting without or against our Will in this sense.—But by acting against our Will we mean against the liking, against the grain, against the inclination, which being observed to set us commonly at work, for we do most of our actions because we like them, hence the cause is mistaken for the effect, and the liking gets the name of the power operating to attain it: and if we find inclination drawing one way and obligation or some cogent necessity driving another, our compliance with the latter we call acting against our Will.

If we view this compliance separately in its own light, this also appears to us an act of our Will. Suppose a girl, living with some relation from whom she has large expectations, invited to a ball which she would go to with all her heart, but the old lady thinks it improper; therefore she stays

at home, and says she does it sorely against her Will. Ask her whether anybody could have hindered if she had resolved positively upon going. No, says she, but to be sure I would not go when I knew it must have disobliged my aunt: I should have been a great fool if I had. You see here by saying I would not go, she looks upon the staying at home as an act of her Will, and thus the Will appears to act against itself; which were impossible if Will stood for the same thing in both sentences. This leads us to another sense of the word wherein it signifies a dictate of prudence, a judgment or decision of the understanding, whose office it is, not that of the Will, to discern the expedience and propriety of measures proposed for our conduct. But because our judgment many times influences our actions, and perhaps we flatter ourselves it does so always, therefore we denominate it our Will, by a like mistake of the cause for the power working the effect.

Do not we frequently join will and pleasure together as synonymous terms? Now not to insist that pleasure is no action but a feeling of the mind, we use this expression upon occasions wherein it cannot relate to our active power. It is his Majesty's will and pleasure that the parliament should assemble: what has this to do with the faculty of the King? the members must come by their own activity; they derive no motion, nor power of motion from the crown. Oh! but the King must do some act whereby to signify his pleasure, or they will not know what to do in obedience thereto. Who doubts it? But when we speak of will and pleasure we do not understand the act of declaring, nor any power exerted to perform it, but the thing so declared; and what is that but the royal judgment that such assembling will be for his service.

When we are called upon to curb, to restrain, to deny our Wills, what are we to understand by these exhortations? or how shall we go about to practise them? Why by resolving strongly not to let our Will have its bent. But is it in our power to resolve? Yes, you may pluck up a resolution if you will take pains. This Will then whereby we form the resolution must be different from that we control: which carries an appearance of two Wills, one counteracting the other. Hence Man has been often represented as containing two persons within him: the old man and the new, the flesh and the spirit, reason and passion, the intellectual and sensitive soul, Plato's charioteer and pair of horses; each having a Will of its own, perpetually thwarting, contending, and struggling with each other, sometimes one getting the direction of our actions and sometimes the other. Nevertheless when we reflect that these actions are all of our own performance, we are at a nonplus to determine which of these Wills is our own, and which of these persons ourselves.

15. To get rid of the ambiguity clinging to vulgar terms, the words Volition and Velleity have been coined, and applied, one to that Will which gets the mastery, and the other to that controlled thereby. Thus the young lady who excused herself from the invitation had a velleity to go, but a volition to stay away. But velleity can scarce be called a power, for a power which never operates is no power at all: Velleity gives birth to none of our motions, it may strive and struggle a little, but volition always carries the day. Our actions constantly follow our volition, such as that is such are they, and what action of those in our power we shall perform depends solely thereupon. Yet neither can we deem volition the same as power, since the one may be where the other is not: a man who sits still may have the power to walk, but he has not the volition, and that

is the only reason why he does not walk. Again, our powers, as Mr. Locke has shown, are indifferent to every action within their compass: but a perfect indifference is no volition, it produces nothing but a total indolence nor does volition come until the mind exerts itself upon something. Therefore volition is not so much a power as the turn or direction of our power upon particular occasions: just as the turn of the wind is not a power, but only the direction the wind takes at any time. Yet the clouds constantly follow the turn of the wind, such as that is such are their courses, and it depends solely thereupon to determine whether they shall travel to the east or to the west, to the north or to the south: nevertheless, nobody can think the turn of the wind is the force or power by which the wind carries the clouds along.

16. Nor does there want room to believe that the double sense of the word understanding has given rise to many disputes, Whether the Will always follows the last act of the understanding or no. For observing that we are generally prompted to action by something we discern pleasant or expedient, and being taught to look upon every discernment as an exertion of the understanding faculty, we conceive our motions governed by our understanding. Then again finding that common usage, the standard of language, has appropriated understanding to knowledge, judgment, reason, the result of thought or experience from which we too frequently and notoriously swerve in our conduct, we bewilder ourselves in mazes without ever coming to an issue. And when we canvass the point with one another, whichever side of the question we take, it will be easy for an antagonist to produce expressions from authors or persons of undoubted credit proving the contrary. Nor shall we be able to satisfy our opponent or ourselves, because we cannot settle what is properly an act of the understanding, and whether it be the same with an act of the faculty.

Mr. Locke complains of the faculties being spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents: not that I suppose any body ever seriously believed them such, but by talking frequently of the understanding, discerning, judging, representing things to the mind or determining the Will, and of the Will obeying or disobeying the understanding, or directing our active powers, we slide insensibly into an imagination or temporary persuasion of their being agents, and proceed in our reasonings upon that supposition, which must necessarily many times mislead and confound us. But neither he nor I can descry any other agent in the mind besides the mind itself: nor can I distinguish any more than two steps in the action of the mind, the discerning what is to be done, and the doing it; or any more than three substances concerned in the whole process, the object, the mind, and the subject whereon it operates. Thus when upon seeing an orange tossed at your head, you instantly hold up your hand to save your face: the orange is the object, the mind is the discerner and sole actor upon your hand, which is the subject. Or more accurately, the further end of the optic nerve, or that other substance, if any such there be, whereof the idea of the orange is the modification, we call the object; and that inner end of some nerve or other nearer substance employed by the mind in moving the arm, is the subject.

17. Perhaps I may be thought too nice in the last part of this explanation, but there are folks who push their refinements a bar's length beyond me, and draw out the process of action much farther than I can pretend to. For besides our active power, they in their great bounty give us an elective power too, without which the former cannot wag a finger; and

according to their way of discoursing, the matter seems to stand thus. Understanding and passion, like two council, plead their causes on opposite sides, while the Will, an arbitrary monarch, sits umpire between them, and by virtue of its prerogative or elective power gives the preference to either as it pleases, without regard to the weight of their arguments, or creates a new preference not suggested by either: this being done, the bill goes to the understanding, which discerning the preference so given, pronounces it good, and adds the sanction of its judgment thereto: then it returns back to the volition where it receives the royal assent, and is from thence transmitted to the active powers as officers of government in order to be carried into immediate execution.

Wherefore in hopes of escaping all these perplexities, I shall crave leave to call the faculties by other names, to wit, the active power, or simply power, activity or energy of the mind, and the passive power, perceptivity or discernment: for I think these cannot be mistaken for agents having powers of their own, nor for instruments distinct from the mind, and employed by it in the performance of its works. Nevertheless, as one is never more easily understood than when using the language current in vogue, I shall not totally discard the old terms Understanding, Will, and Volition, nor scruple applying them to the faculties as often as I can do it safely, and when the occasion introducing or context accompanying them shall ascertain their meaning beyond all dangers of misapprehension.

CHAP. II.

ACTION.

I HAVE heard of a formal old gentleman who, finding his horse uneasy under the saddle, alighted and called to his servant in the following manner. Tom, take off the saddle which is upon my bay horse and lay it upon the ground, then take the saddle from thy grey horse, and put it upon my bay horse, lastly, put the other saddle upon thy grey horse. The fellow gaped all this while at this long peachment, and at last cried out, Lack a-day, Sir, could not you have said at once, Change the saddles? We see here how many actions are comprised under those three little words, Change the saddles, and yet the master, for all his exactness, did not particularize the tenth part of them; lifting up the flap of the saddle, pulling the strap, raising the tongue, drawing out the buckle, taking up the saddle, pulling it towards him, stooping to lay it down, lifting up his body again, and so forth. But had he stayed to enumerate all the steps his man must take in executing his orders, they would not have got home by dinner time. Therefore expedience recommends compendious forms of speech for common use, and puts us often upon expressing a long course of action by a single word, else we could make no dispatch in our discourses with one another: for were we to describe all the motions we make in any business transacted, we must spend more time in the narrative than we did in the performance.

But our horseman, though by far too minute and circumstantial for the fine gentleman, was not enough so for the philosopher. Whoever would penetrate into the nature of things, must not take them in the lump, but examine their several parts and operations separately. The anatomist,

when he would teach you the structure of the human body, does not content himself with telling you it has head, limbs, body, and bowels, for this you knew before and was knowledge enough for common occasions: he lays open the muscles, injects the veins, traces the nerves, examines the glands, their strainers, vessels, and tunicles. And the naturalist goes further, he describes the little bladders whereof every fibre consists, their communication with one another, the nitro-aerious fluid pervading them, distending their coats, thereby shortening the string and producing muscular motion.

Thus to become intimately acquainted with our mind we must, as I may say, dissect it, that is, analyze action into its first constituent parts. The action of the Drama or Epopee, the critics say must be one and entire, or the performance will prove defective. To that of a play they allow the compass of a natural day; that of the Iliad takes in, I think, twenty-nine days, and that of the Æneid six years. We may look upon actions of this enormous bulk till we are tired without learning anything from thence concerning the structure of the mind: let us therefore consider what is truly and properly a single action, and try how far that will help us in our researches.

2. A single action I take to be so much as we can perform at once, for the present moment only lies in our power nor does our activity reach any farther. What our future actions shall be, depends upon our future volitions; we may determine and resolve long beforehand, but it is well known our resolutions frequently change, and when the time of execution comes, we shall do what is then in our minds, not what we had there before, if the two happen to differ.

I will not pretend to calculate how many actions we may perform in any given space of time, as some have computed how many particles of air would lie in an inch: but certainly the motions of our mind are extremely quick. When upon finding yourself thirsty in a sultry day you snatch up a cup of liquor, if after you have gotten it half way up, you espy a wasp floating on the surface, you thrust it instantly from you; which shows that one volition is not sufficient to lift your hand to your mouth, for you see the mind may take a contrary turn in that little interval. How nimble are the motions of the fencer and the tennis player! the hand perpetually follows the eye and moves as fast as the objects can strike upon that; but between every impulse of the object and every motion of the hand, an entire perception and volition must intervene. How readily do our words occur to us in discourse, and as readily find utterance at the tongue the moment they present themselves! The tongue does not move mechanically like a clock, which once wound up will go for a month, but receives every motion and forms every modulation of voice by particular direction from the mind. Objects and ideas rise continually in view; they pass without ceasing before us, vary, appear and vanish; for what is so quick as thought? Yet volition keeps pace with perception and sometimes perhaps out-strips it: for in speaking the word Mind the whole idea seems to present in one perception, but there must be four several volitions to guide the tongue successively in pronouncing the four different letters. Not that volition runs more ground than perception, but follows close with unequal steps, like young Julus after his father: for when you read you see the whole word together, and consequently the D before you pronounce the M.

3. In very nice works we lie under a necessity of spinning very fine, but though we are obliged sometimes to split the hair we need not quarter it. Therefore I shall call one action so much as passes between each perception and the next, although this action produce several contemporary mo-

tions. And anybody may see with half an eye that our larger actions, such as we speak of in common conversation, consist of those under actions : for as days, months, years, and all measurable portions of time are made up of moments, so all our performances and transactions are made up of momentary acts. A walk consists of steps, a game at chess of moves, a description of particulars, a narration of circumstances, and discourse in general, whether serious or trifling, labored or careless, of words and syllables, each whereof must have its distinct volition to give it effect.

Nor does there need much penetration to observe how sociably the two faculties lead one another, as I may say hand in hand, not only in entering upon our works but through all the steps necessary to complete them. If you would walk to any place, it is not enough to use your understanding before you set out in choosing the nearest or most commodious way, but you must use your eyes all along to conduct your steps : for should you shut them a moment, you might chance to run against a post, or tread beside the path. If you are to discourse on any subject, when you have chosen your matter and settled your form, the business is not all done ; you must consult your judgment from time to time during the delivery for proper expressions and proper tones of voice. Even your perpetual gabblers, who let their tongues run before their wits, cannot proceed with one faculty alone, for though they talk without thinking, they do not talk without perceiving : their ideas draw through their imagination in a string, though it proves indeed only a rope of sand without pertinence and without coherence.

4. But these single acts, though confined to a moment of time, may contain several coexistent parts. For we make many motions together by one and the same exertion of our activity ; we may reach out our hands, step with our feet, look with our eyes, speak and think at once. And the like may be said of perception, for we can see, hear, feel, discern, remember, all at the same instant. I know not whether I may have occasion hereafter to consider the parts of action, but for the present I stick to my definition before laid down, terming the whole scene of ideas presented together to our view one perception, and the whole exertion of our activity, upon how many subjects soever operating, one volition, which though without duration may have a large scope : just as your mathematical surfaces which, though void of thickness, may extend to a very spacious circumference.

The not observing the shortness of action, has given occasion I believe to the notion mentioned at the end of the last chapter concerning distinct agents and various powers in the mind : for by help of this clue we may unravel the mystery, and discover that what was esteemed the act of several agents, was indeed successive acts of the mind exerting her two faculties at different times. When several ideas present themselves together, the mind cannot always judge immediately between them, for their colours change for a while, fading and glowing alternately, or the scales of judgment and inclination rise and fall by turns; the mind being sensible of this, sees nothing better than to hold them in her attention until the colours settle or the balance fixes ; as soon as that happens she perceives which of them is the stronger, and this some people fancy done by an elective power, wherewith the Will gives a preference of its own, because the preference follows in consequence of a voluntary attention. Or perhaps a new colour sparkles out unperceived before, or a new weight falls into the scale : and this they call creating a preference. When the prefer-

ence becomes visible, the mind instantly discerns it, and pronounces the object good whereon it alights; and having now no further use for contemplation, she looks out for proper measures of execution, which as soon as they occur she puts immediately in practice.

5. Nor will it be useless to take notice that in common speech we confine action to outward motions and exercises of our bodily powers: as when we distinguish between an active and a sedentary life, between seasons of action and seasons of deliberation: which expressions look as if we thought ourselves totally inactive in the latter, and so indeed we naturally may at first sight because we can show no effects of our activity, But every volition produces some effect, although not always discernible; and every production of our own, be it of a fleeting thought or a permanent work, springs from our volition. If a man retires from business into his closet, we cannot necessarily conclude he does nothing there; for whatever indolent posture he may throw his body into, his mind may find constant employment all the while. Now the mind has only one active power to serve her upon all occasions; therefore acting and thinking are the same with respect to the power enabling us to go through them; they differ only in the subjects operated upon. When the mind withdraws from the world, she may roam about her own habitation; when she ceases to act upon the limbs, she may nevertheless act upon herself, that is, raise ideas to pass in review before her.

6. There is another division of action I find made by Mr. Locke into action properly so called, and forbearance, which latter he seems to think requires the interposition of the Will as much as the former: thus if a man asks his friend to take a walk, it is equally an exertion of his Will whether he refuses or accepts the offer. But I cannot readily understand how a mere forbearance to act is any exercise of our active power at all: it seems to me rather a discernment of the other faculty that we do not like the thing proposed, which discernment or dislike we have seen before is frequently taken for our Will. What we call a forbearance I apprehend to be generally a choice of some other action. We will not walk because we had rather ride, or talk, or think, or do something else: we forbear to act because we would consider first what is proper to be done; or we forbear to deliberate any longer because the time of action is at hand. When we make several motions together, we may forbear one and continue the rest, for while walking and discoursing with a companion we may point at some distant object, which after he has seen we may let our hand fall to our side: but this I do not look upon as any volition of ours, it is rather a ceasing of volition with respect to the arm, which falls down by its gravity, not by our power, and would do the same were we at that instant utterly to lose our active faculty. Nevertheless it must be owned that forbearance is sometimes the sole point we set our minds upon and take pains to effect. When Rich sits as an equestrian statue in one of his pantomimes, we take him for the very marble he represents, for he moves neither head nor body nor limbs, he wags neither eye nor finger, but continues wholly inactive; what he thinks of all the while, whether of the audience or profits of the house, neither you nor I can tell, but if any such thoughts rove in his fancy their rovings are accidental, his mind being intent on nothing else but forbearance from all manner of motion. We cannot deny this attention to be an effort of the mind, but then it is not a forbearance, it is an actual watching of the ideas as they rise, and excluding such as would prompt him to motion. Perhaps his face itches, or the

stirrup presses against his ancle, and he wants to relieve himself, but checks those desires as fast as they start up, and if by this care he can avoid every volition to move, his purpose is answered without anything further to be done. For our limbs do not move of themselves, nor unless we will to move them: therefore that they remain motionless is not owing to volition, but to the absence of volition.

Should we think the limbs do not move because we will Not to move them, this would be sliding back into the vulgar sense of the word Will, wherein it stands for inclination or judgment: for a Will not to move is an act of the other faculty, being no more than a dislike to motion, or a discernment of its impropriety, which produces no volition nor exertion of our activity at all upon the object so discerned.

7. Some immovable postures we keep ourselves in by a continual effort of the mind. If our statue holds up a truncheon in the right hand, he must keep his arm in that position by his own strength: but this cannot, in any light, be deemed a forbearance, for if he forbears to exert himself but for a moment, the arm will fall downwards by its own weight.

If there is any such thing as a total forbearance of action, I conceive it must be in reverie after a fatigue, or when we lie down in order to sleep. Ideas run to and fro in our fancy uncalled, without attention, without preference or rejection of anything occurring, and the mind seems to remain entirely passive. But since whatever passes does not proceed from volition, where shall we find marks of any volition at all? Were we to suppose the mind utterly divested of her active power just at her entrance upon the scene, I do not see how anything could fall out otherwise than it does.

8. But we very rarely find a necessity of considering action so minutely as to distinguish the restraining those workings of imagination, which would excite us inadvertently to motions we choose to avoid, from the forbearance consequent thereupon: and since forbearance often requires a stronger effort of the mind than action itself, for it will cost us more pains to forbear cutting faces, swearing, or any other foolish habit we have got than to practise them, therefore I shall not scruple to ascribe forbearance to volition, for so it may be remotely though not directly; and after the example of Mr. Locke, to include that together with any actual exercise of our powers under the general name of action.

9. One remark more shall conclude the chapter. In speaking of action, besides the several co-existent motions and several successive volitions before-mentioned, we ordinarily comprehend several operations of other agents acting in a series towards completing the purpose we had in view, provided we conceive them necessarily consequent upon our volition. Thus when Roger shot the hawk hovering over his master's dove-house, he only pulled the trigger, the action of the spring drove down the flint, the action of the flint struck fire into the pan, the action of the fire set the powder in a blaze, that of the powder forced out the shot, that of the shot wounded the bird, and that of gravity brought her to the ground. But all this we ascribe to Roger, for we say he brought down the felon; and if we think the shot a nice one, applaud him for having done a clever feat. So likewise we claim the actions of other persons for our own, whenever we expect they will certainly follow as we shall direct. When Squire Peremptory distrained his tenant for rent, perhaps he did no more than write his orders in a letter, this his servant carried to the post, the postman conveyed it into the country, where it was delivered to the steward, who sent

his clerk to make the distress. Yet we ascribe the whole to the Squire's own doing, for we say he distrained his tenant, and call it a prudent or a cruel act, according as we think of the circumstances of the case.

Hence the law maxim, he that does a thing by another, does it himself; which though valid in Westminster-hall will not hold good in the school of metaphysics, for there we shall find nothing an act of the mind that is not the immediate product of her volition. But for the uses of prudence and morality we must recur back again to the common language, because we cannot judge of the merits of men's doings without taking the consequences into our idea of the action. Pulling a trigger, or drawing characters upon paper, are neither good nor bad, right nor wrong, considered in themselves: but as the trigger so pulled shall occasion the slaughter of a man, or of some vermin, or only a bounce in the air; as the characters so drawn shall tend to the necessary security of our property, or to bring a hardship upon our neighbour, or shall carry no meaning at all, we pronounce the action prudent or idle, moral or wicked.

CHAP. III.

CAUSES OF ACTION.

Philosophers of old have observed several causes necessary to concur in producing an effect; and have distributed them into several classes, which they have distinguished by epithets of their own invention. Whoever will look into Seneca, may find the causes of Plato, of Aristotle, and some others, amounting I think to eight or ten classes a-piece. But since those sages have given us different lists, I presume the matter of distribution to be arbitrary, being left to every one's discretion to rank his causes under such classes as he shall judge most convenient to himself in marshalling his thoughts.

I shall not set myself to study for a complete list of the causes contributing to human action, but shall name only such as occur at present; which are the material, the formal, the ideal, the final, the instrumental, and the efficient. Thus when you sit down to an entertainment, the victuals are the material causes of your eating, for you could not eat if there were none; their wholesomeness and palatableness the formal, for if they were raw or corrupted, or in any unsuitable form, you would not eat them; your sight of them and knowledge of their qualities the ideal, for without them you would not know how to proceed in eating; the gratification of your appetite the final, for if you had not this end in view you would scarce think it worth while to eat; your knife and fork the instrumental, for without them you could not cut your meat; and the mind or body the efficient, for by them you perform the action of eating. I say mind or body disjunctively, with reference to the different lights in which you may regard them: for if you consider the eating as an act of the mind, then is the mind the sole efficient, and the hands and mouth only instrumental causes; but if as an act of the man, then the whole compound, mind and body together, is the efficient cause.

I do not intend a dissertation upon all these causes severally in their order: some I may dwell more largely upon, others perhaps I may scarce ever mention again, nor do I give the above as a complete list to which no

new articles could be added. For my aim is not mere curiosity or theory, how much soever I may seem to deal that way; I have something useful in my eye, though it lies at a distance, and I must travel many a weary step before I can arrive at it.

But as I would not run on of my own head without regard to the sentiments of anybody else, I must observe that there are persons who deny the mind to be an efficient cause at all, and they being men of learning, probity, and reputation, it would not be civil to pass by them without exchanging a word or two.

2. Dr. Hartley gives us a very different account of sensation and muscular motion from all we ever learned before from our masters and tutors. We used to hear that the muscles and organs were so many bundles of nerves and fibres, which were little hollow pipes containing a very fine liquor called animal spirits; that these spirits were the carriers serving us in our traffic upon all occasions, perpetually hurrying to and fro, some carrying sensation from external objects to the mind, and others bringing back motion from thence to the limbs. But he tells us the nerves are solid capilaments, having neither hollowness nor liquor within them, but surrounded on all sides with ether, which is a subtile fluid, extremely moveable and elastic, intimately pervading all bodies whatever, even the most compact and solid. That the nerves lie constantly upon the stretch like the strings of a harpsicord, and like them quiver and vibrate upon the slightest touch received at either end, which vibrating causes similar vibrations in the circumambient ether. That those vibrations of ether, which he calls sensory vibratiuncles, excite perceptions in the mind, and at the same time agitate the ether standing round the muscular fibres, which agitation, termed by him motory vibratiuncles, causes those fibres to vibrate and propagate their motion along one another quite to the fingers' ends. That the sensory vibratiuncles, like waves raised in a pond upon throwing in a stone, extend to distant parts out of view, and being reverberated by the banks, recoil again at other times, or mixing together form new vibratiuncles, thereby furnishing us with ideas of reflection.

Thus the mind remains totally inactive, reduced to one faculty alone, for the Will, which he terms expressly a certain state of the vibratiuncles, belongs to the ether, not to her: she sits a spectator only, and not an agent of all we perform; she may indeed discern what is doing, but has no share in what is done: like the fly upon the chariot wheel, she fancies herself raising a cloud of dust, but contributes nothing towards increasing it: she may lay mighty schemes, and rejoice in the execution, but in reality does nothing herself; she can neither move the limbs nor call ideas to her reflexion, the whole being brought to pass by the action of vibratiuncles upon one another. The mind in this case resembles a man who thrusts his hand among the works of a clock; he may feel the movements, and, by long practice, may acquire a skill in distinguishing the hours, and knowing when the clock will strike; if he perceives the hour of dinner approach, this may set his mouth a watering, and raise an appetite of hunger, which he thinks influences his Will to strike, and thereby gives notice to the cook that it is time to take up dinner.

3. On the other hand, the late Bishop of Clogher goes into a contrary extreme, for he allows us neither ether, nor nerves, nor organs, nor limbs, nor external substances, nor space, nor distance. He does not deny we have perceptions of all these matters, but says, we have no communion with the things themselves, nor can penetrate into them, and therefore can

know nothing of their existence, our knowledge consisting wholly of perceptions existent only in the mind: and since we find some perceptions totally dissimilar from anything in the objects exciting them, as colour, sound, pain, and pleasure, how can we assure ourselves the rest are not so likewise, such as magnitude, solidity, figure, situation and motion? Therefore, for aught we can tell, our perceptions may arise from other guised objects than these whereto we attribute them, or perhaps may all flow continually from one and the same source: and because they possibly may, he concludes, by an inference common among persons of lively imagination, that they certainly do. Thus the life of man turns out a mere vision and delusion. We dream of taking long journies, traversing countries, encompassing the globe, but really never stir a foot from home: we please ourselves with the thought of traversing among an infinite variety of objects, whereas in good truth we sit in perpetual solitude, having nothing but ourselves to converse with. For Hampstead Hill you stand upon, Harrow, London, Blackheath, Banstead Down, you see from thence, are not those enormous piles and masses lying miles asunder from each other, as you suppose, but only perceptions huddled together into a mathematical point in your mind; nor with your utmost stretch can you carry your eye an inch beyond yourself.

But here occurs an objection from the regularity of perceptions arising upon the application of proper objects to excite them, which seldom frustrate our expectation. When my fingers are cold, upon holding them to the fire I shall find them grow warm: if then I have neither fingers nor fire, how comes it that I feel a real warmth from an imaginary fire? If I have neither mouth nor meat, how comes it that I taste the savour of visionary roast beef? Oh! says the right reverend, our perceptions are thrown upon us by an invisible intelligent agent, who supplies them in such regular order that they may seem to come in a chain of causes and effects. If you have a perception of cold in your fingers, and of a fire in the room, this is followed by a perception of approaching them to the fire, which again is followed by a perception of warmth. And this succession of perceptions often extends to different persons, in order to keep up our intercourse with one another. If you chance to perceive yourself thirsty, there succeeds a perception of ringing the bell, this is succeeded by a perception in your servant of hearing his master ring, and running up-stairs to receive his orders, next in succession comes your fancy of seeing him stand in the room, upon which, though you have neither tongue nor voice, you fancy yourself bidding him bring you some beer, then he instantly fancies he runs down and fetches up the mug, and lastly, your fancy of quenching your thirst closes the whole imaginary scene.

4. Thus these two gentlemen represent the mind as an idle insignificant thing, never acting at all, but always gaping and staring at what passes. Both equally divest her of all employment whatsoever, though in different ways: one by finding other hands to complete all her business for her, and so leaving her no work to do: and the other by sweeping away her whole stock of materials, and so leaving her nothing to work upon.

But though they seem to stand directly in my way, I have so little spirit of opposition that I shall not endeavour to push them down if I can anyhow slip by them. Wherefore to avoid dispute, I shall put myself upon the country, leaving the matter in issue to a fair trial by my neighbours, upon a full and fair examination of such evidence as their own experience

shall offer. And as I find the opinions above cited have not made many converts among mankind, I need not be in much pain for the verdict.

In the mean while I shall venture to proceed upon these Postulata: That the bodies we daily see and handle, actually exist in as great variety of magnitudes, forms, and situations, as we commonly suppose, and our operations upon them are of our own performance: that Westminster-hall is bigger than a nutshell, and the moon somewhat higher than the weather-cock: that the clothes I wear are not the same thing with the glass window I look at; that I hold a real pen, and have a real paper before me, that my hand would not write unless I moved it, that the thoughts I write down are the products of my own labour and study, and that the ideas floating in my brain would produce neither meditation nor outward action, if I forbore to exert myself. All who are willing to grant me thus much, may listen as long as they find me to their liking; the rest may turn their heads aside as from one who builds without a foundation.

5. Yet upon second thoughts I wish these latter would cast a glance or two more upon me, as they might possibly find something turning to their account. For who knows what effect the characters I draw upon paper may produce upon the ether within them? The rays of light reflected from thence, striking upon their eyes, may possibly excite sensory vibratiuncles affecting their minds with some little degree of pleasure; or rolling round their better shaped understanding, may recoil again in more improved forms, exhibiting useful measures of conduct, and at the same time raising motory vibratiuncles proper for carrying the same into practice. Or on the other system, who knows what a train of imaginations my perception of scribbling may drag after it? When we reflect how ready the mechanical members of our literary commonwealth are to entertain ideas of presenting everything they can get to the public, it will not appear unlikely that some printer may fancy himself printing off the fancies I seem to write down, and then some bookseller may fancy himself spreading open a book in his shop window; the next in succession may be some idle passenger, who, having little else to do, may fancy himself perusing the pages; this perchance may introduce a perception of something amusing, or by great good luck of some useful observation, which may possibly draw after it a perception of benefit received in the practice.

If I can light upon any little hint which may do real service to somebody or other, I care not through what channels it is conveyed: whether by the ordinary methods of persuasion, illustration and argumentation, as commonly apprehended, or by agitating the sensorial and motorial ether, or by beginning a succession of perceptions. I trouble not my head for the means, so they prove effectual to the purpose intended.

Having thus slid through the crowd without jostling anybody, which pleases me better than if I had overthrown half a dozen opponents; and gotten behind them into my former track, with an open road before me, I shall even jog on soberly and quietly in quest of whatever I can find deserving notice.

6. But notwithstanding that we have assumed the mind an efficient cause, we must acknowledge she has not strength enough to do our business alone without some foreign help. Not that I pretend to limit the mind's internal efficacy, or to determine exactly how great or how small it may be. for aught I know she may have force sufficient to remove mountains, could he apply her force immediately to the whole width of their

bases; but this is not her case with respect to the limbs employed in our service. The old notion of the mind's existing like the estate of a coparcener in law jargon per my and per tout, or being all in every part throughout the whole human frame, has been long since exploded: we now rest convinced that the mind does not act herself upon the limbs, but draws them to and fro by tendons, muscles, nerves, and fibres; which latter our anatomists have traced to the brain, where they find them grow smaller and smaller, till at last they quite lose them through their extreme minuteness: and though we cannot thoroughly agree where she resides, yet wherever her place of residence be, she keeps constantly there in kingly state, never making wanton excursions to the toes or fingers, but exercising her executive power upon them by the ministry of those imperceptible fibres.

Now there needs not much argument to show, that if you are to act upon bodies at a distance by some string or other medium, you cannot exert more strength upon them than your medium will bear: consequently the mind, be she as mighty as a giant, can impart no more of her might to the limbs than her fibres are capable of conveying: what could Goliah or Sampson do if you allowed them only a single cobweb to work with? They would not have power to stir a silver thimble; for if they went to push, the string would bend, if to pull, it would break. Yet when one tossed his weaver's beam and the other carried the gates of Gaza, they performed their prodigious feats by tender filaments slighter than a cobweb, undiscernible with a microscope.

7. To solve this difficulty, we are put in mind that the human body is a most admirably contrived machine, and by machinery a small power may be made to perform the works of a greater: and we are shown strings of bladders representing the nerves, which upon blowing into them will shorten considerably and draw after them whatever hangs to the end of the string. But let us consider what all your writers upon the mechanical powers agree in, that no machinery whatever can lessen the momentum necessary for performing any work required, which momentum is compounded of the strength of the power and the velocity wherewith it moves: therefore, if you would lessen the power you must increase the velocity in proportion, to make the product of both, when multiplied together, equal. Thus, a man by help of a lever may raise double the weight he could lift by his own strength, but then that end of the lever he holds must move double the space the weight passes through in rising. I have seen a curious engine compounded of wheels, screws, and pulleys, whereby a lady, with a single hair of her head, might raise a stone of two hundred weight: the hair was fastened to a wheel something like the flyer of a jack, and in raising the weight an inch, the wheel turned round as many inches as there would have required hairs to lift up the stone directly without any engine at all.

Let us now reflect on the greatness of our works, for great I may call them compared to those tinder threads we have to work with, as likewise how suddenly we often perform them, and we shall scarce find time to make up for the deficiency of our strength by an increase of our velocity. I remember when I attended a course of experiments at the university, we were told a man's greatest strength lay in the muscles of his hams, and in order to try their force, an iron ring was screwed into the floor having a pretty strong cord tied to it; this one of the company wound round his waist, then standing just over the ring and raising up his body, broke the cord asunder by main strength. At the same time our professor told us

that if a machine were contrived to move by weights, and act with the force exerted by all the muscles of a man of ordinary size when he jumps from the ground, it would require a weight of I think thirty thousand pounds. Now suppose a person sees a huge stone rolling directly towards him, which he did not observe till it was just ready to strike him, how nimbly will he jump out of the way! But if the mind performed this leap by an inflation of bladders with her nitro-aerious breath, she must either give so strong a puff as would burst their flimsy coats into atoms like an explosion of gunpowder, or if she breathed in such gentle manner as not to hurt them, she would want time for the length of her puff: for the current of her breath must run at least the space of a mile to throw up the whole body an inch, which cannot be conceived possible in so little an instant of time as between the discernment of the danger and springing up of the feet from the ground.

8. Wherefore it seems more than probable the mind has always some good friend at hand ready to assist her weakness, and the main of that strength she exerts upon the limbs comes from some other quarter than her own store-house. Whether this help flows from the animal spirits, ether, or that unknown pressure causing gravitation and cohesion, or what else you please, it is no matter; but that there is another force within us besides our own, capable of acting upon the muscles, we may be convinced by convulsive motions, wherein the mind has no concern, nor volition any share, yet they sometimes imitate, and generally exceed the vigour of our voluntary actions. Perhaps there lies a mighty weight of some subtile fluid thrown from our animal circulation, and bearing constantly against the orifices of our nerves, but prevented from entering by certain little sliding valves kindly provided by nature for our use: the mind then has nothing more to do than draw aside the valves, and in rushes the torrent. The mind in this case works like the miller of an overshot mill—he has shoots lying over every one of his wheels, stopped by flash-boards at their upper ends, against which the water lies bearing always ready to drive the wheels whenever it can find a passage: so the miller, by drawing a little board, which any child might pull up with a finger, turns the stream upon this wheel or that as he pleases, and twirls round a massive stone which he could not stir with both his arms. But as comparisons seldom go on all four, the mill and the human machine differ in one respect: the miller, when he takes up his flashes, lays them it may be on the bank, goes whistling into his mill, and thinks no more till his grist is ground, for the water will work on for ever unless he shuts it out again: but the valves used by the mind fall back again of themselves when the mind withdraws her activity. Therefore, if you would point with your hand at some object for any time, you must continue to exert yourself all the while: for the moment the mind forbears her volition, the valves close, the stream ceases to flow upon the brachial muscles, and the arm, no longer supported, falls to your side. Then again the likeness returns upon disorders in each: for should an eel wriggle under any of the flash-boards, this might give the water a passage without any act of the miller: or should some flood buoy them quite out of their places, and pour down a larger stream than usual, the wheels might turn with more violence than the miller could throw upon them at other times. So some foulness of our juices may work under the valves, keeping them open whether we will or no: or the boiling of a fever may stretch them beyond their natural width, and produce convulsions stronger than anything the mind can effect by her volition.

Nevertheless, as we ascribe the grinding of our corn to an act of the

miller, because he sets the mill at work when and in what manner he pleases; we may with equal justice ascribe our actions to the performance of the mind, because it depends entirely upon her of what kind they shall be. If we consider them as acts of the mind, they extend no further than to drawing back the valves, whereof she remains the sole efficient cause: if as acts of the man, we may still deem her an efficient cause, because the other powers co-operating stand always ready in waiting for her direction, and whatever happens afterwards follows necessarily in the nerves, muscles, or limbs, in consequence of the motion by her first begun.

CHAP. IV.

IDEAL CAUSES.

Under the class of ideal causes I comprehend all those notices of our senses and judgments of our understanding, which direct us from time to time in every step of our proceedings: which is giving a larger compass than I believe Plato allowed them, for he understood by an ideal cause only that plan or design of any work laid in our own thought before we go about it. Thus when a painter draws a picture, whether from some original or by his own fancy, he takes his idea either from the original standing before him or from some archetype of his own invention. But besides this archetype, I conceive other ideal causes necessary to finish the picture: our painter must have an idea of his canvass, his pallet, his brushes, his colours, he must know where they lie, what they will do, and how to handle them; and must receive fresh information continually from his eyes, his hands, and his reflection, or he will make but bungling work. Nor is this archetype wanting except only for works of design and contrivance: whether Plato received an ideal cause for all our common actions I know not, but this nobody will deny me, that we cannot proceed in the least of them without repeated directions from our senses or reflection. We can neither walk, nor write, nor cut our victuals, without using our eyes, our feeling, and applying some little degree of attention. Whatever we go about, we must have some notion of the thing we mean to do, and of the means or motions proper to perform it.

2. Yet if we consider carefully how small a part of our actions is properly our own, there will appear something very mysterious and unaccountable in them: for we shall find that, strictly speaking, we have no idea of any one thing we do, nor of the manner how we do it. I have shown in my last chapter that we do not move our limbs ourselves, and have supposed certain valves which open to let in the stream that moves them: I do not warrant this for a right account of the matter, having given it for want of a better, and until a better shall be given I may find excuse for continuing to use this. In a former place, upon the subject of voluntary reflection, I have supposed certain channels, by stopping some of which, we can turn the current of our imagination into any course we like best: perhaps nature may have furnished us with valves too here, to serve us for stoppers. How little share then of our mightiest performances can we justly claim to ourselves? Our own proper action, the action of our mind, extends no further than to opening the valves, nor perhaps so far neither; for she may have little imperceptible fibres to pull them by. Yet she neither sees nor feels either

valve or fibre, nor has any notion or perception of them; she knows not how many they be, where they lie, nor to what they fasten.

If the master of a large family had his study hung round with bells, one reaching to the dressing-room, another to the nursery, another to the kitchen, another to the stable, and so to each of his offices: when he went to use them, besides his knowledge of the person he would call, he must know the proper bell, in what quarter of the room it hangs; common sense must direct him that he is to stretch out his hand to the handle and pull downwards rather than lift up, and his eye must guide the motion of his hand in taking hold; for were the bells newly put up, and he not instructed in their several uses, or were he left quite in the dark, he might pitch upon the wrong as well as the right, and fetch up the cook when he desired to see my lady, or wanted to speak with the coachman.

In like fashion, the closet of our mind is hung round with multitudes of strings reaching to the eyes, the mouth, the hands, the feet, and every member of our body; we know not their number, their situation, nor the member to which they respectively belong; we know not which lies on the right side or the left, in the ceiling or the floor, before or behind; nor the manner in which we must proceed to work, whether by pushing or pulling, by lifting up or weighing down, by screwing, turning, or driving as with the stroke of a hammer. Yet have we all our limbs perfectly at command, we put them upon services, which they do not fail to execute according to our expectations, and all this without knowing what we do to compass our intentions. We feel a desire of helping ourselves with victuals, and strait our arm stretches out towards the dish; we want to be on the other side the room, and instantly our foot steps forward to convey us. Whence then have we this surprising dexterity in a state of utter darkness? How do we escape perpetually making egregious blunders? How comes it that we never pull the wrong string, since we cannot discern or distinguish them from one another? How comes it that we never kick about with our legs when we would handle with our arms, that we do not toss up our nose instead of turning our eyes, that we do not loll out our tongue when we go to chew our meat? To such questions as these I can give no other answer than by an exclamation. How wonderful are the works of nature! how admirable her contrivance in all parts of this our human machine! exceeding the skill of man to find out, the utmost stretch of our understanding to comprehend!

3. But here, perhaps, Dr. Hartley, if he be not gone out of hearing, may give me a hip, and call out, Prithee, friend, do not think to slip so easily by me; I must stop you with a remark or two upon your last observation. You say the mind draws her valves without any discernment of what she does, therefore their opening is not owing to discernment, since it may be effected without any: but you require an ideal cause for every action of the mind, therefore must not we conclude that this motion of the valves is not an act of the mind but of some corporeal agent which can act by impulse without any idea at all? You admit that those discernments we have are not of the action nor of the instrument primarily employed, but of some remote consequence worked thereby. You have an idea of speaking, but none of the measures you must take to perform it: therefore you have not an adequate ideal cause, because your idea does not take in the valves opening to the muscles of your mouth and tongue, which valves you must nevertheless draw up before you can bring out your words. May not we then presume that discernment is not the cause but concomitant of action, or co-effect of the same cause, given us for our entertainment

rather than use in directing our conduct; and we are led only to esteem it the cause of our motions by seeing it constantly precede them? just as we say the swallows bring us summer because they come always before it; not that they have any hand in lengthening our days, ripening our corn, or producing other effects of summer.

You may remember I have told you of a German of great repute among our brethren of the faculty, who asserts that all our automatic motions, that is, our motions purely mechanical, such as the circulation of the blood and other juices, were originally voluntary: so that the child before birth works out that whole plan of animal economy which is to support and serve him during his state of manhood, by his own industry during his state of gestation. If you will not believe this outlandish man, believe your own senses. Your breath comes and goes of its own accord when you do not think of it; when you do, it seems your own act: for upon the lungs being full you perceive them uneasy, which puts you upon puffing out their contents; upon their becoming empty you feel a want of fresh air, which urges you to draw in a supply. In sound sleep, fainting, or extacy, the lungs continue their play, which you must allow they do mechanically at a time when the mind remains wholly senseless and inactive: while awake and well, your lungs make their strokes at regular and equal intervals if you let them alone, yet you may lengthen, shorten, accelerate, or retard their motions as often as you please to interfere. To read the long periods of Demosthenes or Cicero, you must stretch them far beyond their natural length: to make your stops rightly, to lay your accents or emphasis properly, you must break, increase or abate of their violence, from time to time, as occasion shall require. All this the young school-boy must learn to do with laborious application of mind; but you, who have been long inured to the work, I suppose perform it so easily that, upon having attended closely to the sense of your author for a while, you cannot afterwards resolve with yourself whether it were your own particular volition or some mechanical power that accommodated the length of your breath to the length of your sentences, and the checks, the strength, and softness of that, to your various modulations of voice.

Since then we find our automatic and voluntary actions so similar as that we cannot well distinguish them asunder; since what was once voluntary becomes afterwards automatic, and what we sometimes acknowledge mechanical appears at others an effect of design: may not we fairly conclude them both of the same kind, effected alike by the mutual action of vibratiuncles, and that our discernment is not a direction to us what we shall do, but a foresight only of what will be done? For what needs volition to produce an event that may as well come to pass without it? The region of our active ether extends much wider than the prospect of the mind, so that she sees a part only and not the whole of what passes there: the tides, which lie near enough to excite perception in the fœtus, may remove further off upon the growth of the body; and those which ordinarily roll a little beyond our ken, may be brought within distance by attention. In both cases the vibratiuncles, whether near or remote, hold on their course after the same manner: the only difference is this, in one case we discern them, or as you call it, the ideas they exhibit, in the other we do not. When we see what is doing preparatory to action, we judge it voluntary; when we know nothing of the matter, we account it automatic.

4. Now against this second attack I shall make the same defence as I

did upon the former, namely, by an appeal to my neighbours, desiring them to determine the matter between us: and that they may have some particular case to judge upon, I shall offer them a feigned issue in imitation of those directed out of the court of chancery. Suppose the mind of a man separated from his body without any of those diseases, accidents, or disorders in the latter, which ordinarily bring on our dissolution: let the limbs, the muscles, the fibres, the juices, the ether, if any such there be, remain in the same state as before: how would this body behave after the separation? I in my declaration must aver that though the pulse might continue to beat, the animal secretions be carried on, and the lungs to play, it would do nothing further: its palate in some few hours might come into that state which affects us with hunger; but having no sensation, it would not call for dinner, walk down stairs, sit at table, help itself to victuals, nor converse with the company. The Doctor in his plea, to be consistent with himself, must insist that it would perform all this and everything else one might expect from a reasonable creature: and thus the point is brought to an issue.

Or if the court should think it beneath their dignity to take cognizance of a fictitious case which never actually happens, I shall present them with one that may have fallen under their own observation. Have they never seen a careless nurse sitting by candle-light with a young baby in her arms, gabbling among her gossips, without attention to her charge? The child stretches out its hand to play with the candle, and upon touching the flame instantly snatches it away, crying and squalling as if its little heart would break. Here then was a volition, that is in the Doctor's language, a certain state of the sensory vibratiuncles, proper to agitate such motory as would have continued the motion of the hand until the fingers had grasped the snuff. What then breaks off this motion and turns it to a contrary? is it solely the action of the flame, in putting the tide of vibratiuncles into a new course? or is it the smart felt by the child, which influences it to exert its activity in a different manner? But the discernment of pain belongs confessedly to the mind alone: how different notions soever we may have of colour, magnitude, distance, all who have seriously thought upon the matter unanimously agree to place the sensation of pain in the mind itself, not in any objects, organs, or fluids, contributing to excite it. This then is the question waiting for a determination; and if there should be hands holden up on both sides, I shall demand a division. As many as are of opinion that the soulless body above mentioned would neither eat nor drink nor talk like other folks; or that the child, were it not for the sense of pain, would still go on to play with the candle after its fingers were burnt, come along with me: as many as are of the contrary, turn back again after the Doctor.

For I think we may go each his several way without being solicitous for the success of our cause, as we need not alter our measures according to the verdict. He well knows how strong the tide of vibratiuncles runs which sets the fingers a scribbling, and that it would be labour lost to endeavour at stopping them; and indeed why should he desire to do so unless he sees them running into dangerous currents? Nor can I find reason for pursuing a different plan upon either principle: my design drives at bringing men better acquainted with their mind and that inner part of their constitution wherewith it has immediate intercourse, in hopes they may strike out some light therefrom, which may direct them to the better management of their faculties. If I shall be so happy as to succeed

in any single instance of an addition to their stock of useful knowledge, it is all one whether this improves their judgment and puts them upon thinking or acting for themselves, or whether it agitates their ether into salutary vibratiuncles which shall do their business for them whether they will or no. I shall find my intention equally answered in both cases, and the service I may do will rise to the same amount in the upshot.

5. Upon a review of this whole chapter, without entering into a nice disquisition of what motions are of our own operation and what purely mechanical, we may justly conclude that in all voluntary actions the mind must have a discernment, if not of the very act she performs, yet of some bodily motion or other distant consequence effected thereby: and for the most part we take continual direction from our senses, our judgment, and our experience, shaping the manner of our proceedings according to the notices they afford us: which justifies me in ranking ideas among the causes of action.

But as it is a hard matter to please everybody, many people perhaps will chide me for staying so long to talk with the Doctor. What a pother do you make, say they, about nothing! What a deal of pains to convince us the sun shines at noon-day! Every child sees that we cannot move without the direction of our senses. Common sense and common experience inform us that we never discourse without a notion of conveying our thoughts to one another; that we never do anything without having an idea of something we would be at.

In excuse to this rebuke, I beg leave to observe, that we do not always advert to what we perfectly know, and in reasoning upon abstruse matters often mistake, for want of reflection upon things we are extremely well acquainted with. Therefore they may look upon me, not as unveiling a secret unknown to them before, but as pointing out an observation they cannot fail of making themselves upon such notice; and desiring them to bear in mind as an axiom to be employed upon further occasion, That we have ideal causes of our proceedings, and shape our actions from time to time according to the models by them exhibited. Besides, they may please to remember I told them in my introduction, that my architecture partakes of the military kind: I must provide against attacks as well as for commodious habitation. And by another figure I compared the land of metaphysics to a wilderness abounding in by-paths and intricate mazes: while we travel the plain road of common sense, we shall meet with profound speculatists who will every now and then be drawing some of the company aside into the wood: therefore it behoves us to get acquainted with all the turnings and windings beforehand, that we may know where to look for our lost sheep and how to bring them back again. In the mean while, those who were not inveigled, may sit down upon the turf until they see us come out of the bushes again, and their good nature no doubt will pardon an excursion that was needless to them but necessary for their fellow-travellers. Such necessities may possibly occur more than once: we may be put to prove that snow is white, that we know our own houses, or remember anything happening to us yesterday: and upon these occasions we must take the method we have done already of submitting ourselves to a trial by jury. There is no more received rule in logic than this, Against persons denying principles there is no argumentation: when we have to deal with an adversary of this cast, all pleadings are vain; we must proceed directly to an issue, appealing to common sense and experience for the truth of our principle, after stripping it of all that sophism and equivo-

cation wherewith it has been artfully overclouded, and reducing the question in dispute to a naked fact or single proposition which anybody can judge of and understand.

CHAP. V.

MOTIVES.

Having in my list of causes assigned a particular class to the final, I shall treat of them distinctly, though in reality they are a species of the ideal, as the latter are of our ideas in general. For many ideas pass in review before us which have no share at all in our actions: and many serve us for a guidance in our conduct which yet did not prompt us to pursue it. While we stand talking at a window, passengers may go by without drawing our attention; we see them move along, but do nothing different nor in a different manner from what we should have done had they not appeared; the sight of our companion and our knowledge of language direct us which way to turn our head and how to express ourselves: these ideas perhaps we had before we entered upon our discourse, which we do not begin till another idea arises, probably of entertainment or of giving or receiving some information. When a man walks, he may see bushes growing by the way side, cows grazing in the field, birds flying in the air, without regarding or making any use of the notices they offer: these then are part of his ideas, but not ideal causes, which are the shape of his path and several marks whereby he knows his way; yet neither are these the final cause, but health, exercise, diversion, business, or some other end, he proposes to himself in walking.

This final cause we commonly style the Motive, by a metaphor taken from mechanical engines which cannot play without some spring or other mover to set them at work: and because we find action usually follows upon the suggestion of proper motives, therefore we conceive them moving the mind to exert herself. Thus, by a light figure, we hear her frequently compared to a balance, and the motives to weights hanging in either scale. But if we will apply this comparison to the mind, I think it suits her better in the exercises of her understanding than in her volitions; for it is the judgment poises the motives in its scale to try which of them preponderate, nor does volition ensue until the weight be determined.

Some there are who will not allow the mind to act upon motives at all, or at least assign her a limited power which she exercises sometimes of acting against or without them, or of giving them a weight which does not naturally belong to them; they say, she plays tricks with her balance, like a juggling shopkeeper who slides his little finger slily along one side of the beam, and by pressing upon it, makes twelve ounces of plums draw up a pound of lead. It must be owned, to our shame, that we too frequently practise these scurvy tricks to cheat those who have dealings with us, and what is more fatal, to cheat ourselves into error and mischief: but I hope to make it appear in due time that this is done, not by a free will of indifference overpowering the force of our motives, but by privately slipping in or stealing out the weights in either scale, which we often get a habit of doing so covertly that we are not aware of the fraud ourselves.

2. Now how shall we manage to steer safely between two opposite extremes? The doctors Hartley and Berkeley would not allow the mind an

efficient cause of her own actions: the maintainers of indifference make her not only the efficient cause of her actions but of their causes too, for they will have it that her activity supplies the place of final causes, or gives force to motives.

I shall remark, in the first place, that they distinguish between acting and choosing, to which latter only they ascribe the privilege of indifference. Whether such distinction has any foundation in nature I have already suggested some reasons to question, and may canvass the point more thoroughly hereafter when a proper occasion shall offer. But since they admit we never proceed to action without motives, that our choice sometimes arises from the decision of our judgment without our interposition, and that motives often operate so forcibly we cannot resist them: this is going a great way, and it will be but one little step further to show that acting upon our ideas is acting as well as upon our limbs: which will entitle us to inquire upon the subject of those choices we make in consequence of something done by ourselves, whether some motive does not influence us in everything we do towards bringing on the determination.

In the next place, I would beg leave to ask them, how they become so well acquainted with their own actions beforehand as to lay schemes and plans for their future conduct, and depend upon their adherence thereto? I suppose they do not pretend to the spirit of prophecy, and without that, I do not see how we can know any future event, otherwise than by our knowledge of the causes: for an event, independent on antecedent causes, must remain absolutely contingent until it comes to pass. Yet do they lay claim to commendation for their steadiness in adhering to their plan: the mind then must remain indifferent during the whole time of such adherence, else they would forfeit their claim which they rest solely upon the right exercise of this privilege. For did not the mind retain her freewill of indifference either to keep or to break a resolution already taken, how much soever we might applaud them for resolving, we could owe them no applause for performing.

Then as to their resting the merit of actions solely upon the due use of this freedom of indifference, without which, say they, we shall have no room to praise or blame, to reward or punish: have patience, and perhaps in the sequel of these inquiries we may find other sources of distributive justice besides this privilege. What if we should discover approbation and censure so little inconsistent with the efficacy of motives that they act themselves as such, and become due solely for the influence they are likely to have upon our behaviour?

But as I find the work of improving my own knowledge much more agreeable to my taste than that of battling the opinions of others, I shall leave my antagonists in possession of their indifference for the present, if they still think fit to claim it after all the evidence produced against their title by Mr. Locke; and shall proceed in my consideration of final causes, in hopes thereby to kill two birds with one stone. For while in pursuit of my journey, minding only my own business, I may happen to discover motives for every species of action, and then indifference must quit the field of course, as having nothing to do there. Nor can we take a better method for the recovery of our right than by enclosing the whole contested ground, piece by piece, until there be not a spot left whereon the liberty of indifference may rest its foot.

3. To prevent mistakes, when I speak of the efficacy of motives and of their moving the mind to exert herself, I desire it may be understood the

these are figurative expressions; and I do not mean thereby to deny the efficacy of the mind, or to assert any motion, force, or impulse imparted to her from the motives, as there is to one billiard ball from another upon their striking; but only to observe that motives give occasion to the mind to exert her endeavours in attaining whatever they invite her to, which she does by her own inherent activity, not by any power derived from them. And all mankind understand the matter so, except perhaps some few persons of uncommon sense and superfine understandings. When the poet makes Belinda ask, What mov'd my mind with youthful lords to roam? would he have you believe that vanity, pleasure, desire of conquest, hope of an advantageous match, or any other motive you can assign, made all those motions contained in the idea of roaming? No, surely—it was the lady herself by her own vigour and sprightliness. When she sits down to her toilet, unnumbered treasures ope at once. What opes the treasures? Why the maid, with her hands, not with her desire of tiffing out her mistress in a killing attire. And it is this agency of the mind which denominates an action ours, for whatever proceeds from other efficient causes does not belong to us. Therefore you see, when the maid had sylphs to work for her, he describes the performance, though done by her hands, to them instead of her, And Betty's prais'd for labours not her own.

Nobody will deny that we sometimes act upon motives, that we follow where they lead us, and that we should have acted otherwise had they not presented or had other motives appeared in the opposite scale to outweigh them. How many people flock to hear Handel play upon the organ! they follow him to the Haymarket, to Covent Garden, to the Foundling Hospital; had he not been to perform they never would have stirred from home, but if their doctor had told them that going abroad might prove fatal to their health, they would have forborne. Therefore motives have a natural efficacy to put us upon action, and we need no other spring to move us so long as we have store of them; nor need we fear the want of a continual supply, when we consider how many occasions of life, of amusement, of business, we have to provide for, and how many idle fancies to gratify.

But we run into frequent mistakes concerning the operation of motives, for want of first settling accurately with ourselves what they be. A motive I conceive is the prospect of some end actually in view of the mind at the time of action and urging to attain it: whereas we are apt to take for motives any reasons we can allege in justification of our conduct. If any body should ask why you make your stated meals at breakfast, dinner, and supper, every day, I warrant you would answer, Why, I could not live without eating. But reflect a little with yourself. Do you think of starving every time you run down stairs to dinner? Do not you go because you are hungry, because you like the victuals, because you will not make the family wait, because it is your usual hour? How then can the preservation of life, which is the farthest of anything from your thoughts, be your motive of eating? If you would dissuade a debauchee from his courses, you tell him of the discredit he will bring upon himself from all wise and judicious persons: yet he still goes on as before, and this you call acting against a powerful motive. But is it so in fact with him? Perhaps the approbation of your musty sober fellows weighs nothing in his estimation; he feels no other weight in his scale besides the gratification of appetite: therefore he follows the only motive inclining him to action.

4. But as Hermogenes was a singer even when he did not sing; and the cobbler retains his appellation after he has shut up his stall and sits among

his fellow topers at the two-penny club; so motives still preserve their character with us while they lie dormant in the box and do not operate in the scale. If we know a man has covetousness or ambition, we impute all his actions to that motive; so that a politician cannot take an airing but we suppose him going on some deep design, nor a miser step into his closet but we conclude him counting over his bags. But besides our general motives of conduct, we have many little desires and whimsies which come in every now and then for a share of our motions; and unless we get acquainted with these, we cannot account for a man's behaviour in particular instances.

Few of us I hope are without some prudential motives in store, and those being the most creditable, we would willingly ascribe all our motions to them, not observing what other inducements may slip in unawares to weigh down the scale or so cover it as to leave no admittance for anything else: for inclination and humour so mimic the garb and gestures of reason that we take them for her very self. Sometimes two motives occur together both inciting to the same action, and in this case we cannot rightly tell to which it belongs: because we can judge the efficacy of causes no otherwise than by their effects. This last deceit is greatly promoted by that aptness of inclination to draw reason after her, not as a friend to consult with, but as an advocate to support her cause: for reason, which ought always to keep upon the bench, too often descends to the bar, and then we take her arguments for judgments of court, and applaud ourselves for having paid them a due obedience. When the minister labours to extend the prerogative which he has under his own management, he thinks himself all the while pursuing the public good: when the parson vexes his parishioners with lawsuits, he, good man, would be contented with his present income, but he must not injure his successors: when the young girl chooses her mate for black eyes, white teeth, a frolic air and sprightly prattle, she despises all mercenary views, and pays regard only to solid merit and happiness.

In short, we shall find it extremely difficult with our utmost care and circumspection to know our real motives, as well in general, what stock of them we have, as what weighed with us upon every particular occasion. For we seldom attend to our motive at the instant of its operation, and if we go to recall it afterwards to our reflection, another shall start up in its place. Nor do we know the true weight of our motives before trial. While we hold them in the scale of contemplation they feel exceeding heavy, whereupon we confidently form resolutions of bearing pain, encountering dangers and surmounting difficulties, supposing that our motive fastened thereto, like lead to a bludgeon, will give it a force that shall bear down all opposition; but when the time of action comes, they are found wanting in the balance, and lie lighter than a feather.

There is a vulgar saying, That we measure other folks' corn by our own bushel: therefore we wonder at their proceeding when running in a different channel from our own, because we judge of their sentiments by those we feel ourselves. One is apt to cry, I should have done otherwise had I been in such an one's place, that is, had you had the same materials, abilities, or opportunities as he: but are you sure you should have acted otherwise had you had the same notions, ways of thinking, and motives too, without any mixture of those you now possess? For our desires vary as much as our faces, and what works powerfully upon one, may have no influence at all upon another. If we see a person bringing great damage

upon one who has never offended him, without any inducement either of pleasure or profit to himself, we stand in astonishment that anybody can behave so absurdly without the least motive to urge him; and ascribe his procedure to mere perverseness of will. For we find no motives in our own storehouse that could engage him: resentment, gratification of some appetite or self-interest, may have surprised us sometimes into unwarrantable actions, but we feel no temptation to do mischief for mischief's sake, and therefore can conceive no such in another. But there are tempers with whom mischief itself acts as a powerful motive; some dispositions there are utterly void of humanity, whose place is supplied by a love of injustice and cruelty: even freak and wantonness may do much upon a mind where there is no consideration either of benevolence or prudence to weigh against them.

5. Motives frequently introduce and give life to one another. Your coachman entered into your service for a livelihood; this led him to obey your orders, which directed him to take care of your horses; this put him upon providing hay for them, and that induced him to inquire where the best was to be had. While on his way to the market, he thinks of nothing but the shortest road to get thither; this therefore is the sole motive he has now in view: but if the prior motives had not operated, none of the subsequent would have had any influence upon him.

For the most part we portion our time into large actions tending to some distant end not presently accomplished, which consists of under parts, and admits many bye actions not belonging to the principal. He that travels to York, goes most likely upon some business: he divides his journey into several stages, and while upon each, thinks of nothing but getting well to his inn: this then is his motive for the time. On the road he finds himself weary and alights, or thirsty and stops at the door of some public house, or perhaps he enters into discourse with the passengers in going along, or stands still to look at some magnificent building. All these have separate motives of their own; refreshment, thirst, amusement, or curiosity, which bear no relation to his main design.

While we work, or study, or converse, we often change our posture, turn our eyes, and make many side motions having no connexion with the purpose we are about. But have we not motives for those excrescences of action? We feel ourselves uneasy in one posture, and therefore exchange it for another; we look out for new objects because those before us have cloyed our eyes; we find some trifling amusement in every exercise of our activity. For employment seldom so totally engages us as to fill up all the spaces of our time, but restlessness, whimsy, or habit, come in to supply the vacancies. The busy mind of man cannot lie a moment inactive: she works incessantly with both her faculties while awake, and if her weightier motives suspend their action ever so little, some lighter will slip in to keep her in play: for she has often been compared to an exceeding fine balance, that will turn with the slightest hair when nothing lies in the opposite scale; and she has her drawers stocked with the grains of fancy as well as the pounds of reason.

While one motive urges to action, another may model the shape of it. When a grave divine and powdered fop enter the room together, civility prompts them alike to pay their compliments to the company, but decency leads one to a sober manly deportment, and affectation drives the other into a mincing step, a fantastic air, and an over-delicacy of expression.

The designs that generate our larger actions take time in the forming,

we see them grow by degrees to maturity, and have leisure to contemplate them: but the ideas causing our lesser motions, like lightning, flash, strike, and vanish; they pass so swiftly we cannot get a look at them nor remember their existence. Besides, our weighty motives having the largest influence upon our lives, deserve our greatest regard, and we commonly apply our whole attention to them, overlooking all the rest so far as scarce to know we have any such belonging to us, or to mistake them for something else. Therefore we say, The motive of prudence, but the impulse of fancy, the force of habit, or the sally of imagination: and sometimes term the motion of these latter mechanical, supposing volition had no share in them, or at other times ascribe them to the privilege of indifference for want of discerning the motive that made a difference between one idle motion and another. But whoever desires a thorough acquaintance with the mind, ought to bestow some thoughts upon her little motives, since they have so considerable a share in our actions, and if we are not aware of them, will so cover the scale as to prevent the weighty motive from re-entering, or slip in at improper times, thereby producing a total avocation from the business in hand, or at least an interruption of our proceedings.

6. Nor must I omit to take notice of a certain magic that seems to alter the condition of our motives; they fluctuate and vary unaccountably, fading and regaining their colours, losing and retrieving their weight. An idea, that yesterday appeared vivid and strong, shall to-day show no sign of vigour at all; we still see it in the same form and position of parts as before, but it looks pale and lifeless, and feels as nothing in our hand. A thing we were extremely fond of at one time, we care not a pin for at another; what we admire this hour, we despise the next. Even virtue and pleasure have their seasons of engaging; not only as they appear or disappear to our thoughts, but when we have a full and distinct view of their features, we do not always find them strike upon us with equal allurement.

This fluctuation of our motives I believe has opened another door to the notion of a freewill of indifference; for observing that the mind does not always proceed to action instantly upon the suggestion of motives, that others of them oftener prevail than we should expect, that she resists the strongest passions and breaks through the firmest resolutions; we conclude she has an authority of her own independent of the motives, so that they cannot act until having first received her royal assent, but she can give any of them a preference without regard to their respective weights, and by taking part with inclination, can give it strength to overpower judgment, or by siding with the latter enable it to master the former. But all this may as well be accounted for by the variable quality of motives: while they continue changing their colours the balance keeps nodding to and fro, the mind perceives she has not a just estimation of their weights, and this is a motive with her to suspend action until the balance settles, and then it is the preponderating weight, not the mind, that sinks down the scale. When you have formed a resolution, so long as the considerations inducing you to make it retain their original vigour, and those you rejected their original weakness, and no new matter not taken at first into consideration interferes, you will surely adhere to your resolution: but if the tables turn, if that which was strongest becomes weakest, or fresh inducements not provided against before fall into the opposite scale, you will as surely break it. And that such accidents frequently happen, every one may satisfy himself who will attend carefully to the difference there is in our ideas of a thing between the time of resolving and the time of executing.

'Tis true we do sometimes play tricks with our balance, making it incline to either side as we please; but then this is done by art, not by strength or authority, and always brought about by the application of motives. For we have a power over our ideas, as has been remarked before, by stopping some of their channels to turn them into what other courses we like best, thereby excluding some ideas, and calling up others to our thoughts. We may close our ears against the admonitions of wisdom, or may hear them without attending, or may fill our imagination with something else that shall hinder them from entering; but it impeaches not the weight of a motive, nor shows your superior strength, that it does not operate when you will not let it come into the scale. And whoever watches himself narrowly when he practises this juggling, may always discern some motive of prejudice, favour, wilfulness, or shame of being overcome, which puts him upon the artifice; so that the mind will be found not so perfectly indifferent as she pretends in the very exercise of her indifference.

7. Here I shall take the liberty to stop a moment while I recommend it to every man to study diligently his motives of action; to examine what stock he has, as well of the permanent as of the transient kind, as well of his grand undertakings as of his sudden motions and manners of proceeding; what are their respective weights, either absolutely or comparatively, with one another; to remark how they introduce or mutually affect each other, how they fluctuate, their seasons of vigour and faintness; to distinguish what motive actually swayed with him upon every particular occasion. If he can do all this completely, he will discover the impositions of others, and what is better, will avoid imposing upon himself, which is the worst of all deceits. As the world goes, we lie under the necessity sometimes of alleging specious motives which did not influence us. A man asks you to lend him money which you have reason to think he will not repay, but you dare not tell him so, then you must put him off with excuses: but you ought always to know your own real motive. If the mind ever exerts a power of willing as well as acting, she performs that work by the instrumentality of motives, for therein lies her whole strength. When she perfectly knows her tools, where they lie, what they will do, and when they are in proper order, she may take her measures surely with respect to her moral and prudential conduct, and attain what the poet calls a life unacquainted with disappointment. In short, I look upon the study of our motives as conducing more than any one thing to that most useful of all sciences, The knowledge of oneself.

8. We have seen how the same considerations do not weigh alike with different persons, nor with the same person at different times; how they fluctuate and vary, their colours change to and fro, their weight diminishes, vanishes, and returns again, their form and parts continuing all along the same. Hence it appears that motives are compound ideas, containing something whereon the force of the whole and its title to be deemed a final cause depends, which when wanting it loses its essence: for a motive having lost its force is no motive at all, nor the cause of anything. It remains then that we turn our thoughts to seek for that ingredient which gives efficacy to the compound, and denominates it a motive.

CHAP. VI.

SATISFACTION.

Pleasure seems at first sight to bid the fairest for being that ingredient which gives weight to our motives, and we find by experience in multitudes of instances that it proves a sufficient inducement with us to act, for we perform many of our actions because we like them. And perhaps this may be the thing according to some notions of pleasure, for the word is not always taken precisely in the same sense. But it is the safest way to settle the meaning of our words by the standard of custom, and if we understand the term as it is commonly understood, we shall find pleasure often insufficient to perform the office of a motive, for we do many things against our liking. Pleasure in vulgar estimation stands opposed to business, duty, works of use, and necessity: yet in all these we feel some engagement, self-approbation, or complacence of mind, that carries us through with them. Pleasures, usually so called, often lose their gust, they satiate and cloy upon repetition, and nauseate instead of inviting. Therefore Mr. Locke has fixed upon the term Satisfaction, as being more extensive, comprehending all that complacence we feel as well in business as diversion, as well in the works of prudence as in the starts of fancy. I cannot follow a better authority, especially as I find nothing within my own experience or observation to contradict it: therefore shall adopt his term Satisfaction to express that vivifying ingredient which gives life and vigour to our motives. But to prevent misapprehension, I think it necessary to subjoin a few remarks, in order to ascertain what I conceive we both understand by Satisfaction.

2. In the first place, I scarce need to take notice of what is obvious to every one, that we are not always in so happy a situation as to choose between enjoyments which we will prefer; we are sometimes reduced to the hard necessity of choosing between evils, which of them we judge the lightest. The pleuretic lying on his left side does not expect pleasure by turning to the other; he has no more in view than a diminution of pain. Mischief and displeasure seize upon us unawares, and we think of nothing but how to deliver ourselves from them: dangers threaten, and our care tends solely to escape them. Now in all these cases we are prompted to what we do by uneasiness, therefore uneasiness has an efficacy to set us at work as well as satisfaction; and accordingly Mr. Locke has given them both for distinct principles of action, though I have blended them together into one. But this I do not from any variance in opinion, but for convenience and shortness sake: and I think the junction may be made without any violence, for as a penny saved is a penny gotten, and the miser looks upon it as an actual gain if he can procure the abatement of a payment, so every diminution or avoidance of uneasiness is an approach towards satisfaction. Therefore, though I may speak of them apart, whenever necessity shall so require, yet for the generality I shall consider satisfaction only, and hope what I say of this will, with very little variation, be found applicable to the other.

3. In the second place, if any man desires to know what satisfaction is, he must not expect to learn it by definition from me; I can help him no

further than by pointing out where he may find it himself. Let him reflect no what he feels when anything happens that pleases him, when he sits down to a well furnished table with a good appetite, when he reads a diverting book, when he receives news of some desirable event, when he looks back upon some performance for which he can applaud himself. Nor let him stop here, but carry on his contemplation to the common occurrences of life: when he applies to the business of his profession, or gives orders to his servant, or hears a newspaper, or takes his hat off the pin to go abroad, he will find that complacence in his most ordinary actions which renders life valuable. For bare existence has no other worth than as it serves for a basis to happiness, for we cannot be happy without being at all; but we all value our lives at a high rate, which we could not do, considering how thinly pleasures are scattered in the world, unless we found something satisfactory in almost everything we do upon the most trifling occasions. Some men live contentedly without pleasure, as that stands in the vulgar sense for an intense degree of enjoyment; but your melancholic persons, after having lost that glee which others feel in every common exercise of their powers, quickly grow weary of life. Therefore we must look upon satisfaction as the general term, containing under it joy, delight, pleasure, amusement, complacence, engagement, content, as the several stages. The lowest degree of satisfaction suffices to put us in motion when no higher intervenes; in our idle hours or vacant spaces of time we turn our eyes to look at a butterfly, or put down our hands to remove the flap of our waistcoat that had gotten between us and the chair. For the mind uses a nicer balance than the master of the mint: a cobweb will draw down the scale when nothing offers to counterpoise. Her understanding indeed is liable to mistake, being ill served by its ideas, which exhibit things frequently under wrong appearances, but her volition follows exactly according to her apprehension of things.

4. When the mind has no grand purpose in view, she can fully content herself with any little trifle that presents; if she finds herself easy, and pleasure does not solicit, nor business urge, nor danger threaten, she rests perfectly satisfied with her condition, desiring nothing further. Which induced Hyeronymus to place happiness in vacuity or absence of pain, that is, in mere ease; supposing the sweetest pleasures engage us no otherwise than by creating a want of themselves, which fills us with an uneasiness we cannot remove without attaining them. But I may venture to refer it to the first man you meet in the street, whether there is not a real and sensible difference between actual pleasure and the bare absence of pain: for if this were sufficient to constitute happiness, we must be happy during every sound nap or fainting fit; because while the senses are gone so that we feel nothing, we certainly do not feel pain.

The same consideration I suppose led Epicurus to maintain that all pleasures were equal in degree, and differed only in kind, for the lowest of them satisfies the mind, and the highest can do no more: therefore a man finds as complete satisfaction in pulling up the heel of his slipper in the morning, as he does in recovering his only child that had been stolen away last week by a gipsy. But this contradicts daily experience, which testifies that we find a much greater relish in some pleasures than we do in others. A man may sit picking his fingers after dinner with perfect tranquillity of mind, but this is nothing to compare with the joy he feels on hearing the voice of an intimate friend at the door. Nor is it true that the mind can satisfy herself with little pleasures, unless when greater are not

to be had or not apprehended in the imagination; who would not leave his trifling amusements upon being invited to a diversion he is extremely fond of, if no prudential or other motive withhold him? Why need the mind ever suspend her choice between two pleasures proposed until she has determined which is the greater, if either of them would answer her purpose alike? Therefore when several satisfactions offer together, that apprehended the greatest always prevails and carries away volition from the rest: nor can it be said to do so by the uneasiness of wanting it; for though we sometimes would forego an opportunity but that we fear we shall blame ourselves for having slipped it, yet this is not always the case; we frequently quit a lesser pleasure for a greater instantly upon summons, without the least thought of what we might suffer by a self-denial. There is the like difference of degree in uneasiness; when several accost us at once, we fly that which presses the hardest. So if satisfaction pulls one way and uneasiness drives another, whichever is the strongest overpowers the other and gives the turn to our motion.

Happy is it for us that we can content ourselves with a small pittance of satisfaction, for else our lives would pass most uncomfortably: poignant pleasures and high delights rarely come in our way, and we should have nothing but uneasiness to fill up the large intervals between them. How miserably would the shopkeeper and the artizan spend their days, if they could work no longer than while the dread of starving hung over them! This perhaps might drive them into their several occupations at first, but their work furnishes them with an amusement that wholly engages their thoughts, and while they content themselves with finishing their tasks, they remove the evil without having it perpetually stare them in the face. What enterprize of moment could we perform; what business requiring a length of time could we complete, if we might never stir without some very powerful incitement to spur us? How many useful acquirements should we miss, if the apprehension of their being useful were not enough to move us, without having some particular signal service they will do us under contemplation? our dearest pleasures seldom drop into our mouths, but we must do many things to prepare for their reception, and what we do preparatory thereto partakes of the nature of business. For how lively expectations soever we may entertain at our entrance upon an undertaking, they cannot keep up their vigour during the course of a long work, which we pursue with that quiet complacency accompanying our ordinary motions. It has been commonly observed that a man can never succeed in any science, art, or profession, unless he takes a liking to it, but the liking here requisite need not arise to that high pitch as to render the fatigues of profession an uninterrupted scene of transport or delight. Hence we find that our gentle satisfactions, taken together in their whole amount, are much more valuable than our higher enjoyments; as exceeding them greatly in number, as furnishing us principally with employment for our time, and as serving us in our most useful and important occasions.

5. In the third place I shall remark, that although I have assigned satisfaction for the active ingredient of our motive, yet, if we examine the matter strictly, it is not very satisfaction but the prospect or idea of it; for these are different: one may have the full idea of a toothache one does not feel, and of a diversion one does not partake of. Now we no not use to enter upon action but for some end, which end is some satisfactory perception attainable thereby. Even when we walk for walking sake, it is not the bare motion, but the pleasant feel of our limbs, or of the air, that excites

us. But this perception follows upon the action, and had no existence at the instant when the motive operated.—Therefore it is not the substance, but the prospect or expectance of satisfaction, which makes that part of the compound rendering it a motive. And this expectance, though sometimes fallacious, suffices to put us in motion: the child, that went to play with the candle, expected pleasure but found only smart; and the coward, who runs away from his own shadow, expected a mischief that would not have attacked him.

Since, then, expectation is not the same with the thing expected, it follows that we may pursue satisfaction without being in a state of enjoyment, and fly uneasiness without being in a state of suffering. The former does not often happen, because, being founded upon delusion, we soon discover our expectations to be delusive upon trial, which then changes our prospect, and we change our measures accordingly. Yet it does happen sometimes; for those who have made pleasures their constant employment, quickly cloy themselves with the frequent repetition of them, yet still pursue them with delusive hopes of the same relish they used to find heretofore, and run from diversion to diversion, in restless expectation of an enjoyment they cannot attain. But uneasiness exciting us to avoid it, may continue to operate without delusion: for if we find our endeavours upon trial effectual to ward off a mischief, this will encourage us to repeat them as often as the danger presents, and so long as we can keep evil aloof, we shall not fall into a state of suffering. If two old acquaintance, who had not met for some years before, were to espy one another on the opposite sides of the Haymarket, probably they would run together into the middle of the street, if the weather were fine and the ground dry, where they would join in an agreeable conversation: in the midst of their discourse they see a coach fifty yards off driving directly towards them, I suppose they would remove out of the way to one side or other, still continuing their talk. What then is it puts them upon this action? not satisfaction, for they propose no addition to that by changing their ground: it is no other than the uneasiness of being trampled upon by the horses, which, because they can avoid without trouble, makes no interruption of their enjoyment. He that walks along Cheapside must turn and wind perpetually to avoid jostling the other passengers; the prospect of uneasiness he would feel upon running against people, induces him to all those motions, which yet makes no abatement of any satisfaction he may have in the errand he goes upon, nor throws him into a state of suffering.

6. For my fourth remark, I shall observe that present satisfaction is the end we constantly have in view on proceeding to action. Nor does this contradict what I have just been endeavouring to prove, for by present satisfaction I would not be understood so strictly as to mean the satisfaction we actually have at the instant of acting: for this is no subject of action, nor can receive alteration thereby. We cannot unfeel the pain we feel by any effort of ours, nor does the pleasure we now have need an effort to procure it. But the satisfaction we propose in every exertion of our activity is that of the moment next immediately ensuing, and this may be called present satisfaction without any impropriety of speech. For we are constantly told the present time only is in our power, the past being gone and the future lying out of our reach: but this present time is in reality the next succeeding instant, that alone being the subject of our power, for we do not act in order to obtain what we have already. Perceptions flow in upon us without intermission, and we generally have a foresight of them

before they come, as also a power many times to alter their course by the proper application of objects or management of our organs: therefore we keep constantly upon the look out; while we see that such perceptions as we like will rise of their own accord, we have nothing to do, when they will not, we use our activity to procure them. In all action there are three things to be considered, the prospect or expectation, the action itself, and the perception to be introduced thereby: the first has no other value than as it directs us what action to pursue, nor the second than as it tends to procure the third, so that our business lies in helping ourselves to procure satisfactory or escape uneasy perceptions. But as we must every instant have some perception or other, we must provide for the next ensuing perception, and as soon as that is had, another to follow immediately after furnishes us with the like employment; so that our wants, starting up successively without intermission, require a continual supply; which confines our cares to the present moment, leaving the provision for future moments to our subsequent endeavours.

This accounts for what Mr. Locke has fully proved to be fact, that good, the greater good acknowledged and apprehended to be such, does not always determine the Will: and I may add, it never does, unless by means of the satisfaction we feel in making advances towards it; for if any distant advantage can raise in us a desire of attaining it, the gratification of this desire will afford a present satisfaction. And that remote good and evil have such effect upon us daily experience bears witness: we flatter ourselves often with distant hopes, and shudder at future dangers; we contemplate with pleasure the prospect of enjoyments afar off, and look with horror upon misfortunes before they come. Suppose a person, in whose knowledge and veracity you could fully confide, should say to you, Sir, you shall continue in plenty and the possession of everything you can desire to-day and to-morrow, but the third day your estate shall be seized, your children carried into bondage, and your body afflicted with painful distempers: would not the news fill you with a cruel anxiety? On the other hand, had you been tormented with the gout for a long while, and after having tried many remedies to no purpose had lost all hopes of relief, should you receive the like assurance that in two days' time you should be set at ease and perfectly cured: should not you feel an exhilarating joy that would overpower the pangs of your distemper? And the like happens proportionably upon the prospect of anything useful or detrimental, pleasurable or troublesome, in a lower degree.

7. This presentiment of the future makes the great privilege of human nature; for were we void of it we should have nothing but appetite to follow, like the brute creatures: but our concern for the morrow creates another appetite which prompts us to escape mischiefs that must be guarded against beforehand, and pursue great advantages that require much time and labour to attain. It likewise lengthens our pleasures beyond their natural measure, for enjoyment generally holds only for a little moment, but expectation, hope, and successful pursuit, often supply us with a constant fund of delight for a long season. But on the other hand, it is attended with some inconveniences, by tormenting us sometimes with unavoidable evils before they come near us, and making us tremble at imaginary dangers that would never have fallen upon us.

And these derivative satisfactions fluctuate as much as the original: for we do not always find equal relish in the same enjoyment, nor does the

prospect of it always appear in colours equally vivid. Neither can we observe any other rule in this change of colours than that they generally heighten upon the nearer approach of the enjoyment. But the very prospect of an attainable good, or an avoidable evil, commonly proves satisfactory; therefore, however it may sometimes happen otherwise, for the most part we continue in a state of enjoyment, in some degree or other, during the pursuit of a benefit we hope to acquire, or avoidance of a mischief we can easily ward off. Whence comes the saying, Hope makes the heart glad.

8. Fifthly, I shall take notice that satisfaction always attracts, and uneasiness always repels; and either of them operates according to the present occasion. If some advantage invites, we set ourselves instantly to pursue it; if a greater starts up in view, we quit the former and run after the latter: if mischief approaches, we set ourselves to prevent it: and while it continues to hang over us, we continue our efforts to keep it aloof. Therefore to me it seems that both satisfaction and uneasiness have a like efficacy to make us either change or adhere to our measures, as occasion shall require. But Mr. Locke ascribes the change of action solely to uneasiness, and the continuance of it to satisfaction; it behoves me to give my reasons for departing from so great an authority.

I shall allege first, that, properly speaking, there is no such thing as a continuance of action, all our perceptions and all our volitions being transient and momentary. What we term a continuance is indeed only a repetition of successive perceptions and volitions of the same kind: just as a spout continues to run while it pours forth innumerable drops without any interval between. So if you stare at the same picture for half an hour together, the sight comes by successive rays of light affecting your eyes in the same manner, and the perceptions raised thereby, although exactly similar, are individually distinct. And if you keep pointing with a stick for the same time, successive volitions hold up your hand, for should you forbear to repeat them, your arm would fall instantly to your side.

But waving this nicety, let us consider a series of motions, all proceeding upon one plan and with the same design, as a continuance of action: yet I think one may produce instances wherein we depart from our design, and change our measures without being driven by the lash of uneasiness. Suppose a man sitting down to his harpsichord intending to play through an opera of Corelli: in the midst of his diversion enters a messenger to tell him, that, if he will come away directly to the minister, he may be instated in a considerable preferment he had long wished and ardently sought for. Is it uneasiness or joy that makes him leave his music and run to catch up his hat? Suppose a company of young folks agreeably entertained in dancing; somebody tells them of a fine fire-work just going to be played off in a neighbouring garden: I will not ensure they shall not all run instantly to the window. When their curiosity a little abates and before the sight begins to cloy, some one puts them in mind of their dancing, perhaps the rest take the admonition and they run back to their sport as hastily as they quitted it. Surely this is a change of action and a departure from the plan laid down for the employment of the night: yet I appeal to any gentleman or lady, who may have experienced such an incident, whether they feel the least spice of uneasiness either in breaking off their diversion or returning to it again. On the other hand, suppose a man travelling through a lonely forest infested with a gang of desperate villains, who murder all they meet; he sees them coming towards him, and has but just time to jump into a stinking bog, where he can hide his

head behind a little bush: the rogues halt at a small distance from him, where they sit chattering perhaps an hour or two, all which time I suppose he will hardly quit his lurking hole. Now what is it holds him to this continuance of action? is it satisfaction? He sees none and expects none by sticking up to the shoulders in dirt and nastiness. Is it any other than the uneasy dread of falling into their hands, where he can expect nothing but misery and destruction?

9. But I am so averse to differing from Mr. Locke, that whenever I cannot bring my notions to tally with his, I hunt about for all expedients to reconcile them, so that I may hold my own consistently with those he entertains. And such expedient is most likely to be found by observing upon the unsteadiness and variableness of language. The most careful, as well as the giddy, use their words in various significations. Your men of close application, though taking their terms from the common language, find themselves under a necessity of recasting them in a mould of their own, to fit them for purposes that were not wanted in the usual intercourses of life: and sometimes the moulds they severally use differ from one another in some little particular. What if this should be the case between Mr. Locke and myself? Might we not then think the same at bottom, while we express ourselves by opposite sides of a contradiction? Perhaps, what he calls a continuance of action I should call a continuance of courses; and so there is no repugnance, because we are not talking of the same thing.

Now in order to understand what I mean by courses, please to take notice that we have each of us a set of views, aims, and desires, leading us into those courses of behaviour which fill up the employment of our lives; and though we may frequently step aside out of one track into another, we still continue to pursue courses of the same set. The word carries this sense in common conversation when we speak of virtuous or vicious courses: nor is a man reckoned to alter his courses because he quits the exercise of one virtue, or gratification of one vicious appetite, for that of another, as opportunity occurs. Neither does every turning after other pursuits at intervals make a discontinuance of the first: for some are of such a nature as not to be completed but by returning to the work at distant seasons with large gaps and spaces intervening. Thus a man may continue a course of physic though he dispatches business, takes diversions, and does many things between whiles. Therefore Mr. Locke would probably say of the man that left his harpsichord to get a place, that he had two desires directing his courses, the love of music, and of money or honour, and when the latter drew him away from the former, here was no change of measures, but the continuance of a pursuit he had long since been engaged in. The dancers were following a course of pleasure which kept them on in the same road, how much soever particular objects might vary. That the poor traveller was held in his quagmire by self-preservation, which is a main principle influencing us in the course of our lives, and which we never throw aside until some hard pressure of fortune shall make us uneasy with our being.

And that Mr. Locke had these courses in view appears manifest from the instances he makes use of in support of his assertion; which are that of "an idle fellow whom you shall not move to industry, convince him never so much of the advantage plenty has over poverty, make him see and own never so plainly that the handsome conveniences of life are better than

nasty penury, so long as he can content himself with the latter and finds no uneasiness in it. And of a worldling, who, though never so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as necessary to a man who has any great aims, as food to life, yet enters not upon any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good until he hungers and thirsts after righteousness, and feels an uneasiness in the want of it."

Now I shall not deny that we seldom, if ever, fail to continue our courses of action so long as they prove satisfactory, nor change them until they become insipid and cloy, or lead into inconveniences that gives us a disgust of them. Neither can you well reclaim a man from vicious courses by the offer of satisfaction, for you have none to propose that will be such to him: the pleasure and ease of virtue arise from the practice of it, and he who has never practised it will see nothing inviting in it. Therefore you must begin with him by representing the mischievous tendency of his evil doings, and if you can bring him to a dread and abhorrence of them, which shall make him uneasy under the apprehension of them, you may prevail upon him to change his measures. There are, indeed, besides the satisfaction your proficients in virtue feel in every exercise of it, certain rewards and fruits that any man would desire, but these operate at first by the uneasiness they create in the want of them. For when a man has taken a resolution of purchasing those rewards, the solicitations of old habits will frequently draw him back into his old courses, upon which the uneasiness and vexation of having failed in his resolution may drive him to renew it again, and while he adheres, the uneasiness of denying his other desires still torments him: so that he must remain in a state of uneasiness while the change is making, and until it be completed by the old habits entirely losing their vigour. Which makes good the observation of ancient and modern ages, that the paths of virtue are thorny and rugged at their entrance, but lead into a pleasant and delightful country.

10. Thus, though I have represented action in a different light from Mr. Locke, we must not therefore be thought to differ in substance, but in our manner of handling it. For though I do not pretend to a clearer, perhaps I may to a more microscopic eye: I consider action more minutely, endeavouring to analyze it into its primary parts. Now the shape and other circumstances belonging to the parts may vary greatly from those of the whole. Look upon your table, and you see it round or square, or of some other regular form: hold your eye near the wood, and you will perceive it waving in veins, or running in longitudinal fibres: the little particles composing it attract and cohere strongly to one another, but the table neither attracts nor coheres to the paper, the ink-bottle, nor the penknife you lay upon it. So if a habit of drinking be taken as one action, it may always be continued so long as a man can satisfy himself in the practice, and always broken off as soon as the uneasiness of a gout, or other mischief brought upon him thereby, shall exceed his fondness for the liquor: and yet the single acts whereof that large action consists may spring from satisfaction or uneasiness, indifferently, as either happens to present. For he may change his bottle either because he dislikes that standing before him, or because he pleases himself with the thought of tasting another sort; and he may stay some time at the tavern for the pleasure of the company, and continue there after that pleasure ceases, to avoid the uneasiness of going home, where he will not know what to do with himself.

Since then, nature has furnished me with a microscope, why should I not accept her favour, for she bestows not the slightest of her gifts in vain?

The Temple of Knowledge cannot be built without the concurrent labours of many artificers working with various qualifications. Who then shall blame me for making such use as I can of my little talent in pursuing minute discoveries that persons of larger views overlook? Should I fail of doing any good service myself, somebody else may turn them to better advantage: for it is no uncommon thing in the sciences, as well as arts and manufactures, to see one man prepare materials for another to work up. However, if my health and spirits hold, I shall strive hard but I will make some texture out of my materials that a man shall find convenient for his service, without sending it to another operator to be finished.

11. I hope matters are pretty well accommodated with Mr. Locke in regard to the difficulty before mentioned; but I do not know how I shall come off with him upon another point, where he speaks of the uneasiness of desire, and makes desire constantly accompanied with uneasiness. I can go with him half way, so far as to admit that desire often creates us cruel uneasinesses, and that the smart of their wounds rises in proportion to the intenseness of our desire. But this happens only when desire meets with a disappointment; when two incompatible desires urge strongly at once, both of which cannot be gratified; when some hindrance checks or at least retards desire. For while desire runs on smoothly in its course towards attainment, while we want nothing besides the object we pursue, while no bar stands across the way, nor difficulty occurs to check our speed, for my part I can see nothing but continual satisfaction accompanying the progress.

I may say with Mr. Dryden, "Old as I am, for lady's love unfit, The power of beauty I remember yet." I still bear in mind the days of my courtship, which in the language of all men is called a season of desire; yet, unless I strangely forget myself, it proved to me a season of satisfaction too. But, says Mr. Locke, it is better to marry than to burn, where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into a conjugal life. This, for aught I know, might be the motive with some men, who, being of an unsociable and undomestic turn, can see nothing good in matrimony, but submit to it as a lesser evil delivering them from a greater. And I can excuse an old bachelor for entertaining so despicable a notion of a state he never experienced the pleasures of himself. Others it may be make their engagements too hastily, and then would break them off again through the shame of doing a foolish thing, till the smart of their burnings becomes intolerable, and drives them headlong into the matrimonial net. But this, thanks to my stars, was not my case: my own judgment, upon mature deliberation, and the approbation of my friends, gave leave for desire to take its course. I might feel some scorchings in my youthful days when it would have been imprudent to quench them, and while the object of desire lay at an undiscernible distance: but as the prospect drew nearer, and desire had license to begin its career, it had no more the fierceness of a furnace, but became a gentle flame, casting forth a pleasing exhilarating warmth. Perhaps I might meet with some little rubs in the way, that gave me disturbance: if my fair one spake a civil word to any tall, well-bred young fellow, I might entertain some idle apprehensions lest he should supplant me. When I took a hackney coach to visit her, if we were jammed in between the carts, perhaps I might fret and fume, and utter many an uneasy Pish; but as soon as we got through the stop, though desire abated not, every shadow of uneasiness fled away. As near as I can remember, during the whole scene, desire, close attended by satisfaction, directed all my steps, and occupied all my moments: it awaked with me in the morning, and was the last idea

swept away by sleep: it invigorated me in business, it heightened my diversions, it gave me life when in company, and entertained me with delightful reflections when alone. Nor did it fail of accompanying me to the altar, where, laying aside its sprightliness and gaiety, as unsuitable to the solemnity of the occasion, it became more calm and decent, exhibiting the prospect of an agreeable companion, who should double the enjoyments and alleviate the troubles of life; who should ease me from the burthen of household cares, and assist me in bringing up a rising family; whose conversation should be a credit to me abroad, and a continual feast to me at home. Nor yet did possession put an end to desire, which found fresh fuel to keep it alive from time to time, in mutual intercourses of kindness and hearty friendship, in communication of interests, counsels and sentiments; and could often feed upon the merest trifles. How often, having picked up some little piece of news abroad, has desire quickened my pace to prattle over it at home! how often, upon hearing of something curious in the shops, have I gone to buy it with more pleasure than the keenest sportsman goes after his game! Thus desire, leading delight hand in hand, attended us for many years, still retaining its first vigour, although a little altered in shape and complexion; until my other half was torn from me. Then indeed desire left me, for it had nothing now to rest upon, and with it fled joy, delight, content, and all those under desires that used to put me upon the common actions of the day; for I could like nothing, find amusement in nothing, and care for nothing: and in their stead succeeded melancholy, tastelessness, and perpetual restlessness. And though I called in all my philosophy to rescue me from this disconsolate condition, it could not relieve me presently, but had a long struggle before it could get the better of nature.

12. I doubt not there are many persons in the world, who having been as happily paired, could read the account here given of myself as feelingly as ever I wrote it. As for your determined bachelors or injudicious husbands who have married only for money, or for beauty, or for a frolic, or for a bedfellow, or for they did not well know why, though they may think me romantic, yet I suppose they have had desires of their own of some sort or other; either of raising a fortune, or of preferment, or of building, or of gardening, or of sports, or of dress, or of acquisitions in learning, which have engaged them in long pursuits. And I believe we shall all give in our verdict unanimously upon the positive evidence of our own several experience, That our desires have furnished us with the greatest parts of our enjoyments in life; and that desire, so long as it can move unsuccessfully without rub or disappointment, without wanting fuel to feed it, and without pain or unlucky accidents intervening, has supplied us with a continual fund of satisfaction. But when desire grows languid for want of fresh matter to work upon, when it cannot, like a wanton bird, hop about from twig to twig, from bush to bush, continuing its play, then the time hangs heavy upon our hands: when it meets with crosses or delays, when it rises to impatience, or is of such a nature as to require an immediate gratification that cannot be had; then indeed vexation and uneasiness find a ready entrance.

That the uneasiness Mr. Locke found in desire, proceeds from some of those causes, may appear by the examples he produces in proof of it. Desire, says he, deferred, makes the heart sick. Leave out the participle Deferred, and the rest of the sentence will not hold true. Change it for another, and we may lay down the contrary as a maxim; for desire promoted makes the heart glad. Therefore desire is not in its own nature a

state of uneasiness, nor unless rendered so by disappointment or delay. Give me children, says Rachael, or I die; but this was not till after a long course of barrenness she began to despair of having any; when Joseph was coming, we hear no more of such exclamations, yet I suppose she still continued to desire it might prove a boy. Where he speaks of the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, surely he must have in his thoughts the cravings of a person almost dying with either, rather than the common returns of appetite at stated seasons during health. I speak only for myself: when I sit down to dinner I feel no uneasiness in being hungry, but rather rejoice at having a good appetite, from whence I expect a better relish to my victuals than any sauces could give them. How do other people fare upon the like occasion? If on coming home from a journey in hot weather, you find yourself faintish and droughty, and call for a glass of wine and water, have you not a pleasure in seeing the wine pour from the bottle or sparkle in the glass, even before you bring it to your mouth? And does not this pleasure arise from your desire? for you would feel it no longer on the like prospect after having fully quenched your thirst. Pretty bottle, says Sganarelle, how sweet are thy little glug glugs! how envied would be my lot wert thou to keep always full for all my pourings! Desire then gave the glugs their sweetness, for Sganarelle was in a state of desire, not of fruition, when he solaced himself with their music, the liquor having not yet entered his lips; nor was there I suppose anything very harmonious in the sound, or any other charm besides the assurance of his bottle being full, and the means of accomplishing his desire abundantly at hand.

Could uneasiness alone determine the Will, how wretched must the condition of mankind appear! For the Will never ceases working from morning till night: we are always a doing, but should have nothing to do unless to deliver ourselves from uneasinesses following close upon one another's heels. Human life from beginning to end would be nothing but a restless endeavour to throw off an evil we could never totally remove, and would exhibit one continued scene of uninterrupted uneasiness. But, kind nature be praised! our condition is not quite so forlorn and comfortless. We have our hours, and those of activity too, wherein we can employ ourselves with satisfaction and delight: and since in those pleasurable seasons we do not stand idle, there must be something else besides uneasiness capable of urging us to action.

13. Mr. Locke it seems once held that ancient, and till his time universally received opinion, That good, the greater good, understood and apprehended to be such, determined the Will: he first discovered that it was always something present, and no distant good, that gave the turn to our activity; for which I acknowledge myself and the world greatly obliged to him; for an important and leading discovery it was, as it has let us more than anything into the secret springs of human action. But since new discoveries are seldom perfected at once, may I be permitted to offer at an improvement, and add, that present satisfaction, as well as present uneasiness is capable of performing the office. I know that distant good does often operate by the uneasy want we have of it, by the shame, the vexation, the regret, we feel in slipping our opportunity of gaining it, but it has likewise a quality of throwing a sensible satisfaction upon every step we take in advancing towards it. Which latter I conceive wants not efficacy, especially in those who have a strong attachment to virtue and prudence, or, as Mr. Locke expresses it, who hunger and thirst after righ-

teousness, any more than the former, to determine volition: and according as the one or the other actuates our motions, we pursue the object of our desires through the flowery meads of delight, or the thorny paths of trouble and self-denial.

14. But it may be said that, according to my own doctrine (§ 8), satisfaction and uneasiness are not so incompatible but the one may move us while the other possesses us: therefore why may not uneasiness be the sole incitement constantly spurring to action, without necessarily rendering our motions uneasy, while we can keep it aloof by continual efforts to escape it? I do not forget what I have there laid down, that one may fly uneasiness without being in a state of suffering; for the prospect of the next ensuing moment moves us to action, but the feel of the present denominates our condition: now one may have the prospect of a very different sort of ground from that one stands upon. Delightful is it, says Lucretius, to stand upon firm land and see the mariners tossing and toiling in a tempestuous sea. Delightful to behold the bloody scenes of war spread over a spacious field without sharing in the danger yourself. Not because there is any pleasure in seeing others tormented, but because the prospect of evils from which yourself are exempt is delightful. Nor I suppose would your delight be the less if you were to do something towards escaping the danger, provided you had certain and easy means at hand for effecting your escape: were you on board the fleet, but stepping into a boat that should land you safe before the storm began to rage; or in the army, and mounting an easy pad that should carry you far enough out of harm's way before the battle joined. But where Locke treats of the uneasiness giving birth to our actions, I cannot understand him of the prospect but of very uneasiness itself; which to my thinking cannot consist with a state of enjoyment, but must necessarily, according to the degree of it, throw the mind into a state of suffering so long as it continues and as often as it returns. For to the question, What determines the Will? he answers, Some uneasiness a man is at present under. So that it is not timely caution against an approaching mischief, but the pressure of uneasiness actually felt, that alone suffices to set us at work: and this equally the same, whether the avoidance of evil or attainment of distant good be the object of our endeavours. For, says he, there is a desire of ease from pain, and another of absent positive good, in which latter also the desire and uneasiness is equal: as much as we desire any absent good, so much we are in pain for it. Now whether the prospect of absent attainable good does always fill us with a painful want and uneasiness, I have some reasons to doubt: but shall defer giving them until I have gone through my next observation, which may render what I have to say upon this point more easily intelligible.

15. For my sixth remark I shall lay down, That satisfaction and uneasiness often beget and introduce each other: the bare escape from pain gives a sensible pleasure, and the loss of any great pleasure grieves us: whatever affects us strongly, of either kind, generally leaves its contrary behind. In time to come, says Eneas, we shall find entertainment in reflecting on the hardships we now undergo. For past sufferings, not likely to return, are often a feast to the mind; and past pleasures we can no longer enjoy, remembered with regret. A man just recovered from a fever, finds enjoyment in the very deliverance from his disease; he can pass the day agreeably, though with his servants only about him, in a manner he would have thought insipid, lonely, and irksome, at another

time; for he satisfies himself with ease, and wants nothing further to divert him. Thus a great deal of our good springs out of evil; we should often rust in idleness, and feel the time heavy upon our hands, were it not for pain, difficulty, and danger, which rouse us to action; and though they make us smart for the present, repay us abundantly afterwards by affording a greater satisfaction in having surmounted them, than they gave us trouble in surmounting.

On the other hand, suppose a man provided with plenty of all conveniences, and means of ordinary amusement, and fully contented with his present situation: yet tell him of some high diversion going forward in the neighbourhood which he must not partake of, and you may perhaps raise a want in him that shall vitiate all his other enjoyments, and throw him into a state of disquiet and uneasiness. For I shall never deny that strong desires do frequently raise an uneasy want of the object they fasten upon; nor that this does sometimes prevail where the satisfaction of advancing towards the object would not: but I conceive this is not always the case, but that desire sometimes operates by the satisfaction of pursuing, and sometimes by the uneasiness of wanting, the thing desired. If a lazy fellow has some acquisition greatly to his liking proposed, he may make a few faint motions at first, and please himself with the prospect of possessing it, but his indolence puts him off from day to day from using any significant endeavours; he then begins to reflect with himself, finds the completion of his wishes no nearer than at first setting out; this raises an uneasy want of them, which grows greater and greater by degrees, till at last it overpowers his slothfulness, and makes him set his hand in good earnest to the plough.

16. That uneasiness is the motive in most of those instances mentioned by Mr. Locke I shall readily agree, and might produce others wherein uneasiness does the work, although pleasure in the eye of the world runs away with the credit of it; for many times it is not easy to discern which of the two determined the Will. Your debauchees, your triflers, and very fashionable people, who make pleasure their sole employment, I doubt not find delight in it at first; but pleasure too often repeated abates of its relish, and at length becomes wholly insipid: yet still they run on the same round of diversions, thinking they follow pleasure all the while, and so indeed they do, though not with satisfaction, but for want of something else to amuse them, or through the cravings of an unnatural appetite brought upon them by custom. Follow them to their clubs, and you may hear them sing without joy, laugh without being pleased, and thrum over the same jests till they grow threadbare. View them in their routs, and they run on the same roll of compliments and common expressions, talking incessantly without having anything to say. Peep upon them at their toilets, and you will perceive dress to be a labour undergone to avoid appearing hideous and out of mode among company. Some real satisfactions they may have when anything new or unexpected engages their fancy: but chiefly I believe in going on the way to their parties, which is a kind of business, being an action undertaken not for its own sake, but for some end: they may then rejoice at having thrown off the insupportable burden of time, and escaped the misery of staying at home alone, or may flatter themselves with the same relish in their diversions they used formerly to enjoy; for delusive expectations will satisfy the mind so long as the delusion holds. Thus the cloven-footed tyrant inveigles the unwary with exorbitant wages at first, but having once bound them to his service, by rendering

them unfit for any other, he shortens their allowance, giving them no more than just enough to persuade them they earn something, and for the most part lashes them through his drudgery with scourges, or pinches them with his iron claws.

Now let us do justice on all sides, and confess honestly that the virtuous man does not always find delight in the practice of his virtues. There is a joy, a complacence of mind which I hope every one of us feels upon acting right: but there is likewise a shame, a vexation, a compunction, upon acting wrong: and this latter often serves to keep us steady in our good courses when the other would have failed. Could we behold virtue naked, says Plato, we should find her so divinely charming that we could never like anything else: but virtue is a modest virgin, she will not let you see her naked until you are wedded to her; she displays a hand, an arm, a cheek, at a time, as you get further into her familiarity. Therefore how much soever young admirers may be smitten with her at first sight, while covered with her veil, this like all sudden desires cannot hold its vigour: but the solicitations of passion or old vicious habits will draw them from their pursuit, unless the general persuasion of her being a consummate beauty shall raise a want of her acquaintance that may overpoise all uneasiness beside. As for those who are become intimate with the lovely creature, they may see so much of her beauties, and retain such a taste of her sweetness, as shall fill them with a warm and steady delight, sufficeint to make them surmount difficulties and troubles with pleasure, and if I may so say, render uneasiness itself perfectly easy. I can imagine it possible in theory, that a man may have so strong a relish for the practice of virtue, as may make his condition happy under the greatest pain; that he may look upon all present sufferings as nothing for the exceeding weight of glory that lies in store hereafter. For I know any strong desire has power sometimes to pluck out the sting of pain; I have experienced it myself in little complaints, such as an aching corn or a grumbling tooth, which though I have felt, I have despised and not wished to remove when eager in the pursuit of something greatly to my fancy. But I much question whether the acquisition of so strong a desire as shall keep a man easy in Phalaris's bull, be practicable among the sons of Adam: it is a great matter if we can raise inclination enough to carry us through common difficulties and troubles without being hurt by them. Therefore, unless we had an abhorrence of vice, and felt a want of virtue when absent, as well as a delight in her company when present, we should make very little advance in our progress towards her.

Thus the lives of all men, the virtuous and the vicious alike, though not in equal proportion, are checquered; not only with respest to the vicissitudes of health and distemper, success and disappointment, favours and frowns of fortune attending them, but also to the motives of joy or vexation, content or disquiet, spurring on alternately to action. Desire, like a smiling angel, and its bastard offspring Want, like the knight of the ill-favoured face, direct our conduct by turns. While some idle passion passing by holds desire in chat, the other jumps into the box; as soon as the intruder can be got rid of the rightful coachman resumes his seat. While he holds the reins we roll smoothly and currently along, feasting our eyes upon the gladsome prospect before us; but when his deputy drives, clouds of noisome dust obstruct our view, we feel the carriage jolt and hobble, tossing us to and fro, and knocking our joints perpetually against the sides. For according as desire or want actuate our motions, we are in a state of enjoyment

or a state of suffering: and this whether our object be some distant good, or the removal from approaching evil.

17. Now after what has been laid down under this sixth remark, nobody will expect me to controvert with Mr. Locke, that desire often begets uneasiness, and how much we desire an absent positive good, so much we are in pain for it: but this I apprehend never happens until something obstructs our advances towards the good desired. Want does not come before, nor does the child use to be older than the parent. We cannot be said to want what we may have when we please, or are in the ready way to obtain, yet we desire it, or else we should not proceed in the way. Some desires do not tend to immediate gratification: if a man, fond of hunting, meets with friends who propose a match for the next day, he may desire to make one among them, and give orders to his servant relative thereto, without any want of the diversion, which, were it offered, he would not choose to go upon directly, nor until he had prepared himself by a good night's rest for the fatigue. What we possess we cannot be thought to want, though we may desire the continuance of it; but that is for our future occasions, not to remove any present uneasiness. Every man having just received his last year's income, desires I suppose to receive his next also, but he does not want it, nor, had he it in hand, and were a prudent man, would he make use of it for his expenses of the current year. We all desire life and health, and do many things for their preservation; but while in vigour, peace, and plenty, what want do we feel of either? Can we never choose a food because it is wholesome, nor take an agreeable exercise to mend our constitution, unless driven by approaching sickness, or affrighted by the king of terrors staring us in the face? We all desire the fresh air we breathe, but must we never walk into the fields to enjoy a purer draught, until almost suffocated by the smoke of town?

18. Besides, although every considerable desire may have its opposite want, and either of them be capable of inciting us to action, when we seek for the motive we must consider what actually operated. For the mind may have many motives in store which do not always enter the scale, and when they do not, have no share in weighing down the balance. Whatever other folks might do, Mr. Locke, I dare say, would agree with me, that an action can be ascribed to no motive that was not present in the thought or imagination at the time of acting. A man goes to the playhouse thinking only to see the play, and there meets with an intimate acquaintance, in whose conversation he takes great delight. Perhaps he did not know the other would be there; perhaps he had heard it last week, but utterly forgot it again: amusement then was his motive; the meeting his friend had no share in his motion; although, had that occurred to his thoughts, he would have gone ten times more readily. Therefore, to discover the true spring of action, it is not enough to know that want is capable of performing the office of a spring, but we must examine whether we had such want in view at the instant of bestirring ourselves. The hard student, says Mr. Locke, will not leave his studies for the pleasures of appetite, but when hunger begins to make him uneasy, then away he goes to remove it. But is this the case with every student? When I have been staring all the morning at the light of nature, till I have stared myself almost blind, I find my spirits want recreation: I then throw aside my papers sometime before dinner; the veriest trifle suits my purpose best: the philosopher can loll out at window like Miss Gawkey, to see the wheelbarrow trundle, or the butcher's dog carry the tray, and is perfectly con-

tented with his situation as being fittest for the present occasion. Presently the bell rings, and down run I into the parlour. Now did Whitefield and Wesley endeavour to stop me, bellowing out their exhortations to abstinence, self-denial, and mortification, possibly I might fret a good deal, and the uneasiness of wanting my dinner urge me to exert all my might in brushing by them. But by good luck they do not honour me with their acquaintance, nor have I any of their revelations commanding me to austerities: so that the thought of starving, or of what I should suffer by missing a meal, never once enters into my head, and therefore cannot be the motive actuating my motions.

But neither does it appear to me universally true, that how much we desire absent good so much we are in pain for it. There are many little goods weighty enough to turn the mental scale, but not strong enough to give us pain. We have numberless gentle desires continually prompting us to common actions, yet too feeble to beget any offspring. When these prompt us, if the object can be readily come at, it is very well: if not, we give ourselves no further concern, nor think it worth any trouble to procure; we feel no want, no pain, nor disappointment, in the miss of it. Sometimes I walk to and fro in my garden in the country, intending only to ruminate on some trifle or other; perhaps I espy a peach that looks ripe and inviting, and I reach out my hand to pluck it. Should my gardener tell me, Sir, I thought to have reserved that for the company you expect tomorrow, or should any other little reason occur to stop me, I should forbear; but if nothing intervenes, I go on to complete my purpose. Now, when I reflect on the state of my mind on such occasions, and examine mine ideas with the closest application of the microscope, as well when I gratify my fancy as when I restrain it, I cannot discern the least pain, or want, or uneasiness imaginable: and therefore crave leave to conclude that something else, besides want and uneasiness, is capable of determining me to the use of my powers.

19. Whence then comes it that Mr. Locke and I entertain so different notions concerning desire? For we are both careful plodding folks; not used to do things hastily, but sifting our thoughts, and weighing our words before we deal them out. Is the difference owing to the microscopic make of mine eye, that sees minuter goods, smaller actions, slenderer desires, than other people? or is there some fallacy, some equivocation, some various use of language, that keeps us asunder? Perhaps what I take for desire, while successful in its career, he may call joy or hope, or by some other name. Perhaps all that we do in pursuit of the same object, though I should think it a series of distinct actions, and distinct volitions, he may consider as one action, and one determination of the Will, which, while retaining its full vigour, and the purpose not completed, we do not depart from to make a new determination until pressed by some urgent want or uneasiness. Thus, if your hard student determines at breakfast to study so many hours, and then take an airing abroad, while he turns over his books, or when he throws them aside, here is no determination made of the Will, for that was done once for all in the morning: nor can you draw him from his plan before the determined time by any solicitations of pleasure; but should his head ache, or his stomach cry cupboard, the uneasiness of that might drive him into a new course of action different from that he had determined upon before. I wish somebody would help us to a clue to guide through this labyrinth, and bring us together again; for I am never better satisfied with myself than when travelling in his company. In the mean while, though I

reverence his authority beyond that of all others, whether ancient or modern, in matters relating to human nature, yet he will excuse me for adhering to my own judgment until it shall be altered by better information; for he, I am sure, would be the last man in the world to impose an authority upon anybody, or desire to draw followers by any other force than the conviction of their own judgment. Yet I still hope the difference is not a variance of sentiment, but of expression, or of the manner wherein we consider the same subject; and that we travel the same road, though by different branches. But as one cannot go on currently in any other way than that one is acquainted with, I shall continue to proceed in my own track, trusting that we shall quickly be found walking hand in hand again, and speaking almost the same language.

20. In the seventh place, let it be noted, that neither satisfaction nor uneasiness ever enter the mind without some other sensation or idea to introduce them. For as you cannot have the pleasure of sweetness without putting something sweet into your mouth, nor the delight of a prospect without having some delightful prospect to look upon, so neither can you procure satisfaction without seeing or hearing, or contemplating or reflecting, on something satisfactory. And that the satisfaction is something distinct from the concomitant ideas, appears manifest, because it may be separated from them: for the same object, presenting in the same shape and features, affects us variously, being sometimes alluring and at other times insipid. One may be extremely desirous of seeing a particular play, but being disappointed this week, may not care a farthing for it the next, according as one happens to be differently disposed: the play is the same, the actors the same, and the opportunities the same with those you wished for before, nor can you find any other difference than only the relish. This makes good what I observed before, that all motives are compound ideas, for though satisfaction be the only ingredient weighing in the scale, others are necessary to serve as a vehicle for conveying it to the mind.

21. The eighth particular relating to satisfaction follows naturally from the last: for if we cannot have satisfaction but by applying some vehicle to convey it, it behoves us to look out for the proper vehicles containing the desired ingredient within them. Nature makes up the mixtures herself, nor have we any hand in the composition: sugar has its sweetness, gall its bitterness, success its joy, and disappointment its vexation, by her provision: we can neither alter nor diminish the relish of things by our own power. Sometimes she shifts her ingredients, taking out satisfaction and leaving the vehicle insipid, or substituting uneasiness in its room: but even these changes of taste are of her making, being effected by the variable nature of our palates disposed to different viands at different times, nor can we help ourselves or restore them at pleasure to their former state, but must take objects as we find them, according to the pressing disposition either of our body or mind. This nobody will deny, nor say that when salt has lost its savour we have wherewith to salt it; or that we can always raise the same fondness we had for a particular diversion the other day, or make nothing of a fatigue we used to undergo with cheerfulness.

22. Thus far we go on currently, without opponent or contradiction; but in this divided disputatious world one must not expect to travel any road long without a check. There are people, namely, your sticklers for indifferency of Will, who pretend that nature has left some of her vehicles empty, indifferent to receive either satisfaction or uneasiness as we please to sprinkle it upon them, or mingled up others so loosely that we can pick

out the vivifying ingredient, and throw in its opposite, thus changing the quality of a motive, and rendering that satisfactory which was naturally distasteful. Not that they deny volition always follows the last act of the understanding; but, say they, we have a certain degree of power to give colours to our ideas, and control the understanding, so as to make it pronounce sentence against the clearest decision of judgment, or strongest solicitation of passion.

Here I have the pleasure of returning into my old alliance again, and joining forces with Mr. Locke, whom I find as little inclined to this notion of indifferency as myself. Those he had to deal with, it seems, had delivered themselves so obscurely concerning this antecedent indifference, as they called it, that he could not tell where they placed it: whether between the thought and judgment of the understanding, and the decree of the will, where there appears no room for anything, or before the former, which is a state of darkness exhibiting no object whereon to exercise our power. But by a book not extant in his time, Dr. King upon the Origin of Evil, and his profound commentator, I can discern where they place this supposed indifference, to wit, between the thought and judgment of the understanding; that is, between the action being proposed, and the preference of that action, or its forbearance: and the matter according to their representation stands thus. The mind sits in judgment between several objects offered to her option; arguments occur in favour of either, and unexceptionable evidences are produced; she sees plainly which has the strongest cause, yet gives judgment for the weakest, by virtue of her arbitrary power. Or some council makes a motion of course, which never used to be denied, and which there is no reason for denying; nevertheless she will reject it, merely because she will. So the province of indifference lies between the trial and the judgment, which the understanding pronounces by particular direction from the Will, annexing the idea of best to that which had it not before, and this the understanding having discerned, gives judgment accordingly: and that idea the will annexes by her own sole authority, after full cognizance of the cause, without regard to the merits, and uninfluenced by any motive at all. But there is really no motive inducing the mind to annex this idea, if any such power she has; for acting upon our ideas is an act, as well as acting upon our limbs, and she does not choose to enter upon action of any kind, unless for some end proposed, or to obtain some effect she conceives will prove satisfactory. Nor must we take understanding here in the vulgar sense for the judgment of reason, but for every discernment of the perceptive faculty, including the suggestions of fancy, and impulses of passion; which may start up unawares, and whisper the judge in the ear, just before giving sentence, although they had not spoken a word during the whole course of the trial.

Your abettors of indifference, being solemn folks, deal altogether in general terms and abstract reasonings: but to my thinking, the abstract is seen clearest in the concrete, for ideas fluctuate in our reflection, nor can we hold them long in the same state. If you would judge between two oranges you have seen a little while ago, which is the deeper coloured, you will think sometimes the one, and sometimes the other: but set them close together and fix your eye upon them, this will keep your idea of both steady, so that you may quickly perceive which is the redder and which the paler. Therefore I wish they had given us instances of some particular actions, wherein they apprehended this privilege of indifference is exerted; but since they have thought it below their dignity, or unbecoming their

gravity, I shall attempt to do it for them, and if I can hit upon proper samples to their mind, we shall not rest in speculation alone, but shall see by experience whether, in actions esteemed the most indifferent, there is not some motive actually prevailing upon us to perform them.

23. But I must observe by the way, that the trial above described, is a very complex action, consisting of many single acts, each of which must have its several volition and several end in view, following one another so close, that there is nowhere room for the power of indifferency to interfere. But as the gentlemen we have to deal with seem unprovided with a microscope, I shall not trouble them with minute objects nor such as cannot be discerned with the naked eye; and therefore shall present them with larger actions, suitable to their organs, and consider the whole compound as one body.

Since then, they place the merit of their behaviour in the right use of this power of indifferency, one may expect to find the effects of it most apparent in the most arduous exercises of virtue. Suppose then a good man, solicited by temptations, attacked by threatenings, urged by tortures, to betray his country, yet he bravely resists all opposition: but has he not a thorough persuasion of the advantages of well doing; has he not a strong desire of fulfilling his duty, and a vehement abhorrence of treachery? These must move him to take up his resolution, and support him in going through with it: for another who had not such motives, or had them in a lower degree, would undoubtedly decline the task, or fail upon trial. If they should urge that all men have the like motives, would they but listen to them: those who allege this, must have a different idea of motives from that we have given before, and overlook the distinction between a motive and a good reason for doing a thing. For how reasonable soever it may be to act right, yet to him who does not discern the expedience, or can satisfy himself in the foregoing it, and feel no uneasiness in the want of it, it is no motive at all.

What will they say of the perfect wise man, would not he, if there were any such, adhere to the dictates of his judgment without deviating in a single instance? Yet he, I suppose, proceeds in all his measures upon the motive of their rectitude. So long as the matter remained doubtful, he would remain indifferent to either side, and would all that while suspend his action: but the moment expedience became manifest, his indifference would vanish, nor would he delay the determination of his Will. What will they say of those imperfect wise men we have upon earth? Have they not a quick sense of honour, and love of right conduct? And are they not therefore good and deserving because this motive influences the greatest part of their actions, and because they cannot behold villany and meanness with indifference? Do the judicious and the worthy less enjoy or less use this most noble privilege of human nature than the gay, the giddy, and the thoughtless, whose conduct is much more unaccountable, who frequently act upon no visible motive at all, or run counter to the weightiest.

Why do they ever exhort us to this or that kind of behavionr, or to make a right use of our privilege? Does not this imply an opinion that they may prevail upon us thereby to give a right turn to our indifference. Therefore indifference it seems may be operated upon by exhortation, and may as well be carried on by the same through the execution of its purpose. But what are exhortations besides the suggestion of motives to do a thing? which were needless if we might do the same without any motive at all; and useless if actions performed upon motives had no morality in them, nor any

action were valuable unless for so much of it as proceeded from our power of indifference.

Most probably the notion of this power took rise from an inaccuracy of thought occasioned by an inaccuracy of language. Desire, says Mr. Locke, so constantly accompanies our actions that it is frequently taken for Will, and confounded with it in our discourses. I have observed in a former place, that Will and pleasure are reputed synonymous terms, nor would it be thought a different question should one ask, Will you have such a thing? or Do you desire or please to have it? The preference of one thing above another, either in our judgment or inclination, is often styled the choice of our Will: and when some authority or obligation compels us to do the thing we dislike, we call it acting unwillingly, or against our Will. It would be hard to produce an instance of any man going through with an arduous undertaking, without having it strongly at heart, without a desire of the work to be completed thereby, or without feeling a want of it, upon being obstructed in his progress. I would ask the champions for indifference, whether, when they have made a wrong use of their power, (for possibly they may trip once in a while,) they do not feel a shame, a vexation, a disappointment, in reflecting thereupon; which could not well happen, if they had no desire of improving their opportunities. But this desire, which often has an efficacy to overpower the strongest motives, they confound with the Will, and finding nothing previous in the thought that should give birth to it, they suppose it self-begotten, and thence wisely conclude the Will has a power of determining itself, and of infusing satisfaction into that, which nature had mingled up with uneasiness. There is a desire, having no other object than the restraint of desire: for men virtuously inclined find their passions and appetites perpetually drawing them aside out of their road: this gives them a jealousy of such intruders, and when desires solicit strongly, although not urging to any thing mischievous or improper, yet they will not comply merely because they will not let their passions get the mastery over them, nor acquire a strength too great to be resisted at other times. Now this desire of restraining desire, our profound speculatists mistake again for the Will, to which, therefore, they attribute a power of controlling desire, without aid of any counter-weight whatsoever, and of making an election, like the King by a congê d'elire, in virtue of its royal prerogative.

24. Let us next turn to the abusers of their privilege. A man is urged to some useful attainment: you make him sensible of the good fruits dependant upon it, so as to raise in him some desire of gathering them: you convince him there is nothing difficult in the pursuit, nothing irksome, nothing thwarting his other inclinations, yet you cannot get him to stir. But is there not some secret passion, some habit, some humour, some averseness to trouble, that lies in the way? If you cannot presently discover the rub, it does not follow there is none; for the heart of man is deceitful above all things, containing many springs unknown, even to the owner. But if you have any knowledge of human nature and intimacy with the person, it is ten to one but you may discern the obstacle, which you find to be something that acts as a powerful motive upon him, though it might weigh nothing with yourself. Since then, upon closer examination, you can generally distinguish a motive where there appeared none before, it may be presumed there is one when it escapes your search: therefore those instances of wrong management are too uncertain a foundation to build the doctrine of indifferency upon.

But now and then you shall meet with persons, who being recommended to do something advantageous to themselves, which they would have liked well enough, and been fond of, had it first occurred to their own thoughts, yet reject it out of mere crossness: the more you urge them with motives, the stronger they set themselves against it. But consider whether the bare having of their Will is not an engaging motive with most men. Liberty of itself is sweet, and to have the command of our motions without control, what we all in some measure desire. This desire, when excessive, is thought owing to a perverseness of Will, which can run contrary to all motives, either of expedience or inclination; but it may generally be traced to another source: for obstinate people are either such as have been constantly humoured by those about them, or else persons of shallow understanding. Fools are credulous at first, till having been frequently deceived, they contract a jealousy of all mankind, and see no chance of obtaining anything they like, unless by rejecting whatever shall be proposed by another. Besides, there is a kind of honour in doing as we will: and honour operates as a mighty incentive to action. But you will ask, do I conceive there is any honour in persisting obstinately to do just as we will, without regard to motives dissuading us from it? Truly I cannot answer the question so generally proposed, but must give my opinion disjunctively. When done in opposition to passion, danger, fatigue, or pain, which we will not suffer to drive us from anything we have a mind to, I applaud it highly: when in contradiction to good advice or the suggestions of reason, I censure it as highly. For tenaciousness, even of a resolution taken for opposition sake, serves either to good or bad purposes: when to the former, it is called steadiness and bravery; when to the latter, perverseness and obstinacy. But whether you, or I, or the world, allow it to be honour, or no, there are those who certainly esteem it such; like the miser in Horace, who, being hissed by the populace, applauded himself at home in counting over his bags; as appears manifestly by the shame and vexation they feel upon failing of their Will, and the triumph and exultation they express upon prevailing.

Were the Will indifferent to all motives, and could give itself the turn without any previous cause influencing it thereto, all our actions, those of them at least that are moral, must remain absolutely contingent. How then can we depend upon any man that he will keep this or that tenor of conduct? Yet we daily repose a full confidence in one man, because we know he will deal honestly by us, and refuse it to another who we know would betray us. Oh! say they, the one has acquired a rectitude, and the other a perverseness of will. What do they mean by this rectitude and perverseness of will? A perverseness of mind I can understand, when satisfaction or desire fixes upon pernicious or deceitful views, and continually moves the Will to pursue them. If they will allow this to be a perverseness of will, I have no objection: but then this depends upon a quality in the Will to follow desire starting up perpetually to the thought, and he who has this desire stronger than any other, cannot remain indifferent whether he shall gratify it, or no. Other perverseness, I know none, but were there any other it must equally destroy indifference, for we see this perverseness once contracted determines the Will afterwards to act perversely as often as opportunity shall offer: so the will remains no longer at liberty to follow or reject the instigations of perverseness, nor is it the less bound for having brought the thraldom upon itself; as a man who sells

himself to the plantations is no less a servant, than the felon transported by judgment of law.

25. Thus the doctrine of indifferency, canvassed narrowly, contradicts and overthrows itself; for if indifferency be a privilege inherent in human nature, it can never depart from us, for we cannot lose our nature while we continue to be men. Then, although the Will should have given itself a perverseness, it might as well give itself a rectitude again, and vice versa, as often as it pleased without any previous cause or motive: and the behaviour of men would be totally uncertain and unsteady, for we should act right or wrong, prudently or foolishly, just as indifference happened to take the turn. But if indifferency, by I know not what magic, can control itself and persevere in the turn it has once taken, then we have our independency upon prior causes only upon some few occasions, that is, when we are to enter upon a new course of action, which having once determined, we proceed therein mechanically, like a ball put in motion, by virtue of the impulse first imparted. If this be the case, and merit or demerit extend no further than while the Will can act independently, why do your indifferencists ever punish for acts done in consequence of a perverseness already contracted? As soon as the perverseness appears, they ought to examine the degree of it, and appoint a punishment adequate thereto, which the party having suffered, has paid his penalty, and remains no longer obnoxious to the law: his independency is now gone, and nothing happening during its absence, can upon their principles be imputed to his account. Nevertheless, we find them forward enough to punish again for subsequent offences, proceeding from a perverse turn of will, visible many years before. Will they plead that the power of indifferency is a limited power, and that the Will may give itself so strong a determination, as it cannot afterwards resist by its own strength, therefore they throw in the terrors of punishment in counterbalance, to bring the weights so nearly equal, that the power of indifferency may suffice to turn the scale? Let them have a care how they allege this, because it will tear up the main foundation whereon they build their doctrine of indifference, namely, that without it there could be no demerit, and consequently no room for punishment: for here we see there is room for punishment, which may be lawfully inflicted, not solely with reference to past offences, but also as a necessary remedy to prevent the commission of them for the future. If they give us this inch, perhaps we may take an ell, and show by parity of reason, that the justice of rewards and punishments may remain in full extent, although there should be no such power as that of indifference.

What do they mean by a determination of the Will carrying us through a long course of behaviour? Do they conceive volition a permanent act, extending to a long series of performances? Surely they never reflected with themselves upon the operation of their own Wills, nor the manner of their own motions. We have it upon Mr. Locke's authority that the mind is capable of but one determination to one action at once: and his judgment stands confirmed by daily experience. Successive volitions keep us incessantly in play; each performs its several act, and has the sole direction of our powers for the present moment, both themselves and their effects being instantaneous and transitory, nor does one operate by any force received from a former. Whatever we may will to-day to do to-morrow, we shall perform or omit, according as we shall then be in the mind: for the actions of to-morrow depend upon the morrow's volitions, which are determined either by some motive occurring at the time, or else by the power of indif-

ferency then exerted. Therefore, to talk of the Will by a single act giving birth to many successive motions, and casting a perverseness upon itself that shall continue for days, months, and years, is talking unintelligibly; the continuance of a thing in its own nature momentary, being a contradiction in terms.

Were indifferency a privilege appendant to human nature, one would think all men should possess it in equal degree: but we see the same temptations overcome some men which others can resist, although both strive equally against them. Must we not then ascribe their different success either to the variety of colours wherein the same objects appear to different minds, or to the various strength of other motives they have to oppose against them? I know an old gentleman, who, being pressed by his physicians to go out in his chariot every day, as the only thing capable of relieving him in his infirmities, acknowledged the expedience of their advice, and wished to follow it, yet could never muster up resolution enough to do as he desired. What now was become of his power of indifferency, which was supposed able to control any motives, but could not here act in concurrence with the weightiest? Yet he could choose for himself upon other occasions, and act rightly when tempted to the contrary: and could even go out when he fancied something of moment called him. May we not then look out for some secret motive to account for this difference of behaviour? He had been a man of business, unused to stir, unless upon some affair of importance, and had contracted an aversion to your idle jaunts, taken for amusement only, as fit for none but women and triflers; therefore could not brook his mind to descend to them, although they were become matters of moment, by being necessary to his health.

26. Hitherto we have considered important actions, such as are undertaken with deliberation and design, or upon some distant purpose in prospect. We will now take a view of sudden and trifling motions, which scarce seem to have any motive inducing us to them, and therefore may be thought to proceed from the sole power of the Will. But there needs no great sagacity to observe, that the very want of employment creates an uneasiness, and almost every exertion of our activity affords a small degree of satisfaction, which, whatever first starts up to the fancy, prompts us to pursue. Whoever will take the trouble to watch men in their idle hours, will find a certain regularity in things done without regard to any rule: some habit acting uniformly sets them for the most part at work. For though different persons amuse themselves differently in an infinite variety of ways, each adheres steadily to his own kind of amusement, and acts most in character when he thinks of it least. Therefore, one man whistles, another sings, another dances, another plays with his fingers, when he has nothing else to do. Which shows that the Will has not an indifference, even with regard to trifles, but catches, from time to time, at such little motives as custom has taught to rise most readily in the imagination. One may discern the like causes in those bye motions which fill up the vacant spaces of time during our engagement in some earnest pursuit; when we set ourselves to think intensely, few of us leave our limbs entirely at rest, but give them various employment for every little interval while thought stops, and until it can find an issue; some play with their buttons, some twist their knee-strings, or rub the table, or kick their leg to and fro, or practise some innocent trick they have fallen into by accident, or catched by imitation from somebody else. Now in times of study or business, the

determination of the Will tends solely towards the principal end we labour to attain; the power of indifferency is all exerted that way: yet we see any idle habit can give a motion of its own to the Will, which, like a cord drawn to the stretch by a mighty force, may notwithstanding be bent to this side, or that, by the slightest lateral pressure.

Even in cases where the objects proposed to our option appear indifferent, as well to judgment as inclination, and the Will seems to determine by arbitrary power, because there is nothing else to give the preference; yet a prying eye may discover some latent motive that escaped the general notice. Suppose you call upon a friend just after dinner, before the bottles and glasses are removed. He asks, Will you take a glass of wine with us? Thank you, Sir, I do not care if I do. Shall I help you to red or white? Any that you have upon the table. Here are both. That that stands next your hand. See both bottles stand equally near. Why, then, white if you please. This little dialogue, happening frequently between friends, exhibits as much indifference as the mind of man can well be in; for we suppose neither wine disagreeing with your sromach, or displeasing to your palate, you had drank as much as you cared for before you came out, but a glass extraordinary will do you no harm, yet you are willing to be sociable, and therefore accept his offer, but civility makes you refer the choice of your wine to him, and the same civility prompts you afterwards to choose that which will give him the least trouble: but finding this will not do, and perceiving that further compliments would be troublesome, you take the first that occurs; for you cannot pronounce the words White and Red together, and as you want to end the dispute, whichever comes quickest to the tongue's end, is therefore fittest to relieve you from this want.

Why should choice be deemed an act of the will, when the understanding many times presents a choice ready made, without staying for the will to assist in the production? An ambassador, making his public entry, throws out money among the populace: a porter, scrambling among the crowd, spies a half-crown and a sixpence lying upon the ground; he can get either, but has not time for both, so he takes up the half-crown, not for any preference thrown upon it by his will, but from his knowledge that this piece will go five times as far at market as the other. Many times the will acts without any choice at all: a man hears a sudden cry of fire; he starts up instantly from his seat, and runs to see what is the matter. The alarm banishes all other ideas; he has not a thought of anything else he would not choose to do, nor even of forbearance from all kind of action. The wanton sallies of fancy proceed more from thoughtlessness than wrong election: ideas come in one by one without a competitor, and the mind follows the present whimsey, for want of seeing the inexpedience or impropriety attending it. Can this be called a choice? which in the very nature of it implies a judgment between several things, and a preference of one above another: but when one object only lies in view, there can be no preference, nor can one choose, but take that which alone is presented.

27. But I find there are persons of all characters in the interests of indifference. Those of a humourous turn, not being good at argument, endeavour to ridicule our doctrine of motives, by putting the case of an ass placed between two bundles of excellent hay, both equally alluring to his sense, who, they say, must starve in the midst of plenty, for want of being able to prefer either. It is no uncommon thing for wit to outrun discretion; therefore I would caution these jokers to beware how they anger their solemn friends of their own persuasion. For if the beasts

cannot live without a power of indifferency, what becomes of the noble privilege peculiar to human nature? It is rather a benefit we share in common with our brethren asses, who, by the right use of it, may merit as glorious rewards as ourselves. But we contemplative folks are not to be jested out of our notions; nor shall I scruple to own that their supposition is true in theory: and so it would have been, had they put the case of a sharpened pole, ten feet long, set upright upon a marble pavement, with the centre of gravity directly over the point, which would remain for ever in that posture, if nothing meddled with it. But I question whether such experiments be practicable: let them try, if they can, to place the ass, the pole, or their own mind, in such a situation. Should the beast shake his head ever so little, this may bring it nearer to one bundle, which will make the scent of that become the stronger: the least breath of air, or brush of a fly's wing is enough to throw down the pole: and imagination continually supplies us with motives, either great or small, either of judgment or fancy, sufficient to put the mental balance in motion.

Of the two, I believe instances of such an inability to act for want of motives, more likely to be met with in men than asses: I myself have met with them in my time. I remember once calling upon a friend in the Temple, to take a walk: we came down stairs presently, and then began to talk of the course we should steer. I found him irresolute, but would not interpose, having a curiosity to see the event: the business was whether we should go to the Park, or to Islington: we had no particular call to either, and both appeared equally agreeable. I believe we stood a full quarter of an hour in the court, before he could determine; for he was a man of gravity, used to weigh his motives carefully, and had rejected the impulses of fancy, until they had entirely lost their force: so he had nothing to sway with him, for you may suppose there could be no weighty reasons for preferring one tour before the other. Where now was his power of indifferency, which had he possessed in the lowest degree, might have helped him out at this dead lift?

Such hesitancies as these are weeds of the richest soils, being most frequently found in serious, considerate, and industrious sempers: but they will grow in more barren grounds. I have been pestered with them upon my own estate in former days, till I found out the secret of nourishing a crop of fancies, in those spots which judgment would not cover. I endeavour first to take direction from my reason; but if that has no commands, I give up the reins to fancy; if fancy presents me with double objects, I toss up, cross, or pile, rather than lose time in hesitating: for employment upon any motive, the best to be had, is better than no employment at all. I never could reap any service in those cases from indifference, for, so long as that lasts, I can do nothing at all: nor could I ever remove it unless by suggesting something expedient, or amusing to my imagination, which might urge me to bestir myself.

28. Thus have we examined every species of action, trifling and momentous, sudden and deliberate, fantastic and judicious, in search of an indifference to the preponderancy of motives, but in vain: nor is indifference anywhere to be found, unless in a suspension of action, while the motives hang doubtful, and the mind waits until some of them shall preponderate. I think now we may fairly conclude the mind enjoys no such privilege as this boasted power of indifferency. Nor would it be a valuable privilege if we had it: for as the turns it takes must be absolutely contingent, depending upon no prior cause, there is an even chance it might turn as well to

our detriment as our advantage: nor could we ever pursue a plan, or lay our measures surely, or complete any long work, for want of a sufficient dependence upon our own behaviour, or that of other persons; for the hazard of wrong elections disconcerting our schemes, would discourage us from attempting anything. Should you send for a surgeon to bleed you to-morrow, you could never depend upon his attendance; profit, credit, duty, his adherence to his profession, may urge him to come, but these operate only as motives, and neither you nor he can tell but his will to-morrow, by virtue of its arbitrary power, may annex the idea of best to the refusal or his assistance. Nobody can pretend here that the motives are so strong as to exceed the power of his will to control them: for certainly he may stay at home if he will, nor will his legs or his chariot bring him without some act of his will to order their motion.

29. But is it never in a man's power to change the pleasantness or unpleasantness, that is, the satisfaction or uneasiness accompanying any sort of action? Yes, says Mr. Locke, it is plain in many cases he can. One may change the displeasingness or indifferency in actions into pleasure and desire, by doing what lies in one's power towards effecting it. A due consideration will do it in some cases, and practice, application, and custom in most.—But he nowhere says it may be done by mere dint of volition, or otherwise than by the use of proper means, which means must lie within our reach, or we cannot procure the change. Is your tea bitter? You may sweeten it by putting in a knob of sugar: but not if there be no sugar in the dish. Does your meat taste insipid? You may give it a relish by sprinkling a little salt: but not if the salt have lost its savour. So, should you feel an averseness to labour, you may conquer it by contemplating the credit of industry, or shame of idleness; or the good fruits expected from your labours: but not if you have no value for reputation, nor desire of any particular benefit, attainable by diligence greater than your love of indolence.

For I look upon it as an invariable rule, that you can never bring a man into the liking of anything disagreeable, unless by means of something he already likes appearing connected therewith, or attainable solely thereby. Bread or tobacco, says Mr. Locke, may be neglected, when shown useful to health, because of an indifference or disrelish to them: reason and consideration at first recommends and begins their trial, and use finds, or custom makes them pleasant. That this is so in virtue too, is very certain. Thus, in his opinion, our very virtues derive from other sources than the power of indifferency. But if bread appears insipid, tobacco nauseous, or virtue disagreeable to the present taste, no man can render them otherwise or suddenly alter his palate, solely by willing it.

With respect to ourselves, indeed, we have another expedient for changing the state of our motives, by that command we have in some measure over our organs both of sensation and reflection. For as we can turn our eyes upon any object of the scene before us, and shut them against the light, or wink when it strikes too strongly upon them; so we can close the organs of reflection, bringing particular ideas to our notice, and thereby throw the course of thought into another channel: or, where we cannot entirely dam up the passage, we may sometimes obstruct it, thereby reducing the current to a smaller stream. This way we can, and very frequently do, alter the colour of our motives, by throwing a stronger attention upon them, or by removing, or obscuring their competitors. But when we take the latter method, it is no impeachment of the efficacy of motives that they do not strike when you shut your eyes upon them, or

discern them faintly; nor mark of absolute power in the Will that is forced to thrust out of sight, a motive which it could not resist: and when the former, it is the reflection, not the Will, that adds colour to the motive. For, as when you put sugar into your mouth, it is the sugar, not yourself, that affects your palate with sweetness, notwithstanding you put it in yourself: so when you throw a strong attention upon some particular idea, it is the state of your organs, not your Will, that heightens its colours, although you put them into that state by an act of your Will. Certain it is, we do sometimes pluck up a resolution to surmount a pain, a labour, a danger, without suggesting fresh reasons to encourage us; and this I take to be done by some such method as that above spoken of; for earnest, eager resolution is a kind of temporary passion, brought upon us by our own procurement, and it is well known we may work ourselves up by degrees into almost any passion, by dwelling upon ideas, fomenting it without admission of others. Upon these occasions, I conceive the mind raises an extraordinary motion in some parts of the animal circulation, which then runs more rapidly than while under command in the service of our ordinary purposes. For it seems apparent from the quick violent starts of motion, the ferment of spirits, the solicitous turn of countenance, usual in times of vigorous resolution, that the body bears no inconsiderable share in the business.

30. This power over the organs I take to be indeed the grand privilege of human nature, for I can discern nothing of it in the brute creation. It is true our notions concerning them amount at most only to conjecture, for we know not certainly what passes within them, nor in what manner they proceed to action. Remembrance, fancy, and some degree of knowledge, cannot well be denied them; unless you suppose them mere machines, which, though perhaps it cannot be demonstratively disproved, there is not the least shadow of positive evidence to prove that they are: but their ideas come up uncalled, being occasioned, for the most part, either by sensible objects, or the motions of their animal juices, or particular state of their bodies: nor can I discern any such thing as voluntary reflection, or any control of fancy belonging to them; which therefore remains the peculiar property of man. From hence spring all our virtues, all our rules of prudence, all our measures of conduct; and upon this principally, though not entirely, stands the justice of reward and punishment; for we reward and punish the beasts, to bring them thereby to do something we like, or deter them from something we dislike. If our opponents will accept of this power in lieu of their indifferency, as equally serviceable to all useful purposes, they are heartily welcome, but I cannot allow them that both are the same thing. For indifferency implies a power in the will, or furnishing the idea of Best out of its own store and by its own sole authority, without recourse to any contrivance or artifice to obtain it. And because a man may give the preference between two objects proposed to his option, either by suggesting considerations, recommending the one and dissuading the other, or by throwing a stronger attention upon one and withholding it from the other, it no more shows an indifferency of the Will, or a power of annexing Best to what appears Worst in the judgment, than because one may make a pebble outshine a diamond, either by covering them with different kinds of paint; or, by diminishing the light falling upon the latter, and increasing that upon the former, it shows an indifferency in the eye, or a power of annexing lustre to objects naturally obscure.

31. Besides, whoever will diligently examine the state of his mind, when

he gives this supposed arbitrary preference, will always find opposite desires accosting him at those times, to one of which he harbours a secret prepossession or favour, therefore practises every art to make that prevail in his imagination: and this alike in the right or the wrong exercises of his power. If pleasure, profit, or resentment, solicit to act, and the still voice of conscience whispers to forbear: one man has a love of virtue which he cannot easily forego, therefore he suppresses all instigations of passion that might draw him aside, for he will not suffer his beloved and valued object to be wrested from him; or fortifies himself in his desire, by considerations proper for that purpose, or the earnest contemplation of what he used always to behold with delight; another man has a favourite inclination which he longs to gratify, but reason puts in her negative: therefore he stifles the cries of reason, or turns a deaf ear against them, lest they should importune him too much; or hunts for any excuses or palliations he can muster up; or casts a wistful look upon his darling, whom he is unwilling to leave, and contemplates so long until all other ideas are banished out of his thought. Thus, in reality, the preference is already given, before we enter upon the act, whereby we fancy ourselves conferring it; nor was the mind indifferent whether such act should be performed or no: and the subsequent determination or idea of Best thrown into the doubtful scale, comes from the means used to effect it, not from the Will. But if you ascribe it to the Will because that applies the means, you might with better reason ascribe it to the predominant inclination, because that puts the Will upon making such application. For whatever the Will does towards annexing the idea of Best, even supposing it to do the business without employing any other means than its own inherent power; nevertheless, it acts herein ministerially, not authoritatively, but in service of the favourite desire, to which therefore the credit and merit of the performance belongs.

32. What has been said concerning the methods and organs employed in bringing about a determination of the mind, accounts for the limitation of that power, and the difficulty attending the exercise of it; for our organs can perform their office for a certain time, but no longer. A man may walk a mile with pleasure, but when he has walked five, he may find it fatiguing; nor perhaps can he walk twenty at all, because his legs tire long before. So he may hold up a weight at arm's length for some time; but cannot keep in that posture for ever, for the muscles of his arm will grow weary. The same may be said of satiety, which proceeds from an alteration in our organs, as weariness does from an alteration in the state of our muscles. We may like venison prodigiously for a day or two, but should be terribly cloyed had we nothing else to feed upon during the whole season: for the palate being over-clogged, no longer receives the flavour in the same manner as before. This of course limits our power to that proportion of labour the instruments we have to serve us are capable of bearing, and confines our activity to that compass of time whereto the relish of things may extend. But I know of no labour, no difficulty, no satiety, in pure acts of the mind: we are never tired of commanding so long as our limbs and organs are not tired of executing: we will from morning to night without intermission, and without trouble; and though our employments often fatigue and nauseate, let but some new desire give play to a quite different set of organs, and the mind runs after it with as much freshness and eagerness as if it had never done anything. Upon coming home quite wearied down with a long journey, a man may give orders for his conveniences and refreshments to be brought him, perhaps with more ease and relish than he

had in first mounting his horse. After a long morning spent in hard study, we could easily find volition enough to continue the work, but that our head aches, our spirits fail, and nature can no longer bear the fatigue; wherefore labour of mind is as often called labour of brain, and more truly belongs to the latter than the former. Even at night, when all kind of action becomes irksome, it is not the Will but the eye that draws straws, for the mind does not desire to sleep so long as the body can hold awake. What then should limit our power with respect to anything we can do by barely willing it? Why do we ever strive to exert such power and fail in the attempt? or why do we succeed at one time and fail at another? A man may as easily will to walk a hundred miles as one, or to lift up the house as to take up his slipper, if he can believe himself able; every one sees why he cannot do either, namely, from the deficiency of his strength: but what the Will has once performed, it then had strength to perform; what then is become of this strength, that it cannot perform the same again? Does the Will grow feeble and vigorous by turns, like the muscles, upon labour or rest? If we assign for cause, that the Will used some medium before which now is wanting, the difference may be accounted for much better than by any variation of strength in the Will itself.

History informs us that Mutius Scevola held his hand in the fire till it was burnt to the bone; therefore burning was susceptible of the idea of Best: why then could not you and I pluck up the like resolution? But perhaps we can annex the idea to some objects he could not. One man can restrain his appetite of meats and drinks, but cannot refuse the offers of ambition: another can reject all temptations of unlawful gain, but cannot resist the impulses of anger. Is there then a strong and a weak side in the Will? or are the Wills of men cast in different moulds? One may readily conceive how the various degrees of resolution may arise from the strength of spirits, texture of brain, habit, education, or turn of imagination, but from the constitution or mould of the Will it seems inexplicable. When we take up a strong resolution, we find pains and difficulty in keeping it, and often faint in the midway after having made a very good beginning. A pain or trouble that a man has borne patiently for a while, shall sometimes fairly overcome him without growing stronger, merely by tiring him out. This, not to repeat what I have said before of the effects visible upon the body, shows that there are organs or nerves employed upon those occasions which require labour to keep them upon the stretch, and can serve us no longer than to a certain period, but may acquire strength, like our limbs, by constant use and practice.

33. After all, the very expression of a power belonging to the Will, when used in philosophical discourses, will not bear a strict examination. Will, in the vulgar sense, stands for a pressing inclination, or strong conviction of judgment, to which we may properly enough ascribe the power of making labour pleasant and difficulties easy. But if we go into the land of abstraction and study the language current there, what must we understand by Will but the turn of the mind's activity? The mind has power to move our limbs and organs of reflection, but none of them will move by the bare possession of this power unless it be directed some particular way, and this direction we call our Will: therefore our actions all depend upon the Will: such as our volitions are, such will they be. So the wind has power to drive the clouds or ships along, but there being such a force in winds avails nothing unless it be turned to some particular point of the compass: therefore the courses of the vessel depend upon the turn of the wind, for it can-

not get into port while the wind sets a contrary way. Now to talk of a power of the turn of the power of the wind would be accounted mere jargon: and how much better is it to contend for a power of the turn of the power of the mind? Yet have we been talking and arguing all along in that style, nor could do otherwise: for one must speak like other folks if one would speak to be understood, and this may plead our excuse. For custom has a despotic authority in matters of language, so far as to render even nonsense and absurdity reputable by turning them into propriety of speech.

34. Is there then no liberty at all in human action? no freedom of Will? Are we under a constant necessity, and our motions all brought upon us by the cogency of causes, without our intervention or power to control? By no means: neither Mr. Locke nor I ever dreamt of such a notion. As for necessity, I cannot be suspected of inclining to that, since the little conference I had with Doctor Hartley upon the road. For freedom of action, Mr. Locke strongly asserts it; but we both apprehend it to consist in our being so circumstanced as that action will follow or not upon our willing to do it or forbear: nor will our present opposers, I believe, controvert this point with us. When upon using our endeavours towards something lying within the compass of our natural powers, some obstacle would prevent their taking effect, then is our liberty gone: when no such hindrance intervenes but that we shall effect our purpose, or not, according as we try for it or forbear, then are we free; and nevertheless so for being influenced thereto by consideration of judgment or instigation of fancy. He that relieves a family in distress gives his money freely, although he does it upon motives of charity or compassion or particular kindness, and would have kept his money in his pocket had he not had those or any other inducements whatever to part with it. He that goes to stir his fire is not at liberty while anybody holds back his hand, but the moment they let him alone, his liberty returns, and he acts freely, though he falls a poking for the sake of warming himself: and even though he should resolve to bear the cold in his toes till he can bear it no longer, still when he puts forth his hand to relieve himself it is his own free act, for the poker would not have stirred of itself had not he meddled with it, neither would the muscles of his arm have operated to extend it without some act of the mind to begin their motion.

35. As to freedom of Will, how much soever Mr. Locke may seem to reject it in words, where he declares liberty as little applicable to Will as swiftness to sleep or squareness to virtue, yet I do not apprehend him denying it in substance, nor that he would count me heterodox for holding what I take to be generally understood by freewill. For I conceive the exercise of this to be only a particular species of action performed in raising up ideas or fixing them in the mind, which shall determine us to such volitions as we want. And this we may and do practise every day of our lives: we determine upon things beforehand and execute them punctually, we form resolutions for difficult undertakings, we collect reasons to support us in them, we fortify ourselves with motives, we inculcate them deep in our imagination, and afterwards find they produce the effect we expected. Thus we have a power over our future volitions, and in respect of that power, are capable either of liberty or restraint. For if any obligation or compulsion prevents us from exerting this power, or any prevailing dread or inclination obstructs so that it cannot take effect, though we still remain at liberty to act, we are not at liberty to will as we desire: if no such obstruction or hindrance lies in the way, we are perfectly free both to will and to do. And after the determination made, our liberty still remains to change it by the

like methods whereby we established it at first, though we shall never employ them unless we happen to view the matter in a different light from that we saw it in before. Nor is liberty the less for our being prompted to use it this way or that by reasons or motives inducing us thereto. But here we must distinguish between want of liberty and want of power: for our title to freedom accruing to us only in respect of our power, we can be capable either of liberty or restraint no further than our power extends. He that goes to push down a stone wall fails in his attempt through a defect of strength, not of liberty, provided you do not restrain him from thrusting and shoving against it as long as he pleases. So we may attempt in vain to overcome the terror of any great pain or danger, without an impeachment of our free will. None of us but may, if he will, thrust his hand into burning coals like Scevola, for the hand will undoubtedly obey the orders of the mind, should she so direct; but we cannot bring our mind to such a pitch of resolution, because we have not command enough over our imagination, nor motives in store sufficient to overbalance the smart of the fire. Yet nothing hinders us from trying, therefore we are at liberty to exert such power over our will as we have; and if any strong desire incite us, we shall employ our organs of imagination however inadequate to the task, so long as we can retain any hope of prevailing, there being no encouragement to try where we are sure to fail of success. For there is a manifest difference between the two cases; where some secret reluctance prevents us from using our best endeavours to bring the mind into a right temper, and where we set about it heartily and in good earnest, but want strength to compass our design.

Therefore I am not for expunging the term freewill out of our vocabulary, nor against exhorting men to raise their wills to a proper pitch, when some laborious enterprise is to be gone upon. But there is no occasion to trouble them with niceties concerning their manner of going to work, for though they have not the power of indifferency to determine their Will without the use of means, yet if you can once stir up in them an unreserved desire of exerting themselves, they will hit upon the proper means, without knowing what they be: just as we move our limbs by touching the nerve leading to each particular muscle, without knowing what nerves we have, or where they lie. The common notions of liberty serve well enough for the common uses of life; and were it possible totally to eradicate them, there must ensue a total stagnation of business and cessation of all activity whatever: for nobody would stir a finger, nor resolve upon any future measures of conduct, if he conceived himself not at liberty either to act or will otherwise than necessity should urge him. They may contain some inconsistencies which men of plain sense do not see, and so never perplex themselves therewith, nor yet suffer any inconveniences from this their want of discernment. The young lady spoken of some time ago, who stayed away from the ball because her aunt disapproved of it, could say she had a good Will to go, and forbore much against her Will, yet declare in the next breath that she might have gone if she would, but chose to stay at home, because she would not disoblige the old gentlewoman. She saw no contradiction in these expressions, nevertheless appears to have been a sensible girl by this instance of self-denial, and I doubt not had discretion enough to gratify her inclinations, or restrain them, whenever either were most proper: and this perhaps without having ever heard of the terms Velleity and Volition; nor had anybody done her a kindness that had taught her them, for she could not have conducted herself better, had she known them ever so well.

36. But when we would penetrate into the depths of philosophy, we cannot proceed to any good purpose, without a philosophical microscope: therefore before we begin the attempt, we ought to examine whether nature has furnished us with a good one, and whether we have brought it into due order by care and application. How much soever people may make themselves merry with me for talking of my microscope, I shall not be laughed out of it while I find it so necessary for discovering the secrets of human nature. And I can comfort myself the easier, because I observe our reprovers themselves very fond of using something like it: but they have only a common magnifying glass, such as we give children to play with, which just enables them to discern objects not obvious to the naked eye, but does not exhibit a perfect view of their shape and colour; therefore they see distinctions without a difference, and perplex instead of instructing mankind. But the possessors of a good microscope see the difference too, which they either find immaterial or turn to some useful service: it is observable they never unsettle the minds of men, nor combat with received opinions, and though they may seem to oppose them for a while, it is only in order to establish them upon a more solid foundation, to render them more clearly intelligible, or purify them from error and extravagance. They have many things to discourse of, not cognizable by the vulgar, for which they must find names and phrases not current in ordinary traffic: hence it comes that philosophy has a language peculiar to herself, a little different from that of common conversation, from which nevertheless it ought to vary as little as possible. But your half-reasoners, getting a smattering of the language, without a thorough knowledge, lose their mother tongue, and acquire no other in lieu, so they are fit to converse neither with the vulgar nor the learned: for they puzzle the former with their shrewd observations, and stand in the way of the latter with their cavils and blunders. They add nothing to the public stock of knowledge, but deal altogether in objections, without knowing how to solve them, or being able to understand a solution when given: and if they take up an opinion at hap-hazard, they fortify themselves in it by throwing a cloud of dust over whatever shall be offered to undeceive them, and thus if they can escape conviction by confounding themselves, they look upon it as a complete victory.

Enough has been said, and perhaps more than enough, upon indifference; but I have still a long chapter in reserve for human liberty together with those three concomitants which never fail to enter the thoughts when contemplating freedom of Will, Necessity, Certainty, and Fatality. But this I must postpone until I have gathered sufficient materials, which I hope to pick up here and there in the progress of my search: and when I have gotten matters together preparatory for the task, I have such confidence in the microscope, having already found it serviceable upon many occasions, that I doubt not to follow, without losing or breaking the threads, all the twistings and crossings, and entanglements in those intricate subjects that have hitherto perplexed the learned world: for men of plain understandings would never trouble their heads about them were they let alone by the others. All my concern is where to get a good pencil to delineate exactly what I see, so as to make it apparent to another. I wish it were invariably true what I find laid down by many, That clear conception produces clear expression; but I have often experienced the contrary myself, and Tully, that great master of language, maintains there is a particular art of conveying one's thoughts without dropping by the way anything of that pre-

cision and colour belonging to them in our own minds. When the time comes, I shall try to do my best, than which nobody can desire more; and in the mean while shall return back to the course wherein I was proceeding.

37. The ninth and last remark I have to make upon satisfaction and uneasiness is this, That they are perceptions of a kind peculiar to themselves, analogous to none others we have, yet capable of joining company with any others. We neither hear, nor see, nor taste, nor imagine them, yet find some degree or other of them in almost everything we hear, or see, or taste, or reflect upon. But though they often change their companions, they never change their nature: the same thing may become uneasy that before was satisfactory, but satisfaction never cloys, and uneasiness never loses its sting. Sometimes nature assigns them their places on her original constitution of the subjects, and sometimes custom, practice or accident introduce them. To some sensations and reflections they adhere strongly, not to be removed at all or not without much labour, time, and difficulty; and upon others they sit so lightly that the least breath of air can blow them away. They have their seasons of absence and residence, lasting longer or shorter as it happens, and often trip nimbly from object to object without tarrying a moment upon any: and when separated make no other difference in the idea they leave, than that of their being gone. For in a picture that you looked upon at first with delight and afterwards with indifference, you shall perceive no alteration of form or colour or other circumstance than that it once gave you pleasure, but now affords you none. Sometimes they propagate their own likeness upon different subjects; at others they come into one another's places successively in the same. One while they come and go unaccountably; at another, one may discern the causes of their migration: for an idea, whereto satisfaction was annexed, entering into a compound which is afterwards divided again, the satisfaction shall rest upon a different part from that whereto it was at first united; and a satisfactory end shall often render the means conducive thereto satisfactory, after the end is removed out of view. Some things please by their novelty, and others displease from their strangeness: custom brings the latter to be pleasant, but repetition makes the former nauseous.

All which seems to indicate that there is some particular spring or nerve appropriated to affect us with satisfaction or uneasiness, which never moves unless touched by some of the nerves bringing us our other ideas: and that the body, being a very complicated machine, as well in the grosser as the finer of its organs, they delight or disturb us in various degrees according as in the variety of their play they approach nearer or remove further from the springs of satisfaction or uneasiness. For as the difference of our ideas depends probably upon the form, or magnitude, or motion, or force of the organs exhibiting them, one cannot suppose the same organ by the variations of its play affecting us either with pleasure or pain without producing an alteration in our ideas. Now what those springs are, where they lie, or by what kind of motion they operate upon us either way, I shall not attempt to describe: nor is it necessary we should know so much; for if we can learn what will give us pleasure or pain, and how to procure the one and avoid the other, we ought to rest fully contented, without knowing the manner in which they produce their effect. And in order to attain so much knowledge as we want, I shall endeavour to examine how our ideas form into compounds, and how satisfaction becomes united to them, or is transferred from one to another.

CHAP. VII.

SENSATION.

Sensation, as we learn from Mr. Locke, and may find by our own observation, is the first inlet and grand source of knowledge, supplying us with all our ideas of sensible qualities; which, together with other ideas arising from them, after their entrance into the mind, complete our stores of knowledge and materials of reason.

Sensations come to us from external objects striking upon our senses. When I say external, I mean with respect to the mind; for many of them lie within the body, and for the most part reach us by our sense of feeling. Hunger and thirst, weariness, drowsiness, the pain of diseases, repletion after a good meal, the pleasure of exercise and of a good flow of spirits, are all of this kind. But sometimes we receive sensations by our other senses too, coming from no object without us: as in the visions and noises frequent in high fevers; the nauseous tastes accompanying other distempers, and the noisome smell remaining many days with some persons after catching an infection of the small-pox. For whatever in our composition affects our senses in the same manner as external objects used to do, excites a sensation of the same kind in the mind.

I shall not go about to describe what are to be understood by external objects, for any man may know them better by his own common sense than by any explanation of mine: but I think it worth while to observe that they are not always either the original or immediate causes giving birth to our sensations. When we look upon a picture, the sun or candle shining upon it primarily, and the rays reflected from it and image penciled upon our retina subsequently, produce the idea in our mind; yet we never talk of seeing them, but the picture, which we account the sole object of our vision. So when Miss Courteous entertains you with a lesson upon her harpsichord, both she and the instrument are causes operating to your delight, for you thank her for the favour, and may speak indifferently of hearing the one or the other: but when you consider what is the object of your hearing, you will not call it either the lady or the harpsichord, but the music.

2. It is remarkable that although both visible and sonorous bodies act equally by mediums, one of light and the other of air, vibrating upon our organs, yet in the former case we reckon the body the object, but in the latter the sound of the air: I suppose because we can more readily and frequently distinguish the place, figure, and other qualities, of bodies we see than of those affecting our other senses. We have smells in our noses, but cannot tell what occasioned them; tastes remain in our mouths after spitting out the nauseous thing that offended us: we may feel warmth without knowing from whence it proceeds; and the blow of a stick, after the stick itself has been thrown into the fire and consumed. And that this distinction of bodies denominates them objects of vision, appears further, because some, having in a course of experiments been shown a calf's eye whereon they see the miniature of a landscape lying before it delineated, very learnedly insist that the image penciled on the backside of our eye, and not the body therein represented, is the object we behold. But unless

like Aristotle they hold the mind to be existing in every part of our frame, they must allow that neither is this image the immediate object of our discernment, but some motion or configuration of the optic nerves, propagated from thence to the sensory. Therefore it is the safest way to take that for the object which men generally esteem to be such: for should we run into a nice investigation of the causes successively operating to vision, we shall never be able to settle whether the object of our lucubrations be the candle, or the light flowing thence, or the letters of our book, or the light reflected from thence, or the print of them upon our eye, or the motion of our nerves. If we once depart from the common construction of language, and will not agree with others, that we see the lines we read, we may as well insist that we see the candle, or the optic nerves, as the image in our retina.

But with regard to the sense of hearing there is no such difficulty started, because you cannot, by dissecting a calf's ear, exhibit anything therein to your scholars similar to the lowings of a cow which the calf heard when alive. Wherefore learned and simple agree in calling sound the object of hearing: nevertheless, every one knows that it must proceed from the cry of some animal, play of some instrument, collision, or other action of some body making the sound. When imagination works without anything external to strike upon the senses, we call our ideas the objects of our thought, because we cannot discern anything else from whose action they should arise: yet this does not hinder but that such of them at least, as come upon us involuntarily, may proceed from something in our humours, or animal circulation, conveying them to the mind; and were we as familiarly acquainted with these as we are with visible bodies, we should call them the objects.

3. Our manner of talking, that the senses convey ideas from objects without us, implies as if ideas were something brought from thence to the mind: but whether they really be so, is more than we know, or whether there be any resemblance between them and the bodies exhibiting them. The sense of hearing bids the fairest for such conveyance; for when you strike upon a bell, you put it thereby into a tremulous motion, which agitates the air with the like tremors; and those again generate similar vibrations in the auditory nerves, and perhaps propagate the same onward to that fibre, or last substance, whose modification is the idea affecting us, with sound.

Colours seem agreed on all hands to be not existing in bodies after the same manner as they appear to our apprehension. The learned tell you they are nothing but a certain configuration in the surfaces of objects, adapted to reflect some particular rays of light and absorb the rest: and though the unlearned speak of colours as being in the bodies exhibiting them, I take this to proceed only from the equivocal sense of the word colour, which stands indifferently either for the sensation, or the quality of exciting it. For if you question the most illiterate person breathing, you will always find him ascribing the sensation to the mind alone, and the quality of raising it to the object alone, though perhaps he might call both by the name of colour: but he will never fancy the rose has any sensation of its own redness, nor, could your mind and sensory be laid open to his view when you look upon a rose, would he ever expect to find any redness there. The like may be said of heat and cold, which signify as well our sensations as the modifications of bodies occasioning them: therefore, though we say the fire is hot, and makes us hot, we do not mean the same

thing by the same word in both places. When nurse sets her child's pannikin upon the fire to warm, she does not imagine the fire will infuse a sensation of heat into the pap, but only will communicate a like quantity of raising warmth in her, should she thrust her finger or the tip of her tongue into it; and when she feels herself warmed by the fire, she never dreams that this feeling will impart its likeness to the child, without application of her warm hands, or a double clout having received the like quality of warming from the fire. When we talk of fire melting metals, or burning combustibles by the intenseness of its heat, we mean the quality it has of producing the alterations we see made in those bodies; and this we denominate heat, from that best known effect we find it have upon ourselves, in raising a burning smart in our flesh, whenever we approach near enough. Therefore, those, who would find fault with us for attributing colour, heat, and cold, to inanimate bodies, take us up before we were down; for by such expressions we do not understand the sensations, but the qualities giving rise to them, which qualities really belong to the bodies: so that I shall stand by my plain neighbours in maintaining snow to be white, fire hot, ice cold, lilies sweet, poppies stinking, pork savory, wormwood bitter, and the like, which they may justly do, without offence either to propriety of speech, or to sound philosophy.

4. We are not troubled with the like shrewd objections against pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, because those are commonly appropriated to the perceptions of the mind, and not spoken of as residing in bodies without us. Yet we lay ourselves open to criticism here too, as often as we talk of a pain in our toes, or a tickling in the palms of our hands, for it might be alleged the limbs are incapable of feeling either, and can only raise sensations of them in the mind. And we might as justly be charged with incorrectness, in complaining of our mind being uneasy; and our bed being uneasy; but our defence shall be, that the term carries a different force in the two parts of this sentence; for every child knows that if the bed becomes uneasy by the feathers clotting together into hard knobs, it is not because the lumps give uneasiness to the bed itself, but because they will make any one uneasy that shall lie upon them. But though pleasure and pain be perceptions, yet we may have an idea of them in their absence, or even in the presence of their contraries: for we often remember past pleasures, when gone from us, with regret, and think of an evil we have escaped with joy at the deliverance; and this regret, or joy increases in proportion to the strength and clearness we have of the enjoyment or suffering, we now expect to feel no more.

Magnitude, figure, and motion, are reputed both by learned and vulgar to reside in the bodies wherein we observe them: yet it cannot be denied, that they suffer alterations in their conveyance to the mind, whether that be made through the sight, or the touch; they being all motion in the rays of light, the organs or other channels wherealong they pass, and that a different kind of motion from any in the bodies themselves. Nor, on arriving at the seat of the mind, can we say they reassume the same form they had at first setting out: magnitude assuredly does not, for when we look upon the cupola of St. Paul's, we cannot suppose any thing within us of equal size with the object it represents; nor do we know whether there be anything of similar figure: and when we see a chariot drive swiftly before us, it is hardly probable, that the ends of our fibres imitate that whirling motion we discern in the wheels. But since it is the received opinion that magnitude, figure, and motion, are in the bodies such as we apprehend them to be, I

shall take it for granted, nor shall I urge the changes they may receive in their passage to the mind as an argument to the contrary, because I know that in other cases, ideas may be conveyed by mediums very dissimilar to themselves: when we read, or hear read, the description of a palace, or a garden, a battle, or a procession, there is nothing in the letters we look upon, or the sounds we hear uttered, at all resembling the scenes they describe; nevertheless, we have a full and clear conception of all the circumstances relating to them, conveyed either way to our understanding. As for solidity, when distinguished from hardness, I apprehend we have no direct sensation of that, but gather it from our observation of the resistance of bodies against one another, and of their constantly thrusting them away before they can enter into their places.

5. Sensations from external objects come to us ordinarily through certain mediums, either of light, air, or effluvia, feeling only excepted, which, for the most part, requires that the substance exciting it should lie in contact with some part of our body; yet, things intensely hot, or cold, we can feel at a distance. But, when the causes of sensation have reached the surface of our body, we must not think they have done their business there, for perception lies not at the eyes, or the ears, or the nose, or the tongue, or the finger ends; therefore, the influences of objects, after entering the body, have several stages to pass through in their progress towards the seat of perception. How many of these stages there may be, I shall not pretend to reckon up, but I suspect them to be very numerous, and that the parts of our machine, like the wheels of a clock, transmit their influence to one another successively, through a long series of motions. But it seems convenient to divide them into two classes, which I shall call the bodily, and the mental organs, as this division tallies well enough with our usual manner of expressing ourselves, concerning what passes within us. For we have many ideas arising involuntarily to our imagination, besides others we call up to our remembrance by our own activity; and upon all these occasions, the whole transaction is esteemed to be carried on by the mind alone, without intervention of the body, without impulse of external objects, and by the sole working of our thoughts. But we have shown in a former place, that the idea perceived, must be something numerically distinct from the thing perceiving it, and that there are certain mediums employed in exhibiting it to our view, as well when it comes of its own accord, as upon call; for which reason, we find particular ideas more or less easily introduced, according as our mind stands disposed to entertain them. Whence it follows that there is an organization in the mind itself, which throws up objects to our thought, or which we use to bring them there, when nothing external interferes, and the senses remain inactive: and this is what I understand by the mental organs.

6. But since I have spoken of mental organs, and extended the machinery of our frame quite into the mind itself, it is necessary, for avoiding the scandal that might be taken thereat, to observe that the word Mind, as used in our ordinary discourses, is an equivocal term: for we suppose our knowledge of all kinds to be contained in the mind, and yet speak of incidents bringing particular things to our mind which we knew before: but if Mind were the same in both places, it were absurd to talk of bringing a thing to mind which was there already. Therefore, Mind sometimes stands, in the philosophical sense, for that part of us which acts and perceives, or, as Tully expresses it, which wills, which lives, which has vigour; and to this Mind

I ascribe no organization: for I conceive perception to be what it is at once, unchangeable and momentary, having no progress from one place to another, like the influence of objects transmitted from channel to channel, along our organs. In like manner I apprehend action, while exerted by the mind, to be instantaneous and invariable, until reaching the first subject whereon the mind acts, where it becomes impulse, and continues such during its passage to the extremities of our limbs, in the same manner as motion propagated from body to body impelling one another. Now whether this philosophical mind be still a compound, or a pure and simple substance, whether material or immaterial, I have hitherto forborne to examine: I may, one time or other, do my best towards discussing this very point fully, when, whatever I may prove to others, my own opinion thereon will appear sufficiently manifested; though at present I choose to leave the question undecided, as being too early to take in hand.

But we frequently use Mind, in the vulgar sense, for the repository of our ideas, as when we talk of storing up knowledge in the mind, of enriching her with learning, or adorning her with accomplishments: for those stores and treasures are certainly not in the mind spoken of in the former paragraph, because then we must actually perceive them all, so long as they remain in our possession; but I defy any man, with his utmost efforts, to call to mind the thousandth part of all the knowledge he has in store. Where then is that stock of knowledge which lies dormant and unperceived? If you understand something of mathematics and something of agriculture; while busy in giving orders to your bailiff for the management of your grounds, your mind continues wholly intent upon the latter, nor do you perceive any one mathematical truth. What then is become of your mathematical knowledge in the interim? You have not lost it, you still retain it in possession, but where shall we seek for its residence? It is not in your closet, it is not in your hand, yet it lies somewhere within your custody: and where else can we place it, with any propriety of speech, unless in your mind, which you have improved with the acquisition of that science? But this mind, which discerns not what it possesses, must be something different from that whereby you perceive whatever you have under immediate contemplation. Now concerning the vulgar mind, I shall not scruple to pronounce, because I may do it without offence to anybody, that it is a compound consisting of parts; one vigorous and percipient, which is strictly the mind, the other inert and insensible, furnishing objects for the former to perceive: which latter I would call the repository of ideas, containing under parts in all probability of a corporeal nature, distributed into channels, filaments, or organs; and that our knowledge, that is, our ideas, or the causes of them, lie here ready for use, and proceed mechanically from organ to organ, until their last operation, whereby they raise in us perceptions. In short, I take the ambiguity of the word Mind to arise from the grossness of our conceptions: for though the mind alone be properly ourselves, and all else of the man an adjunct or instrument employed thereby, yet in our ordinary conversation we consider the body, the limbs, the flesh, and the skin, as parts of ourselves; nay, sometimes even our clothes, it being usual to say, You have dirted me, or have wetted me, when somebody has happened to splash either upon one's coat. And when we go to distinguish between the body and the mind, we do not separate them carefully enough in our thoughts, but take some of the finer parts of the former into our idea of the latter.

7. This imperfect division of man into his two constituent parts, has in-

troduced an inaccuracy and contrariety into our expressions, which whoever shall try to escape in discoursing upon human nature, will perhaps find it impracticable: for though we may model our thoughts for ourselves, we must take our language from other people. I had intended at first setting out to appropriate Mind to the percipient part, but have found myself insensibly drawn in to employ it in another signification upon several occasions: nor could I avoid doing so without coining new terms and new phrases, which might have looked uncouth, abstruse, and obscure, and formed a language not current in any country upon earth. But to deliver oneself intelligibly, one must adopt the conception and idioms common among mankind: and we find talents, qualifications, and accomplishments, generally ascribed to the mind, which I conceive depends upon the difference of our organization. This led me into the notion of mental organs which I beg leave still to pursue, and to speak indifferently of mind in the philosophical or vulgar sense, as either shall best suit my purpose. If anybody shall think me worth a little careful attention, he may quickly perceive, by the context or occasion, in which signification I employ the term at any particular time: but it was necessary to warn him of the double meaning, because without such caution I might have been grossly misunderstood, and thought to advance doctrines the farthest in the world from my sentiments.

Sensations from bodies we are conversant with come to us mostly through external mediums first, then through our bodily, and lastly through our mental organs; and the workings of our thoughts require no other conveyance than the latter: therefore, these, in all cases, are the immediate causes exhibiting ideas to our perception. For the mind sits retired in kingly state, nothing external, nothing bodily being admitted to her presence: and though in sensation, the notice be received from things without us, they only deliver their message to the mental organs, which by them is carried into the royal cabinet. Thus, whether we see and hear, or whether we remember what we have formerly seen and heard, the mind receives her perception directly by the same hand: and how much soever sensible objects may give us information remotely, the pictures of them in our imagination, are what we immediately discern, as well as when they arise there without any apparent external cause: nor do we ordinarily distinguish them any otherwise, than by finding the former more lively and vigorous than the latter: for which reason, in dreams and strong impressions of fancy, we sometimes mistake them for real sensations.

CHAP. VIII.

REFLECTION.

As we have all been children before we were men, we have, I doubt not, amused ourselves at that season with many childish diversions; one of which, we may remember, was that of burning a small stick at the end to a live coal, and whisking it round to make gold lace, as we called it. We little thought then of making experiments in philosophy, but we may turn this innocent amusement to that use in our riper years, by gathering from thence, that our organs can continue sensation after the impulse of objects exciting it is over. For the coal is in one point only at one instant of time,

and can be seen nowhere else than where it is; yet there appears an entire circle of fire, which could not happen, unless the light, coming from it at every point, put the optic nerves into a motion, that lasted until the object returned unto the same point again, nor unless this motion raised the same perception in the mind, as it did upon the first striking of the light. For if the stick be not twirled swiftly enough, so as that it cannot make a second impression from the same point, before the motion excited in the optics by the first is over, you will not see a whole fiery ring, but a lucid spot passing successively through every part of the circle. He that has been in a great mob, and dinned with incessant noise, clamour, and shouting, if he can get suddenly into a close place, and shut himself up from their hearing, will still have the sound ring for a while in his ears. So likewise upon receiving the blow of a stick, we feel the stroke when the stick touches us no more. From all which instances it is manifest that our organs, being once put in motion by external objects, can excite sensations of the same kind, for some little time after the objects have ceased to act.

2. But beyond this little time, and after all sensation is quite over, there will often remain an idea of what we have seen, or heard, or felt, and this I call an idea of reflection. From hence it appears, that our mental organs have a like quality with the bodily, of conveying perception to the mind, when the causes setting them at work no longer operate. For what the impulse of objects is to the optic or auditory nerves, that the impulse of these latter is to the mental organs: yet we see the idea of an object may be retained after both those impulses are over. How long these mental organs may continue their play by themselves I shall not pretend to ascertain, but certainly much longer than the bodily, and probably until thrown into a new course by fresh impulses, or until quieted by sleep. But we know from experience that objects sometimes make so strong an impression upon our senses, that the idea of them will remain a considerable while beyond the power of all other ideas to efface, or of our utmost endeavours to exclude it. Which to me seems a sufficient evidence to prove the existence of these mental organs, and to show that whatever throws our ideas of reflection upon us, has a force and motion of its own, independent of the mind.

Let any man look steadfastly against the window when there is a bright sky behind it, and then, shutting his eyes, clap his hand close over them: I would not have him repeat the experiment often, it being hurtful to the eyes, but he may try for once without any great damage; and he will still see an image of the window distinguished into frame and panes. This image will grow languid by degrees, and then vivid again at intervals, the glass will change into various colours, red, yellow, blue, and green, succeeding one another; the bars of the sash will encroach upon the panes, throwing them out of their square, into an irregular form: sometimes the frame will appear luminous, and the glass dark, and after the whole image has vanished, it will return again several times before it takes its final leave.

In like manner, any scene we have beheld earnestly for a while, will hang afterwards upon the fancy, and while we contemplate it there, we shall find the objects varying their forms, their colours fading and glowing by turns; from whence proceeds that fluctuation of ideas I have often spoken of before: and after having been quite gone out of our thoughts, they will frequently return again with the same vigour as at first. But there is this difference between the play of our sensitive and our reflective organs, that in a few minutes, the image above mentioned will totally fly off, never to appear

more, unless you renew it, by taking another look at the window: but an object we have once seen, may recur again to our reflection after days, months, and years, without any fresh application to the senses; and that the ideas of things we are frequently conversant with, thereby grow gradually more fixed and steady. Were one to mark out the space of a yard, from the edge of a long table, he would touch some particular spot with his pencil, then he would shift it to another farther off, or nearer, and then perhaps to one between both; nor would he be able to satisfy himself presently, because his idea of a yard would lengthen, shorten, and dance to and fro; and when at last he had make his mark, it is ten to one but upon applying his rule he would find himself mistaken. Or were he to match a silk for a lady, without carrying a pattern to the shop, when he had several pieces of different hues spread before him upon the counter, he would be a good while before he could fix upon the right: for his idea of the colour would fluctuate in his imagination, corresponding sometimes with those of a darker shade, and sometimes with those of a lighter, or appearing by turns to have more of the green mixture, or of the red; and after all his care, he would run a great hazard of being chid when he came home, for bringing a colour that would not suit. But the mercer, who does nothing all day long but measure and tumble about his silks, upon seeing the lady's gown, can run home and fetch a piece that shall match it exactly, and can cut off her quantity by guess, without the trouble of taking his ell to measure it.

3. Reflection then, as hitherto considered, is only a continuation or repetition of sensations; and thus it is that our senses furnish us with the first stock of materials we have to work upon, in the absence of external objects. For we conceive ourselves as having these ideas in store, deposited somewhere in what is vulgarly called the mind, even when we do not actually perceive them. We commonly say a blind man has no knowledge of colours, but a man with his eye-sight perfect has, although perhaps at the time of speaking, he has no colour under contemplation; and we esteem it a part of the stock of knowledge he possesses: but this knowledge, while lying dormant and unperceived, I take to be nothing else besides the disposition of his internal organs to receive such forms and motions from other causes, as they have been first put into by visible objects striking upon the optics.

I have before declared that by the term ideas, I do not understand the very perceptions of the mind, but the figure, motion, or other modification, of some interior fibres, animal spirits, or other substances, immediately causing perception; which substances I have since called the mental organs. Now, I do not apprehend that from our seeing any strange creature, as an elephant, or rhinoceros, to our reflecting on it again a year afterwards the same modification remains within us during the whole interval: for then our internal organs must be as numerous as the ideas we possess, which, considering the prodigious multitude of them we have in store, seems inconceivable. But one substance may be susceptible of various modifications, at different times, and as the same optic nerves serve to convey red, yellow, or green, according to the rays striking upon them, so the same internal organs may exhibit various ideas, according to the impulse they receive from elsewhere. Therefore it was, that I ascribed our whole stock of dormant knowledge to the disposition of the latter. For the ideas composing that stock, strictly speaking, exist nowhere, but our possession of them is none other than our having a disposition in the

mental organs to fall readily into them; which disposition they first acquired from the action of the senses: for Mr. Locke has sufficiently proved that no colour or other simple sensible idea ever occurs to the thought, until it has been once introduced by sensation.

4. But those ideas before mentioned having gained admittance through the avenues of sensation, do, by their mutual action upon one another, and by their operation upon the mind, or of the mind upon them, generate new ideas, which the senses were not capable of conveying: such as willing, discerning, remembering, comparison, relation, power, and innumerable others. And this proves a second fund for supplying us with materials for our knowledge, which materials so stored up in the understanding, as well as those of the former sort, I conceive to be, when appearing to view, none other than modifications of our internal organs, and when dormant, dispositions of the same organs. Not that I look upon actual volition or perception as nothing else besides the motion, figure, or other modification of some organ, but the ideas of those acts are different from the acts themselves, as remaining with us often in their absence. One may have the idea of comparing without actually making comparisons, of remembering what one has now forgot, and of willing or discerning things one does not at present will or discern. And one may have the idea of the operations of another person's mind, the original whereof we certainly cannot immediately perceive, but apprehend them by representations of them formed in our own imagination. So, on the other hand, we sometimes act and discern without reflecting or perceiving that we do so; and it often costs great pains to carry with us an idea of our operations, even at the time of performing them.

5. If any one shall desire me to explain how the play of an organ can affect us with the perception of remembrance, volition, discernment, and the like, let him first explain how external objects, which he must acknowledge to act by their figure, motion, and impulse, excite perceptions of colour, sound, taste, and other sensations; and when he has given a thorough and clear account of this matter, I shall not despair from the lights he shall therein suggest, as clearly to explain the other: but while such lights are wanting, I must own them both inexplicable. Nevertheless, the fact is too notorious to be denied, how little soever we may be able to account for it: continual experience testifying that nature has established such a connection between the motions of matter and perceptions of mind, that one frequently begets the other. We reason and discourse, every day, of the past and future operations of our own mind, and those of other people, and when we do so, we must undoubtedly perceive the terms concerning which we affirm or deny anything: but there can be no perceiving without an object to be perceived numerically and substantially distinct from that which perceives, and what is more likely to be this object than some modification of our internal organs? But when sound sleep, or a fainting fit, has cut off the communications between our animal motions and the mind, we can no more raise ideas of our own acts than we can of sensations. Both sorts start up involuntarily, as well in dreams as in our waking hours; both occur more or less readily, according to the health, fulness or emptiness, or other disposition of the body; and both sometimes force themselves upon us against our strongest endeavours to remove them. From whence it seems undeniably to follow, that whatever throws up ideas of all kinds to our reflection, has a force of its own, independent of the mind, and belonging to something else: and therefore their repository is

not in the mind, unless understood in that vulgar sense wherein it comprehends a mixture and organization of corporeal parts. At least this approaches nearer towards an explication than what men generally satisfy themselves with, to wit, That by reason of our vital union, there is so close a connection between the mind and the body, that according as the latter stands disposed, she can more or less easily perform those acts which they esteem her to perform by herself alone, without aid or instrumentality of the body.

6. This second class of ideas alone is what Mr. Locke understands by ideas of reflection, but I have extended the term to the other class too, which we receive originally by the senses, as judging it most convenient for my purpose so to do. For I may have frequent occasion to speak of ideas of all kinds, not coming immediately from sensation, by one general name, and could not find a properer for them than that of reflection. If I use the term a little differently from what has been done before me, it is no more than common among persons who treat on these subjects: for every man has a way of modelling his thoughts peculiar to himself, and must necessarily accommodate his language to his manner of thinking. Nor can any uncertainty or perplexity ensue from such liberty, provided it be taken sparingly, and proper warning given whenever it is taken. And I have the better excuse in the present instance, because Mr. Locke himself has a little departed from the common language. For Reflection in ordinary discourse denotes a voluntary act, whereby we turn back our thoughts upon some past occurrence, or hold something under contemplation in the mind, or draw consequences from what has been so contemplated; whereas ideas of reflection many times start up of themselves and vanish, without our reflecting on them at all, or doing anything to introduce or procure them.

CHAP. IX.

COMBINATION OF IDEAS.

From the ideas thus received by sensation and reflection, there grows a new stock, framed up of these as of so many materials, by their uniting together in various assemblages and connexions. This their junction I choose to call by the name of Combination, as being more comprehensive than Composition, the term usually employed. For our ideas combine together in two several manners: one by composition, when they so mix, and as I may say melt together as to form one single complex idea, generally denoted by one name, as a man, a table, a dozen; the other by association, when they appear in couples strongly adhering to each other, but not blended into the same mass, as darkness and apparitions, the burst of a cannon or push of a drawn sword, and the dread of mischief accompanying them. For when we think of a man we conceive him to be one thing, and his body, limbs, rationality, with other ingredients of his essence, as parts of the same whole: but when we reflect on a naked sword, we do not consider that and the terror occasioned thereby as parts of any compound, although the one constantly attends the other, beyond all possibility of separating them in the mind of a fearful person.

2. To begin with composition, wherein I shall not attempt to reckon up how many sorts of complex ideas we have, that having been done already

by Mr. Locke much better than I can pretend to, but shall examine how composition itself is effected, which it did not fall in his way directly to consider: though if it had, I am apt to think he would have ascribed more to the ministry and organization of our corporeal parts than has usually been done, as one may gather from the hint he gives in his chapter of association (§ 6), where he says, "That habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the Will, seem to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits, which once set a going, continue in the same steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas seem to be produced in our minds."

3. Composition, I apprehend, is preceded by a selection of some ideas from the rest, exhibited at the same time to our view, as a necessary preparative thereto. For as a lady, who would make a curious piece of shell-work, must first pick out the proper shells from the drawers wherein they lie, before she can dispose them into figures, so there can be no compound formed in the imagination until the particular ideas whereof it is to consist be disengaged from all others presented in company with them. This separation is partly made by the objects themselves striking more strongly upon the senses, and appearing eminently above their fellows; but I conceive the mind has a principal share in the business, by turning her notice upon some particular objects, preferably to others standing together before her.

Nature at first presents her objects in a chaos, or confused multitude, wherein there is nothing distinct, nothing connected. When the new-born babe comes into the world, the sight of things in the chamber, the gabblings and handlings of the gossips, and perhaps some smells and tastes, rush in at all the five avenues of sensation, and accost the mind in one act of perception. The nurse's arms appear no more belonging to her body, than the wainscot seen on each side of them: and the midwife's voice has no more relation to her person, than to the bed-post. But as objects do not strike with equal force, the more glaring and striking give a stronger impulse to the organs, which continue the motion imparted therefrom, after that of the feebler impulses have entirely ceased; and thus the former become selected in the reflection out of the rest entering in company with them. And as our organs acquire a disposition of falling more readily into modifications they have been thrown into before, hence frequency of appearance produces the same effect with vigour of impression, and sensations continually repeated become distinguished from others received more rarely.

4. Both those causes, strength of impression and frequency of appearance, are greatly assisted by the operation of the mind: for some objects affecting us agreeably, and others appearing indifferent, she fixes her notice upon the former, for sake of the satisfaction received therefrom which gives them an advantage above their fellows. Every one remarks how constantly the eyes of a young child follow the candle about the room whithersoever you carry it: and when we come to man's estate, we often pursue particular objects through all the motions and turnings they make before us. We have not indeed quite the same command over our ears, and other senses, yet among variety of sounds, smells, tastes, or touches, accosting us at the same time, we can pick out some in disregard to the rest; and we can do the like with respect to different senses. A man who reads in a room where there is company talking, may mind his book without taking notice of anything they say, or may listen to their discourse, without minding a word of what he reads.

This culling of particular objects from the whole number exhibited to view, I call turning the mental eye or directing the notice, by which I would not be understood as exactly describing the operation of the mind herein, (for I do not ascribe to her a blind side and a light, nor suppose her actually turning to the right or the left by a loco-motion,) but as using a figurative expression borrowed from the motion of the bodily eye, producing the same effect. For how wide soever the circle of our vision may extend, whatever lies in the centre against which the eye is levelled directly, affects the sense more strongly than other things equally lucid lying nearer the circumference. Wherefore the notice we take of particular objects not only occasions their leaving a stronger impression, but their agreeableness makes this application of the notice to be more frequently repeated upon them than upon others less engaging. But when I speak of the notice which conduces so much to the first selection of our ideas, I do not mean that thought and reflection we apply in our riper years to things we contemplate, for such a careful exercise of the faculties little children can scarce be supposed capable of; but that transient and cursory observation the mind makes upon certain conspicuous or pleasing objects passing in review before her, without designing it a moment beforehand, or reflecting on it a moment afterwards.

5. But objects that shine eminently above their fellows, or on which the notice fixes, are not always single objects; for two or more may appear equally conspicuous, or may give a pleasure jointly which each of them separately could not have afforded: this happening often, cements them together and makes them coalesce into one assemblage. Another cause of coalescence arises from objects constantly presenting themselves together: most of the bodies we are conversant amongst being compound bodies, the parts of them preserve their contiguity to one another while they move from place to place, although they change their situation with respect to other bodies surrounding them; hence the ideas of those parts uniting together form an assemblage. When nurse walks about the room, she carries her arms along with her, but not the wainscot seen on each side of them: when she goes out, every part of her disappears, and when she returns, the whole of her figure presents again to the eye, and by frequent use becomes apprehended by the child in one complex idea. Nor can it be doubted what efficacy the consorting of objects has towards compounding them, when we reflect that we scarce know our own acquaintance in an unusual dress, and how surprising an alteration a different coloured wig makes in a man's person: so that the clothes we have been accustomed to see worn seem to enter into our complex idea of the wearer. So likewise ideas that use or conveniency has led us to consider frequently together become a compound, as a yoke of oxen, a flock of sheep, a city, a country.

We have seen how sensations, after their disappearance, leave ideas of themselves behind in the reflection, and if other sensations follow immediately and constantly while those ideas are fresh, they unite into an assemblage. Thus the taste of sugar in our mouths joins with the colour we saw before putting it in, and the hardness we felt while we held it in our hands, and the ideas of a certain colour, consistency, and sweetness, make the complex of sugar. By degrees we add more ingredients to the compound, further experience informing us of other qualities constantly attending what we have already comprehended under the idea of sugar whenever they have an opportunity of showing themselves; and hence we learn that sugar is brittle, dissolvable, clammy, and astringent. For the complex or essence

of bodies is made up of the qualities we find them have of affecting us in several manners, or of working changes in other bodies, or of undergoing changes from them.

6. Composition maks us esteem the things united therein as one; for how many soever present themselves to our thought in one assemblage we look upon as one thing, and that although they may be actually disunited. Thus if a bed be taken to pieces for conveniency of carriage, upon being asked where it is, we say in the great chest, and if the chest contain nothing else, we conclude it was filled with that one piece of furniture. But having frequent occasion to consider things so compounded separately, we then see them different and distinct from one another, as the curtains, the tester, the headboard, and so forth: at other times, we view them under both considerations at once, and thence get the idea of whole and parts, for we call the several things forming an assemblage parts of the same compound; thus by a kind of contradiction conceiving them at the same time as one and many.

With regard to the species of things, we are greatly determined in our notions by the names affixed to them: for ice, although nothing but water congealed, is esteemed a different kind of thing from water; but lead, whether cold or melted, still retains its name, and is reckoned the same metal. Were we to define lead or water, I suppose we should call one a solid and the other a fluid substance, esteeming these their natural states, although we may have seen them put into the contrary by violence: but when we reflect that cold is no more than a privation of heat, I do not know why we should look upon fluidity as the natural state of water, which, unless acted upon by a certain degree of warmth, will of itself form into a consistency. But we call that the natural state which falls most commonly under our observation; therefore, if we had lived in Saturn, we should doubtless have given but one name to ice and water, and defined it a solid body, although we might now and then have seen it liquefied in a furnace: as on the other hand, had we been born in Mercury, we should have deemed lead a fluid body, although by keeping it a long while at the bottom of a deep well, we might have found it sometimes coagulate.

7. We get a stock of ideas of the second class pretty early, those I mean strictly called ideas of reflection: and they run into assemblages in the same manner, and from the same causes already spoken of; sometimes with one another only, but more commonly in conjunction with those of the other class derived originally from sensation: being often either thrown upon the notice by the workings of imagination, or the mind being invited to turn her notice upon them by use and convenience, which always carries some degree of satisfaction.

Few of our assemblages are without some reflective ideas of the one sort or the other, not excepting those which are reckoned to come immediately by sensation. We talk of seeing cubes and globes, but in reality our sense exhibits no such objects to the mind: we can at most see only three sides of the former, and one hemisphere of the latter, but imagination supplies what is wanting to complete their figures. It has been said that all things strike upon the eyes in a flat surface, and that our former acquaintance with the objects makes them appear standing out one before another: thus much is certain, that the figures lie level in a picture, wherefore the roundness and protuberance we observe in them cannot come from the sense, but must be drawn from our internal fund. Whenever we hear a noise there enters instantly with it an idea of some instrument, or string, or animal, or clash-

ing bodies, we apprehend making the sound. We can scarce look a stranger in the face without entertaining some notion of his character and temper of mind, which we conceive conveyed by sensation; for we think he looks morose or heavy, or courteous or sensible: it is true, we are often out in our guess, and change it upon further observation, but some conjecture constantly occurs at first sight, and together with his outward figure forms our complex idea of his person. And though the characters of our familiar acquaintance are too well known to depend upon a single view, yet their present disposition may appear visible upon their countenance; and we may see them dejected or joyful, serious or frolicsome, in the same glance wherewith we behold their features.

8. In process of time, when we become capable of care and attention, we join many ideas that would not have consorted of themselves, nor occurred to that common notice we are led to take of things by their present agreeableness. And our conversation and intercourse with other people daily furnish us with new assemblages; for by perpetually communicating our ideas to one another, we become possessed of multitudes that our own experience would never have exhibited, nor our own sagacity worked out. In short, whatever cause occupies the mind strongly or frequently with any set of ideas, thereby joins them into one compound.

Here we see the benefit of industry and society, as they tend greatly to enlarge our stock of complex ideas, which are the principal basis of knowledge: for were it confined to simple ideas alone, it would be very scanty, and of little service to us in the conduct of life. We could not tell what to apply for satisfying our appetites of hunger and thirst, were not the sight of aliments connected with the idea of their palatableness: and in general, our ideal causes of action perhaps are all of them compounds; as are undoubtedly all our final causes, they containing an idea of satisfactory joined to whatever we apprehend possessing that quality.

9. There being multitudes of the same things subservient to us all for our uses and pleasures, causes a great similitude in the assemblages of all men. The common complex ideas of a chair, a table, of fire, water, victuals, drink, of honesty, gratitude, obligation, and other things, we have frequent occasion to take notice of in the daily course of our lives, are much the same in every one. But as we divide into various professions, and fall upon different ways of observation, there is likewise a great diversity in men's ideas; so that the same collection of materials, presented to several imaginations, shall run surprisingly into various assortments, according as they have been respectively accustomed. Carry a number of persons equally clear sighted upon a hill, from whence they have an extensive prospect with a variety of objects before them: the farmer sees turnip and corn grounds, meadow, pasture, and copice; the soldier observes eminences, valleys, morasses, and defiles; the mathematician descries parallelograms, triangles, and scalenums, in the fields and hedges: the country attorney distinguishes parishes, hamlets, manors, and boundaries of estates; the poet beholds shady groves, sportful flocks, and verdant lawns; the painter discerns variety of colours, contrast of light and shades; the religious man discovers materials for building, provisions for eating, for drinking, for clothing, for the necessities and conveniences of life, accompanied with a thought of the Giver of those blessings, and all this instantly without any endeavour of their own; on the contrary, were they to try to form one another's compositions they would find great trouble and difficulty in the undertaking, and perhaps could not do it completely at last.

10. As our acquaintance with objects increases, we add fresh ingredients to the compounds formed of them in our imagination; therefore those we have occasion the most frequently and carefully to consider become the most comprehensive assemblages. By this means, manufacturers, artisans, scholars, and others following any particular occupation, have a fuller idea of the things belonging to their respective trades or sciences than other persons. The idea of the Iliad in the vulgar perhaps contains no more than an old story of a siege wrote in Greek verse: but together with this, there arises in the mind of the poet or critic ideas of the fable, the characters, the sentiments, the figures, the diction, any of which being altered, they would not acknowledge it to be the work of Homer. Yellowness, hardness, and valuableness, in commerce, seem to constitute the whole complex of gold in common persons, to which the goldsmith, refiner, and naturalist add malleability, ductility, specific gravity, dissolubility in aqua regia, and indissolubility in all other menstruums, besides other qualities, which never enter into the head of an ordinary man.

By thus adding daily to our compositions, they grow so bulky, that we cannot take them in at one glance, but are forced to turn them about, as we would some very complicated piece of workmanship, in order to view them a side at a time. He that knows the properties of gold most completely, cannot bring them all into his thought at once; he may run through them successively in a very short space of time, but can never make them all appear together at the same instant: nay, should he go to give a full and accurate definition, it is odds but another person may suggest something that he has overlooked. But however this be admitted or not, certain it is, we do not always think of every particular belonging to the compounds under our consideration: nor can it be supposed, that every time we tell over a few guineas we have a thought of ductility, and many other qualities we know residing in them. Yet upon every idea being excited, some part at least of the assemblage whereto it belongs almost constantly occurs: we cannot see the face of a man, hear the barking of a dog, or smell the sweetness of a rose, without thought of something more than the bare sight, or sound, or smell: and how many soever ideas thus start up in company, we find them closely connected together, and apprehend them as component parts of one complex.

11. This partial appearance of our compounds suits extremely well with the narrowness of our conception. The ideas of things most familiar to us, contain a multitude of particulars, and were the whole tribe to rush in upon us at once, they would so fill the mind as to leave room for nothing else, at least we should find them too unwieldy and unmanageable to do us any service. For a single idea, how complicated soever, can at most afford us only a present amusement; it is necessary for use, that we should have two or more together in view: without this we could neither compare nor distinguish them, could discern neither their resemblance, nor difference, nor relations, nor effects, neither could we affirm, deny, or reason, concerning them; wherein the whole benefit we may expect to reap from them consists.

On the other hand, no small inconvenience arises from their not presenting before us entire: for by this means our ideas continually fluctuate, not only by their colours fading and glowing alternately, but by varying their shapes; our assemblages turning about perpetually, and presenting different faces, or their component parts slipping away, and others supplying their places, so that we can scarce ever hold anything steady in our contempla-

tion. Hence we are led to reason erroneously, or misunderstand one another, to discern resemblances, and draw consequences upon one view, of the same things which we do not find holding good upon another.

To remedy this mischief, logicians take the method of definition, but then if the definition descend too minutely into particulars, it will perplex instead of helping: therefore, when we would settle the idea of an object, we need bear in mind only so much of what belongs to it as may be sufficient for the occasion.—What good would it do the gold-beater to think of the fusibility of his gold, or that it will not evaporate in the furnace, like lead or mercury? the colour, malleability, weight, and thickness, are all that he has any concern with. Rhetoricians and poets employ figures and copiousness of expression, to bring that side of objects forward, which they would have to strike fullest upon our notice: they often use epithets contained in the things whereto they are applied, as just properties, verdant lawns, living men; not that such epithets add anything to the signification, but because they strike that part of the assemblage more strongly upon the mental eye, which might otherwise have been unobserved.

12. The circumstance, or situation things appear in, joins to make a temporary assemblage together with the things, but does not coalesce so as to remain always in their company. A man running exhibits one complex idea, wherein his motion is contained; the same man standing, or sitting, presents another: yet if we were to describe him to a stranger, we should hardly take his running, or sitting, into our description of his person. Nevertheless, we cannot call those circumstances, whenever they occur, distinct ideas from the man, but parts of the same compound, because they present instantly in the same glance, and may be suggested where they are not: as in statues and drawings of animals in a moving posture, which strike us with ideas of motion in figures really quiescent. Much less can we suppose them distinct, when joined by that main bond of composition, a name, as in the terms wind, rain, a river, a torrent, a horse race, which severally express one complex idea, whereof motion is a necessary ingredient; for, strike that out, and the remainder will be esteemed another thing, and deserving another appellation.

13. I shall have the less to say upon Association, because of the near affinity it bears to Composition, depending upon the same causes, and subject to the same variations: and perhaps composition is nothing more than an association of the several ideas entering into a complex. What shall be the one or the other, seems to depend generally upon the use of language: for if things arising to the thought constantly in company, have a name given them, we deem them compounded, if none, we can only call them associated. Names being a receptacle, in great measure necessary for gathering our ideas, and holding them together in a complex: like those cushions your gossips stick with pins in hearts, lozenges, and various forms, against a lying-in; the cushion is no part of the figure, yet if that should chance to fall into the fire and be consumed, the pins must all tumble down in disorder, and the figures composed of them vanish. It is not always easy to determine when ideas combined together belong to the class of compounds or associates: perhaps the connection between the looks and sentiments of persons, which I have mentioned under composition, others might call association: nor is it very material to ascertain the limits between the two classes exactly. But since there are combinations which cannot with any propriety be styled complex ideas, I thought proper to take some notice of them apart.

The principal of these, because the most universally prevailing, and having the greatest influence upon our thoughts and transactions, is the associations between words and their signification. Nobody will deny that sounds and characters are mere arbitrary signs bearing no relation in nature to the things they express, yet they become so strongly connected by custom with our ideas of the things, that they constantly start up in the mind together, and mutually introduce one another. For words, heard or read, instantly convey the meaning couched under them, and our thoughts, upon common occasions, find a ready utterance when we would communicate them either by speaking or writing. Nor does the junction between words and their meaning depend upon the Will, whether it shall take place or no. Were a man unluckily obliged to sit and hear himself abused, he would be glad, I suppose, to dissociate the grating words from the scandal they contain, and reduce them to their primitive state of empty sounds, but will find it impracticable: whence it appears that the seat of association lies in the organs, which seems to conspire in this case to throw a displeasure upon the mind, that she would exert all her power, if she had any, to escape.

14. And as our most compounded ideas turn different sides of themselves to view, so ideas, linked to a variety of others, usher in different associates, according to the occasion introducing them. For, besides the combination, there is likewise a kind of attraction between our ideas, so that those preceding generally determine what associates shall make their appearance; because our organs fall more easily into motions, nearly the same with those they have been already put into, than they can strike out different ones. Hence it comes to pass that many words, having various significations, always suggest that sense which the context requires.—The word man is used for one of the human species, for a male, for a full grown person, a corpse, a statue, a picture, or a piece of wood upon a chess-board, yet we never mistake the meaning, being directed thereto by what gave occasion for its being employed. Nor do single words only carry a different force, according to the sentence wherein they stand, but whole expressions to cast a lustre upon one another, and the very structure of the phrase gives a different aspect to the contents from what they would have had if placed in another order: in the due management of all which consists a great part of the arts of oratory and poetry.

I do not know how it is with other people, but I find that upon coming home after an absence of some months, I have a fuller and clearer idea of the scenes, persons, and places in the neighbourhood, immediately upon coming into the house, and before I have seen any of them again, than I could have raised in the morning while at a distance: as if the bare removal from place to place gave a turn to the imagination, like the stop of an organ, that brings another set of pipes into play.

15. Upon this quality of cohering in our ideas was founded that art of memory mentioned by Cicero, and as he tells us generally ascribed to the invention of Simonides, who hit upon it by an accident. For being at an entertainment where there was a great number of guests, a message came that somebody wanted earnestly to speak with him in the street: in the interim, while he was gone out, the house fell down, and so crushed the company within, that when their relations came to bury them, they could not possibly distinguish the bodies from one another, until Simonides pointed them out by remembering exactly where every man had sat. From hence, observing the connection between objects and their stations, he took the hint of his artificial memory, wherein he taught his scholars to choose

some spacious place, as a town, a park or large garden, with which, and all the turnings, corners, plan, buildings, and parts belonging to it they should be perfectly familiar, and then to fancy certain images resembling the things they would remember, disposed regularly in the several parts of that place. Having done this carefully, when afterwards they cast their thoughts upon the place, it would appear replete with the images, each in its proper order and situation wherein it had been disposed. But the same place was to be employed upon all occasions; for the figures might be wiped away at pleasure; by substituting a new set in their room, which would remain there so long as were wanting, or until displaced by having successors assigned them. Thus the association between images and their stations was only temporary, not perpetual like that of man and wife, but occasional, like that of travellers in a stage coach, who look upon themselves as one society during their journey, but when that is ended, separate, perhaps never to meet again: their places being supplied the next day by another company, and the same coach serving successively as a cement for different societies. Something like this artificial memory our ladies practise every day; for when they are afraid of forgetting any thing they purpose to do by and by, they put their ring upon the wrong finger, or pin a scrap of ribbon upon their stomacher: when afterwards they chance to cast their eye upon the ring or ribbon, they find the purpose for which they put it there associated therewith, and occurring instantly to their memory.

16. There are many other sorts of association, which whoever desires to know, may consult Mr. Locke's chapter upon that article, to which he may add others from his own observation, if he thinks it worth while to take the pains. But though our ideas are often made to cement by our bringing them together, yet the association once formed, they continue joined without any act of ours to preserve their coherence. Like the diamonds which a jeweller sticks in wax, in order to show you the form he proposes to set them in: they are held together by the tenacity of wax, that is by the properties of matter, though it were the act of a man that pressed them down so as to make them fasten.

CHAP. X.

TRAINS.

Our combinations being most of them too large to be taken in at one glance, turn up their different sides, or introduce their several associates successively to the thought, exhibiting so much at a time as can easily find entrance. Thus, when we think of man, there occurs first perhaps the whole outward human figure; then the inward composition of bowels, muscles, bones, and veins; then the faculties of digestion, locomotion, sense, and reason. Or if we read a passage in Virgil, the plain meaning of the words starts up foremost to view; afterwards the turn of phrase, the grammar, the elegance of diction, sentiment, figures, and harmony. And as some of the same materials obtain a place in several combinations, one complex idea gives rise to another, by means of some particular ingredient possessed in common by them both. Thus it often happens that two things, very different in themselves, introduce one another by the intervention of some medium bearing an affinity to both, though in different re-

spects, which serves as a link by which the former draws in the latter. On hearing the report of a gun, one's thoughts may run upon soldiers, upon their exercises, upon battles, particularly that before Quebec: this may put one in mind of Canada, of the fur trade, of surprising stories told of the beavers, their contrivance in building themselves houses, of the sagacity of animals, of the difference between instinct and reason, and abundance of other speculations widely remote from the sound of a gun.

2. Nobody but must have observed an aptness in the fancy, and even the tongue, in common chit-chat, to roam and ramble when left to itself without control. Yet in our most incoherent sallies there is generally a coherence between single ideas and the next immediately preceding and following, although these two contain nothing similar to one another. Perhaps our imagination would rove always in this desultory manner, were it to contain only one combination at a time without a mixture of anything else: but an idea, on being displaced by another, does not wholly vanish, but leaves a spice and tincture of itself behind, by which it operates with a kind of attraction upon the subsequent ideas, determining which of their associates they shall introduce, namely, such as carry some conformity with itself. Thus, if on going to market to buy oats for your horse, you meet a waggon on the way, it might suggest the idea of other carriages, of turnpike roads, of commerce; or of the axis in peritrochio and five mechanical powers; or of the materials composing it, of the several sorts of timber, the principles of vegetation: but that your horse's wants being already in your thoughts, confine them to take a course relative thereto: so the waggon puts you in mind of the owner being a considerable farmer, who may supply you more conveniently and cheaper than the market, the idea of the man suggests not that of his wife and children, nor of the country he came from, which have nothing to do with your first thought, but that of his house, of the way thither, what you shall say to him, whether he shall deliver the corn home, or you shall fetch it. This regular succession of ideas, all bearing a reference to some one purpose retained in view, is what we call a train; and daily experience testifies how readily they follow one another in this manner of themselves, without any pains or endeavour of ours to introduce them.

3. What first links ideas into trains, I take to be the succession of objects causing or leading to our satisfactions: for having observed that things agreeable come to us through several steps, whenever the first of them is made, it carries the thought on to all the rest, and having perceived that our desires cannot be gratified without using some means to obtain them, imagination runs back to all that is necessary to be done for that purpose. The sight or smell of victuals, putting into the child's mouth, constantly preceding the taste of them, excites an idea of that taste before the palate can convey it; in a little while the sight of the nurse coming in to bring the pap becomes another link in the chain, to which is afterwards added the sounds of her steps on entering the room, and the creaking of the door when she opens it. In process of time, the child, making various noises, perceives that some of them have an influence upon the nurse's motions: hence it gets an imperfect notion of language, of cause, and effect; and when hunger presses, the little imagination runs backward to the ministry of the nurse, and the sounds using to procure it, which the child accordingly makes in order to obtain a relief of its wants.

Desire, curiosity, amusement, voluntary attention, or whatever else carries the notice frequently through a number of ideas always in the same series, links them into a train. When we would learn anything by heart,

we read it over and over again, and find the words fixed thereby in our memory, in the same order as they lay in the page: but if we had read inattentively, so that the notice had rambled elsewhere, we should never have got our lesson. Were the same scrap of a song to be chanted in our ears for a month together, I suppose we could not fail of learning it exactly without any desire or endeavour so to do: but if when the singer came it always happened that we were so earnestly intent upon something else as to take no notice of him, he would not work the like effect.

4. But though the mind by her notice begins the formation of a train, there is something in our eternal mechanism that strengthens and completes the concatenation. It has been generally remarked by schoolboys, that after having laboured the whole evening before a repetition day to get their lesson by heart, but to very little purpose, when they rise in the morning, they shall have it current at their tongue's end without any further trouble, Nor is it unusual with persons of riper years, upon being asked for a determination which they cannot form, without a number of things to be previously considered, to desire time to sleep upon it: because with all their care to digest their materials, they cannot do it completely, but after a night's rest, or some recreation, or the mind being turned for a while into a different course of thinking, upon her return to the former ideas, she finds they have ranged themselves anew during her absence, and in such manner, as exhibits almost at one view all their mutual relations, dependencies, and consequences. Which shows that our organs do not stand idle the moment we cease to employ them, but continue the motions we put them into, after they have gone out of our sight, thereby working themselves to a glibness and smoothness, and falling into a more regular and orderly posture, than we could have placed them in with all our skill and industry.

Our trains once well formed, whatever suggests the first link, the rest follow readily of their own accord: but as practice joins them more firmly, so you find them hanging closer or looser together, according to the degree of strength they have acquired. There are some, who, having gotten a thing by rote, can go through it currently, at any time, without mistake or hesitation, but if you interrupt them, they cannot go on, without repeating what they had recited before from the beginning. Generally, when we are out, a single word prompted will draw up the remainder of the chain, and set us in our career again: but what we are extremely perfect in, we can leave off and resume of ourselves, begin in the middle, or take up any part at pleasure. There have been persons, who have acquired a surprising perfectness of this kind: I remember formerly to have seen a poor fellow, in Moorfields, who used to stand there all the day long, and get his living by repeating the Bible: whoever gave him a halfpenny, might name a text anywhere in the old or new Testament, which he would repeat directly, and proceed to the next verse, the next chapter, the next book, and so on without stopping, until another customer gave him another cue.

5. But trains of this enormous length are few, and wanted only upon extraordinary occasions; those which serve us for common use, are innumerable, and extremely short, nor should we find them commodious if they were not so. For objects continually changing before us, and sensations of various kinds accosting us incessantly, there is very little scope for reflection to range in, before the notice is engaged by something else: and the purposes directing our observation from time to time being various, if

our trains were not very numerous, we should not so readily as we do, find enow of them suited for carrying on the course of thought we desire. By continual use, our trains multiply and open into one another, which gives a facility to our motions, and makes the imagination like a wilderness, cut into a multitude of short alleys, communicating together by gentle and almost imperceptible windings, where one may pursue an object seen at a distance, without much deviating from the straight line, or take a compass without losing our way. Besides, the smallness of our trains, and their being mutually interwoven, furnishes more play for the fancy; for a thread stretched out lengthways, you can view only two ways, either backward or forward, but the same being worked up into a curious cypher presents an abundance of mazes, wherein the eye can wander with an endless variety.

How helpful these little involuntary trains are to us, upon all occasions, may appear manifest, without much consideration. What is the difference between a number of words as they lie in a dictionary, or in some well wrote page? for in both we know their several meaning, but in the former, they represent a succession of loose incoherent assemblages, whereas in the latter they appear linked in trains familiar to our imagination. Nor let it be objected, that the author may lead us into a course of thinking we never travelled in before; for though the course may be new, the component parts of it, that is, the phrases, the structure, and idiom of language, must be of our old acquaintance, or we shall not understand him.

The learned languages are taught at school by rules, but we may remember how tediously we proceeded, while forced to have recourse every foot to our rules, either in constructing or composing: wherefore their use is only to bring our ideas of words into trains corresponding with the concords, and other rules of grammar: when this is done completely, by long practice we may forget our rules, as I believe most of us do, and yet without them we find the nominative or the adjective, at the beginning of a sentence, lead naturally and of its own accord to the verb, or substantive at the further end. And though we learn our mother tongue without rule, only by hearing it continually chimed in our ears, yet until it be sufficiently formed into trains, we find the child express itself imperfectly, and in broken sentences. In a language we are masters of, while we read currently on, the sense of what we read seems wholly to occupy the imagination, yet, for all that, the mind can find room for something of her own: how quick soever the eye may pass along, the thought flies still quicker, and will make little excursions between one word and the next, or pursue reflections of its own, at the same time it attends to the reading. Hence arises the difference, so necessary to be taken notice of, between the letter and the spirit, for whoever stops at the former, will be very little the better for what he reads: but this spirit must be drawn from our trains, which the author excites, but does not infuse. It has been remarked as one quality of the sublime and of fine humour, that they convey a great deal more than they express, but this More must be something the mind has already in store, and they only draw it up to view: therefore, sublimity of style and delicacy of wit are lost upon the vulgar, who having no proper trains to be excited, descry nothing beyond the obvious meaning of the words, and for that reason, are more taken with plain language, and broad jokes, as leading into trains of thought, to which they have been accustomed. Wit depends chiefly upon allusion for its supplies, and metaphor and many other figures of speech derive from the same source: but what is allusion, besides the suggesting ideas already familiar to the imagination? Transition is the

art of leading the mind with gentle and easy turnings, so that she finds herself unawares in a new field, without perceiving when she quitted that she was engaged in before.

6. What has been remarked just now concerning the manner of learning languages, may as justly be applied to all the arts and sciences in general, and to the common actions of life: for in our first attempts upon them, while we are forced to dig up every thing by dint of application, how slowly, and awkwardly, and imperfectly do we proceed! but when we have furnished ourselves with proper trains, that will spring up of their own accord, upon touching a link of them, then we can go on expeditiously, readily, and perfectly. For it has been shown in the chapter of Action, that those commonly called so, consist of many single acts, each of which must have its idea directing to perform it: but our thought and care reach no further than the main action, the particular part of it must be thrown up by imagination. Therefore the machinery of our organs bears at least an equal share with the mind, in all our transactions, for she only chooses what shall be done next, but the several means, and minute steps necessary for executing it, occur without our seeking. Nor yet would they so occur, unless they had been inured by practice to follow one another successively: from whence it appears, that the disposition of our organs to fall into little series of motions spontaneously, is the thing that gives us all our dexterity and expertness in every kind of action.

Trains are most commonly taken notice of in the memory, because there are the longest, and consequently the most visible: and those little trains, which serve us upon ordinary occasions, depend upon the same disposition of our organs, though we do not usually call them Remembrance, unless they occur with that additional circumstance of their having been in our thought before. Yet we can often discern their reference to memory, as appears from our usually justifying ourselves upon being criticised at any time for speaking or acting improperly, by alleging that we remember others saying or doing the same upon the like occasion. Wherefore the ancients made Mnemosyne the mother of the Muses, supposing memory the ground-work and foundation of all skill and learning: nor is it improbable that the structure of a man's organs, which enables him to remember well, may render him equally capable of any other accomplishment, with proper cultivation.

7. As much a paradox as it may seem, I shall not scruple to assert, that if it were not for our trains, we could not have that entertainment we receive from novelty: for things so far out of the way of all former experience, as that we cannot tell what to think of them, appear strange and uncouth; but there is a difference between strangeness and novelty: the latter belongs to objects that work new openings into old trains, and so give them a play that was not common to them before: or else renew a former course of thought, that has been long intermitted. For we may observe that a new play, a new pattern of flowered silk, or a new anything, does not please, if it does not in any respect resemble what we have seen of the kind before, or does not suggest some little trains of reflection, besides the bare sight: and after we have forgotten it for a time, it may give us the pleasure of novelty again. If objects engage us in trains that will not readily coincide, they raise our wonder: but the trains, by being often brought together, open into another at last, whence comes the vulgar saying, that a wonder lasts but nine days. I shall leave it to the critics to

settle the precise limits between wonder, admiration, amazement, and astonishment: and only observe that in all of them there is a stoppage of the thought, which being unable to remain entirely motionless, makes little excursions, but finds the trains abrupt, and crossing one another, being perpetually checked and diverted from its usual courses by the object that holds it engaged.

As letters united together compose words, words compose sentences, and sentences discourses, so our ideas run into assemblages and associations; these link in trains, and a texture of trains makes larger trains or courses of thinking; and each species of junction opens a wider field for the mind to expatiate in, for composition greatly increases variety: eight bells tolled singly can give only eight sounds, but above forty thousand changes may be rung upon them. But as the occasions of life and objects surrounding us perpetually require us to alter our course of attention, our trains branch out into several others, and we are easily diverted into a new track, provided it be done by gentle turnings, and through openings to which we have been accustomed.

8. This disposal of ideas into trains, and their being interwoven together in a manner suitable to our occasions, gives birth to Order; which consists not in any number or species of ideas, but in their introducing one another in such successions as shall readily answer our purposes. There are persons who have laid in vast heaps of knowledge, which lie confusedly, and are of no service to them, for want of proper clues to guide into every spot and corner of their imagination: but when a man has worked up his ideas into trains, and taught them by custom to communicate easily with one another, then arises order, and then he may reap all the benefit they are capable of conveying; for he may travel over any series of them without losing his thread, and find anything he wants without difficulty. Nor is it material for his own private use in what manner his trains lie, provided they be wrought into some uniform plan: but with respect to his intercourse amongst other people, it is very material that he should range his ideas in a manner conformable to their ways of thinking, or they will find nothing regular in them. Were the methodical schoolman and polite pretty fellow to mix in the same company, the discourses of each would appear easy, clear, and pertinent, to those of his own class, but perplexed, dry, and unengaging, to those of the opposite; for your close deductions of reason seem a heap of rubbish to the man of the world; and the conversations of the latter, while he keeps up the ball of discourse for a whole evening with smart expressions that come in always pat upon the occasion, are a mere volubility of words, with no more coherence than a rope of sand to one that has immured himself in a college. The discourses of either present the same succession of ideas to the hearer that was in the mind of the speaker, but that succession exhibits nothing regular or coherent to the former, because it does not run in trains familiar to his apprehension. For what is regularity to one man may be all confusion to another: which proves order to be relative, and to derive its existence from the cast of our imagination.

Objects stand in order when their situation corresponds with that of our ideas: and as the moulds of all imaginations are similar in some respects, hence we term things regular or irregular as they tally or not with the trains which the ideas of mankind most generally fall into. Straight lines and easy curves the notice can readily run along, and by travelling frequently in those tracts they become familiar; wherefore figures consisting

of them, such as squares, triangles, circles, spirals, serpentine lines, parallel rows, and rays diverging at equal angles from one centre, are esteemed regular, because objects placed in them link of their own accord into lines, and the mind has but a few parts to put together, in order to form the whole figure, and can range over them by paths to which it has been accustomed: whereas the same objects being jumbled together promiscuously, each of them becomes a separate part unconnected with the rest, and the whole is too numerous for the mind to manage; nor can she find any passage leading to them successively one after another. For the same reason, symmetry and proportion contribute greatly to order, because the one gives dispatch to the eye, by enabling it to take in objects by pairs, and the other smooths the passage over them by the mutual dependence of parts. But the mind must have been inured to observe proportion, or it will lose the benefit resulting therefrom; therefore we see that common persons do not discern half the regularity in a fine building, or other piece of well-proportioned workmanship, that is obvious to connoisseurs; and that they do discern any, is owing to the degree of skill in proportion, which few men are without.

9. Order may be produced without changing the position of things, only by removing whatever would obstruct the eye in its passage along them. When a young lady cuts a curious figure out of paper, she gives no new position to the several parts of her figure, for they had the same situation with respect to one another while they lay in the whole paper as after they have passed through her hands. And indeed every sheet of paper contains all the figures that any clean-fingered damsel can cut out of it: therefore the operatrix is so far from creating the figure, that she spoils all others that might have been formed out of the same sheet, so that for one she seems to make she really destroys a thousand. Nevertheless, she produces order and regularity where there was none before, only by snipping away the superfluities of the paper from her figure, and thereby leading the eye along all the mazes and windings comprehended therein.

As order consists in the correspondence of objects with our ideas, it is all one whether the former be placed in figures familiar to our apprehension, or whether the latter be worked into trains conformable to the position of things we behold: order will ensue alike in both cases. New prospects generally appear irregular, until by frequent contemplating they grow into form without any real alteration in the scenes: nor is there anything so irregular but by pains and long acquaintance may be brought to lie in order in our imagination. What can be more a wilderness than the great town of London to strangers? they can scarce stir a hundred yards without losing themselves. But the penny-postman finds no perplexity in his walks to any part of it: he reads only the name of the street, or court, or alley in his superscription, and instantly the way thither occurs to his thought. Were some fairy while he sleeps to dispose the houses into straight lines, crossing each other at right angles like the streets of Babylon, he might not perhaps, at first, find his way about the town so readily as he does at present.

10. Whatever situation men have accustomed themselves to place things in, is order to them, though perhaps nothing like it to anybody else. When one steps into the shop of a country chandler, or haberdasher of small wares, one is apt to wonder how they find everything so readily as they do: but custom has brought their ideas into a conformity with the position of their wares, so that upon any particular thing being asked for, their thought runs in train to the proper drawer; and were we to place their goods

otherwise, though in a manner we should think more regular, they might justly complain we had put them out of order. We studious folks generally have each of us a way of placing our implements peculiar to ourselves, the ink-glass must stand just in this spot, the penknife in that, the pens in another, and the books and papers have their several stations allotted them, so that we may presently reach what we want without loss of time or interruption of our studies. As soon as our back is turned, in comes the maid to clean the room: she cannot dust the table while it remains covered, so she removes all our things, and never replaces them as they were before. Not but that the wench is careful enough to set all to rights again, but her idea of order being different from ours, she lays the folio underneath, then the papers upon it, blank or written as they come to hand, and the smaller things on top of all: so that on our return we find everything at the same time in the neatest order and the utmost confusion, for we are forced to tumble over the whole parcel to come at any individual we want.

Thus order often respects convenience: for we say things are in their places when they lie handy for our purposes, so that we can execute them without interrupting or deviating from the plan of action we had laid down. Nor does use give occasion to order less frequently than convenience: when things stand in such a situation as to produce some advantage that would not have accrued from them in any other, we say they are in order, and the want of that situation we call disorder. Thus, disorders of the body, of the air, or the elements, are nothing but such commixtures of their parts as destroy the soundness of health, disturb the animal functions, or stop the progress of vegetation; and without a reference to some such consequences as these, we should not term them disorders. And this kind of order, resulting from use and convenience, refers either to the disposition of things we have usually beheld them in, or to the train of thought of some agent placing them in that manner. For though chance might once in a while dispose matters very cleverly for our purpose, we should not conceive them the more orderly upon that account. If a traveller, upon perceiving himself thirsty, should immediately espy a bough of ripe apples hanging over his head, and wanting a stone to beat them down, should find one lying just before him, and a little further a knife to pare them, dropped by some careless passenger; all this would suggest nothing of order, unless he supposed them laid there on purpose.

What we call the order of nature does not consist only in the position of things considered in themselves, but either in their being so disposed as to produce the uses derived from them, or their moving in rotation by constant returns of the same changes. Under the former view, we see the bodies of this vast fabric of the world, minute and large, the fibres of plants, the vessels of animals, the luminaries of heaven, contributing in their several stations to the support and conveniences of life, and other purposes, in a manner we could not in any degree imitate in things under our own management, without design and contrivance: which, therefore, leads our thoughts into trains composing the plan exhibited thereby. Under the latter view, we observe the stated successions of night and day, the vicissitudes of seasons, the progress of vegetation from the seed to the blade, the bud, the flower, and the seed again, the stages of growth in animals, the circumvolutions of the firmament; and having joined our observations into a system, there springs up order therefrom, which increases in proportion as we can add new branches to our scheme. In ancient times, the fixed stars only were esteemed regular, as rising and setting always at equal intervals, and

keeping their positions with respect to one another, while the other seven, being thought reducible to no certain rule, were styled Planets or Wanderers: but later discoveries having brought their motions too into a system, we now admire the wonderful regularity of their courses.

Nor let it be said there was an order in all these particulars, before men took notice of it; for if we place order in the position of things taken absolutely without reference to our ideas, there will be no such thing as disorder in nature. Every number of things, not excepting the wildest productions of chance, must lie in some position or other; and were there an understanding pliable and comprehensive enough to strike out trains immediately among any collection of objects, and discern their respective situations, as clearly as we do in scenes the most familiar to our acquaintance, it would not know what irregularity was. Therefore, if we make a distinction between orderly and disorderly, or the latter term has any meaning in language, it must belong to such positions of things, as do not correspond in their parts with any courses our ideas usually fall into, nor are reducible to any system in our imagination.

11. Did order exist in things, there could not be an order of time and of causes: for there exists no more than one point of time, and one step of causation in every moment: but this single object is not capable of order, unless in conjunction with the series of events preceding, or to follow after, which being never existent together, cannot be the residence of any quality. Therefore it is the ideas of past and future occurrences brought together in the mind, that renders them capable of order, which they then receive, when she can discern their connexions and dependencies upon one another. If we consider objects co-existing together in the same scene, we shall find that though they can have no more than one position at once, they may contain a variety of orders. The spots of a chess-board lie in eight equal rows, with their flat sides turned towards each other: they lie likewise in fifteen unequal rows of lozenges, touching at the angles, the middlemost having eight spots in length, the next on each side seven a-piece, and so falling off until you come to single ones at the corners: and they lie also in squares inclosed within one another, the innermost consisting of four spots, the next of twelve, or four on a side; the third of twenty, or six on a side; and the outermost of twenty-eight, or eight on a side. These three forms of order, besides others that might be traced out, are generated in the imagination, and may be changed, or cast into one another at pleasure, successively, without making any alteration in the chess-board, only by the eye compounding its objects variously, and running along in different courses of observation.

12. But those courses, or the component parts of them, must be such as were familiar to us before, or we must render them familiar by practice and application. And what is more remarkable, after we have brought our thoughts to run currently along a train of ideas, they cannot always run back again the contrary way, although in the same track. Take a sheet of paper written on one side in a fair legible hand, an easy style, and familiar language, turn it upside down, or hold it against a strong light, with the back part towards you, and though you have a full and clear view of the writing, you see nothing but perplexity and confusion: you must pick out letter by letter, and spell every word as you go along. If any particular form of objects, or their situation, with respect to one another, constituted the essence of order, this could not happen, for the form of things does not depend upon their postures; a man does not lose his human shape by being

set upon his head, nor does a horse undergo a metamorphosis every time he rolls upon his back, neither do the words lose their places, nor the letters their joinings, by a different manner of holding the paper: but the mind has always been used to read them from left to right, and therefore cannot follow in any other course. What, then, is there a right hand and a left in the mind itself? or have her perceptions a locomotion, which can proceed only in one particular direction? Let us rather attribute the cause to the motion of our internal organs, running mechanically in the courses to which they have been accustomed. For as the blood circulates from the heart to the arteries, and returns back again through the veins, but cannot take a contrary round, beginning first at the veins, and thence proceeding to the arteries; so the channels of our ideas give them a free passage in that course they have been used to, but close against them upon their return. Our mental organs, indeed, are of so soft and pliable temper, as that they may be brought to admit trains passing through them either way, for there are some figures we comprehend presently, whichever part of them first catches the eye: but then this must be effected by long practice, by frequently running them over, backwards and forwards in our thoughts, or by having been used to see them in all aspects wherein they can be placed.

But though order subsists only in the conformity of our trains, with the position of objects, yet is it not produced by a voluntary act of the mind: for we cannot see order wherever we please, nor can we avoid seeing it in some subjects, if we will contemplate them at all: which I suppose has made it be imagined that things were essentially and absolutely regular or irregular in themselves. The mind, as we have shown before, may, by painful application, bring any set of objects, how confused soever, to lie in trains, or the same may be brought to pass without industry, by long and intimate acquaintance: but when the organs have once acquired a habit of throwing up ideas in that manner, corresponding with the situation of objects, they will afterwards exhibit order upon sight of them without aid of the mind, and solely by virtue of their own machinery.

13. I have but one or two observations more to make upon trains, which are, that they grow quicker by continual use, and if short, unite at last into combinations, or if long, the middle links frequently drop out, or pass so swiftly as not to touch the notice. When children learn to read, they join the letters and syllables in trains to form words, and the words to form sentences. By degrees they do this faster, and in process of time the whole ord or sentence arises to their view in one assemblage. When we would recollect the members of a family, where we are tolerably well acquainted, we find the ideas of them introduce one another in trains, but after having lived, or conversed daily among them for some time, upon hearing the name of the house, the whole association of persons belonging to it starts up instantly to our fancy. And when the channels of our ideas are worn smooth by constant use, the current runs too rapid for the notice to keep pace with it. I have met with persons who could understand more of what they read in Latin or French, than in English, because their mother tongue affording too easy a passage to their thoughts, they skim lightly over the surface, and never touch the greater part lying at the bottom.

CHAP. XI.

JUDGMENT.

Narrow as we must acknowledge our capacities to be, they can nevertheless give harbour to several ideas, and several combinations at the same time. External objects continually pour a variety of sensations upon us, which do not so fill the imagination, but that reflection still finds room to throw in other ideas from her own store. And when the notice touches upon two or more ideas together, there generally arises another, not compounded or extracted from them, but generated by them, to wit, an idea of comparison, resemblance, identity, difference, relation, distance, number, situation, or other circumstance belonging to them: all which, in metaphysical language, are comprehended under the general term of Judgment, which, in common speech, we distribute into several species, as knowledge, discernment, opinion, and appearance, not indeed very accurately, as not always adhering inviolably to that division, but often using them promiscuously for one another.

2. Single ideas may be expressed by single words, as a man, a colour, motion, gratitude; for upon hearing the sound, the whole idea associated therewith starts up instantly to the thought; but to express a judgment, you must employ a proposition, which always contains three parts at least, namely, the terms, and the judgment, passed upon them; as, man is an animal, fire consumes wood, one egg resembles another. For though we have sentences consisting only of two words, as, Peter lives, Thomas sleeps, the earth moves, which therefore seem to contain no more than one term, yet that there is another implied appears manifest, because we may express that other, without adding any thing to the sense: for Peter is alive, Thomas asleep, the earth in motion, convey not a whit more than was conveyed by the shorter sentences above cited. And though many times one of the terms be comprehended within the other, as being an ingredient of the assemblage, expressed thereby, yet must it be taken out from the assemblage, and stand apart, before we can judge any thing concerning it. The idea of man includes that of life, activity, reason, and several other particulars; but this idea, contemplated ever so long, will make no proposition, nor produce any judgment, unless some of those particulars be considered in the abstract, and beheld in the same view as it were by the side of the concrete; and then we can discern that man is a living, an active, or a rational creature. But this abstract is as much a complete idea, when compared with assemblages comprehending it within them, as when compared with others that do not: the idea of sweetness being as distinct from that of sugar whereof it is affirmed, as from that of gall whereof it is denied: and he that thinks of the former, has no fewer ideas in his mind, than he that thinks of the latter.

3. That judgment likewise, although the production of the terms, for we cannot judge without something in our thoughts to judge upon, is nevertheless a distinct idea from the roots whereout it grows, cannot be doubted when we reflect, that many things occur to our view, and affect our notice in some degree, without our passing any judgment upon them. We may see leaves falling from the trees, birds flying in the air, or cattle grazing upon

the ground, without affirming, or denying, or thinking anything concerning them: and yet, perhaps, we had taken so much notice of them, that, upon being asked a minute afterwards, we could remember what we had seen. A man may have beheld a field from his window a hundred times, without ever observing whether it was square, or pentangular, and yet the figure was exhibited to his view every time he looked upon it: and we have observations suggested to us sometimes, upon things extremely familiar to our acquaintance, which we acknowledge very obvious, when put in mind of them, although we never hit upon them ourselves. It is notorious that men judge variously of the same objects, and so do the several faculties of the same man upon many occasions; Appearance, which is the judgment of sense, being opposite to Opinion, or the judgment of understanding. For we believe the sun to be an immense globe, much larger than all the countries we ever travelled over, while it appears at the same time to our eyes but as a little ball, that one might roll about in a bushel. And though the apparent magnitude of objects is supposed to depend upon the angle they subtend at our eye, nevertheless our familiarity with them changes our estimation of their bulk. Why does the sun look smaller than the house, and yet a man at twenty yards' distance does not look smaller than your hand, although you might quite cover him from your sight by holding it up at arms-length before you? Unless because we continually see men close by our side, whereas we never saw the sun so near as to subtend a greater angle than the house.

4. Hence it follows incontestably that judgment is an act of reflection, never thrown upon us by external objects, but something done upon the ideas after their entrance. Therefore the schoolmen reckon it a second act of the mind, distinct from the first, called simple apprehension, whereby we receive the ideas conveyed by sensation, or turned up by the workings of imagination. But if it be an act of the mind, it is, as well as apprehension, an act of her perceptive faculty, wherein the mind remains purely passive, and only receives what some other agent strikes upon her. For judgment is not a voluntary act, any further than that in many cases we may choose whether we will consider things attentively enough to discern their relations or resemblances: but this we have not always in our option, for sometimes they force upon us, whether we will or no; and when we fix our attention voluntarily, the judgment formed thereupon is not the work of the mind, for she cannot discern snow to be green, nor twenty to be less than fifteen, but must take such estimation as results of its own accord, from the subject she contemplates. It is true we sometimes judge amiss through the fault of our Will, when we had materials before us for doing better, but the we do by the power we have over our ideas to overlook, or as it were, squint upon some, and hold others in a steadier view; but what is done by the instrumentality of ideas, although remotely our own act, and therefore justly chargeable at our door, is nevertheless the immediate operation of the instrument; just as an impression is made by the seal, although we press it down upon the wax ourselves.

5. Since then the mind is purely passive in the act of judging, as well as of apprehending, we must seek for some agent to produce that effect upon her: and what can this be besides the mental organs? I shall not pretend to explain by what particular figure or motion they do their work: for we cannot pry into a man's sensory while he thinks, to discern what disposition of the fibres in any case either of sensation or reflection affects him with this or that perception; but it seems undeniable that they must have a

different modification, when they enable us to pass a judgment, from that whereby they exhibit the ideas whereon we judge. For else why do not all objects, when clearly discerned, suggest all the relations they stand in to one another, or all the comparisons that may be drawn between them, or why do men judge so variously upon the same subject? The papist thinks persecution a duty, the protestant thinks it none; they both have the same terms in their thought, and therefore so far their organs are modified alike, but they judge of them differently, and that judgment is not of their own making, but something they discern in their view of the objects they contemplate; consequently the modification exhibiting this part of their view, being different in one from what it was in the other, cannot be the same with that which was alike in both. One may read the words, Persecution, Duty, without any connecting verb between them, and in that state they convey the ideas of the things expressed by them complete; if we proceed to affirm or deny the one or the other, we may perceive our prospect enlarged beyond the bare sense of those two disjointed terms; but there can be no increase of prospect, without the accession of another object to behold, which must be some new modification superadded to the former, or generated thereby.

6. As judgment seems an act subsequent to the apprehension of the subject whereon it is pronounced, one would expect there should be some time intervening between the one and the other, and so in fact we often find there is, for we sometimes hold objects a considerable while in contemplation before we con decide concerning them: but in things familiar to our knowledge, the judgment rises instantaneously, and in the same view with the objects, by that quality we have observed belonging to ideas following in train, of quickening their pace by degrees, until at last they coincide into one combination. A man knows his own horse, his own house, his bosom friend, immediately upon sight, without waiting for any further operation to be made upon the ideas presented by his optics. And this is what we call the evidence of sense, which we abuse, without reason, for perpetually deceiving us; whereas the senses cannot well deceive, because, strictly speaking, they never inform us of anything, they throw in their ideas, but the opinion entertained thereupon is generated by the reflection. At least, we make them depose things of which they cannot give us sufficient information. Is it not thought vouching the testimony of the senses, when, upon being asked how you know that Alderman Punctual sits in Guildhall, you answer, Because I see him there? That John is in the kitchen, Because I hear him talking? That there is such a passage in Virgil, Because I read it there? An utter stranger to John and the Alderman, or one who had not learned to read, would know this never the more for any thing he should see or hear, but if his senses are as acute as yours, they throw in the very same sensations upon him as they do upon you: therefore if they furnish you with an evidence he has not, they must fetch that evidence from some other quarter than the eyes or the ears. When we talk of seeing tables, chairs, and such like common objects, we ascribe more to the senses than properly belongs to them; for we see only colours, it is our former knowledge of things that informs us what they are. Nor let it be said, that though we may attribute too much to the senses, yet something remains justly their due, because upon being shown a thing we never saw before, though we cannot tell particularly what it is, nor what name to call it by, we may nevertheless see that it is made of wood or steel, that it is soft or hard, stiff or limber: for this partial knowledge arises from the former acquaintance we

have had with wood or steel, or the usual look of things, upon their hardening or softening, or the posture they fall into by their flexibility. Therefore if a statue of exquisite workmanship has the same look in the limbs and drapery that we have never used to see in stone, but see continually in flesh and garments, we say it looks soft and pliant.

7. Even distance and figure, which seem to bid the fairest for being judgments of sense, do not come solely from thence; for we find people judge very differently of distances anything remote, according as they have used themselves to observe them: and though we judge a little better of things near us, because we have perpetual occasion to take notice of their situation, yet there are few persons who can always tell whether two shelves of a bookcase, standing just before them, lie further apart than any other two, until they measure them. I have read a printed account of a boy, who being born blind, was brought to his sight by couching, at the age of fourteen: after being permitted to go abroad some time, one evening he was lost, and upon searching, they found him upon the leads of the house. It seems he had been in the street, and upon seeing the moon peep a little over the roof, he was going to climb up the tiles in order to catch her: which shows he had no idea of the remoteness either of the moon, or of the pavement from the gutter where he stood, or else he would have been afraid, as much as any of us, of venturing for fear of breaking his neck. I will not vouch for the truth of this story, but it seems very probable, if we may believe what has been held by many learned men, that a person on coming to the use of his sight, would imagine every thing lying close to his eye; and that our knowledge of distance is an art we acquire by degrees, as we grow more and more familiar with objects surrounding us; and therefore cannot be infused by our optics, which transmit no fewer nor other rays of light from objects the first time we behold them, than the thousandth.

8. Neither does the idea of figure come entirely from the senses. Three of them have no pretence to make the conveyance, and one of the two claiming that privilege, I mean the touch, cannot be applied at once to bodies of any magnitude; but we must run our finger over the surface and judge of them by piece-meal, not only upon what we feel, but upon what we have felt the moment before; so that our evidence results from the joint testimony of sense and memory. And for things that we may grasp within our hands, we turn them round and round before we determine, nor then can do it exactly if they be a little irregular. Clap a flat iron sensibly hot or cold upon a man's naked back, and let him describe, if he can, the exact shape of the piece, or whether the angles be obtuse or acute: perhaps he might guess nearer if laid upon his hand, because the hand has been more exercised in judgments of this kind, not that it has a quicker sense of feeling than many other parts of our flesh. Nobody can tell the shape of the gout or cholic he feels, which yet he might be expected to do, if the figure were included in the sensation of feeling: neither can one determine the shape of a bruise by the smart, though one may by pressing the parts of it successively with a finger. And that we gather the form of things from sight as well as touch, seems to indicate that they are not ideas of sensation, for the senses all have their distinct provinces allotted them, sensations entering at one avenue cannot find a passage through the others. But waving this argument, if the two senses gave evidence of figure, they ought always to agree in their testimony immediately upon examination, which, whether they do or no, let the works of painting and sculpture determine. In the letters between Locke and Molyneux we find both those gentlemen, and they tell us,

all others upon maturely considering the question, agreed that a blind man perfectly well acquainted with globes and cubes would not, upon being suddenly endued with sight, be able to distinguish thereby, which was the globe, and which the cube. And I may propose another question, whether a man having often seen globes and cubes, but never touched any thing of either form, would not be as much puzzled to know them apart, upon being put into his hands in the dark. Whoever resolves these questions in the negative, must acknowledge that neither sense, without some previous acquaintance, can give evidence of figures very well known to us by the other: and they cannot be said to agree in their testimony, when the old sense, prompted by experience, deposes positively, while the new, although conveying all that mere sensation can convey, professes to know nothing of the matter.

9. Did the eyes transmit the idea of figure by immediate sensation, they would exhibit one and the same in all prospects, to wit, the circle or ellipsis bounding the scene before us, for all objects lying within that compass strike upon the optics promiscuously, the chairs together with the wainscot around them, and the floor seen between their frames, the books close to one another, and touching the shelves whereon they stand: wherefore it is the notice, not the eye, that runs the lines of separation between one thing and another, without which their figures could not be ascertained. We have shown in speaking of order, how fancy may cast objects into various forms, while the sensations excited by them remain exactly the same: the marshalling the spots of a chessboard into parallel rows, or lozenges, or enveloping squares, still holding the board in one position, was not the work of our optics, but of some more internal cause. Even colours, although conveyed directly by vision, are not distinguished from one another by the sight alone, for we may see cattle in the fields without regarding their difference of colour; and when we do regard it afterwards, it is by an act of reflection, no new sensation being obtained upon the second view which we had not in the former. From whence we may conclude, that sensation operates no further than to throw materials into the imagination to be worked up there: and that the business of selection, composition, association, comparison, distinction, and judgment, belongs to other powers operating after the senses have done their office.

10. Nevertheless, the evidence of sense being an expression current among mankind, I am very far from desiring to discard it; on the contrary, I shall employ, and may lay great stress upon it myself, as occasion shall offer: all I meant by the foregoing observations was to explain my sentiments of what is to be understood by the expression, which I conceive to denote, not any thing thrown in upon us from external objects, but that judgment occurring to the thought instantly and involuntarily, without deduction of reason, or chain of consequences, upon ideas being exhibited by our senses. And I so little undervalue this evidence, that in my present opinion, I think it never ought to be, and perhaps never is, rejected, unless when overpowered by other evidence of the same kind, or by reasonings grounded thereupon.—Why do we believe a stick to be straight, although appearing crooked in water, but because upon drawing it out we see the crookedness vanish, or running our finger along, we feel no bend where there seemed to be one? Why do we believe the sun an immense body, notwithstading its apparent smallness, but for reasons drawn from the phenomena of that and other objects we have seen at various distances, and from various situations?

11. Our internal sense or reflection furnishes us with an evidence of the like kind; for we judge as commonly, as instantaneously, and as necessarily, upon subjects we remember, as upon those we have before our eyes. These judgments are often weaker and less steady than those of immediate sensation, our ideas continually fluctuating, and varying both in colour and shape: but if we can fix them by contemplation or habitude, the judgments resulting from them strike as vigorously as those of the senses.—And even in their unsettled state, although we cannot judge critically and fully, yet we may discern something clearly concerning them, because their fluctuation keeps within certain limits sufficient to answer our purpose. The idea of an elephant never contracts so small as to come within the compass of that of a mouse, therefore we can always tell which has the greater bulk: yet perhaps our ideas of both are so variable, that we could not determine between two elephants or two mice upon the pictures of them in our memory, without seeing the creatures stand together side by side. Nor are confused ideas utterly incapable of suggesting any clear conception concerning them. Mr. Locke says we have a very confused idea of substance; yet who does not know the difference between substance and shadow? which latter too seems to lie a little confused in the minds of many learned men, for they think they have done notably when they define shadow the absence of light: but the words of this definition contain an idea of light, for you must have the thing in your thought whereof you predicate the absence; and I appeal to every man, whether he finds the idea either of light or absence occur whenever he looks upon a shadow: nevertheless we can think currently and talk intelligibly of shadows, their figures, magnitudes, and motions, and so we can of substances, their qualities, and modifications, without perhaps having a quite clear and adequate idea of either.

12. Ideas of reflection, strictly so called, generate judgments no less than those derived originally from sensation: justice, mercy, approbation, virtue, duty, and other abstracted ideas, being as frequently made the terms of a proposition, both in our thoughts and discourses, as colours, sounds, or touches, and their relations, similitudes, and differences, as obviously discerned when we are gotten as well acquainted with them. For let us observe, that the internal sense, as well as the external, only exhibits objects to our apprehension, and they generate the judgments: now though the child be born some time after the first entrance of the father, yet when grown to strength and maturity, it may accompany him hand in hand, and come together into our presence. Wherefore the faculty of judging, both in the mental sense and the bodily, is an art acquired by time and practice, not an essential quality of the objects to make an impression of conformity or disagreement upon us as soon as apprehended.

13. The schoolmen make a third act of the mind, which they call Ratiocination, and we may style the generation of a judgment from others actually in our understanding: for what is reasoning but discerning the agreement of two ideas between themselves by their agreement with some third? and what is the fruit of reasoning but to beget an assent to some proposition we were ignorant of before? While assent depends upon our view of the premises, the new judgment is yet in embryo; but when perfectly formed, when it can stand alone, and still adhere to the conclusion after the premises drop out of sight, then it becomes of the same nature and has the same force upon us with the evidence of sense. For we hold many things assuredly for truth, and that perhaps upon very good foun-

dation, although we have absolutely forgotten the reasons first inducing us to believe them. And this assurance, we gain sometimes very quickly; if we did not, we could make but little dispatch in business, it being impossible to retain the whole chain of reasoning in our thoughts when it runs to any considerable length; therefore, if we could not rest satisfied in the conviction left by the premises upon a short view of them, we should never arrive at the conclusion desired.

14. There are various degrees of strength in judgments, from the lowest surmise to notion, opinion, persuasion, and the highest assurance, which we call certainty: for we do not believe what weather it will be to-morrow, or what we read in a newspaper, with the same force of conviction as what objects we see before our eyes, or what we have done ourselves a quarter of an hour ago. If our premises are uncertain, they can throw no stronger light upon the conclusion than they had themselves, or rather than belonged to the weaker, if they happen to differ in lustre: nevertheless, where there are many conspiring to illustrate one point, they may supply by number what they want in vigour; as one may make a prodigious glare with rush candles provided one lights up enow of them. This we commonly find the case in public rumours, which, though perhaps little heeded the first time we hear them, yet when current in everybody's mouth, seldom fail of gaining our assent. So likewise experiments made for discovering the properties of bodies do not always satisfy immediately, until by repeated trials we find them constantly producing the same effect. Repetition likewise of the same evidence sometimes will answer the purpose equally with multitude of witnesses: many people taking up an opinion, slender at first, and upon slight grounds, have by mere habitude of assenting, worked it up at last into a firm persuasion, without any additional proof. Nay, a bare assertion, frequently reiterated, may supply the place of evidence: scarce anybody but has found occasion to remark how the tenets of a sect or party, continually chimed in men's ears without any argument to support them, have been at length received as articles of faith, sometimes even in spite of the most opposite sentiments entertained before. And Archbishop Tillotson assures us, there have been persons who have told a lie so often till they have actually believed it themselves.

15. And as opinions generate, so they die away again by degrees; not only by the force of opposite evidence overpowering them, but by a kind of natural decay. Facts we have read in history, problems we have seen demonstrated in Euclid, having been long out of our thoughts, sink into slight opinions; we think they are so as we conceive, but we are not sure; and upon further disuse the evidence of them may be actually forgot, so that though the terms be suggested, or we remember such matters have been treated of, we can give no assent to them at all. Besides, any one who will take pains may observe that his judgment upon the same point is not always steady, but varies according to the humour or disposition of his spirits: nay, if he holds the same proposition under contemplation a considerable time, he will find the judgment fluctuate while the terms remain unaltered; it will strike sometimes fuller, and sometimes fainter, by intervals, without any apparent cause or argument occurring to occasion the change. A man in liquor judges diversely from what he does in his sober senses: passion notoriously perverts the judgment, warping it this way or that, according as best suits its purposes, and giving a stronger or a weaker bias, in proportion to the violence whereto it rises: when we wish a thing to be true, we therefore believe it so, desire performing the office of evi-

dence. I grant this most frequently happens through a partial consideration, the notice fixing upon such ideas as make for the favourite opinion, and turning away from all others that might overthrow it; but one may perceive that inclination sometimes operates upon the judgment alone, without making any alteration either in the number or colour of the terms whereon it is passed. The very same arguments, attended to carefully and impartially, do not always make an equal impression in times of joy or melancholy, in vigorous health, or upon a death bed, when relating to things near or remote, in laying a plan of future operations, or entering upon the execution: and this not only by new thoughts occurring, which we had overlooked before, but by a new estimation of the same objects casting a different light upon one another.

16. Let us now look back upon the several changes a judgment may pass through, according as time or other causes increase or abate, or suspend its vigour. A man's own thoughts may suggest, or he may have suggested by another person, a matter of fact, a theorem of mathematics, an axiom of natural philosophy, or a maxim of morality, whereof he may clearly apprehend the terms without giving any assent to it: he may then be brought to a full conviction of it by setting proper proofs before him, which conviction may remain after the proofs are quite slipped out of his memory: if he thinks no more of it for a considerable while, his persuasion may dwindle into a vague opinion, and in further time wholly vanish away, so that he may now view the same terms with no spark of assent more than he did at the beginning. At all these times the mind does no more than observe the ideas in her thoughts, and if she judges variously, that diversity is not owing to any act of hers, but to the different state of her imagination: she plays the spectator only, discerning the prospect before her, and whether she shall see a full or a faint evidence, or none at all, depends upon what her organs of reflection shall exhibit. This we readily acknowledge in memory, which is one species of judgment; for what is remembering, but having the idea of a thing we know we had seen before? everybody will allow that we remember past events according to the traces of them remaining in our memory, and when those traces sometimes happen to be altered, we remember wrong: nor has remembrance been unfrequently compared to reading a written memorandum, which being obliterated gives us imperfect information, or none at all; or being erased or interlined in our absence, leads us into mistakes. And one might as aptly apply the comparison to all other kinds of knowledge, which being nothing but the perception of what lies in our understanding, may be called reading the characters exhibited by our mental organs, and whatever changes the inscription there must of course produce a like alteration in our perceptions.

17. From hence arises a curious question, Whether, if it were possible for two men to transport their minds suddenly into one another's seats, each would not instantly lose his own ideas and acquire those of the other. I think it cannot be doubted the exchange would be complete with respect to sensation, for the senses must convey all their notices to the present inhabitant, not being able to reach the former occupier now removed to a distance. It seems probable that each would be able to repeat whatever the other had learned by heart, and remember occurrences happening to him: and if arts and sciences have their foundation in memory, he would slide at once into possession of all the other's accomplishments. Perhaps it may be thought going too far to suppose they would adopt each other's sentiments, opinions, and consciousness, but it would be hard to demonstrate

there would not be a thorough exchange in these respects too: so that the Papist might laugh at all revealed religion as being a thing ridiculous in itself, and the freethinker contend tooth and nail for the pope's infallibility: the methodist might clearly discern at one glance the absolute impossibility of miracles, and the rationalist hear revelations conveyed in a whisper, with an evidence greater than that of sense: the philosopher might see there is no enjoyment but in the hurry of company, or a round of fashionable diversions, and the giddy girl discern the vanity of all sensual gratifications, and find herself never less alone than when alone: the saint might tremble at the dread of punishment, being conscious of villanies he never committed, and the murderer look back with joy upon a life of innocence, and feel the comforts of a conscience void of offence.

18. These and such like speculations have put some persons quite out of conceit with their understandings, which they say are incapable of certainty, having no mark to distinguish between that and full assurance, representing the same things variously at different times, and therefore not to be depended upon: for who would credit a witness that should contradict in one breath what he had deposed in another? And indeed if we will consider the matter impartially, we must needs lay aside all claim to absolute certainty of external objects, of past occurrences, or the success of our most common endeavours: for our knowledge of all these depends upon sense, memory, or experience, which we have sometimes found fallacious, and this fixes such a blemish upon their characters, that we can never be certain they are not so. The utmost that we can know of them is, that in some instances they have constantly agreed in the same story; but for this we must trust our memory: and yet even this amounts no higher than to a negative evidence that we have never been able to detect them, though what we may do in time to come remains still unknown. Even mathematical demonstration depends upon the faithfulness of our memory, to preserve the evidence thrown from the principles in every step of our progress. Therefore it is possible there may be no pictures in the room, though I see them before mine eyes; that I never was in my garden, though I remember walking there this morning; that sugar will not melt in warm water, though I have seen it melted a thousand times; that the angles of a triangle are not equal to two right angles, though I have read it demonstrated in Euclid. For who has seen through all the compass of nature, so as to know without possibility of a mistake what powers there are, yet undiscovered by any man, which may alter the properties of bodies, and vary their operations upon one another, make impressions upon our senses in the manner of external objects, work traces in our memory, draw pictures in our imagination, or stamp judgments upon our understanding, without any of those causes to which we currently ascribe them.

19. Our knowledge never surpasses the degree of assurance we have in our minds, and constantly keeps even pace with it: for whatever other folks may think of us, we always think ourselves that we know for certain what we are firmly persuaded of. The highest pitch to which assurance ever rises is, when we can form no conception how things can possibly be otherwise than as we apprehend them: thus we rest assured the fruit grows out of the earth through the tree, because we cannot conceive how it should come there any other way: but do we certainly know there are no possibilities of which we cannot form any conception? Nor does assurance mount to a less height when we do not than when we cannot conceive any-

thing to bring it lower: we often persuade ourselves things must be so and so, because we cannot account for their phenomena otherwise, yet perhaps another person may suggest an account that shall satisfy us of the contrary. A man in his sleep entertains as full persuasion of the reality of his dreams, as he does of anything else at other times: when he wakes, he sees they are mere delusion, not by discovering any defect in the persuasion itself, but by other knowledge derived from former experience; and when this is withdrawn by the return of sleep, he falls into the like delusion again. If you convince a man of an error he was strongly possessed of, you do it, not by showing the insufficiency of his former appearances to beget assent, but by suggesting new ones from arguments not occurring to him before. Nobody will deny we have some assurances that are fallacious, others that are true; but we can see no difference in the countenance of the one or the other while they remain our persuasion: when they have been driven out by opposite evidence, like servants whose faults you seldom hear of till they are turned away, then indeed we may discover their delusiveness, but then they are no longer our judgment; every judgment, while it is our present judgment, carries the same face of veracity. For let us remember that a judgment is a different modification of the organs from those which represented the bare terms whereon it was passed to our apprehension; therefore if I believed a thing yesterday, but am convinced of the contrary to-day, though I may recall at pleasure the ideas of the terms, I shall not find the same character of judgment with them that accompanied them then: so I see my mistake by having a different representation of the matter now in my mind, but whatever characters of a judgment we read in the understanding, we have no test to try whether it be genuine or counterfeit. Therefore for aught I can demonstrate to the contrary, Bishop Berkeley may be in the right, and that infinite variety of objects nature seems to present us, may be purely imaginary, and life one continued scene of delusion from the cradle to the grave.

20. But then have we no certainty of the judgments we pass upon ideas in our own minds, though we should have none of external objects? What though our senses, our memory, our experience, may deceive us, yet surely we may know what their representations are, and judge of their similitude or diversity, without any possibility of mistake; for the ideas present before us we see directly and intuitively, not through any medium which might falsify their appearance, nor by footsteps of them left behind, which might alter in shape. If I hold no real pen in my hand, nor see any real table before me, have I not an absolute knowledge of the appearance of both being in my imagination? and may not I pass an unerring judgment upon those appearances? Cannot I discern certainly that my idea of the pen differs from that of the table in colour, shape, position, contexture of parts, flexibility, and other particulars? If I never learned my mother tongue but had it inspired into me just now by the organs of my reflection being made to fall suddenly into their present modifications, do not I understand the meaning of words now in my thought, and see clearly what sense is associated respectively to each of them? Though there should be neither lines nor angles in nature, have we not distinct notions of either, and may we not pronounce safely, that a line drawn between two others from their point of contact, forms two angles, both together equal to the angle formed by the two outermost lines? Thus while the judgment keeps within the compass of ideas immediately exhibited, it seems possessed of absolute certainty: but when confined to these narrow limits, it can be of little use to us, more than

bare amusement, nor answer any of our purposes in life. How unerring judgments soever we may pass upon our ideas of the pen and the ink-glass, yet if those ideas happen not to correspond with the things themselves, we may puddle about for ever without getting up a drop of ink to write with. And if experience has deceived us in the properties of wood and fire, though we reason ever so justly upon the ideas we have of them, we shall never be able to warm ourselves by throwing a load of billets upon the hearth.

21. But our present inquiry regards only the certainty, not the usefulness, of our knowledge: let us, therefore, examine whether we have that absolute certainty we are in quest of, even in our judgments upon ideas actually in our thoughts. In the first place, let us call to mind that the judgment, even in this case as well as in all others, is something distinct from the terms whereon it is passed; therefore there is one step at least between our apprehension of the terms and the judgment resulting from them, and who can ever tell what causes may possibly intervene to give that step a wrong direction, or create a judgment which we suppose to be the genuine offspring of the terms? In the next place, if we had absolute certainty in our ideas, we must be so well acquainted with it as to know perfectly what it is, and should have a standard in our minds whereby to try all other judgments, nor ever after repose an entire confidence in any where the proper characteristic were wanting. In the third place, our knowledge here too rises no higher than to the fullest assurance built upon this foundation, that we cannot conceive any possibility how we should mistake concerning ideas actually before us; but we have shown before that inability of conception is not an unexceptionable evidence. But lastly, the judgments we make upon our ideas sometimes contradict and overthrow one another, nor can we always satisfy ourselves whether we really have those ideas in our minds upon which we reason very currently. After the discredit I have brought upon our senses, I must not say that we have seen two billiard balls lying close to one another, and upon pushing one of them with a stick they have both moved along; but be it a mere delusion, nobody will deny we have had an idea of seeing such an event in our time. Let us consider what judgments occur upon this little phenomenon, that the hindmost ball moves the foremost, that it cannot give motion before it has any, that it cannot have motion before the other ball has moved away to make room for it. These are judgments made upon ideas actually in our understanding, yet we see how inconsistent they are with each other: therefore there must be some false brother among them, though we know not how to discover him, for they all appear with an equal air of certainty. Let us now examine the terms of our mental propositions, and satisfy ourselves whether we have an idea of mathematical points and mathematical lines, before we presume to determine anything for certain concerning them: for if we can form no conception of a line without thickness, nor a point without any dimensions, what certainty can we have of things whereof we can form no conception? An angle does not lie where we commonly measure it by applying a graduated circle, but at the very point of contact between the two lines, and therefore is itself a point, and all points being destitute of dimensions we cannot conceive one greater or less than another: yet when we affirm a difference in size between two angles, the terms of our proposition are a larger and a smaller point, which we confidently pass our judgment upon without having an idea of them in our imagination. Thus upon the whole I believe we had best not pretend to be wiser than Socrates and

quit claim to all certain knowledge except of one thing, which is, that we know nothing. But then again when we reflect that these arguments against our having an absolute knowledge of anything must necessarily destroy themselves, we can lay no more stress upon them than they have taught us to lay upon those they overthrow: for if our judgments upon ideas present in our imagination may deceive us, the proofs of this very liableness to deceive, being drawn from ideas in our imagination, may deceive us too; so there still remains a possibility that we may certainly know some things, notwithstanding all the evidence that can be produced to the contrary. Thus we find that single certain truth left us a little before, to wit, that we know nothing, now wrested out of our hands, and ourselves driven into arrant pyrrhonism, as being wholly uncertain whether we know anything or not.

22. We now find ourselves reduced to a state of utter darkness and confusion, the most uncomfortable and mortifying imaginable; therefore it is no wonder if we are willing to try all means for extricating ourselves out of it: and for that purpose let us review the thesis proposed at first entering upon this question, which was, That our understandings are incapable of absolute certainty, and therefore not to be depended upon. I fear we must admit the assumption, but I think we may deny the consequence: for though our knowledge never rise to certainty, it does not therefore follow that we may never depend upon such knowledge as we have. Nor indeed could we avoid it if we had a mind; the active powers of man cannot stand idle; we must be doing something or other every moment of our waking hours, at least, upon every action proposed we must resolve either to do or forbear it: but all the determinations of the Will contain a judgment that the action or forbearance will prove beneficial or satisfactory, and this upon less information in cases requiring haste than we might have had if there had been time to consider: which kind of judgments prevail upon us all, without exception, the thoughtful and the giddy, the wise and the foolish. Therefore I can by no means agree with those of the ancients who laid down that the perfect wise men would never assent without absolute certainty; for I suppose they would not have him a lumpish indolent creature: one should rather expect to find him more active and busy than other people; but without assent there can be no action; and a certain knowledge in the expedience of measures is not always to be had where nevertheless it is necessary to pursue some measures or other. If the wise man upon a journey inquires the road of a stranger, will he never assent to what is told him until he can assuredly know the character of the informant? or must he not believe he shall get home in good time while there remains a possibility that an earthquake, an inundation or an insurrection, may have barred up all the passages? Besides, there are some cases wherein the fulness of assent conduces much to the success of an enterprise: we may remember what Virgil said, They can, because they think they can: a soldier fights the better for believing he shall conquer, and any man might walk on top of a wall as safely as along a board in his chamber floor, if he could persuade himself he was in no danger of falling. Therefore in these cases the wise man, who disposes all things, even the ideas in his own imagination, for the best, would exert himself, or at least recommend to others as the wisest thing they could do, to banish all thoughts that might abate the fulness of their persuasion, though he might see at the same time there were very good grounds for them.

23. If we examine into the nature of the mind, we shall find that all evidence begets a proportionable assent where there is no contrary evidence to oppose it: we may observe children extremely credulous, and trusting to the representations of their senses: if they grow more diffident afterwards, it is because experience informs them of the fallaciousnes of men and deceitfulness of the senses. And when we come to riper years, we proceed upon the same rule, yielding to any evidence where we see no reason drawn from our former experience to the contrary; nor do I imagine the wisest among us would do otherwise. It is a stated maxim, both in law and common practice, that we should esteem every man honest and sincere until something appears to impeach his character, and our judgments are entitled to the same candid presumption: if the first person we meet in the street tells us of something happening in the next, we believe him without reserve, unless the thing appear unlikely, or contradict some other information, or that we discern an archness in his look that raises a suspicion he meant to banter us.

24. It seems almost a self-evident proposition that there must be assurance where there is no doubt; but dubitation in the nature of it implies an assent to something, if not to the thing doubted of, at least to the reasons occurring for and against it: for if you see none on one side, what can you doubt about? Hence we find ourselves sometimes wavering in our doubts; for as ideas fluctuate in our imagination, if the evidence on one side drops out of our thought or loses its brightness for a moment, we find a temporary persuasion of the other, and vice versa; which shows that even uncertain evidence (for both cannot be true) naturally gains credit upon the mind when appearing without a competitor. Doubts indeed may sometimes seem to arise from the weakness of evidence without needing an antagonist to overthrow it: as upon seeing a person at some distance in the dusk of evening, you doubt whether it be your friend or somebody else, merely from the imperfection of the appearance, without having any particular reason to think it cannot be him. But let us examine whether there be not an opposition of evidence even in cases of this kind: if you were upon a desert island, inhabited only by you two, and could just distinguish something walking upright, I suppose you would make no doubt what it was: therefore this imperfect appearance is sufficient alone to work assurance when it has nothing to stand in competition with it. Perhaps you will say that your reflection of there being no other inhabitant corroborates the testimony of your sight, and both together do the business by their united strength: but should you always stay for that reflection before you gave your assent? nay, do not you give it sometimes when you have no such reflection to make? For let us now change the scene to the crowded streets of London: when you see something in Cheapside that looks like a particular person, you take it to be him at first glance, nor do you begin to doubt until a second thought suggests that hundreds of people pass along there, many of whom may resemble as much as you can see of him by such an imperfect light. Sometimes indeed this suggestion occurs with the first thought, and then the doubt will be as early as the appearance: but this takes nothing from what I have been saying, for it is no proof that an appearance is not sufficient alone to work assurance, because it fails of working it when not alone, but confronted with something else. Nor is the case different in our most careful deliberations from what we have found it in sudden and temporary assents: for what avails consideration unless to discover the evidences on each side the question, and weigh the merits between them? Let a man consider ever so long, he will never reject the

first judgment of sense, until he finds it inconsistent with some other appearance, or with his former observations, or with some judgment of his understanding: even when we suspend our assent only to think further of the matter, though we may not have any particular reason occurring to create a doubt, we have that general reason of having experienced the danger of hasty determination; so that we trust our understanding or our experience in the very act of distrusting our senses.

25. Much the same may be said of probability that has been spoken above concerning doubt, for we reckon a thing probable when we discern reasons why it should be, and others why it should not be: but if we lose our assent to the reasons on one side, the other will no longer remain a probability, but will gain our fullest assurance. And even when we seem to deem it probable only for want of better evidence, still it is because we have had experience of things being otherwise under the like appearances. Perhaps there is no other difference between doubt and probability than that in the former our ideas fluctuate, whereas in the latter they continue steady: therefore we cannot estimate the quantity of our doubts, at least only in the gross, as when we talk of doubting much, or doubting a little of a thing, but how much or how little we can never ascertain exactly; but we can often calculate probabilities, as in chances upon cards and dice, with a mathematical nicety. And though we cannot do this with equal precision in matters of morality, yet many times we can discern clearly on which side the probability lies: when we have once gotten this discernment, after having satisfied ourselves that we had examined all the lights in our power relative to the matter in hand, we generally dismiss those hanging on the weaker side out of our thoughts, as being of no further service, but tending rather to disturb us in the vigorous pursuit of our measures, and thereby turn the probability into an unreserved assurance; until some new light occurring, or some change of circumstances happening, shall make us judge it expedient to resume the consultation afresh. Nor can you ever unsettle a man in a determination he has fixed upon, without at least suggesting some suspicion that he may have determined wrong, to which suspicion he must assent, or he will never hearken to your remonstrance. Thus we find the mind never totally without an assent to some judgment, either of her senses or understanding, as well in times of doubt and probability, as in those of firm persuasion, as well in contrariety as uniformity of evidence, as well at the beginning and throughout the course of an inquiry as upon the final determination.

26. How idle then is it to talk of the wise man's forbearing to do what all men must do continually? For though wisdom may perfect our nature it cannot change it, nor transform us into other creatures: therefore the wise man, as a man, must always assent to something, and if so, must assent sometimes to uncertainties, unless you will suppose him to have a full view of all the lights that can fall upon every subject the instant it starts up in his thoughts. Does he never alter his judgment upon better information? Does he never profit by consideration, so as to discern things otherwise than he apprehended them? Do no arguments ever raise a scruple in him upon matters he had no doubt of before? If any of these cases happen, then he once assented to an uncertainty, or which is as bad, he afterwards doubts or dissents from a certainty. I suppose he may be allowed to dream sometimes in his sleep, and to take his dreams for realities, as much as the rest of us half-witted mortals: therefore that noted liar Fancy gains undoubted credit with him when the

judgments of his understanding are shut out of his sight. Thus we see the giving or withholding assent does not depend upon the mind itself, but upon the ideas she has to read in the organization: she cannot lose her perceptive faculty, though she may lose the use of it for want of objects to exercise it upon; nor does her eye grow dim and strong alternately by night and by day: it may be obscured, not impaired, by darkness, nor do the vapours of sleep make any change in the sight, but only in the prospect, and it is in the nature of the mind to assent to whatever appearances that exhibit when all other evidence that might correct them is removed out of her reach. Therefore the difference between a sleeping and a waking man does not lie in the mind, unless understood in that vulgar sense of the term comprehending a corporeal organization, that which presents ideas being differently disposed, not that which perceives them. And the same causes make the difference between one man and another; the wise man having many judgments in his understanding which the foolish wants, and being exempt from many appearances which mislead the other: nor does this derogate at all from his merit, provided he have brought his understanding into a better state by his own good management and industry.

27. What then are we to understand when we hear it asserted that the wise man never assents to things uncertain? Is it that he will not assent without absolute certainty? This we have proved to be false in fact. Is it that he will not assent where he discerns their uncertainty? This is saying nothing, for no man assents to a thing at the same time while it appears doubtful to him. The expression then can mean nothing more than that he will not assent rashly, like the common herd of mankind, before he has examined the matter as fully as opportunity will permit, or the lights of his understanding enable him. If he has canvassed the point to his satisfaction formerly, he will still rest satisfied in the consciousness of having done so, unless some fresh information or suggestion not thought of before should require a re-hearing. By following this practice often, he will become acquainted with the degrees of evidence, so as to measure them almost upon inspection, and judge of the weight or frivolousness of objections, and will lay up a stock of principles in his understanding which he may trust to, so as to be able to make his decisions quicker and surer, though less hastily, than other people.

28. Look into Tully's Academics, and other sceptical treatises, and you find arguments to invalidate the judgment of the senses and understanding, drawn from examples wherein they have deceived us: but how shall we know the truth of those instances, unless we give credit to our experience informing us of them? or what conclusion can we draw from the facts, if we may not depend upon any judgment of our understanding? If those who produce the arguments, and cite the examples, do not assent to the force of the one, or truth of the other, they trifle with us, and deserve no regard; if they do assent, they practise the very thing they labour to prove unreasonable. What their real sentiments may be I shall not pretend to guess, for they are an unfathomable sort of people, but I think it impossible that one of these two should not be the case with them: either they assent without reserve to the judgments they dispute against, only to show their skill in disputation, or if they really doubt, they assent with as little reserve to the grounds they have for their doubting. Therefore we need not make a scruple of assenting, after having found that the wise man

assents who knows best what is proper, and the sceptic assents in spite of all the pains he can take, or contrivances he can devise to avoid it.

29. Thus this disquisition upon the fallibility of our judgment, which at the beginning perhaps might seem an attempt to unsettle the minds of men, will, I hope, upon taking the whole together, appear to have a direct contrary tendency, and in that prospect I entered upon it; for I look upon this as one of those sources of disputation which must not be dabbled with: we must drink deep, or had better not taste at all, for we shall find at bottom what may remedy any disorder brought upon us by the surface. Men commonly please themselves with a notion of absolute certainty, and may enjoy that pleasure so long as they remain unmolested in the notion: but when a subtle enemy approaches, they will find it an untenable post, and must inevitably be ruined unless they have another fortress to retire to behind. Therefore I conceive nothing conduces more to insure a tranquillity of mind against all attacks than establishing these two maxims, that knowledge, that is, absolute certainty, was not made for man, but that man is so constituted as to do very well without it. The former may mortify or disturb us a little at first, but the other will set all to rights again, and put us upon a firmer footing than we stood on before: for while placing our dependence solely upon certainty, we could never be secure that our own imagination in some melancholy mood, or the arts of an adversary, might not start objections to wrest our idea of certainty from us, and then we should be left in a state of doubt and despondency, as having nothing to trust to: but being possessed of these maxims, we may allow the objections their full weight, without abating of our confidence in the measures we proceed upon.

30. Hence arises that so much-used distinction between absolute and moral certainty: it is not in the nature of the latter to exclude all possibility of mistake, and therefore it is not destroyed by the suggestion of such a possibility; but it is in the nature of man to repose an entire acquiescence in it to the exclusion of all doubt. And for the attainableness of such certainty I appeal to every man's experience, excepting those who set all their wits at work to undervalue it; nor should I except them, could they be depended upon, to give an honest answer: but I refer it to all others, whether they believe them entertaining the least doubt of the force of those arguments they bring to persuade us out of our senses. I shall not undertake to give an exact definition of moral certainty, which may comprise everything belonging to the term, but I think a man may be said to possess it when he is conscious of having had all opportunities of examining a thing, has considered it thoroughly and impartially, and upon the issue finds a clear judgment remaining in his understanding of its being true, with no probability of the contrary. This I believe all men confide in, and I do not see what the wisest of us can have better to rest his assurance upon. It is true, every man is liable to mistakes, notwithstanding all his care to escape them; but if the error be invincible, you will not blame him for assenting to it as a truth, because nobody could have avoided doing so under the like circumstances; and if it were owing to prejudice or hastiness, still the fault does not lie in his adhering to what appears to him as a certainty, but in his negligence or partiality, while he had the matter under examination.

31. Constant and uniform experience produces the like certainty, and this gives us confidence in the evidence of sense, of memory, and in the

judgments of our understanding, upon having found them testify the same thing upon repeated trials. Nor will any man distrust his senses, unless in those instances wherein he has experienced their giving fallacious appearances, as in a stick seen crooked in water, or a square tower seen round at a distance. Neither will he distrust his memory or his understanding, when clear and positive, without some very strong reasons suggested to the contrary, which his understanding must approve of, and his senses or his memory bear witness to the facts whereon they are grounded. Therefore we may, without imputation of folly, rest assured that the tables, chairs, and other objects, really exist in such figures and places as we see them, that stone is hard, and wood combustible, that occurrences have really happened to us as we remember, that two and two make four, that a part cannot contain the whole, that the principles of arts and sciences are true, the conclusions appearing necessarily to flow from them just, and our established rules of conduct and argumentation right, until we shall find sufficient cause to doubt of them.

32. For everything, that may seem to contradict an opinion, is not a sufficient cause for doubting: the mind, though compared to an exceeding fine balance, in that it will turn with the slightest hair when nothing lies in counterpoise, yet does not resemble it in all respects; for where the weights are greatly disproportionate, the heavy scale will press down with as strong a force of assurance as if the opposite scale had been absolutely empty. Were a man, whom you know little of, to relate a fact not improbable in itself, you would believe him; therefore he has some weight with you: but if twenty persons of undoubted veracity should assert the contrary, you would not give a jot the less credit to them than if the first man had said nothing. So upon hearing a thing reported that we judge utterly improbable, we give no heed the first time, nor the second, but if repeated in many companies, we begin to doubt whether it may not be true: then each report must have some weight singly, for a multitude of nothings can make nothing, yet these small weights have no effect at all until they consolidate, and by their number grow into a great one.

33. The vulgar are commonly very positive, thinking themselves possessed of absolute certainty in almost everything they know: this happens from their weighing their evidences singly, which will naturally produce that effect; for we can judge of weights only by their opposition, because any one thrown in alone drives down the scale forcibly. But the contemplative use themselves to compare the judgments, as well of their senses, as of their understanding, which they frequently find contradictory; therefore they abound in doubts that never enter the head of a common man, which has occasioned doubting to be reckoned the avenue to philosophy: but if it be the avenue, it is no more, nor can one arrive at the thing itself until one has passed it, and he that sticks in the passage had better not have attempted it. The use of doubting is to prevent hasty decisions, and lead to something more sure and certain than we could have attained without it: for the first notices of our understanding direct to many things for our benefit, therefore we suffer damage by parting with them, unless we supply their places by something else more effectual for the purpose.

There is a moderation in all things: a man may as well doubt too much as too little: nor let us run away with a notion that a propensity to doubting shows a sagacity of parts, for it may as well proceed from the contrary quality. We have shown already that in every doubt there is an assent to the validity of opposite evidences, for if the evidence on either

side appear invalid, the doubt vanishes; and we have observed that our assent is according to the character we read of the judgment engraven upon the understanding: but the understanding is most perfect when it represents the characters of judgments in the truest colours, neither stronger nor weaker than they deserve. If it be faulty, it may show the thing doubted of in too faint and the cause of doubting in too glaring a light, in which case the doubt will be owing to the dulness not the quickness of the organs. Perhaps a man of more sagacity may have discerned the objection as soon as the doubter, but discerned at the same time that there was nothing in it. He whose views are confined to one narrow point of evidence, will think himself certain because he sees nothing to oppose it; if he can widen them a little, he may discover something to stagger his confidence; but if he can open them still further, he may discern what will bring him again to a fixed determination: and in the clearness and extensiveness of our views sagacity chiefly consists, which gives stronger marks of itself in a quickness of resolving doubts than a readiness of starting them. We can measure evidences no otherwise than by the weight we feel them have upon us; while the weights bear a near proportion to one another, the doubtful beam still nods from side to side; but the excellency of a balance lies, not in having large scales that will hold a number of weights, but in turning upon the smallest difference. Therefore there is a common sense or discretion infinitely preferable to brightness of parts, which indeed has no other value than to furnish weights for it to examine. Whoever is possessed of this quality will steer equally clear of doubt and positiveness; though his scale may be small it will weigh things exactly, he will distinguish the glare of tinsel from the ponderancy of gold, he will reject whatever makes nothing to the purpose, and take into consideration everything pertinent that he has room for, and will be steady in his opinions but not tenacious. Whereas your men of large capacities, if wanting in this quality, get rid of vulgar errors only in exchange for others peculiar to themselves; they are quick at seeing things, but not at comparing them; they argue strongly, but cannot determine justly, and amidst all their caution and reserve you may find them obstinate in some absurdity that everybody else clearly discerns to be such with half an eye.

34. When we reflect on our utter incapacity of attaining to absolute certainty, this is enough, though not to make us doubt of the clear judgments of our understanding, yet to make us acknowledge a possibility or their being erroneous: and this, if not overlooked, must prevent every man from being so wedded to an opinion as to turn a deaf ear upon all evidence that can be offered against it. Wherefore I must look upon those bigots in religion or reason, for there are of both sorts, as very little skilled in human nature, who lay so great a stress upon one kind of evidence as to think no other worth regarding in competition with it. Some ascribe so much to faith, built nevertheless upon human testimony and tradition, as to set it above the strongest contradiction of the senses or the understanding; others, conceiving a thing impossible in itself according to their abstract notions, reject all evidence that can be brought in support of it without hearing. Whereas, if we consult experience, it will testify that all species of evidence have their turns in prevailing upon us: generally we accommodate our theory to the success we find it have upon trial, but sometimes we correct our senses by our theory, as in the seeming annihilation of water over a fire, in the beginning of motion by matter upon attraction, repulsion, explosion of gunpowder, fermentation, and the like. Sometimes we discover

the falsehood of a currently received opinion by reason, at others are convinced of things we thought impossible in nature, by concurrence of testimony. Why then should we reject any means of information put into our power? For no channel can pour it in so fully, but that another may convey more of a kind we could not have expected.

A prudent man indeed will decline inquiry when he has room to think there is design and ability to impose upon him by sophistry, or on the other hand when the motives alleged for entering upon it appear trifling; and it must be left to his discretion to determine when either of these is or is not the case: but he will never think himself so sure of any point as to render all further examination needless upon whatever grounds or by whatever persons recommended. For my part, as well persuaded as I am that two and two make four, if I were to meet with a person of credit, candour, and understanding, who should seriously call it in question, I would give him the hearing; for I am not more certain of that than of the whole being greater than a part, and yet I could myself suggest some considerations that might seem to controvert this point. The time that has passed from all eternity before building the tower of Belus, was but a part of that time which has passed to this day, and that still to come is a part only of that which was to come in the days of Nimrod: and the time before and after any moment you can assign, are component parts of all time: yet one cannot say whether either of these parts be less than their wholes. Yet for all this, and notwithstanding my acknowledging the fallibility of our clearest judgments, I cannot find the least shadow of doubt in my mind whether two and two make four, nor whether the whole be greater than a part, but build anything I can upon them as upon sure and certain principles. Nor am I singular in this respect, for I observe that other people as well of great as small capacities do the same, and sometimes give an unreserved assent to things, even in cases where they themselves acknowledge a possibility of mistake. For we all acknowledge the uncertainty of life, and that a man under the strongest appearances of health, may be cut off in a moment by an apoplexy or other sudden disorder, yet we depend without reserve upon our common actions of the day, and upon other persons keeping their appointments: much more do we hold, without scruple, such maxims as the two above mentioned, whereof we cannot conceive any possibility how they can be otherwise than true, although there may be possibilities which we cannot conceive.

35. This moral certainty then, which is the portion of man, we must be understood to mean, when we speak of knowledge; for whoever has all the information the nature of the thing will admit of, with a clear judgment of its being true, and no scruple of doubt to the contrary, may be said in propriety of speech to know it. Therefore those who would prove that we know nothing, because we have no absolute certainty, are guilty of a gross abuse of language, ascribing another sense to the term, than the general consent of mankind has allotted it. For no man who asks whether you know that Mr. Such an one is in town, means to inquire whether he may not be dropped down dead since you saw him, or sent for away upon some pressing occasion, which you could not foresee: nor if he asks any other point of knowledge, will he understand any more by your answer, than that you have a reasonable assurance, without any mixture of doubt of the truth of what you tell him. And he that should say he does not know where he breakfasted this morning, what it is he holds in his hand, what he shall do this afternoon, or when the moon will be at the full, when

he has this reasonable assurance, would speak an untruth, because he would convey other ideas to the hearer, than the expressions carry in his own mind.

Therefore we may lawfully claim to know, or be certain of some things, for the common use and propriety of language will justify us in so speaking; and may place a full reliance on those deductions which appear to flow necessarily from them, after examining every corner that might contain a latent fallacy, for it is in our nature so to do. All sound reasoning must rest upon this basis, and what has this basis to rest upon will never fail to satisfy: this entire acquiescence then is the utmost I aim at in the course of my present inquiries, for I pretend not to absolute certainty. I endeavour to collect such particular exercises of the faculties as I conceive every man's experience will bear witness to the fact when put in mind of them, and suggest such observations as appear naturally resulting therefrom. I make no new weights, nor expect to be helpful any otherwise than by handing those into the scale that lay neglected, or sorting them together in a manner not done before; but I leave it to every one who shall vouchsafe me the hearing, to hold the balance himself: if I should be so fortunate as to procure a moral certainty, it is all I desire, and all I need, for I do not fear its having a proper effect.

One inconvenience happens from acquiescence being our only mark of certainty, for it gives us an unlucky bias, and makes us partial in our judgment, because when evidence offers in support of the thing we wish to be true, the mind receives it with pleasure, and mistakes that complacence for an acquiescence in the weight of the evidence. And perhaps we should always labour under this infirmity, if the mischiefs, frequently consequent upon such mistakes, did not teach us better caution. Therefore we see children and persons of little consideration very apt to judge according to their desires, until experience and proper observation upon that experience in some measure remedy the evil: but we can never get rid of it entirely, wherefore the laws will not allow a man to be judge or witness in his own cause, nor can the most judicious persons ever trust their judgments so securely as in matters wherein their own interest or inclination have no concern.

36. It has been currently held, that there were certain truths imprinted upon the mind by nature, but since Mr. Locke has fully refuted the doctrine of innate ideas, another opinion has been taken up, of the mind having a particular faculty to judge between her ideas, distinct from that whereby she apprehends them: therefore we find three kinds of operation ascribed to her, simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Ratiocination, and it is supposed there are some truths and conclusions necessarily obvious to every man, as soon as the ideas or the premises are clearly apprehended. But for my part, I can see no foundation for such a triple capacity, the single faculty of perception seeming to me sufficient for all those operations, according to the prospect lying before us in the understanding. Nobody will deny that we acquire the knowledge of some truths long after being made acquainted with the terms whereof they are affirmed, and learn rules of argumentation by which we can make a use of premises that we could not do before; and in process of time we retain those truths and practise that manner of reasoning, after having utterly forgotten the evidences and rules that taught us them. Wherein then lies the difference between a man before and after he has attained this knowledge? Is it in his faculty which receives an additional strength? or is it only in the objects he has to behold? He could

look back upon his thoughts before and clearly discern whatever they represented, but found there only the naked terms: and now he does no more than look back in the same manner, but finds, besides the terms, a judgment concerning them, which he does not create by any act of his, but discerns by inspection upon the traces of his understanding. Even the most obvious truths may be overlooked, while the ideas they belong to are in our thoughts; a man may see two pair of horses without ever considering that they make four: but if the mind had several faculties which were severally affected by the same ideas, since they must all be passive faculties, one would expect that whatever is present, and operates upon the mind, should equally affect them all. If it be said we overlook the judgment for want of reflecting, I would ask what else is reflecting besides turning the mental eye inwards, which is the same act in looking for judgments as for naked ideas of terms, and differs only in being directed to different objects. Therefore while we speak of the mind, and not of the man, comprehending his body or finer organization, I can see no more reason to suppose one faculty for apprehending, another for judging, and another for reasoning, than to suppose one faculty for seeing blue, another for yellow, and another for scarlet.

37. When I make judgment a distinct idea from that of the terms, I do not mean that it may be separated from them so as to be discerned apart by itself, for one cannot judge without some ideas to judge upon, but this does not hinder its adding to the prospect exhibited by the terms alone: for there are ideas received by sensation, which cannot subsist without others, and nevertheless are really distinct from those whereon their subsistence depends. We cannot see motion without seeing somebody move, yet none will pretend our idea of motion is contained in that of the body, which we had complete while we saw him at rest; but when put in motion it presents a new idea it did not before, and we discern this new circumstance of motion by the same sense of vision wherewith we discern the body itself. So we may reflect on a cow and a sheep, without thinking whether the one be larger than the other, and when we make this second reflection, though it cannot subsist without the former, it has something more for its object, nor does there need any other faculty to apprehend this additional object of the judgment, than that whereby we apprehend the subjects whereon it is passed.

38. But improvements in knowledge, as well by reason as experience, arise from the transferable nature of judgment: for the premises transfer their certainty to the conclusion, and particular facts transfer their degree of evidence to the opinion they tend to establish, until they grow into a certain experience. I do not reckon the translation made while we cannot assent to the conclusion, without contemplating the proofs: but when we can use it as a principle, and whenever we reflect upon it find the characteristic of truth associated with it in the same combination. This we very frequently do, for we have many judgments to which we give an unreserved assent; we are sensible we learned them, though we cannot tell where, or when, or how we learned them. Nay, sometimes, when we cannot recollect who told us of a thing, we know we must have heard it somewhere, and not dreamed it, by the strength of persuasion we find accompanying our idea.

Yet our judgments cannot all come to us this way, because we must have had some previously to our entering upon it; experience must have a beginning, and reason must have some principles to build upon, already known and assented to, before she goes to work upon them. We begin to judge

very early, as early or rather a moment earlier than we begin to act, for we never act without an apprehension of expedience in the action: therefore the first judgment we ever made must precede the first action we ever performed, and consequently must precede all experience we could have of our own power or the effects of it. The child does not try to throw off its swaddling-clothes without a judgment that the pressure it feels comes from them, and that it may remove them by struggling. I do not propose this as the very earliest act of human life, but whatever you will suppose the earliest, was done for some end which the fancy represented as desirable and attainable. This first judgment, then, arose without any manner of proof, not even of prior experience, but was owing to the ideas springing up spontaneously in the infant fancy. Thus we see that that state of our finer organization, or whatever else one can assign for the mind to look upon in the suggestions of fancy, has a natural efficacy to excite a perception of judgments as well as of other ideas. One modification affects us with colours, another with sounds, another with remembrance, another with assent: and whatever, whether mechanical or other causes, bring the organs into this disposition, they will have the like effect. Wherefore there is no absurdity in conceiving it possible in theory, that a man, by an immediate operation upon his organs disposing them into a proper state, may be brought to understand what he never learned, to remember what he never saw, to perceive truths instantaneously discoverable only by long investigations of reason, and to discern others clearly which no reason can investigate.

39. But how consistent soever this may appear in speculation, the possibility of a thing does not prove it actually true, and if we consult experience we shall find the contrary to be fact; all our knowledge being derived from those sources to which we commonly ascribe it, our senses, our memory, our reason, or the testimony and instruction of others. Therefore I am so far from imagining our judgments to proceed from any sudden irregular configuration of our organs, that perhaps I may be blamed for running into an opposite extreme; for I conceive that all our stores of knowledge, and skill in discerning between one thing and another, was acquired, not born with us, but learned by practice if we had judgments any other way than those above mentioned in our infancy, we have lost them, and possess nothing now which was not once a new acquisition. I have already declared my opinion concerning the judgment of the senses, that a grown person, on first coming to the use of any of them, would not receive the same information therefrom that we do; and that we attain our ideas of magnitude, figure, distance, and many other particulars, by having frequent intercourse among objects. And for judgments of the understanding, besides that they cannot be had before we arrive at the use of understanding, they for the most part consist in generals, which can be known only by experience of particulars founded on the evidence of the senses. There are some truths esteemed self-evident, because supposed to be assented to as soon as proposed: but I question the fact, for I fancy one might meet with children who do not know that two and two make four, or that the whole cannot be contained in a part, after they clearly understand the meaning of the terms. We call them self-evident, because we discern them upon inspection, but so we do the figures and distances of bodies, which has been shown the effect of a skill attained by use. There is as necessary a connexion between nine times four and thirty-six, as between twice two and four; and we find that butchers or market-women, who have constantly used themselves to reckon by groats,

judge of their several amounts upon inspection without staying to compute: therefore those ideas operate upon them in the manner of self-evident truths, which speak for themselves as soon as admitted into the reflection. They do not the like upon other persons who have not accustomed themselves to the like train of thinking; but all men have had some experience, and made some observation upon things daily occurring to their senses or reflection, from whence they gather that knowledge we style self-evident, because we know not its original, nor remember the time when we were without it.

40. From what has been observed above, it may be justly doubted whether, strictly speaking, we have any such thing as first principles of reason, but what we deem so are accessions of knowledge derived from some channel whose source we cannot discover. I do not remark this with a view to depreciate such knowledge or lessen our dependence upon it in all the uses of life: for I think, where we find a thing command our assent as soon as proposed, agreed to by mankind in general, and we can see nothing in all our stores of experience suggesting a possibility of its being untrue, we may build upon it as upon a sure foundation as well of our conduct as of our reasonings. But my design tends to show that nothing is above being made the subject of examination when an opening offers: for those commonly esteemed first principles may be often traced to some higher origin, and several of them not unfrequently to one and the same. Therefore, the more a man thinks, especially upon points of morality, he will find his principles the fewer, but of more extensive influence; for many of those he looked upon as such at first, will resolve themselves into conclusions from the few that remain. By this means his reasonings will grow more clear and uniform, and his improvements greater, for by tracing points of knowledge, generally received, up their channels, he may discern how they came to prevail with mankind, and thence learn to deduce others from the same stream with equal effect and certainty. May I then be permitted, in the sequel of these inquiries, to question whether several things be evident in themselves, or good or right in themselves, which are commonly reputed such? Not with an intention to overthrow them, but with an endeavour to discover why they are evident, and why they are good or right: nor shall I do this wantonly, or unless I apprehend some advantage will accrue from the attempt. But as I do not pretend always to penetrate quite to the fountain head, shall content myself with stopping at postulata, which I apprehend nobody will deny me, whenever finding it impracticable or needless to go further.

CHAP. XII.

IMAGINATION AND UNDERSTANDING.

We have observed at our entrance upon these inquiries, that a compound may have properties resulting from the composition which do not belong to the parts singly whereof it consists. Therefore, though the mind, taken in the strict and philosophical sense, possesses only two faculties, the active and the perceptive, this does not hinder but that the mind, in the vulgar and grosser acceptation, may possess a greater variety of faculties, such as discerning, remembering, thinking, studying, contemplating, and a multitude of others: which are but different modes or species of perception,

varying according to the state of the ideas there are to be perceived, and are all reducible under two general classes, Imagination and Understanding; neither of them born with us, but acquired by use and practice, and the latter growing out of the former. We come into the world a mere blank, void of all inscription whatsoever. Sensation first begins the writing, and our internal sense or reflection increases the stock, which runs into various assortments, and produces other ideas different from the root whereout they spring; whence we quickly become provided with store of assemblages, associations, trains, and judgments.

These stores, together with the repository containing them, we may style the imagination, the very word implying so much; for being derived from image, which is the same as ideas, it imports the receptacle of idea. And whatever number of them is excited by external objects, or presented by the mechanical workings of our animal spirits, or other causes, I call an act of imagination or scene exhibited thereby. I know that imagination is applied in common discourse to ideas purely imaginary, having no existence in truth and nature, such as a Cyclops, a Chimera, the enchanted island of Circe, or whimsical Adventures of Pantagruel. But we find rhetoricians and critics extending the term to pictures of real originals drawn in the mind by descriptions of scenes actually existing, or occurrences actually happening. Mr. Addison, in his essay on the pleasures of imagination, treats of those conveyed by the works of art and nature. Therefore I shall not offend against propriety, by taking the word in the largest sense, as comprehending every representation of the mind, whether of real things or fantastical, either brought into view by some sensation, or starting up of their own accord.

Among these ideas, some being more engaging than the rest, attract the notice particularly to themselves: the mental eye singles them out from the whole scene exhibited before it, sees them in a stronger light, holds them longer in view, and thereby gives occasion to their introducing more of their own associates than they could have done in the rapidity of their natural course. This operation of the notice being frequently repeated, at length becomes itself an object of our observation, and thus we discover a power we have of heightening the colour of our ideas, of changing or directing their course by the application of our notice: and the exercise of this power I take to be what is commonly meant by an act of the Understanding.

2. Thus there are three ways in which ideas are made to affect us; by mechanical causes, when either sensible objects excite them, or the working of our animal spirits throws them up; by the notice being drawn to fix upon some appearing eminently inviting above their fellows; and by exerting this power of the notice purposely, in order to discern them more fully, or bring in others that do not occur of themselves. The two first belong to imagination, and the last to understanding.

To render my notion of this division the clearer, I shall endeavour to illustrate it by an example. Suppose a servant wench in London, after being fatigued with several hours' hard labour, can get up-stairs to repose herself a while in indolence. She squats down upon a chair, shuts her eyes, and falls into a state between sleeping and waking; but her fancy roves upon the work she has been doing, the utensils employed therein, and the chit-chat of her fellow-servants. If the cat mews at the door, this changes the scene to puss's exploits in catching mice, or her fondling tricks while she lay purring in somebody's lap; until some other sensation or turn of

fancy leads on a new train of ideas. Hitherto all proceeds mechanically: volition remains wholly inactive, there being nothing alluring enough to raise a desire of retaining it in view; but the images pass lightly and nimbly along, according to the impulse received from the causes exciting them, without leaving any trace of themselves behind. Presently there arises a great noise and hubbub in the street. This rouses up the girl, and carries her in all haste to the window. She sees a crowd of people, and in the midst of them my Lord Mayor going by in procession. She minds nothing of the houses before her, nor of the mob jostling one another below, for the prancing horses with their gorgeous trappings engage her whole attention, until drawn from them by the great coach all glorious with sculpture, gold, and paintings, which she follows with her eye as far as it can be discerned distinctly. Then the sheriffs, and whatever else appear remarkable in the train, have their share in her notice: which impresses the objects whereon it fixes so strongly, that the traces of them remain in her reflection after the objects themselves have been removed, and perhaps raise a curiosity of knowing what could be the occasion of this parade. Thus far imagination only is employed: but curiosity puts her upon searching for the means of gratifying it, which not occurring readily, she must use her understanding to discover and pursue them. So she examines the sheet almanack pasted up behind the door, to see what holiday it might be; but finding none, she casts about in her thoughts for some other way of accounting for the coach of state being brought out; when at last it may be she recollects that somebody had told her there was to be an address presented to-day to his majesty.

3. Although in the second article of the division above mentioned, our active power be employed as well as in the third, yet it is manifest we proceed in a different manner. In the former we act inadvertently, heedlessly, and without thinking, drawn only to pursue certain objects that happen to strike upon our fancy; in the other we act knowingly and designedly with a view to introduce some other idea not already within our prospect, and with a consciousness and reflection upon what we are doing. For there is a reflex act whereby the mind turns inward upon herself to observe what ideas arise in her view, or what effect her activity has upon them, or the bodily members, distinct from that whereby she produces those effects. The one is commonly called reflecting, the other acting, and both may be performed at the same time, or the latter singly without the former. The beginning of our lives I apprehend passes wholly without this reflection, which we acquire in time, and by degrees. When we have discovered our power of directing the notice, and obtained some expertness in the management of that power, we may be said to have arrived at the use of our understanding.

The degrees of exertion in both cases are very various, from the intensest study down to that common reflection we make in the ordinary transactions of life; and from the steady attention given to very engaging scenes to that transient notice we take of objects moderately alluring, when they pass swiftly in succession before us. All strong efforts of the understanding are laborious and fatiguing, visibly wasting the spirits, and affecting the head and stomach if continued long; nor have the most abstracted reasonings less of that effect than others: which seems an undeniable evidence, that when the mind is thought to be most retired, and to converse solely with herself, she nevertheless uses some instrument or organ, and employs the bodily forces in carrying on her work.

It is common to style those actions mechanical that are performed without thought or forecast, especially if we cannot discover any inducement that led us into them; for we ascribe them to the force of habit or impulse, of passion or fancy: but how much soever habit or fancy may have thrown up the ideas, the motions ensuing thereupon could not have been produced without the agency of the mind. This was proper to be remarked, because, if we take the microscope and examine the minute constituent parts of action, we shall find that far the greater number of them, although certainly performed by our active power, are yet directed by sudden transient ideas starting up from time to time spontaneously. But those ideas skim so lightly as to leave no print of their foot in the memory; therefore, if we look for them the moment after, we cannot find them, and so persuade ourselves there were none. When a man walks, he moves his legs himself, yet they seem to move habitually and involuntarily, without any care of his to make them step right and left, alternately, or to ascertain the length of their paces: nor is it an easy matter for him, with his utmost attention, to discern the ideas that occasion this regularity of their motions.

4. To this inadvertent action of the mind we owe that dexterity in the use of our powers, which is supposed to be an immediate gift of nature: for we are not born with the faculty of walking, or handling, or speaking. When little children go to put their coral into their mouths, they do not know how to get it thither, but hit it against their chin, or rub it about their cheek: when you would set them to walk, they jump with both legs at once, or lift up their foot as if they were to step over a stile: and the first sounds they make are none other than those of grunting and crying. But the ideas formed daily in their imagination lead them on, step by step, to the management of their limbs, and first rudiments of speech, before they are capable of anything that can be called learning or application. And afterwards we catch many little habits by accident or imitation, or fall into ways of acting by the force of example, or grow more perfect in our manner of proceeding merely by dint of practice. Nor does imagination stand idle even in those seasons wherein we most employ our understanding, but makes many bye motions of her own, or acts an under part, assisting to execute the plan laid by her partner.

For understanding endeavours to extend her prospect as far and wide as she can stretch: she aims at distant ends, considers remote consequences, joins the past and future with the present, and contemplates imperfect ideas, in order to strike out from thence something that may be a surer ground of our proceeding. Therefore she can direct only our larger actions, drawing the outlines of them, or giving the main turns to our courses of behaviour, but leaves the intermediate spaces to be filled up by habit, or the transient ideas starting up in train to our notice. She moves too slowly to give constant employment to our active power, which while she is deliberating must take its directions elsewhere.

5. Thus it appears that imagination actuates most of our motions, and serves us perpetually in all the purposes of life, which understanding recommends, but the habitual and spontaneous rising of ideas prompts and directs us to complete. To this belongs all that expertness we have in any art or business or accomplishment whatsoever: nor can even science proceed to good effect without it, as containing something of art in the due management of our thoughts, and proper application of our inquiries. We have observed above, that many useful attainments are made in our infancy, and afterwards, without any thought or pains of ours: and even those we

acquire by care and industry will stand in little stead until the trains we have hammered out by long labour have gotten a facility of springing up upon touch of a single link. Herein lies the difference between theory and practice: for there are many things we cannot do long after we know well enough how they are to be done, not because our active powers are insufficient for the work, but because the ideas, necessary for conducting them along the minute parts of it, are not inured to rise currently and in their proper order.

The beginner in music must learn his notes one by one; then he must associate them with the keys or stops of his instrument, and these again with their correspondent sounds: next he must join the notes into bars, and by a proper composition of these form a tune. All this he must work out at first with painful application, and while such application is necessary, he proceeds slowly and awkwardly, making frequent mistakes, and taking up an hour to go through his tune, with much trouble to himself, and very little entertainment to the hearer. But when by long practice he has taught imagination to throw up her associations and trains spontaneously, he has no other use for thought than just to choose the tune, and give some slight directions now and then as they may be wanted: for his eye will run along the lines, and his fingers along the keys, mechanically; and it would require more attention to put them out of their course than to suffer them to proceed.

6. Hence we may judge of how great importance it is to have a well regulated and well exercised imagination; which, if we could possess completely, it would answer all our occasions better, with more ease and dispatch, than we could compass them in any other way. But as nature has not given us this faculty in perfection, nor will it grow up to full stature of its own accord, she has endued us with the privilege of understanding, to form and improve it. Therefore it is our business to range our ideas into such assortments and trains as are best adapted to our purposes; to bring them under command, so that they may be ready for any services to be required of them: and continually to keep a watchful eye over them while at work, to prevent their deviating into wrong channels.

Nor would understanding herself find so constant employment as she does, were it not for some principles and views laid up in store which start up occasionally to set her at work. For who would consider, or study, or contrive, unless to attain some purpose suggested to his reflection. Thus understanding often begins and terminates in imagination, which nevertheless does not derogate from its excellency, because very few of our most necessary and useful purposes could ever be attained without it. And indeed understanding may justly claim the merit of those very exploits performed by habit or expertness, when it was owing to her care and diligence that they were acquired, or to her command and contrivance that they had proper cues given, and proper tasks assigned them.

7. For the most part, both faculties go hand in hand co-operating in the same work, one sketching out the design, and the other executing the performance: but sometimes we find them acting at once in different employments. When two persons engage earnestly together in discourse as they walk, their thoughts are wholly intent upon the subject of their conversation: but the transient notices of their senses, and their habitual dexterity in the management of their limbs, guide them in the mean while through all the turnings of their path. And thus they may go currently on while

the path lies smooth and open: but should anything unusual happen in the way, and attention be so fully taken up as not to spare a glance away from the object that holds it, they may chance to run against a post or stumble over a stone. Your profound thinkers are sometimes absent in company, and commit strange mistakes for want of attending to the objects around them; or perhaps set out for one place and strike into the way leading to another. Which shows that the slightest and most common matters cannot be carried on safely, without some degree of thought and observation: not that habit and imagination cannot find employment for our active powers of themselves, but it is a great chance they wander from the plan assigned them, unless kept in order by frequent directions from understanding.

Thus the mind may be said to have two eyes, in their situation rather resembling those of a hare or a bird than a human creature, as being placed on opposite sides, and pointed towards different sets of objects. Or may be more aptly compared to a man looking at a common field through a telescope, with one eye, still holding the other open: with the naked eye he sees the several lands, their length and shape, and the crops growing on each; with the glass he sees only one little spot, but in that he distinguishes the ears of corn, discerns butterflies fluttering about, and swallows shooting athwart him. Sometimes both eyes turn upon the same prospect, one tracing the larger, and the other the minuter parts: at other times they take different courses, one pursuing a train of little objects that have no relation to the scenes contemplated by the other.

8. Whatever knowledge we receive from sensation, or fall upon by experience, or grow into by habit or custom, may be counted the produce of imagination: and to this we may refer the evidence of the senses, the notices of appetite, our common notions and conceptions of things, and all that rises up spontaneously in our memory. Whatever has been infused into us by careful instruction or worked out by thought and industry, or gained by attentive observation, may be styled the attainments of understanding: among which may be reckoned what skill we have in any art or science, or in language, or in conducting the common affairs of life, or what we bring to our remembrance by recollection. Our tastes, sentiments, opinions, and moral senses, I apprehend, belong partly to one class and partly to the other: their seat lies in the imagination, but they are introduced there sometimes by an industrious use of the understanding, and sometimes by the mechanical influence of example and custom.

Understanding commonly draws imagination after it, but not always, nor immediately. Men seen from a great height look no bigger than pigmies, though we judge them to be of ordinary stature; but seen at the same distance upon a level, they appear as they should do, because we see them continually in the latter situation, and but rarely in the former. Then again, objects beheld over water, or other uniform surface, which deceives us in the distance, seem smaller than their real dimensions, because the scenes we are commonly conversant with contain a variety of distinguishable parts. For imagination gets her appearances by use, but use must come by time and degrees. A discovery that we have worked out by a consideration of various particulars, often loses its force as soon as the proofs whereon it depended have slipped out of our sight: the next time we employ our thoughts upon it we arrive at the conclusion sooner, and upon every repeated trial, our process grows shorter and shorter, until in time we learn to discern the thing so discovered to be true upon a very little reflection, without the suggestion of any proof: upon further acquaint-

ance it takes the nature of a self-evident truth, the judgment arising instantaneously in the same assemblage with the terms, and then becomes a property of imagination. Thus these two faculties contribute to enlarge one another's stores: imagination suggests principles and inducements to set understanding in motion, or furnishes her with materials to work upon; and the judgments of the latter, either by the strong glare of their evidence, or more commonly by long familiarity, grow into appearances of the former.

9. From this last consideration it appears that understanding may transfer over some part of her treasures to imagination, that is, by making us so completely masters of them as that they shall always lie ready at hand, without requiring any time or trouble to rummage for them: the other part which she reserves to herself is such as will not occur without seeking, but must be drawn up into view by thought and voluntary reflection. For how perfect soever any person may be in architecture, sculpture, or painting, though upon the bare inspection of things belonging to those arts he will discern more than the ignorant, yet by considering them attentively, he will strike out further observations that had escaped him at the first view. This then is the distinction I would make between the stores of knowledge contained in our mind. Those that have an aptness to rise up spontaneously, or be introduced instantly by sensation, whether originally deposited by custom, experience, or our own industry, I would assign to imagination; and their rising in such manner I should deem a movement of imagination. On the other hand, those which lie below the surface, and require some thought and reflection, be it ever so little, to fetch them up, I conceive belonging to the understanding; and that operation whereby they are so brought to light, I call an act of understanding.

Perhaps this allotment of the boundaries between the two faculties may be thought arbitrary, and not warranted by any lawful authority, but I do not apprehend authority has yet interfered in the case: for though we often distinguish between understanding and imagination in our discourses, yet we as often use them promiscuously, and assign the same territories and operations to the one or the other, according to the humour we are in, or according to the light in which we happen to take things. Therefore in a matter so unsettled, every one is at liberty to do as he pleases, and I have chosen that partition which I think will be most convenient for the course I am following in bringing ourselves acquainted with the nature of the human mind.

10. It is customary with most persons in handling this subject to throw in some conjectures concerning the capacity of brute creatures; and indeed all we can say of them amounts to little more than conjecture, for we cannot penetrate into their sensories, nor receive information of anything passing there from themselves, but can only guess at their ideas, by observing their motions. It seems generally agreed among learned and simple, to exclude them from all share of reason and understanding, which is esteemed the peculiar privilege of man, and thought to constitute the essential difference between him and his fellow animals. But many judicious persons look upon this as a vulgar error, and hold that several other creatures possess a degree of understanding of the same kind with our own.

Now the determination of this point seems to depend greatly upon what notion we entertain of understanding: if the description I have endeavoured to give of that faculty be admitted, I do not conceive the brutes have any portion of it belonging to them. For I cannot discover in them

anything of thinking, or observing, or meditating, or what is called labour of brain. Ideas of reflection cannot well be denied them, nor assemblages, associations, trains, and judgments, but such only as are impressed by external objects, or formed by accident, not by their own care and application. They remember, but do not recollect, nor seem capable of that reflex act whereby we turn inwards upon ourselves, to call up any thoughts we want, but are continually employed by such ideas as their senses or their fancy suggest. They fix a strong attention upon things, but it is of the mechanical kind described before, where the notice is drawn by the glare of present objects, and not directed for the discovery of something unknown. They sometimes persevere a long while in pursuit of one design, as in hunting for their prey, which they prosecute by motions of their limbs and applica tion of their senses, not their reflection, and retain no longer than while appetite continues to solicit: for though the hound when at fault may take as much pains to recover the scent as the huntsman to put him upon it, yet when returned home after the chace is over he does not, like his master, ruminate upon the transactions of the day, endeavouring to find out his miscarriages, and draw rules from thence to conduct him better for the future. Their views seem confined to the present, without reflection upon yesterday, or regard for to-morrow; and though some of them lay in provision for a distant time, it will appear upon examination that they are led into what they do by a present impulse. For the knowledge of future wants can arise only from experience of the past: but ants, bees, and squirrels, hatched in the spring, who never knew the scarcities of winter, do not fail to lay up their stores of corn, or honey, or nuts, the first summer of their lives. Or, if without any evidence you will suppose them instructed herein by their elders, what will you say to canary birds, taken young from their parents, and kept in a separate cage by themselves? who yet, if you supply them with suitable materials, will build a nest as dexterously as the most experienced of their species.

11. This sagacity, in many instances surpassing the contrivance of man, and discerning things undiscoverable by human reason, is usually styled instinct: of which the world seems to have a very confused idea, esteeming it a kind of sixth sense, or a particular species of understanding different from our own. But I do not see why it may not be ascribed to the five senses, or to that internal feeling called appetite, which we find variously affected by objects in different creatures, and which may prompt them to take prudent measures unknowingly, and without foresight of the good effects resulting therefrom. Nor shall we be so much at a loss to know what instinct is, when we are shown some footsteps of it, or at least something very like it in ourselves. If cattle, ants, and other animals, prognosticate the changes of weather, a shooting corn, or an old strain will enable a man to do the like: the same cause producing the same effect operates upon both, namely, the various degrees of moisture in the air exciting a particular feel in their flesh. What shall we say to the nauseas preceding fevers, or those longings one now and then hears of in sick persons, pointing out to them an effectual cure for their distempers, after having been given over by their physicians? I knew a person troubled with indigestion, for which he had three several remedies, each of which would give him relief at times, when the others would not; and he used always to know which of them to apply, only by the strong appetite and propensity he found in himself towards that particular thing. Now why may not this be called instinct, as well as that which every one has observed inclines

a dog to gnaw the grass by way of medicine, when he finds himself out of order? Perhaps I should not aim much beside the mark if I were to define instinct those notices of sensation, or appetite, and those untaught arts of exercising the active powers which we do not usually experience in ourselves.

12. According to the division made in this chapter, sense, appetite, and instinct, fall under the class of imagination, as so many different species contained within that general term. Nor need we wonder that imagination in brutes should have the advantage of ours in many respects, since there may be several causes assigned why it should be so. In the first place, nature makes greater haste in the perfecting their limbs, which are the instruments employed by the mind in the exercise of her active powers. The chicken breaks forth from the egg completely formed with beak, and legs, and other members, fitted for immediate use: but man comes into the world the most unfinished creature breathing, and arrives the latest to maturity, therefore cannot acquire expertness in the use of his limbs, while they continue imperfect and unsuited for action. In the next place, many animals have acuter senses, and more distinguishing appetites to direct them in their choice between things noxious and wholesome. Then as they have nothing beside imagination to employ them, they attend constantly to that; which of course therefore must strike out longer trains, and connect them stronger, and work them smoother, than it can be expected to do in us, where it is perpetually disturbed and interrupted by being called off to assist in the services of reason. For the fewer ways we have to practise in, we shall grow the more perfect in them: thus persons deprived of any one sense make a greater proficiency in improving the others, and he that should be obliged to walk in the dark would do wisely to take a blind man for his guide. Besides this, we corrupt imagination by the perverse use of our understanding: for we contract depraved appetites, immoderate cravings, vitiated tastes, and pernicious fancies, which stifle many salutary admonitions we might have received from sense and instinct, if preserved in their natural state.

But on the other hand, understanding, as we have already observed, makes over a part of her purchases to imagination, who thereby becomes seized of territories she could not have acquired herself. Among these I think may be reckoned principally the faculty of speech, which by constant practice we grow so current in, that we exercise it like Peter, when he proposed making the three tabernacles, while we wist not what we say. But the use of speech, although universal among mankind, is not to be found elsewhere, notwithstanding that the apprehensions of some men seem duller, and their stores of knowledge scantier upon the whole, than those of some animals; which one would think an evidence that the human faculties differ from all others in kind as well as in degree. And I apprehend the difference lies in this, that other creatures have fewer mental organs, being particularly void of those whereby we turn our attention inwards, or call up ideas to our reflection, so that we may be said to have two mental eyes, and they only one: by which means their circle of vision must necessarily be smaller than ours, although the objects within it may shine as clear or clearer than they do to us.

Upon the whole, the dispute concerning this matter seems to turn upon words more than upon things. For if anybody shall look upon every deduction of consequences, how spontaneously soever occurring to be reason; and every portion of knowledge, through what channel soever flowing in,

that man could not attain without thought and application, to be understanding; I shall not refuse either of them to many birds, and beasts, and insects. And if he shall think them entitled still to further privileges, I will not contend with him; conceiving it enough just to offer my conjecture and pass on; for my business lies with the human mind, not the brutal.

CHAP. XIII.

CONVICTION AND PERSUASION.

These are commonly used as synominous terms; or if any difference be made between them, it lies in this, that conviction denotes the beginning, and persuasion the continuance, of assent: for we are said to be convinced, when brought by fresh evidence to the belief of a proposition we did not hold for truth before, but remain persuaded of what we have formerly seen sufficient grounds to gain our credit. I shall here take the liberty to employ them in a sense not exactly the same with that wherein they are ordinarily understood, using them as appellations of two things really distinct in themselves; one for those decisions made by our reason, and the other for those notions starting up in our fancy or reflection; wherein I shall not depart much from the distinction above mentioned: for as understanding requires some little consideration to bring up her judgments to the thought, this may be regarded in the nature of a new conviction which we had not the moment before; and imagination always follows the train that former custom has led her into.

Nor let it be thought I am only resuming the subjects already treated of in the two last chapters under the names of Judgment and Appearance: for we do not always fully confide even in the judgments of our understanding, but many times suspect some latent terror where we cannot discern any, or opposite evidences occur which gain a momentary assent by turns, as each can catch the mental eye: but I do not call it conviction until we can fix upon some one determination of which we can rest satisfied with a full assurance. So likewise appearance sometimes varies from persuasion, for when we see a stick thrust into water, we do not imagine it really bent because it seems to be so: nor does a man, who looks at his friend through an inverted telescope, fancy him even for an instant to be of that diminutive size to which he appears contracted: nor does he persuade himself he has two and twenty hands, when holding up one of his own behind a multiplying glass he sees so many exhibited to his view.

There is sometimes a temporary persuasion we can lay aside at any time, as in reading a poem or a novel, where imagination enters fully into all the scenes of action described, and receives them as real facts recorded in some authentic history. Therefore fictions must be probable to give entertainment, for whatever carries a glaring absurdity, or is repugnant to our common notions of things, we cannot even fancy to be true. What are the changes of scene upon the stage, but contrivances to transport the audience in imagination into distant countries or companies? What are lively descriptions but representations to the mind, which make us ready to cry out that we actually see the things described, or hear the discourses related? In all these cases there is no conviction worked, for a very little reflection will make us sensible that all is pure invention: but understanding pur-

posely nods, that she may not by her unseasonable reflections interrupt the pleasure received from the soothing deception. Nay, she sometimes assists in the delusion; for a man by taking pains may work himself up into an imagination of being in places where he is not, and beholding objects nowhere existent. Tully, the great master of rhetoric, teaches that an orator cannot do justice effectually to his cause unless he makes the case his own, enters thoroughly into the interests of his client, and places himself in his situation. And Horace lays down the like rule: If, says he, you will draw tears from me, you must first be grieved yourself: which one cannot well be without imagining oneself interested in the misfortune. But these temporary persuasions may become permanent ones where the organs happen to be weak or disordered: and this I take to be the case of madness, which being a distemper often removable by medicines, seems another proof that the judgments of the mind depend upon the disposition of the bodily organs.

2. Conviction and persuasion influence one another reciprocally; the latter often following the former instantaneously, but more commonly in time and by degrees. Where we can have ocular or other sensible demonstration of a mistake, we are generally cured of it once for all, but where such evidence is not to be had it will not presently yield, and after being once driven out, will many times steal upon us again at unawares. Therefore if we see sufficient reasons to work a complete conviction, but still find a reluctance in the mind to lay aside an inveterate error, we shall be more likely to succeed by frequently contemplating the proofs already suggested, than by accumulating new ones: for importunity and assiduity prevail more upon imagination than strength of argument, because our judgments as well as other ideas run in train, and require repeated efforts to turn them out of the course to which they have been habituated: like a distorted limb that must be brought to rights by continual application, not by violence. On the other hand, notions riveted in the fancy too often debauch the understanding, and even overpower the direct evidence of sense; and that among the greatest scholars as well as among the vulgar. For having found the Latin words Lævis, light, and Lævis, smooth, Venit, he comes, and Venit, he came, marked with different quantities in their gradus, they adjudge them one short and the other long, and would be horribly shocked at the inharmoniousness of a verse wherein they should be introduced in each other's places: but as our modern Latinists pronounce those words, it would puzzle the nicest ear to distinguish any difference in the sounds. On the contrary, they insist upon the first syllables in Teneo, Levia, having the same quantity with those in Tenui, Levibus, though anybody except themselves may discern they pronounce them quicker and shorter in the two latter than the former. And the like cause operates upon their judgment in our own language, where we place the particle A before a consonant, and An before a vowel, for the better sounding of our words, not for their better appearance upon paper: but your very learned folks determine the sound by the spelling; for I suppose they would not for the world say, An youthful sally, or, A useful accomplishment, though both words begin exactly with the same initial sound. The same may be said with respect to the rule of H being no letter, which seems a notion peculiar to the schools, and not admitted elsewhere; for one may converse seven years among the politest companies, provided they be not deeply versed in Latin and Greek, without hearing anybody talk of buying an horse, or taking an house.

3. Probably conviction would operate more effectually and constantly if we were capable of absolute certainty, for the force of that, one would think,

must bear down all opposition at a single stroke : but there being always a possibility that our clearest reasonings may deceive us, this lessens the authority of reason, and leaves room for a lurking suspicion of its fallibility in particular instances.

But however this be, certain it is we cannot with our utmost endeavours always bend imagination to that ply which judgment would direct. If you desire your friend to take something out of your eye that troubles you, with a feather, how much soever you may be convinced of his tenderness and dexterity, yet when the feather approaches close to your eye, you cannot help winking, because you cannot exclude the sudden apprehension that he will hurt you. All the arguments in the world avail nothing in this case : yet I doubt not but by repeated trials a man might bring himself to stand such an operation without flinching. Why can bricklayers walk safely along the gutters of a high building, but because they have gained a confidence in their security ? Any of us who has the perfect command of his limbs might do the same, if he could once totally throw aside the persuasion of danger. Low ceilings, swagging beams appearing below the plaster, and walls standing out of the perpendicular, threaten a downfall : set twenty the most experienced workmen to examine the building, and though they unanimously assure you all is safe, this will not entirely remove your apprehensions, until, by constant habitation in the house, the persuasion dies away of itself. Fear cannot subsist without an apprehension of mischief ; but it is well known that the strongest demonstration will not always dissipate our fears. Let a woman take a gun into her hand, examine the barrel and pan as long as she pleases, until she is fully convinced there is neither charge nor priming, yet if you present the muzzle against her head with threatening gestures and expressions, you will raise in her a sudden persuasion of danger. Some apprehensions, as of seeing spirits or apparitions, being grounded early in our childhood, can never be totally eradicated afterwards, neither by reason, nor example, nor ridicule, nor time, that cureth all things. Nor are the other passions void of their several persuasions, which they frequently retain against evidence. Hope and expectation will continue beyond all probability of success : and love sometimes flatters with an opinion of reciprocal kindness, notwithstanding the grossest repeated ill usage. The tenets of a sect or party, deeply inculcated betimes, keep their hold in spite of the strongest conviction : whence the saying applied to persons obstinately attached to their notions, You shall not persuade them even though you do persuade them : or, as I would rather phrase the sentence, You shall not persuade them even though you convince them.

4. We have observed before, that imagination actuates most of our motions, and serves us perpetually in all the purposes of life : it often holds the reins of action alone, or at least guides them in those intermediate spaces while understanding looks forward towards the general plan. So that our behaviour depends for the most part upon what persuasions we have, and upon conviction little further than as that may draw the other after it. For how well soever we may be convinced of the reasonableness of our measures, we shall never pursue them heartily and currently while there remains a latent mistrust in their disfavour ; nor can we be sure of accomplishing an enterprise so long as any cross apprehensions may rise to interrupt it. Besides, we cannot constantly keep a watchful eye upon our thoughts, but such notions as start up in the fancy will take direction of our active powers, while reflection is attentive to something else : and upon sudden emergencies, or in the hurry of business, we have not time to reflect, but

must follow such persuasions as occur instantaneously. Add to this, that in our most careful deliberations understanding works upon materials supplied her from the storehouse of imagination; nor is it possible to examine the credit of every evidence giving testimony in the course of a long argumentation.

Hence appears the mighty import of habituating imagination to run in the track marked out by reason; for when we have made any useful discovery, and fully satisfied our judgment of its truth and expedience, the business is but half done; it as yet remains only a matter of speculation, and will not serve us as a principle either of our reasonings or behaviour: but when inculcated into a firm persuasion, so that it will arise upon every occasion in full vigour without waiting to be called up by consideration, then it becomes a practical rule, and will never fail to influence our conduct.

5. As much a paradox as it may seem, certain it is that people do not always know their own real sentiments, for they are apt to mistake conviction for persuasion. In time of deliberation they are mighty confident of their resolves, and think they will continue in full force beyond all possibility of change: but if imagination has not been brought under due subjection to reason, they will find them fail, and give place to other notions at the time of execution. Hence proceeds an inconsistency in men's behaviour according as understanding or imagination gains the ascendant, which could never happen if the latter were inured to follow the former. Such deceits as these are taught us in our earliest youth: boys are made to say they love their book, or love to go to church, when in reality they cannot endure either; and after we grow up, it is no unprecedented thing for men to think they believe or disbelieve certain points in religion, philosophy, or morality, when in good truth they do not, because they esteem the contrary blameable or ridiculous. This deception may be sometimes practised upon other persons with good effect: for one may chance to bring a man into an useful persuasion, by persuading him he has it already, but it is very dangerous to be practised upon ourselves: for perhaps what we fancy blameable or ridiculous may be found otherwise upon a fair examination; or if we have any wrong turn in our mind, how shall we ever apply a proper remedy, or even attempt to rectify it unless we know what it is? It is a false and mischievous shame that would prompt us to conceal ourselves from ourselves: nor does anything better show a true freedom and courage of thought than to search out the closest recesses of our heart impartially, and know all the persuasions, good or bad, that find harbour there.

CHAP. XIV.

KNOWLEDGE AND CONCEPTION.

Although our knowledge all arises from our conception of things, and generally is more full and complete according as that is clearer, yet we know some things assuredly for true of which we cannot form any adequate conception. Different persons conceive variously of the same things, of which they all equally acknowledge the existence. Common people cannot easily conceive of opinions, tastes, sentiments, or inclinations, opposite to their own, though they see them exemplified in others: nor can they conceive the masterly performances of art or science, nor tricks of jugglers,

nor anything out of the usual course of their experience: but such as have severally applied themselves to penetrate into those matters, find nothing surprising in them. For it is the repugnancy of objects to what we have ordinarily seen or known that renders them inconceivable, and therefore familiarity may make them easy to our apprehension. The savage cannot comprehend how men convey their thoughts to one another by writing, and the communication of them by sounds would appear as wonderful, but that mankind fall into that method before they know what wonder is, that is, before they have gained any experience, to which new appearances may seem repugnant.

The studious familiarize themselves to trains of observation peculiar to themselves; therefore, as they can clearly apprehend what remains a mystery to others, so on the other hand they find difficulties that nobody else can discern. The plain man makes no boggle at the ideas of creation, annihilation, or vacuity: for he thinks he sees instances of them every day, in the production of plants from the ground, the consumption of fuel in the fire, and the emptiness of his pot every time he drinks out the liquor. But the naturalist considers that the materials composing the tree were existing either in the earth, the air, or the vapours, before it grew up, that the fire only divides the billet into imperceptible particles, and that after the liquor is all poured out of the pot it may yet remain full of light, or air, or ether: therefore he conceives no powers in nature that can either give or destroy existence, and disputes incessantly concerning the reality of a vacuum.

2. There are perhaps few more inexplicable ideas than that of force, whereby bodies act upon one another, and which may be divided into two sorts, impulse and resistance. The wheelwright, the millwright, and the gunner, can reason about it accurately and effectually to serve the purposes of their several arts; but the philosopher knows not what to make of it. It is neither substance, nor form, nor quality: as impulse, it is something imparted by external agents; as resistance, it is a property inherent in the body itself; yet resistance cannot subsist without an impulse received from some other body. It is the immediate cause of motion, nevertheless this cause may operate without producing its effect: for if you lay a dozen huge folios upon the table, they will press it strongly downwards with their weight, but the floor by its resistance presses it as strongly upwards; so the table, though receiving continual supplies of force, remains immovable.

Some things generally admitted for realities exceed the comprehensions of all men; as the velocity of light, travelling fifteen thousand miles in the swing of a clock pendulum, the greater velocity in the vibrations of ether, which we learn from Sir Isaac Newton overtake the rays of light, the minuteness of vessels carrying on circulation, and performing secretion in the bodies of scarce visible insects, the eternity of time, immensity of space, and all infinities in general.

As imagination takes her first impression from sensation, therefore I think we cannot form a clear conception of sensible objects whereof we have not had an idea conveyed by the senses. We have not any direct notion of very swift or very slow motions, because properly speaking we do not see either, but only gather them from the change of position in the objects moving, which in the former case seem at once to fill the whole space taken up in their passage, and in the latter appear stationary; nor can we frame an idea of very small or very great magnitudes, otherwise than by enlarging the one in our fancy to a discernible size, and supposing

the other removed to a distance that will lessen them within the compass of our vision. Neither perhaps can we conceive ideas of reflection whereof we have not experienced something similar passing in our own minds.

3. Things surpass our comprehension upon two accounts, either when they are so unmanageable in themselves as that we cannot form any likeness of them in our imagination, which is the case of all infinitudes; or when we cannot conceive the manner in which they should be effected. I can easily conceive Dedalus flying in the air, for I have seen a print of him in Garth's Metamorphosis: but when I consider the weight of a man's body, the unwieldiness of wings sufficiently large to buoy him up, and the inability of his arms to flutter them fast enough, I cannot conceive the possibility of his ever practising that manner of travelling. Yet when we consider the small degree of force in rays of light, together with the solidity of glass, it seems as hard to conceive a possibility of their finding their way through so compact a body, as of Dedalus's flying: nevertheless constant experience convinces us of the fact.

When we have not an adequate conception of things themselves, nevertheless we may clearly affirm or deny something concerning them. Mr. Locke says we have a very confused idea of substance, and perhaps not a much better of form considered in the abstract; yet we may rest assured that form is not substance, nor substance form, and pronounce many other things concerning them without hesitation. And as imperfect notions as we have of force and impulse, or the manner of propagating motion, still we may easily apprehend a difference between the manner of imparting it from body to body, and from mind to body: for bodies only transmit the force they have received from elsewhere, nor can communicate more than they have themselves, and their re-action is always equal and opposite to action; but the mind produces an impulse she has not herself, nor does she ever feel the limbs re-act against her when she moves them: on the other hand, she receives a perception from the organs of sensation which had it not themselves, and returns not their impulse by a re-action, whenever they act upon her. Both those productions, of perception by body, and of motion by mind, appear alike incomprehensible, when we attempt to penetrate into the manner how they are effected.

4. But in order to understand ourselves the better, when we would go about to explain the manner in which causes produce their effects, let us consider what we generally mean by explanation. He that would explain the contrivance of a clock being made to strike the hours, begins with showing how the weights pull round the main wheel, how that by its teeth catches hold of the next wheel, and so he points out all the movements successively till he comes to the hammer and the bell. Or if he would explain the manner of nutrition, he tells you of the digestion of the stomach, the secretion of chyle, its passage into the heart, the circulation of the blood, and thereby its dispersion throughout all parts of the flesh. Here we see that explaining is no more than enumerating the several parts of an operation, and tracing all the steps of its progress through intermediate causes and effects: therefore the manner of a remote effect being produced may be explained, but to call for an explanation of any cause operating immediately is absurd, because it is calling for an account of intermediate steps where there are none. In this case, we can only satisfy ourselves from experience, that such and such effects do constantly follow, upon the application of particular causes: all we can do further, is by

remarking some difference in operations seemingly similar, as was attempted just now with respect to the action of mind and body, to prevent our mistaking one thing for another, not with an intent to give that as an explanation of either. To endeavour extending our idea beyond the cause operating, and the effect produced, would be to aim at apprehending more than the object really contains.

The quality we find in subjects of producing immediate effects, we call a primary property, but we cannot trace every phenomenon to this first source: there are many properties observable in bodies, which we are well satisfied result from the action of other bodies upon them, though we cannot investigate their operations. Such as the four kinds of attraction, namely, gravity, cohesion, magnetism, and electricity, the violence of fire, the sudden hardening of water by intense cold, the fusion of metals by intense heat, the vital circulation and secretion of humours in animals, and a multitude of the like sort, which a little reflection will easily suggest.

5. Number itself, whereon we can reason with the greatest accuracy and certainty of any subject, quickly exceeds our comprehension: it is a question with me whether we have a direct idea of any more than four, because beyond that little number we cannot tell how many objects lie before us upon inspection, without counting. Higher numbers we cannot ascertain, unless when by ranging them in order, which compounds the individuals into parcels, and thereby reduces them to fewer ideas, we can bring them within the compass of our apprehension: therefore we can presently reckon nine disposed into three equal rows, because then we need only consider them as three threes. The regular position of figures in numeration, and the contrivance of expressing the largest numbers by various combinations of a few numerals, enables us to run those lengths we do in arithmetic. We talk currently of millions, and compute them with the utmost exactness, but our knowledge of two millions being double one million, is no more than the knowledge of two being the double of one: and we know the value of figures only by the number of places they stand removed to the left. When we cast up the largest accounts, we have only three or four names or characters in our view at a time: and by this compendious artifice of drawing multitudes into so narrow a compass, we find means easily to manage objects that would be too cumbersome and extensive for us to conceive of themselves.

Nature abounds in mysteries, of which we may have a certain knowledge, but no clear conception: some are too large for imagination to grasp, some too minute for it to discern, others too obscure to be seen distinctly, and others, though plainly discernible in themselves, yet remain inexplicable in the manner of production, or appear incompatible with one another. Therefore, though conception be the groundwork of knowledge, and the inconceivableness of a thing a good argument against its reality, yet is it not an irrefragable one; for it may be overpowered by other proofs drawn from premises, whereof we have a clear conception and undoubted knowledge. I suppose it will be allowed that a man born blind can form no conception of light, nor how people can have sensations of objects at a vast distance, so as to determine thereby their magnitudes and situations: yet by conversing daily among mankind, he may find abundant reason to be satisfied of their possessing such a faculty. And as we proceed further in our investigation of nature, we shall find effects that cannot proceed from causes whereof we have had any experience, therefore must ascribe them to

powers of which we can know nothing more than their being adequate to those effects; and what we know so imperfectly, we may justly pronounce inconceivable.

6. It is one of the most useful points of knowledge to distinguish, when the repugnancy of things to our common notions ought to make us reject them, and when not: for men have fallen into gross mistakes both ways. Some have been made to swallow the most palpable absurdities, under pretence that sense and reason are not to be trusted; others have denied facts verified by daily experience, because they could not conceive the manner wherein they were effected. There have been those who have disputed the reality of motion, of distance, of space, of bodies, of human action, upon account of some difficulties they could not reconcile to their ideas. I know of no other rule to go by in this point than that the strongest evidence ought always to prevail: wherefore nothing inconceivable in philosophy deserves credit, unless it necessarily follows from some premises assuredly known and clearly conceived.

But though in some instances we may and must admit things our imagination cannot comprehend, yet it is well worth our care and study to render them as familiar to our comprehension as we can: for we shall find them gain easier persuasion with us, and become more serviceable both in our reasonings and practice. For there is a difficulty in the management of inconceivable ideas: wherefore we sometimes suffer conception to run contrary to knowledge, where it can be done without hazard. Everybody now agrees that the Sun constantly keeps his station, and the earth circles round him as an attendant planet: yet we commonly think and speak of his diurnal and annual courses through the heavens, as being more convenient for our ordinary occasions. We may hereafter find it necessary to accommodate our language to the conceptions of mankind, though we should herein a little depart from our real sentiments: this necessity gave rise to the distinction between the esoteric and exoteric doctrine of the philosophers, the meat for men and milk for babes of St. Paul, and the parabolical and plain, or direct and figurative styles. And we may meet with cases wherein it would be pernicious to entertain conceptions of things ourselves, of whose truth we have abundant reason to be satisfied; the rules of decency require this sometimes, and a regard to higher considerations at others.

CHAP. XV.

COMPOSITION OF MOTIVES.

If one were set to take an account of any of those vast woods in America, scarce ever trodden by human foot, he could not be expected to proceed with much regularity at first: he must follow wherever he should find an opening, and his observations upon the first trial would direct him to take another method of proceeding in making a second: when he had examined one quarter, he must return back to where he set out in order to examine another, and would often find occasion to take fresh notices of things that he thought he had sufficiently observed before. So in this, my investigation of that wilderness, the human mind, I am forced to work my passage where I find it practicable; for I have no preconcerted plan, nor any favourite point, which I am determined to make good at all events: and though not

without some general idea of the end to which my inquiries will lead me, yet have I not a full prospect of the track they will take. I am not to be considered as a professor instructing others in the science he is completely master of, but as a learner seeking after an improvement of my own knowledge: therefore strike into whatever turnings appear most likely to advance me forward on my way, and after having pursued them awhile, sometimes discover a necessity of returning back to take a fuller review of subjects I had considered before. This is at present my case with respect to Motives, and that vivifying ingredient which gives them their vigour and activity, Satisfaction, which I thought to have dismissed long ago, but now find myself unable to proceed further without taking them under examination afresh. If I do not perform my work with the regularity I wish, yet as charity covers a multitude of sins, so I hope an earnest desire of producing something that carries the appearance of benefit will cover a multitude of defects in the performance. But because I would not neglect method where I can attain it, shall divide what I have next to offer under four general heads; the composition of motives, the several species of them, their production, and the causes introducing them to operate. We have observed before that motives, strictly such, are always something actually present in the thought, but they usually retain the name while remaining in the repository of our ideas, and not directly occurring to view; and I have distinguished them by the figurative expression of motives operating in the scale, or lying dormant in the box. Under the first head I shall consider them in their active state, under the two next in their quiescent, and the fourth will relate to their passage from the box into the scale.

2. By the composition of motives, I mean the matter whereof they are made, which consists of three principal parts: some action apprehended possible, some consequence, perception, or end, to be attained, which we have heretofore styled the Vehicle, and the satisfaction expected therein. Hence it appears that motives always contain a judgment of the action being possible, of its producing the effect, and of the satisfactoriness of that effect.

Were you privately to unlock the doors of a prison unknown to those within, they would never try to get out so long as they remained persuaded their endeavours would prove ineffectual. Indeed a bare possibility of succeeding will often suffice to set us at work: you shall see men endeavouring to open doors that they believe to be made fast, but then it is with an apprehension of some chance that they may find means of opening them. Sometimes impatience will raise a temporary persuasion, which the mind eagerly admits against evidence, because it soothes her uneasiness for a moment; while this lasts, it will make men strive to push through stone walls, but the instant it subsides they give over their efforts. Nor can you instance any one action of our lives wherein there is not a momentary apprehension, either well or ill grounded, either suggested by understanding or fancy, of something we can do. This seems a strong argument against Hartley's vibratiuncles, since in every exertion of our activity there must be a perception in the mind of its efficacy. Or if his doctrine were true, it would be of most pernicious consequence to prevail amongst mankind: for were it possible once totally to banish all opinion of power, nobody would ever stir a finger to help themselves. We see this now and then exemplified in persons deeply affected with hypochondriac disorders, who, while they fancy themselves under an utter inability of action, you can never bring them to move either hand or foot, until by some sudden alarm or pungent

smart you can dissipate their ideas, and turn imagination into her ordinary channels.

3. But the practicability of an action alone will not incite us to undertake it, for we have many ways wherein we might exert our power continually occurring to our thoughts, which yet we forbear to pursue: and when we do act, it is not merely for the sake of acting, but for some end conceived attainable thereby, which our judgment or our fancy recommends. And this end I take to be always some perception the mind desires to have: if we put sugar into our mouths, it is for the sweetness of the taste; if we aim at things useful, it is for the thought of having them in our possession: if at things laudable, it is for the consciousness of having acted right. Even when we go abroad merely upon being tired of sitting, or while away the time in some trifling amusement, it is either to remove the uneasiness of indolence, or for the sensation our exercise will give us, or for some engagement we expect to find in what we do. Nor can one well conceive a man to make any movement, without a notion at the instant of something to be effected thereby.

4. Neither will the idea of action and its event suffice, without an expectance of satisfaction in the attainment: for we pursue and reject the same things at times, according as we find ourselves in the humour. It is not barely the taste, nor the sight, nor the reflection of objects, but the satisfaction expected therein, that urges us to pursue them: those who have not a palate for sweet things, will never be tempted by the sweetness of sugar, nor will a man take pains to obtain things useful, if he have no concern for the future, nor things laudable, if he have no relish in the consciousness of having performed them. But as we cannot procure satisfaction without the application of something satisfactory, therefore other perceptions are regarded only as the vehicle necessary for conveyance, but that alone gives weight to the motive. If we search throughout all the actions of men, we shall find them always preferring that wherein they for the present apprehend the greatest satisfaction: even when they forego pleasures, or submit to pains, or undergo labours, they do it for the sake of something they conceive to be more satisfactory; and when they neglect the known greater good for some paltry appetite, it is because they find more satisfaction in present gratification than in the prospect of distant advantage. Nor if we consider the matter rightly, is this denied by those who ascribe the greatest power of self-moving to the mind: for though they contend for her having the privilege of annexing the idea of Best to whatever object she pleases, yet they admit that this idea so annexed influences the active powers to pursue it.

5. For the most part we proceed upon some design more or less remote, and then our motive contains several ends of action one within another; understanding retaining the principal purpose in view, and imagination suggesting the means from time to time in their proper order. Thus a motive appears to be a very complicated idea, containing a variety of judgments, together with the subjects whereon they are passed. Besides this, we cannot go on currently without ideal causes to conduct us on our way, nor instruments to assist us, of which we must have a competent idea or we shall mistake in the use of them. But by long custom and familiarity, our compounds coalesce into one idea, and so, as I may say, take up no more room in the mind than if they were single and uniform: and by habituating ourselves to fix our notice upon a variety of objects in the scenes passing before

us, such of them as may serve to prompt or shape our actions, occur at one glance, and as it were in one complex; which gives us our readiness and dexterity in all those exercises of our powers to which we have been frequently accustomed.

CHAP. XVI.

SPECIES OF MOTIVES.

Satisfaction is always one and the same in kind, how much soever it may vary in degree, for it is that state the mind is thrown into upon the application of things agreeable; and whatever possesses that quality in equal degree, whether meats and drinks, or diversion, or gain, or acquisition of power, or reflection on past performances, fills it with the same content and complacence: wherefore the various species of motives must be distinguished by the variety of vehicles containing satisfaction.

Innumerable are the ways men find at different times to satisfy themselves; to enumerate them all would be endless and needless: therefore I shall endeavour, what is usually practised in such cases, to distinguish them into classes, and I think them reducible to these four, Pleasure, Use, Honour, and Necessity. For I cannot recollect anything we undertake unless it be either for some amusement we hope to find in it, or for some service we expect it will do us, or for the credit that will redound from it in the estimation of others or ourselves, or because compelled thereto by the urgency of our situation. Sometimes two or more of these join forces to move us, and sometimes we have them all four in view at once: a man on bespeaking a suit of clothes, may do it because his old ones are worn out, and he must have something to put upon his back: he may choose his piece of cloth for the closeness and strength that will render it most serviceable; he directs the cut and make so as to appear fashionable, and perhaps orders a dab of gold or silver lace to please his own fancy.

2. There is another division running through all the classes above mentioned, which distinguishes them into motives of reason and motives of fancy: the one giving birth to our considerate, and the other to our inadvertent actions; and both of these for the most part find room to operate without interrupting each other; when two persons walk together to some place on business, they may swing their arms, or whistle, or discourse, or practise some other little amusement, which neither retards nor forwards them on their way. Nor are we scarce ever so totally engaged in the prosecution of any design as not to make many motions that do not directly tend to the furtherance of it. Or fancy may alter the shape of our actions without turning them aside from their purpose: a man may go on tiptoe for a whim, and make as much speed that way for a while as he desires, but when he finds it grow tiresome, he will return to his ordinary gait.

Our larger undertakings contain many ends, subordinate to one another, and all conducive to the principal; each of which in turn wholly occupies the thought, but the principal all along lies dormant in the mind, ready to operate as occasion shall offer. Thus a traveller, going on a long journey, has the next baiting place for the object of his pursuit during every particular stage; but if anything happens suggesting an alteration or addition to his plan, then the main purpose of his journey presently occurs and weighs with him in his deliberations. Most of us have a few leading aims that shape the

general course of our lives, such as the attainment of some art or science, advancement of our fortune, engagement to a profession or favourite diversion : and these branch out into divisions which again contain inferior views; like the governors of provinces or generals of armies, who have their subaltern officers commanding the private men. In some persons there is one predominant purpose, usually styled the ruling passion, as wealth, power, or fame, that like Aaron's serpent swallows up all the rest, and will suffer nothing to weigh that does not coincide with its interests.

3. We observed a little while ago how understanding and imagination influence each other: there are few of our purposes to be attained at a single stroke, but judgment recommends the thing to be done, and the trains of imagination, or that habitual expertness we have acquired in works of the like nature, successively suggests the means of performing it; which must be looked upon as ideal causes, having no satisfaction of their own, but taking a tincture of that belonging to the design they tend to promote.

On the other hand imagination often sets understanding at work. How many people employ all their sagacity and contrivance to compass some sudden whim they take into their heads without ever considering whether it be worth the while! And indeed in our most prudent proceedings we generally set out on some motive arising involuntarily to our view: for when sense, appetite, or a train of reflection instigates to an undertaking, and nothing occurs to render the expedience of it doubtful, what has understanding to do but concert proper measures for completing it?

4. Wherefore as the motives deposited in our imagination bear so great a sway in our proceedings, it is well worth the pains to examine what kinds of them we are capable of, in order to store up such as may serve us best and most effectually; but this is no easy matter, as well by reason of their smallness as of their obscurity. The satisfactions urging to our by-motions, while attention fixes on something else, are of the evanescent kind, as Hartly calls them, by an epithet taken from the mathematicians, who term those angles evanescent that lie between a perpendicular and the foot of an hyperbola : yet these little angles are sufficient to begin an opening between the two lines, and so are the little satisfactions sufficient to produce sudden and short actions, and afford us that complacence we feel in the common transactions of life. But there are other satisfactions, which, though strong enough of themselves to strike the eye, yet are covered from our sight whenever we endeavour to look upon them by other objects intervening. When we attempt to recollect the inducements of our conduct, there commonly occurs, instead of them, specious reasons serving to justify it to ourselves or the world. How many people ascribe their actions to disinterestedness, or benevolence, or virtue, when they were prompted by fear, or resentment, or profit, or reputation? They fancy themselves possessed of those motives, but really have no such thing in their composition, or have them so feeble as never to weigh against anything else lying in counterbalance. For it must be noted, that when we reflect on our past behaviour, we have not in view before us that state of mind we were actually in at the time of acting, which is gone and over, but its representative idea; and our ideas being perpetually upon the float, leave room for another representation to slip in such aims as bear an unfavourable aspect, hiding themselves, or taking shelter under others more reputable, which renders it extremely difficult to discover what real motives we have belonging to us, without continually

keeping a watchful eye and fixing our attention upon them at the very instant of their operating.

5. The want of knowing what motives lie in the storehouse of imagination has probably given rise to the notion of an arbitrary power which some attribute to the Will: for being acquainted only with the motives of understanding, and those strong instigations of passion which can escape nobody's observation, and yet finding that those incitements do not operate with equal effect upon all occasions, but sometimes one prevails, and sometimes the other, they can assign no cause of the difference besides an inherent authority in the Will to determine its own motions. But if one could discern all the various turns imagination is apt to take, it might not be difficult from thence to account for the turns of volition: and whenever the dictates of reason appear to act with more or less weight than was expected, one might always discover some secret inclination, or wilfulness, or persuasion, or moral sense at bottom that casts the balance. Therefore I shall endeavour, as far as I am able, to trace out the minute and obscure motives, as well as the more observable, when I come to consider each of my four classes particularly.

CHAP. XVII.

PRODUCTION OF MOTIVES.

For reasons before given, it seems probable there is some particular organ or fibre, which I have called the spring, that affects us with satisfaction and uneasiness. Whether there be a several spring for either, or that one affects us differently according to its different motions, I shall not pretend to determine: but this spring never plays, unless touched by some of those organs which excite our other perceptions. Hence proceeds the necessity of a vehicle, because we cannot obtain satisfaction without the ministry of some idea that shall prove satisfactory, nor fall under uneasiness without the feeling or thought of something that shall render us uneasy.

But in what manner soever our ideas operate either way, certain it is that nature, in the formation of our bodies, first gives them their respective qualities; for many sensations from our birth give us pain, and others afford us pleasure, and those sensations are not of our own procuring, but excited in us by external objects wherewith volition has no concern: therefore nature does not furnish us with motives, which must be worked out by experience of what hurts or delights us; for we can have no inducement for action before we know what to choose or reject. Our senses each of them respectively convey pleasure from certain objects, and pain from others; but those sensations do not discover the means of procuring them, therefore they cannot generate a motive; which must arise from the remembrance of what exercises of our power have used to bring the objects to our organs, or to remove them. Even appetite, as given by nature, is no more than a pleasing or irksome feel, according to the several degrees of its intenseness; nor does it grow into desire until we have learned what will satisfy it. One may observe that little children, when uneasy through hunger or sleepiness, do not know what is the matter with them, and are so far from being moved by appetite towards the gra-

tification of it, that they fight against their victuals and other methods of relief when applied to them.

We have observed before, that every motive contains a judgment, and that the first judgment we ever passed must precede the first act we ever performed. How we attain this first judgment, whether by participation of the mother's ideas, or by the mental organs being thrown mechanically into a modification that shall excite a perception of judgment, I am not able to explain: but thus much we may conclude for certain, that little children come into the world with a general notion of action, though they know very little how to apply their powers for particular purposes. When anything affects them with pleasure or pain, they put themselves into violent agitations, throwing about their arms and legs, and working with every muscle of their body: and at other times you see them very full of motion continually while awake. By thus perpetually exerting their powers, they light upon such motions as happen to relieve them in their wants or please them with the sensation they feel in the exercise: the idea of those motions and their effect in time sinking into their reflection, urges them to repeat the like upon other occasions, and thus instructed by accident they gradually rise to the more perfect management of their limbs and organs.

2. As motives have their foundation in the knowledge of things satisfactory, or the contrary, of course they will follow the quality found in certain sensations of affecting us either way, and consequently will depend upon that which gives them their respective qualities: therefore many of our propensities and aversions, and our appetites, may be termed natural, although not innate; because unavoidably fallen into by experience of those properties of affecting us, which nature has given to several sensations. But the matter of our composition, whereon our sensations depend, being extremely soft and pliable, is susceptible of change from alterations in the grosser parts of our frame: therefore nature does not entirely preserve the texture she had given us originally, but in the growth of our bodies brings other wheels of the machine to catch the spring of satisfaction. Children, boys, young men and old, have their different sources of enjoyment; and it has been observed of our tastes, that they vary every seven years. Custom likewise, commonly styled a second nature, varies the position of our mechanism, so as to produce an affection from the same touches, different from that they produced originally. What parts of our flesh are tenderer at first than the soles of our feet? yet continual use brings them to be callous, and enables them to bear our weight without trouble. Bitters or tobacco offend the taste or smell of those who never tried them before; but use reconciles men to them, then renders them pleasant, and afterwards indifferent again. Nor have particular accidents or the dispositions of our body less effect to change the quality of objects: a surfeit will give an antipathy to things we were fond of before; a fever makes us nauseate our ordinary food; fulness, emptiness, or drowsiness, renders those motions of our limbs irksome that used to delight us. Nature has so constructed our muscles, that they remove from one spring to the other in the course of their play: after long sitting we find our legs stiff, a few steps make their movement pleasant, a long walk renders it laborious, and a longer fatigues us. The same is notorious with respect to the other senses, wherein weariness takes the name of satiety: uncouth motions or sensations we find troublesome, familiar ones generally agreeable, but continued too long they become tiresome; whence comes the

observation, that variety makes the pleasure of life. As the sources of our enjoyment vary we quickly perceive it, and our motives vary accordingly; for those objects we conceive in our present circumstances agreeable move us to pursue them.

3. It may be presumed, that nature gives our mental organs an aptness to affect us agreeably with their motion, though this quality cannot operate till there have been a competent number of trains worked in the imagination to give them play: for I think we may perceive an amusement in every easy motion of our thoughts, though upon matters indifferent, when they are not strained by intense application, nor stopped by difficulties, nor run upon melancholy subjects; and so we may in every motion of our limbs and exercise of our senses, unless prevented by some such hindrances as those above mentioned, or by the notice being drawn off upon something else.

But imagination derives most of her affecting quality from sensation; for the first ideas of reflection being only sensations repeated though in a fainter degree, they return with some portion of the satisfaction accompanying them at their first entrance. For the remembrance of past enjoyments generally fills us with delight, if it be not destroyed by another reflection of their being to be had no more; and this delight increases upon the prospect of their being repeated, for whatever we apprehend will please us when attained, gives actual pleasure in the approach towards it. Which adds strength to our motives, or rather gives them their whole vigour, for present satisfaction being our constant pursuit, nothing remote could ever move us if it did not afford an immediate enjoyment in the expectation, or there were no uneasiness in the thought of missing it.

4. Thus far our motives may be styled natural, for though nature does not directly infuse them, she supplies us with sensations that cannot fail to attract our notice, and thereby informs us what to choose, and what to refuse. But we receive a considerable accession to our stock of motives from other sources. Our situation and circumstances in life, and variety of accidents falling out, furnish us with many: our intercourse among mankind with many more, some of them thrown upon us designedly by education and instruction, and others formed insensibly by custom and example; some we fall into by habit without intending it, and others we work out for ourselves by our own care and industry. But the principal supply of our stores comes from Translation: upon which, though perhaps I may not have a great deal to say, yet because we shall find frequent occasion to mention it hereafter, therefore I shall make a chapter of it by itself.

CHAP. XVIII.

TRANSLATION.

We have taken notice in the chapter on judgment (§ 38.) of the transferable nature of assent, and how it passes from the premises to the conclusion; I do not mean while we retain the whole process of argumentation in view, for then assent does not adhere directly to the point concluded on, but only connects with it remotely, by the intervening evidence. But daily experience testifies that conviction will often remain after the grounds of it have slipped out of our thought: whenever we reflect on the thing proved,

there occurs a judgment of its being true, united in the same assemblage without aid of any proof to support it; and this many times after the proofs are so far gone out of our memory that we cannot possibly recall them. By this channel we are supplied with many truths, commonly reputed self-evident, because though we know them assuredly for truths, we cannot discover how we came by that knowledge. In like manner we have store of propensities, generally esteemed natural, because we cannot readily trace them to any other origin than that quality of affecting us, assigned by nature to certain ideas. But having shown how translation prevails in satisfaction, as well as assent, there will appear reason to conclude, that we derive our inclinations and moral senses through the same channel as our knowledge, without having them interwoven originally into our constitution.

As every motive contains an opinion of the object moving us being satisfactory, whatever appears conducive to procure it we must necessarily judge expedient: but this does not complete the translation, for there requires something more to transfer satisfaction than assent. If a man wishes to see some fine house and gardens, but the way lies along very dirty roads, the circumstance of slouching through mire does not immediately become a motive of action with him: but if he had frequent occasion to ride along bad roads upon very desirable errands, though he might never come to like the exercise, they would grow much more tolerable to him than he found them at first. For the perpetual tendency of measures to what will please us greatly, alters their quality of affecting us, and in many cases renders them pleasant of themselves: and when this happens they become motives, the translation being perfectly made.

2. Imagination is not so scanty but that it can exhibit several objects to our notice at once, and this I may say in longitude as well as latitude, presenting a chain of causes and effects lying beyond one another. As few of our desires can be accomplished by a single effort, there occurs together with the object of our wishes several means tending successively to compass it; which means have no satisfaction of their own, but take a tincture from that whereto they conduce: under this prospect, the object lying at the end of the line only is our motive; but as whatever we apprehend will please gives actual pleasure in the approach, therefore we pursue the intermediate steps for the satisfaction of that approach.

But the line of our pursuit frequently runs to a greater length than imagination has room to contain, and some of the means necessary to attain our end require our whole attention to compass them; in this case, so much of the line as lies beyond those means drops out of our thought for a time, but leaves that tincture of satisfaction it had given them behind: the means then become motives for the present, for our motive upon every occasion is always that furthest point we have in view at the instant of acting; whatever inducements we might have had to fix upon that point, are not motives while absent from our thought. Thus, if a man, being to ride a long journey, wants to buy a horse, which he does not know readily where to procure, the inquiries necessary to be made, and steps to be taken for that purpose, occupy him entirely, until he has gotten one to his liking; all this while the acquisition of a horse actuates his motions, and he will assign that for his motive to anybody who shall ask why he bestirs himself, unless they recall another idea into his head, by asking further what he wants the horse for. But these are only temporary motives, which borrow satisfaction for a time from another hand, and have it not of their own property, there-

fore are not to be reckoned among our stock of motives reposited in the storehouse.

But many times it happens that we find the same means conducive to our enjoyments of various kinds, and upon repeated occasions, which gives them the tincture so often, that at last it becomes their natural colour. they then move us of themselves, without needing any further inducement to recommend them; and then the translation is perfectly completed. Sometimes they receive their quality by one strong impression: a burnt child dreads the fire, and some persons having received hurt by a sword can never endure the sight of one afterwards. But oftener the quality comes gradually by use: boys are driven by fear to their lessons until they take a liking to them; and many find amusement in professions they first entered into much against the grain. Nor is it uncommon for this quality to adhere so strongly, that no change of circumstances can disengage it: old people retain a fondness for their youthful sports after they have lost all sensation of pleasure in the exercise; and your hard students continue to plod on without prospect of any good to come of it, and after it appears manifestly prejudicial to their health.

3. Translation takes place solely in the mental organs, yet seems to bear some resemblance in the manner of it with those changes made in our bodies by custom. Sailors bring their hands to a hardness by continually handling the ropes, so that they lose a great deal of the sensibility belonging to them. Nature perhaps at first designed us for quadrupeds, but the continual cares of our nurses inure us to an erect posture, so that we should now find it extremely troublesome to go upon all four. In these cases there is an alteration made in the texture of our flesh, or disposition of our muscles, whereby the same motions and objects give us different sensations from what they formerly did. In like manner when inclination passes from the end to the means, though there be no change in the grosser parts, nor difference of sensation effected, yet we may suppose some variation in the posture of our internal organs, those which did not affect us at all before being brought to fasten on the spring of satisfaction by frequent application thereto.

But in what manner soever translation be effected, nobody can deny that we often acquire a liking to things from their having frequently promoted our other desires, where no alteration in our muscles or animal economy can be suspected. I need instance only in one very common propensity, whose derivation from prior inclinations will not be controverted. Everybody will acknowledge that the value of money arises solely from the use of it: if we had not found it commanding the pleasures and conveniences of life, we should never have thought it worth our regard. Nature gave us no such desire, but we are forced to take pains in teaching children to be careful, and those with whom such pains have proved unsuccessful cannot rest till they get rid of their money, or, as we say, it burns in their pockets. Nevertheless, the continual experience we find of money supplying our wants and fancies gives it a general estimation among mankind, so that the desire of gain becomes a powerful motive of action. Few of us being suggested an acquisition of fortune by some honest, creditable, and easy method, but would feel an immediate pleasure in the pursuit, without looking forward to the many pretty things he could purchase: nor would he be thought a prudent man who should hesitate to receive a sum until he could find out some particular uses whereto he might apply it. And in

some persons the love of riches rises to such an exorbitant pitch, as to overwhelm all those desires which first made them valuable: a covetous man will deny himself the pleasures, the conveniences, even the necessaries of life, for the sake of hoarding up his pelf, and seems to retain no other motive in his storehouse than that of dying worth a plumb. What shall we say then? is there a different structure of parts between the miser, the generous economist, and the spendthrift? Their organs of sensation continue the same, there is no hardness of flesh, no stiffness or flexibility of muscles, in the one more than the other: but their imagination has received a different cast, and the mental organs, exhibiting their ideas of reflection, been made to communicate differently with the spring of satisfaction. For though the niggard may possibly be prevailed on to do a generous deed once in his life, yet even then he feels a secret reluctance in parting with his cash: which reluctance is involuntary, therefore forced upon him by the act of some other agent distinct from himself, for we may suppose he would give cheerfully if he could; but this agent can be none other than the internal and finer parts of his mechanism, which, being differently connected, affect him in a different manner from what they would another person.

One might produce many other instances to show that our motives generate one another; that the children survive after their parents are dead and forgotten; and sometimes, like the viper's brood, destroy those that gave them birth. Many of these descendant motives gain the credit of being coeval with ourselves, and that even among the considerate and studious: they are currently reputed to have been, like Melchizedech, without father or mother, because we find no mention in our records of any they had. But upon a strict and impartial scrutiny it may not be impossible to trace out their origin, and perhaps make it appear that all the motives actuating us in our riper years, except sensations of pleasure and pain, or our natural and acquired appetites, are of the translated kind. Through this channel we derive most of our tastes, inclinations, sentiments, moral senses, checks of conscience, obligations, impulses of fancy, attachments to professions, fondness for diversions, regard to reputation, views of prudence, virtues and vices, and in general all those pursuits, whether of distant or present aims, that render the occupations of men different from the amusements of children.

CHAP. XIX.

SYMPATHY.

This title may perhaps give occasion to expect a dissertation upon those sympathetic cures spoken of by Sir Kenelm Digby, who tells you that wounds have been healed by applying salves and plasters to the instrument that made them. Or of that similitude supposed to be in the constitution of two persons, so that any good or evil befalling one of them shall instantly affect the other at a great distance, by means of certain cognate effluvia passing to and fro between them. But I deal in no such wonders; common experience is my guide, and that must have informed everybody how much we continually sympathise with the sentiments and affections of the company among whom we converse. As this quality contributes

greatly to introduce our motives into act, and by frequently introducing them to produce new ones, it seems properly to claim a place between those two subjects.

2. We are not long in the world from our first entrance before we perceive that our pleasures and pains depend much upon the actions of those about us: on a little further progress, we discover that their actions follow their dispositions of mind, and afterwards learn to distinguish those dispositions by certain marks of them in their looks and gestures. This makes children perpetually attentive to the motions and countenance of persons into whose hands they fall: nor does there want another cause to render them more so, for having but few stores in their own imagination, they catch the ideas of other people to supply themselves with employment. And in our advanced years we cannot well carry on any business or argument, or enjoy the pleasures of conversation, without entering into the thoughts and notions of one another. When we arrive at the use of understanding, the judgment of others weighs with us as a just and natural evidence, inducing us to judge accordingly; but we have seen how the judgment of expedience, frequently reiterated, transfers satisfactions upon the measures so conceived expedient: and we purposely imitate the ways and manners of our teachers, or other persons whom we esteem more expert and knowing in any matter than ourselves. Thus we acquire much of our sympathy by inadvertent notice, and add more by design and industry; until custom in both ways has worked out trains wherein imagination learns to run involuntarily and mechanically. This appears most evident in compassion, for we cannot help sympathizing with distress, though we feel it painful to ourselves, and know it can afford no relief to the party suffering.

3. But we catch our other affections, too, from the prospect of them exhibited before us: a sprightly countenance makes us cheerful, and a face of melancholy damps our spirits; we pursue other people's hopes, and take alarm at their terrors; we grow to love things we perceive them fond of, and contract aversions from their dislike. Nor is immediate sensation the only thing that can work this effect upon us; for we find the same produced by stories of accidents befalling persons at a distance; we receive impression from facts recorded in history, and feel ourselves affected with the affections of those who have been dead a thousand years ago. Nay, we find ourselves interested in imaginary scenes, partaking the pleasures and pains of fictitious characters in a play or a novel: and as we take a tincture of the affections, so we imbibe the opinions, and insensibly adopt the views of those with whom we have continual intercourse, which gives example the prevalence over precept, and enables evil communications to corrupt good manners. Even sensations may undergo a change by the effect we see them have upon others: we may get a relish to a dish upon observing the company eat eagerly of it, and nauseate a joint of meat because somebody at table fancies it to have an unsavoury smell. How many people take their taste of music from the applauses of connoisseurs? How hideous does a once admired pattern of silk become in the ladies' eyes upon being grown out of fashion? What change do imbibed notions make in the ears of great scholars, as we have remarked in Chap. XIII. § 2, so that they cannot distinguish between a long sound and a short, a vowel and a consonant? None can have avoided observing how apt we are to mimic the gestures, fall into the habits, and copy the imperfections we see continually before us: and it has been observed a thousand times, that laughing and yawning generally go round the company. We participate in

some measure the ideas of all men, but more with those of whom we have a good opinion or frequent converse than with strangers; for the judgment of the former carries greater weight upon us for our estimation of their persons, and that of the latter makes up by repetition for what it wanted in strength.

4. But were we to give a full latitude to sympathy, we should whiffle about with every wind, nor could ever keep steady to one tenor of conduct, because we should perpetually meet with somebody or other leading us by their example to swerve from it. This teaches us a reserve and caution against taking impressions too hastily, and confines our propensity to imitation within due bounds. Yet where there are not urgent reasons to the contrary, I do not see why we may not let sympathy take its course, as it gives an easier flow to our thoughts, renders us more sociable, and assists us in making many improvements.

There are some who carry this reserve to extremities, so far as to throw their mind into a disposition contrary to that they see exhibited: this temper whoever pleases may call Antipathy, as being the opposite to sympathy. It generally takes its rise or terminates in ill nature, rendering the possessors morose, contemptuous, and intractable: they repine at others' successes, and rejoice at the sight of disappointment; if you talk seriously to them, they fall to joking; and if you make them merry, they put on a more than ordinary solemnity of countenance. There are those who affect this contrariety of humour towards mankind in general, but it is more usually practised with respect only to such against whom we have conceived some great prejudice. And, indeed, if ever allowable, it is so when we fall under a necessity of consorting with persons of whose errors or evil principles we have just cause for suspicion, to prevent our taking contagion from them. Yet some situations render us all so unapt for imitation, that we rather take disgust at the expression of affections not tallying with our own: in our seasons of jollity we cannot endure a melancholy aspect, and when under affliction, any levity disturbs us: but this proceeds rather from the force of sympathy than otherwise; for that perpetually urges the mind to assimilate her trains to patterns she cannot follow under her present circumstances.

CHAP. XII.

INTRODUCTION OF MOTIVES.

Sensation first moves us to action, in order to continue it if pleasant, or remove it if painful: thus the taste of victuals urges children to take more of them into their mouths, and the smart of a pin to catch away their hands from it. When they have gotten competent stores of reflection, these too affect them in like manner with sensation, and sometimes overpower it; for you may draw off a child's notice from any little pain or craving of appetite, by diverting it with play-things. As imagination becomes worked into trains, the notice, being put into one by some particular object, will run on to other ideas very different from those the object exhibited. Nor does imagination fail to suggest fancies of her own motion, without any object to introduce them: of what kind they shall be, depends greatly upon constitution, the present state of our animal spirits, or disposition of mind, inclining us either to seriousness or gaiety, business or diversion. Habits, too,

attract the notice to follow them inadvertently by that ease there is in giving way to the little transient desires they present rather than restraining them. And when experience has brought us acquainted with the properties of things external, and the command we have over the ideas of our mind, which knowledge gives us the use of our understanding, we can then procure motives for ourselves; either by application of such objects as will raise any particular desire, or by putting reflection upon the hunt for something that will please us, or suggesting inducements to strengthen us in our purpose, or by resolution to banish some intruding ideas, and fix our whole attention upon others.

2. Thus there are three causes contributing to introduce motives into the scale: the action of the mind, impulse of external objects, and mechanical play of our organs; and these three mutually influence one another. The mind operates two ways, either by design or inadvertently; for when she turns her notice upon an idea, though with no other view than for the present amusement it affords, this occasions it to lead in a train of its associates, and often awakens a desire that would have lain dormant without such attention. Therefore, if we have any hurtful inclination belonging to us, it is very dangerous to let our thoughts run upon objects relative thereto; for we may raise a disturber we did not expect, nor can quiet again whenever we please: and perhaps desire scarce ever rises to any high pitch, unless assisted by some action of the mind tending to foment it. But when the mind acts with design, nevertheless she has that design suggested by something happening to her from without, or by the spontaneous working of imagination; to which sources she must have recourse in search for motives of her conduct, or gathering encouragements to support her in an undertaking. Even in the most arbitrary exercises of her power, as when she endeavours to attain her purpose by dint of resolution, she uses some instrument to do her work. A man that holds his hand near a roasting fire, must have some reason for so doing, either to cure a burn, under the notion of fire driving out fire, or to try how long he can hold it there, or for some other purpose which appears satisfactory at the time, or else it would never have put him upon the attempt: this satisfactory purpose, then, he strives to retain in full vigour, without suffering it to fluctuate or fade, and withdraws his notice from that uneasiness the smart of the fire would throw upon him. Herein he acts upon the mental eye much in the same manner as we do upon the bodily, when we wink against a glaring light, or stretch our nerves to observe some obscure object that cannot be discerned without straining; or as we do upon the organs of hearing, when of two persons talking to us at once, we disregard the one, and attend wholly to the other. And in all cases of resolution, we may perceive the like method practised: we do not annex the idea of Best to what had it not before, but among opposite subjects, whereto that idea is already annexed, we hold one under contemplation, and exclude the rest, or strengthen it with other considerations, from whence that idea may be transferred.

Things external are made to operate upon us either by natural causes, or the situation we stand in, or the company we consort with: but what effect they shall produce in us depends greatly upon the cast of our imagination. For we have observed before, that the same objects affect people variously, exciting different judgments, and suggesting different motives in one from what they do in another: nor does the mind want a power many times of applying or removing objects, and of increasing or diminishing in some measure the impression of those before her by an operation upon her organs.

In like manner the spontaneous courses of our ideas, although depending chiefly upon habit, and running into those trains of thought to which we have been accustomed, yet may be diverted by objects occurring, or drawn aside by the force of sympathy, or controlled by the power of the mind, so as to take another track than they would have followed of their own accord.

3. If we examine our proceedings carefully, we shall find in all of them a mixture of volition and machinery, and perhaps the latter bearing a greater share than the former. We never enter upon an undertaking without some purpose starting up in our thoughts, or recommended by the present occasion as expedient or agreeable: we choose the measures for accomplishing it from among the stores presented by our understanding; and though we perform the work by our own activity, yet our manner of proceeding is such as former practice has made ready to us, and the minute steps necessary for completing it rise mechanically in our imagination. Our latent motives, which bear so great a sway in the behaviour of most men, cannot owe their appearance to the mind, because they escape her observation when she would discover them: and our minute motives prompting us to inadvertent actions, which are far more numerous than commonly supposed, must take rise from some other spring, because the mind perceives them not the moment before they operate, nor remembers them the moment after. Nor are the grosser parts of our machine without their influence upon our actions; the natural temperament of our constitution, the accidental condition of our humours, the brisk or slow circulation of our animal spirits, the circumstances of health or sickness, freshness or weariness, fulness or emptiness, render the mind alert or unapt for exercise, turn imagination into different trains, excite desires of various kinds, and in great measure model the shape of our behaviour.

4. What is the particular structure of our machine, how the several parts of it communicate, or in what manner they operate upon one another, we cannot pretend to describe, and therefore must express ourselves by figures. Sometimes we talk of characters imprinted, or traces engraven in the memory, sometimes of roads and tracks worn in the imagination, of weights hanging in the balance, springs impelling to action, wheels resembling those of clock-work, images striking upon the mental eye, or streams and currents running in various channels. Those expressions, if intended for a physical account of our interior frame, could not all be admitted, as being inconsistent with one another: but when we speak figuratively of a matter we cannot describe directly, we may vary our images without inconsistency, for the same will not answer in every case, therefore it is allowable to take any that shall afford the greatest resemblance according to the present occasion for which we want to apply it.

But if we may guess at the internal texture of our machine by the grosser parts of it discoverable upon dissection, they will lead us to imagine that our ideas are conveyed by a multitude of little tubes affecting us variously according to the motions excited in them, or according to the courses of some subtle fluid they contain: or should we, with Doctor Hartley, suppose the nerves to be solid capilaments, and the business performed by an ether surrounding them on the outside, this will amount to the same thing; because a number of these small strings placed close together will form tubes of the interstices between them, which may serve as channels for the foresaid ether to pass along. Therefore, if I were to compare the human machine to any of our contrivances of art, I should choose for my foundation a large Organ; wherein the bellows answer to the animal circulation,

the pipes to the organs of sensation and reflection, and the organist to the mind. But the organist here does not make all the music: for the pipes are so contrived as to sound with the striking of things external upon them, or by the mere working of the bellows, which plays as it were by clock-work without a blower. Yet is this but an imperfect representation of the natural machine: to make our comparison more complete, we must suppose other sets of pipes for conveying objects of the other senses; besides innumerable smaller ones returning an echo to the larger, and new modulating the sounds or lights received from them, which supplies us with our ideas of reflection. These little vessels are so soft and flexible, that they will change their form and run into various contextures with one another, whereon depend our inclinations and stores of knowledge: for as a pipe will give a different sound according to the length or other dimensions it consists of, so objects affect us differently according to the disposition of the channels through which they pass. Nor must we omit the many conveyances necessary for distributing the alimentary juices, which serve like oil to moisten and supple the works or to repair the waste made by continual use. Add to this a multitude of other pipes which dilate and shorten upon inflation, and thereby draw certain strings fastened to their extremities: from whence proceeds muscular motion, and the power of acting upon the several parts of our machine, as well the grosser as the finer. And all this infinite variety of works, so complicated with one another, and yet so exactly disposed as not to interfere with each other in their play, Nature has stowed within the narrow compass of a human body; which if an artist were to endeavour to imitate by constructing an engine that should perform those few of the human movements that art can imitate, it would require an immense fabric to contain everything necessary for executing his purpose. But the most wonderful circumstance of all is, that our organist sits in utter darkness with respect to the nearest parts of his instrument, which are to be the immediate subjects of his action, having no notice of anything but what comes to him through his pipes: he knows not the situation of his keys, on which hand lies the base or the treble; nevertheless, after a competent practice in his trade, he acquires such an unaccountable expertness, that he never touches the wrong key, but takes his measures exactly, without perceiving what they are, and upon an idea only of some remote consequence they will produce.

5. Since there is so close a connection between the parts of our machine acted upon by the mind and those moved by the animal circulation, it follows that each must have an influence upon the other. Our vital spirits, according as they stand disposed, force a particular kind of ideas upon the mind, and the latter in every exertion of her power causes an alteration in the courses of the former: sometimes designedly, but oftener as a natural consequence of something else she intends. He that runs means only to arrive the sooner at the place whither he would go; but besides this he quickens his pulse, heats his flesh, and puts himself out of breath, effects which he did not think of, nor perhaps should have ensued had it been at his option to have helped them. The like happens on other exercises of our activity, which propagate a motion to the several parts of our body corresponding respectively with the organs employed in those exercises; and these parts, by frequently receiving such motions, become disposed to fall into them again mechanically, or upon the slightest touch, and thereby excite the same ideas that generated them. From hence arise our habits, which though learned at first by single, but perhaps inadvertent acts of the

mind, yet recur upon us aftewards involuntarily. Hence likewise spring the passions, which I take to be only a stronger sort of habits acquired early in our childhood, when the matter of our composition being tender and pliable, may be worked easily into new channels wherein the animal spirits may flow more copiously. For I do not imagine that nature gave us passions: she may indeed have made each man more susceptible of one sort than another, but they are brought into form by the action of the mind bending her notice continually to particular sets of objects. Just as nature may have prepared one man for a dancer by giving him strength and suppleness in his joints, or another for a singer by giving a clear and sonorous voice: but it is art and practice that invest them with the respective faculties of dancing or singing.

CHAP. XXI.

PASSIONS.

We have taken notice that children, on their first entrance into the world, have a general notion of action, though they know not in what manner to apply it: therefore when anything affects them strongly, they strain every nerve, and exert all their little powers of motion. But as they grow acquainted with the uses of those powers, they confine their efforts to some particular quarter: yet their knowledge for a long while being very imperfect, they still employ more exertion than necessary, striving to attain that by vehemence which they want skill to accomplish by management. These efforts made upon the organs of reflection, as well as those of motion, being frequently repeated upon the same parts, widen the passages communicating with the vital circulation, which thereby more readily admit the animal spirits, and take in a larger flow than they were capable of in their natural state. Whence proceeds the violence and obstinacy of passion, which will scarce allow any ideas to enter the mind besides those of its own cast, nor can be put out of its course until the ferment subsides of itself: wherein there is no room to doubt of the animal spirits being concerned, when we consider the effects generally visible upon the pulse, the nerves, and the countenance. Thus it appears we work out the passions by our own activity, not indeed with a deliberate design which the infant mind is scarce capable of at the time when she lays the foundation of them, but by that inadvertent notice she is led to fix upon striking objects.

The passions seem to have their particular provinces in the several parts of our machine: what alterations they produce in the body, it belongs to the painter, the sculptor, and the anatomist to ascertain; and what play they give the mental organs belongs to no professor whatever, as lying beyond the reach of any science yet attained by human sagacity. So there remains only for me to examine what ideas give rise to each of them, and hang upon the mind during their influence: nor shall I attempt a complete dissertation upon them all, but offer such few observations as may occur concerning the principal.

2. Immediate satisfaction being the point that constantly attracts our notice, and gives influence to all our other ideas, we must look there as the most likely place to find the source of our passions. Whatever present

action in our power promises satisfaction, prompts the mind to pursue it, and this state of mind we call desire; for I take desire to be nothing else but the prospect of some agreeable perception, together with some present act apprehended productive thereof: this therefore is the spring that begins to set us in motion, and actuates us incessantly in every exercise of our powers, for we never stir a fibre but for the sake of something we desire to have produced thereby; and Mr. Locke declares himself of the same opinion, where he says desire is always the thing that determines the Will. But this common desire is not a passion, being too gentle to deserve that name: otherwise we could never possess our minds in tranquillity, because there is scarce a moment in our waking hours wherein we are not urged to something either momentous or trifling. But when the purpose we aim at does not ensue upon our first endeavours, the mind redoubles her efforts under an apprehension that a stronger exertion may succeed where a weaker did not; for it has been commonly remarked that difficulties lying in the way of desire, like water thrown upon coals, if not enough to extinguish it, make it burn with a fiercer flame. After having frequently practised exertions of this sort, the spirits get a habit of rising in a ferment, which will let no other idea intrude besides that of the engaging object; and then desire takes the form of a passion. I know that strong sensations, and cravings of appetite, will raise violent commotions in the earliest times of life, before any habit can be acquired: but sense and appetite have always been distinguished from passion, wherein the organs of reflection bear a principal share, and ideas hang longer, and make deeper impression upon the mind than sensation could have enabled them to do, which additional force they must have derived from habit.

But an objection may be started against my making the prospect of means tending towards an attainable satisfaction to constitute desire, because it is very well known, that men too often set their hearts upon things they see no possibility of obtaining. This I acknowledge to be fact, nevertheless even in these cases there is something the mind apprehends to be feasible; for when the object of desire lies anything remote, every step leading to it, nay, the very thought of an approach towards it, soothes the mind with a momentary satisfaction, which thought may be in our power, though the object itself confessedly is not; for we have seen that persuasion does not always follow conviction, and as by reading a poem or a novel, so by an operation upon our mental organs, we may sometimes raise a temporary persuasion of things we know to be false. Besides, the holding an object in our thoughts is one means towards attaining it, because that may suggest expedients which did not presently occur, and because the strength of an idea, heightened by our attention to it, urges us to a stronger exertion of our powers. These causes I conceive make people dwell upon whatever appears with an engaging aspect, and keeps them still hankering after things they have found unattainable. For present satisfaction being the point continually in view, they flatter themselves with a fond imagination of making advances towards the obtaining of their wishes, where understanding can give them no such prospect, overlooking that disappointment which must necessarily ensue. The mind has a strange knack of deceiving herself with respect to the success of her measures, when the taking them promises some little amusement for the next succeeding moment. If the idea of something attainable were not part of the essence of desire, there would be no difference between desire and the contemplation of anything agreeable, which is contrary to experience. I

suppose most of us would think it very agreeable to fly about in the air like a stork or an eagle; methinks it would be mighty pretty to glide along with such an easy motion, to transport ourselves suddenly from place to place, to soar in the upper regions, having an extensive prospect of lands and seas below, and varying our scenes at pleasure; yet we never fix our desires upon such amusement, but what hinders us, unless that we cannot raise even a delusive imagination of anything practicable towards the attainment of it? But should some Dedalus invent a plausible scheme for making wings, we should probably find ourselves very desirous of having a pair, though we sold our coaches for the purchase: and if after many fruitless attempts we were convinced the thing was impracticable, we might still continue to ruminate upon it for a time, and please ourselves with hunting after better expedients upon a bare possibility, though without any hope of finding them.

3. All that has been said above concerning satisfaction, may be applied with a little alteration to uneasiness, which urges us to fly from it in the same manner as the other attracts us towards it. Wherefore the schoolmen reckon another passion opposite to desire, which they call Flight, or Avoidance, and has some impending evil for its object: but since whatever appears hurtful we always desire to avoid, since the very escape from mischief affords a sensible satisfaction, and since nature has so befriended us that we never want for amusement, whenever we can keep clear of all disagreeable perceptions, there seems little need of distinguishing between the avoidance of evil and desire of good, the latter being always implied in the former; and the less, because it would require some nicety and labour of thought to make such distinction.

But there is another distinction which, though somewhat nice, we have found occasion to take notice of before, and may find the like again hereafter; I mean the making want a separate species of desire. For when the mind is moved by some object, and exerts herself strenuously in searching for some means of advancing towards it, but none offer, or such only as appear ineffectual upon their presenting themselves, this state of mind I call Want; and may be compared to the gnawings of an empty stomach, whose sides grind against one another, as having nothing to work upon. Therefore genuine desire finding continual issue for its efforts, proves the source of all our enjoyments, but want always torments us with uneasiness. Whenever incompatible desires assail us together, one of them at least must degenerate into want, if it still continue to solicit, and be not quite overwhelmed by its antagonist wholly engrossing our attention. But though want throws the mind into such a disagreeable situation, yet it may be expedient to endure it sometimes for the sake of a greater future advantage: for many very useful desires not vigorous enough at first to surmount all opposition, and therefore meeting with continual disappointment, yet by being still kept alive, and put often to struggle with a superior adversary, may in time acquire strength to overthrow him. Content I take to be nothing else but the privation of want, which though indifferent in itself, yet a contented state is always a happy state in consequence, because as observed just now, we never fail of finding matter of amusement whenever we can keep clear of all disagreeable perceptions.

4. Desire, as we learn from Mr. Locke, obtains a place in all the other passions, and we may say they are only desire under so many different forms. As this derives its original from the expectance of satisfaction to

come, so the actual possession of satisfaction throws the mind into a state of enjoyment. But possession does not always put an end to desire, but many times excites it, putting the mind upon stretching her mental optics to obtain a stronger view of the object that pleases her, and upon opening the passages of the animal spirits, to admit a larger current that may heighten and prolong the delightful sensation; when this is done with any considerable degree of exertion, it produces the passion of joy. I think we may pronounce the province of this passion extends over the whole system of vessels concerned in exhibiting ideas, or performing voluntary motion, and that it quickens the circulation of spirits throughout all their passages in general, whereas some other passions pour them more copiously upon particular quarters: for we find people very brisk and active in seasons of joy, breaking out continually into wanton and extravagant sallies, unless restrained by decency and reflection. Sometimes joy has been known to rise so high as to produce great disorders in the body, and even extinguish life, too great a redundancy of spirits causing suffocation, like a strong wind blowing against one's mouth and nostrils, which hinders the play of our lungs: but these transports rarely happen, nor perhaps ever unless when the channels have been emptied before by some opposite stagnating passion, as grief, or fear, or want. The sight of an only child given over for lost, a pardon brought to a malefactor under the gallows, or a sum of money poured into the lap of a man in utmost distress, may have proved fatal: but then the pleasure comes accompanied with an idea of deliverance from something very irksome before, which gives it a double force. As joy introduces a pleasurable situation of mind, it would deserve encouraging whenever we could, if it were not for some pernicious consequences attending it: for it confines our views within the present to the neglect of our future interests, it disturbs the operation of reason, shutting our eyes against the lights she would offer, and turning a deaf ear against her remonstrances; for the mind, perfectly satisfied with her present condition, cares for nothing else, but rejects every other idea that might interrupt or abate her enjoyment.

5. As the expectance of satisfaction, dependent upon our endeavours to procure it, causes desire, so the like expectance from external causes, when no endeavours of our own appear necessary, gives birth to Hope. It is true, we often find it incumbent upon us to do something ourselves for accomplishing our hopes; but then so far as our own activity extends belongs to desire, hope relates only to that success of our measures which is not in our power: for no man is said to hope that his hunger will be appeased by eating when he has victuals set before him, and there is nothing requisite besides his own act to assuage his cravings. It is commonly reckoned that hope must contain a mixture of fear; and perhaps this is generally the case, considering the uncertainty of events for the most part; but sometimes we have the prospect of a distant good to befall us without any doubt of its arrival, and I know not what better name than hope can be given to this situation of mind; therefore see no impropriety in the expression of a sure and certain hope. I am not quite satisfied that hope ought to be ranked among the passions, as being gentle in its own nature, and never raising emotions unless by means of other passions generated from it. For as a man reckons the reversion of an estate among his valuable effects, and esteems the gaining a title to such reversion an accession of fortune, so the assurance of future good affords a present pleasure: and if the mind exults in the contemplation of that pleasure, or feels an extraordinary flow

of spirits arise upon it, this we may call a species of joy. On the other hand, if the promise of distant enjoyment does not instantly satisfy, but begets an eager impatience of possessing it before the time, then hope assumes the form of want.

6. The old philosophers, as we may gather from Cicero, could not settle among themselves, whether to define anger a fervour of mind, or a desire of revenge; which seems to me just as wise a dispute as if they had contended whether Chrysippus were an animal or a man, the one being implied within the other, and differing no otherwise than as genus and species; for custom has appropriated the name of Anger to that particular fervour arising in the mind upon thought of a supposed injury. But there are fervours occasioned by other causes: any pressing pain or uneasiness sets the mind a struggling to throw it off; and difficulties not apprehended unsurmountable stir up an earnestness of resolution to master them: therefore it is common when we see people go about any thing in a great hurry and flutter, to admonish them not to put themselves in a passion. And I conceive it is this view of difficulty that gives rise to the violence of anger; for as the party upon whom we would wreak vengeance will naturally oppose it with all his might, a more than ordinary exertion becomes necessary in order to surmount that opposition; and the mind, having found this to be constantly the case, gets a habit of eagerness and vehemence in everything she does, either tending or preparatory to revenge. Whatever may be thought of other passions, this cannot be borne with us, for there are several things to be learned before we come to the idea of anger: nature makes us concerned originally only with our own pleasures or pains; we feel not, and consequently regard not, what happens to other people, until having received hurt from them, and found that our retaliating the like prevails upon them to desist from offending us, we thence learn the expedience of exerting ourselves upon such occasions. Thus the desire of revenge is not a natural but a translated desire: we first look upon it as a means of procuring ease to ourselves, and security from injury; but having often beheld it in this light, the end at length drops out of sight, and desire, according to the usual process of translation, rests upon the means, which thenceforward become an end whereon our views will terminate. We may reckon at least four stages in our progress to the passion of anger: our experience of damage brought upon us by others, of our power to give them displeasure, of the effects of such displeasure to make them alter their measures, and of the opposition we must expect against the exercise of that power. But having by these gradations once brought satisfaction to connect immediately with revenge, it becomes a motive of action which we pursue many times by ways not at all conducive to the end that first rendered it recommendable. For men sometimes vent their wrath upon inanimate beings, although incapable of punishment, or of mending their manners thereupon: and in violent transports of rage beat their heads against a wall, or otherwise punish themselves, thereby bringing on that hurt which it was originally the purpose of anger to remove. Though anger raises a mighty flood of spirits, it does not, like joy, diffuse them equally throughout the whole system, but forces them in torrents upon the vessels concerned in action, producing sudden violent starts of motion, spreading a heat to the outward parts, and showing more apparent signs of disorder than any other passion: for which reason I suppose it has generally engrossed the name from the rest, for when we call a man passionate we mean that he is prone to take offence and quick to resent,

not that is he apt to fear, or hope, or grieve, or fall into any other emotion. We may safely rank this among the uneasy passions, as partaking more of that species we have called want than of genuine desire: for, however it may have been said that revenge is sweet, the sweetness does not come until the desire ends by having been glutted; but while the desire subsists, how strong assurance soever it may have of succeeding, there always remains a restless impatience, which, like immoderate hunger, never ceases to torment until it be removed.

7. When danger threatens and appears inevitable, or the means of avoiding it do not yet discover themselves, this fills the mind with fear, which proceeds upon two views; one of collecting a fund of spirits to be ready for use when any method of deliverance shall offer, the other of benumbing or deadening the notice so that when the mischief comes it may affect us the less sensibly: both which are effected by the same means, to wit, withdrawing the animal spirits from the organs of reflection and motion: because the strength of our perceptions and vigour of our actions depending upon the quantity of spirits employed therein, if we can withhold them from flowing upon the mental organs, we scarce feel the pungency of evil befalling us; and if we forbear to spend them in fruitless endeavours, we shall have the greater supply ready to serve us when they may prove effectual. Therefore, fear overwhelms with confusion; and though people will stare wistfully at a frightful object, they discern little of what they stare at, their ideas being duller than usual: and if the terror rise to a very high degree, it totally stupifies the senses, and causes a fainting. Fear is observed to chill the limbs, crowding the whole mass of blood upon the heart; and as the vital spirits have their circulation too, we may presume it gathers them all to some vessel, which performs the same office with respect to them as the heart does to the blood. But that there is a mighty fund of spirits collected somewhere, appears manifest from the uncommon force they operate with when breaking forth into action. Fear adds wings to our speed; none fight so furiously as cowards driven to despair; and people in a fright have been known to exert double the strength they could muster up at other times with their utmost resolution. I have been credibly informed of a man so lame with the gout, that he could stir neither hand nor foot, who on hearing a sudden outcry of fire in the next house, started up out of bed and ran to the window, but upon finding the danger over, his strength immediately left him, and he was forced to be carried back again. Children and other animals show no signs of fear at their first coming into life; nor can they be supposed capable of any before they have an apprehension of danger, which must come by experience of things hurtful: indeed, they learn very soon to take fright at hideous objects; but then it is not till they can discern the difference between them and others whereto they have been some time familiarized.

8. Shame seems to be a species of fear, having for its object the evil of disgrace: like other fears, it fills with confusion and darkens the ideas; it operates rather by deadening the notice than collecting spirits for future exertion, therefore seems to be occupied chiefly in driving them from the organs of reflection, whose seat probably lies in the head, and discharging them upon the next adjacent parts, which may account for the blushings wherewith it overspreads the countenance. Shame, indeed, often proves a powerful incentive to action; but at such times it takes the form of desire, urging us to do something either for reinstating ourselves in credit again, which we look upon as an attainable good, or for preventing the censure

that might otherwise happen, which we consider as an avoidable evil; there is not properly shame until the consciousness of disgrace actually comes, or the mischief is apprehended irremediable, which throws the mind into a state of want wherein she exerts herself in endeavours to stifle the uneasy reflection, and withdraw her notice from it as much as possible. This is one of the latest formed among our passions; for little children appear to have no notion of it a considerable time: it is so far from being infused by nature that it derives wholly from our intercourse with mankind, nor would ever come to a person who from his birth should be secluded from all society: before we become susceptible of it, we must have gotten some use of language, without which we cannot well be made sensible of the estimation set by others upon anything we do: and though after having arrived at maturer reflection, we take shame to ourselves for follies that can be known to nobody else, yet are we taught this practice by censures we have found others pass upon us, or we have passed upon them. For as anger, although beginning on hurts received from other persons, will at length sometimes turn upon ourselves, so having got a habit of blaming what we have seen blameable elsewhere, we fall into the like train of thinking with respect to our own miscarriages. There is another emotion o mind, the opposite to shame, that deserves to be ranked among the passions with better reason than Avoidance, the opposite to desire: for commendation agitates the spirits and stimulates to action no less than disgrace. Nor let it be said that the one allures only as implying a removal from the other, for though we sometimes stand so circumstanced as that we must either attain the one or incur the other, according as we exert ourselves in something, or let it alone, yet this is not always the case; for persons already in good credit will bestir themselves strongly to increase it, where there is no danger of censure falling upon them if they were to forbear their endeavours. But I shall have occasion to consider this principle more particularly, when I come to my four classes of motives, of which I have made Honour to be one.

9. But of all the passions, there is none more difficult to be accounted for than grief, which keeps the mind intent upon a troublesome idea, that one would think she should endeavour most strenuously to throw off. It seems to contradict the constant experience of satisfaction being the point the mind every moment pursues, when we find her strangely courting uneasiness, and dwelling upon an object that affords her nothing but torment. I conceive the mind led originally into this absurd procedure by the same view that draws her into that situation we have termed want: for as we have observed under that article, the holding an evil in our thoughts is one step towards removing it, because they may suggest expedients which did not presently occur, and because the strength of an idea, heightened by our attention to it, urges us to a stronger exertion of our powers. Therefore you find it commonly used as an argument to dissuade men from sorrow. That it can do no good, and that the mischief is irremediable: which shows the general opinion, that when men afflict themselves, they do it under a delusive persuasion of receiving benefit thereby, and that if we can get them out of this notion, they will rest contented. On the other hand, we endeavour to increase their vexation at evils brought upon them by their own misconduct, because there it may do service by withholding them from committing the like for the future. And our aptness to vex ourselves increases not a little by our intercourse with mankind: for complaint procuring us the comfort and assistance of others, and our complaints rising in

proportion to the pressure we feel, we get a habit of adding to that pressure, in order to obtain the surer and readier relief. For which reason children grow more fretful for being humoured, their fretfulness having proved a means of getting their desires gratified. Thus the mind having found the contemplation of evil, and the increasing her sensibility of its pressure expedient, desire, as is usual in the like cases, becomes translated to the means, and her view terminates upon afflicting herself as much as possible, without prospect of any further end to be attained thereby. When she has often turned the spirits into this train, they will take it afterwards mechanically: for I can admit the doctrine of Hartley's German friend, Stahl, with respect to the mental organs, that motions in them which were voluntary at first may grow to be automatic; and when this is the case, they will pour in one set of ideas forcibly, to the exclusion of all others. Therefore you see people under great affliction tasteless of enjoyments they were fond of before, incapable of business, and unable to think of anything but the subject of their grievance: nor can you extricate them from their distress, until by some amusement, or engagement, or danger, or pain, you can turn their spirits into another channel. Nor can it be doubted that there is an earnestness of want in all heavy sorrow, a want to get rid of the uneasiness, how improper means soever may be employed for that purpose, a want to undo what has been done, and to alter past events, which being palpably impossible, the mind works without any subject to work upon, and worries herself with empty strugglings: but if anything flatters with the promise of a momentary relief, we see how strongly she exerts herself, as in cryings, exclamations, stampings, tearing the hair, and beating the breast, which draw off her attention elsewhere for awhile, and thereby suspend her uneasiness.

10. Though we always find Love and Hatred upon the list, I take them to be not so much passions in themselves, as the aptness of certain objects to excite passions in us: for a man may be said to love what he has not in his thoughts, if we conceive him generally looking upon it with complacence; but he cannot be said to hope, or fear, or rejoice in a thing, whereof there is no idea present before him. Besides, the beloved object may give occasion to opposite and incompatible passions, without making an alteration in our love: which shows it to be something distinct from them, since it can subsist entire under all their various forms without losing its essence. Therefore I apprehend love to be a disposition of mind to receive pleasure from certain things, which disposition nature never gave us, but we acquire it by experience of what has been used to please us; and the idea of this effect being associated with that of the things themselves, the bare contemplation of them affords us delight. But as our pleasures are of very various kinds, so are the affections they generate: for the love of eating, of hunting, of money, of power, of reputation, of virtue, of a mistress, a friend, a child, or a wife, though all called by one common name of love, yet operate differently, and form dispositions spreading into very different branches, how much soever the roots may be similar. I shall not stay to examine all the several kinds of love the human breast is capable of, but confine myself to those which fasten upon our own species.

Under the helpless condition wherein we are born, we stand indebted to the care of others for the continual supply of our wants, and the satisfaction received in such supply communicates a portion of itself to our idea of the person administering it; therefore a child's first love is its nurse. But this love is of an imperfect nature, being the same in kind with that we entertain for things inanimate, which we consider only as instruments of

our pleasure: for though the child will cry if you turn nurse out of the room, it feels the same emotion if you take away its rattle. But after having a little enlarged our acquaintance, and found that everybody will not, like nurse, give us the same assiduous tendance upon all occasions, but are more or less willing to oblige us, according as they are at ease in themselves, or as we can oblige them, then are we ready to do and wish them pleasure, that they may be the more ready to humour us. Yet this is not perfect love, which will suffer no advantage of our own to stand immediately in view. In further process of time, if we find our enjoyments arising chiefly from the conversation or intercourse of one or a few persons, we practise the like method of engaging them to serve us so frequently, until this end slips out of view, and satisfaction, as we have before remarked in cases of translation, adheres immediately to the thought of doing them kindness. Then it is that love becomes personal, and then arrives at its highest state of refinement, wherein it may be defined the pleasure of pleasing: for I cannot conceive a purer love than that which makes us feel a sensible delight in gratifying another, and in every thing that happens conducive to his gratification, without thought of any other benefit redounding therefrom to ourselves, except that very delight. And this delight is of two sorts, which may be distinguished into Love and Fondness; the latter tends barely to gratify, the other to gratify without doing a disservice, and even to forbear a present compliance for the sake of a real advantage.

Thus the most resplendent love springs originally from our concern for ourselses, and our own desires, like a rose growing from a dunghill: wherefore Cupid, that is, Desire, was supposed the god of love, and nothing nourishes it so much as reciprocal kindness, and a return of good offices, or rather a ready compliance with our humours; for we are more inclined to love those who humour us, than those who do us good. But as flowers retain no scent of the dirty ground from whence they sprung, so genuine love, although increased by acts of kindness, carries always a retrospect to those that are past, and does not look forward in expectance of having them continued. But though the natural progress of love be through expedience, yet our converse in society generally shortens the way, for seeing other people love upon receiving good offices, we catch the like disposition by sympathy from them, without needing to travel the usual road. For sympathy takes a nearer compass to arrive at its end than translation, and we sometimes contract a liking to things or persons merely upon finding others fond of them, with no other inducement than the force of example. For the same reason romances tend greatly to infuse that whining love wherewith they abound, by keeping the mind continually conversant in imagination among persons who talk and act with an amorous extravagance.

11. The strongest connexions of love are reckoned to be those of friendship, of the sexes, and of parents towards their children. Friendship we know proceeds from long intimacy, mutual interests, and similitude of temper, which leads friends into the same courses of action, and methods of diversion, whereby they continually assist in promoting their common schemes, and enhancing their common pleasures, until each other's company becomes almost necessary. Nor is it hard to guess at the source of that propensity between the sexes, which has been always assigned as the peculiar province for Cupid to reign in, for he does not pretend to interfere in the affairs of friendship, or parental fondness. The love lighted by this desire too commonly burns with the grossest flame, and is rather of

the instrumental kind than the personal; men looking upon the beloved object as a means of gratifying their pleasures, rather than as amiable in itself. Such love, when desire happens to abate, changes instantly into aversion, as was the case of Amnon with respect to Tamar: and these accidents happening oftener than were to be wished, gave occasion to that severe remark of the poet, Two things in marriage happy are allowed, A wife in wedding sheets and in a shroud. And though there may be for the present a desire of pleasing, this is only a borrowed, not a translated satisfaction, which we have observed in a former chapter rests for a while upon means apprehended necessary for a further end we have in view. Nor perhaps is there the true pleasure of pleasing until by cohabitation, by communication of interests, and partnership in amusements of all kinds, by those graceful acts, as Milton calls them, those thousand decencies that daily flow from all her words and actions, mixt with love and sweet compliance, which declare unfeigned union of mind, we have joined a thorough friendship to love: or at least, unless the prospect of such intercourse occupy the imagination as much as any other idea. If any one would know whether he possesses the genuine pleasure of pleasing, let him consider whether he could at any time forego his dearest pleasures, when he perceives them hurtful, or unseasonable, or disgustful to the party beloved: for if he could not, his passion is to please himself and not another. Love has been usually esteemed productive of our greatest pleasures, and our greatest pains, and which sort of fruits it shall bring forth depends greatly upon the object of our choice: if the disposition and qualities of that be such as may add friendship to love, we shall reap a plentiful crop of enjoyment; if the contrary, it will yield continual vexation and disappointment; if neither, our life will become insipid and tedious.

Parental affection has been currently ascribed to instinct, and is the only species of it that I remember ever supposed belonging to mankind: but if there were a sense of instinct infused by nature, nobody need remain in doubt concerning the genuineness of their offspring. Husbands would have a sure and ready test to try the fidelity of their wives, for they need only set their children in a circle before them, and by looking round upon each, considering how powerfully instinct operates, they would feel an emotion by which they might easily distinguish their own from those of the gallant: but I never heard of a discovery made this way, therefore we must seek for some other origin of this supposed instinct. I shall not trouble myself to examine how it might arise in a state of nature, though I think it might be accounted for there, without having recourse to a secret impulse: but as we live in society, we see the care of parents so universal, that we derive the like quality by sympathy from others; the notion of children being our own flesh and blood throws a part of our self-love upon them; we have in view, upon our entering into wedlock, the prospect of amusements and comforts expected from them; and receive congratulations from every quarter upon their birth. All these causes make us look upon them as a valuable possession, and begin our concern for them: therefore fathers who bring children into the world clandestinely and unlawfully, wanting these sources, feel less tenderness for them, and many times none at all. The regard we thus entertain at first for our children, urges us continually to provide for their welfare and gratification, and every exercise of our cares increases our affection: therefore we see people more afflicted for the loss of a child when grown up, than of a new-born babe. For continual tendance alone, from whatever

inducement first undertaken, suffices to create a habit of loving. How often do nurses, though hired to the task, show as evident signs of instinct towards their charge as the parents themselves? and how many women feel a kind of parental fondness for the birds, the puppies, and the kittens, they have bred up.

12. It has been noted before, that anger sometimes vents itself upon inanimate beings, and imagination on other occasions personifies them, prompting us to behave towards them as though they were capable of receiving benefit or damage, pleasure or pain. We retain a kind of personal love for the towns, the countries, the places which have been the scenes of our enjoyment, after having been long removed from them, and never likely to see them again: we still wish them well, rejoice to hear of their flourishing, and if any calamity befalls them, express our sorrow by tender exclamations, in the manner we should do upon losing a friend.

Love, peculiarly so called, must always centre in a single object, because that thorough coincidence of interests, and participation of pleasures, necessary to render it perfect, cannot obtain between more than two persons. Friendship may take in a little larger compass, but can extend only to a few chosen objects; the friendships recorded in history have always run in pairs, as between Theseus and Perithous, Orestes and Pylades, Scipio and Lelius, Cicero and Atticus. Yet I do not see why there may not be a sincere and hearty love, ardent enough to be reckoned a passion, between more than one friend, as well as a parental fondness for several children, which we know is often the case, and I can confirm upon my own experience: for I have more than one, and had I twenty, if I know my own heart, I could never see any signal good or evil befall any of them without feeling a strong emotion of soul. But love in a gentler degree may diffuse itself to multitudes, to the whole human species, to everything capable of being the better for it. A good-natured man can relish the pleasure of pleasing; whatever subject shall afford him an opportunity of enjoying it, he will be ready to oblige upon every occasion; he rejoices in the enjoyments of others, and makes their successes become his own: but this pleasure does not rise to a passion, so as to render him uneasy whenever the means of gratifying it are wanting.

13. Hatred derives in like manner from the contrary sources to those of love, being produced by some hurt or displeasure received, or the apprehension of an aptness in certain objects to bring them upon us. It may be catched by sympathy, as well as infused by translation, for we are often drawn to detest merely by the strong expressions of abhorrence we see in those we converse with. I cannot subscribe to the notion that men are born enemies to one another, or that nature has given us any constitutional aversions; for I apprehend we are born with a total indifference to all things, until experience teaches us to make a difference between one thing and another, upon seeing the manner in which they affect us. Sometimes hatred becomes personal, and then may be styled the pleasure of displeasing: under this disposition men desire and wish hurt to their enemy as an ultimate end, without any prospect of benefit, or effecting a security from danger to themselves. Generally, when people have taken a violent distaste to one or two persons, they behave with more than ordinary civility to the rest of the world: but there are those in whom the pleasure of displeasing extends to all mankind; they take delight in crossing and vexing, and rejoice at the sight of mischief or disappointment, on what quarter soever it shall appear. On the contrary, there are other tempers to whom nothing is so

hateful as hatred itself, therefore they never give it admittance, or at least do not suffer it to become personal: and though the sight of detestable qualities has an aptitude to transfer an odium upon the possessor, yet they find means to separate the offender from the offence, and can do him all kind of good offices consistent with the general good, or a necessary regard to their own lawful interests. We have shown before in the proper place how translation arises from the narrowness of our imagination, which when any purpose requires a number of steps to complete it, cannot retain the whole line in view, and as it loses sight of the further parts, desire rests upon those remaining; therefore the proneness to animosities argues a narrow mind, which having found the doing hurt to others sometimes expedient, forgets that expedience, and confines its views to the means which that had rendered desirable. But whoever possesses a large and open understanding, if the giving displeasure appears at any time necessary, will hold that necessity in view, which draws his aversion aside from the person, and carries it forward to those mischiefs which cannot be prevented, without giving such displeasure.

14. Despair, envy, jealousy, contempt, vexation, peevishness, astonishment, and the like, are not distinct passions, but branches or mixtures of those already described, and therefore need no further notice. But there is one situation of mind, causing great emotions both in her and the body, that deserves particular consideration, as having been of late much recommended for uses whereto it seems not properly applicable: which is, that species of joy called Mirth, expressing itself frequently in laughter. This has been commonly held by our moderns to arise from contempt, upon a comparison of ourselves with something apprehended greatly our inferior. I shall not urge that we make ourselves merry with compositions of mere matter, which cannot come into competition with any supposed excellencies of our own: because I know very well, and have observed just now, that imagination often personifies things inanimate, conceiving them at first glance as possessing the qualities and sentiments of men, or as representations of the human affections, or as evidences of blunders in the contrivers of them. But if we consult experience for instances of contempt and laughter, we shall find either of them often appearing without the other. If a man, going to take up something shining upon the ground, discovers it to be a pin, if upon being offered a bribe he rejects it with scorn, if he sees a child endeavour to stop his passage, will he burst into laughter upon the occasion? Contempt and scorn are gloomy situations of mind, and the proud who deal most largely in them are the most solemn and stateliest of mortals: besides that a despicable object contemplated ever so long will appear equally so, but a diverting one cannot keep up your merriment for ever. On the other hand, your merry giggling people love best to consort among their equals, to put themselves upon a par with the company, and are less supercilious or disposed to draw comparisons between themselves and others. The sudden appearance of an intimate friend spreads a smile over the countenance: the sight of an exquisite dainty, the unexpected offer of an advantageous scheme, sets the voluptuous, the covetous, and the ambitious a chuckling, and would produce a downright laughter, if men had not been habituated to restrain themselves by the rules of decorum: but the situation of mind they then stand in seems the farthest imaginable from a state of contempt. Success of all kinds, if it does not immediately shake the sides, yet renders us more susceptible of mirth upon any little trifling occasion happening to excite it. Who are so easily set a laughing as young

children? but what idea of superiority can they be supposed to have? They laugh before they are capable of casting back a reflection upon their own qualifications, much less of comparing them with those of other people. They laugh upon the sight of nurse or mamma: begin, little child, says Virgil, to show you know your mamma by your smiles: but if they make any comparisons, they must consider nurse and mamma as their superiors and governors. That exultation the mind feels upon an opinion of superiority is a very translated satisfaction derived through many stages: she must have learned the tendency of things to gratify her desires, the propensity of other people to get them away for ministering to their own, the contest ensuing upon such occasions, the advantage of greater powers towards obtaining victory, and the reflection of possessing such advantages as of an immediate good; by all which gradations satisfaction must have been transferred to the thought of superiority; a process too long to be gone through in the first stages of life, wherein the proneness to laughter appears evident.

15. Mirth I conceive occasioned by a sudden influx of spirits generally, if not always, turned from some other channel, to which they have been drawn by an earnest attention: and therefore perhaps it is that to make merry is called to divert, as being a diversion of the spirits out of the course they have been strongly thrown into before. For that attention gathers a considerable fund of them appears manifest from the fatigue and wasting it brings on if continued long, and when some pleasurable idea opens the sluices at once, it lets in so large a flood that reflection cannot employ them at all, having no other business for them than to contemplate that idea, and the superfluity overflows upon the muscles causing the convulsions of laughter. Thus there seems to be three causes concurring to excite laughter when not produced mechanically, as by tickling, by fits of hysterics, or the like: viz. a stretch of attention loosened at once, the suddenness of such relaxation, and want of employment for the spirits so discharged upon the mind. Wit consists in allusion, and is commonly said to carry two faces; that on the grave side engages your attention, which upon turning the other instantly lets go its hold: the most diverting humour is that which raises your expectation of something very serious, and then upon breaking the jest cuts it short with an issue very different from what you expected. Nor yet is it always necessary there should be a long preparation to introduce a joke, imagination being extremely agile and quick in her motions can fix a strong attention upon one object, and turn it off upon another in a moment: therefore a short expression, a single gesture, an arch look, a comical figure, will suffice to create mirth. We learn from Mr. Locke that wit lies in putting ideas together, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity; to which I may add by way of comment, that the resemblance must be pointed out between things usually esteemed the most discordant, and which contemplated separately would lead the mind into the most opposite trains of thinking: for the quick transition of thought or fluctuation between such distant ideas is what causes your merriment. And the like changeable situation of mind occasions our laughter at the follies and blunders we see committed: for every blunder implies a deliberate endeavour to attain some purpose by means not conducive thereto, and the sight or thought of earnestness and expectation, in the persons so labouring, fills our own imagination by sympathy with the like ideas, which are immediately dissipated upon the reflection of their being ineffectual and nugatory. But I have said the relaxation must be sudden, and the employment wanting for the spirits let loose thereby:

therefore if the relator of a merry story manages so ill that you see beforehand how it will end, you lose half your pleasure. For the same reason, a story often repeated becomes insipid, and a jest may be worn threadbare: because when you know what is coming, attention cannot run into another channel from whence it might be suddenly diverted. Nor will all kinds of joyful ideas, how unexpected soever, provoke us to laughter: the news of an estate or some extraordinary success befalling us, leads in a train of advantages and pleasures attendant thereupon, which fill imagination with a variety of ideas, and find abundant employment for thought, so there is no redundancy of spirits to run over upon the risible nerves: but a jest presents one pleasurable idea without further consequences, which occupies the mind alone, and requires no pains to retain it, or keep out other ideas, but leaves the spirits at liberty to rush into whatever quarter their own impulse shall carry them.

16. If laughter sometimes accompanies a thought of superiority, it is owing to that vanity which too often teaches men a habit of exulting at the sight of folly or infirmity; for the vain having an immoderate fondness for pre-eminence, without either abilities or application to raise themselves above the common level, feel a sudden joy on beholding anything below it. And this aptness to mirth upon such occasions, whatever they may think of it, redounds very little to their honour, as implying a secret consciousness of wanting merit in themselves; for it shows that instances of their superiority come seldom and unexpected, carrying something of novelty and surprise, without which they could not instigate to laughter. A good-natured man can smile at indiscretions, without casting back reflections upon himself; and whenever such reflection does occur, I believe it is most commonly an after thought, not so often the cause of mirth as the consequence: vanity running on to a comparison of our own supposed perfections, which must rather abate the emotion than increase it, by finding other employ for the spirits: and we find, in fact, that it does make such abatement; every one sees the difference between a hearty laugh of real joy, and a scornful sneer, or a grin, expressing a claim to superiority; the laugh of contempt is a forced laugh, showing signs of gladness in the countenance, but not making the heart merry, and encouraged not so much to please ourselves as to vex another.

Contempt being so apt to show itself in derision, hence the making a thing appear despicable and silly, has been called rendering it ridiculous. But ridiculous, although derived from the Latin word standing for laughter, does not always imply a quality of exciting even that affected laugh which is the expression of contempt: you shall see men with a very grave countenance go about to demonstrate the ridiculousness of a thing without ever raising mirth in themselves, or expecting to raise it in others: therefore ridiculous is not synonymous with comical or diverting, but rather coincides with absurd or foolish, and tends more to provoke your spleen than your laughter.

17. Upon this view of the nature and essence of wit and ridicule, it seems surprising to hear them recommended as methods proper for the discovery of truth, and offered as the surest test and touchstone to try the soundness of an opinion: for they tend to alarm the passions, they fill the mind with one single idea, barring her attention against all others, and produce their effects by their manner of placing objects, one setting them in a diverting, and the other in an offensive light. Whereas reason requires a calm and dispassionate situation of mind to form her judgments aright:

she wants the whole attention to look round upon every circumstance, and places her objects in all the lights wherein they are capable of standing. But the most surprising thing is to find the greatest stress laid upon jest and derision by those who make the loudest pretences to freedom of thought: for liberty consists in a thorough exemption from all influence and constraint whatsoever, which may as well be thrown upon us by the allurements of wit and stings of ridicule, as by any other impulse: for they cast a prejudice upon the mind, that cramps and confines it within the narrow point of view they hold their objects in; and he that lies liable to be laughed out of his sentiments, is no more master of his thoughts than if he were driven by the force of authority or example.

It has been alleged, in support of these methods of arguing, that disputants of all kinds are observed to employ them, if they have talents that way, and fit opportunities offer for exerting them. But I desire it may be remembered, there are two sorts of argumentation, one by way of rhetoric, and the other by that of logic: the former addresses the imagination, aims at working a persuasion there, and endeavours to interest the passions: the latter appeals directly to the understanding, proposes only conviction, rejects all kind of artifice. Therefore, when we have fully satisfied ourselves of any matter upon a full and fair examination, and are only to persuade others who will not hear reason, being hindered by some prejudice or passion, it is allowable to use any contrivances likely to remove those obstacles: but when the business is to inquire into some doubtful point, and such are all to be esteemed during a debate with any sincere and judicious antagonist, none of the arts of persuasion ought to find admittance. I can allow jest and taunt to be useful engines of oratory, but can by no means think them proper instruments for reason to work with: nor do we ever find them employed in the sciences, where understanding alone is concerned. Where is there purer, closer, or clearer reasoning than in the mathematics? but what room do they afford for merriment? Whoever demonstrated a problem in Euclid by ridicule? or where will you find a joke in Sir Isaac Newton's Principia? The five mechanical powers, the properties of fluids, the courses of the planets, were not discovered nor explained by sallies of humour and raillery: and though the cycles and epicycles of the ancients are now become ridiculous by being grown out of fashion, they were first overthrown by serious argumentation from the phenomena of nature. Divination, astrology, magic, and the philosopher's stone, afford an ample field for humour and raillery; yet I believe no man who held them upon principle was ever beat out of his notions by those weapons, without some solid argument convincing to his understanding.

18. Violence and turbulence constitute the essence of passion: the same emotions of soul, when too gentle to deserve that name, are styled Affections. It is not easy to ascertain the precise limits between passion and affection, the difference lying only in degree, nor indeed are they always accurately distinguished, either in discourse or writing; but, strictly speaking, passion is that which causes perturbation and disorder of spirits, throwing its own set of ideas forcibly upon the mind, and not leaving her master of her own motions; a situation very dangerous, as laying us open to every mischief, while the exercise of understanding, by which alone we might help ourselves, remains suspended. Therefore, passion may be styled the fever of the mind, which disturbs and weakens, and cannot continue long, or return often, without pernicious consequences: but affection, like the steady beating of the pulse, actuates and invigorates, and keeps the

mind continually alive. For we are every moment, while awake, pursuing or avoiding something or other; and indeed it is necessary we should be so, for were it possible to remain totally unaffected and unconcerned with anything, there would be no business for volition to do, but we must lie like logs, to receive whatever chance should throw upon us. It is our affections that lay the foundation of prudence, by prompting us to look forward to the future, that multiply our enjoyments beyond those of sensation or appetite, and find work for understanding by suggesting objects to contrive and provide for. Nor are any of them unserviceable, if properly directed, and kept within due moderation: cheerfulness preserves health, and renders the common scenes of life pleasurable: hope was esteemed of old, as we learn from the fable of Pandora's box, a salve to assuage the smart of all evils, and supplies the place of enjoyments when we have none actually in our power: caution helps to preserve the good things we have, and secure us against dangers: sensibility of the difference between good and bad usage urges us to apply the proper means for preventing injuries: decency keeps the world in order, nor could society or good manners subsist without it: reflection on cross accidents teaches us to provide against the like for the future: good nature and obligingness double our pleasures by making those of other people our own, and are the channels through which the benefits of society are chiefly conveyed: dislike to things or persons obnoxious secures us against catching contagion, or receiving mischief from them: desire, if not boisterous, furnishes us with constant employment, and gives a glee to everything we undertake: and want, not rising to impatience, spurs us up to industry and vigilance, and holds us steady in pursuit of useful aims not presently attainable.

19. I said at the end of the last chapter, that the passions were only a stronger sort of habits acquired early in our childhood: from whence of course it follows, that habits must be feebler passions learned later, when the organs being grown tough, become less susceptible of new forms, but having once taken them, are less easy to be thrown out of them again. The force of passion seems to proceed from the wideness of the channels, and that vigorous pulsation wherewith they drive on the spirits contained in them: that of habit from the stiffness of their coats, which will not readily close, so as to turn the spirits from their accustomed track. Therefore passion does its work by vehemence and impetuosity, bearing down all opposition; it can only be mastered by a strong resolution, and that not without difficulty; but if you can stop the torrent it leaves you quiet. But habit prevails by perseverance and importunity; it does not bear you down by force, but steals upon you imperceptibly, or teazes and tires you into a compliance; it is easily restrained at any time with a little attention, but the moment you take off your eye it recoils again, and when grown inveterate, is extremely difficult to be totally eradicated. Our little motives are mostly introduced and the manner of our proceeding shaped by habit: it is that gives us dexterity and readiness in everything we do, and renders our thoughts and motions easy. We see how awkward and troublesome it is to consort with company, or pursue a method of conduct, or perform any work very different from what we have been used to. The tenor of our lives, and success of our endeavours, depends more upon habit than judgment: for what avails the knowing what is proper to be done, without an expertness and readiness to compass it? wherefore we cannot employ our understanding better than by inuring ourselves to such ways and practices as may prove beneficial, and carefully guarding against any others

encroaching upon us: for it understanding can gain over habit to her service, it will do her work more completely, and effectually, and pleasantly than she could herself. Passion grows feeble with age, but habit gathers strength: old people can relinquish any fancy that comes into their heads, without much trouble, but none are harder to be put out of their ways; and in those few desires they have remaining, they show less of the eagerness of passion than the stubbornness of habit. But we take notice of their attachments to money, to command, and some other objects, and style them passions because they are few, and engross their whole attention for want of a competitor, not because of any violence, or impetuosity we discern in them. But as passion, affection, and habit, must have some matter to work upon, and the subjects giving rise to them or recommended by them to our pursuit are infinitely various, it would be endless and perplexing to particularize them all: therefore I shall attempt to reduce them under a few general heads, and can think of none more proper than those four classes into which I had before proposed to distinguish our motives of action.

CHAP. XXII.

PLEASURE.

To Pleasure I might have joined Pain or Trouble, in the title of this chapter, but they being each of them respectively a species of satisfaction or uneasiness, may be treated of in the same manner, that is, both under the former. For as the one by repelling actuates us to almost the same motions as the other by attracting, what I shall observe concerning pleasure will serve equally for its reverse, unless where some particular occasion may require them to be considered distinctly.

Pleasure, like other satisfactions, when taken as a motive, must not be understood of the actual possession, but the prospect or idea of it: for motives do not prompt us to what we have already, which were needless, but to attain something we have not, or to preserve the continuance of something that would otherwise slip away from us. Yet as that idea rises from experience of the manner wherein things have affected us, we can only get acquainted with this species of motives by examining from what sources we derive our pleasures.

Nature gives us at first none other pleasures besides those of sensation and appetite, among which may be reckoned that soothing feel accompanying the free circulation of our blood and humours when in health and vigour, or the easy flow of spirits along the mental organs, when in contemplation or pursuit of anything engaging our attention: and in these internal sensations perhaps may consist all the pleasures of imagination and reflection which we feel in seasons of joy, or hope, or desire, or other agreeable situations of mind. But however this be, certain it is that in process of time, when reflection has learnt its play, it supplies us with a considerable fund of entertainment; the pleasures of reading, of meditation, of conversation, of diversions, of advancement in knowledge, honour, or fortune, belong to the reflection rather than the senses, therefore are styled mental, as the others are bodily pleasures. And the former furnish much the greater share of our enjoyments in our riper years: for if any man will reflect on a day agreeably spent, he will find much less of it taken up in mere sensa-

tion than in some pursuit or variety of amusement that engaged his attention. Thus our pleasures, how much soever afterwards multiplied, take their rise from sensation alone, all others being derivative or translated from that original. To instance only in acquisitions of knowledge, which is commonly held sweet to the mind by the very frame of her constitution: but if it were so, every accession of knowledge would engage everybody alike, whereas in fact we find the contrary. What would the mathematician give to know the newest fashions as they start into vogue, or be let into all the scandal and tittle tattle of the town? Or what cares the beau for discoveries in astronomy, or explanations of attraction, repulsion, or other secrets of nature? Though we all have our curiosity to a considerable degree, yet it leads us by various tracks to objects that we have found contributing most to our entertainment: not that we have always anything further in view than to gratify our present curiosity; but it is the usual course of translation to confer a quality of pleasing upon whatever has often administered to our other gratifications. The most refined pleasures are those that have passed through the greatest number of translations, and therefore stand furthest removed from sense: but before we depend upon them for our enjoyments, we ought to be well assured of our having a real relish for them; for men often deceive themselves in this point, affecting a fondness for refinements they have not; from a secret motive of vanity which induces them to believe themselves possessed of anything they think will give them credit and reputation.

2. Our pleasures, as well those of the gross as the refined kind, depend upon the constitution and disposition of our machine; some can bear hot weather best, others cold; health and sickness, vigour and weariness, render the same sensations and exercises delightful or irksome. In like manner, the gust of mental amusements varies according to the cast our imagination has been thrown into by education, or custom, or habit, according to the humour we happen to be in, to various accidents or circumstances befalling us, or to the satiety or novelty we find in them.

This variety of disposition in mankind to receive pleasure from different objects is called Taste, because like the palate it enables us to distinguish the relish of things, and to discern which of them are savory, insipid, or disgustful. Taste is usually confounded with judgment, of which it is rather the basis than the thing itself: for taste properly denotes a sensibility of delight in certain objects, and therefore having experienced what has pleased us, we learn to judge what will please others or ourselves another time. Nature may have laid the foundation of taste, but the superstructure is raised by instruction, or conversation, or observation; for we never find it in children, and very rarely among persons confined to the common laborious occupations of life. Not but that all men have their sources of amusement, and therefore in this sense your mechanics and ploughmen may be said to have a taste for bull-baiting, foot-ball, the finery of a Lord Mayor's show, or diversions of a country fair: but taste is most usually applied to those relishes given by the perfection of art, or good company, or an uncommon sensibility of imagination. Yet we sometimes take it in a larger sense, as when we distinguish between a gross and a refined, a vulgar and an elegant, a false and a true taste: the latter being such as enables us to receive more exquisite or more durable pleasures from things, or in greater variety, or as Horace calls it, more sincere, that is, unalloyed with any disagreeable mixture. But there be an over squeamishness and nicety of taste, which renders the imagination too delicate, and liable to disgust from the common objects

continually surrounding it, like a very tender skin, that cannot bear the least drop of rain, or breath of air, without suffering, and is rather to be esteemed a weakness than a perfection. Therefore goodness of taste seems to be relative, that which is suitable to one man being not so to another: what good would a fine taste for opera music do him who could not afford to go to it? or of what service would a taste for poetry, rhetoric, or elegance, be to a missionary, who must spend his time among savages? I conceive the best, if not the truest taste, is that which gives a man the strongest and fullest relish of objects and employments lying within his power and suited to his situation and circumstances in life. But if one could cast imagination into any mould one pleases with a wish, I would make the same distinction here as I have done before between desire and want. and would wish to have a taste for the finest productions of art, without any distaste of those that fall greatly inferior: for by this means I should have a chance of being sometimes exquisitely pleased, but run no hazard of being ever disgusted.

3. What is called genius I imagine proceeds chiefly from the turn imagination has taken early in our youth: we do not discern when it begins, and therefore ascribe it to nature; but though nature may have given each of us quicker and stronger, or duller and weaker parts, or made some of our organs more lithesome and sensible than others, yet their aptness to run into this or that particular course of exercise depends upon some accident or lucky hit, or the company we converse with. Mr. Waller supposes, that Great Julius, in the mountains bred, Perhaps some flock or herd had led: The world's sole ruler then had been But the best wrestler on the green. 'Tis art and knowledge which draw forth the hidden seeds of native worth. A book falling into a boy's hands, an adventure related, or performance he sees, that happens to strike his fancy, the conversation of a servant or a companion, may lead his imagination into particular trains of thinking, which thenceforward become easy to him, and he cannot strike into others of a different kind without trouble and uneasiness. If example had not at least as great a share as nature in the formation of genius, why should we see different ages and countries produce their several sorts of it peculiar to themselves? and why should men ingenious in any particular way generally arise together in clusters? for we cannot suppose the time when, or place where they are born, should make such a difference in their constitutions.

4. Beauty is a species of taste: it may be defined an aptness of things to please immediately upon sight; for if they please from a view of something else introduced by them, they are not beautiful, but useful or valuable. But this aptness to please is a relative term, not solely a quality residing in objects, but depending equally upon the cast of our imagination: as the aptness of a shoe depends no less upon the shape of your foot than upon its own make, for that which sets perfectly easy upon one man may pinch another, or may become uneasy by your foot being swoln. We find the taste of beauty infinitely various and variable, the same thing appearing charming to one person, indifferent to another, and disgustful to a third; admired or neglected in the several stages of our lives; courted or nauseated at different seasons, according to the disposition of body, or humour of mind, we happen to be in. Therefore nothing is beautiful in itself; those things bid fairest for the title that are adapted to please the generality of mankind: for as the features of all men have a resemblance in some respects, how much soever they may vary in others, so it is with the trains of our imagi-

nation. Our frame, our constitution, as well internal as external, our employments in life, our wants, our enjoyments, are in a great measure the same, and our daily intercourse with one another increases the similitude: therefore it is no wonder that some objects are generally beheld in the same light, and appear agreeable to every one. Hence it is we can pass a judgment on beauty, even when not affected by it: for having observed what usually pleases, we get a standard wherewith to compare any object we behold, and if it agrees with that, we pronounce it beautiful, though through some particularity of our own it does not hit our fancy.

One cannot easily discover that little children have any notion of beauty at all: they will turn away from the sight of a celebrated toast, with all her tackle trim and bravely on, to hide their faces in the flabby bosom of an old wrinkled nurse: nor do they feel anything of those charms which, as Horace expresses it, inspire desires, and steal a man away from himself. We find the first notions they get of prettiness very different from those of their maturer years. Gewgaws, tinsel, high colouring coarsely laid on, ill-shapen playthings, and figures carrying scarce a half resemblance of their originals, delight them. And though their fancy improves as they grow up, yet they scarce ever gain a relish for the finest performances of art, or works of nature, until taught by care, or led into it by example.

5. Thus our sense of beauty was not born with us, but grows by time, and may be moulded into almost any shape by custom, conversation, or accident. There seem to be four principal sources from whence the efficacy of beauty derives; composition, succession, translation, and expression. The materials of a fine building do not entertain the eye until disposed in their proper places: and a parcel of colours unstriking of themselves may hit the fancy upon being curiously assorted and interspersed together. Symmetry, proportion, and order, contribute greatly to the good look of things: but we have already shown, in CHAP. X., that they consist in the correspondence of objects with the trains of our imagination, and the mind must have learned to run the proper lines of separation before she can discern anything of order or proportion. Order enables us to take in a larger view of the scene before us, presenting a more complex idea, consisting not only of the objects themselves, but of their situations, connections, and relations, with respect to one another. In deformed things there is commonly one or two remarkable parts at which the eye sticks. A lump of lead is neither handsome nor ugly, because as there is no composition, so neither is there a want of any, but may become either, according to the mould wherein it is formed; when cast into an ill shape, the continuity of parts leads the eye to expect a composition of which it is frustrated.

6. Succession is another spring of beauty; for as some motions, as in riding, walking, bowling, and the like, which are pleasing at first, become indifferent, and then irksome by long exercise, so it is with our ideas of sensation and reflection, and in a much quicker transition; many that were striking at first soon grow insipid, and afterwards troublesome; wherefore to prevent cloying, there must be a variety of objects succeeding each other to keep up the play. Order, symmetry, and proportion, furnish great store of variety without multiplying the subjects whereon it is thrown: in the materials of a fine building, you see there is stone, there is mortar, there is timber, with a few other particulars, and that not without attention and labour; but when skilfully put together, they present a multitude of assemblages readily occurring to the reflection. In the scenes before us, the notice, as has been formerly observed, changes continually to different

sets of objects, or contemplates them in various lights, the reflections shifting while the sensations remain the same. Hence in a masterly performance, whether you consider the whole, or the principal members, or parts of those members, or move the eye from one to another, there is always something of composition or comparison presented, which perpetually supplies a fund of fresh entertainment. But mere novelty does not delight of itself, unless there be an aptness in the imagination to take impressions of what it exhibits: for as a man would find it extremely uneasy to walk backwards, being an unusual motion, so the mind feels an awkwardness and irksomeness in receiving assemblages entirely different from any she has been accustomed to. A rustic, bred up among wilds and forests, being brought into a fine garden, would see more confusion than ornament there, and though you were to point out the disposition of the whole, and correspondence of the parts, you would not make him so sensible of them as to be affected therewith. Our pleasures are generally the greater for being preceded by pains, or set in comparison with them, and so are our lesser amusements of sight and imagination: therefore an agreeable object is rendered more so by having a foil, and a proper contrast of lights and shades embellishes a picture; for the notice passes to and fro successively, between the opposite branches of the comparison.

7. A third source of beauty is translation: whatever has been the occasion of much or frequent delights becomes agreeable in our eye, satisfaction being transferred from the effects to the cause. A person that has delivered us out of some great distress, or helped us in a matter we had strongly at heart, or gratified our desires in many instances, appears the handsomer for it ever afterwards: while the sight of him only introduces a reflection of the good he has done us, there is no alteration in his features, but by degrees the intermediate links of the chain drop off, the pleasure at the end becomes immediately connected with the person, and then it is that his beauty begins: which is often so closely united with his appearance, that we shall like another person the better for resembling him. Thus though Cupid be usually styled the son of Venus, we may say there is another of the name, who is the son of Pleasure, and many times begets a little Venus; for the love we entertain for things upon account of the gratifications received from them, gives them charms in our eyes they had not before. Wherefore lovers think their mistresses, and parents their children, handsomer than others do, because having found continual entertainment in their company, they are accustomed to behold them with delight. So likewise women conceive an advantageous opinion of the favourite animals under their care, because the satisfaction and amusement they have found in a constant tendency upon them becomes transferred to the creatures themselves. And we see charms that other folks cannot discern, in a place where we have spent our time very agreeably, or found conveniences wanting elsewhere; whence the saying, that home is home be it never so homely.

8. The fourth and most plentiful source of beauty is expression. The knowledge of this discloses the secret of that commanding majesty, that winning softness, and other graces of the countenance: for the face being a picture of the mind, whatever amiable qualites are discerned there give a lustre to the features denoting them. Good nature, health, sprightliness, and sense, enable and dispose men to give pleasure to others, therefore the marks of them are pleasant to behold. The force of sympathy has a great

influence here, for whatever bespeaks ease, satisfaction, and enjoyment in the mind of the possessor, throws that of the beholder into the like agreeable situation: therefore in our description of beauty we commonly employ epithets belonging to the sentiments, as a cheerful, an innocent, a smart, an honest, or a sensible countenance. But the language of the eyes and face requires time to be perfectly understood: some turns of feature seem expressive at first, but are afterwards discovered to have no meaning; in others we find a significancy, upon better acquaintance, that did not show itself before. Therefore some beauties striking immediately upon sight, quickly fade away, and cloy; others make no strong impression, but steal upon the heart insensibly by imperceptible degrees. Beauty has the strongest influence upon those of the opposite sex: women are imperfect judges of one another's persons, because they are not affected by them; they judge by rules, not by what they feel. Though there be one original cause of desire between the two sexes, many subordinate desires of conversation, or other intercourse, branch out from thence, which have not a visible connection with the principal root, and therefore may consist with the purest modesty: now an object expressing all the requisites for gratification, even of those lesser desires, without any obstruction, abatement, or disappointment, is alluring to the sight. And a long intercourse of endearments, and good offices of all kinds, may increase the expression so far as to render the party exhibiting it the most agreeable object one can behold, styled in the language of mankind above two thousand years ago, by way of eminence, the desire of the eyes. Many works of art are esteemed pretty, merely from their expressing a likeness with the works of nature: in artificial figures of men, birds, beasts, insects, trees, or flowers, the eye expects no more than an exact resemblance of the things they represent: wherefore there may be a beautiful copy of an ugly original. The famous statue of Laocoon is admired, though Laocoon himself would be shocking to the beholder: we admit pictures of satyrs, witches, old men with hard rugged features and grisly beards, to hang as ornaments in our chambers, where the real originals would be deemed an eyesore.

9. Beauty of action and sentiment seem to derive wholly from translation, for the good nature, complacence, innocence, cheerfulness, patience, and considerateness of others, so continually promote our advantage, ease, and enjoyment, in the commerce of life, that the pleasure felt in these effects is transferred to the qualities producing them, which thenceforward become engaging in themselves, so that we cannot help admiring them in persons at the greatest distance of place or time, from whom we can reap no possible benefit. But that we cannot help being thus moved no more proves us born with such affection, than that you cannot help understanding a reproach cast upon you proves you were born with a knowledge of language. But it has been usual to style acquisitions natural that we were led into by custom and experience, without any care or instruction to convey them, for we are said to speak our mother tongue naturally; and in this construction only we may admit our sense of the amiableness of good qualities to be natural.

From all that has been said above, it appears how little foundation there is for Plato's notion of an essential beauty existing independently of any subject whereto it might belong, and as that was superadded to particular substances it rendered them beautiful. For not to insist upon the inconceivableness of a quality existing without any subject to possess it, or of there being beauty before there was anything beautiful, we have found that

objects, however qualified, please us or not, according to the disposition of our organs, translation, or resemblance casting a lustre upon what had it not before; and that the same thing appears agreeable, or indifferent, or loathsome in the eyes of different beholders: which, if it depended solely upon the qualities of the object, then the opposite qualities of beauty and deformity must reside at once in the same subject.

10. Among our distastes, there is none so visibly dependent upon imagination as that of nastiness: a filthy word, a nauseous comparison, a mere fancy of having touched something loathsome, shall set our stomachs a kecking against the most innocent food. Nothing is nasty of itself, but things become so by being assorted together in unsuitable mixtures: he that should gnaw his glove, and paw the meat with his hands, would be cried against as a nasty fellow, but if he apply both to their proper places, you have nothing to complain of him. Dirt in the fields, gravel upon the roads, and the carpets upon our floors are not nasty, but whoever should lie down upon either, would be blamed for daubing his clothes. Nastiness seems to have no opposite, for cleanness is rather a negation of that than a contrary quality, and to make clean implies no more than to remove away filth, without substituting anything else in its room. We often use Neatness to express the middle point between beauty and deformity in objects, and Decency to denote the like in actions or sentiments: a neat little house, and a decent behaviour, is that wherein there is nothing either to engage or offend the eye. Yet these middle points incline a little to the favourable side, for there is a degree of complacence in seeing things clean and neat, and persons behave decently about us: but this complacence perhaps is of none other kind than that which frequently arises upon contemplating the absence of anything that would disturb us.

11. Our tastes varying as much as our faces, make us very bad judges of one another's enjoyments, for we take for granted that every body must be pleased with what we like ourselves, and according to the vulgar saying, measure other people's corn by our own bushel. Nor are there instances wanting wherein we measure our own corn by their bushel; when we see a crowd of people running to look at any sight, it raises our own curiosity to make one among them, and a dish, or diversion, we find others eagerly fond of, stirs up a longing to partake of the like: but upon trial, we often find our expectation disappointed, and that what may give another great delight affords us no entertainment.

Nor do we judge much better of our own pleasures, for want of being well aware of their aptness to cloy upon repetition, and to change their relish perpetually according to our disposition of body or mind, or the circumstances we happen to stand in: neither can we trust even experience itself in this case, for because a thing has pleased us once we cannot always be sure it will do so again. The boy who wished to be a king that he might have an officer appointed to swing him all day long upon a gate, took his resolution upon the remembrance of what had given him pleasure; for we may suppose he had often found a supreme delight in that innocent amusement, but little thought that the same continued for hours together would prove extremely tedious and irksome. The like mistake prevails with many after their ceasing to be boys; they find a vast delight in diversions and fancies of several kinds, and therefore eagerly pursue them as inexhaustible sources of enjoyment; not considering that those things please only in the acquisition, or by their novelty, and lose all their poignancy upon growing familiar. Therefore it is one of the principal arts

of life to find out such pleasures as are most durable, and least liable to change by an alteration of temper, or circumstances.

12. But if we make mistakes in estimating pleasures singly, we commit more in computing the value of a series of them taken collectively: for we cannot reckon them with the same exactness practicable in our money affairs, nor can we tell how many little amusements are equivalent to a great one, as we can how many shillings go to a pound. He that keeps a regular account of his cash may know to a shilling what were his receipts, and what his disbursements, in any month of the last year, and how much they exceeded or fell short of those in any other month; but I defy any man to make the like entry of his enjoyments and disquietudes: if he can tell that such a day was spent more agreeably than such another, it is more than he can always do with certainty, but he can never cast up the exact amount on the debtor and the creditor side in any day, nor tell precisely the proportion one bears to the other.

Therefore we are forced to take our pleasures in the lump, and estimate them upon view; as a man who guesses at a flock of sheep by the ground they cover, without being able to count them, and who will do it very imperfectly, until he has got an expertness by long and careful practice. For absent enjoyments, whether past or future, being not actually existent, we cannot hold them as it were in our hand to weigh them, but must judge by the representative idea we have of them in our imagination; and we ordinarily determine their value by the degree of desire we feel in ourselves towards them. Besides, the mind being constantly attentive to the bettering her condition in the next succeeding moment, it is not, strictly speaking, distant enjoyment that ever moves her, any otherwise than by the desire it raises of advancing towards it, the gratification of which desire yields a present satisfaction.

13. For this reason, intense pleasures engage more with the generality of mankind, than a continuance of gentler amusements: for the latter weighing only by their number, cannot so easily be brought within the compass of a single idea, and when we endeavour to do so, we commonly fix upon one or two of them as a sample of the whole; as a man who would recommend a poem, a play, or any other entertainment, pitches upon a few striking parts for a specimen of the rest: whereas high delights, carrying their whole force in a single point, make a deep impression upon the mind, which excites a desire proportionable to the representative idea left behind. But frequently desire increases, though the relish dies away upon repetition, hence your men of pleasure retain the former, after having utterly lost the latter, and perhaps receive none other satisfaction from their pleasures than what arises from the gratification of their eagerness in the pursuit of them. This probably induced Sir John Suckling, who was a man of pleasure, to say, It is expectation makes a blessing dear: and if he added, Heaven were not heaven if we knew what it were, we may presume it was because he had no idea of any other than the Mahometan heaven, which was not likely to prove one upon experience, how alluring soever it might appear in speculation.

But if we sit down to such careful computation as we are able to make of our enjoyments, we shall find ourselves much more beholden, upon the whole, to those of the gentler kind; for high delights, like high sauces, if they draw no mischiefs after them, at least pall the appetite for every thing else, or create a hankering after themselves at seasons wherein they are not to be had: thus making us pay dear enough for the transient gratification

they afford. Yet pleasures of the tempting kind, if properly chosen, have their value, not so much for their intrinsic worth, as for the fruits they produce: for pleasing sensations or reflections rarely come upon us of their own accord, much the greater part of our enjoyment lies in the exercise of our activity, when engaged in some pursuit or employment; but there can be no engagement without an end, which we conceive it would give us a more than ordinary degree of complacence to attain. The pleasures commanded by riches, or those expected from eminence of station or accomplishment, spur men on to industry in their several callings and professions. The joy of seeing a piece of workmanship completed carries an artist through the toils and difficulties of his work. I find myself not a little encouraged in this my pursuit of the light of nature, by casting back a look now and then upon those rays of it already collected. Even virtue herself receives no small accession of vigour from the contemplation of such few of her beauties as we may have in our possession. Nor need I mention that seasonable recreation enlivens the spirits, gives briskness to the circulation, and renders the mind alert for any exercise: it often prolongs enjoyment beyond the present moment, by furnishing materials to think and talk of afterwards: so that a few days' diversion in summer may supply a fund of entertainment for the succeeding winter. Let us not think then pleasures unworthy the attention of a philosopher, since in good hands they may be turned to excellent services.

14. As expectation makes a blessing dear, so by making dear it makes it valuable: the main of our enjoyment depends upon our desires, which take rise from experience of what has pleased us, whence we conceive an expectation of its doing the like again. But desire generally produces a more plentiful crop than the parent plant from which it sprung, especially in our common diversions, which lie almost wholly in the pursuit, and very little in the attainment. He that at whist should have four honours, six trumps, always dealt him, would lose his whole diversion, because he would have nothing to do but throw down his cards and set up his score. So in bowling, the player minds to deliver his bowl aright, he runs after it, chides it, encourages it, writhes his body into all manner of contortions, as if to influence the bias, and herein consists his entertainment; for the joy of winning the game passes over in a moment, he takes his stake, pockets it, and thinks no more than where to throw the jack for beginning another cast. Many a man has found greater pleasure in planting a tree, and tending, and pruning it, and observing its growth, than he ever did in tasting the fruit: yet the former arises wholly from the latter, for else why might not he plant a bramble as well as a nectarine?

But every pleasure does not keep desire alive alike, nor will every desire return an equal produce of entertainment, which makes the science of pleasure so little understood. Men run eagerly after the most intense, thinking the more of them they can obtain so much the better, being deceived herein by their method of computation; for they reckon, like the boy, that if a quarter of an hour's swing upon the gate gave immense delight, five hours' swinging must give twenty times as much: whereas the arithmetic to be employed in this science differs widely from common arithmetic, two and two do not always make four, the second number often operating as a negative quantity, which being added to the former, diminishes instead of increasing the sum. Besides, when we have settled the intrinsic value of our pleasures, all is not done, we must consider other things dependent upon them, and proceed in a kind of algebraical method: such a degree of delight, more by

the amusement it will afford us in the pursuit, the pleasing expectation it will raise beforehand, and the soothing reflections it will leave behind; less by the labour we must undergo, the difficulties and hazards we must run to obtain it, the wants and cravings it may create, the disappointments we may meet with, and the mischiefs and inconveniences it may introduce. Thus we find the art of book-keeping in the commerce of pleasure very hard to attain, for besides the difficulty of reducing every species of coin to some current standard, we must make all fair allowances for interest and produce, and take all reasonable charges and deductions into the account: but any tolerable skill we can acquire in this business is well worth the pains of learning.

I have remarked in another place, that our idea of pleasures, like our prospect of visible objects, appears duller when they stand at a distance, and grows more vivid upon their nearer approach; and that habit and sympathy take effect by suggesting trains of thought, and methods of action, without the trouble of hunting for them. For there being a degree of complacence in every common motion of the mind, and exercise of our activity, ease and readiness become a species of pleasure, and whatever gives play to our powers engages us in each succeeding moment, until something more important carries us into another track. From this source, I apprehend, are derived most of our little motives, influencing our by actions, and under motions, which steal upon us without our perceiving, and shape the manner of proceeding in all our performances.

CHAP. XXIII.

USE.

As the greater number by far of our pleasures spring from one another by translation, so our other satisfactions come to us through the same channel, being derived from pleasure; for nature affects us originally only with sensations excited by the play of our external or internal organs, and objects engage us according as in the various alterations and contextures of our frame produced by education, custom, or accident, they are made to give that play to the organs. But that use bears a derivative value is implied in the very term, for whatever may have been said concerning things beautiful or laudable in themselves, we never hear them styled useful in themselves, but for something else; that is, so far as they tend to improve our condition, or contribute to our enjoyment, either immediately or remotely in some respect or other.

Though nature has poured enjoyments around us with an unsparing hand, yet she has not hung them so near within our reach, as that we can pluck them whenever we please: we must do many things beforehand preparatory to the obtaining them, we must provide instruments and lay in materials to serve us upon occasion, furnish ourselves with the necessary means for administering to our wants, and take pains in planting and cultivating the tree long before we can gather the fruit. This tendency to supply the means of gratification transfers our desire to things indifferent in themselves: so that having observed them frequently serviceable, we can willingly store them up, without view to any particular service they will do us, but upon the general prospect that we shall find occasion for them one

time or other. And as the materials of enjoyment many times are no more to be had with a wish than the enjoyments themselves, but require other materials to procure them, hence use grows from out of use: for whatever conduces to the acquisition of useful things becomes useful itself upon that account. Thus, if the accommodations of life are useful for the comfort and delights they continually afford, money is useful too, because it will purchase those accommodations; an estate because it yields an annual income of money, a profession because it tends to raise a competency of estate, application and industry because they help to make men thrive in their professions, skill and sagacity because they render industry successful, experience and learning because they improve our skill and sharpen our sagacity. All that men esteem valuable or think worth their while to pursue, derives its value either directly from enjoyment or from something else first recommended thereby. Riches, power, fame, health, strength, existence, talents, knowledge, accomplishment, luck, liberty, justice, steadiness, become this way objects of our desire.

2. But desire, as has been shown in the last chapter, although the child of pleasure, begets an offspring of the same features, make, and complexion with its grandmother; for the gratification of any desire, by how distant object soever excited, affords a present pleasure proportionable to the eagerness of the desire. Therefore, we see men express great joy according to the ardency of their wishes upon any accession of wealth, or power, or knowledge, or enlargement of their liberty, or discovery of their strength of resolution: and these secondary pleasures take up much the larger share on the credit side of our account after we arrive at manhood; yet even these objects affect the balance more by the engagement of their pursuit or consequences of their possession than by the joy of their acquisition. Wherefore the wisest of men have been ever observed attentive to things useful in preference to things pleasant, because the former contain the seeds of many future enjoyments, whereas the latter can only improve our condition for the present moment: and we have seen a little while ago that pleasure itself does not deserve regard so much for its own poignancy as when it becomes useful by raising an expectation that engages us in a pursuit giving scope to agreeable reflections, or instigates to something more beneficial than itself.

That species of use called convenience visibly bears a reference to pleasure; for though our instruments be inconvenient, nevertheless we may make shift to work with them, but when we have all our implements convenient about us we can complete our work with more ease and dispatch. The conveniences, as distinguished from all the necessaries of life, serve only to make it run more smooth and agreeable, and to render that an amusement which would otherwise have been a task. He that has all necessaries fully supplied him has every thing requisite for his being, but conveniences superadded enable him not only to support but to enjoy his being.

Desire having passed through many translations we often lose all remembrance of the progress it has made, nor can trace it back to the original fountain, which induces us to believe many desires natural and interwoven into our constitution, that derived their influence from certain things conducive to our enjoyments and conveniences. A very little reflection will convince us this is the case with respect to money, which, however sometimes looked upon as desirable in itself, and how much soever the covetous man may prefer it beyond all things else, yet nobody can suppose he would ever have had the least attachment for it, if he had never found it service-

able to procure the enjoyments and accommodations of life. But there are other desires, whose derivation is not so apparent, and therefore are imagined born with us, or to be propensities infused into the mind, and which break forth into act immediately upon the proper objects to excite them being presented. Of this sort are the desire of knowledge, of liberty, of power of self-preservation, and many others. I shall examine only two, which may serve as samples for the rest: the love of justice, and that fondness for having our own wills discernible more or less in all men.

3. We find justice commonly divided into two branches, called Commutative, directing us to render to every man his due, and Distributive, guiding us in the application of reward and punishment. The first of these you see no appearance of in children, who greedily catch at everything they can get without regard to the claims of their playfellows: and when they grow up, all the laws, the penalties, the punishments in the world, are little enough to prevent the invasion of property; but the generality of mankind still remain disposed to overreach one another in a bargain, and take all undue advantages whenever they can do it safely. So that since the golden age Astrea resides no more upon earth: even the honestest of men, if they will speak ingenuously, must acknowledge it extremely difficult to preserve a strict impartiality of judgment, in matters affecting their own private interest. Besides, it seems to be agreed among the learned, that nature gave the earth and all its produce among mankind in common, and that property would have had no existence, but for the necessity of it to preserve order and encourage industry with all the improvements consequent thereupon. The view of these advantages inspires us all with a liking to justice, but it is when discerned in other people, and certainly there can be nothing more convenient than that everybody should behave justly to us: therefore no man but would be glad to see justice prevail universally, with an exemption only for himself. And though I doubt not there are many who would act uprightly although there were no laws nor even hazard of a discovery to restrain them from the contrary, yet these are persons who have learned to regard the interests of others as well as themselves: so that their principle of integrity still results from convenience, though not their own, but that of other people.

As for distributive justice, we have already seen, under the article of anger, how the desire of revenge springs from expedience; and though men of consideration and judgment will often punish but not in anger, they do it from the necessity of punishment to keep the world in order; wherefore, they regard the intention more than the deed, knowing that the use of punishment is not to repair the damage sustained, to which it will by no means contribute, but to mend the manners and direct the intention of mankind to the forbearance of injury. Even the vulgar, though ordinarily prompted by impulse of passion, yet if you would dissuade them from the prosecution or retaliation of wrongs, reply readily, Why otherwise we cannot sleep safe in our beds, or we shall be liable to perpetual insults: which however insincere they may be or ignorant of their real motive, shows that common sense dictates expedience as the only plea to justify resentment. If there were a natural and necessary connection between offence and punishment, how could there be any room for mercy? which a person of humanity will always show whenever it can be extended to the offender, without inconvenience to the public, or detriment to private persons. Nor does our inclination to reward grow from any other root than that of expedience, as encouraging men to repeat the good offices that have

deserved it. When we promise a poor man a reward for doing us some particular service, or offer one for the recovery of goods lost, or apprehension of a thief, we have visibly our own ends in view. And the observation that the return of good offices engages men to continue them, is so obvious as to escape nobody's notice; but the convenience found in such returns occur so continually in the commerce of life, that satisfaction, as customary in translations, becomes connected with the practice, and we get an habitual aptness to retaliate favours as well as injuries, without looking forward to the benefits attending upon so doing. Thus the heartiest gratitude, as I have shown in the proper place concerning the purest love, though bearing the fragrantest flowers, sprouts originally from the earthly principle of self-interest.

4. And that adherence to what we have once set our hearts upon, so common in the world, issues from the same bed: for our larger actions, by which alone we can help ourselves in our needs, consist of many single acts, which must all tend towards the same point, or they will never form an entire body to complete the purpose we intended. We cannot walk across the room with a single step, nor help ourselves to a glass of wine by one motion of our arm, nor compass anything whatever, until our volitions have been accustomed to follow one another in the same direction. This discovers to us the expedience of a steadiness and consistency of conduct, and renders the having willed a thing a motive with us to will it still, until some cogent reason shall occur to the contrary. Experience indeed might convince us, in time, that it is often expedient to change our measures, and comply with the necessity of our situation: but all do not profit by experience; and those are observed to be the most wilful, who have found the least need of compliance, being either such whose strength of body, and hardiness of constitution, have enabled them to resist compulsion, or such as being constantly humoured by persons about them, have used to gain their ends by persisting. But this sturdiness of temper ought by no means to be absolutely rejected, being eminently serviceable or pernicious, according to the objects whereto it is directed: when turned the wrong way, it is called obstinacy, stubbornness, and perverseness; when the right, we entitle it steadiness, resolution, and bravery, without which there is no enduring pains, hardships, and difficulties, nor going through with an arduous undertaking, nor indeed completing any work that requires labour and time. For considering the fluctuating nature of our ideas, it is impossible to keep up the desire first urging to the task in its full colours, but we should faint in midway upon any fatigue or obstacle intervening, if it were not for the habit of perseverance in what we had once begun. The forming a resolution requires a very different situation of mind from that of executing: in the former we gather as many considerations as we can to fortify our resolves; in the latter we are too busy with the measures to be taken to admit any further idea relating to our purpose than the strength of resolution, wherewith we had determined upon it. Especially when pain assaults us, it so fills the mind, that we have no room for more than the remembrance of our having judged the thing to be attained by supporting it expedient, without any of the foundations for that judgment: all we can do further is by an operation upon our organs, to withdraw our notice from the smart and heighten our desire or want of perseverance in our design as much as possible.

Since then adherence to our purpose proves so signally serviceable upon

great occasions, and so continually useful upon common ones, no wonder it becomes the object of desire in some degree with all men, and gives them vexation upon being crossed, and pleasure upon being gratified. They may not always be able to trace out its reference to use: they know they love to have their Wills, but forget by what steps they fell in love with them; for understanding cannot penetrate into all the private recesses of imagination. In other cases, men are frequently deceived with respect to the influence that use has upon them, self-interest giving a wonderful bias to the judgment, and producing those motives we have called the obscure, because sheltering themselves under cover of more specious reasons, while they too often give the real turn to our behaviour.

CHAP. XXIV.

HONOUR.

As use sprouts from pleasure, so honour branches out from use, and stands one remove further from the parent root, for which reason it is more readily supposed innate, its derivation being not so easily traced; for it never grows to maturity while adhering to the mother plant, nor until separated from it as an offset, and standing upon its own stem. We are not thought actuated by honour, so long as we have any further advantage or gratification in view, nor until it becomes a motive of itself sufficient to operate upon us, without needing recommendation from anything else to give it weight. But this does not prove it to be the gift of nature, for we may remember many instances already pointed out of translation, wherein satisfaction has been made to fix so strongly upon things originally indifferent, as to render them powerful motives of action.

Our principle of honour is so far from being born with us, that we should never have acquired it, if we had always been debarred from society. Little children, as they show no signs of shame, so neither do they discover any notion of applause, until being perpetually told that Mamma will not love them, nor Papa give them pretty things, nor Nurse take care of them, unless they be good, they learn to look upon the approbation of persons about them as desirable. And when we grow up, we find it so extremely and continually useful to have the good opinion and esteem of others, which make them friendly and obsequious to our desires, that this is enough to give us a liking to esteem, and consequently to those actions or qualities tending to promote it. For affection and experience leading us by gradation from one thing to another, our desire of approbation throws a complacence upon actions procuring it, and this again makes us value the possession of qualities productive of such actions, although we have no present opportunity of exercising it.

2. Besides, there lies a nearer way for good qualities to arrive at their valuableness; for we find the very sight of them raising an esteem in the beholder, without staying for the benefits to be received from them. Nay, that sight contributes more to give a good opinion of the possessor than the reception of the benefits, and the latter only as an evidence of the former. Whatever enables a man to do much good or hurt, sets him higher in the estimation of the vulgar, than a disposition to use his powers well: there-

fore we see great talents, sagacity, strength of body, nobility of birth, and even opulence and good fortune, introduced for topics of panegyric as well as beneficence, public spirit, and industry.

But what is more useful carries away our attention from what is less; therefore we judge of things by comparison, placing our esteem upon those which are excellent and supereminent in their kind; and what we once greatly admired, may be eclipsed by something darting a superior lustre. And our admiration of superiority renders the marks of it subjects of our admiration too: hence proceeds our fondness for titles of honour, splendour of equipage, and badges of distinction: hence likewise majesty of countenance, dignity of gesture, and solemnity of deportment, command our respect, as expressing something extraordinary and excellent within; for where we know the subject exhibiting them possesses nothing more than common, they excite our laughter instead of our admiration. Nor are we unaffected with excellence appearing in beasts, or things inanimate, or the performances of art: we admire the noble mien of a lion, the magnificence of a building, the immense expanse of heaven, the regular courses of the stars, the master strokes of poetry, and sublimity of style, because these objects afford immediate entertainment, by filling the imagination with large ideas, or express something extraordinary in the authors and causes of them. And honour, resting chiefly in comparison, teaches us to see an expedience in excelling; for it is not so much matter what we are in ourselves, as what degree we stand in amongst others, which sows the seeds of envy, emulation, and contention for superiority. But as excellence will not produce its effects until made visible, this opens the door to ostentation, vanity, and affectation, which may be observed abounding most in those who have been flattered into an opinion of their having something extraordinary to exhibit, or some agreeable peculiarity in their manner.

3. But the thought of possessing whatever we esteem useful or advantageous, soothes and gives immediate pleasure to the mind: for which reason there is a near affinity between beauty and honour, both delighting the eye instantly upon sight, without reference to those further advantages which first made it recommendable, and love and esteem commonly generating one another, or at least nourishing each other's growth. In visible objects one can more easily discern the distinction than describe it, only we may say that beauty seems to affect the sense alone, whereas admiration more apparently requires the concurrence of imagination. But when applied to actions and sentiments, it is harder to know them apart: wherefore the Greeks used the same term to express them both, and though the Latins had a different name for each, yet they applied their epithets promiscuously, distinguishing things indifferently either into beautiful and deformed, or laudable and blameable. But the mind, having a natural propensity to pleasure, loves to solace herself in the contemplation of whatever belonging to her she conceives will do her honour: this engenders pride; which may be called a habit of dwelling upon the thought of any supposed excellences or advantages men believe themselves possessed of, as well power, birth, wealth, strength of body, or beauty of person, as endowments of the mind.

But our propensity to this, as well as other pleasures, produces mischievous effects, too often misleading the understanding, damping industry, and destroying its own purpose by overcharging the appetite. It casts a wonderful bias upon the judgment, inclining men to fancy themselves possessed of advantages they have not, to overvalue those they really have, and to depreciate those of other people. It keeps them so attentive to their own

self-sufficiency, as to think it needless to look for anything further: whereas industry bespeaks a humble mind, more solicitous to make new acquisitions, than to count over those already gained, as not judging them enough to rest satisfied with. And it destroys the relish men find in the possession of good things, by satiating them with the contemplation: for as our bodily members tire upon continual exercise, so our mental organs cloy upon repetition, soon exhausting the sweets of an object, and entertaining no longer than while receiving fresh supplies of novelty and variety. Accordingly the proud reap no delight from their pride: we rather see them more gloomy and discontented than other people; and if they still retain a fondness for reflecting on their superexcellence, it is like the unnatural thirst of a drunkard, which does not draw him by pleasure, but drives him by the uneasiness of his unextinguishable cravings.

4. Is it then never allowable to cast back a look upon anything wherein we have succeeded well, or upon any advantages we possess? This I do not assert; for the complacence we feel upon such occasions improves our condition, so long as we can enjoy it pure, and whatever pleases deserves our regard, if none other consideration interfere. I see nothing should hinder the boy from swinging, provided he took care to do his lesson first, not to break down the farmer's gate, and to leave off his diversion before it grew tiresome: so neither need we scruple to ride upon any little excellency we may possess, taking only such transient views of it as may afford us a real gust, if we have nothing else to do, and neither injure nor offend anybody, nor harbour a thought injurious or offensive to anybody. Besides, there is a further use beyond the present amusement, in making proper comparisons of things and persons: for the retrospect upon what we have done well, encourages us to persevere in the like conduct; the knowledge of any good things we possess whets our industry to preserve and procure more of them; and a due sense of our estimation among mankind withholds us from consorting with persons, or giving into behaviour unbecoming our character. But what comparisons of this kind are proper or not depends upon a fair computation of the service they will do, or the net income of real pleasures they will yield upon the balance.

5. As honour branches from use, so it takes divers tinctures, according to the stock whereon it is grafted. The professions and situations of men in life rendering different things serviceable to them, creates proportionable variety in their sentiments of honour: the merchant places it in punctuality of payment, the soldier in bravery, the artificer in the completeness of his works, the scholar in acquisitions of learning, the fine gentleman in politeness and elegancy of taste, the lady in her beauty, or neatness of dress, or skill in family economy. There is no man utterly destitute of honour, because no man but finds the expedience of it in some degree or other: nor is there a possibility of living in any comfort or tranquillity under universal contempt. But men's notions of it are widely different and discordant: what one esteems an honour, another looks upon as a folly or disgrace; one values himself upon his sincerity and plain dealing, another upon his art of dissimulation: one upon his patience in enduring wrongs, another upon his quickness in resenting them: though Falstaff ridiculed the grinning honours of the field, yet he scorned to give a reason upon compulsion: every one esteems that highest which he has found turning most to account in the way of life wherein he is engaged, or best promoting his designs, or adding to his enjoyment in the company among whom his lot has fallen. Which shows that our sense of honour is not natural like that of seeing,

for this exhibits the same distinction of colours to all alike, nor ever makes a lily appear blue to one man, green to another, and scarlet to a third, according to the several ways they have been brought up in, or employments they have followed.

6. Though our estimation of things commonly first arises from the credit they bear with other people, yet the judgments of mankind being so various obliges us to look out for some other rule to direct us in our observation: for by following what we see admired at one time, we may be thought to pursue trifles or incur censure at another. To avoid the trouble such accidents would give us, we have none other remedy than by hardening ourselves sometimes against reproach, which we see every one ready to do more or less upon occasion: for there could be no steadiness of conduct nor perseverance in any purpose, if we were to veer about with every blast of applause or censure. But as no man would wish to throw off all sensibility, he must distinguish when to restrain and when to give it scope: this teaches him to look inwards upon himself and observe what estimation things bear in his own mind, and the judgments the mind passes in such cases immediately upon inspection are called the sentiments. I know this term is often applied to opinions concerning the truth or falsehood, expedience or inexpedience of things: as when a man is asked to declare his sentiments upon a point of natural philosophy or a maxim of policy or measure of prudence, the question means no more than to know what he judges most agreeable to reason, or most conducive to the purpose aimed at. But Sentiment being derived from Sense or Feeling, seems more peculiarly applicable to those judgments the mind passes upon matters of praise or blame, which she cannot do without feeling a degree of complacence or disgust in contemplating the subject whereon she so passes her judgment.

One can live but little while in the world without acquiring some of these sentiments, and when deeply rooted by long habit, they become powerful incentives of action. The testimony of a man's own breast when clear and full will bear him up against the reproaches of the whole world. Self-approbation when strong and well grounded will support him under hardships, disappointments, and distresses; and the desire of doing something he may applaud himself for will carry him through labours, difficulties, and dangers. You may move any man almost any way by touching his point of honour, if you can but find out where it lies: but herein and in applying the proper means to affect it rests the difficulty, for perhaps it does not lie in the same part nor look towards the same objects as it does in yourself. We currently pronounce the vulgar void of honour because they want those notions of it instilled into us by education and good company: but if they had not a sensibility of their own, they would never be moved unless by blows or something affecting them in point of interest, whereas we find the meanest of mankind as apt to take fire upon opprobrious language or defamation, when they understand it, as the most refined.

7. The generality of men draw their sentiments of honour from those with whom they consort, or from the tendency of things to promote what they most ardently desire: they feel themselves affecting some objects and shocked at others; they neither know nor inquire how they come to be so, but follow the present impulse without further examination. But the studious, desirous to see with their own eyes, and unwilling to trust either the opinions of mankind which they perceive infinitely various and contradictory, or even their own sentiments which they find wavering and clashing

with one another, endeavour to fix upon some criterion whereby to distinguish true honour from the false. This has led many into the notion of an essential quality, which residing in certain objects they became laudable in themselves: which quality I take to have been understood by the Kalòn of the Greeks and Honestum of the Romans, to which I know of no word that answers in the English tongue, but it may be described, that which raises your approbation instantly upon being suggested to the thought, without reference to any consequences attendant thereupon. If you asked what this Kalòn was, you were referred to the effect it would have upon the eye of an impartial beholder. But several beholders see different appearances in the same object: this it was replied arose from a fault in the vision, for the optics of some are so dimmed and overclouded by the mists of error and prejudice, that, like a jaundiced eye, they cannot see the Kalòn in its true colours. Well, but how shall we know whether our optics be clear and how to rectify them? why, observe the best and wisest men, and learn to see as they do. Thus, the whole matter is at last resolved into authority, a method unbecoming a philosopher; for though the examples of wise men be an excellent guide for us to follow in our conduct, it lets us nothing into the nature of things unless we have the grounds explained whereon they formed their judgment: and as we shall meet with many instances wherein we cannot have the benefit of their example, we shall still remain at a loss how to distinguish the genuine Kalòn from the spurious. Besides, the actions of the wise themselves have been made the subject of controversy, many judicious persons having doubted whether Cato the censor had a just idea of the Kalòn when he persecuted the Carthagenians to destruction, or Brutus, when he assassinated Cæsar, or the younger Cato, whom Seneca pronounces a perfect wise man, when he deserted his post of life at Utica: so that we want some other test to try the dictates of wisdom when mingled among the frailties of human nature in the very best of men.

When such disputes happen, the parties generally recur to some principles they think will be admitted on the other side; and if those are agreed to, it is very well; but what if they be denied? or what if it be asked upon what grounds those principles are founded? I know of none other way to determine the matter than by a reference to use. And so far the old philosophers seem to have admitted this rule as to allow that all things laudable were useful, but then they placed those qualities out of their proper order, for they held that things were therefore useful because laudable, whereas the truth appears to me to be that they are therefore laudable because useful: for I cannot conceive how any practice can be laudable which will never do the least service to the performer nor anybody else, nor blameable from whence more good will accrue by following it than letting it alone. All services are esteemed, as well in the eye of the world as in a man's own reflection, according as they are more or less signal: and if temptations and difficulties standing in the way render a deed the subject of greater applause, certainly nothing can be more useful than an ability to surmount difficulties and resist temptations when they would withhold us from anything beneficial.

8. But if things be laudable because useful, must not use and honour always go together? Is there then no difference between one and the other? If a man entrusted with a valuable deposit by a person deceased debates with himself whether he shall apply it to the purposes directed or to his own benefit, does not use exhort him one way and honour the other?

Certainly they do: but then use must be understood here of what appears such to him, not what is really such upon the whole upshot of the account. We get a habit of looking upon power, profit, and such like, as valuable, and thence contract a desire of attaining them whenever an opportunity offers; but this desire would lead us many times into mischiefs and inconveniences if not withheld by the restraint of honour: or we grudge the pains of pursuing things really valuable, and should miss of them unless shamed out of our indolence: here the sense of honour does us signal service by stimulating when interest wanted sharpness sufficient, and urging to practices whose use we are not sensible of, as lying too remote for us to discern. Were there a race of men of so penetrating and extensive an understanding as to comprehend at one view all the consequences of every action, and so well regulated a taste as constantly to prefer the greater remote good before the lesser near at hand, they would have no sense of honour because they would want none: for their own discernment would lead them precisely into those very courses which true honour recommends. The necessity of this principle arises from the weakness and narrowness of our capacities; they that are whole need not the physician nor his remedies, but they that are sick; and honour is that remedy which alone can cure the disorders and confusions brought upon the world by a too close attachment to our injudicious desires in disregard of the general good, wherein our own is ultimately contained, or I may say lies concealed. The voluptuous, who constantly follow whatever appetite or fancy prompts, have the narrowest minds; a prudent regard to interest widens them a little; but a due sense of honour opens the heart and enlarges the soul as far as it is capable of extending. Therefore, the wisest and best of men, as they have ever been observed attentive to things useful in preference to things pleasant, so they give the like preference to the laudable before the useful, and for the same reason; because as use contains the seeds of many future enjoyments, so honour leads to further uses than their wisdom, but imperfect at the best, can always descry.

Now to come as near as possible to my old friends of former ages I shall readily admit that, although things be not therefore useful because laudable, yet they ought therefore to be esteemed useful because of that approbation we feel resting upon them in our minds. For as we have shown in CHAP. XI. that many truths reputed self-evident were not innate but acquired by experience of facts, nevertheless we may justly employ them as the basis of our reasonings, because the strength wherewith they strike upon the judgment, is a good evidence that we had sufficient grounds for embracing them, though now absolutely forgotten and irrecoverable: so when we perceive objects commanding our applause instantly upon inspection, we may rest assured that we ourselves, or those persons from whom we have taken the tincture, have found advantages in them which we do not now retain in memory, nor can readily trace out. The uses we see daily resulting from a principle of honour are enow to give it a value in the eyes of every prudent person; continual experience testifies that this principle rightly grounded withholds us from folly, rouses us to industry, shines through the mists of prejudice, and balances the influence of passion: nor can anybody avoid taking notice how much men's regard for their credit with others, and self-approbation within themselves, contributes to preserve that good order in the world, the benefits whereof they want penetration to discern. Therefore we shall do well to follow the dictates of our own heart concerning

what is commendable or unworthy, for that will inform us sufficiently for common occasions, if we take care to consult it sincerely and impartially: and when doubts arise, we must adhere to such sentiments as we find established most firmly, and striking most strongly. I know nothing further we can do, unless we stand in a situation to discern all the consequences and tendencies of the matters under deliberation; and then that which appears least confined to private or present gratification, but most extensively and generally advantageous, will deserve the character of the most laudable.

9. But in computations of this sort regard must be had, not only to the usefulness of the objects proposed, but likewise to the usefulness of praise or blame, towards attaining them: for if there be other motives sufficient to set us at work, commendation were thrown away as being superfluous. This explains why, though honour depends upon use, nevertheless everything useful is not laudable: because where we discern the use, and are moved by it to exert ourselves, there is no use for honour. Therefore we do not lavish our applauses upon things we find men willing enough to do of themselves, however beneficial they may appear. What is more useful than eating and sleeping? but nobody gains credit by them, for appetite prompts us fast enough without it. Bakers, shoemakers, and tailors, are very serviceable members of society, but who ever rose to honours by exercising those trades? for why? the prospect of getting a livelihood holds them tight to their work, without any other spur to assist it. But upon boys being first put out as apprentices the master finds it useful to encourage them by commendation, because they have then none other inducement to do their duty besides reward and punishment. We chide and applaud our children to make them careful of their money; but when they have gotten a competent habit of economy, then honour changes stations, standing as a fence on the other side, to secure them against covetousness.

Hence too we may learn why the most considerate persons honour the intention rather than the deed, for though the usefulness of an action results from the performance, not the design, yet the use of commendation lies only in its operating upon the mind, nor does it at all influence the success any further than by doubling our diligence. Yet a proper estimate of external objects has its use too, as directing us which way to apply our endeavours out of several presenting: for if there were not a credit in having things neat and handsome about us, many men would satisfy themselves as well with grovelling always in the dirt; and if there were not a respect paid to eminence of station and fortune, even where we have no high opinion of the persons, we should invalidate those rules of good breeding which keep up decorum, and render conversation easy. Hence likewise we may see why honour generally runs counter to profit and pleasure, because the use of it lies in restraining them when they would carry us on to our detriment; and the more forcibly they tempt us, the greater is the merit of resisting them, because we then need a stronger weight to overbalance their influence. The same reason may account for honour resting upon comparison, because use frequently does so too: for as among many things proposed to his option, a prudent man will always choose the most useful, so he will prefer the most laudable, as carrying the presumption of being the most useful. Therefore the desire of surpassing others is always faulty, unless when some real benefit will result therefrom, or there be some good purpose in view, which cannot be attained without it.

10. The desire of honour, like all other desires, gives an immediate pleasure in the gratification, or when moving on successfully towards its

object; and this may be reckoned among the uses of honour. But these pleasures are not to be valued according to their intenseness, for high delights of all kinds, though they ravish the mind while fresh and new, yet they pall the appetite, and render it tasteless of common enjoyments; nor can they keep their relish long, because our organs are too weak to support the violent exercise they put them upon. But there is a self-approbation, which, being of the gentle kind, throws the spirits into easy motions that do not exhaust nor fatigue, and sooths the mind with an uninterrupted complacence in the reflections she may cast back upon her general tenor of conduct. For as ease, health, and security, afford a degree of actual pleasure, though implying no more in themselves than a negation of pain, sickness, and danger, so there is a real satisfaction in keeping clear of everything for which others might justly censure us, or we might blame ourselves. This then the wise man will be most careful to attain, as adding more to the sum total of his happiness than the momentary transports of joy, upon excelling in any way whatever. Nevertheless, an ardent desire of doing or possessing something extraordinary has its value, but as we observed before concerning intense pleasures, not so much for its intrinsic worth, or for the gust found in the gratification, as for the good fruits it may produce, by stimulating our industry, furnishing us with employment, and putting us upon useful services we wight otherwise have omitted.

11. If there be any meaning in the expression of things laudable in themselves, it must belong to those we find esteemed most universally, or by the best judges, or from which we cannot withhold our applause whenever we consider them in our own minds, though we know not why they so affect us: but our not seeing the benefits resulting therefrom is no proof of their non-existence. By such tests it behoves us to try our sentiments every now and then, for as we catch a tincture from others by custom or example, without this caution we shall lie perpetually liable to be drawn aside by the glare of false honour from pursuing the true. But when we do employ the method of reference to use, we must carry the reference to all quarters whereto it can extend: for it is not enough to weigh the consequences of the present action, but we must consider what effect our departure from a rule may have upon ourselves at other times, how far it may influence other people to follow our example, when they have not the like reason for doing as we do, and in short all the circumstances that any ways relate to the case. Honour, says Mr. Addison, is a sacred tie, and its laws are never to be infringed, unless when more good than hurt will evidently result from dispensing with them: nor must the danger of weakening their authority be forgotten in the account; and if that be considered, there are some of those laws which perhaps a sufficient warrant can never be found for transgressing.

12. Situation and circumstance may cast a dishonour upon what appears perfectly innocent in itself: there are many things I need not name, that every man must do, and therefore will acquit himself in doing, yet every discreet man will choose to do in private, and conceal from the knowledge of others as much as possible. It is well known what irregularities the Cynics were led into by judging of things as laudable or blameable in themselves: for intrinsic qualities cannot be divested by the circumstances of time and place, from the subject whereto nature has united them. A stone will retain its hardness so long as it remains a stone, and air be yielding to the touch always and everywhere: therefore they made no

scruple to commit the grossest indecencies in public, because their adversaries could not but admit the acts they performed were at some times allowable. But if they had judged by a proper reference to use, they must have seen the expedience of decency and decorum, that what becomes one man may not become another, and that the same actions, according as they do, or do not, tend to give offence, or to the breach of good manners, may become blameable or allowable.

13. Much ado has been made of late days about certain moral senses, which nature is supposed to have furnished us with, for the discernment of things laudable or blameable, becoming or ridiculous, as she has with the bodily senses for the discernment of sensible objects ; and this notion seems introduced to supply the place of innate ideas, since their total overthrow by Mr. Locke. If we allege that nature is more uniform in her gifts than we find these moral senses to be, which judge very variously of the same object in different persons, we are silenced with the old pretence, that all who do not see as we do must labour under some disorder in their vision, by having contracted films before their eyes from error and prejudice. But how shall the moral sense be proved born with us, when we see no appearance of it before we arrive at some use of our understanding, and there are whole nations who seem utterly destitute of it ? Our five senses we receive perfect at first, they rather decay and grow duller than improve by time : the child and the savage can see, and hear, and taste, and smell, and feel, as well as the most refined and civilized. Let us then look upon this supposed sixth sense as an acquired faculty, generated in us by the operation of those materials thrown in by the other five, together with the combinations formed of them, and other ideas resulting from them in our reflection. We ordinarily imbibe our sentiments by custom or sympathy from the company we consort with, or from persons whose judgments we revere : therefore the exposing of children, the extirpating of enemies, assassinating for affronts, persecuting for heresy, do not strike with horror in countries where commonly practised, or taught by the leaders. But as all custom must have a beginning, and all judgment some foundation to build upon, let us try to discover what might first bring into credit those objects which the moral sense, when supposed clearest, will recommend : and this will appear upon examination to be nothing else besides their expedience and eminent serviceableness to promote the happiness of mankind. The objects that seem most strongly to affect the moral sense are integrity of justice and restraint of brutal appetites, which we have already seen deriving their value from expedience : and it is remarkable, that the mind discerns the beauty of them abroad before she can discover it at home. For as the eye sees not itself, unless by reflection in a glass, so neither can we know our own internal features, unless by beholding the counterparts of them in other persons : therefore if you perceive the moral sense in anybody a little dull, it is common to clear it up, by asking him how he would approve the like behaviour in another towards himself. Which shows that actions have not an intrinsic turpitude necessarily touching the sense, when contemplating them naked, but we must place them in other subjects, where their tendency to bring trouble and inconvenience upon ourselves casts a turpitude upon them : having frequently seen them in this position, we learn to reflect that what appears foul and ugly without doors would do the same within, if we stood at the proper point of view ; we then practise the art of removing ourselves to a distance from ourselves, through which channel we derive that skill of discernment called the moral sense.

Nevertheless, I am not for depreciating these moral senses; on the contrary, I wish their notices were more carefully regarded in the world than they are: for their being acquired is no diminution of their value, unless we will despise all arts and sciences, acquisitions of learning, and whatever else we had not directly from the hand of nature; which would reduce us back again to the helpless and ignorant condition of our infancy. Men of the most shining characters and exemplary lives are found peculiarly attentive to them, nor will ever suffer themselves to be drawn into a disregard for them, by the impulses of passion, or temptations of profit. Yet being apt sometimes to gather films and foulnesses, it may not be amiss to examine them at the bar of reason by a jury of their peers; that is, by comparing them with one another, when we have leisure and opportunity to give them a fair hearing, and take full cognizance of the cause: for the presumption lies strongly in their favour, and the burden of the proof belongs to him that would impeach their character. For we may have had substantial grounds for our estimation of things, though we do not now retain them in mind, and the experience of others may have discovered an expedience that we never stood in a situation to discern: therefore whatever appears shocking to our thought, or generally odious in the eyes of mankind, deserves to be rejected without very evident and invincible reasons to the contrary.

CHAP. XXV.

NECESSITY.

By necessity I do not mean that impulse whereby bodies are made to move and strike upon one another, nor those laws, by which nature carries on her operation in a chain of causes and effects unavoidably depending upon each other, without choice or volition. For I consider it here as a motive driving the mind to one manner of action, when we have the contrary in our inclination and our power: and we hear the term often applied this way, how properly I shall not examine, choosing rather to regard every expression as proper, that obtains currency in the language of mankind.

I have laid down that all our motives derive their efficacy from pleasure, other satisfactions flowing through the channel of translation, either immediately or remotely from that: but then it must be remembered, that under pleasure I comprehend the avoidance of pain, and it is the latter solely that gives rise to the class of motives at present under consideration. In all necessary actions, we have some uneasiness, or displeasure, or damage in view, and some inclination drawing us another way which we should gratify if it were not for such obstacle; and as inclination generally stands for Will, we are said in such cases to act unwillingly or against their Wills, notwithstanding that we perform the acts by our volition, and therefore are no more necessary agents than when pursuing the thing most agreeable to our heart's desire.

2. Thus the motives of necessity have the very reverse for their objects to those of the three former classes, to wit, some pain or disquietude of mind, some detriment to our possessions, or blemish in our character, to which may be added the omission of something pleasant, profitable, or creditable, which we conceive in our power to attain; for whatever we desire strongly we feel an uneasiness in the thought of going without, which uneasiness

many times lays us under a necessity of taking all measures to prevent it. To this class belong the obligations of duty, of honour, of justice, of prudence, of the laws of the land, and of fashion : the attachment to professions, application to business, preservation of our persons and properties, checks of conscience, and the greatest part of the influence of our moral senses. For whenever we do so or so because we must, whether the obligation be laid upon us by our own fondness for particular objects, or by the judgments of reason, we are actuated by the apprehension of some mischief attendant upon the forbearing it. Conscience particularly acts as a monitor, like Socrates' demon, never exhorting to anything, but restraining our desires from the course they would otherwise take, informing us what is right, no otherwise than by warning us against what is wrong : and moral senses, when young and newly acquired, operate by the dread of that compunction we should feel upon transgressing their dictates.

The very term Must implies that we should have acted otherwise, had matters been left to our choice, and indicates a desire subsisting in the mind, which unavoidably degenerates into want upon our being obliged to thwart when we cannot stifle it. Therefore, want being an uneasy passion, necessity always throws the mind into a state of suffering, greater or less in proportion to the degree of want urging us to the course we must not take. But men frequently misapply the term, using it as a pretence to justify what they really like and might have omitted without the least inconvenience : or when there is a real necessity, ascribing their action to that, though they were in fact pre-engaged by other motives. For we must remember the motive of action is always something actually in the scale ; not every good reason that might move us if its help were wanted, but some object in view, and weighing with us at the instant time of acting. So that we cannot certainly conclude people uneasy when we hear them talk of being obliged to such a particular proceeding : for perhaps there was no obligation, and they only amused themselves, or meant to amuse us, with the pretence of one ; or if they were, perhaps they had nothing less in their thoughts, but proceeded upon other grounds. What is more necessary than eating ? yet which of us sits down to table upon that motive ? we do not need to be told that without victuals we cannot sustain life, nor keep our bodies in health, and this consideration might have sufficient influence to bring us to them, if there were nothing else : but appetite engages us beforehand, and sets our jaws at work long before necessity can heave itself into the scale. On the contrary, physic, having no other recommendation, will not go down with us, until we throw in the heavy weight of necessity. And in this as well as all other cases wherein the cogency of necessity gives the real turn to our activity, there is an uneasiness corresponding to the reluctance we feel against complying with it.

But as this uneasiness proceeds from the opposition of contrary desires, if that which occasioned the reluctance can be totally silenced, necessity changes its nature, and becomes a matter of choice, having no competitor to struggle against it : for as when driven by necessity, we should have acted otherwise if that necessity had not occurred, so we should have readily complied with it as a thing desirable, if we had had no contrary inclination which must be thwarted by it. Therefore persons well practised in the ways of honour, take delight in performing the obligations of it, and fulfilling the rules of duty and justice : for though these ties were obligations at first, and still retain the name, they no longer act as obligations, but as objects of desire, nor does the party influenced by them once think of any

mischief that would ensue, or any pleasure he might lose upon transgressing them.

3. The bare exemption from evil often suffices to touch us with a sensible pleasure. The testimony of a good conscience, although implying no more than a clearness from offence, has been ever held a continual feast to the mind. And in common cases, the avoidance of mischief does not operate as a motive of necessity, where there is nothing to raise a reluctance against the measures to be taken for preventing it. We bar up our doors and windows every night to secure them against robbers; we provide fuel against winter, and send down stores into the country for our summer occasions: there is no pleasure in all this, nor should we do it unless necessary; yet being familiarized to the practice, we do it as a thing customary without thinking of that necessity. The essence of necessary action consists in an unwillingness to perform it; take away that unwillingness and the necessity is gone. There are persons of so happy temper as to bring their minds into a ready compliance with what must be done, and upon discerning that, whatever desires they might have had before for doing otherwise instantly vanish: if we could attain a perfect acquiescence in whatever the present circumstances require, we should escape the iron hand of necessity, we might see which way it drives, and lay our measures accordingly, but should always elude its grasp, and take the gentler guidance of expedience.

Nevertheless, since our desires will not always lie down quiet at the word of command, we can only restrain them from mischief by contemplating the necessity of so doing, and inculcating that idea so strongly as to drive us into the performance of what we could not do willingly: for though it will throw us into an uneasy situation, we must submit to it for the good fruits expectant thereupon; the road to ease and pleasure lying frequently through trouble and uneasiness. It is by this way we first come within the influence of honour, prudence, and justice; and the moral senses, as we observed before, begin their operation in this manner, though by a long and steady practice they get the better of all opponent inclinations, and become themselves the sources of desire, which would then prevail with us if there were no necessity to enforce them.

But as necessity by good management may be refined into pleasure, so pleasure by indiscretion may be corrupted into necessity; a constant indulgence of our appetites increases their cravings while it lessens and at last totally destroys the gust we had in gratifying them; so that desire, whose office it is to solace and delight us, changes into the tormenting passion of want. It has been often said that hunger is the best sauce to our meat, but this the voluptuary never finds in his dish; and likewise that novelty gives a relish to pleasures, but by hunting continually after a variety of them, we may bring novelty itself to be nothing new. Many run a perpetual round of diversions abroad only because they should be miserable at home; so that while they seem invited by pleasure, they are really lashed on by the scourge of necessity. Therefore if we wish to pass our time easily and agreeably, the worst thing we can do is to make a toil of a pleasure, and the best to make a virtue of necessity.

CHAP. XXVI.

REASON.

Thus far we have been busied in laying our foundation, a toilsome and tedious work, but wherein diligence and an attention to minute particulars was requisite, because we were unwilling to leave any cracks or chasms unfilled, over which our future building might stand hollow: how well we have succeeded in the attempt, and whether we have worked the whole compact with a mutual dependence, and due coherence of parts, must be left to the judgment of others, whose decision in our favour I rather wish for than expect. For, to say truth, it has not answered my own expectation, as wanting much of that complete workmanship I am well satisfied the materials were capable of: but with regard to the necessity and usefulness of all we have been labouring, I beg the determination of that may be suspended until it shall be seen what uses we can make of it. Let us now begin to raise the superstructure, wherein I hope to proceed with a little more ease to myself, and satisfaction to anybody that may deign to look upon me. We have examined how and upon what incitements men act, together with the tendencies and consequences of their action: let us try to discover from thence how they ought to act. But I am not so fond as to imagine anything can be done this way so completely as to render all further care and consideration of other persons needless: if I can set up the main pillars of morality, and perform the offices of mason and carpenter in erecting the edifice, this is all can be required of me: I may leave it to each particular man to fit up the several apartments according to his circumstances and situation in life; for things calculated for general use require some pains and circumspection in applying them to private convenience in the variety of cases that may happen.

2. We have seen how the actions of men are of two sorts, inadvertent and deliberate, the former prompted by imagination, and the others by understanding. To imagination belong our combinations and judgments, starting up immediately upon the appearance of objects, our spontaneous trains of thought, our passions, habits, and motives giving the present turn to our volition. Of what kind all these shall be, or when, or how they shall affect us, depends upon the impulse of external objects, upon experience, custom, and other prior causes: the mind has no share either in modelling or introducing them, and though she acts by her own power without their assistance to invigorate her, yet she shapes her motions according to the directions received from them. There remains only the understanding, in whose operations the mind acts as principal agent, comparing and marshalling her ideas, investigating those that lie out of sight, forming new judgments, and discovering motives that would not have arisen of themselves. It is therefore by the due use of our understanding, or reason alone, that we can help ourselves when imagination would take a wrong course, or proves insufficient for our purposes. To this then we must have recourse, if we would avail ourselves of anything we have learnt in the foregoing inquiry, because we must employ this to rectify whatever shall be found amiss elsewhere.

3. And in such employment consists principally, if not entirely, the benefit we may expect from reason, which is necessary to be noted, that we

may know wherein she may prove serviceable: for some people require too much at her hands, more than she is able to perfom; they want her to actuate every motion of their lives, which is impossible, for her power lies in her authority rather than her strength, she does little or nothing herself, but acts altogether by her inferior officers of the family of imagination: at least, till she takes them into her service, her efforts terminate in speculation alone, and do not extend to practice. Nor can she work, even in her own peculiar province, without continual supplies from elsewhere; for she works upon materials found in the repository of ideas. She never produces a judgment or a motive from her own fund, but holds the premises in view until they throw assent or satisfaction upon the conclusion. She is perpetually asking, Why is such a thing true? Why is it desirable? but former experience must suggest the grounds from whence the answer will result; for reason does not make the truth nor the desire, but only lays things together whereout either of them may grow. And when she has formed her decisions, she must deposit them with her partner for safe custody against future occasions; who proving ever so little unfaithful, all she has deposited will either be absolutely lost or so weakened in its colours as to become unserviceable. She runs very short lengths, sees very little way at once, therefore must establish rules and maxims for her own guidance, and make over her treasures to imagination as she acquires them, that they may rise spontaneously to serve her afterwards in her further advances towards knowledge. But we ordinarily mistake the province of reason by supposing everything reasonable to lie within it, whereas that epithet implies no more than a thing that reason would not disprove. But many very just and solid opinions we imbibe from education or custom, without any application to our reason at all: and those we do acquire for ourselves by the due exercise of that faculty, when firmly rooted, become the property of imagination; conviction growing into persuasion. They then command our assent without contemplating the evidences whereon they were founded, and that full assurance wherewith they strike the mind instantly upon presenting themselves is not an act of reason, but of habit or some moral or internal sense, which continue to influence, though consideration and understanding lie dormant. Were our faculty of reason to be suddenly taken from us, how unable soever we might find ourselves to make new acquisitions of knowledge or judgment, we should not necessarily lose those already gotten by former exercises of the faculty.

4. But if the office of reason lie within so narrow a compass in her own province of speculation, we shall find it reduced to narrower limits when applying her theory to practice; for she is a tedious heavy mover, poring a long while upon objects before she can determine her choice: our active powers will not always wait her leisure, but take directions elsewhere while she deliberates. Besides, there is not always time for consideration: when the season of action comes unexpectedly, we must instantly turn ourselves one way or other, therefore should make no dispatch in business or must give up the reins to chance, if we had not some rules and measures of conduct ready in store for our guidance: and the principal service our understanding does, is by holding our attention steady to those rules, wherein she quickly tires and faints unless there be some motive of pleasure, or profit, or honour, or necessity, at hand to assist her. And yet in doing this service she performs the smallest share of our work, directing only the main tenor of our conduct; but the component acts whereof that conduct consists must be suggested in train by former practice and experience; for

it avails little to know what is expedient, or the rules proper for attaining it, without an expertness and readiness in practising them. The orator may choose his arguments and select the topics proper for enforcing them, but the figures, the language, and the pronunciation, will be such as he has accustomed himself to in former exercises. The musician may think what tune he will play, what divisions he shall run, or with what graces he shall embellish it; but unless his eye has learnt by use to run currently along the notes, and his fingers along the keys, he will make very indifferent harmony. The business of life goes on by means of habit, opinion, and affection, which understanding only checks from time to time, or turns, or sets them at work, without adding anything to their vigour, unless by bringing several of them to co-operate together. Reason, as Mr. Pope says, is the card, but passion is the gale; and if there were a necessity of parting with one of them, we might better spare the former than the latter; for though the course of the ship would be very uncertain without a compass, yet without a wind it would not move at all. To lose our reason would make us beasts: to lose our appetites, mere logs.

5. If there be any instances wherein reason shows signs of an active vigour, they are when we surmount difficulties or endure labours or pains by mere dint of resolution: yet even here every one's experience may convince him how feeble she acts unless seconded by some powerful motive retained in view, and how carefully she is forced to fortify herself all around with considerations of damage, or shame, or compunction. Nor has she even this little vigour naturally, but acquires it by inuring the mind by previous discipline to a habit of perseverance; which when gained, a little time passing in softness and indulgence will divest her of it again. And when with all her care and contrivance she has mustered up a resolution, we know too well how wofully it fails in time of trial, how often it is borne down by the weight of pain or passion, undermined by the working of habit, or surprised by some sudden temptation catching her at unawares.

I have remarked elsewhere that if our imagination were rightly set so as to exhibit no false appearances, and our appetites and desires all turned upon proper objects, we should want nothing else to answer all the purposes of life more effectually and readily than we can do now. On the other hand, if our understandings were so large as to comprise in our respect all the tendencies of things so far as they might affect us, and to see the future in as strong colours as the present, we might serve ourselves of that alone to supply all our occasions. But since we have neither of our faculties perfect, we must employ both in their proper offices to make up for each other's deficiency. Man has been incompletely defined a rational animal; he is rather, to use Mr. Woolaston's words, sensitivo-rational, therefore must regard both parts of his constitution; for one can do nothing without the other, and this would run riot and do worse than nothing without continual direction from that.

6. The contrariety and opposition observable in the mind gave rise, as I have already remarked in my first chapter, to the notion of several Wills within us: for the mind constantly following the direction of her ideas, that state of them immediately preceding her action we entitle the Will, by a metonyme or sometimes mistake of the cause for the effect. For, if we apprehend every prospect of objects inclining us to act to be really a Will, we shall fall into the absurdity of several Wills, several agents and persons in the same man: whereas it is the same agent, the same power, that acts in all cases, whether we act madly or soberly, whether we deny or indulge

our Wills. But if we take the matter figuratively, this diversity of persons may serve aptly enough to express the disordered condition of human nature, wherein reason and passion perpetually struggle, resist, and control one another. The metaphor employed by Plato was that of a charioteer driving his pair of horses, by which latter he allegorized the concupiscible and irascible passions; but as we have now-a-days left off driving our own chariots, but keep a coachman to do it for us, I think the mind may be more commodiously compared to a traveller riding a single horse, wherein reason is represented by the rider, and imagination with all its train of opinions, appetites, and habits, by the beast. Everybody sees the horse does all the work; the strength and speed requisite for performing it are his own; he carries his master along every step of the journey, directs the motion of his own legs in walking, trotting, galloping, or stepping over a rote, makes many by-motions, as whisking the flies with his tail or playing with his bit, all by his own instinct; and if the road lie plain and open without bugbears to affright him or rich pasture on either hand to entice him, he will jog on, although the reins were laid upon his neck, or in a well-acquainted road to take the right turnings of his own accord. Perhaps sometimes he may prove startish or restive, turning out of the way, or running into a pond to drink, maugre all endeavours to prevent him; but this depends greatly upon the discipline he has been used to. The office of the rider lies in putting his horse into the proper road, and the pace most convenient for the present purpose, guiding and conducting him as he goes along, checking him when too forward or spurring him when too tardy, being attentive to his motions, never dropping the whip nor losing the reins, but ready to interpose instantly whenever needful, keeping firm in his seat if the beast behaves unruly, observing what passes in the way, the condition of the ground, and bearings of the country, in order to take directions therefrom for his proceeding. But this is not all he has to do, for there are many things previous to the journey; he must get his tackling in good order, bridle, spurs, and other accoutrements; he must learn to sit well in the saddle, to understand the ways and temper of the beast, get acquainted with the roads, and inure himself by practice to bear long journeys without fatigue or galling; he must provide provender for his horse, and deal it out in proper quantities; for if weak and jadish, or pampered and gamesome, he will not perform the journey well: he must have him well broke, taught all his paces, cured of starting, stumbling, running away, and all skittish or sluggish tricks, trained to answer the bit and be obedient to the word of command. If he can teach him to canter whenever there is a smooth and level turf, and stop when the ground lies rugged, of his own accord, it will contribute to make riding easy and pleasant; he may then enjoy the prospects around, or think of any business without interruption to his progress. As to the choice of a horse, our rider has no concern with that, but must content himself with such as nature and education have put into his hands: but since the spirit of the beast depends much upon the usage given him, every prudent man will endeavour to proportion that spirit to his own strength and skill in horsemanship; and according as he finds himself a good or bad rider, will wish to have his horse sober or mettlesome. For strong passions work wonders where there is a stronger force of reason to curb them; but where this is weak the appetites must be feeble too, or they will lie under no control.

7. From all that has been said above, as well literally as allegorically, we may learn what the proper business of reason is, namely, to watch over our

motions and look out for the proper measures of conduct with as much circumspection as the present circumstances of the case shall permit or require. For this there is little need of instruction, but rather exhortation, to prevail on men to exert their faculty; for everybody knows the difference between considerate and thoughtless behaviour. The principal part of her employment lies in storing the mind with solid knowledge, establishing useful rules of conduct, and above all, contracting such habits and desires as may continually lead the active powers into proper courses. For this last branch is of the most importance, because it fructifies our knowledge by making it practical; nor can any one doubt that the world would receive more improvement by everybody's living up to what they know, than by any increase of their knowledge whatever; and that they do not live up to it, can be owing to nothing else besides bad habits and inordinate desires. But every rule and every desire must have some purpose to drive at, and it becomes reason to examine the propriety of the purpose as well as conduciveness of the measures towards obtaining it: this commonly leads to some further end first recommending that purpose to our choice, and that many times points out another end lying still beyond, and so on without limitation. For the most part we stop at a few general principles which we have found most universally received or esteem valuable in themselves, without knowing or without remembering what first discovered to us their value: and this method may serve well enough for common use. But the studious, in their seasons of leisure and contemplation, endeavour to carry back their researches as far as they can push them, and penetrate quite to the fountain head: but being sensible that reason must come to a stop at last, and arrive at something which had a recommendation prior to any that she could give it, they strive to find out what is that First or ultimate end; for first and last here are the same thing, which nature has given for our pursuit, and from which reason must deduce all those principles and rules of action she recommends.

And as there has been great variance upon this point, it will deserve a particular consideration, for which I shall appropriate the next ensuing chapter.

CHAP. XXVII.

ULTIMATE GOOD.

For so I choose to translate the Summum Bonum of the ancients, as much and as unsuccessfully sought after as the philosopher's stone, rather than call it the Chief Good, as it is vulgarly termed. For the inquiry was not to ascertain the degrees of goodness in objects, or determine what possessed it in the highest pitch beyond all others; but, since the goodness of things depends upon their serviceableness towards procuring something we want, to discover what was that one thing intrinsically good which contented the mind of itself and rendered all others desirable in proportion as they tended directly or remotely to procure it. Good, says Mr. Locke, is that which produces pleasure, and if we understand it thus strictly, in the true original sense, our inquiry were vain: for then the very expression of good in itself would be absurd, because nothing good could be ultimate, the pleasure it produces lying always beyond. But it is customary to call that good which stands at the very end of our wishes, and contents the mind

without reference to anything further: and in this common acceptation the term will be applicable to our present purpose.

2. Upon perusal of the chapter of satisfaction, and those of the four classes of motives, whoever shall happen to think they contain a just representation of human nature, need not be long in seeking for this summun bonum: for he will perceive it to be none other than pleasure or satisfaction, which is pleasure taken in the largest sense, as comprising every complacence of mind together with the avoidance of pain or uneasiness. Perhaps I shall be charged with reviving the old exploded doctrine of Epicurus upon this article, but I am not ashamed of joining with any man of whatever character in those parts of it, where I think he has truth on his side: though whether I do really agree with him here, is more than I can be sure of, for I find great disputes concerning what he called pleasure. If he confined it to gross sensual delights or imaginations relative thereto, as his adversaries charged him with, and the bulk of his followers seem to have understood him, I cannot consent to shut myself up within such narrow limits: for though these things may afford a genuine satisfaction sometimes and when sparingly used, yet it is to be had more plentifully elsewhere. Therefore, being regardless whether my sentiments tally or no with those of Epicurus, I shall not trouble myself to examine what he really thought, but endeavour as far as I am able to explain what this satisfaction is, which I suppose the summum bonum or ultimate end of action. And this I cannot do better than by referring, as I have done before in the chapter upon that article, to every man's experience of the condition of mind he finds himself in when anything happens to his wish or good liking; when he feels the cool breezes of a summer evening or the comfortable warmth of a winter fire; when he gains possession of something useful or profitable; when he has done anything he can applaud himself for or will redound to his credit with persons he esteems.

3. But to consider satisfaction physically, it is a perception of the mind, residing in her alone, constantly one and the same in kind, how much soever it may vary in degree: for whether a man be pleased with hearing music, seeing prospects, tasting dainties, performing laudable actions, or making agreeable reflections, his complacence and condition of mind will be the same if equal in degree, though coming from different quarters. But this complacence, and indeed every other perception, the mind never has, unless excited in her by some external object striking upon her bodily senses, or some idea giving play to her mental organs. We have supposed there may be some certain fibre whose peculiar office it is to affect the mind in this manner, and our organs please or not by their motion according as, in the natural texture or present disposition of our frame, they stand connected with this spring of satisfaction. Whether there really be such a particular spring or no is not very material to know, for if we could ascertain its existence we cannot come at it either with the finger or surgeon's probe so as to set it a working for our entertainment. Since then we cannot touch this spring directly, we must endeavour to convey an impulse to it by those channels that nature has provided us with for the purpose: for common experience testifies that there are a variety of sensations and reflections qualified to excite satisfaction in the mind when we can apply them. But our attention usually reaching no further than to these causes, for if we can procure them the effect will follow of course, we give the name of pleasure to those sensations and scenes of imagination which touch us in the sensible part: hence pleasure becomes an improper term to ex-

press the summum bonum by, because objects or ideas that have pleased may not do so again; therefore if we were to recommend it as the end of action, we might be misunderstood, or mislead some unwary person already inclined that way into the pursuit of a wrong object; for pleasure in the vulgar acceptation will not always please. If Epicurus understood it in this sense, I renounce communion with him as a heretic; but if by pleasure he meant the very complacence of mind generated by agreeable objects of any kind whatever, I cannot refuse him my assistance against all opponents; and the rather for fear this may prove the only point whereon we shall ever have an opportunity of joining forces together.

4. Nor can it be doubted that satisfaction is proposed to our pursuit by nature, when we reflect how universally and perpetually it engages all mankind, how steadily volition follows the prospect of immediate satisfaction, as has been shown in the foregoing inquiry, if one may be said to show a thing that was before sufficiently manifested by Mr. Locke. The man and the child, the civilized and the savage, the learned and the vulgar, the prudent and the giddy, the good and the wicked, constantly pursue whatever appears most satisfactory to them in their present apprehension: and if at any time they forego an immediate pleasure for sake of a distant advantage, it is because they conceive a greater satisfaction in the prospect of that advantage or uneasiness in the thought of missing it. Therefore, those who can content themselves with the enjoyments of to-day without feeling an actual concern for the morrow, will never be moved to action by anything future, how fully soever they acknowledge the expedience of it: and when pain rises so high as that the mind cannot find any contentment under it, it will overpower the best grounded resolutions. Neither is there any more room to doubt of satisfaction being the ultimate end than of its being a natural good, because all other goodness centres in that: the gratifications of pleasure, the rules of prudence and morality, are good, only as they tend by themselves or in their consequences to satisfy the mind: one may give a reason for all other things being good, but for that alone no reason can be given, for experience not reason must recommend it. Why is knowledge good? because it directs us to choose the things that are most useful. Why are useful things good? because they minister to the supply of our wants and desires. Why is this supply good? because it satisfies the mind. Why is satisfaction good? here you must stop, for there lies nothing beyond to furnish materials for an answer: but if anybody denies it, you can only refer him to his own common sense, by asking how he finds himself when in a state of satisfaction or disquietude, and whether of them he would prefer to the other.

In short, the matter seems so clear that one may be thought to trifle in spending so many words to prove it: and after all, what is the upshot of the whole but to show that satisfaction satisfies? a mere identical proposition adding nothing to our knowledge, but the same as if one should say that plenitude fills, that heat warms, that hardness resists and softness yields to the touch. Yet as trifling as the proposition may appear, Mr. Locke has bestowed a great deal of pains in proving the value and efficacy of satisfaction: nor have there been wanting persons of no small reputation with whom such pains were necessary, who out of their extravagant zeal for virtue denied that all other pleasures conferred anything towards bettering the condition of the mind. Had they pronounced them cloying, unstable, often delusive of the expectation, and productive of greater mischiefs, they had said right, and enough to answer their main purpose: but this

would not do; they insisted that when we see a man actually pleased with trifles, wanting nothing else, but fully contented with the condition of mind they throw him into, nevertheless he was miserable at the very instant of enjoyment without regard to consequences. What is this but undertaking to prove that satisfaction does not satisfy, which whoever can accomplish may rise to be a cardinal, for he need not fear being able to demonstrate transubstantiation. Our divines talk more rationally when they admit that the pleasures of sin may satisfy for a moment, but are too dearly bought when purchased with disease, shame, remorse, and an incapacity for higher enjoyments.

5. One remark more concerning the summum bonum, viz. that though a noun of the singular number, nevertheless it is one in species only, containing a multitude of individuals. For our perceptions are fleeting and momentary, objects strike successively upon our organs, and ideas rise incessantly in our imagination, which thereby throw the mind into a state of complacence or disquietude, corresponding with the manner of their impulse, which has no duration: therefore satisfaction cannot continue without a continual application of satisfactory causes. This gains another name for the summum bonum, and makes us entitle it Happiness, which is the aggregate of satisfactions. For though this term be sometimes applied to the enjoyment of a single moment, and then is synonymous with satisfaction, yet it more generally and properly denotes the surplus and successes a man has met with or may expect over and above his disappointments: if the surplus be anything considerable, we pronounce him happy; if his disquietudes greatly exceed, we style him miserable. Ovid understood it in this sense when he laid down that we can never pronounce a man happy before his death, because the fortune of life being uncertain, whatever enjoyments we see him possessed of we can never be sure they may not be overbalanced by evils to come: and Milton the same, in his apostrophe to our first parents, Sleep on, blest pair, yet happy if ye seek not other happiness and know to know no more. But sound sleep, being a state of insensibility, is capable neither of satisfaction nor uneasiness: therefore the sleeping pair were happy only in respect to that ample store of unmingled pleasures lying in reserve for them against they awoke.

Thus happiness relates to the whole tenor of our lives, but multitudes of our actions do not reach so far as to affect our condition so long as we have our being: this breaks happiness again into smaller portions corresponding with the length or extent of their influence. It may be all one after dinner whether I eat mutton or chicken, but if one will please me better during the time of eating and the indulgence will do me no harm, why should not I take that I like best? When we lay out a day's diversion by some little excursion abroad, we regard what will entertain us most for the day, notwithstanding some trifling inconveniences of sloppy roads or indifferent accommodations at a paltry inn. If we take a house we consider, not what will be the most easy for the first month, but most commodious during the whole lease. And when a father puts his son to school, he might supply him with more enjoyment at home than can be expected during the seven years of schooling; but he considers that learning will enable him to pass his life afterwards more agreeably and usefully. Thus upon several occasions proposed to our option, that is always the best which will add most to our happiness as far as its consequences extend.

6. Our satisfactions come sometimes from causes operating of their own accord, as upon change of weather from chill or sultry to moderate, or upon

hearing joyful news unexpectedly; but for the most part we must procure them for ourselves by application of proper means. Now since we are prompted to use our activity by desire, since the good things occurring spontaneously would have been objects of our desire had we known of them beforehand, or our intervention been wanted, therefore may justly be styled desirable; and since desire of itself renders objects satisfactory which would otherwise have been indifferent, therefore it is the first rule of happiness to procure the gratification of our desires; nor shall I scruple to recommend this as the proper business of life. Let every man by my consent study to gratify himself in whatever suits his taste and inclination, for they vary infinitely: one man's meat is another man's poison; what this person likes the next may abhor; what delights at one time may disgust at another; and what entertains when new may grow stale and insipid afterwards. Our appetites and fancies prompt us fast enough to this gratification, to choose objects suited to our particular tastes and to vary them as we find our relish change: but the misfortune is that desire often defeats her own purpose, either by mistaking things for satisfactory which are not, as when a child goes to play with the flame of a candle; or by a more common mistake apprehending gratification to lie in a single point, whereas this, like happiness, consists in the sum aggregate of enjoyments. He that indulges one desire to the crossing of many others, ought no more to be thought pursuing gratification than he can be thought to pursue profit who takes twenty pounds to-day for goods that he might have sold to-morrow for forty: a true lover of money will reject it when offered upon such terms, and a true lover of gratification who knows what he is about will reject it upon the like. Therefore there is no occasion to persuade men out of their senses, and face them down that gratification adds nothing to their satisfaction, no not for a moment: on the contrary, we may exhort them to pursue it as a thing most valuable, and therefore to pursue it in the same manner as they would other valuable things, that is, not to take a little in hand in lieu of more they might have by and by. Any trifle that hits our fancy suffices to content the mind, and if we could enjoy it for ever with the same relish, it would answer our whole purpose; for I know of no weariness, no satiety, no change of taste in the mind; these all belong to the organs bodily and mental. When a glutton sits down to a well-spread table with a good appetite, if he ever has any, he possesses as much of the summum bonum as can be obtained within the time; and if he had victuals continually supplied him, a hole in his throat to discharge them as fast as swallowed, and nothing in the world else to do, he might attain it completely: but this cannot be: yet if he can prolong appetite beyond its stretch by high sauces, until he has overcharged himself, still I can allow him in a state of enjoyment during the repast, for he has a desire, and he gratifies it. But has he none other desires that will solicit him by and by? has he not a desire of being free from sickness of stomach, or distemper; nothing else he wants to do with his money; no diversion, no business that requires alertness of spirits, no regard for his credit, the good word of his friends, or his own peace of mind; if he has other desires that must suffer by indulging this one, he is a very bad accomptant in the article of gratification. Thus the very interests of our desires sometimes require self denial, which is recommendable only on that account: nor would I advise a man ever to deny himself, unless in order to please himself better another time.

7. Since then our desires mislead us so grossly, sometimes mistaking

their own intention, and at other times starving one another, let us have recourse to reason to moderate between them, and to remedy the inconveniences they would bring upon us: and this, upon observing the opposition among them, will quickly discover that there are two ways of attaining gratification, one by procuring the objects we desire, the other by accommodating desire to the objects before us, or most convenient for us upon the whole. Either of these methods would answer our purpose, if we could pursue it effectually: were it possible to command everything with a wish, and supply fuel to our desires as fast as they start up, still varying their objects, as they themselves vary; or could we carry our heart in our hands, moulding it like wax, to the shape of every circumstance occurring, we need never feel a moment's uneasiness. But neither of these is possible: many things that would please us, lie out of our reach, some of them never to be obtained, others only now and then, as opportunity favours, but the greater part of them satiate, before desire abates: on the other hand, there are some natural desires we can never totally eradicate, some necessaries, without which we cannot sustain our bodies in vigour, nor our spirits in alertness, to serve us upon any occasion. Therefore we must drive the nail that will go, use our understandings in surveying the stock of materials for gratification, either generally or at any particular time in our power, and examining the state of our desires, which among them are most attainable, or least contradictory to others, or what we can do towards blending them to ply most suitable to our convenience.

The former of these methods, that of procuring objects to our fancy, is the most obvious, therefore most commonly practised. We see men run eagerly after whatever their present desire urges them to, in proportion to the strength of their inclination; yet even here they must often call in consideration to their aid. For our pleasures, even those of them which are attainable, do not always hang so close within our reach, as that we can gather them whenever so disposed, but there are many things preparatory to the obtaining them; materials to be provided for supplying them, skill to be learned, dexterity to be acquired for the making and properly applying of that provision. This gives rise to the common rules of prudence, to all arts and sciences, directing or enabling men to make advances in fortune, honour, elegance, or other principal object they have set their hearts upon, and supplying the world with the conveniences and entertainments of life. The preparatories to pleasure will by translation become themselves objects of desire sufficient to move us, without the reference they bear to their end: and it is necessary they should, or else we must miss of the benefit they will do us. For as a traveller must not keep his thoughts constantly intent upon the place he wishes to arrive at, if he would make any dispatch in his journey, but having once taken the right road, fixes his eye upon the nearest parts of it as he goes along; so neither can we always contemplate the enjoyments we are providing for ourselves without interrupting our progress. Our capacities are too short to hold the whole line of our pursuit in view, but we must rest upon some part of it most convenient for our present direction: nor indeed could we always see to the end of our line if we were to strain ever so much, therefore must trust to others, or to our own former determination, for an assurance that it will lead us the way we would wish. Thus happiness, although the ultimate end of action, yet is not always, perhaps I might say, very seldom, our ultimate point of view: for our road lies through lanes and hedges, or over an

uneven, hilly country, where we can see very little way before us: nay, sometimes we must seemingly turn our backs upon it, and take a compass round in the plain beaten track, to avoid impracticable morasses, or other obstacles intervening. Hence we may learn why pleasure is so deceitful a guide to happiness, because it plunges us headlong forward through thick and thin, fixing our eyes upon a single point, and taking them off from the marks leading to that aggregate of satisfactions whereof happiness consists. Wherefore he that resolves to please himself always will scarce ever do so, for by perpetually indulging his desires he will destroy or lose the means of indulging them.

8. For the skill of providing materials to gratify our desires, we must consult common prudence and discretion, or resort to the professors of arts and sciences containing the several branches of it: but the other method of gratification by managing the mind itself and bringing desire to the most convenient ply, belongs properly to the moralist; whose business lies not so much in informing you how to procure what you want, as how to forbear wanting what you cannot have, or would prove hurtful to you. But want cannot be removed without aid of some other want; for as you can never bring a man to assent to a proposition unless by means of some premises whereto he does already assent, so you can never bring him to any desire, unless by showing the connection it bears with something he already desires. The desire of happiness would suffice for this purpose, if we had it stronger infixed than we find in our breasts: but though all have this desire, so far as that they would be willing enough to receive happiness, if they could get it upon asking for; yet, being an aggregate, and therefore always in part at least distant, they prefer the present gratification of other desires before it. Therefore the moralist will begin with striving to inculcate this desire of happiness into himself and others as deeply as possible. But since this can hardly ever be done so effectually as one would wish, for we can never raise so vivid an idea of remote objects, as to equal those standing close to us, he will examine all other propensities belonging to us in order to encourage those which are most innocent, most satisfactory, most compatible together, and best promoting his principal aim. These he will endeavour to render habitual, so as that they may start up to the thought uncalled, and gather strength enough to overpower others he wishes to eradicate. As we cannot upon every occasion see to the end of our proceedings, he will establish certain rules to serve as landmarks for guiding us on the way. These rules, when he has leisure and opportunity for mature consideration, he will build on one another, erecting the whole fabric upon the basis of summum bonum before described. But because their reference to the ultimate end cannot be continually kept in mind, he will inure himself and everybody within his reach, by such methods as he shall find feasible, to look upon them as good in themselves, that they may become influencing principles of action. The outer branches of these rules, calculated for ordinary occasions, will of course vary according to those occasions or to the tempers, abilities, situations, and needs of different persons, to particularize all which would be endless and impracticable; but there are a few general rules universally expedient, as being the stem whereout the rest are to grow. The first seems to be that of habituating ourselves to follow the dictates of judgment in preference to any impulse of passion, fancy, or appetite, and forbear whatever our reason disapproves as being wrong: for there is nothing more evident than that the knowledge of right and wrong can do us no benefit while resting in speculation alone and not reduced into practice;

which it can never be unless become habitual, and striking with the force of an obligation or an object of desire.

CHAP. XXVIII.

RECTITUDE.

We hear much of an essential rectitude in certain things, but before we attempt to judge of their essence it will be expedient to settle with ourselves the purport of the word Right, for we shall be likely to reason very indifferently without understanding the terms we employ. Right belongs originally to lines, being the same as straight in opposition to curve or crooked. Everybody knows a right line is the shortest that can lie between two points so as to touch them both, and the nearest approach from any one to any other given point is along such right line. From hence it has been applied by way of metaphor to rules and actions, which lying in the line of our progress towards any purpose we aim at, if they be wrong they will carry us aside, and we shall either wholly miss of our intent, or must begin again and take a longer compass than necessary to arrive at it: but if they conduct effectually and directly by the nearest way, we pronounce them right. Therefore the very expression of right in itself is absurd, because things are rendered right by their tendency to some end, so that you must take something exterior into the account in order to evidence their rectitude. Rules are termed right upon a supposition of their expedience, and so are actions too for the most part: when a man digs for hidden treasure, we say he has hit upon the right spot if he pitches his spade just over where the treasure lies, though perhaps he did it by guess: but since we are often uncertain of our actions, we apply them to some rule in order to determine their propriety. Hence action has another source of rectitude, namely, its conformity with rule, and consequently may chance to be right or wrong, according to which of the two sources you refer it; for our rules being generally imperfect or built upon probability, we may act right, that is, conformable to them, and yet take a wrong course with respect to the design we had in view. If you look over the hands at whist, and see the party upon whose side you have betted lead his ace of trumps when the adversary has king alone, you will be apt to cry out Right played! because it suits your purpose best of anything he could have done; yet perhaps he might play wrong according to the rules of the game. What if you see him playing on Sundays? you may perceive he plays his cards extremely well, yet if you are a conscientious man you will condemn him for acting wrong: but playing is acting, so then he acts right and wrong at the same instant. What becomes now of the essence of rectitude, when the opposite essence resides in the same subject? Can the essence of things change without any alteration in themselves, but as they are compared to this or that particular object, or set in various lights? Besides that actions perfectly innocent, having neither essence regarded nakedly in themselves, may derive it elsewhere: nothing can be more harmless than wagging your finger considered in itself, yet if the finger rest against the trigger of a loaded musket, and a man stand just before, you cannot do a wronger thing, and why? not because of anything contained in the essence of the action,

but because of the fatal consequences attendant thereupon. Nor are rules less liable to vary their rectitude, which constantly follows expedience and changes with the change of persons or circumstances. Suppose you lay down for a rule, When you want provisions to go to the east; this may be a very good precept for those who live to the westward of a market-town, but when carried to villages on any other point of the compass loses its essence.

2. It must be owned that this essential and intrinsic rectitude is not attributed to all rules, but to those only supposed invariable and general, not confined to particular cases. I know of none better entitled to this character than that recommended at the close of the foregoing chapter, to follow reason in preference to passion and appetite: yet one may question whether this be in fact perpetual, for what rule is it to a young child not arrived at the use of his understanding, or to a man who has lost it through age or distempers? Or if there were a man whose appetites were so happily turned as to fix always upon things beneficial, our rule would be wrong, because reflection and consideration would retard the speed of appetite and interrupt it in its operations. But this case being never likely to happen upon earth, we will admit the rule to be invariable; still its rectitude flows from the condition of mankind, which may be looked upon as a permanent circumstance attending them through the whole line of their existence. So then all rules whatever, as well general as particular, become right, not from anything essential or in themselves, but from their reference to happiness, and the situation either natural or accidental of the party to be directed by them.

3. Though I said just now that the conformity to rule was a second source of rectitude in actions, yet this conformity does not so much constitute as discover their rectitude. Could we always see the certain consequences of our conduct we should need no rules, for our own sagacity would be a sufficient guide; but since our ultimate end is not perpetually our ultimate point of view, as lying beyond our ken, we want certain marks to direct us in our approach towards it. The rules of life are those marks hung up by observing men for the benefit of themselves and others travelling the road: but nobody supposes a mark to carry any essential intrinsic goodness. Thus rules draw their goodness from the shortness of our views and narrowness of our capacities, and bear a reference not only to the good end whereto they conduce, but likewise to the need we stand under of a conductor. As people make further proficiency in any art or business they employ the fewer rules, and in things quite familiar to them they use none: like carriers jogging on continually in the same road with whom posts of direction lose their quality and become no direction at all. To tell a man that when he walks he must step one foot first and then the other, were no rule, for he does it of his own accord; but what is nothing can have no essence and contain nothing.

4. But it may be objected that actions sometimes receive a rectitude from their conformity to rule when they do not answer the purpose intended by them. A good man, failing in the success of his endeavours, will find great consolation in reflecting that he had acted right, that is, had laid his measures justly and executed them punctually. But let us remember that the good man aims at happiness rather than pleasure, that is, at the greater sum of satisfactions preferably to the less, and though he misses his purpose in the present instance by following his rule, yet he shall attain it more completely in other instances by the like adherence. Your gamesters have two

sayings current among them, one that the cards will beat anybody, the other, that the best player will always come off winner at the year's end. So how much soever fortune may influence our success in the game of life, yet she is not so unequal in her favours but that prudence and steadiness will always succeed in the long run better than folly and inconsiderateness. The consolation under disappointment of measures rightly taken rests upon this bottom, that as acts of conformity to rule strengthen and evince our habit of adherence to regular conduct, the possession of this habit conduces more to our happiness than any little success we might have gained by a lucky misconduct; and we may reasonably esteem ourselves put into a better condition upon the whole by performing those acts of conformity than we should have stood in had we omitted them. Therefore whenever we can discern the inexpedience of our rule, and may depart from it without lessening our own regard for it or those of other people, we always deem this an excepted case: and if it be true, what is commonly held, that there is no rule without exceptions, then there is no rule which may not become wrong in some instance or other.

5. Let us now trace out if we can the origin of those epithets Essential and Intrinsic, and examine how they first came applied to rectitude of rules: for we cannot but suppose there must be some good foundation for the use of terms we see currently used among learned and judicious men. There are some rules which respect the qualities of objects wherewith we have any concern, and of course must vary according as those objects change their position, or others succeed in their room, or as we have or cease to have a concern with them: these we style occasional, being calculated for particular occasions and relating to the situation wherein we happen to stand. Others take their rise from the make and constitution of man, and therefore cannot change with any change of place or things external, because we can never remove ourselves from ourselves: these are called essential, as being founded on the very essence of human nature. Thus, lay in a stock of coals in summer, is a very proper rule of family economy here in this climate, where the coldness of our winters renders such a provision necessary: but if we were to inhabit the torrid zone, this rule would lose its rectitude. But look before you leap, is a rule calculated upon the observation of human nature, wherein appetite would continually hurry on to mischief if not restrained by consideration: therefore this rule will remain right everywhere and always so long as we continue to be human creatures, that is, sensitivo-rational animals. The former I take to be of the occasional kind, and the latter essential: and a very proper distinction it is, as instructing us which to prefer when they happen to come into competition. Nevertheless, the essence belongs, not to the rule, but to the object whereon it is grounded.

6. The idea of right in itself I conceive arose from observing that our rules grow from one another, their rectitude depending upon the rectitude of those whereout they spring; and that some of them may be rendered right or wrong by authority, custom, or compact. It was right some years ago to import and wear cambric, but now it would be wrong, because the laws have prohibited it: it was right among our ancestors to appear in public with ruffs, slashed sleeves, and high hats, but now wrong, the fashion being altered: it might have been right yesterday for me to have resolved upon taking a long journey of pleasure, but if I have since made a solemn appointment to meet a neighbour here at home, it would be wrong to disappoint him. These things are rendered right or wrong by their conformity or contrariety to the higher rules of obedience to the legislature, of decency

and good manners, and of fidelity to our engagements, without which there can be no order nor agreeable converse, nor dependence in the world: but because we do not always discern, or at least not think of their expedience, we entitle them right in themselves; whereas the rules receiving their sanction from them we do not call so because we can see to what they owe their rectitude. This distinction likewise is of great use, because it helps to discover the proper objects of authority, custom, and compact; for what carries a strong intrinsic rectitude they cannot alter: no laws, nor general practice of a country, nor private engagement, can make it right to commit murder. I said a strong intrinsic rectitude, for there are various degrees of it, and rules carrying a higher degree may supersede those of a lower. Surely the rule of self-preservation must be acknowledged right in itself, yet the laws of every country oblige men to neglect this by compelling them into military service, and I never heard such laws absolutely condemned by the speculative as unrighteous. And when intrinsic rules interfere, that ought to carry the preference which conduces most largely to happiness, wherein not only the present expedience is to be considered, but likewise the danger of invalidating a rule and the greater mischiefs that may ensue thereby: which make such cases many times extremely difficult to determine, there being so many distant consequences to be taken into account.

7. Thus I conceive those rules essentially and intrinsically right of whose rectitude we are well satisfied or find no controversy made, although we do not discern from whence that rectitude flowed; and these rules are of signal service for trying others of an inferior kind by an application to them: therefore, I am not for discarding the terms, but giving them their due weight and setting them upon their proper foundation. For some men carry them a great deal too far by supposing them to imply something valuable contained in the exercise of a rule without reference to anything further: as when they place the wisdom of Regulus's choice of a certain and cruel death rather than breaking faith with his enemies, in the sole act of conformity to the rules of fidelity abstracted from consequences. If Regulus did right, it must be not for any value in the naked act, but upon supposition that he acted more for his own happiness in the sequel than he could have done by any breach of faith, for we can hardly think he acted more for his present ease. I know of nothing absolutely good besides satisfaction; but since there are many actions not apparently satisfactory or sometimes the reverse, which yet tend to procure an increase of happiness, rules are the marks directing us to the choice of such actions: and the highest rules are those which answer this purpose most generally and effectually. We meet with persons sometimes who, perceiving a character of rectitude in their rules, will not suffer you to ask why they are right, but stop your mouth with the repetition of a necessary and essential rectitude: such may be very honest and worthy men, and if their principles be good and their practice conformable, they certainly deserve that character; but to talk in this strain upon a serious inquiry or contest with an opponent, is talking very unphilosophically. For no rule is right without a reason that renders it so, nor are the clearest of them above examination; nay, an examination now and then is advisable, they being apt to warp with common use or contract rust and dross with lying by; and if their purity and sterling be doubted of, there is none other so certain way to try them as by the touchstone of expedience.

CHAP. XXIX

VIRTUE.

Virtue has been always esteemed something habitual: our first advances towards it were styled by the ancients an Inchoation of virtue, or as we may call it the embryo or seedling not yet arrived to perfection. A drunkard who abstains from liquor once or twice does not instantly commence a sober man, nor do we think him entitled to that appellation until he has so mastered his fondness for tippling that it disturbs him no more. Thus virtue we see is a habit: it remains to fix on some characteristic whereby to distinguish it from other habits. The most obvious definition is that of a habit of acting rightly: but this upon examination will be found much too large, as taking in other things which do not belong to the subject we would define: for though we must acknowledge every act of genuine virtue to be right, yet every right action is not an act of virtue. It is certainly very right to eat when we are hungry, sleep when we are weary, put on boots when we ride a journey, and a great coat when we must walk abroad in the rain: so is the habit of taking things with the right hand rather than the left, speaking when we are spoken to, crying out when somebody treads upon our toe: but these are never looked upon as instances of virtue, nor have they any other concern with her than that she does not disallow them. The next definition occurring is a habit of contradicting any inordinate desire or impulse of passion; but against this there lies two exceptions. One that there are people whose natural temperament or manner of education inclines them to be temperate, chaste, industrious, generous, or obliging, without any efforts of their own: now it would be hard to deny these qualities the title of virtues, and imprudent not to propose them as such to the imitation of other persons. The other that this definition seems not to suit with virtue at all unless in her imperfect embryo state wherein she is not herself: for after the opposite passion being completely mastered, there remains nothing for her to contradict. Can we suppose then that virtue loses her essence the moment she has gotten it? or were there a man who had conquered all his passions, should we deem him destitute of every virtue because he possesses them all? Let us try then once more and call virtue a habit of pursuing courses contrary to those pernicious ones that passion or appetite generally lead men into: we shall now save the credit of natural good qualities and those imbibed insensibly from custom, together with the benefit of their example to the world, and secure the prize to all who have completed their conquest. Nor shall we contradict the old observation, that the paths of virtue are rugged and thorny at first, but lead in a delightful champaign country: whereas did virtue consist in opposition alone, she could accompany her votary no further than through the thorny paths, but must quit him as soon as the champaign opens. This definition, I believe, contains the idea of virtue most generally entertained, and will serve best for common use: for those courses which virtue would recommend being beneficial, let us encourage the practice of them by any means we can, and bestow our applauses upon them in whatever manner acquired. If a man be affable and courteous, and ready to help his neighbours upon every occasion where wanted, it is all one with respect to the world and to his own pleasure of mind in the exercise of

those qualities, whether he had them from nature or good company, or gained them by his own good management and industry. Under this notion of virtue it will appear capable of variation both in kind and degree; for as many evil courses as there are into which men stand liable to be drawn by their passions and desires, there will be so many opposite virtues; and as every habit gathers strength by exercise, it will enable a man more and more to resist temptation in proportion as it strikes deeper root. The man may be sober at home, who cannot forbear excesses among a jovial company: or may have common honesty, though he wants that total exemption from the bias of self-interest which would denominate him strictly righteous.

2. Yet it still remains a question whether we ought to satisfy ourselves, much less can please everybody even with this last definition; for it may be asked, What merit is there in following the bent of inclination or torrent of example when they chance to carry us in a right course? Does not the province of virtue lie solely in controlling the passions and surmounting difficulties? at least, is she not stronger and more conspicuous in the conquest of an adversary than when she has none to contend with? When we see a man bear slander and reproach with a becoming patience, does it not heighten our opinion of him to hear that he was of a warm violent temper, bred up in a country remarkable for being choleric and testy? Remember the story of Zopyrus, the physiognomist, who, pretending to know people's characters by their faces, some of Socrates' scholars brought him to their master, whom he had never seen before, and asked him what he thought of that man. Zopyrus after examining his features pronounced him the most debauched, lewd, cross-grained, selfish old fellow he had ever met with: upon which the company burst out a laughing. Hold, says Socrates, do not run down the man; he is in the right, I assure you: for I was all he says of me by nature, and if you think me otherwise now, it must be because I have in some measure corrected my nature by the study and practice of philosophy. Now does not this story manifest a higher pitch of virtue in Socrates than he could have attained had his stars befriended him with the happiest turn of constitution?

To these queries I shall answer, there is a particular species of virtue, which we may call the habit of following the dictates of judgment in preference to the impulse of fancy or appetite, and therefore may well enough fall within our definition, and if it were possible to be attained in full perfection would subdue all other desires, so that it could not then consist in opposition, having none to struggle against. This I acknowledge to be the most excellent of the virtues, as most generally serviceable to influence the practice, and being the root whereout we might raise all the others: for if we had this habit in any considerable degree, it would supply their places and quickly bring us into such of them as were wanting. Therefore when we behold a man persevering in a right course against the bent of nature and stream of example, we know he must have an ample portion of this higher virtue, which redounds more to his honour than any of the inferior kind. But I see no reason why the superior excellence of this virtue should destroy the merit of all the rest. Silver may be worth having though not so valuable as gold: and whatever tends to mend our manners, to the benefit of society, or our own convenience, does not deserve to be despised, though something else may tend more eminently to the same purposes. If a man be made honest by self-interest to preserve his customers, it is better than that he should not be honest at all: if he keep

himself sober for his health's sake, still it is a point gained: if he learn activity and perseverance in difficult undertakings from a love of fame, it is likely he will do more good to the world, and find more engagement for his time, than if he sat still in indolence. Therefore I am for storing up as many of these inferior virtues as possible, by any means we see feasible. As old Gripe said to his son, my boy, got money; if you can, honestly; however, get money: so would I say to anybody that will hear me, Acquire good qualities by your desire of rectitude, if you can; however, acquire them. Yet notwithstanding what I have been saying here, I think we ought to make the love of rectitude our principal care, to strengthen it as much as in us lies, and keep it in continual exercise by rectifying the frailties of our nature and turning those inclinations that still point towards an improper object.

3. The stoics, as far as I understand of them, would allow none other virtue besides this of rectitude: therefore they held all exercises of virtue and all offences equal and alike, robbing an orchard as criminal as breaking open a house or betraying the most important trust. For they said that right action without regard to consequences being the sole proper object of desire, so that the wise man would not forbear housebreaking out of fear or shame or because it hurt his neighbour or any other consideration, except because it was wrong, every departure from this rule showed a want of such desire or at least an influence of other desires: he that quits his rule of right to steal a cauliflower, shows that he has not an abhorrence of wrong-doing purely as such, therefore when he travels the right road it is by accident, and if he abstains from robbing a house there must be some other motive that withholds him. I think this doctrine of the equality of crimes is now quite out of doors, and therefore we need not trouble ourselves any further about it. But they held some other tenets that we still hear of now and then, as that virtue is good in itself and only desirable, that it is the ultimate good, making the possessor invariably happy; and I think some of them denied that it could be acquired, but must be implanted by nature, or that the party possessing it could ever lose it.

4. As to the unacquirableness of virtue, this somewhat resembles Whitfield's day of grace, which being not yet come or being once past, no man can attain to righteousness. But if we look back upon human nature, there will appear no colour to suppose ourselves born with an idea of right or that it ever comes upon us at once. Our senses first put us in action, and upon observing what objects please them we get a desire of those objects: in our further progress we find it often necessary to make long preparation for obtaining the things we desire, but the measures we take sometimes succeeding and sometimes failing, we learn by observation to form rules for our conduct, and thence get the idea of right, by which we understand no more than that such a measure will lead us surely to any purpose we have at present in view: thus if we would obtain the favour of tyrants, obsequiousness and flattery may be the right way. But this is not rectitude considered as a virtue, which we know nothing of until having experienced that our desires thwart one another, that it is expedient to restrain them, and that the exercise of such restraint in adherence to the dictates of judgment meets with commendation from others and the approbation of our own breast: we then look upon the Honestum as a mark directing us to what will conduce most to our happiness, and at length as an object of immediate desire; and when this view appears in the highest pitch of colouring imaginable, and becomes steady so as never to vary nor

fade, then, if ever the case happens, I conceive a man completely possessed of the virtue of rectitude. Thus we see the desire of Honestum is a translated desire, drawn originally from our others by a prudent regard for the greater number of them in preference to any particular one that may solicit at present. Nor can it be doubted without contradicting experience, that a man's progress in virtue may be quickened by instruction, exhortation, example, and his own industry, or that after having in some measure attained it he may receive further improvement by the same means. There may be a particular time wherein virtue first manifests herself, and so there is in the manifestation of most other habits and acquirements. If you converse every day with a man from his beginning to learn any art or language, you will become able in some one moment to pronounce him a master of it: yet for all that, his skill was growing gradually all along from his first entrance upon the rudiments; nor perhaps did he make a larger progress in that day when you took notice of it than in any other before, or than he will do again by further use and practice afterwards. And as we gain habits by use so we may lose them again by disuse: therefore it is a very dangerous position which some have maintained that the saint can never sin; it were much safer to take Saint Paul's caution, Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall.

5. Whether virtue be good in itself may be determined by referring to the last chapter but one, wherein it appears that satisfaction, the only intrinsic good, lies in our perceptions: action is only good as it applies the proper objects for raising those perceptions, and virtue, which is a habit or disposition of mind, is good only as it leads into such actions: so that virtue stands two removes from the summum bonum. There are some pleasures fully contenting the mind which come upon us by the operation of external objects without any care of our own to procure them: if we could have a continual and uninterrupted supply in this manner we should have no use for volition at all, and were our appetites so rightly set as to put volition upon everything most beneficial for us we should have as little use for virtue, which is good for nothing else but to rectify the disorders of our nature; but that is enough to make its value inestimable though not intrinsic. But it will be said, there is a satisfaction in the very exercise of virtuous actions: this I grant; but then it must be to those who have a taste for virtue; and there is the like satisfaction in gratifying every other taste. The virtuoso finds it when catching a curious butterfly, the proud finds it when flattery soothes his ear, the covetous when driving an advantageous bargain, the vindictive when taking measures to satiate his revenge. Perhaps you will say there is a secret misgiving and compunction attending the performance of unwarrantable actions: I believe there would be in you or me, because I hope we have some seeds of virtue in us; but the consummate villain, who has none of these, feels no remorse to embitter, no reluctance to lessen, the pleasure of any wickedness his vicious inclinations prompt him to; so then in this respect he has the advantage of us. But it is the fairest way to compare both parties in those instances wherein they gratify their respective desires. If you and I can at any time command our passion by the authority of reason, as I hope we sometimes do, we find an immediate content and complacence of mind: if the hardened wretch goes on successfully in any wicked attempt he has set his heart upon, he finds an immediate content and complacence of mind; therefore thus far the case of both is similar. You will ask whether, if the thing could be done with a fillip, I would be content to change my situation with

his? By no means, for it is in my power to act right always, unless where my judgment happens to be doubtful; but it is in my power to gratify my other inclinations only now and then as opportunity favours. When I act right I am providing for my future enjoyments; when I act wrong I am doing something that will cross my other desires or bring mischief upon me. If I take one course I shall find frequent occasion to reflect with pleasure on having pursued it; if the other, I shall find perpetual cause, if not to repent, at least to rue sufficiently for my misconduct. Thus the advantage of virtue over vice and trifle does not lie in the very act, but in the consequences. The pursuit of either will please each man in proportion as he has a relish to it: but one relish prompts to take in wholesome food, the other to that which will bring on sickness of stomach, painful distempers, and perhaps utter destruction.

6. Were virtue the ultimate and only desirable good, she would have nothing else to do besides contemplating her own beauties: she could never urge to action; because action must proceed upon a view to some end, and if that end were not desirable the action were nugatory; but such contemplation is so far from being our only good that one may question whether it be a good at all. I grant the satisfaction felt in acting right makes one considerable part of virtue's value, but then it must be such as arises spontaneously, not forced upon the thought. Should a man do nothing all day long but reflect with himself, How I love rectitude! how happy am I in the possession of virtue! you would hardly think the better of his character for this practice. Such contemplations as these, I fast thrice a week, I pay tithe of mint, annise, and cummin, I give alms of all I possess, are more likely to engender spiritual pride and bring mischief upon a man than to prove his virtue or insure his happiness. Besides, the confining virtue to the satisfaction of possessing her destroys her very essence, which consists in the efficacy she has to set us upon exerting our active powers, which cannot move without an aim at something better to be had than gone without: and when the good man enters upon an undertaking, though the satisfaction of doing right might urge him to resolve upon it, yet our capacities are too narrow to admit of his carrying this reflection throughout! when he comes to the performance he will be too busy in pursuing his measures to think of anything else; but must fix his desire from time to time upon the several objects as he goes along. He reaps none other benefit from the rectitude of his design, during his engagement in the execution of it, than that his conscience does not check, nor his moral sense disturb him, which is a mere negative benefit. Nor would virtue find materials to work upon if she could find nothing else desirable besides herself; she does not make her objects desirable, but chooses those already made so to her hands, whose prior value recommends them to her option: were there no difference what befals us, it were wholly indifferent what we did, for every manner of acting and even total inactivity would become equally right. Where would be the difference between setting a man's house on fire, and running in to extinguish the flames? or why does virtue urge you to the latter, unless because you think the security of a family, and preservation of their property, desirable things? If you knew them to be virtuous persons, I suppose you would not be the less forward to assist them: but why may you desire to do what virtuous persons ought not to desire should be done? and if they may desire to have it done, the desirableness has no relation to their virtue, which would continue the same whether burnt out of house and home or no, nor would suffer diminution though they were to perish in the

flames, but must arise upon some other account. I would not willingly drop a word to abate our love of virtue, for I think it cannot glow too strong, so long as we preserve it pure and genuine: but you know I have distinguished between love and fondness. Let us not then be so fondly enamoured with our mistress as to allow nothing valuable elsewhere, for there are other objects desirable previous to her recommending them: nay, she herself would never have become desirable had it not been for them; for why should I ever desire to do right, or whence come by a satisfaction in so doing, unless from a persuasion that it is better for me, that is, productive of more good, to act right than wrong?

7. We will now examine whether virtue will make the possessor completely and invariably happy; or, in modern language, whether of the two kinds of evil, physical and moral, the latter alone be really such, and the former only in imagination. For my part, I can see none original evil, besides the physical; were there none of that in nature there could be no such thing as moral evil, for we could never do amiss if no hurt could ever redound from our actions, either to ourselves or anybody else. Could you steal a man's goods without endamaging his property, without depriving him of something useful, without taking off the restraint of honesty from your own mind, or shaking the authority of those rules which keep the world from disorder and confusion, why need you scruple to do it? Were it possible to murder a man without pain, without abridging him of the enjoyments he might expect in life, or might assist in procuring for other people, and without setting an example that might occasion the murdering of others not so circumstanced, where would be the immorality of the deed? But since these are wild and impossible suppositions, and that moral evil constantly leads some way or other, directly or remotely, into physical, therefore it is an evil most strenuously to be avoided.

8. The question we are now upon commonly produces another, namely, whether pain be an evil, or only rendered so by opinion: because it being never pretended that virtue would exempt a man from all pain, while this remained an evil, she could not perform her engagement to insure him perpetual happiness. In the first place, let us observe that pain appears an evil to young children, before they can be supposed to have contracted any erroneous opinion, so there remains no doubt of its being sometimes an evil not of our own making; and if we may afterwards render it harmless, merely by thinking it so, then it will follow that we can change the nature of things by our opinion of them, which surely no philosopher will assert. The truth seems to be, that we may sometimes help ourselves against the pungency of pain, not by pulling out its sting, but by turning it aside from us. It was observed at the close of the chapter of sensation, that our frame is of a very complicated texture, the influence of objects passing through many stages before they arrive at the seat of perception, where only they can affect us: now if pain can be stopped in any part of its passage, we shall receive no hurt from it. The mind sits retired in kingly state: nothing external, not even the bodily organs, can approach her, but they deliver their message to the mental organs, and if these officers do not transmit it to the royal audience, it is the same as if never delivered. But the mental organs do not stifle messages out of wantonness, they only drop them when engaged by something else picked up in the family: therefore when painful sensations do not gall, it is by means of some other idea occupying our notice, and sheltering us from their sharpness. Certain it is, we can all upon occasion support a small degree of pain without uneasiness: young ladies will bear

it for their shape, a beau for the neatness of his foot, a common labourer for his sustenance; sometimes diversion will beguile it, business lull it asleep, fear banish it, revenge despise it, wilfulness, eagerness after pleasure, or the love of rectitude, overpower it. In all these cases there is a withdrawing of our notice from the pain, and turning it upon other objects, either by presenting those objects, or by an operation of our own upon the organs, in which latter case, the moment we remit our efforts, the pain pinches again. In like manner, affliction may be rendered easy by suggesting topics of consolation, or encouragements for enduring it, or diverting the thoughts into another channel. But it does not prove a burden not galling in its own nature, because you can shrink away your shoulder from it, or thrust in something soft between: and while you can thus keep off the pressure of the burden, it is no wonder you are of opinion it is easy. Therefore we may admit it true that pain is no evil to those who do not think it so, because they think it none who do not feel the smart: but opinion must follow fact, and cannot make it; nor can you alter your opinion, without an appearance, at least, of evidence, but merely by willing it. However, it may be of excellent service to entertain a good opinion, if you can, beforehand, for nothing like a strong assurance to help us in exerting our strength for applying the proper means to relieve ourselves: when Virgil said of his competitors for the naval prize, that they could because they thought they could, he did not mean that success was nothing more than opinion, but that their confidence spurred up their activity to a higher pitch than they could ever have raised it without. If any man can attain so ardent a desire of rectitude as shall overbalance all attacks of pain, it is happy for him; but he may allow us, who have not such an effectual remedy in store, to call it an evil: and if he can master it so far as to keep it from stinging him, yet I suppose it will require his whole efforts, so that he will have none to spare for other occasions wherein he would wish to employ them, and in this light it deserves some bad appellation: let him choose his term to express it by.

9. The desire of rectitude, like other translated desires, cannot subsist without continual exercise in actions tending to the gratification of it: therefore virtue alone, how completely soever possessed, cannot insure happiness, as being unable to insure its own continuance without the concurrence of fortune supplying opportunities of exerting it, which are the food necessary for keeping it alive and vigorous. This probably induced some of the most extravagant zealots for virtue to maintain the lawfulness of suicide, when fortune was so averse that there was no sustenance for virtue to be had. And even in its most flourishing state, it gives more or less delight in proportion as things fall out well or ill: for how much soever the virtuous man may comfort himself under disappointment of his endeavours to serve his neighbour with the reflection that he had done his best, yet I suppose he would have been still better pleased had the success answered his intention: and if he sees a distress he knows not how to relieve, will he not feel an additional joy upon the proper means being put into his hands? Could he say to any one imploring his assistance, Look ye, friend, I'll do my best to serve you, because it is right, but I do not care twopence whether you reap any benefit from my services or no: were he capable of saying this, it is hard to conceive how he could have any spice of benevolence, and as hard to conceive, how without benevolence his virtue could be complete. So that were there two persons alike consummately virtuous, the one destitute of all materials or abilities for doing good to mankind, the other amply pro-

vided with both, this latter would pass his life more happily than the former. Besides, as we have remarked before, there are many right actions requisite for the sustenance and support of nature, whereto we are prompted by appetite; in these virtue has no concern unless negatively to forbear restraining us from them: if the moral sense does not check, if the demon does not warn, this is all that appetite desires, for she wants no assistant nor conductor; and he must be of an uncommon make, different from all other men, who will never eat when hungry, nor lie down when sleepy, until urged by the motive of its being right.

Now, during the performance of these actions, the virtuous man must be happy, or else he would have gaps in his happiness, which it would be woful heresy to allow; but during such performance, he receives no benefit from his virtue, her influence being suspended, for he does the same and feels the same as the sensualist: therefore he is beholden in part at least to nature for his happiness in giving him appetites, the sources of these enjoyments, and to fortune for supplying him with materials for satisfying his appetites.

10. But how mighty matters soever may be justly ascribed to perfect virtue in the highest idea we can form of it in speculation, I fear such perfection is not attainable among the sons of men: the highest pitch we can rise to will not set us above all approach of evil; pain will gall, labour will fatigue, disappointment will vex, affliction will torment, when they cannot overcome us; so that we owe more of our enjoyment to nature and fortune than to virtue. There are people with a very moderate portion of virtue, no more than just to keep clear of turbulent passions and destructive vices, who, being placed in an easy situation of life, pass it more agreeably than others of far superior merit, forced to struggle perpetually with disease, poverty, contradiction, and distress. Much less will it appear upon an impartial survey, that every man's share of enjoyment in the world bears an exact proportion to the measure of his virtue. Nor yet do the strongest instances of virtue prove always the scenes of greatest enjoyment: for we must remember that uneasiness sets our activity at work as well as satisfaction, and the love of right sometimes operates by the uneasiness of departing from it. If we have desires which we cannot banish from our thoughts urging us strongly to do wrong, but the moral sense threatens with shame, remorse, and mischief, it acts as an obligation, laying us under a necessity of fulfilling it: and we have shown in the proper place that necessity always throws the mind into a state of uneasiness. For aught I know this might be the case of Regulus. I would not detract from his merit, nor pretend to dive into the exact situation of his thoughts; therefore shall suppose what I conceive possible in theory, that he might feel so strong a satisfaction of mind as overbalanced the pain of the tenters. But suppose another person, not quite so happily disposed, yet he might have a violent abhorrence of infamy, self-reproach, and breach of faith, and the uneasiness of falling under what his soul abhorred might prevail upon him to undergo any torments for escaping it: he might still expect uneasiness in the tentered cask, nevertheless, might choose it as the lesser evil, and in so doing he would act right, and what all men of honour and probity would applaud him for; yet this less evil remains still an evil, and he, while under it, in a state of suffering. Nor is it a just inference, that whatever all wise men approve, and the moral sense clearly recommends, must necessarily be an act of enjoyment; for wise men and the moral sense regard the whole of things, therefore will recommend a present diminution

of happiness, for a greater increase of it to be obtained thereby. We may sometimes fortify ourselves against pain and self-denial by the dread of infamy or compunction, and holding the force of our obligations strongly in view, when we cannot raise an immediate satisfaction in our proceeding: therefore, it is for the interests of virtue that we should, upon occasion, put ourselves into the iron hand of necessity; she will pinch us sorely while she has us under her clutches, and all that time we shall be very virtuous, and yet very uneasy.

11. Thus we see that virtue cannot secure us uninterrupted enjoyment, for there are other causes contributing to procure it; but though the condition of men does not always answer to their degree of virtue, yet I conceive every particular man will be more or less happy in proportion as he acts right. Life has been compared to a game, and we know the cards will beat anybody, but he that plays them carefully will do more with the same cards than another who throws them out at random. The gifts of nature, education, and fortune, are the cards put into our hands: all we have to do, is to manage them well by a steady adherence to our judgment. Therefore virtue, taken in the largest sense, as including every right conduct, as well upon small as great occasions, may well be styled the only thing desirable, as drawing all other good things in our power after it; for though there be others valuable, yet Seek ye righteousness first, and all these shall be added unto ye. In common language, a thing is called desirable for its consequences; therefore this, on which all good consequences we can procure depend, may well deserve that epithet: we may have other desires, but they need be only such as arise of their own accord, or the present occasion requires, but upon this alone it behoves us to take pains in fixing our desire, because it will direct us to encourage or restrain our other desires as shall be most for our benefit. And things are said to be good in themselves, when they have a natural tendency to our advantage, without regard to reward or pleasure, or other adventitious benefits attending them; so virtue may be termed good in itself, although bringing no honour nor profit, nor anything else we desire, because it will lead us into a right behaviour most conducive to purposes we shall hereafter desire, and furnish us with pleasing reflections that will abundantly repay the trouble we are at in pursuing it. In like manner, Happy, in vulgar expectation, as when Milton pronounced the sleeping pair happy, does not stand confined to the instant time of speaking, but like an estate which denominates the owner rich, though at present quite low in pocket, it relates to the whole stock of enjoyments belonging to a man. Thus virtue, which we may look upon as an estate, yielding an income of happiness, may well entitle the possessor happy, although the rents may not happen just now to come in: and, as a man, having his all, amounting to a hundred pounds, in his pocket, would be glad to exchange condition with one of large fortune whom he finds at a distance from home without ready money or credit; so a prudent man, deficient in virtue, would think it a happiness to be placed in the condition of one possessing it in an eminent degree, though at that time not in a state of enjoyment. In the sense herein last described as being the most obvious, one should naturally understand those expressions of virtue, being the one thing desirable, good in itself, and making the possessor invariably happy; and I believe the persons who first employed them meant to be so understood, wherein they carry a just and useful meaning. Therefore, I am not desirous of discarding or contradicting them, nor shall I hesitate a moment to agree with Socrates, that it is hap-

pier to receive an injury than to do one: but, as some of his followers, ancient and modern, men of deeper thought than judgment, have strained them to an extravagance, I was willing to endeavour restoring them to their proper and genuine signification. This is one of those transmutations spoken of in the introduction, whereby valuable and excellent truths, which have been debased into error and falsehood, may be transmuted back again into their original sterling.

12. I apprehend several advantages accruing from our resting the merit of virtue upon this true and solid basis, its usefulness: for if you talk of an essential and independent goodness, few can discern it; if you appeal to the judgment of the wise, many think themselves wiser; if you tell them that every act of virtue affords greater immediate enjoyment than the practice of vice, they will not believe you, nor do I know how they should, as it contradicts their experience; so you will have your principle to battle for, before you can deduce anything from it. But we proceed upon a postulatum that will readily be granted, for nobody can deny that he had rather have his desires gratified than crossed: we need only exhort men not to forget their absent friends, nor to neglect such desires as they may have at another time, for the sake of one or two at present uppermost in their thoughts: so the door stands open before us, and we shall be willingly admitted to go on in showing the necessary connection of virtue with gratification. A second benefit of referring virtue to use is, that it helps us to rectify our notions of it, to interpret our rules, and teaches us which of them to prefer when they appear to clash: for our moral sense, though the best guide we have, is not always to be trusted; education, custom, prejudice, and human frailty, will sometimes set it to a wrong point, and when suspicions of this kind arise, there is no surer way of trying the justness of them than by examining whether the courses we find ourselves prompted to tend more upon the whole to the increase or diminution of happiness. Many of our rules may be understood variously, but when this is the case, that construction, which appears evidently the most conducive to general convenience, ought to be chosen as the truest: nor is it scarce possible to apply a rule always properly, or know what circumstances require an exception, without understanding the drift and design of it: and when two of them interfere, we can never determine the preference so well as when we can clearly discern which of them it would be most dangerous to break through. For a third advantage of frequently tracing out the good consequences of virtue, we may reckon that it will give us a better liking of her, and greater confidence in the rules she dictates; for by consideration and continual observation of their tendency, we shall often discover an expedience we could not at first descry, and shall more readily entertain an opinion of the like expedience in other cases where we cannot discern it. Whatever practices have the general approbation of mankind or our moral sense urges us earnestly to, though seeming needless or inconvenient in our present apprehension, will then carry a strong presumption, sufficient to persuade us of their being beneficial, and we shall pursue them by desire, not necessity; that is, not as an obligation but as our interest. This seems the readiest way to conduct us to a love of virtue for her own sake, for having once gotten our thorough confidence and esteem, wherever she appears she will become our ultimate point of view, which we shall follow without looking for anything beyond, and this we may do without supposing her the ultimate end of action, for we have seen before that these two are often different.

CHAP. XXX.

PRUDENCE.

I GAVE warning in the introduction, that I might sometimes seem to shake the main pillars of morality, but should never do it, unless when I conceived them slid off their original basis, in order to restore them to a solid and durable foundation. I hope I have not been found failing of my promise; for though in the last preceding chapters, we have appeared sometimes to turn our backs upon rectitude, and take the gratification of every man's tastes and inclinations for our ultimate end, yet, at the close of them, we have left virtue in a recommendable light sufficient to engage the attention of every reasonable person, as being justly entitled to be called good in itself, the one thing desirable, and capable of making the possessor happy, in the proper and genuine meaning of those expressions, when not strained to unwarrantable lengths, but understood as common sense would lead us to understand them. We have likewise endeavoured to ascertain the province of virtue, which does not extend to everything right; for our appetites prompt us to many right things, the sensualist doing the same in some instances as the righteous: therefore, the office of virtue lies in watching over their motions and instigating to such right actions, from which our other inclinations would lead us aside. But this description of virtue being thought too general, your ethic writers have distinguished her into four principal branches, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice, which they call cardinal virtues, from a Latin word signifying a hinge, these four being the main hinges whereon all inferior virtues and particular rules of conduct hang. The first of these in order they reckon Prudence, as being the chief, and, in effect, comprehending the other three, which relate to the removing three certain obstacles in our nature most apt to disturb and stop us in the exercise of prudence.

2. Before we enter upon a particular consideration of this cardinal virtue, it will be necessary to observe, that there are two kinds of prudence which may be distinguished, as evils have been, into physical and moral. The former consists in knowing the best measures to be taken upon any occasion, and depends upon sagacity, quickness, and strength of parts, or upon experience, instruction, or the opportunities we have had of advancing our knowledge: this we may reckon a valuable endowment, but can by no means be ranked under any class of virtues, for we find it conspicuous in persons overwhelmed with vice and debauchery. But moral prudence, with which alone we have concern at present, consists in making the best use of such lights as we have, not in the number or clearness of them; for virtue lies solely in the right application of our powers, and may reside with those of the narrowest as well as the largest extent. Were a man wholly void of moral prudence, to be invested with it at once in the most eminent degree conceivable, he would not become a whit the more knowing for the acquisition: it is true, at the year's end, he might advance considerably in knowledge, because he would omit no opportunity of improving it, but he would not instantly discern a single truth more than he did before, unless, perhaps, by dispelling the mists of some passion that might just then prevent him from taking notice of what he knew well enough already.

3. If we survey the transactions of mankind, we shall find there is a discretion much more valuable than knowledge, as being more generally serviceable and carrying on the affairs of life more completely and clearer of mistakes. Your men of fine sense, having lost their common sense, get nothing by the exchange: they will work wonders sometimes in matters happening to suit their talents, but know not, or regard not, how to apply nor conduct them, or commit some egregious blunder that overthrows all the good they have done: they perform excellent service under proper direction, but plunge into some quagmire when left to themselves: they can give the best advice to others, but through some whim or oddity let their own affairs run to ruin. On the other hand, we see persons of very moderate capacities, who, by a discreet management of them, pass their life with more comfort to themselves and credit among their neighbours, than others of far superior endowments. They know the extent of their talents, and do not aim at things beyond their reach. They regard the propriety of their design as well as of the measures of executing it; no less carefully considering what they shall do than how they shall compass it. They attend to all the notices of their judgment, never fondly fixing upon any one point to the overlooking of others. They are ductile and flexible, never striving obstinately against the stream, but ready to seize every light that shall break in upon them, and to lay by their design or change their measures as occasion varies; yet steady to their purpose, so as not to waver with every sudden start of fancy. Willing to play a small game, rather than stand out, and always making some progress when they cannot run extraordinary lengths: yet not backward to quicken their pace and enlarge their schemes, whenever they find it safe and feasible. Their conduct is uniform and consistent throughout: if they cannot perform great undertakings, what they do is complete and free from fatal mistakes, one of which may do more mischief than a great deal of sagacity and diligence can afterwards repair.

4. Now this discretion discoverable in the ordinary behaviour of some persons is not the moral prudence we seek after, yet seems to be the root giving birth to it, and communicates its own complexion and flavour to the fruit: for persons having practised this happy manner of proceeding in the common affairs of life, will follow the same when they come to have an idea of virtue; they will use their whole understanding, regard all the rules of rectitude, and proceed upon a judicious love, not a fanciful fondness for virtue, regarding all her interests so as to hurt none of them by too eagerly pursuing others. It is a virtue, says Horace, to escape vice, and the first step to wisdom is made by getting clear of folly: and we know where else it is recommended not to confine our eyes so closely to what things we ought to have done as to overlook what things we ought not to have left undone: therefore they will be more solicitous to avoid acting wrong, than to act remarkably right, nor think that the omission of common duties can be compensated by works of supererogation. I do not say that moral prudence is incompatible with great accomplishments; on the contrary, it will improve them to the utmost, employ them most usefully in services whereto they are fitted, and appears most conspicuous in the management of them: nevertheless it may subsist without them, or be wanting where they abound, being a distinct quality of itself. It does not always accompany the most glowing zeal, nor give birth to the most shining performances: as Horace says, we may pursue virtue too intensely, that is, when we pursue her with passion, not with judgment. It is not the disquisitions of the closet, excellent discourses, or profound speculations upon the nature of right and

wrong, nor yet single acts, how exemplary soever, but the general tenor of a man's conduct that denominates him virtuous. As thought and consideration contribute greatly to increase and clear up the lights of our understanding, one should be apt to imagine that those who think most carefully upon the subject of righteousness should be the most righteous persons; but this is no certain rule; for men may contemplate for ever without making use of their discoveries, which then tend only to enlarge their knowledge; wherein we have seen virtue does not consist, but employs it only as an instrument for effecting her purposes. And there are persons of lively tempers and little inured to study, who cannot think intensely at all, yet do not want discretion to steer them right in all the variety and quickness of their motions. In most common instances it is easy to see at a glance what is the best step to be taken, the characters of our duty being printed so large, that he that runs may read them: and if men would use themselves constantly to follow their present judgment, when clear and vivid, they would make greater progress towards rectitude than by any other exercise of their faculties whatsoever.

5. It is not easy to pronounce upon actions, or distinguish precisely, when they proceed from the virtue of prudence, and when not; for we have seen the rectitude of actions consists either in their conducivenes to the purpose intended, or in their conformity to rule: but men sometimes act very right upon wrong principles, or adhere to their rule, because no temptation starts up in their thought to draw them aside: in neither of which cases their prudence can be inferred from their acting prudently; for their taking the right course is luck rather than virtue. Nor are we complete judges even of our own prudence, because having no better method of estimating it than by reflecting back upon our past conduct, we cannot retain in mind the secret motives that may have actuated us, much less tell what unlucky turn of imagination might have led us another way. Therefore, as I said before, we may judge best of ourselves or others from the general tenor of conduct, rather than from any particular parts of it how shining soever. Yet this will not insure us against mistakes, for our leading principle or ruling passion, as it is called, which gives the general turn to our actions, may have been inculcated by others, or taken up upon hazard, and we been led by good fortune into a right course of behaviour, without having ever examined whether it had that tendency, or discerned the reasonableness whereon it was founded.

6. Neither is it an easy matter to settle the exact idea of this cardinal virtue we are speaking of, so that we may know what to look for when we go to pass our judgment. It is not knowledge, nor acuteness of parts, nor clearness of understanding, nor largeness of information, nor goodness of principles instilled; for it should be something entirely our own: but all these depend upon other causes. It may seem, at first sight, to lie in the exercise of our reasoning faculties, because most of the miscarriages in life proceed from inconsiderateness and hasty determination; but then it lies as much in quickness of following the lights of reason, whenever they shine out clear: for to stand thinking when we should be acting, or hunt after speculations when something lies ready at hand for us to do, were not much less imprudent than never to think at all. Since then it is so difficult to describe, and when we seem to have laid our finger upon it still it eludes our grasp, let us endeavour to place it in several lights, that one may supply what shall appear wanting in another. I conceive, then, prudence will enable him that has it completely to keep the mental organs open and watchful, hearing the whispers of the moral sense amid the clamours of passion, and

discerning the feeblest glimmerings of reason through the glare of fancy; so that every object in the prospects glancing before him, whether the scene contain more or fewer of them, will be seen in its true shape, and his notice will instantly turn upon that which is most proper. For our doings being all made up of single momentary acts, volition perpetually following the fresh ideas thrown up by imagination, must take their denomination from that of their component parts: therefore if the steps be prudently taken, the whole progress must needs be so too: but if they be not, we may still chance to steer the right course while nothing occurs to mislead us; but our success will be owing to the goodness of our lights rather than to the soundness of our eye. Nor does this vigilance or openness of the mental eye depend wholly upon industry and the intense application of our optics: they help to improve it when deficient, or on the contrary may sometimes do hurt by confining it to one narrow point; but when once acquired, it becomes a habit operating spontaneously, rather using application as an instrument to effect its purposes than wanting it as a spring to put itself in motion. Whoever could attain this habit completely would never act in the dark nor at random; for though his lights might be faint, he would distinguish which of them were the clearest, he would find an opportunity for doing something in every situation of circumstances, and would discern what is feasible as well as what is desirable. It would direct him which of his several faculties to exercise, when to deliberate and when to execute, when to suspend his judgment and when suspension were needless, when to exert resolution and when to comply with the occasion, when to bestir himself, and when to receive whatever ideas occur. In short, he would act with the same uniform tenor throughout, as well in trifles as matters of importance, and though he might sometimes take wrong measures through ignorance, his every motion would be right with respect to his degree of knowledge or present information.

7. In another light we may consider prudence as a disposition of mind to regard distant good equally with present pleasure, estimating both according to their real not apparent magnitude: like the skill we have of discerning a grown person twenty yards off to be larger than a child sitting in our lap, although the latter take up more room in our eye. Nature first moves us by sensations of pleasure or pain: experience soon teaches us that pleasurable sensations will not always come of themselves, but we must do something to make provision for obtaining them; hence spring our desires and passions. Upon further experience we learn that desire often leads into mischief, this gives rise to the moral sense admonishing to restrain desire when pointed the wrong way: but there being an ease in gratifying and a trouble in crossing it, the contest in these cases lies between expedience and pleasure, and to choose constantly the former is an effect of prudence. For as worldly prudence engages a man upon every occasion to improve his fortune rather than get a little ready money in hand, so moral prudence will incline him always to prefer that which is best before that which will immediately please his senses or gratify his desire or his indolence.

8. The third light wherein I shall endeavour to place our virtue is that of a readiness in following the dictates of reason; but by reason we must not understand here the act of reasoning; for that, in many cases, might be imprudent, but those treasures which we have shown elsewhere reason deposits in the storehouse of ideas, that is, such notices occurring from time to time to our judgment as were formerly the produce of careful consideration, or

have been examined and approved thereby. The bare possession of these treasures renders a man more knowing and many times a more useful member of the community, because the deed does the service, not the internal disposition of the performer; but it is the readiness in following them instantly upon their appearance that constitutes him a perfectly prudent man. For our active power must take some turn every moment, and if the present judgment does not operate, the turn will be taken imprudently, though no damage may happen to ensue. This readiness depends upon a happy cast of imagination, representing the dictates of reason as satisfactory; for volition ever moves towards that point where satisfaction appears connected, and is not influenced by a conviction of the understanding until it becomes a persuasion too and an object of desire: therefore prudence is no more than a steady, habitual desire of acting reasonably, generated by a thorough persuasion that in so doing we shall act most for our advantage; for nothing else can give birth to such a desire, because all desires not natural must derive by translation from those that are.

9. Hence it appears that this cardinal virtue must have had a beginning, owing its rise either to natural constitution inclining some men to be more observant than others, and rendering their imagination more pliable to receive persuasion easier from conviction, or to accidents teaching them discretion from their own miscarriages, or to instruction and example. The growth and progress indeed depends chiefly upon our own care and industry, but then we must be prompted to use that care and industry by some consideration already in our thoughts, and the first act of prudence we ever exerted must have had some prior motive exciting us to it, which was suggested by our other desires. Whether, as the nature of man is constituted, it may be lost again when once arrived to perfect stature, we cannot certainly know, having never seen an instance of such perfection among us; yet it seems hard to conceive how the habit of following reason can subsist after reason itself is totally lost and all the characters imprinted by her obliterated by age and distempers: but we find by woful experience, that such degrees of it as man can attain may be lost again by despondency, or uninterrupted prosperity, or too great security, or evil company, or other causes. Nevertheless, it is the most durable possession we can have, as being untouched by many outward accidents that may deprive us of all others, and warning us against the approach of whatever might endanger it: and the most valuable, for though it cannot insure us perpetual success, it will help us to the greatest measure of all other valuable things in our power to obtain: nay, if we believe Juvenal, we shall find no deity averse if prudence be not wanting.

10. This virtue of prudence constitutes the essence of moral wisdom, of which some in former ages have entertained very absurd and extravagant notions; supposing the wise man beholden to himself alone for his wisdom, placed above the reach of fortune to hurt him, and master of all arts and sciences, from the highest to the lowest, even to the making the clothes upon his back, the shoes upon his feet, and the ring upon his finger: wherein they confounded wisdom with capacity, which are manifestly different, the one consisting in extensiveness of knowledge, the other solely in the due management of such as we have, be it more or be it less. Therefore there may be the greatest folly where there is the most knowledge, and upon that very account; for if two persons take the same improper course together, he will be deemed to act most imprudently who best knew how to have acted right. If a man unacquainted with a wood

takes a country fellow for his guide, who knows all the paths and turnings perfectly well, but will needs push on the nearest way through the thickest part until both are entangled in the briars, it is easy to see that the charge of folly lies wholly at the door of the guide, and for this very reason, because he knew better than the other. Besides, by placing wisdom in science, they overthrow the wise man's claim to the sole merit of it, making it to depend upon the natural endowments of body or mind, and accidental advantages: for not to mention the necessity of instruction, leisure, and quickness of apprehension, to render knowledge complete, I suppose they would hardly pretend that a man born blind could ever make himself perfect in the art of painting, or science of optics.

11. But neither, when we understand wisdom in the proper and genuine sense, can the possessor claim it as entirely of his own creation, for it grows out of common discretion, being the same quality carried to the greatest length human nature can contain: but this depends upon an observant, though perhaps not always a thoughtful temper, upon good guidance or example, and upon lucky accidents: for men often learn discretion from their own misconduct, when the mischiefs of it happen to be so obvious that they cannot but take notice, and so galling that they cannot fail of remembering them. And he must have an uncommon degree of self-conceit who can persuade himself that he should have acted with the same discretion he does, had he been born with a dull apprehension, and strong sensations, or bred up among the savages in America. I know some affect to cry up the barbarous nations, as furnishing instances of as great soundness of judgment as is to be met with among the most civilized: I shall not deny that such instances may be found, because having no acquaintance with those nations, I cannot disprove them; but we must remember that discretion proceeds from observance of temper, incidents touching the notice, instruction, or example; and any one of these causes may sometimes operate so favourably as to supply the place of the others.

Let us now suppose the sage possessed of perfect wisdom, yet is he secure that he shall always retain it? Why yes, it is always in his power to act according to the circumstances of every situation that shall happen. I grant it, but this is no answer to the question, for so it is in the power of the unwise: but our power takes its turn, or in other words, volition is determined, by the motives and ideas present in the thought, and what ideas, or in what colour shall be presented, depends upon the state of the mental organs; so that any little change in their texture might destroy the best disposition of mind, or turn it into the worst. Now who can know the whole composition of man so thoroughly, as to pronounce certainly, that no external causes may operate to work a different texture in our organs? It may perhaps be alleged, that the mental organs have a separate mechanism of their own, independent of the bodily, so that though their play may be suspended or varied, according to the different action of the latter, yet no disease nor accident happening to the grosser parts, nor impulse of outward objects, can alter their texture. Whether the case be so in fact, or no, is more than I can tell, but admitting it true, still is the wise man beholden to nature for having framed his composition in two such distinct compartments; and he owes the preservation of his best property to the laws she has kindly provided for securing it against damage from that part of his mechanism which does not lie under his absolute command. Neither is he little beholden to fortune for supplying him with materials and opportunities of exercising his wisdom, which render it more serviceable to others

and productive of enjoyment to himself than it could be without those assistances.

12. But whatever condition the consummate wise man may stand in, we who only make distant advances towards his perfection cannot pretend to self-sufficiency, nor claim the merit of every little success we meet with as all our own: for we find our pittance of virtue improve and kept alive by exercise, but when this exercise is interrupted for want of proper subjects to work upon, or our minds thrown off the hinge by cross accidents, or our discretion beguiled by temptations, we perceive ourselves retarded, if not thrown backward in our progress. Let us then acknowledge our obligation to nature, as well for the good she has already done us, as for the continuance of it by her salutary establishments, and own ourselves dependent upon fortune for the favours we may still hope for at her hands, leaving, however, like wise generals, as little to her disposal as possible: and nothing will better put us in a way of being befriended by her when favourable, or shelter us from her attacks when she proves out of humour, than such degree of moral prudence as we are capable of attaining.

CHAP. XXXI.

FORTITUDE.

Of all the obstacles standing in our way, when disposed to act right, none operates so powerfully as fear: other passions beguile or tire us out, but this stops us short in our career; therefore the conquest of this passion has been made one of the cardinal virtues. It is not easy to fix upon a proper definition of this virtue: at first thought one should be apt to call it a habit of fearlessness, but every absence of fear is not courage: for it may proceed from ignorance of the danger, as when a child goes to play with the muzzle of a loaded musket; or it may arise from an insensibility of temper, for there are people who see their danger, but want feeling enough to be touched by it. Now we must acknowledge this insensibility a very useful quality to the public, for without it perhaps we could not properly man our fleets nor recruit our armies: yet is it so far from deserving the name of virtue, that it seems scarce compatible with the principal of them. I mean prudence, which grows out of caution, and ever keeps it in company throughout all her proceedings. Besides that, we find fear a necessary engine to restrain many inordinate desires and unruly passions that would else make strange havoc and disorder in the world: and if the intrepidity of pirates and banditti could be wrested from them, it would be much better both for themselves and all others within their reach.

2. This fearlessness of temper depends upon natural constitution, as much as any quality we can possess; for where the animal system is strong and robust, it is easily acquired, but when the nerves are weak, and extremely sensible, they fall presently into tremors that throw the mind off the hinges and cast a confusion over her. Nor are the changes in our disposition of body without their influence; old age abates the spirit; men have their ebbs and flows of bravery, and some distempers bring a mechanical terror upon the imagination. It has been observed, that courage may be partial, dauntless to some objects, and gone upon the appearance of others. Mr. Addison tells us he knew an officer who could march up to the mouth of a cannon,

but affrighted at his own shadow, and unable to bear being left alone in the dark. Such contrariety of character must have been owing to impressions taken in his youth; and indeed courage as well as timorousness may come by sympathy and imitation from the company wherewith men consort: the recruit becomes intrepid by the dauntless looks and discourses of his comrades, and their taunts upon cowardice; he improves better this way than he could do by all the lectures of philosophy aided by his own utmost industry. Courage, from whatever cause arising, may be ranked under those inferior virtues mentioned at the beginning of CHAP. XXIX. which spring indifferently from nature, education, custom, or our own diligence: nor is it the less intrinsically valuable, because sometimes turned to mischievous purposes, for the best things corrupted become the worst. It gains admiration and applause more than the rest, for fear being the most difficult passion to overcome, therefore the conquest of it deserves to be most honoured, because honour, as we have already seen under that article, belongs not only to things the most useful, but to those where the honour itself will be of the greatest use: as it certainly will here, for nothing carries men so effectually through danger as a quick sense of honour, which therefore has always been looked upon as the necessary qualification and distinguishing characteristic of a soldier. Yet courage, to deserve the name of virtue in any degree, must be habitual, not owing to insensibility; for the danger must be seen but despised; nor accidental, or occasioned by the prevalence of any passion. Some folks are mighty valiant in their cups, others in the heat of resentment care not what becomes of themselves so they can but wreak their revenge; others again, eagerly bent upon some foolish desire, will run any hazards to gratify it: in all these cases their courage is not their own, but cast upon them by another agent working upon their organs, and is rather a mark of stupidity, or weakness of mind, than of bravery.

3. From what has been observed above, we may gather the true notion of fortitude, and having seen what it is not, may more easily discover what it is. The contempt of danger, when owing to the want of apprehension, thoughtlessness, or to some other idea forcibly occupying the thought, carries no merit at all: when the effect of constitution, education, or the desire of applause, has become habitual, it deserves the name of virtue, and our commendation as such: but to entitle it a cardinal virtue, it must be a branch of prudence, which we have seen consists in discerning all the lights of our understanding as they present from time to time before us. Therefore he that possesses fortitude completely, will enjoy a perpetual presence of mind; nothing will ruffle or discompose him, but he will proceed in an equal tenor, not having his seasons of failing, nor particular objects to start at; the dread of shame will no more disconcert him than other evils; he will regard consequences in order to take his measures accordingly, but rest wholly unconcerned at the event; he will suffer no idea to intrude upon him against his liking, and will have the absolute command of his notice to fix it upon any point he judges proper. Etymologists derive virtue from virility, supposing it to denote a manly strength and vigour of mind: now vigour will naturally exert itself in throwing off everything displeasing or unwelcome; and as a concern for sinister events, further than requisite in directing us to provide against them, and the dazzle of objects preventing the sight of others that lie before us, are what everybody would wish to avoid, when ideas intrude forcibly upon the mind, it proves her infirmity and inability to resist them. Thus the being master of our thoughts, having the perfect use of our discernment, and all that authority over our

mental organs which they are capable of obeying, constitutes prudence; and that branch of it relating to terrible ideas is understood by fortitude, which though not the less for being aided by nature, custom, or other causes, yet is not complete until it can operate without them.

4. But in order to render this command of our ideas complete, it is necessary that present evils should be no more capable of discomposing us than the apprehension of them at a distance; for if we can face danger while aloof, but shrink under mischiefs when actually falling upon us, it argues a feebleness of our ideas rather than the strength of our mind. Therefore patience has always been esteemed a species of fortitude, enabling us to bear pain, labour, indignity, affliction, disappointment, and whatever else is irksome to human nature. I will not undertake to determine whether these may be rendered quite harmless, so as not to hurt at all, yet if there be any salve to prevent their galling, patience is certainly the thing, which whoever possesses completely, if he cannot escape suffering by them, yet he will be able to divert his thoughts in great measure upon other objects: for he will never be thrown off his basis, nor permit them so to obscure the notices of his judgment, as that he cannot find something proper to be done upon the present occasion, which may in part, at least, engage his attention. Nay, he will very often prevail to fix it wholly upon the measures of his conduct; in which case, he will relieve himself entirely; for when we can forbear attending to uneasiness, it vanishes, which made some imagine it lay solely in opinion. When the mind has gotten this habitual command over her motions, she will exercise it, I conceive, for I can do no more than conjecture, with ease, freedom, and readiness, and without variation. But for us learners in the art we must expect to meet many difficulties, which we cannot surmount, nor hope to make any improvement without frequently exerting our utmost resolution: nor should we disdain to avail ourselves of example, company, shame, argumentation, or any other helps that may advance us forward. But to make the most of our resolution, it will be requisite to know the strength of it, that we may not put it upon more than it will perform: because repeated ill success may drive to despair, and damp the spirits instead of raising them. It will be expedient to take all opportunities of increasing what little courage or patience we have, to examine in what particulars we are defective and what feasible methods we have of remedying that defect, thus keeping our resolution in continual exercise; for every habit and every power of our nature gathers strength by being exercised. With such good management, and a vigilant but judicious use of the strength we have, we shall be continually advancing forwards by little and little: and the acquisition of any of those inferior virtues spoken of in § 2, will bring us so much nearer to perfection; for if it were possible to attain every one, I imagine the aggregate of them all would make that fortitude we are in quest of.

5. Intrepidity in the day of battle is not the only species of courage, for I suppose many a brave officer might not be able to walk upon a wall like our common bricklayers; which shows he has not an absolute command over his ideas, since some of them will intrude so far upon his judgment as to make him throw himself down for fear of falling. The art of walking upon walls is scarce necessary for those who do not intend to follow the trade of a bricklayer, for they may find other objects whereon to exercise their resolution to better advantage; therefore I do not recommend it anybody to learn until he has completed himself in all other branches of

knowledge: but I apprehend the ideal sage, having a perfect mastery over his imagination, would upon occasion run along the ridge of a house as securely as he could upon the same tiles ranged along his chamber floor; and would likewise, where it were necessary, bear any filthy discourse, noisome smell, or nastiness besmearing him, without squeamishness or offence to his delicacy. But besides natural terrors which may seize anybody upon first trial, before they have hardened themselves by custom, there are others which gather like rust upon the imaginations of particular people, making them distrust their own senses, and afraid that some sudden impulse should drive them upon extravagant actions, though they have never yet done any such, and have the strongest intention to avoid them. I know a very sensible man, who once scrupled to take a bank note into his hand for fear he should throw it into the fire: another unwilling to go near a precipice, lest he should have an inclination to throw himself down. I have heard of a lady that terrified herself when going a visiting with a notion that she might tumble down on entering the room, or say something very rude; and I myself when a boy, having occasion to retire to some private corner, have been sometimes grievously disturbed, lest I should be still in a room full of company, and only fancied I had left them. I am apt to suspect there are more of these whimsies in the world than one hears of, for people are shy of betraying their foibles, and it is but by chance, after being very intimate, that one gets any such confession out of them. These little distempers of mind may proceed from too great intenseness of thought; for as hard labour brings a trembling and weakness upon the nerves until refreshed by rest, so the organs of attention being overstrained, become unable to resist whatever fancies start up in its way, and I believe your hard students if they take notice will find more of this disturbance after a series of close application or having been much alone than at other times: but if it be thought that ladies and children cannot be supposed to hurt themselves this way, let it be remembered that they too sometimes puzzle their brains as much, though not upon the same subjects nor in the same manner as great scholars. The like effect may spring from a custom of making uncommon suppositions, which the studious sometimes necessarily and sometimes needlessly give in to, or the habit of building castles in the air, that others often divert themselves with: for, by these practices, we teach imagination to paint her figures as strong as the real objects exhibited to us by nature. Another source of the same stream may rise upon taking too much of the pillow, for sleep protracted longer than necessary will not be sound: but in dreams, volition remains inactive, all being carried on by the spontaneous workings of our organs, which having thereby gotten a habit of moving themselves, will afterwards throw up dreaming thoughts amongst our waking ones so strongly, that we shall scarce be able to know them asunder. I would recommend it to persons labouring under this infirmity, to observe whether they do not find it trouble them less upon those days wherein they happen to have risen early. I do not know that the believers in a free will of indifferency are more subject to these fantastical disturbances than other folks, yet one may well wonder why they should not, for upon their principles the danger would be real, not fantastical: because what avails it to have our senses, our judgment, and discretion, if, by our elective power, we may annex the idea of Best to whatever they warn us most clearly against? How can we depend upon our subsequent behaviour corresponding with our precedent

if volition be determined by nothing antecedent, nothing exterior to the will itself? In short, take away the influence of motives, and all before us becomes contingent, doubtful, and hazardous.

But whatever causes give rise to such apprehensions, they certainly indicate an impotence of mind, that has not a command over her ideas, nor can turn her notice upon any spot she pleases in the scenes of her imagination. One cannot expect a remedy in this case so much from reason as resolution, or rather care and vigilance; for authority grows by custom, and every power gathers strength from exercise: therefore it is expedient to accustom ourselves to choose out of the ideas before us for our inspection, to thrust away those that would intrude upon our notice, and to discern the degree of evidence sufficient to work assurance. It has been made appear in CHAP. XI. that absolute mathematical certainty was not made for man; therefore whoever looks always for that must hang in perpetual doubt and obscurity.

6. There is likewise a courage of assenting, as well as acting; for it cannot be denied that men may cramp themselves in their deliberations for fear of discovering a fallacy in something whereof they have conceived a favourable prejudice: and certainly, without a freedom of thought, there is very little advance to be made in our researches after truth. But then it ought not to be forgotten that there is a difference between courage and rashness, between freedom and change of servitude: for if we run deeper into one prejudice by flying eagerly from another, we shall not much enlarge our liberty. Therefore, it behoves us to join caution to our bravery, without which it will not be genuine; to look around us, observing every quarter from whence an undue influence may fall upon us; to examine all sides calmly and impartially, and give a just weight to the presumption that our prejudice may have been founded upon solid reasons formerly discerned by ourselves or others, though we cannot now recover them.

7. Neither is patience confined solely to the endurance of pains and labours; those whose situation exempts them from such trials, may yet find subjects whereon to exercise this branch of fortitude. There is nobody but meets with disappointments, cross accidents, contradictions and interruptions, as well in business as diversion; and if we could bear these without ruffling, it would certainly be gaining a valuable point. For my part, I often envy the patience of hackney coachmen sitting whole hours in all weathers upon their boxes, tradesmen waiting behind their counters, and servants attending in anti-chambers liable to be called upon any trifling errand at every touch of the bell: were I in their situation, restrained from employing myself as I liked, and unable to enter upon a train of thought, because expecting every instant to have it broken, I should be miserable: but though I would not choose to pass my time in idleness, I should be glad to bear it when forced upon me unavoidably. While I am pouring with the microscope upon objects lying within the light of nature, if a billet rolls off the hearth, or my servant comes in abruptly with a message, I cannot help fretting and vexing a little inwardly: this I acknowledge to be a failing, and would wish to receive all events with tranquillity and evenness of temper, pursuing my little engagements without anxiety, and breaking them off without discomposure. For virtue is valuable all over; if we cannot obtain large portions of her, yet every little scrap will repay the trouble of acquiring, as containing a source of enjoyment, and adding something to our estate in the fund of happiness.

CHAP. XXXII.

TEMPERANCE.

There have been heroes intrepid in dangers and indefatigable in labours, despising death, wounds, and hardships, who yet have been shamefully overcome by luxury and all kinds of wanton desires, made slaves to popular applause, or to some favourite mistress. For besides the dread of approaching, or pressure of present evil, there is another obstacle against the influence of reason by the allurement of pleasure, either in prospect or fruition; and it no less requires an exertion of vigour in the mind to secure her against being drawn off her basis by the one than driven by the other. Therefore the habit of resisting pleasure and controlling desire has been justly reckoned a cardinal virtue, called by the name of Temperance. Nor does it less deserve a title to one of the four principal places than fortitude, as being more generally useful for all ranks and conditions of people and more difficult to be attained completely. For many persons are not in a situation exposing them to much danger or labour, nor of a constitution subjecting them to acute or frequent pains, and so may pass through life well enough, although somewhat deficient in courage or patience: but there is no man without desires, and no man whom they will not lead astray from the paths of reason if he has not power to restrain them. Nor perhaps is it harder to subdue terror effectually than pleasure: the one requires a stronger resolution, the other a more constant vigilance. Pain and danger assault us rarely; their attacks are furious but generally short; if you can sustain the first onset, the business is done; or should they renew the charge, they will do it feebler after every repulse, until at length they cease to be formidable: but desire brings a numerous host into the field; put one enemy to flight and another presently succeeds in his place; if they cannot master you by force, they will weary you down by importunity; if they find you invulnerable in front, they will detach a regiment of secret motives to take you in rear, so that you may be brought to the ground without knowing from what quarter the blow came. Therefore you must continually keep upon your guard and bestir yourself without respite, which demands a larger fund of vigour to perform than any sudden starts of resolution, as it shows more robustness to carry a weight for miles than to pull out a wedge at a jerk. Besides that intestine enemies are always accounted the most dangerous, and though pleasure sometimes allures with outward objects, it oftener tempts by desires that have found harbour in the breast: and the most judicious persons have always esteemed the conquest of oneself the most important and most glorious of victories, which a man may most justly applaud himself for, however the world may think otherwise.

2. According to my notions of temperance, it is not confined to restraining the solicitations of appetite or what is usually called pleasure, but extends to habit, passion, humour, and whatever else would entice us away from following our judgment: therefore covetousness, ambition, resentment, extravagant joy, sanguine hope, thirst of knowledge, and even zeal for virtue, when not conducted by reason, are species of intemperance, as well as luxury, debauchery, and indolence. Pleasure is most dangerous in the season of youth, when the organs are vigorous, sensation strong, and

every allurement presents with the charm of novelty: in our riper years there is generally some ruling passion, either of advancement in honour or fortune, increase of knowledge, or other particular aim, that captivates the mind, and instead of obeying the command of reason presses it into its service: and the intemperance of old age shows itself in an attachment to our own ways and humours upon the most trifling occasions. But education, custom, and constitution, raise a different set of ideas in each man; therefore it behoves him to examine his condition of mind, and set himself most carefully to guard that quarter where he perceives the greatest danger threaten.

3. As desire not only entices by the delight promised upon gratification, but when opposed often degenerates into want, which arrives by the uneasiness of missing the thing desired, therefore temperance must call in patience as an auxiliary to assist her; and we find the uneasiness arising upon a delay of desire vulgarly styled impatience. He that cannot forbear hankering after pleasure lost, nor support the trouble any little importunate habit may give him, will make no progress towards mastering them; for whatever ground he may have gained by repelling the first attack, he will lose it all again upon the second. And sometimes, I believe, men give way for fear of this uneasiness, when it might not have proved insupportable; so that a little courage and confidence in our strength is very helpful upon these occasions.

4. Of all the propensities that take us at unawares none are more dangerous than indolence and pride, or vanity, because none are more universal, and none more sly in making their approaches covertly: a man can hardly fall into excesses of debauchery without being sensible of them; but he may be vain or idle without ever knowing that he is so. Laziness seems to be the very opposite to virtue; for as this consists in exerting the vigour of the mind to discern the lights of our judgment when overshaded by other ideas, he that could keep this vigour perpetually alert would never fall into any error of conduct. But there is a love of ease in us all, that makes people often bestir themselves prodigiously in the prosecution of some fond desire, rather than be at the pains of overcoming it, and gives birth to the violence and impatience of passion, which wants to have the purpose aimed at by it presently attained that the business may be over. And, perhaps, laziness may lie at the bottom of all pride and vanity; for there is much less trouble in persuading ourselves we possess accomplishments we have not, in contemplating those we have or displaying them to public view, than in improving them, or acquiring new ones. He that is always diligent in advancing forwards, will scarce have time for more than a transient look now and then upon the progress he has made, much less will he stand pointing out the length of it to every passenger he sees in the way. But vanity is so deeply rooted in us by education, by example and sympathy, and assails on so many quarters, that no wonder we can never guard against it effectually: we are taught to judge of ourselves and our possessions of any kind by comparison with others, to despise or overlook what we have not, and value ourselves upon any trifle peculiarly our own. The Spectator tells us of a young lady whom he found one day hold up her head higher than ordinary, and wondering what could be the occasion, her sister whispered him that she had got on a new pair of silk garters. One would think virtue should secure a man most effectually against all vain imaginations; but there is a pride of thinking oneself and a vanity of appearing virtuous: nay, some have been proud of their

humility and contempt of pride, as witness Diogenes, when he trampled upon the fine tapestry brought by Plato from the court of Sicily. But until a man can discover all the secret recesses of his heart, and restrain his fondness for contemplating or displaying any supposed perfection, he will not have attained completely the virtue of temperance.

5. Nor is moderation less necessary than courage to insure a true liberty of thought. Men esteem themselves free-thinkers because they can think anything, but I do not hold them really such unless they can likewise forbear to think anything. It has been often observed there is a certain enthusiasm in poetry, and perhaps there is a degree of it though not so much observed in argumentation and most prose compositions. The neat structure of an hypothesis, the shrewdness of a discovery, the acuteness of an observation, the charm of novelty or pleasure of overthrowing a vulgar error, will sometimes transport men beyond themselves: one sparkling thought will eclipse all others their judgment presents, and a secret inclination cast a glare of evidence upon any notion that favours it. There are other restraints upon our freedom besides pusillanimity, and in order to think perfectly free we must learn to think soberly as well as boldly; for courage and caution, like two antagonist muscles, serve to keep one another from drawing the mind awry: if either of them have lost its tone, the party may be said to labour under a paralytic disorder.

6. Some seasonable austerity and self-denial will be found expedient, or rather necessary, for us all to practise: for we have not such strength of mind as to surmount all opposition, therefore must endeavour to weaken the enemy by entering the lists against him as often as we can do it safely, and by so doing we shall add vigour to our own resolution, which always gathers strength by exercise. This consideration will engage us sometimes to deny innocent desires, that we may have it in our power to restrain them when hurtful. For the same reason we ought to keep a guard upon our thoughts as well as upon our actions: for there is an intemperance of imagination that engages men to dwell upon fantastical scenes of power, or gain, or revenge, or unwarrantable pleasures, under a notion of their being harmless, because they do not immediately break forth into act. But, when we reflect upon what has been shown before in the course of these inquiries, how great a sway imagination has, in shaping our behaviour, it will appear extremely dangerous to let that take a wrong turn, for it may steal upon us insensibly, and give a wrong turn to our conduct when we are not aware; at least it will abate our relish for other employments wherein we might spend our time to better advantage.

7. But self-denial is an evil considered in itself, wherefore those are not to be heeded who would persuade us into a life of austerities without regard to any good purposes to be effected thereby: for happiness, that is content and solace of mind, is our proper aim, nor does present enjoyment ever deserve to be rejected, unless for the sake of some greater enjoyment to be had in exchange for it. There is no good merely in crossing and afflicting ourselves; but self-denial becomes recommendable, for the ease it will procure us, by breaking the force of those desires that would interrupt and teaze and torment us perpetually with their importunities. Our business is not to extinguish desire, without which there could be no pleasure in life, no choice among objects before us, nor glee in anything we undertake, but to prevent it from being troublesome: and while we have unruly desires belonging to us, it is necessary to travel the rugged road of self-denial in our progress towards the wise man's tranquillity. For I conceive

the consummate sage, if there were such a one upon earth, would never practise self-denial, because he would not have an opportunity, his desires lying under such control as never to raise an opposition for him to struggle against: not that he would be without desires; on the contrary, I imagine he would abound in them more than we do, receiving delight from them in many things we should count insipid; but they would hang so loose about him, as to let go their hold the instant an object appeared improper or unattainable, to leave no secret hankering behind nor ever degenerate into want like the sheep, who they say is never thirsty, unless when he sees water; so his appetites would prove sources of pleasure to him, but none of pain. And why should we think such a disposition of mind impossible when there is scarce any of us who do not possess it in some little degree? We can sit down with desire to a party at cards when proposed, or content ourselves without it, if not agreed to: we may eat fruit with good appetite in summer, and take pains in planting trees to procure it, without wanting it in winter: we can bestir ourselves lustily in forwarding schemes of hunting, or bowling, or dancing, or other diversion, when they fall in our way, and rest fully contented with our situation when they do not. So that we have nothing to do but improve a faculty we already possess, and extend our authority gradually to all our other propensities, whether of profit, or honour, or building, or equipage, or curiosity, or knowledge, or whatever else would raise an intemperance of desire. The secret of happiness lies in having a multitude of engagements fitted for every occasion that can happen, so that some or other of them may constantly give us an appetite for employment, but none that shall disturb us when we judge it necessary or proper to break them off.

8. As self-denial helps to bring desire under control, so indulgence must needs have a contrary effect, adding vigour to the adversary and enfeebling ourselves: it is throwing the reins upon the horse's neck, which will quickly make him grow unmanageable. Wherefore, it behoves us to be cautious of our most innocent desires, lest by indulging we render them habitual, and instead of inviting, which is their proper office, they will drag us forcibly along: nor shall we ever recover our liberty, without a more painful self-denial than had been otherwise needful. Nor do intense pleasures deserve the value too commonly set upon them: it may be a man's misfortune to have been too highly delighted, for it will often destroy the relish of his common enjoyments, or fix so strong an impression upon the fancy, as shall obliterate all other ideas, and make him perpetually restless for a repetition: so that whoever seeks to be highly pleased, runs a hazard of being seldom pleased, and passing the greatest part of his time in disquietude and impatience. Many persons, especially young folks, make pleasure their sole aim whenever they can get the command of their time, in those intervals when the restraints of their superiors are withdrawn, imagining they shall enjoy the more by how much the more assiduously they pursue it: but this is a fallacious way of reckoning, for pleasure is an errant coquet, flying those who court her most servilely, and showing herself most gracious to those who bear the greatest indifference towards her. She makes forward advances to the unwary to bring them to her lure; but when she has gotten them fast in her fetters, she uses them scurvily, allowing them no rest in her service, and feeding them only with delusive expectations and stale scraps of enjoyment, that have utterly lost their savour. Nor indeed is it in her power, were she ever so kindly disposed, to give a solid and lasting enjoyment; for those pleasures your men of pleasure hunt after, owe their gust

merely to their novelty and the vigour of youthful blood and the freshness of the organs, but our organs can supply no more than a certain portion of entertainment; for when much employed in the same way, though they may still perform their work, yet they lose that sensibility in the exercise, which they had originally. Therefore, he that makes intense pleasure his whole business, is like an extravagant heir, who squanders away his whole patrimony in a year or two, and leaves himself nothing to live upon afterwards besides poverty, want, and distress. Hence we may see the benefit of this cardinal virtue, Temperance, which will debar us no pleasure we can have at free cost, but rescue us from those that would make us pay more for them than they are worth, will open to us many sources of delight the voluptuous never taste of, and secure us an estate for life in such enjoyments whereof our nature is capable.

CHAP. XXXIII.

JUSTICE.

There is one particular desire, that of appropriating whatever we can get to ourselves, and following our own pleasure without regard to the hurt it may do other persons, which prevails so universally and strongly among mankind, and which, indulged, causes such disorder in the world, that the restraint of it has been thought worthy to be made a cardinal virtue, distinguished by the name of Justice. It is easy to see that justice owes its being to society, for it could have no place were each man to live separately by himself, or had he not in any instance a power of endamaging the possessions, infringing the liberty, or abridging the enjoyments of his fellow creatures. Were men just now brought out of such a state, and placed upon this habitable earth, every one would naturally take of the good things scattered around him, whatever he wanted for his present occasion; when he went to do the same a second time, he might often find that somebody else had taken away the things he wanted before him; this would put him, as often as he had an opportunity, upon securing as many of them as he could get together, to provide against the like accidents for the future; from whence springs self-interest, the desire of gain, and covetousness. But as others would do the same, the public stock would be soon exhausted, the fruits all gathered from the trees, and the desire of engrossing would then prompt men to invade one another's hoards: whence must ensue trouble, vexation, and contention, and much waste must be made in the struggle, to the great damage of them all. These inconveniences being severely felt, would teach them to see that their true interests lay in restraining their own desires within such compass, as might bring them compatible with those of others, and they would form rules for securing to each man his share of the blessings that nature had poured out among them. But it being obvious that the gifts of nature may be improved by labour, nor indeed can fully supply our wants without it, and there being no encouragement for any man to labour, if all the rest were to share the fruits of it with himself, they would find it necessary that all should enjoy the produce of their skill and industry in severalty, without interruption from others: and this would lay the foundation of property. But as it may often lie in a man's power to work out some advantage for others or for the public, and the security of property would be no encouragement with him so to do, because the fruits

of his labour in this case would not redound to his own benefit, they would see the expedience of a compensation or reward, to serve as an encouragement for performing such services. On the other hand, some would still employ their strength or cunning to encroach upon their neighbour's properties, or through mere wantonness, or resentment, or other unruly passion, would endamage them in their persons or possessions: this would show the necessity of punishment to restrain such outrages. And as vicious inclinations, according to their strength, would require a greater or less restraint to curb them, therefore punishment would be apportioned to the heinousness of the offence, of which the greatness of the mischief done would be deemed an evidence when the inward depravity could not otherwise be discovered.

2. Were mankind reduced to a state of nature, I imagine they would gradually fall into notions of justice by such steps as those above described. But we being born into settled communities, having regulations already established, take them as we find them, with the sanction of authority annexed to them, without penetrating into the sources from whence they are derived. Yet if we were to suppose all reward and punishment, all law and honesty, banished from among a people, there would be nothing left to guide them besides self-interest, appetite, passion, and humour; and it is easy to see what wild doings, what havoc and distraction, these would introduce. Since then we find so manifest a necessity of justice to secure the happiness and tranquillity of life, we need seek for no other foundation than utility, whereon to build our obligation to support it. Many laws are calculated for the particular convenience of the people to whom they are given, and would be unjust because inconvenient if transported into other countries. The duty of subordination and obedience to higher powers, arise from the benefits of union: for it being impossible that all individuals should agree in their measures of conduct, or stand in a situation to judge of them, if the authority were not placed in a few hands, a nation could never act as one man to repel the invasions of an enemy, nor execute any one undertaking that required the concurrence of numbers. Therefore, though it be possible that governors may command things inconvenient, yet it is not justifiable to disobey them, because of the debility that must ensue upon loosening of their authority. Just as a man, who should find a troublesome twitching in his muscles, would do very wrong to destroy the tone of them: for he had better bear the present uneasiness than lose the use of his limbs. It has been commonly said, the worst kind of government was preferable to anarchy: wherefore the consideration of that preference will prove a tie upon every prudent man to submit to such government.

3. Nobody will deny there is a natural justice distinct from the legal, and must be presupposed before men can pay a proper submission to authority: for whoever obeys the law for fear of incurring the penalty is not a just man; he only deserves the title of just who would deal honestly, and forbear offending, although there were no terrors hanging over to compel him, and who does not think of the penalties annexed, but acts upon a motive of principle. Where this principle is wanting, the best contrived laws cannot wholly supply the deficiency; for they being calculated for general use, it is impossible to shape them so exactly as to suit all the variety of cases that may happen, therefore there wants some other clue to direct us when to pursue and when to abate the rigour of justice. Besides, there are many ways by which men have it in their power to affect one another in

matters where the law does not and perhaps could not interfere, particularly in the application of applause and censure: in all these cases they can have no other guidance than the law of their own minds binding to the observance of certain rules, founded originally upon utility, though not always, or rather very seldom, carrying a visible connection therewith. We have seen under the article of honour, that praise and blame belong properly to those objects whereto the annexing them will do greatest service. Reparation for damages tends to the security of property, preventing retaliation, and answering as a penalty to restrain mischievousness and heedlessness. The labourer is worthy of his hire, because it cannot be expected men should labour without it: and the shopkeeper ought to be paid for his goods, because else there would be an end of all commerce and industry. Merit and demerit of all kinds arise from a right understanding, and prudent regard to our own interests; and the very term Deserve, implies that such a particular treatment will be most expedient upon such or such a behaviour.

4. Thus every species of justice, as well public as private, as well commutative as distributive, rests upon the basis of utility: but what causes the mistake upon this matter is, the double sense of the word utility, as distinguished into real and apparent; for in philosophical consideration, it is understood of that which upon the whole amount of consequences tends most to advance a man's real happiness, but in vulgar language it stands for that which exhibits the clearest prospect of advantage or profit. If we look back upon the chapter of Use, we shall find how pleasure transfers satisfaction upon things instrumental or preparatory to the procuring it, from whence grow the principle of self-interest and many desires of things conceived beneficial or conducive to our purposes. Now if we take this self-interest, and the gratification of these desires of utility, it is certainly quite different from justice as standing generally at the greatest variance with it; he that deals honestly when not compelled either by the fear of punishment or censure, and without this he cannot claim a title to honesty, manifestly foregoes his interest for the sake of justice. But our ultimate end of action is not always, or rather very rarely our ultimate point of view, for our faculties being too scanty to look forward to the journey's end, we set up certain marks whereon to fix our attention from time to time for our guidance on the way: some of the first of these marks are the rules of interest, profit, convenience, and worldly prudence; but they proving often insufficient, we find a necessity of other marks in the rules of honour and justice to rectify their mistaken directions.

I am well aware that each of us singly learns our honesty by instruction or sympathy from others, but then it can scarce be denied that those who first set the example did it from observation of the mischiefs attendant upon a too close attachment to interest. If we could constantly see to the end of our proceedings, and compute exactly the whole produce of enjoyment and suffering to be expected from them, we should want no other rule than that of preferring the greater distant good before present pleasure, for our own advantage would guide us sufficiently in all parts of our conduct; but since we cannot look so far, and interest frequently leads astray from its own purposes, we have need enough of the restraint of justice to keep us from being beguiled by it, and led out of the road to real utility, which we often miss of through too great eagerness for the apparent. It may be remarked, that honour and justice abound more in rules than any other principle of action; because, lying further removed from pleasure, we can seldomer discern the connection therewith, and consequently stand more in need of direction.

But rules will stand us in no stead without a propensity urging strongly to practise them, which propensity, in the present case, is styled the moral sense or conscience: wherefore it behoves every man to cultivate or improve this moral sense or conscientious regard for the obligations of justice to the utmost, and adhere to it without reserve against all the solicitations of interest. The proper office of justice lies in restraining our selfish desires: a thorough righteous man will never suffer any of them either to draw him privily, or hurry him forcibly upon actions for which his heart may afterwards misgive him, or which his moral sense warns him to beware as unlawful, although he may not directly discern their inexpedience. It is true he may sometimes mistake and forego his lawful advantages needlessly, but the possession of a strong moral sense is more valuable than any present benefit he could receive from its weakness; and he may look upon these inconveniences in the light of troubles naturally attending an estate, which no man would throw away for the sake of escaping them.

Therefore it is much the safer side to be too scrupulous than too remiss, especially for young people. Tully used to reckon exuberance a good sign in a young orator, and say he loved to find something to prune off. The moralist may say the same with respect to his scholars, that he loves to see the moral sense vigorous and redundant, affording something to prune off; for it is much harder to nourish up a weakly plant than reduce one that is luxuriant. The expedience of justice lies through so many stages, that it is difficult to trace them, but the inconveniences of over strictness are easier manifested, nor will fail to discover themselves upon a little experience. But though the moral sense ought to master desire, it ought not to prevail over reason; therefore whenever upon a full and fair examination we find our rules tend to greater harm than good, we must alter or dispense with them; and since they are liable to error, it will behove us, as often as a proper opportunity offers, to try them by a reference to use. This will prevent their running into extravagances, and give us a better opinion of them; for by frequently observing the benefit of justice, we shall become intimately persuaded of its expedience at other times when we do not discern them: which will teach us a confidence in our moral sense, and make us look upon the laudableness of an action as a certain evidence of its usefulness.

5. As we are mighty fond of personifying everything, even the creatures of imagination, abstract notions, and whatever we can express by a noun substantive, it is common to consider the law either of the land, or of nature, as a person, having perception, volition, design, desire, and passion In this light, if we look for what design the law must be supposed to have, we cannot well conceive any other than the preservation of property, the security of life, limb, peace, liberty, and all other requisites for enjoyment, that may be destroyed or lessened by the behaviour of men to one another. But all design tends to something future, the past being no object of power or contrivance: hence it is plain the law carries always a prospect forwards, and only casts a retrospect behind, in order to take her measures for providing against the time to come. The reparation she awards for damages sustained, manifestly relates to the future convenience of the party aggrieved; for if he be satisfied by being reinstated in the possession of those materials for enjoyment he had before the offence committed, or receiving an equivalent that will answer his purposes as well, the law is satisfied too. But it may often happen that the offender is not able to

make reparation, or the injury, as in cases of murder or maiming, is of a nature not to be repaired or compensated: under these circumstances the law will not be supposed to design impossibilities, and can only have in view the preventing the like injuries for the future, by such punishment as shall be judged sufficient for that purpose. So that in reality punishment is not inflicted for crimes committed, but as a remedy against those which might be committed hereafter; and guilt is rather a direction than a motive for taking vengeance. And that this is so, will appear more evident when we reflect that natural justice restrains the thoughts, desires, and intentions of men, as well as their outward actions: nor do the laws sometimes scruple to punish for the intent where no mischief has been actually done. Conspiring to defraud, assaulting with intent to rob or ravish, are deemed misdemeanours; lifting up a latch in the night-time with intent to commit burglary, forging or knowingly publishing a forged note, are made felony; imagining the death of the king, is high treason. And if an overt act be required to convict the delinquent, I believe every one, who knows the nature of right and wrong, will admit that the overt act adds nothing to the delinquency, but is only necessary to prove it, because we cannot dive into the thoughts of men, nor judge of them otherwise than by their actions. Were there a man to whom the hearts of all others should lie open, and a discretionary power entrusted, to do as he judged reasonable, he would not think it unjust to apply such punishment for the most secret evil designs, as he conceived effectual for preventing them from breaking forth into act.

6. But to pursue our idea of personality in the law; as we all look upon the defeating of our designs as a damage, and the law designing the peace and security of those under her protection, therefore every hurt brought upon individuals is considered as an injury done the law itself, for which she will require such satisfaction as can be made, that is, such adequate punishment as may deter the offender or others from repeating the offence, and reinstate her in her power she had before of protecting: this brings punishment under the idea of a reparation or satisfaction for damage done, not indeed to the party injured, but to the law; for when the offender has undergone the chastisement allotted him, he is said to have satisfied the law, and to stand right again in court. Then as in ourselves satisfaction becomes often transferred from the end to the means, particularly in resentment, where we think of nothing further than wreaking our revenge, and in pursuits of honour or power, which we do not follow for their uses but to gratify our present desires of them, we conceive the same passions to prevail and the same narrow views to obtain in the law, which animadverts upon delinquents for her own satisfaction rather than for the sake of the community under her charge.

7. This custom of conceiving the law to have interests of her own to serve, and the detestation which arises instantly in the hearts of the best and wisest men upon the thought of heinous wickedness, has given rise to the opinion of an immediate and essential connection between offence and punishment, which is supposed due to the former without taking any other idea into consideration. I shall readily agree that in taking measures for punishing we need consider nothing further than the degree of delinquency; for being well satisfied our rule is right, we need not, nay cannot constantly look forward for the reasons inducing us to believe it right; and so we depend upon the 47th of Euclid as a certain truth, without running on to the demonstrations convincing us of its being true: but if we search for the

foundation of justice, though here too we shall find a connection, it will be hard to trace it out unless by the intervention of two links lying between; I mean, the power of men still to hurt one another, and the tendency of punishment to make them change or withhold them from executing their evil intentions. Were mankind to be suddenly placed in a situation which should render them incapable of ever more receiving damage from others, or their dispositions of mind so changed as that they should never more think of doing acts of injustice, I believe every good man would vote for a general amnesty of all former misdemeanors, because the remembrance of them would be needless in one case and useless in the other.

If the connection between offence and punishment were natural and necessary, submission and repentance could never dissociate them, for the nature of actions cannot be altered by anything subsequent; but repentance, answering the purpose intended by chastisement, takes away the use of it, and thereby dissolves the connection: therefore when severity appears necessary as a warning to others, that they may not expect to come off upon the like easy terms, the just man will not accept of repentance: thus we see justice disarmed upon becoming needless, and the sword put into her hands again upon the further prospect of necessity.

And the same cause extends her province beyond the limits naturally belonging to it, by warranting her sometimes to take vengeance upon the innocent for wrongs wherein they have had no share: for this is the case of war, wherein the goods and possessions of private persons are invaded for injuries received from the state. I know that in national transactions all the members of a community are looked upon as constituting one person, and in this light you take revenge upon the person that injured you: but this is only an imaginary personality, very useful for pointing out the measures of national justice, but by no means supporting it as a foundation. If the French king has fortified Dunkirk, or encroached upon our colonies in America, in breach of treaties, you cannot charge the merchant trading from Martinico with any faithlessness or badness of heart upon that account: so justice stands here separated from delinquency and every spice of evil intention; for you esteem it lawful to seize his effects by way of reprisal. But why do you judge it lawful? because you cannot right yourself otherwise: so necessity makes it justice; for were it possible to come at the governors directly without touching the subjects, no righteous man would think the latter method justifiable, notwithstanding any supposed identity of persons between them.

8. Were the justness of actions essential and inherent, whenever the rules of justice clash, as we find they sometimes do, that which must be superseded must abate something from the justness of the other: for the case is so in matters of profit or pleasure. If you lay out a sum of money to make an improvement of greater value upon your estate, you are certainly a gainer: yet could you procure the same improvement free of charges your gain would be greater. If you might partake of some very agreeable diversion by going five miles through very dirty roads, it is worth your while; yet could you have it without that trouble I suppose you would like it better. But suppose two men in different parts of a field near a river, alarmed by the cry of some person drowning, one hath a path to run along, but the other cannot go to help without trampling down his neighbour's corn, which you must allow to be an unjust action considered in itself, nevertheless I conceive the strictest casuist would acknowledge the merit of both equal: so the lesser rule bears no intrinsic value to be

subtracted from the greater, for the expedience of abstaining from another's property is taken off by the higher importance of saving a man's life.

9. Nor do the obligations of truth and fidelity rest upon any other basis than expedience: it is easy to see that were truth banished the world, there could be no intercourse among mankind, no use of speech: if you asked anybody's direction upon the road, you might as well let it alone, for you could gather nothing from their answer if there were no truth in men. Were all falsehood wrong as such, why are poems and novels suffered? why do moralists invent fables wherein they introduce beasts talking, gods appearing in the air, and the moon desiring to be taken measure of for a suit of clothes? But when fiction may serve some good purpose and does no hurt, the wisest do not scruple to employ it. Did the bare form of an agreement create an obligation to perform it, no circumstances whatever could render it invalid. Are then all those suitors unrighteous who apply to our courts of equity to be relieved from their contracts? or are the courts iniquitous in decreeing them relief? But were there no faith among men, no regard to their engagements, anybody may see, with half an eye, what stagnation of business, what mutual diffidence and confusion must ensue; and it is the avoidance of those evils that gives them their sanction: therefore, when the rigid observance of compacts manifestly tends to greater mischiefs than could be avoided thereby, no righteous judge, having authority so to do, will scruple setting them aside. Nevertheless, this does not justify a man in breaking his engagements whenever he finds it detrimental or inconvenient to keep them, for our views are so narrow that we cannot always see all the consequences of our actions, and rules are the marks hung out to direct us to an advantage we cannot discern: therefore the wise man will adhere inviolably to his rules though he cannot discover their expedience; for he will look upon the manifest injustice of a thing as a stronger evidence of its being detrimental than any appearance that may arise to the contrary; yet an expedience there must be, or the rules will not be right. For justice is the minister of reason, though it ought to be the master of action; and it is one thing to establish rules of conduct, but another to show the foundation of them. When a man is to act, he ought to consult his ideas of justice, and follow whithersoever they direct, without reserve or looking to anything further; but when we inquire why justice is recommendable, it behoves us to trace out the reference it bears to happiness; for without this it will be hard to prove the obligation to it; and this being once clearly evinced, it would want nothing else to give it all the influence that could be desired.

This method seems to have been attempted by the old philosophers, but they stopped short in the midway, as we may learn from Cicero, who was no philosopher himself, but an elegant reporter of the Greek philosophy, where he endeavours to show the prudence of Regulus' conduct in Lib. III. Cap. 27, 8, 9, of his offices; for he tells us those are are to be rejected who would separate utility from justice; because, says he, whatever is just or honestum is therefore useful. This is giving the ladies' reason, It is so because it is; for he does not vouchsafe a word to prove why it is useful. That everything just is really advantageous I shall not deny, nor that the practice of justice is the surest road to happiness, but I must deny that this is a first principle or self-evident proposition, or to be discerned without much thought and consideration; for I know that in many cases the contrary appears upon first sight: therefore it had become a philo-

sopher, especially such a powerful artificer of words as Cicero, to have laid open the fallacy of this appearance and shown the intermediate steps by which justice leads to utility. He might have had an ample field to expatiate upon the benefits and necessity of justice to the welfare of mankind. He might have shown that the Roman commonwealth rose to that pitch of grandeur they shone in by a strict fidelity to their engagements, and that they afterwards began to decline and fall into confusion by their oppression of the provinces taken under their protection, and their selfish endeavours to encroach upon one another's rights. He might then have gone on to prove the good of every individual contained in that of the republic, and thence concluded that Regulus, all things considered, acted more for his own advantage in submitting to the torments he underwent than he could have done by any breach of faith whatsoever. As for his rhodomontade that the brave man looks upon pain as a mere trifle, this overthrows his other assertion, because it seems to admit that if pain were an evil it might justify the breach of engagements: and indeed we, who take it for such, commonly do admit it as an excuse when in a degree we conceive intolerable. When a sum of money is sent for a particular purpose, justice certainly requires it should be disposed of according to the owner's directions. Suppose then the party carrying it attacked on the way by ruffians, who threaten him with some grievous mischiefs unless he will deliver it them: if he be perfectly honest, and at the same time possessed of the stoical fortitude so as not to value pain at a straw, he will bear the worst they can do to him rather than betray his trust: but suppose the messenger were a weak and fearful woman, to whom violent ill usage were really terrible, I believe none of us would think it the least abatement of her character for hone ty if she yielded to her terrors. So that justice is not so necessarily connected with use, but that a greater evil on the other side may separate them, and in that case the action ceases to be just: wherefore utility constitutes the essence of justice, but not justice that of utility.

10. But though justice be not utility, nevertheless it ought to be esteemed the certain mark and evidence of utility, and an intimate persuasion of its being so will fasten desire upon it as upon an ultimate point of view, without needing anything beyond to recommend it. Whoever has this desire so strong as to counterpoise all other desires, possesses the cardinal virtue here treated of; and whoever has not this desire at all cannot be called an honest man in any degree, though he may do honestly for fear of punishment or prospect of advantage. Therefore, if a righteous man be asked why he fulfils his engagements, though to his own manifest detriment, he will answer, because it would have been unjust to have failed in them; for he wants no other motive to induce him; and if the querist be righteous too, he will want no other reason to satisfy him. But if he be asked further, why he esteems justice a proper motive of action, and he be a person who does not take his principles upon trust from the example or authority of others, but has used to examine them himself, he will refer to the general necessity and expedience of justice, and allege that what conduces to the general good of mankind must be good for every particular. But could it be made to appear that injustice in some single instance tended to the general advantage, he would not think himself warranted to practise it, because the mischief of setting a bad example, and weakening the authority of a beneficial rule, would be greater than any present advantage that might accrue from the breach of it. And even supposing his injustice could be concealed from all the world, so that it could do no hurt by example, still he would

not believe it allowable, for fear it should have a bad influence upon his own mind. For whoever understands human nature, knows how dangerous it is to lessen the force of those restraints that withhold us from the exorbitances of self-interest: if we break into them in some instances where we might do it innocently, we shall run a great hazard of losing their influence at other times when it will be absolutely necessary for keeping us within bounds. Nor can we doubt of there being an utility in justice, when we find it acknowledged in some measure by the unanimous consent of all mankind: it is a vulgar saying, that Honesty is the best policy; nor perhaps is there a man who, if he could accomplish his desires justly, would not choose it that way rather than by wrong. The very gangs of highwaymen and street robbers observe some fidelity, though little enough it is true, in their engagements with one another: so that even those persons who take their notions of utility and pleasure for their sole guidance, still pay some regard to justice, being led by their experience of its conducing necessarily thereto.

11. The just man, to deserve that appellation, must be so throughout, in small matters as well as great: he will regard natural justice, and legal too, when it is not superseded by the other: he will abstain from injuring, not only the persons, possessions, and liberties of his neighbours, but likewise their good name, reputation, and claim to the merit of their performances, neither deceiving by flattery, blackening by calumny, overbearing by haughtiness, nor overreaching by cunning: he will beware of wronging anybody, even in his own private estimation, nor give credit hastily to unfavourable reports, but judge of persons and interpret actions candidly and cautiously: he will look upon all untruth or bias to the prejudice of another as a species of injustice, and will esteem ingratitude one of the most flagrant.

12. As justice consists in a hearty desire of doing right to every one against the solicitations of other desires urging another way, and as among contending impulses the most vigorous will always prevail, therefore justice, though distinct from temperance and fortitude, cannot well subsist without them, because it is their office to reduce our other desires within a manageable compass. Ambition, covetousness, extravagant fondness for pleasure, anger, and all kinds of intemperance, hurry men on, otherwise well disposed, to unwarrantable actions. Fretfulness, sloth, over delicacy, effeminate softness, and every other branch of impatience, will not suffer them to do justly, where any pains or difficulty are requisite. These vices lay them under a necessity of transgressing: but though we have seen before that a real necessity takes away injustice from a deed, yet an unnecessary necessity, if I may be allowed the expression, that is, one brought upon us by our own folly, leaves it in full colours. Therefore, the ancients were right when they said that whoever possessed one virtue completely must possess them all, because they mutually nourish and protect one another.

CHAP. XXXIV.

BENEVOLENCE.

The grand impediment against making philosophy universally understood, arises from the particular style unavoidably employed therein, different from that used upon common occasions. Sometimes it is found necessary to frame technical terms unknown to the man of plain sense: at other times,

when words of general currency will serve, yet a peculiar idiom and structure is necessary to make them answer the purpose effectually. This is nowhere more apparent than in speaking of the virtues, which are vulgarly conceived infinitely numerous and various: but the moralist, being willing to methodize his thoughts and reduce the wilderness into a regular plan, endeavours to comprise them all under four general heads, to which he assigns names already in use, but must extend their signification beyond what custom will warrant, in order to bring them wide enough to take in all he would have them. By this means it happens that the plain man, attempting to follow his method, finds himself frequently perplexed; for after being fully satisfied that an action is right, he still remains at a loss to know what particular species of virtue it belongs to; or perhaps sometimes mistakes that to be the virtue recommended which is really no virtue at all. Thus prudence, the principal virtue comprehending all the rest, stands in vulgar acceptation for sagacity, penetration, experience, and clearness of judgment, which are not virtue but good fortune; or if attained by our own industry, still are the fruits of virtue rather than the tree itself: and as prudence is vulgarly understood of a cautious regard to interest, we find it often standing at the greatest variance with virtue. But we have seen before, that moral prudence consists in making a due use of our lights, not in the abundance or clearness of them, and vigorously adhering to the dictates of reason, against the solicitations of interest, or any other desire whatsoever. So likewise fortitude is made to include patience, because the same robustness of temper that enables the possessor to stare danger in the face, is supposed to render him invincible by pain. But to common apprehension a man may be very patient and yet very timorous; nor on the other hand, if we see him preserve an uninterrupted presence of mind in perils of all kinds, shall we think him deficient in courage, because he frets under imprisonment, or cannot bear disappointment and contradiction. In like manner temperance implies the moderation of every desire and appetite that would carry us on unadvisedly to present gratification: but in our familiar discourses, we confine it to sobriety in eating and drinking; for if we find a man abstemious in these points, we count him a model of temperance, notwithstanding he may be ambitious, or slothful, or revengeful. To come lastly to the cardinal virtue of justice, the philosopher must comprise under it benevolence and whatever we do for the benefit or pleasure of others without regard to our own: but nobody else would esteem that person a friend or good neighbour who should do no more to serve another man than what the strictness of justice obliges him to.

2. For this reason I have thought convenient to make a distinct article of benevolence, which if you please may be called a fifth cardinal virtue. For though it has been hitherto reputed a branch of justice as springing from the same ground, namely, that our own good is contained in the good of others, yet I do not see why it may not as well be reckoned the root, and justice the branch, since it bears that and many good fruits beside; for we do not use to behave dishonestly to our friends, and if we had a proper regard and concern for all mankind I do not imagine we could ever deal unjustly with anybody. However this be, there is a manifest difference between them in the common conceptions of the world. Justice only restrains from doing damage or wrong: good nature does the same too, but over and above, this prompts to do all the service for which there is an opportunity. A debt and a favour seem essentially distinct, so that what is one cannot be the other; for a man is bound by obligation to render to every one

his dues, but in doing a kindness he must be free from all obligation or else it is no kindness. If a man pays you what he owed, you do not thank him for it, he only escapes the censure you might have thrown upon him for failing: but if he does you a service you had no right to expect, he deserves your acknowledgments. Since then benevolence carries a different idea in common apprehension from justice, what has been offered in illustration of that subject will not suffice for this: and if we consider how it is generally understood, I think it may be called a diffused love to the whole species, in which light the same definition we gave of love will remain applicable here, to wit, the pleasure of pleasing: or if, as we distinguish the passion into love and fondness, so we should distinguish the virtue into benevolence and good nature: the one will be a pleasure of benefiting, the other that of pleasing. To render it perfectly formed, desire must connect immediately with these ends, for if there be any thought of our own interest or gratification between, what we do for others is not an act of kindness. I do not apprehend that nature gives us any such desire, but we have already shown in several places by what steps desire becomes transferred from ourselves to other objects, and when we can perform good offices upon the sole consideration of their being such, then is the translation complete. Whoever has this desire habitual, will feel a satisfaction in acts of kindness proportionable to the benefit of them which will urge him to perform them as a matter of entertainment, whenever they fall in his way.

3. Persons deficient in this quality endeavour to run it down, and justify their own narrow views, by alleging that it is only selfishness in a particular form: for, if the benevolent man does a good-natured thing, for his own satisfaction that he finds in it, there is self at bottom, for he acts to please himself. Where then, say they, is his merit? what is he better than us? he follows constantly what he likes, and so do we: the only difference between us is, that we have a different taste of pleasure from him. To take these objections in order, let us consider that form in many cases is all in all, the essence of things depending thereupon. Fruit, when come to its maturity, or during its state of sap in the tree, or of earthy particles in the ground, is the same substance all along: beef, whether raw or roasted or putrified, is still the same beef, varying only in form: but whoever shall overlook this difference of form will bring grievous disorders upon his stomach: so then there is no absurdity in supposing selfishness may be foul and noisome under one form, but amiable and recommendable under another. But we have no need to make this supposition, as we shall not admit that acts of kindness, how much soever we may follow our own inclination therein, carry any spice of selfishness. Men are led into this mistake by laying too much stress upon etymology; for selfishness being derived from self, they learnedly infer that whatever is done to please one's own inclination, must fall under that appellation, not considering that derivatives do not always retain the full latitude of their roots. Wearing woollen clothes, or eating mutton, does not make a man sheepish, nor does employing himself now and then in reading render him bookish: so neither is everything selfish, that relates to oneself. If somebody should tell you, that such an one was a very selfish person, and, for proof of it, give a long account of his being once catched on horseback by a shower, that he took shelter under a tree, that he alighted, put on his greatcoat, and was wholly busied in muffling himself up, without having a single thought all the while of his wife or children, his friends or his country: would not you take it for a banter? or would you think the person or his behaviour could be called selfish in any

propriety of speech? What, if a man agreeable and obliging in company, should happen to desire another lump of sugar in his tea to please his own palate, would they pronounce him a whit the more selfish upon that account? So that selfishness is not having a regard for oneself, but having no regard for anything else. Therefore the moralist may exhort men to a prudent concern for their own interests, and at the same time dissuade them from selfishness, without inconsistency.

4. As for the influence of satisfaction, we have already seen how that gives life to all our motions, so that if that rendered them selfish, there would be no use for the term, nor any distinction between selfish and disinterested: for the wise and the foolish, the good and the wicked, the thoughtful and the giddy, in business and diversion, in their deliberate and inconsiderate actions, all incessantly follow satisfaction. But we have shown that satisfaction is ever one and the same in kind, and the variety of motives arises from the difference of vehicles containing it, which vehicles are the objects of desire, for we know well enough we must have the satisfaction if we can attain the satisfactory object: wherefore desire fixes upon this as an ultimate point, and we take our measures according to what we conceive satisfactory. Nature first conveys satisfaction by the ministry of the senses, from thence it becomes transferred to the instruments or materials we have found qualified to furnish us with agreeable sensations: by degrees we come to have an intercourse with mankind, and find that they get away the materials of pleasure from one another, we then learn a desire of securing as many of them to ourselves as we can, and this I apprehend gives rise to self-interest, which is never understood, either in common or philosophical language, of the natural propensity to pleasure, but of the pursuit of our own ends in opposition to those of other persons. In process of time, wantonness, or resentment, or bad company brings some to delight in mischief, and these we term mischievous: others are led by consideration, or kind usage, or better example to take the like delight in good offices, and these become benevolent: such as have neither of those tastes, but always do either good or hurt, just as it serves their own purpose, are properly selfish. Hence the following of inclination does not constitute selfishness, for in this respect all men are alike; but the difference results from what they severally fix their inclinations upon: for it is the object of desire, the ultimate point in prospect, that denominates an action. He that abstains from mischief, out of fear of punishment, or for some private advantage, is selfish, not benevolent in the deed, and if he do it because he thinks it his duty, still he is not benevolent, though he may have some other virtue which guided him in the doing; for to entitle an action to that epithet, it must proceed from the sole motive of good-will, without thought of anything beyond the benefit of the party who is the subject of it.

5. Nor need anybody be at a loss to form an idea of such an inclination, for I suppose the most selfish creature breathing may chance to be sometimes in good humour, and has some child or mistress, or boon companion, to whom he can take delight in doing a favour when he has no end of his own to serve upon them: let him only reflect upon the state of his mind in these hearty moods, and he may understand that benevolence is no more than the same disposition carried as far as human frailty can extend it. Neither need we seek for any greater refinement or purity of intention than this I have been speaking of: we may lawfully and laudably follow our pleasure, provided that be set upon such an employment. The good old rule holds in this case, of doing and standing affected to others as we would

have them do and stand affected to us: now what can we desire better, than that they should take delight in pleasing us? Could your family, your friends, your neighbours, your acquaintance, come and say with truth and sincerity, Sir, please to let us know wherein we can serve you, for we shall take delight in doing it: what would you want with them more? what other disposition could you wish them to put on? Would you answer them, Look ye good folks, while you take delight in serving me, you do it to please yourselves, so I do not thank you for it: but if you would lay a real obligation upon me, you must first hate me with all your might, and then the services you shall do me will be purely disinterested. Surely he that could make this reply must have a very whimsical turn of thought, and a strong tincture of envy, since he cannot be content to receive a kindness, unless the person conferring suffers for it, by forcing himself against his inclination.

6. As commendation and a return of good offices tend to encourage benevolence, therefore it deserves them: for we have seen in a former place that honour and reward belong properly to where they will do most service. But the reward must not constantly follow too close upon the action, for then it will be apt to catch the eye, and become the end expected, at every performance, which will render it selfish. But when good offices meet with a return of the like only in general, or in the gross, they lie too wide to be carried always in view, and desire will fix upon the acts of kindness as upon an ultimate point: wherefore many spoil their children by hiring them perpetually with playthings to do as they would have them. As an action takes it quality not from the thing done, but from the motive operating to produce it, therefore benevolence, to be genuine, must be free and voluntary: for what we are drawn or overpersuaded to do, does not proceed from inclination, and is rather an act of impulse than choice. There is a softness and milkiness of temper that cannot say nay to anything; but he that can never refuse a favour, can hardly be said ever to grant one: for it is wrested from him, not given; he does it to rid himself of an opportunity, and save the trouble of a denial, in which case it is a weakness rather than a virtue. Hence good nature is often called, and sometimes really proceeds from folly, which gets no thanks when it proves most beneficial: for men applaud themselves for having gained a compliance by wheedling or pressing, and secretly laugh at the silly thing that could be won by such artifices.

7. There is likewise a spurious benevolence which flows from vanity; it makes men helpful and obliging to show their power and importance, or gain the incense of applause, or bring others into dependence upon them. Persons actuated by this motive may behave kindly enough to such as are submissive to them, but are generally envious of their superiors, and carry themselves haughtily to those who do not want them, and cannot endure to see any good that is not done by themselves. Wherefore how much soever they may value themselves upon their good deeds, they carry no intrinsic merit: for their desire never terminates upon the good of another, but only urges to it as a necessary means for serving their own ends. So that the commendation bestowed on them by such as penetrate into their motive, is not paid as a debt, but thrown out as a lure, drawing them to a continuance of the like practices; and the commerce on both sides is rather a traffic of interest, than a mutual intercourse of kindness.

8. But true benevolence, as it will not bear mingling with any other motive or passion, so neither may it become a passion itself, for it must be

judicious, and then can never be such. We have laid down in the chapter of passion that the difference between that and affection lies only in the degree, and that not in the absolute strength of it neither, but in its rising so high as to become uncontrollable by reason. If this description of passion be admitted, I can readily come into the stoical doctrine concerning apathy: for the wise man will always remain master of his own actions, he will never suffer any inclination, not even the best of them, to gain an ascendant over him, he will permit them to recommend and invite, and will employ them to assist him, but never follow them implicitly, and will preserve his seat of empire over them to prevent their encroaching upon one another's rights. By this impartiality and steady tenor of conduct he will fall deficient in no one branch of benevolence; and though he will prove a tender and affectionate relation, a sincere and zealous friend, yet his attachment to particulars will not overwhelm his regard to mankind in general, but rather cherish and purify it: for by reflecting on the sincerity and heartiness wherewith he can run to oblige those who are dearest to him, he will have a pattern from his own experience, instructing him what kind of disposition to put on with respect to others. Nor will he carry himself stiffly and austerely, despising little good offices, when they do not stand in the way of more important; for though his benevolence will not degenerate into fondness, neither will it want for tenderness. He will study not only to do solid good, but to please and humour whenever it can be done without ill consequence, and will be as much though not so weakly compliant, as the good-natured man a little before spoken of, to every innocent desire and fancy: but in the manner of his compliance, will resemble the ivy which twines and conforms itself freely to all the inequalities of the substance whereto it adheres, rather than the metal that takes an impression forcibly stamped upon it, or the vapours drawn up out of their element by the insinuating action of the sun. Courteousness is the skin and outside of virtue, and though a man would wish, in the first place, to enjoy vigour of limbs and soundness of constitution, yet if he can have a good skin too, it is no detriment to his person. Therefore this will not be neglected by the sage we have in idea, he will finish his virtue in every part, small as well as great, ornamental as well as serviceable, nor think the body of it complete until the bones and muscles are invested with their proper covering.

9. But the having one inclination does not necessarily imply the utter banishment of all others, therefore benevolence will never make a man's regard for another destroy his proper regard for his own interests, nor supersede the obligations of justice, temperance, or other rules of action: much less will it prompt him to humour anybody to their own real detriment. If we take our idea of benevolence from the notions of it current among the polite world, it should seem to consist wholly in trifles, subscribing to a concert, making one in a party of pleasure, saying civil things, promoting any little scheme of one's acquaintance, or complying with them in all their follies and fancies. What is this but placing the essence of virtue in her outside, making her a man of straw, an empty covering containing nothing within? But the wise man, though not regardless of an agreeable complexion, will desire to have a solid substance underneath; he will aim constantly at the greater good, use his judgment to discern it, consult his moral sense and discretion as the surest guides to find it, and exert his resolution to follow their directions.

10. Nevertheless, if different inclinations may reside in the same person

yet inclinations directly opposite cannot; wherefore pure and perfect benevolence can never delight in mischief, nor harbour any thought of revenge. I do not say that it will preserve the same behaviour under all kinds of usage, for this would make it a weakness instead of a virtue, but a proper notice may be taken of injuries without any sentiment of revenge. The judge is not revengeful when he pronounces sentence upon the criminal, nor the magistrate when he chastises those who contemn his authority; for they do it to preserve peace, property, and order, the great blessings of society. But revenge is properly a desire of hurting those who have offended, without any further consideration: the view terminates on that point, which it can never do in the good man, being always turned a contrary way. He may punish or censure where he has it in his power, and judges it expedient and necessary, but he always carries that necessity in view: so that his animadversions will be matter of compulsion not of choice, an undesirable means to attain a greater good. He will consider wickedness as a distemper of the mind, dangerous to the patient, contagious and pernicious to the public, and proceed against it in the same disposition as a surgeon who performs a painful operation for the sake of a cure, or cuts off a limb that would endanger the whole body. He will take injuries patiently when he has not power to resent them, or finds the retaliation attended with more inconvenience than advantage. He will be ready to forgive whenever repentance renders punishment unnecessary, and rejoice to find it become so. Nor will he not retain a good will even towards his enemies, nor enmity he will have none himself, nor any resentment against them, but will only oppose them so far as to repel their attacks, or take away their power, or restrain their inclination to do hurt: in all other matters consistent with those purposes he will be ready to do them any kindness. He will have that laudable love of pleasure as to take it in all the good he sees, and feel the prosperities even of strangers; and be so covetous of enjoyment, as to make that of other persons his own, by partaking in the satisfaction attending it.

11. This it may be said is a glorious and happy temper of mind, but possible only in speculation and unattainable by frail mortal men, who are so deeply engaged in providing for their own necessities as not to be capable of opening their thoughts much beyond themselves, whose passions prove too strong for their reason to control, and whose aptness to injure would perpetually break out into act, if there were not a desire of revenge to keep it in awe. I am afraid all this is but too true, yet by contemplating the character of an ideal sage, we may learn what it is we are to aim at, and if we despair of arriving at perfection, we may endeavour to resemble it in some particulars we find feasible. For we are none of us without some seeds of good nature, which, with due cultivation, may be made to produce something in the most barren ground. Our own occasions do not so perpetually engage us but that we may sometimes spare a look elsewhere, nor do any of us want our seasons of good humour, wherein we can find a sensible delight in assisting and obliging without prospect of advantage to ourselves. The business then is to encourage these favourable dispositions whenever they appear, for though we cannot raise nor change an inclination at once, yet experience testifies that like a tender twig it may be brought to grow in any shape by continual bending: so that though we must force ourselves at first, yet repeated acts will contract a habit, which we shall then follow with ease and pleasure. It will be of signal service frequently to place ourselves in the situation of other persons, to adopt their desires, and imagine ourselves under their wants, at least to paint as exact a representation as we can of

their condition of mind, according to our manner of behaviour towards them: for then the force of sympathy will assist us greatly, because as a cheerful countenance makes the company cheerful, we shall be willing to brighten the prospect as much as we can, that it may reflect the more pleasurable ideas upon ourselves. Nor must we neglect to root up those weeds that check the growth of benevolence, an intemperance of self-interest, an averseness to trouble, a contemptuousness of pride, an inconsiderateness of vanity, but, above all, a spirit of animosity. I hope we are none of us insatiable in our resentments; and if we can set a measure to them all, what better able to assign the proper limits than reason? but this will always apportion them to the necessity of preventing some greater mischief that could not otherwise be avoided. And though passion may sometimes suspend the influence of reason, we may hinder it from enslaving her; and if we cannot help being angry, may take care that the sun shall not go down upon our wrath. As an encouragement to practise the methods above pointed out, or any others our observation may suggest, let us consider and inculcate in our memory the benefits naturally redounding to ourselves from a benevolent temper of mind, which I shall now endeavour to investigate.

12. I have assigned happiness, a man's own happiness, or the aggregate of his satisfactions, for the ultimate end of action: therefore it behoves me to show what reference the quality I recommend bears to that end, or else it will not appear worth the wise man's possessing. Nor does this contradict what I laid down a little while ago, that a benevolent act must carry nothing of self in view: for it has been made evident upon several occasions already, that our ultimate end is very rarely our ultimate point of view, but we have divers principles, like so many stages of our journey, which occupy our thoughts from time to time as we proceed. Thus, when the wise man meets an opportunity of doing a kind thing, he follows his dispostion to embrace it without looking for anything further; he performs the good office because he likes it, because he judges it right: but we must imagine he had taken his own heart under examination before, and determined to cherish benevolence there, because of the connection he had observed it to have with happiness, or with some other principle wherein he had formerly found the like connection. Let us then suppose him utterly divested of all his desires, except that of happiness, and that virtues, vices, tastes, and inclinations of every fashion, were to be sold like clothes ready made at the saleshop: let us consider why he would choose to purchase benevolence as most convenient for his wear. In the first place, he would presently discern the benefits of society, which arise solely from the mutual help afforded by mankind to one another; and though there be other motives urging them to provide for one another's conveniences, as fear, shame, glory, profit, self-interest, or custom, he would see these are only expedients to supply the want of mutual good-will, but cannot answer the purpose so completely nor universally. We see how, in parties of diversion or intercourses of friendship, the pleasure and interests of all are much better provided for by a willingness to promote them than they could be by any regulations that human skill can devise; and could mankind in general be inspired with the like sentiments, there would want nothing else to keep the world in order. If the desire of promoting the general good were to prevail among all individuals so strongly as to overcome their averseness to labour and trouble, I am persuaded it would bring back the golden age or paradisiacal state again, without any change in the elements; and whatever advances the happiness of all, must necessarily increase that of every parti-

cular. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that benevolence, in the midst of a selfish world, must admit a little more reserve and caution than would be needful among persons of its own character: yet still every feasible exercise of it tends something towards advancing the general good, wherein a prudent man will see his own contained.

13. Secondly, benevolence, judiciously exercised, will generally engage a return of the like, and entitle us to the assistance or comfort of others when we may stand in need of it: at least it will afford no fuel for malice, but tend to lessen animosity. A soft word, says Solomon, turneth away anger, and kind usage seems most likely to prevent it: if it meet with unsuitable returns, they do not fall so heavy as suitable returns upon the malicious; for malice, disappointed or chastised, fills with a vexation that has nothing to alleviate it; but the good man repaid with ingratitude still has the consolation to reflect that he acted right, and possesses a quality that will yield him better fruits upon other occasions. One receives no pleasure unless successful: the other feels a delight in the action as well as the event, so misses a part only of his reward by failing of success. Add to this that a readiness to do good offices begets esteem even with those who want it themselves: it gives a confidence in the possessor, and renders his transactions of all kinds easier to be dispatched; for nobody will scruple to trust him whom they find always wishing them well and ready to do them more than justice.

14. Thirdly, benevolence is an inclination oftener to be gratified and less liable to disappointment than malice. It is true, mischief may be done easier than good, but then mankind will quickly be aware of it and take measures to prevent it, whereas they will be ready to assist the endeavours of him that designs them well. So that though according to the principles formerly laid down, we must admit that acts of good or ill nature may give equal pleasure to those who have a taste for either, yet the one will naturally meet with opposition and the other with concurrence from the persons upon whom they are to be exercised. If I take delight in mischief, there may be ways of vexing another which I do not know; these he will carefully conceal from me, and so I shall miss a pleasure that was in my power to have enjoyed: but if he knows me fond of good offices he will be ready enough of his own accord to tell me wherein I can serve him, and so furnish me with opportunities of gratifying my inclination that I might never have thought of myself.

15. Fourthly, good nature multiplies the sources of enjoyment, for as the pleasure of life consists for the most part in action, and he is the happiest man who can always find something to engage his pursuit, therefore a relish for good offices is an advantage to the owner, because it will furnish agreeable employment for many spaces of time wherein he has nothing to do for himself. Besides, it will teach him to rejoice in services wherein he had no hand, make him partake of the pleasures he sees, and even lighten his misfortunes by reflecting how many people are exempt from them. Nor let it be objected that those who sympathize with the successful will be apt to do the like with the afflicted, for the perfect wise man would feel none of the uneasiness of compassion, and though we imperfect creatures must encourage it so far as to give a spur to our industry in helping, yet we may prevent it from making us suffer much at the sight of distresses we cannot possibly relieve. So that for a few troubles of this kind the tender-hearted man meets with, he finds a multitude of enjoyments the cross-grained and selfish never taste of.

16. Fifthly, benevolence prevents groundles suspicions and jealousies, ill opinions of mankind, unfavourable construction of words and actions; for men are not wont to think ill of those to whom they wish well. It will likewise make us observant of happy events befalling other people, for we naturally take notice of objects we are pleased to see; which will give us a better notion of external nature and the dispensations of fortune. For the tastes and wants of mankind varying infinitely, what suits one extremely well is wholly useless to another, wherefore those narrow souls who can see nothing good that does not relate to themselves, if their own desires happen to be disappointed, grow melancholy, discontented, and out of humour with the world. But the generous open hearted man sees a thousand bright spots in the prospect around him, not striking directly upon himself but reflected from others: when the clouds hang over his own head he can smile at the sunshine on either hand, and please himself in contemplating the uses of things that cannot do him any service. I believe it may be generally remarked that the best tempered people are the best satisfied with the persons and things about them, freest from gloominess and repinings at the condition of human life, and consequently easiest in themselves, most uninterruptedly cheerful, and best pleased with their situation.

17. By often contemplating these advantages of benevolence, a man may bring himself to a hearty liking of it, and then whatever opportunities of exercising it offer, he will embrace them out of inclination, not from any selfish views, but because he thinks it the best, the most becoming, and most satisfactory thing he can do. For desire being perfectly translated to the act itself, he will no more need to retain in mind the reasons first inducing him to put on that disposition, than the covetous man has to keep his eye upon the conveniences he may purchase with his money, or the mathematician to run over perpetually the whole process of demonstration by which he arrived at his theorems. For we have remarked more than once before, that it is the motive at present in view not any inducement formerly recommending that motive, which denominates the action: therefore he who shows an habitual readiness to do good offices without further consideration than there being such is truly benevolent, whatever prudential or other causes first gave him that relish.

18. But there is a spurious benevolence, too often mistaken for the genuine, which proceeds from violent attachments to particular persons: some will do anything for those they fancy, but nothing for those whose faces they do not like. This stands but one little remove from selfishness, being a weakness rather than a virtue, rendering men partial to their favourites, unjust or indifferent to everybody else, and therefore ought carefully to be guarded against. For the virtues do not use to destroy nor interfere with one another, nor will sterling benevolence ever make the possessor unequitable, or intemperate in his likings; it knows no bounds besides those of reason, and diffuses itself to all capable of receiving benefit by it: I do not say in equal measure, but as justice, though not requiring an equality of possessions, yet secures the rights of all alike, so will benevolence deal out to all their proper share of kindness, nor ever confine her regards so closely to one or a few objects as to have none left for any others.

CHAP. XXXV.

MORAL POLICY.

Plato, in his fifth republic, introduces Socrates declaring, that the world would never go well until either philosophers were entrusted with the management of public affairs, or persons in authority became philophers: that is, as he explains it afterwards, until both sciences of political and moral wisdom centred in the same persons. If this assertion be taken literally, I am afraid it will not conduce much to the benefit of mankind, for each science being more than enough to employ the thoughts of any single man, were our ministers to spend their time in hunting after the abstractions of metaphysics, they must unavoidably neglect many duties of their station; and on the other hand, were the helm of government committed to persons well versed in these matters, the ship would quickly strike against the rocks for want of skilfulness in the pilots, who would be more attentive to the rectitude of their course than expert in their measures for pursuing it. This construction then savours more of philosophical vanity than sound prudence: as it arrogates to the studious a claim to power, or at least would make him of consequence with men of power, by urging them to a pursuit wherein they must resort to him for instruction. Therefore I should rather interpret Socrates' meaning to be, that either professor, without interfering in the province belonging properly to the other, should only adopt so much of each other's science as may render his own more complete and effectual.

2. How much of philosophy may be requisite for politicians I shall not presume to determine: for as they must be possessed of great sagacity and penetration to have merited that character, they are much better qualified to judge for themselves than I can be to direct them. Yet I think I may without offence exhort them to use their own judgment, not only in contriving methods for bringing their schemes to bear, but in discerning the propriety of the schemes they take up. What tends most effectually to increase their power and aggrandizement, it belongs to their own science to ascertain; but I could wish they would ask themselves further why they desire power or aggrandizment at all. I do not propose this question by way of defiance, as if I thought there could no solid reason be given for entertaining such desire: but if we have ever so good reasons for our conduct, I conceive it expedient we should know them, because they may direct us how far and in what manner to pursue it. Common persons may be allowed to act implicitly upon principles instilled into them by others, for their want of capacity to strike out lights for themselves will plead their excuse: but for men of extraordinary talents to make power their ruling passion merely because they were taught to admire it in their childhood, because they see others aspiring eagerly after it, because it gains the applauses of the multitude, because it happens to hit their fancy, seems unbecoming their character. It may be expected from such that, instead of acting upon impulse or suffering themselves to be drawn by sympathy and example, they should trace thier motives up to the first principles whereto reason can carry them, and before they begin their career of ambition, examine the grounds which may justify them for entering upon such

a course. If they should find upon such inquiry that happiness or complacence of mind, from whatever object received, is the sole proper and ultimate end of action, that the good of every individual is best promoted by promoting the general good, that our passions and particular aims ought to be regarded as engines, employed by reason for spurring on our activity to work out her purposes, and that whatever desire can be no longer gratified it is most prudent to extinguish, they might then employ their power while they had it, in advancing the welfare of their country, as well by procuring it strength and security against foreign dangers, as by establishing regulations for its internal polity: and if age or infirmities, the intrigues of a cabal or popular distaste, should divest them of their authority, they might resign it quietly, without reluctance, without attempting to raise disturbances, and without want of employment to solace themselves with, in a private station. I am the more emboldened to offer this exhortation, because I conceive it not disagreeable to the taste of the present times; if one almost immured within his closet may judge of the sentiments of the great by so much of their behaviour as stands exposed to public view. For our wars are made, not for ambition or conquest, for particular views or private resentments, but for the security of commerce and advancing the public interests: wholesome provisions are annually contriving for the better order, the convenience, and even pleasures of the community: when changes happen in the ministry they pass on silently without interruption to public affairs, except a little clamour and invective while the smart of a disappointment is fresh, which disturbs the quiet of none but such as are fond of the sport for want of something better to employ their time in: and in general I think I can discern a stronger tincture of sound philosophy and regard to the general good among our modern statesmen than I can find in the histories of our ancestors.

3. Thus much may suffice for the politicians, and more it might not have become me to urge upon men of their superior talents: but with regard to the philosophers, under which class I would beg leave upon the present occasion to comprehend all who apply any serious attention to study the measures of right and wrong, I may be more free and particular, as reckoning them to lie nearer my own level. And I cannot help remarking that their ardour for virtue sometimes outruns their discretion, and like other strong desires defeats its own purposes through too great eagerness in pursuing them. It is possible with the best intentions in the world to bring much mischief both upon ourselves and others, by following headlong a blind zeal without knowledge and without examining the expedience of our aims or fitness of the measures taken to effect them. The province of zeal lies in seasons of action, and its office is to carry us through labour, pain, difficulty, danger, to bear down the force of any passion that shall obstruct our passage; but it does not become us to act without considering why nor wherefore, and in seasons of deliberation the mind cannot be too calm and unprejudiced, nor the mental eye too disengaged from any single point, or too much at liberty to look upon every object around and discern them in their proper colours. Wherefore, I apprehend with Socrates, that the world would go on much better, if well disposed persons would not confide too inplicitly in their rules, but examine them from time to time as they have leisure and opportunity, consider their tendencies, mark how they succeed, and observe whether in particular instances they lead to that ultimate end of all rules, the increase of happiness: and further, if in the prosecution of them they

would mingle a little policy with their uprightness, choosing such measures as upon every occasion will contribute most to the purpose they have in hand. Craft, cunning, and artifice stand opposed to fair dealing, sincerity, and open-heartedness; from whence it seems to have been unwarily concluded, that to be honest a man must have thrown aside his understanding. But there are honest arts as well as deceitful tricks, and it is not the manner of proceeding, but the aim driven at, that denominates them either. The same sagacity and attention to catch opportunities, which makes craft in the selfish, becomes prudence and good policy in the benevolent: nor do I see why a man should not employ all the talents nature and education have furnished him with to good purposes, because some others have perverted them to bad ones. The covetous man, who makes money his idol, will cheat for it if he cannot procure it otherwise: what then should hinder the good man, who takes happiness for his sole aim, from cheating his neighbours into it, if he cannot get them to receive it willingly?

4. The foundation of politics I take to lie in submitting every other desire to the ruling passion: though honours be particularly alluring to the ambitious, yet if the statesman sees that he shall have greater influence by sitting among the commons, he will not accept of a title; and how strongly soever he may have established maxims with himself for increasing his interest, if he perceives them by any circumstances rendered improper for his purpose, he will readily forego them. Now the virtuous man's principal aim is the advancement of happiness, to which every other consideration ought to give way; and though he may have contracted desires as subservient thereto, and set up marks for himself to guide him on his way, yet if by any accident his desires become incompatible therewith or his rules lead him astray, he ought to depart from them without scruple; he may cast his eye upon the marks for the direction they will afford him, but ought never to forget the main purpose for which they were set up. We have seen that satisfaction consists in perception, that action is good only as it affords satisfactory perceptions, and virtue good as it leads into a course of such actions; so that virtue is a means only conducting to our ultimate end, and stands at least two removes from happiness. It is true we cannot expect to attain our end without using the proper means, and I know of no means so proper or effectual as a steady adherence to whatever our moral sense represents to us as right. Were our internal senses of nature's immediate donation, they would probably discern their objects as truly and distinctly as the bodily senses, but it has been shown in a former place that their judgments are of the translated kind, conveyed to us through experience, sympathy, or the instructions of others, which channels sometimes corrupt the stream; so that this guide, though the surest we have, does not always prove infallible, nor is there anything so idle or absurd but what men have been reconciled to under a notion of its being right. How many have been led into all the follies of fashion, drawn into mischievous compliances with the company, put upon ruinous expenses, urged to take revenge for slight affronts and supposed injuries, hurried on through all the cruelties of persecution, because they esteemed them right? Perhaps their own judgment and inclination would have carried them another way, yet they proceed, though with reluctance, because they think they ought. For shame, resentment, vanity, and prejudice, will sometimes assume the garb and countenance of a moral sense.

5. Nor is reason herself to be trusted too hastily, for she may find occasion to correct her own mistakes: and an obstinate adherence to her deci-

sions once made, against further information, tends as much to produce bigotry as any deference to authority whatsoever. Persons of this tenacious turn allege ordinarily in their defence, that we must necessarily follow our reason, because we have no higher faculty to control it: but it is no uncommon thing for the same faculty to control its own judgments. What have we to judge of visible objects beside the eye? yet this eye, upon their being brought nearer, or placed in a different light, may discover the fallaciousness of the notices itself had given before: or on perceiving a haziness in the prospect, may know its own appearances to be imperfect, and yield to the information of others who stand in a situation to discern them clearer. So reason may find causes sometimes to submit herself to authority, and trust to others in matters belonging to their several sciences, although appearing paradoxical to herself: nor can she ever be so sure of her determinations, but that evidence may arise sufficient to overthrow them. Let us then admit it possible that a man may act very unreasonably through too strong an attachment to reason; let her therefore continually watch over her own motions, as well as those of our inferior powers, for if she treads confidently and carelessly, she may be as liable to trip as appetite.

6. Besides, it has been made appear before that reason actuates very few of our motions, she acts chiefly by her inferior officers of the family of imagination: while her treasures remain in her own custody they rest in speculation alone, nor do they become practical until she has made them over in property to her partner, in which case they take the nature of appetites. For it avails nothing to know what is right, nor to resolve upon it, until we have contracted a desire and inclination strong enough to carry us through all difficulties in the pursuit of it: so that virtue itself when completely formed is but an appetite, acquired indeed by our own industry, but impelling to action in the same manner with the natural. Now none of our appetites, not even the best of them, can be left entirely to themselves without extreme hazard: our very hunger and thirst after righteousness, like that of meats and drinks, if eagerly and fondly indulged, may rise to extravagant cravings, or hanker after unwholesome food.

7. But neither can the love of rectitude in general answer all the purposes of life: we must divide it into various branches, and furnish ourselves with under propensities suitable to the various occasions wherein we are to act, from whence spring those inferior virtues that help to diversify the characters of mankind. Now how much soever the main foundations of right and wrong may be laid in nature, and consequently unalterable, certain it is that the particular habits and propensities, conducting us in the several parts of our behaviour, may change their rectitude with a change of situation or circumstances; and what is virtue at one time or in one man, become vice or folly in another. What is more commendable than application in a young lad, while the spirits are brisk, and the animal circulation vigorous? but if he continues the same intenseness of application after age and infirmities have disabled him from doing any good thereby, when it takes him off from other duties whereof he may be capable, or tends to impairing his health, it becomes faulty. To the young trader beginning upon a slender stock, a habit of parsimony and attention to little matters is a necessary duty: but if any sudden fortune should cast an estate upon him, the same disposition of mind would remain no longer proper or becoming. It is well known what strong hold our habits of all kinds take upon us, and those first recommended by reason, or taught us by persons in whose understanding we confide, are looked upon as right in themselves,

taken as first principles of action, and not easily laid aside when grown unreasonable; unless we have practised that statesman's habit of casting our eye frequently upon our ultimate end, and used ourselves to try our rules of conduct by a reference to expedience.

8. The same consideration likewise may induce us to regard other things more beneficial to the world in some cases than what is ordinarily esteemed virtue. A man that wants shoes will sooner resort to a clever workman than one scrupulously honest, that is a bungler in his trade: and when attacked by a distemper, had rather call in a debauchee physician, skilful in his profession, than one strictly conscientious, but of dull capacity and little experience. Were all our artisans and professors to barter their knowledge and dexterity for a proportionable degree of virtue, the world would suffer greatly by the exchange: we should all be ready indeed to help one another, but could do no good for want of knowing how to go about it. Therefore there are other qualities, beside that of an upright disposition, worthy the attention of him that designs the general good. The want of making this reflection seems the grand mistake of enthusiasts and rigid observers of a stoical rectitude: for by their incessant and vehement exhortations to inward righteousness they either make men selfish, so busied in improving the state of their own minds as never to do anything for anybody else, unless to pray for them, or censure them, or give money to those who pretend to give it away again; or else take them off from the business of their callings, wherein they might do real service to their neighbours. But virtue, as has been observed before concerning reason, confers us very little benefit with her own hands, no more than by that complacence of mind we feel in the exercise of it, which we may sometimes find as well in the gratification of any other desire: the principal service she does is by keeping us diligent in acquiring all other things beneficial to us, and applying them, when acquired, to the best advantage, both of ourselves and others. Wherefore he that never loses remembrance of the general good, will endeavour to procure for himself and such as lie within his influence, all useful endowments both of body and mind, as well as the disposition to use them rightly. If he should do otherwise, he would be like a man who should spend his whole time in a riding-school, in order to make himself a complete horseman; but never get a horse to ride upon either on the road or field.

9. Nor must it be forgotten that our virtues do not start up in us instantaneously, but grow out of other habits and desires. Ambition, covetousness, vanity, spur us on to industry, an affectation of being thought polite makes men obliging, fear begets caution, obstinacy produces courage, and a careful regard to our own interests generates discretion, from whence sprouts the cardinal virtue of prudence. The main turn of our future lives is ordinarily given before we arrive at manhood: the course we are then put upon by our friends, or led into by our own particular liking, taken up without judgment but by mere fancy, the tastes, inclinations, opinions, we then imbibe, lay the foundation of those virtues we afterwards acquire. Perhaps, an admiration raised at the finery of a Chancellor, or Lord Mayor's coach, may have stimulated many a young school boy or apprentice to that application which lays the ground-work of those good qualities that will make him eminent at the bar or in commerce. Therefore a judicious lover of virtue will study to cultivate and prepare the ground for its reception, and nourish up such wild plants as may serve for stocks whereon it may be grafted most easily, and flourish most abundantly.

10. He will consider further, that the busy mind of man cannot stand a moment idle: our activity must exert itself some way or other from morning to night, and if reason has not planned out a course wherein it may expatiate, it will run after any whim or folly that shall present it with allurement. Besides, satisfaction being momentary, cannot be provided for completely without supplying fresh fuel every moment to keep it alive: happiness depends upon having something constantly at hand, wherein we can employ ourselves with relish. Now, the grand occasions of exercising virtue do not offer at every season, nor can the mind always find employment in her immediate service: wherefore it will be expedient to furnish ourselves with other aims and pursuits, methods of engagement or recreation, which may fill up the spaces she leaves vacant; choosing such, if possible, as may conduce remotely to her interests, or at least such as are innocent, and may protect her by preventing the growth of those evils that might blight and overshadow her.

11. It is one characteristic of policy, that it aims at things feasible rather than things desirable, never attempts impossibilities, but applies its endeavours always to drive the nail that will go, and lays aside its most favourite schemes when the tide of popular dislike sets most strongly against them. If the nation will not have an excise, the statesman lays aside all further thoughts of it; and if they will have a militia, he concurs in planning schemes to satisfy them. In this respect your very righteous people prove often grossly deficient: they fix their eye upon the sublimest heights of virtue, without considering whether they be attainable; they confine their exhortations to practices that would prove of excellent service, but they have no likelihood of ever being followed; and so by aiming at too much, miss of that benefit they might have done. Whereas it would become them better to study not only the abstract nature of things, but likewise the nature of men, their characters, dispositions, and capacities; accommodating their endeavours to the subjects whereon they employ them, and circumstances of the times wherein they exert them; choosing rather to sow such seeds as the soil will bear, and the season cherish, than such as would yield the most delicious grain. The interests of virtue require sometimes that we should temporize and dissemble, becoming all things to all men, if by any means we may gain some, and drawing them unawares into their good, by seeming to soothe them in their favourite inclinations. He that would serve virtue effectually, must not disdain to do her small services as well as great, for occasions of the latter, as was observed in the last section, do not occur at every turn; and many times, when we cannot get her authority to prevail, we may introduce something very much resembling her, and contribute to the growth of other good qualities, that shall in some measure supply her place, by instigating to the very works she herself would recommend. Besides, when the mind has been habituated to the practice of good works, from what motive soever induced thereto, it will become more susceptible of right intentions afterwards.

12. There is a well-known maxim of politics, Divide and govern, which the moralist may turn to good account in the management of his province. The little state of man is far from being an absolute monarchy, or having any settled or well-regulated polity, the prerogative lies within a very narrow compass, but the power lodges in the rabble of appetites and passions: and any importunate fancy, that like some popular orator, the favourite of the day, can raise a mob of them to clamour after it, bears down all opposition. Reason can do nothing to stem the torrent, unless she can stir up

a party among the populace to side with her: for if they begin to quarrel among themselves, she may then cast in her weight, to turn the balance between them. Nor can she ever prevail by mere dint of resolution, to have her commands vigorously executed without aid of some passion to second her: and, as she will always find one or other of them opposing her measures, she must continually play them one against another: pleasure against indolence, selfishness against pleasure, vanity against selfishness, fear against rashness, shame against indulgence, resentment against cowardice, reputation against injustice, and particular desires against their several competitors. Wherefore she ought to bend her endeavours towards suppressing the most riotous, rather encouraging the weaker and more manageable, that she may have something ready at hand to assist in pulling down the others: but above all, she must beware of letting any one grow so powerful, as that it may wrest the staff out of her hands. If she does admit a ruling passion, let her employ it as a first minister to execute her orders, not as a favourite, to gain an ascendant over her, nor suffer it to fill the council board with a clan of its own dependents. Your zealots sometimes commit this oversight; for observing that all men have a desire of excelling, they endeavour to turn this principle to the services of virtue, and herein they do well: but they go on to encourage it without measure until it begets spiritual pride, censoriousness, sourness, envy, and ill nature, possesses their whole minds, becomes the sole motive to do good works, and vitiates the best of their performances.

13. The politician carefully surveys the ground before him, considers what may be done with the materials he has to work upon, does not run counter to prevailing humours nor particular fancies, but studies how to turn them to his own advantage, sets every engine at work, and neglects no trifle that may be employed any ways to advance his purposes. So let the moralist observe the disposition and qualities of his own mind, the circumstances of his situation, the temper and character of the times wherein he lives: not striving to force his way by opposition, nor vainly expecting to make everything tally with an ideal plan, how well soever framed in his own imagination; but contriving how to draw the most good from opinions and customs already received, by grafting something beneficial upon them: not driving men violently out of their accustomed courses, but turning them gently and dexterously into such track as may lead to their solid advantage. For a single person may promote the interests of virtue better by joining in with the company to encourage practices tending in any degree thereto, than he can by striking into a new road which he has nothing besides his own authority to recommend. Nor let him despise every little ceremony or vulgar notion as idle and unworthy his notice: for sometimes these small springs may be turned to good account, or made to put others in motion which may prove more efficacious.

14. It is no inconsiderable branch of the minister's art to discern the talents of men, to know what they are fit for, and employ every one in the way wherein he may be most useful. In like manner, it is an essential part of the moralist's office to observe carefully with what endowments nature and education have furnished himself or any others he has to deal with, what are the duties of their respective stations, and what opportunities they have of promoting the grand design of happiness. For though it were to be wished that every virtue might be infused into every man, yet this being impracticable, it behoves each person to acquire such particular species of them as are best adapted to his use. For different profes-

sions require different qualifications to succeed in them: courage is peculiarly necessary for some, temperance for others, impartiality of justice for others.

Wherefore let every man apply himself to the attainment of that virtue wherein he can make the greatest progress, and which will render him the most serviceable according to the situation and circumstances he stands in. Were it possible to make profound philosophers of the common artizans and mechanics, the world would be very little benefitted thereby, for it might take them from attending to the business of their occupations, and render them less useful members of the community: therefore it were better for them to cultivate the qualities of honesty and industry in their callings without aiming at much beside. Some, whose talents fit them peculiarly for the office, may do more good by improving their reason, pursuing such speculations as may produce something beneficial to others; but few of these are wanted in the world, for one man may discover what will employ thousands to use. The far greater part of mankind have little more work for their reason than to choose their guides and apply the directions received to their own particular occasions, for the service they do lies in action. The purposes of life are effected by an infinite variety of different ways, and would be better answered by every one taking the task properly belonging to him, than by all crowding in to perform a few of the most important.

15. Your statesmen are observed often to stand much upon punctilios, to contend strenuously for the precedence of an ambassador, the ceremonial of an entry, or style to be used in a treaty. So the moralist, though he always prefers substantials before forms, yet where the latter affect the former he will stickle as earnestly for them: for he extends his view as far as it can reach, and regards not only the present action but the most distant consequences attending it. When he sees usages and ceremonies, however insignificant in themselves, so connected in people's minds with matters of importance as that one cannot be broken through without endangering the others, he will consider them as bulwarks protecting the essentials, and contend for them accordingly with might and main. As the inhabitants of a town exert all their efforts in defending the ramparts, though yielding neither corn nor pasture nor accommodations for their dwelling, for this obvious reason, because when those are taken the town lies at mercy. Of this kind we may reckon the rites of burial and decencies observed towards the dead, which though of no real avail or intrinsic value, yet find place in all civilized countries: because they stand as barriers against that savageness which might otherwise encroach upon men's tempers and cause infinite mischiefs among the living. Nor will he consent to have his rules dispensed with whenever he sees them expedient for the present, if there is a hazard of their being so weakened thereby as never to recover their influence again: proceeding upon my Lord Coke's maxim, that the law will rather suffer a private injury than a public inconvenience.

16. But how anxious soever the man of consummate policy may appear about niceties upon proper occasion, there is nobody less hampered with scruples when he sees them standing in the way of his designs: he can throw aside animosities, put up with injuries, submit to indignities, when it serves his purpose, and join with his bitterest enemies when there chances to be a coalition of interests. Here, too, the man of judicious virtue will follow his steps, nor disdain to employ the ministry of her adversaries in promoting her designs, not scrupling to cherish any vice or folly that tends evidently to check the growth of others more enormous. It is true he can

scarce ever find occasion to use his endeavours this way, for vice and folly sprout fast enough of themselves without needing any culture, and were it possible it would be desirable totally to eradicate them all, for then we might expect to reap a more plentiful crop of happiness. But since evil dispositions will abound, since they continually oppose one another's aims, and prevent the mischievous effects that would flow therefrom, it behoves him to act circumspectly, forbearing to do good where it may occasion a greater hurt, nor attempting to reform the world in points wherein, though it may be faulty, yet a worse evil would ensue upon such reformation. Nor can it be called deserting the interests of virtue to turn our backs upon her for a while in order to serve her more effectually, for policy requires us to do the same in our other pursuits: we follow pleasure through the road of self-denial, money must be disbursed to purchase commodities that will bring in a larger return, and lowliness, says Shakspeare, is young ambition's ladder. So that virtue may well excuse us for running into the enemy's camp to turn his own cannon against him, if we have her interests at heart all the while, and a reasonable prospect of promoting her service in the long run by so doing.

17. Great pains was taken by a particular author some time ago to show that the vices of men tend to the benefit of the community, and though he seems to have made good his assertion in particular instances, yet it was an unfair conclusion to infer from thence in general that private vices were public benefits: for so it might be proved that disease conduces to health, because the doctor sometimes brings on a gout in order to cure other more dangerous distempers, or wishes to raise a fever to force away obstructions causing paralytic disorders. But disease is then only salutary when necessary to remove disease, and vices then only tolerable when they put men upon actions from which their other vices would withhold them. So that the benefit of vice, when it affords any, arises from its hurtfulness: for if the vices it counteracts were not mischievous, there would be no good in that which obstructs their operation.

18. But it is the property of a politician to be close and covert and keep his motives of action to himself. This the man wisely righteous will imitate with respect to the doctrine above mentioned of conniving at particular vices occasionally, which falling into unskilful or ill-designing hands may prove of dangerous consequence, as opening a door to the most latitudinarian practices. Therefore he will lock it up among his esoterics for the use only of adepts, and think the sacredness of the rules of virtue cannot be too strongly inculcated upon the vulgar, who, being apt to take that for good which suits their own humours and interests, would make mad work, unless restrained by the authority of rules. For they do not stand in a situation to judge of the general expedience, but can only be led into it by the maxims of morality, and must unavoidably lose their way the moment they take off their eye from that guidance. I have said before under the article of justice, and repeat it here with regard to morality in general, that I like to see young men rather over scrupulous, nor would wish them to wear off their scruples but by degrees, as they arrive at a full discernment of their respective inconveniences: for it requires a considerable degree of skill and competent experience to prevent liberty from running into licentiousness. Our school-masters keep their lads strictly to the rules of grammar and prosody, nor until perfect therein ever suffer them to launch out into poetical licences: they would whip a boy who should write, like Milton, Adam the godliest man of men since born his sons, the fairest of her

daughters Eve; or reckon only three syllables in Tiresiàs, or four in Beelzebub, or place their accent in the middle of Prosérpine. It is the masterpiece of moral science to know when a fundamental rule may be dispensed with, nor ought great liberties ever to be taken until we have learned by long experience how to do it safely, and have made such a proficiency in virtue, as that a single act of necessary disrespect cannot endanger the lessening our cordial regard for her.

19. There is one piece of good policy very proper for the moralist, though not at all suited to the cabinet, which is, to make others like himself, and diffuse his virtues as far and wide as he has opportunities for so doing. Considering how much of our enjoyments depends upon those we converse with, it may be made a question whether it would be more for a man's ease to be wicked himself, but surrounded with persons just, prudent, and benevolent, or to be singly good in the midst of a corrupt and perverse generation: but there is no need to canvass this point, for it must certainly make for his interest, that the morals of all with whom he has any concern should be improved, and he can take no likelier method for propagating good qualities elsewhere than by cultivating them first in himself. But then he must proceed in this culture with discretion, attending not only to the growth of his plants but to their aptness for transplanting, taking care to make his virtues inviting as well as genuine, to set them off with such appearance as may make them more easily catched by sympathy, to abate of such rigour and austerity as might raise a distaste against them, to forbear what is innocent when likely to give offence; remembering that things lawful may not be expedient, and to have a view in all his actions to their exemplariness, as well as their rectitude.

CHAP. XXXVI.

LIMITATION OF VIRTUE.

I HOPE what has been hitherto delivered, may be found tending to recommend virtue as the most desirable object a man can pursue, to rest it upon the solid foundation of human nature, instead of those airy notions of an essential beauty wherein some have placed it, and to purify it from those extravagancies wherewith it has been loaded by the indiscretion of zealots. But to deal ingenuously and aim at truth, rather than saving the credit of our performance, let us not suppress an exception there lies against it, as limiting and confining the obligation of virtue within a certain compass which ought to extend to all cases universally. For it may be urged, that if satisfaction, a man's own satisfaction, be the groundwork of all our motives; if reason can furnish no ends of her own, but serves only to discover methods of accomplishing those assigned her by sense; if she recommends virtue and benevolence solely as containing the most copious sources of gratification: then are virtue and benevolence no more than means, and deserve our regard no longer than while they conduce towards their end. So that upon an opportunity offering wherein a man may gain some pleasure or advantage slily and safely without danger of after damage to himself, though with infinite detriment to all the world beside, and in breach of every moral obligation, he will act wisely to embrace it.

2. I cannot deny that the consequence follows in speculation upon the

case above supposed, but I conceive such case can never happen in fact, so long as a man has any prospect of good and evil to come. For we must take into account, not only the advantage accruing from an action, but likewise the benefits or mischiefs of the disposition of mind giving birth to it: and if this will lead us into evils overbalancing the present profit of the action, we cannot be said to do it without danger of after damage to ourselves. The virtues belong to the heart rather than the head, or to speak in our own style, their residence lies in the imagination not the understanding; and to be complete must direct our inadvertent motions as well as our deliberate, that is, must become appetites impelling to action without standing to consider their expedience. Now whoever resists their impulse soberly and premediately upon consideration of their being inconvenient to his private purposes, will thereby make such a breach upon their authority and give such a crooked turn to his mind, as must unavoidably draw him into evils greater than any immediate advantage he may gain. All vice, says Juvenal, stands upon a precipice, and if we once step over the brink, nobody can tell how far we shall go down: one of these two things must necessarily follow, either we shall continue sliding until we fall into destruction, or must put ourselves to infinite trouble in climbing the precipice, a trouble far exceeding the pleasure we may have felt at first in the ease of a downhill motion. He that cheats when he can do it safely will want to cheat at other times, and consequently must suffer, either by a self-denial or the mischiefs of an indulgence: so that it had been more for his benefit to have adhered inviolably to his rule of honesty. The ultimate end we have assigned for a reasonable creature to act upon was not present pleasure or profit but the aggregate of enjoyments: and we have laboured, I hope not unsuccessfully, to prove from a survey of human nature that nothing adds so largely to that aggregate as a right disposition of mind. We have indeed placed enjoyment in gratification, but then have put those who will lend us an ear in mind, that gratification depends more upon bending desire to such a ply as that it may fasten upon things attainable and convenient, than upon procuring the objects of every desire starting up in our fancy. Now the habits of moral prudence and benevolence alone can bring desire to the proper ply: but those habits cannot retain their influence with him who shall wilfully and upon principle permit his other desires to break in upon them. Therefore though the common rules of virtue may lawfully be dispensed with upon an honest regard to her interests and a judicious discernment of the greater general good, for this strengthens our attachment to those objects whereon the rules were founded: yet we may never infringe them upon any other consideration of pleasure or selfishness, for this would be introducing another principle of action inconsistent with the former. But it would be the most imprudent thing in the world for a man to allow himself in such liberties as must destroy a principle of conduct that prudence and reason have recommended, so long as there remains any prospect of his receiving future benefit from its influence.

3. Nevertheless, it must be confessed that when life draws near to an end, if it should be urged upon us that then the obligations to virtue must cease, I should not know what to answer. For since they arise from expedience, they must drop of course when there is no longer a possibility of that expedience taking place. We have laid down before, that a man need never deny himself in anything unless in order to please himself better another time; if then he shall never see that other time, there is no reason why he should deny himself at all: but he may without scruple gratify

whatever desires he finds in his heart, since there is no room for any bad consequences to follow upon them; nor need he fear their subverting a principle he has found all along of excellent use to guide him in his conduct, when he has no further course to run wherein that principle may direct him. Why should he restrain his extravagance when he has enough to last him the little time he expects to live? why should he forbear intemperance when it cannot have time to fill him with diseases? why should he scruple to cheat when he shall slip out of harm's way before a discovery can overtake him? why should he trouble himself with what becomes of the world when he is upon the point of leaving it: or do anything for the benefit of others, when he can receive no returns from them, nor in any manner gather the fruits of his labours.

4. But notwithstanding this concession, it does not necessarily follow that a man must quit the practice of virtue when he sees his dissolution approaching; for this will depend upon the turn of mind he has already taken. If indeed he has pursued it hitherto by constraint, and still finds in himself strong propensities to gluttony, debauchery, gallantry, and other inordinate desires, I have suggested no arguments which might induce him to restrain them, nor offered advantages he can reap sufficient to compensate the trouble of a self-denial. For as physicians permit a patient, whom they have absolutely given over, to eat and drink whatever he pleases, because when nothing can do him good nothing can hurt him; so the moralist will think it in vain to prescribe a regimen for diseases of the mind, when there is no time to work a cure, nor any enjoyment of health to be expected. Our motives of action are not to be changed presently, nor can we give a new turn to desire as easily as put on our clothes; therefore, when the glass is almost run out, it is too late to think of taking up a set of fresh inclinations, but every one must be left to make the most of those he already possesses. But this very consideration will engage the man who has spent his days in a virtuous course to persevere in it to the last: not indeed now from obligation or expedience, but for the ease and pleasure he finds in pursuing an habitual track. We observed just now that the virtues to be complete must have fixed their residence in the heart, and become appetites impelling to action, without further thought than the gratification of them; so that after their expedience ceases, they still continue to operate by the desire they raise. Nor is it unusual in other cases for men to continue the courses they have been accustomed to, after the reasons upon which they began them are no more. I knew a mercer, who having gotten a competency of fortune, thought to retire and enjoy himself in quiet, but finding he could not be easy without business, was forced to return to the shop and assist his former partners gratis, in the nature of a journeyman. Why then should it be thought strange that a man, long inured to the practice of moral duties, should persevere in them out of liking, when they can yield him no further advantage? To tell him that he may squander without fear of poverty, gluttonize without danger of distempers, and bring a secret mischief upon others without hazard of its ever coming round upon himself, were no temptation to him: for he has no relish to such divertisements, his appetites having been long since set upon what is just, and becoming, and beneficent. So that though prudence has no further commands, he will employ himself in the same exercises she used to enjoin, as the most agreeable way wherein he can lay out his few remaining moments.

5. Upon this occasion, I cannot avoid entering the lists once more on

behalf of Epicurus, to vindicate him against a charge of inconsistency, laid by Tully in his second de Finibus, Cap. 30, 31. Epicurus it seems had written a letter, on the last day of his life, to one Hermachus, earnestly recommending his pupils, the children of his deceased friend, Metrodorus, to his tuition. And had directed by will, that his executors should provide an entertainment, yearly, on his birth-day, and on the like day of every month, for such as used to study philosophy with him, in order to preserve alive in their minds the remembrance of himself and of the said Metrodorus. Now this friendly concern for the name and family of Metrodorus, and this careful provision for keeping up the spirit of the sect, by bringing them together once a month, Tully thinks acting out of character in one who referred all things to pleasure, and held that whatever happens after our decease is nothing to us. But whoever observes the motions of the human mind, may see that many things which are nothing to us when they happen, are yet a great delight to us in the prospect and contemplation. How often do people please themselves with laying schemes for raising a family, or spreading their fame to future ages, without any probable assurance that they shall enjoy the successes of their family, or have any knowledge of what the world shall say of them a hundred years hence? but the thought of what shall then happen affords them a present entertainment, and therefore they follow pleasure as much in promoting those schemes as they should do in pursuit of any favourite diversion. I would fain know how Tully would have had Epicurus dispose of his last day to have acted in character: should it have been spent in the enjoyment of nice dainties, exquisite wines, or fine women? this he might have expected had he had the same notion of Epicurus that we have of an epicure. La Fontaine's glutton having eaten up a whole salmon all but the jowl, so surfeited himself therewith, that his physicians declared him past all hopes of a recovery: well, says he, since the case is so, then bring me the rest of my fish. Now this man we must own behaved consistently with himself throughout: but why must other people follow his example who have not the same fondness for salmon? Let us give everybody their due, whether we like them or not: it appears from what accounts have been handed down to us, and which Tully was not ignorant of, that nobody was less of an epicure than Epicurus himself. He had carefully studied the sources of pleasure and found nothing more conducive thereto than temperance, patience, benevolence, and all the moral virtues; we may suppose he had so full a persuasion of this their tendency, and so inured himself to the practice of them, that he had gotten an habitual liking to them, and could not turn his hand to anything else with equal relish. Imagine then a man of this turn arrived at the last morning of his existence, and considering how to pass his only remaining day with most satisfaction to himself: how could he do it better than by continuing that course which he had constantly found most pleasurable and best suited to his taste? There is no occasion to suppose the love of probity, friendship, and public spirit, to be innate: for the perpetual experience and contemplation of their advantageousness is enough to make them objects of desire.

6. But though I have thus much to allege in favour of Epicurus, towards showing that his conduct might be all of a piece when he wrote the letter and made the will above mentioned, notwithstanding his referring all things to pleasure: yet I cannot so easily justify Regulus against all imputation of imprudence upon the like principle. For it is one thing to contrive how we shall lay out the day in a manner most agreeable to our liking, when nothing

we do therein can affect us to-morrow, and quite another to take our measures wisely when it depends upon our present behaviour whether we shall have a morrow or no. There is nothing more glaringly evident than that the end of Being must put an end to enjoyment: therefore, he that takes a course, how satisfactory soever to his own mind, which must destroy him, acts imprudently, as he consults present satisfaction rather than the aggregate of it, wherein happiness properly consists. Nor am I moved with those ranting exclamations of the Stoics, that there is more joy in a day well spent than in years of sensual delights: I am sensible our pleasures are not all equal in degree, but I cannot conceive how so much enjoyment can be crowded into a small space of time as to make it worth our while to neglect years to come for the sake of it; for our organs can neither bear nor contain so large a measure. Such outcries are in the style of the dissolute and inconsiderate, as encouraging the same disregard to the future with the maxim they proceed upon, a short life and a merry. But the most fatal mistake men are apt to fall into, lies in their estimating pleasures according to the degree of them: for it has been made appear under the article of Pleasure, that we are much more beholden to those of the gentler kind, as adding more largely to the aggregate of satisfactions, than to the intense. Even our common diversions please more by the engagement of some pursuit they put us upon than by the joy of an acquisition. Nor shall we see cause to lay so much stress upon the raptures of virtue, when we reflect how many less worthy objects can give them as well for a time; a sudden turn of good fortune, a title of honour, a ribbon, whether blue, green, or red, the smiles of a mistress, a kind word, a delusive promise, the veriest trifle, will do it in proportion to the fondness there is for them: so that a day spent in the accomplishment of any eager desire carries as much intrinsic weight, abstracted from all considerations of the future, as a day spent in the exercise of virtue. Wherefore the preferableness of virtue does not arise so much from the transports she occasions as from the calm serenity and steady complacence of mind she insures, the satisfactory reflections she gives scope to, the attainableness of the desires she raises, their compatibleness with one another, and their clearness from mischievous consequences: all which regard the time to come, and therefore cannot consist with whatever renders us incapable of good or evil for the future.

7. Yet neither can it be certainly concluded from men's enduring patiently for a good cause, that they feel those transports in supporting it which shall keep their minds in a state of continual enjoyment: for we may remember, that objects operate no less by the want than the desire of them; by our unwillingness to miss them than by the pleasure of moving towards them: and that there is an abhorrence of vice as well as a love of virtue. When motives act this way they fall under the class of necessity, which always throws the mind into a state of uneasiness; nor is her condition instantly bettered upon doing well while it is done out of obligation, nor until we can come to do it upon liking. If this were Regulus' case, we must certainly pronounce him to have acted imprudently, and that Epicurus could not have done the same consistently with his principles, since he gave up all those enjoyments he might have expected in a longer life without receiving even present pleasure in exchange: and it had been for his benefit to have had no such strong attachment to his obligations. But not to derogate from the character of Regulus, let us suppose the utmost that can be supposed in his favour: let us allow him to have felt so great satisfaction in the nobleness of his conduct as drew out the sting

of every evil that could befal him, and to have ended his days in exquisite delight amidst all the cruel torments that were inflicted upon him. Still this delight, how high soever in kind, must necessarily fall short in duration; and he had better have contented himself with smaller pleasures which might have compensated by their continuance for what they wanted in weight. Perhaps it may be said he had contracted so strong a detestation of treachery and abhorrence of infamy that he could not support himself in any quiet of mind under the reflection of them: so that being no longer capable of enjoying life with pleasure he chose to end it in a manner that might prove most satisfactory. But what brought him under this incapacity besides his own disposition of mind which could find a relish in nothing but what was just, becoming, and laudable? Another who had not the same squeamish disposition might have found enjoyments enow under general censure and self-reproach to make life desirable. Nor will it suffice to allege that he had good grounds at first for acquiring this disposition, which having once taken up it was not in his power to lay down again at pleasure: for it is not our business to find excuses for him in the weakness of human nature, which cannot suddenly change a rooted habit of acting or liking that we have long accustomed ourselves to, but to inquire whether this procedure of his were a weakness or no. And for this purpose we must imagine to ourselves a man who should have an absolute command over his inclinations to turn them this way or that as he saw proper, and consider how such an one would use his power in the situation of Regulus. We cannot well suppose otherwise than that such a person would keep his eye constantly fixed upon the original rule of rectitude which drives solely at happiness. He would establish upon that bottom certain maxims of conduct and morality as he judged them conducive thereto: but he would never suffer himself to be enslaved by the maxims himself had established, nor let any subordinate means lead him away from his ultimate end. He would know that what is good and laudable at one time, may become mischievous and blameable by a change of circumstances. He might encourage in himself a love of probity and honour as yielding the largest income of satisfaction, yet if matters came to that pass as to make it appear they must have a contrary tendency, he would throw aside his scruples and turn his thoughts to such enjoyments as were to be had without them.

8. Upon the whole we are forced to acknowledge that hitherto we have found no reason to imagine a wise man would ever die for his country or suffer martyrdom in the cause of virtue, how strong propensity soever he might feel in himself to maintain her interests. For he would never act upon impulse nor do anything without knowing why: he would cultivate a disposition to justice, benevolence, and public spirit, because he would see it must lead him into actions most conducive to his happiness, and would place such confidence in his rules as to presume they carried that tendency in particular instances wherein it did not immediately appear. But it is one thing not to see directly that measures have such a tendency, and another to discern clearly that they have a contrary: and when they take away all capacity of further enjoyment, this is so manifest a proof of their inexpedience as no presumption whatever can withstand. Therefore he will never let his love of virtue grow to such an extravagant fondness as to overthrow the very purposes for which he entertained it.

9. I am apprehensive this conclusion will give offence to many as seeming to undo all we had done before in the service of virtue, by thus

deserting her at last in time of greatest need when she is entering upon her most arduous undertakings. Yet I know not wherein we have acted unfairly either in the choice of our premises or deduction of inferences from them. We have searched every corner of the human breast, and found that all our motives derive either immediately or remotely from our own satisfaction and complacence of mind. Nature has given us this spring as the first mover of all our actions and ultimate object of all our contrivances. We have seen that reason cannot work upon her own bottom, but must fetch materials from elsewhere, for there is no reasoning unless from premises already known before we enter upon the consultation: therefore how far soever she may investigate her principles upon one another she must at last rest in such as she finds assigned her by sense and appetite, her office being only to correct their errors in the prosecution of their aims, to take better measures than they do, and lead to the same point discreetly and effectually which they drive at preposterously and vainly. We have shown that the rules of morality stand on the foundation of happiness, that all notions of them which have not this basis to rest upon are fantastic and unstable: from whence it will follow that whenever, by the unlucky circumstances of our situation, this support happens to be withdrawn from under them, they must necessarily fall to the ground. Thus if our premises lead us to a conclusion we do not like, we may say with Doctor Middleton, that we cannot help it: for it was not our business to hunt for arguments in support of any cause whatsoever, but to take a careful survey of nature without prejudice or prepossession, and gather such observations as should appear resulting therefrom.

10. But it will be said that we have made only a partial and imperfect survey; for if we had availed ourselves of all the light nature would have afforded, we might have discovered that the end of life is not the end of Being, that our dissolution is but a removal from this sublunary stage to act upon some other, where our good works shall follow us and yield a plentiful harvest of happiness which had not time to ripen here: therefore a man does not act imprudently who perseveres in his virtues to the very last, although they manifestly tend to cut him off from life with all its enjoyments, and promise him nothing but pain and torment for the little time he has to continue upon earth. All this, consistently with the nature of my work, I can regard yet only as a suggestion, having found nothing in the progress of these researches to convince us of another life, or show the tendency of what we do here to affect us hereafter: yet neither have I found anything to disprove them, so that they remain proper matter of further inquiry. And since I find them maintained by persons of the greatest learning and judgment, and almost universally received among mankind, since they are in themselves matters of the utmost importance, and we see the limits of virtue cannot be ascertained without them, it would be inexcusable to pass them over unregarded, or without a thorough and careful examination; which not being easily dispatched, so as to settle those points to our satisfaction, I shall reserve them for the subject of another volume. Therefore it may be considered that I am but in the midway of my journey, and what I may learn in the succeeding stages of it is yet uncertain; nor because it is said in § 4 that I have suggested no arguments to induce a vicious man near the end of his days to restrain his desires, and in this section, that I have found nothing to convince us of another life, ought it to be inferred from thence that I may not in my further progress? He

that has a good opinion of religion, as having a rational and solid foundation to stand upon, ought to believe that I shall find such arguments and grounds of conviction as have not hitherto occurred, when prosecuting the subject with a fair and careful examination; and may presume that what now appears the most exceptionable part of my doctrine will then become capable of being turned to the advantage of religion, by showing its absolute necessity to make the system of morality complete. In the meanwhile he cannot surely blame me for attempting to prove that the practice of virtue is the wisest course a man can follow to attain happiness even in this world; and to abate the scandal he might take at the exception made of a person in Regulus's situation, to whom a strong attachment to virtue would be a misfortune, he may please to reflect it is not unsimilar to a declaration of St. Paul's, that if in this life only we had hope we were of all men the most miserable. But one who is proceeding on a course of inquiries can take nothing for granted beforehand, he can draw his inferences only from the premises already collected, and must shape them in such manner as they shall naturally lead him. So that I must still adhere to my present conclusion, until seeing cause to alter it, for I cannot yield to any authority how great or general soever: this would be to depart from the plan I proposed at setting out, which was to try what lights I could strike out by the exercise of my reason, without calling in foreign aids; the extent of that, be it greater or be it less, is the line I am to run; and when I am come to the end of this line I must stop short, unless by another effort of reason I can chance to catch hold of another clue.

11. Nevertheless, I am very loath to leave the scrupulous reader with an ill impression of me upon him, though but for a season, and yet I do not know how to efface it myself, but must trust to his candour to do the best he can for me. Perhaps his good nature may suggest to him, that if this conclusion I pretend to abide by were my real ultimate opinion, I should not be so inconsistent with myself as to divulge it. For the discovery that a man's own safety will supersede all obligations, is of a nature not to be communicated without lessening its value to the owner: he may believe then I should have locked it carefully up, as a precious deposit to be reserved for private use, that if ever the case should so happen as that I cannot obey the dictates of honour and conscience, without endangering my person, I might avail myself of this secret to slip my own neck out of the collar: but it would certainly be for my interest to persuade the world that the duties of virtue are indispensable, and they ought to sacrifice everything for the good of the public, whereof I am a member, and must consequently share in the fat of their sacrifices. Therefore I think it is no unreasonable favour to expect, that he will suppose I have already run over in my own mind the matters I am to present him with by-and-by, and foresee something will occur among them, which will oblige me to recant the odious part of my doctrine, and come over to his sentiments. Let us then take leave in good hopes, that however we may part a little out of humour for the present, we shall grow better satisfied with one another upon our next conversation.

THE

LIGHT OF NATURE PURSUED.

THEOLOGY.

CHAP. I.

SUBSTANCE.

HITHERTO I have proceeded only upon a view of human nature, and the things we are daily conversant with; in order to frame some rules for our conduct, as well in the prudential management of our powers with regard to our own interests, as in joining our mutual endeavours towards promoting those of one another, whereby we may render life more comfortable and happy. But as I proposed in my general introduction to examine the foundations both of Religion and Morality, the reader may think himself disappointed in that, after having attended me through so large a portion of my work, he finds me amusing him with one of them alone without mentioning a single word of the other, and that in such manner as to leave it grossly defective at the conclusion. I am now going to satisfy him in this particular, by which, if pursued with tolerable success, he may expect I shall be able to restore morality to that completion whereof he thinks I have defrauded her.

Let us now therefore enter upon a careful examination of what other principles may be found besides those we have already collected, and push our researches beyond the scene exhibited by our senses and our experience. And as this attempt will lead us to take a view of external nature and things invisible, or which can be discovered only by the eye of reason, we shall have an ample field to expatiate in, distant objects and extensive prospects to contemplate, no less than universal Nature, comprehending things visible and invisible, with the connections and dependencies running between them, so far as the feeble optics of human understanding can reach to discern them. In the progress of this task I must learn to handle the telescope, the vastness of whose scenes may demand as close an attention to view them distinctly as our minute observations of the microscope have done before. For the objects we are ordinarily conversant amongst lie within a certain compass of magnitude: whatever greatly exceeds or greatly falls short of the sizes familiar to our acquaintance, carries a strangeness and unwieldiness forbidding and irksome to those who read for amusement only. The description of them must not be read but studied, and the describer can do no more than strive to make the study as little laborious as possible. But I cannot yet consent totally to lay aside the microscope, for I pretend to no extraordinary illumination nor direct intuition of things in-

visible, but can hope only to investigate them by the things that are seen: therefore, it behoves me to attend still for a while to minute objects, being desirous to lay the remainder of my foundation with the same exactness I have endeavoured at before.

2. But before we enter upon a view of external nature or proceed to investigate causes from their effects, in order to discover what powers or what laws there may be to govern the invisible world, it will be proper to consider whether we are likely to have any concern in their operation. For as Epicurus rightly observed, that what shall happen after we cease to exist is nothing to us, it will be superfluous to inquire into the sources of enjoyment or suffering in future times, until we have satisfied ourselves that we shall stand in a capacity of being affected by them. Nothing is more certain than that this bodily frame of ours shall be dissolved in a few years: we daily see instances of its mouldering into dust or putrefying into corruption, so that we cannot flatter ourselves with its having a long continuance: but it has been made appear in our survey of human nature, that the body serves only as a channel of conveyance to the mind, which is properly ourselves as being our sentient principle which perceives whatever is perceived by us, acts all that we do, and receives notices from external objects through the corporeal organs. So that our capacity of good and evil to come must depend upon the durableness of the mind: concerning which we can know nothing from sense or experience, for they inform us not what becomes of the mind upon dissolution of the body, we do not see it moulder and putrefy like that, yet neither do we see it give any signs of life or existence; nor can we learn anything from the testimony of others concerning the inhabitants of that country from whose bourne no traveller returns. Therefore, we must endeavour to gather by deduction of reasoning from such observations as experience has afforded us, what is the constitution of the mind and whether it be of a lasting or a perishable nature. I do not forget that we are taught to believe a resurrection of the body, and that some have maintained that the mind, although naturally perishable, may be preserved in Being by the agency of a superior power. I would not be thought to reject either of those opinions, but it is obvious that the consideration of them cannot fall within the compass of my present plan: for none ever attempted to show by the mere light of reason, either that the body shall rise again, or that the mind, if corruptible in itself, shall be continued longer than the term assigned her by nature. Wherefore the nature of the mind is the thing to be inquired into: and all who have examined this point, seem agreed to resolve it into another, namely, whether the mind be a compound made up out of several materials, or a pure simple substance without parts or mixture.

For it was admitted on all hands, that whatever was generated may be corrupted; the productions of nature being only so many various assortments of matter united together by the natural action of the elements upon one another, as that action never ceases to operate, it must of course destroy what itself had produced: so that the forms of bodies whereon their essence depends continually change and fluctuate; what is one thing to-day becoming another to-morrow, and a quite different the day after. Those therefore who would shorten our existence to the period of human life, proceeded upon a supposition that the finer parts of the elements, united properly together in a certain organized structure, might produce an animal endowed with life, sense, and motion; that the degree of sense depended upon the greater or lesser nicety of this organizatian; and that thought and

reason could not subsist out of the human form. So they held that the mind itself was nothing else beside a curious assortment of elementary particles ranged together after a particular manner, or a harmony resulting from the nice order and mutual congruity wherein they were disposed. This being laid down, it would follow incontestably that the laws of nature, which have brought those elements into the order wherein they stand, may as easily separate them again, and divest them of that sense and reason they had acquired by their contexture: in which case the mind must be destroyed upon dissolution of the body, nor can the harmony subsist after the strings that gave the notes composing it are broken asunder. From whence they justly inferred that the end of life must be the end of being, and that we can have no concern with anything that shall happen after our decease.

3. Those on the other hand, who would extend our duration beyond the present state, generally set out with showing the absurdity of imagining that any combination of senseless matter could produce sense and reason, which must be primary qualities belonging essentially to the subject wherein they are found, and not resulting from any others. They insist that Mind is a kind of fifth element, different from the other four, not producible out of them, and totally dissimilar from that first matter, whether water, or fire, or atoms, or whatever else can be supposed, whereout the elements themselves originally sprung: that being no production of nature, it is not destructible by any law or power of her's: that when united to body, it does not inhere therein as an accident or modification, but is joined thereto as a distinct substance, and may be separated again without losing its existence. They conceive that upon such separation it may perform its proper functions better and freer than while encumbered with flesh: or if it should become incapable of exercising its powers, it will nevertheless retain the powers themselves, and continue capable of being united to another organization, which may prove equally fitting for its purposes with that it now inhabits. From whence they as justly infer that death is not an end of Being, but at most only a suspension of sense: therefore it behoves us to carry our thoughts beyond this present state to what shall happen hereafter, as being matters wherein we ourselves may have an actual concern.

4. This question, then, concerning the simple or compounded nature of the mind, I am to begin with: but before entering upon the discussion, I conceive there is something to be done preparatory thereto, for ascertaining the terms we must employ, without which we cannot proceed with exactness in our reasonings: and as our ideas of compounding seem a little variable and undetermined, I shall begin with endeavouring to settle what is to be understood by the terms Composition and Substance.

5. I have met with people who pretend they have no idea of substance, because they cannot comprehend a naked substance divested of all its accidents: they want to see one taken out from its qualities, and laid upon a table for them to push about and examine, like the spring of a watch taken out from the work. But this is a most unreasonable expectation, for though I see no impossibility there may be a substance devoid of all qualities whatsoever, it is not at all probable there should, because it could be of no use either to itself or anything else; yet if there were any such we could never know it, for substances discover themselves to us only by their qualities, and those qualities are as irrefragable an evidence of their existence as we could have were we able to discern them without. What we term qualities, as

Mr. Locke observes, are powers of affecting us, or of causing alterations in other substances, making them affect us differently from what they did before; thus, whiteness in snow is the power of affecting us with the sensation of white, heat in fire is the power of affecting us with the sensation of warmth, and of melting wax, whereby it is made to exhibit another appearance than it did while cool and hard. But an act of power is the operation of some agent, of which therefore it gives as full evidence as of the power thereto belonging; for there cannot be power with nothing to exert it. So that naked quality is no more comprehensible than naked substance, and you might as well undertake to lay a substance devoid of quality upon the table as to lay whiteness, squareness, softness, coolness, without laying something white, or square, or soft, or cool: now if this assertion be intelligible, as I presume it is, you must have an idea of every term employed in it, and consequently of the word Something; if then there be a meaning in the word, you may take that for your idea of substance.

6. But the quality that most commonly gives us evidence of substance is solidity, or tangibility, therefore the vulgar do not count those things substantial which they cannot feel compact in their hands, such as froth, vapour, smoke, light, odours, or the like: and they frequently conceive a production of substance, as in the growth of plants; or the destruction of it, as in burning wood, or evaporating water over a fire. But those who use ever so little reflection, know that our senses cannot in any manner be affected without an agent to operate upon their organs: we cannot see light without something striking upon our eyes, nor smell an odour without something entering our nostrils: we cannot perceive a smoke or vapour unless there be something floating about in the air to obscure it, nor discern the colours in a bubble unless there be something capable of refracting the light. They know likewise that our discernment of things, though an evidence of their being, is not an evidence that they began to be just when we discerned them: nor is the loss of that discernment an evidence of their ceasing to be, but only of their removing beyond the reach of our senses. If I find my table dusty, I shall not think the dust a new production, but that it was flying about in the air before I perceived it, and is now only gathered into a thickness to make it visible: and if, on my return after going out of the room, I find the table clean, I shall not suppose the dust absolutely destroyed, but only swept away somewhere out of my sight. So when I see a tree which I remember to have been a slender twig, there is no need I should imagine the great accession of substance a new production, but drawn from the earth, the air, or the clouds, wherein it lay dispersed and undistinguished: and when the tree is cut down and consumed in the fire, there is no occasion I should believe it reduced to the little substance of ashes left behind, but that the rest is dissipated in imperceptible portions in the same manner as before their coming into the tree. Yet when substances by their minute divisions are withdrawn from our observation, we still apprehend them possessing qualities had we senses acute enough to be affected by them: for we are ready to think that we could feel the smallest particles if we had fingers fine enough to take them up, and that if one were pressed ever so strongly on each side by two others of equal bulk, it would keep them from coming into contact. Thus some qualities, especially those of resistance and solidity, seem to be inseparable companions of the substances we are ordinarily conversant with or exercise our thoughts upon; and all qualities, during their continuance, are inseparable from the sub-

stances whereto they belong, nor can be removed from them without being lost, for if you rub over a piece of paper with ink, the whiteness is not banished into another quarter but is absolutely destroyed.

7. This necessary connection of qualities with some substance makes them an evidence to us of its existence, for if there could possibly be whiteness without an object to exhibit it I could not conclude from seeing a whiteness that there is something white lying before me. This likewise may convince us that existence belongs solely to substance, quality having none of its own, being no more than a particular mode of existence in whatever possesses it. Not but that quality has a reality concerning which we are liable to mistake, for a child, on seeing an evening mist rise out of a pond, may take it for smoke and think the water must be hot: but what else is this than an apprehension that the water is so conditioned as that it will scald him upon putting in his finger, whereas in reality the condition of the water is otherwise and would feel cold to the touch; so that the existence of coldness is nothing else than the water being in such a state as might affect our flesh with a sensation of cold upon being put into it. I am not unapprized that Plato supposed qualities might subsist without any substance to possess them, because while we can form an idea of them they may have a reality in our thoughts: but I beg leave to observe that our idea of a thing is not the thing itself, for one may remain after the other ceases, and may subsist though the other never had a being. I know well enough what the toothache is though now quite free from it; I remember the transactions of yesterday, but the occurrences themselves are clean gone and over; I have a clear idea of a Cyclops, a Centaur, a Chimera, yet without believing there ever were such things in nature. Nor do I find other people backward in denying the reality of qualities they conceive readily enough; some in their melancholy moods, when put out of humour by egregious impositions, will insist there is no such thing as honesty in the world, they do not mean that they have no idea of it, but in their notion of its reality they refer to some substances possessing it, and you must understand them saying there is no man who possesses a principle of perfect honesty. Besides that the reality of a quality in one subject is not preserved by its remaining in others: the whiteness of this paper does not depend upon the whiteness of that, but would continue the same though there were nothing else white in the world besides; and if I blot it over, the whiteness of that particular paper is utterly gone out of all reality, though I should have ever so many sheets in my closet still unsullied, and should remember ever so well how it looked before I spoiled it.

8. From hence it appears that identity carries another meaning when applied to substance than what it does when applied to quality, in the latter being nominal only, not real: for though we currently say that two sheets of paper have the same whiteness, yet upon colouring one, the whiteness of that is absolutely destroyed, the other remaining still unhurt, but it is absurd to suppose the same thing can subsist and be destroyed at the same instant. Nevertheless our uses deriving from the qualities of things, it concerns us chiefly to take notice of qualities; for which reason whatever continues to serve our uses in the same manner, we denominate the same thing, notwithstanding any change of substance there may have been in it. Thus we count a river the same although perpetually changing its waters, provided those waters be equally fit for our services in swimming, or rowing, or washing, or drinking. Here it is easy to see, that the identity of form only in the river continues all along, the substance every moment varying:

as, on the other hand, if you mould a piece of wax with your fingers, it may become sometimes round, sometimes square, sometimes triangular, according as you fashion it, the wax being still the same. Therefore, there is a formal or specific, and there is a substantial identity; the former, when several substances stand so conditioned as to affect us exactly in the same manner; the other, when we are satisfied the substance remains the same, whether appearing under the same or various forms. Specific identity is a branch of the formal, being of those qualities which constitute its essence, adapt it for some particular uses, and gain it a particular name: thus the wax, while moulding into different figures, still is wax; but if laid long in a damp place where it loses its oiliness, the essence of wax is gone, and it becomes dirt or some other kind of thing, yet substantially the same it was before. As we can know substances only by their qualities, if we have a dozen eggs in all respects similar which we would distinguish apart, it is common to mark them with No. 1, 2, 3, &c. in order to know them again severally, after being taken out of our sight: for this reason, I suppose, substantial is often called numerical identity, as a synonymous term. Substantial or numerical identity cannot be lost, though we may not know where to find it, for one substance cannot be changed into another, but must always continue the same it ever was; it can only succeed in the room of another, or assume its form upon that being removed to some other place: and though qualities be so far unchangeable as that squareness can never be roundness, yet are they perishable and producible; for when the wax is new moulded, the squareness it had is totally lost, not flown off to some other quarter, and the roundness substituted in its place is a new production, not drawn from any fund where it had lain concealed before.

9. As to the unity of substances, that is not easy to be ascertained, for want of acuteness in our faculties which require numbers of them to affect us in any manner; for frequent experiments assure us, that all the objects we discern are composed of substances numerically distinct from each other, which when separated, are singly too feeble to touch any of our senses; we cannot see them, nor feel them, nor count their numbers, but are perpetually perplexing ourselves with subtile questions concerning their infinitude. But though we cannot tell what is one, we may know what is many; for whenever we perceive distinguishable parts in an object, we may rest assured it contains as many substances as there are parts we can distinguish. If I have a gallon of wheat before me, I may pronounce that the gallon consists of so many substances as there are grains in the vessel, though I cannot restrain them to that number; because not knowing how many dusts of flower or particles of bran, all of them distinct substances, lie in each grain: and if I pitch upon some particular grain, and then shake the vessel, I may still remain satisfied that my grain is somewhere among the rest, numerically the same as when I took notice of it, and not changed into any other, though I cannot now find it again. Or suppose the wheat sent to mill, the flour kneaded into dough, then baked into bread, and the bran all employed to stuff pin-cushions: I cannot doubt that the substance of my grain, although altered in form, and dispersed indiscriminately among that of the other corn, still subsists undiminished in the meal, the bread, and the cushions, and that all together contain at least the same number of substances as there were grains in the gallon, besides an accession of others in the water, the yeast, and silk coverings to hold the bran. And as the corns in the gallon, and particles of flour or bran in the corns, have each a distinct being and existence of their own, independent on the rest, and

which receives no increase by their junction; hence it seems to follow that the gallon has no other existence than that of the corns, and the corns none other than that of the flour and bran composing them; that nature has made all things in individuals, and though we cannot tell whether what we commonly term so consists of finite or infinite parts, yet that it must derive its existence originally from single substances, how many soever there be that enter into it.

10. I have observed before, that though qualities are our sole evidence of the substances possessing them, yet we do not imagine the substance destroyed upon losing its qualities: in like manner, though the operations of qualities upon ourselves, or upon other substances, when we can perceive them, are our sole evidence of their reality, yet we apprehend the qualities more permanent than their operations, and not lost when they cease: for, if I take a snow-ball into my hand, I shall be satisfied of its coldness by my sensation; but if I throw it out upon the grass where I no more feel it cold, nor perceive its effects upon anything else, nevertheless I shall still remain persuaded it retains the quality of coldness; but if I put it into a saucepan over the fire it will lose its specific essence, being turned into water, and may exchange its quality of freezing for that of scalding. Hence it appears there are qualities which a substance may assume or lay aside according to the texture and position of its component substances or motions among them, and these we term secondary qualities: others which we conceive inseparable from all substances falling under the observation of our senses, whether single or in junction with others, such as solidity, impulse, and mobility, and these are called primary qualities. Which primary qualities are a necessary foundation of the others, for without solidity a knife could not have the quality of sharpness to force its way into whatever we employ it to cut; without motion and impulse the lucid darts of day-light, as Lucretius calls them, could not affect our optics with colours; nor could bodies discover to us their figures without resistance to our touch or force to throw off the light in a particular manner upon our eyes.

CHAP. II.

COMPOUND SUBSTANCES.

Whoever will consider the idea of composition a little attentively must perceive it to be a particular manner of juxtaposition, and to contain several species under it, as joining, coalescing, mixing, incorporating, and the like. But every bringing of things together does not form them into a compound: if I bespeak a table of Hatchet the carpenter, which I will needs have him make up in my presence, he prepares the materials at home, and brings them all together in a hand-basket; but I do not conceive them in that position to be anything until he has joined the several parts properly to one another, and then I look upon the boards, the legs, the hinges, the screws, the glue, and whatever else he has put among them, as one thing, which I call a table. So when the cook brings out her flour, her suet, her sugar, her raisins, they still are but what they were before, though laid ever so close upon the dresser; nor do we even then consider them as single things, but call them heaps or parcels, which are nouns of multitude, until she has mingled them well into one mass, which then becomes a pudding.

2. In like manner, nature forms her productions out of materials collected from the elements, but with this difference, that as she works in a finer manner than art can imitate, we seldom know the ingredients she uses until they appear in the composition. Thus the particles constituting a plant could not be distinguished whilst they lay mingled in the mould, the water, or the air, nor do we perceive the sources at all diminished from whence they were drawn, wherefore we are vulgarly apt to regard them as new beings not framed out of any others. Sometimes indeed we may know partly what are the ingredients employed, as when a farmer enriches his ground with manure; but then the manure must be divided by putrefaction into imperceptible parts before it be fit for nature to work upon. Nevertheless, it is universally agreed by all men of thought and consideration that the substance of everything we see produced was existing before, and is only brought together into that form and order which renders it the object of our notice.

3. Nor does the mind want a power of compounding things that nature has not joined, or of making arbitrary junctures for which she has given no foundation; as a flock of sheep, a nation of men, a parish, or a bay. For the sheep of a flock or men of a nation have no more natural connection with one another than with those of any other drove, or country, the lands of a parish lie as closely contiguous to those of the next as they do to any lands of the same, and the waters of a bay are as much mingled among the waters of the ocean as they are with one another: yet we consider each of them as one thing, and call them by names of the singular number.

4. Thus we see compounds produced three ways, by nature, by the hand of man, and by the imagination: and all three proceed in the same manner, to wit, by selecting materials from the funds where they are to be had and placing them together so as to strike our observation as one object. Nevertheless they proceed differently in this respect, that the two former make a real change of position in the things they compound, whereas imagination can work only upon its own ideas, throwing them into a particular order or combination, without actually removing anything from its place. But all composition, whether actual or mental, bears a reference to the thought, for the essence of things depends upon the uses we have for them, the properties we observe in them, or the manner wherein they affect our senses: therefore we conceive them to remain the same so long as they continue to exhibit the same appearances, how much soever the component parts may be shifted: thus we esteem the Thames the same river we saw last year, although the waters of it have been changed a thousand times. Nor do we consider everything as entering into a compound if it does not answer our purpose so to do, although joined as closely as those we call constituent parts: if while Hatchet makes up the table he carelessly drops a spoonful of glue which fastens a chip to it; or if while our backs are turned, an unlucky boy screws a piece of deal upon one of the leaves, we do not reckon the chip or the deal a part of the table. So neither do we esteem an oak apple as part of the tree, but an excrescence, although adhering as firmly to the leaves as they do to the branches. We say oil will not incorporate with vinegar: because after shaking them ever so long we can still distinguish them floating amongst one another: but water, arrack, orange juice, and sugar, compose punch, which we reckon a new production, because it affects our senses with a taste and appearance the several ingredients had not before. The blood, humours, and fat in our bodies, seem to enter into the composition of them; but not the breath in our lungs nor victuals in our

stomachs; because we perceive these continually coming and going: but we do not see when the others fly off or are renewed. Nature unites nothing, not even the strongest of her works, any otherwise than by holding the parts of them firmly together. It is now I think generally agreed among the learned that that quality of bodies called the attraction of cohesion, which keeps them united, is the effect of a certain subtile fluid pressing strongly against them on the outside: so that if a carpenter setting an upright post to support a floor, upon finding it too short, should drive in a plank between the post, the plank and the beam above, although manifestly distinct from one another, would be as truly united as the parts of iron, marble, or other the most compact and durable substances.

5. But it seems this subtile fluid, which makes the particles of matter cohere so firmly when pressing them on the outsides, if it can get between them, rends them as forcibly asunder, whence proceeds their elasticity; so that the heaviest bodies, upon having their parts dissipated beyond their sphere of attraction, may become the lightest: and Sir Isaac Newton supposes air itself generated this way out of metals and minerals. Thus all production is no more than an assortment of minute bodies, imperceptible before, in such manner as to render them discernible; or else throwing them into new forms from whence shall result qualities they had not in their former state: and all destruction no more than a dissipating of them again, or else such a change of their contexture as shall divest them of the qualities they had by their first union. And it depends upon our customary manner of conception and the use of language to determine what shall be deemed a change of one thing into another or only a circumstantial change of quality in the same thing. Cream beaten into a certain consistency by churning produces butter, but upon the same consistency being destroyed by melting it continues butter still, unless the careless cook, thinking of her sweetheart, should let the saucepan stand over the fire, for then we say it is turned into oil. So butter kept to be sour still retains its essence; but dough grown sour makes leaven, and well baked becomes bread, though raw beef well roasted is nothing more than beef as it was before. What is it forms the stars into constellations besides the consent of astronomers? and that upon an apparent only without a real juxtaposition; for the stars of each constellation lie at immense distances from one another, and probably some of Aries may stand further apart from others of the same sign than they do from those of Libra in the opposite hemisphere.

6. The more closely we consider the nature of compounds the more fully shall we be convinced, that how much soever they may change and vary, there is nothing new in them beside their order and situation and the properties arising therefrom; and that they are nothing but collections or numbers of things brought together so as to affect us in a different manner from what they did when separate, or joined into one idea by the arbitrary power of imagination. It is this collectiveness of compounds that enables us to divide them, and furnishes us with the idea of whole and parts, which being relative terms cannot subsist without their correlatives: for nothing is a whole unless as it contains all the members necessary to complete it, and nothing a part except in reference to other parts among which it is to be numbered. Every compound must have some quantity, and all quantity may be expressed by numbers, which alone renders it divisible; for nothing beside numbers is capable of being divided; but they being combinations of one another and ultimately of units, may either in fact or thought be separated into them again. But what perplexes this matter is that arithmeti-

cians understand by dividing a separating into equal parts : but there may be an unequal as well as an equal division, twenty may be parted into nine and eleven as easily as into two tens, or into three, four, six, and seven, as into four fives; and in this sense there is no number divisible until you come to unit; lower than which you cannot go, for one cannot be divided. I know we often proceed to fractions supposed to express less than unit, but in this notion we impose upon ourselves by shifting our ideas and considering that as a multitude which before we considered as one; therefore we cannot make a fraction without multiplying first before we divide. He that would part a sum of money into several shares, procends first to see how many pounds belong to each, if there be a remainder he multiplies it by twenty to find the shillings he shall allot beside, and so on to pence and farthings; if there still be a remainder and he would be very exact, having no lower denomination of money to reduce into, he makes an arbitrary coinage in his own mind, and supposes his farthings to contain so many pieces as there are shares into which he would distribute them, which he sets down for the denominator of his fraction : so a farthing with him is no more an unit than a pound was at first; nor is seven thirteenths of a farthing less than an unit, any more than three-pence or seven shillings, which everybody will allow to be whole numbers.

7. Hence and from what has been said in the last chapter may be gathered that composition works a different effect upon qualities from what it can do upon substances : for quality having no existence of its own, but being a particular manner of existing in substances, it is easy to conceive how the manner will vary according to their various coalitions, and that they may acquire powers of affecting us which they had not while single, which will then be new productions having no reality before. This experience testifies, for things invisible when separate may become objects of sight by being brought together in numbers : the vapours in a clear sky we see nothing of, but when condensed into clouds we discern them plainly enough; if you bring up a bottle of wine out of a cool vault in a hot day, though the air appear clear you will quickly perceive a dew gather upon the glass. Qualities mingled together may generate a new quality different from all its constituents : blue and yellow will make a green : all the variety of colours we behold are supposed to be only various combinations of the seven primary, yet you cannot possibly tell which of them, nor in what proportion go to form a brown : whiteness has been demonstrated to arise from the joint action of all the seven operating equally upon you, yet the idea of white contains nothing of other colours as component parts. Position likewise will give substances a form which they had not singly; I may place a number of shillings so as to make a square, the shillings themselves still continuing round; here then squareness has a reality in the number and roundness in the several pieces : so there is no absurdity in a compound having forms and qualities of which the component members are destitute. But this holds good only with respect to secondary qualities which are producible and perishable, as the primary are not; for a solid body cannot be made up of unsolid materials, nor a moveable body of those that are incapable of motion. Therefore forms, qualities, and essences are producible by composition, destructible by dissolution, and interchangeable among one another by the various stationing of the materials composing them : but with substances the case is otherwise, for however dispersed, or gathered together, or however variously placed among one another, they contiune always numerically the same, without increase or diminution of their num-

bers, or of their quantity, without transubstantiation of any particular one into any other that was not of their number before. A pint of water is the same quantity whether lying in a basin, or evaporated in steam, and if there were five millions of particles in the vessel, there are still the same identical five millions floating about in the air: it is not now water, but still is substance, having lost its essence but not its existence. Or if you suppose each aqueous particle to consist of infinite parts, which might then be separated to infinite distances, yet in their dispersion they would be the same quantity and number of substances, be it finite, or be it infinite, as while collected in the particle: for it is inconceivable that nature can ever lessen or add to the number of substances she has already in store; she can do no more with them than congregate, or dissipate, or assort them variously, by changing their positions with respect to one another. But our business in common life lies solely with the qualities of things, not their substance, for so we find them convenient for our purposes, we need not care what substance or particular materials they are composed of. If a vintner gives me the taste of wine from a particular pipe in his vaults which I like, I may perhaps desire to have a parcel out of that very pipe, because doubtful whether any of the others might please me so well: but if I could be assured he would send me wine of exactly the same quality and palatableness, I should not be solicitous to have it drawn out of that or a different vessel.

8. For this reason we ordinarily denominate things the same or different, according to their appearances or aptness for our purpose, and when we give them those epithets, we oftener mean specifically than numerically the same or different. Thus if I order my merchant to send me the same wine I had last spring, I can expect only wine conditioned alike; for I must know it is impossible he should send the very wine I have already drank out. Or should I bespeak a box of the joiner, which on coming home appears not shaped according to my orders, I may be apt to say, this is not the thing I wanted: if he carries it back, and afterwards brings me one exactly answerable to my intentions, I shall be content with it, as being the very thing I would have, yet without regarding whether he had made it up of the same materials with the former, reframed, or of fresh stuff, and if he tells me I shall not alter my opinion thereupon. Therefore it is very material for having a just idea of identity and composition to observe whether, when we use the word Same, we understand thereby the same thing, or the same sort of thing: in the case before mentioned of sending the same wine, it is plainly to be understood wine of the same kind, and when I say of the ill-contrived box it is not the thing I wanted, my meaning must be that it is not such a sort of box as will suit my purpose, for had it been constructed and worked to my mind, I should have been equally satisfied whatever pieces of deal or wainscot it had been made of. Cream churned into butter is still the same thing it was before, but a different kind of thing, and applicable to different uses: the human body is certainly a different thing in a full-grown man from what it was in the new-born infant, yet is counted all along the same body, because conveying sensations and serving for an instrument of action to the same person. But the common language of mankind adapted to the common occasions of life, which require our attention to the kinds, the qualities, and uses of things, leads us perpetually to mistake essence for existence, specific for substantial identity, and the manner of being for being itself. Hence we look upon the production of a compound as a creation, and the change of a sub-

stance from one species into another as a transubstantiation: for, when a millwright has set up a windmill, we suppose there is a new thing, a new being produced, because there is a new kind of thing, having properties wanting before, for now it will turn with the wind, and grind our corn, which the disjointed materials could not do: and upon salt being thrown into water, we think the salt has utterly lost its being, and a new substance produced which we call brine. Whereas anybody, with a little reflection, may see that the materials of the windmill retain the same existence when put together as while separate, making only a more serviceable kind of thing than while lying in confusion: and that the brine contains no more nor other substance than was in the water and salt when kept apart. So that all the operations of nature and art which have been performed in the preceding year have neither added to the number of substances, be they finite or infinite, which were in being a twelvemonth ago, nor diminished nor changed them, but only cast them into various kinds, exhibiting different appearances, and diversely answering our uses.

9. From all that has been observed above, I think it must appear manifest that existence belongs only to individuals, that whatever has a being of its own cannot be divided, and that a compound is no substance otherwise than to our apprehension, but an aggregate of so many substances as the component parts whereof it consists. This will be seen plainer if we consider the incorporations made by men: if our sovereign lord the King embodies six hundred men into a regiment, to be called the royal volunteers, the regiment taken collectively is no real being, but a creature of the imagination: I do not mean to call it a mere shadow, for the brave fellows composing it have a real existence, and I doubt not will prove themselves effective substances in the day of trial, but the body has no other existence than what belongs to the men; if it had, there would be a power of creation by human management, for then, upon the incorporation, there must be six hundred and one beings instead of only six hundred there were before. In the like manner the productions of nature, which are only collections of imperceptible particles into a perceptible form, add nothing to the number of beings, nor does anything properly deserve that appellation, unless what is uncompounded and indivisible.

CHAP. III.

DIVISIBILITY OF MATTER.

But an objection may be thought to arise against the sole claim of individuals to existence, from the divisibility of matter, which according to the fashion at present prevailing among the learned, is held to be absolutely infinite. For it may be urged, that if all body consists of parts, those again of under parts, and so on for ever, we must either suppose with Dr. Berkeley, that the bodies we daily see and handle are mere phantoms and ideas of the mind; or if we allow them a real existence, we must needs rest it at last upon something which is itself a compound; because, after infinite divisions, we can nowhere find anything which is not so. But it must be granted that infinite divisibility, as well as finite, has its difficulties; which, I believe, are gotten over principally by the definition generally given to matter of an extended substance. If you ask what is meant by the term

extended, they tell you it is the having parts without parts, that is, extraneous to one another. Now for understanding this explanation we must observe, that appearances, or ideas, may have parts within parts, co-extensive together throughout the whole compound: thus our idea of a piece of gold contains the ideas of weight, compactness, ductility, fusibility, with many others as parts thereof, and each of these is diffused equally through the whole piece: but when we consider its bulk and substance, the right side does not reach into the left, nor is the top diffused among the bottom; so that the substantial parts do not lie within one another, but each has its separate station. Thus to say that matter is divisible, because extended, amounts to no more than saying it is so because it consists of parts distinct, and removable from one another: a pretty way of proving the point, being no better than the ladies' reason, it is divisible because it is.

2. It seems a more colourable argument, when our conception is appealed to, and we are defied to imagine any particle which must not at least have two sides distinct and distinguishable from one another. I may perhaps by-and-by accept the challenge, and attempt to show, that we do not always conceive of things as having two sides: but for the present, let us see what can be concluded from this argument, supposing the premises assumed in support of it were true. It has been shown by Mr. Locke, and in our chapter on Reflection, that our ideas concerning external objects are originally derived from sensation, all we can do for ourselves is by repeating, compounding, associating, dividing, or extracting from what we have received by that channel. Nor is it certain we can form any conception of magnitude greater or less than what we have seen: we talk indeed currently of immense spaces, of millions of miles, of vortices and planetary systems; but our imagination keeps all the while within the same compass it would do if we were to contemplate any measurable portion of ground we could distinguish with our eyes. We proceed in the same manner a person would who should undertake to draw any plan assigned him upon a slate: if he be set to describe a garden, he marks the walks, the beds, the groves, the buildings, in their proper dimensions, so that the whole may just fill up the space he has to delineate them upon; if a county, then spacious roads and wide rivers run in the place of walks, and you find towns occupy the spots where there stood alcoves before; if the terraqueous globe, the parishes are lost through their minuteness, and their room is taken up by mountains, kingdoms, seas, and oceans; if the solar system, he places a little ball in the middle to represent the sun, draws the planets with their satellites rolling round at proper distances, and makes the orbit of Saturn touch the edges of his slate: thus when he is put to take in a larger space he does not enlarge his draught, but contracts his scale, and lessens his figures to bring them within the limits to which he is confined. Just so it fares with imagination, whose scenes contain the same dimensions whether we contemplate larger spaces or smaller: we fancy ourselves climbing to immense heights, but in reality contract our objects to a conceivable size, and draw down immeasurable distances within the length of our own line: like Prior's squirrel in the tinman's shop, who seemed continually mounting up in his rolling cage, but never advanced one step higher beyond his own length.

3. Let us now invert the glass and turn our thoughts upon objects less than what ordinarily fall under our observation. He that would cut a hair as small as possible, may work a good while with a caseknife by drawing the pieces doubled along the edge: when he has reduced them so small that they will not double, he may lay them upon a smooth table and cut a

little longer with a penknife; after he has done what he can this way, he may take a microscope, and by help of that make two or three cuts more with a fine lancet: there is now no more room for manual operation, but if he will proceed further he must go to work with his imagination; which may chance to play him a sly trick he is not aware of; for, upon contemplating one of the little particles of his last division, he will find it grow into a magnitude having two distinguishable sides, which he can easily conceive separated from one another; but upon their separation, each will immediately grow again into their former size; and thus he may go on without end until he be tired of the sport. Hence it appears, that our imagination is hemmed in by certain boundaries on both sides beyond which it cannot pass: nor can we conceive things greater or less than certain dimensions, unless by diminishing or magnifying them we can bring them to a size discernible by our senses; and that when we attempt an infinite division, we proceed without making any way, undoing as fast as we work, and only dividing what we had magnified ourselves: just as was shown before in the case of numbers, where we make a fraction supposed less than an unit, by the process of multiplication, how much soever we may fancy it dividing. Wherefore this argument drawn from our want of conception seems inconclusive; it may convince us of a failure in our faculties, but proves nothing concerning the nature and constitution of matter: for since there is a certain measure below which we cannot form an idea, since experience and reason assure us there are particles far within that measure, how know we what we might conceive, had we faculties piercing enough to discern them clearly?

4. Mathematicians tell us, that points disposed in a row form a line, that lines placed side by side make a superficies, and that a number of superficies laid over one another compose a solid. Let us try to analyze a solid into its constituent parts: we cannot by any contrivance actually take off a superficies without thickness; if we go to work with our imagination, after having detached the surface from the main body, we shall find it have an upper and an under side: endeavour to split the sides asunder, and suddenly you will find each af them by a kind of magic provided with a lining. The fault then lies in the imagination, which cannot perform what is desired of her for making the experiment; for those who hold the divisibility of matter surely must allow that every part may be separated from every other, but in all solids there must be some parts lying uppermost: we only desire you to take off these, and not meddle with anything else, but this it seems you cannot do, for you cannot separate them without tearing up others clinging underneath. Thus our solids resemble a quantity of fine paper piled up in a stationer's shop, if you set a man with gloves on, or a rustic whose hands are hard by labour, to take off a single sheet, he will fumble about a long while, and at last take up two or three together: so if we attempt to take off a superficies we cannot do our work neatly, but our clumsy-fisted imagination pulls up another adhering to it beneath.

5. Having so little success with superficies, considered by themselves, let us try what can be done with them in their state of junction with the main body. When one thing lies upon another, how porous soever we may imagine them, there must be some solid parts of each which touch, and those who contend that all body has magnitude must admit that these parts have superficies by which they rest upon others of equal size that support them. But not to perplex ourselves with such minute parts, since we are inquiring only into our conceptions rather than the reality of things, let us

consider larger objects that we can easily comprehend: it is certain we may and do conceive of compact substances as of perfect solids, and therefore these will answer our present purpose as well as if they were truly such. Let us suppose then a six-inch cube of glass perfectly smooth standing upon a well polished marble table, here we may conceive a superficies of six inches square that touches a like superficies of the table: but what does it touch? is it not real body? and must not that body be void of thickness? for none ever imagined that bodies could penetrate at all into one another. If you say this body must have an under side, that cannot be, for the under side will be a distinct thing from the body, one being touched by the glass and the other not, but the same thing cannot be touched and not touched at the same time. But this same individual body, individual I mean in depth, which touches the glass, must likewise touch some part of the table below, or else it would fall lower until it did: if you say again it touches only by the under side, then you make it a compound consisting of two parts, the uppermost of which touches the glass and nothing else, and so has nothing to sustain its weight with the weight of the cube above; and the undermost touches the rest of the table but nothing else, and so has nothing that it can support, nor any weight resting upon it. Wherefore there must be a number of superficies, each whereof touches both the next above and the next below, running on in continuity to make the thickness of the table. Now consider the surface covered by the cube as joining to the rest of the table's surface, that part which it touches on the right hand, for instance, you must acknowledge to be a body, and as it cannot be diffused or penetrate thereinto, what it touches must be a line without breadth or thickness. Consider again what this line touches of the further and higher parts of the table, and we shall find them to be points, that is, bodies destitute of any dimension.

6. Some have questioned whether magnitude be really inherent in bodies or only an idea wherewith they affect us: I do not know how this matter can be determined with absolute certainty, for we can know nothing of bodies unless by our ideas, but if it be real we must suppose it to correspond with our idea, and everything to be predicated of it, which may be predicated of that. Now though we must acknowledge that our idea of magnitude consists of parts, yet it is not necessary those parts should have a magnitude too; things may affect us with an idea by their united force when they could not do it singly. We know visible objects are compounded of invisible particles: and audible sounds made up of little motions in the air which cannot be heard: the watery vapours dispersed up and down in fair weather affect none of our senses, but when condensd into rain we can both see and feel it; a single drop falls silently down, but when multitudes of them pour in showers we hear them patter against the ground: why then may not bulk and thickness be composed of what has neither? One is no number, yet all numbers are made up of units, and two of them are enow to compose the lowest: we have observed before that all magnitude may be expressed by numbers, as of yards, inches, or fractions of an inch, and indeed is no more than a number of parts undistinguished from each other in the thought. Therefore, in things whereof we can perceive the parts singly, we reckon by number, as a hundred men, a thousand sheep, twenty guineas; where we cannot, we estimate by measure or magnitude, as a pint of water, a square yard of clay, an ounce of gold. Now we shall see this doctrine confirmed if we attend to the discourses of such

as would prove the divisibility of matter, for you will find them always contented with number two to make a dimension: there is no line, say they, so short but must have two ends, no superficies so narrow as to be without two sides, and no solid so thin as not to have two surfaces; allow them two extremities and their conception does not boggle at any dimension without wanting a middle to complete the idea. Then again, if we take our judgment from the scenes in our imagination, no body can be infinitely divisible, for infinities are the most inconceivable things we can turn our thoughts upon, and I defy any man to form a clear conception of an infinite number of parts in a mountain, or a province, a planet, or a sun.

7. But before I am entitled to give a challenge I must take care to acquit myself manfully in answering that I accepted a little while ago: let us therefore examine whether it be really true that we have no conception of a body without parts. When we look upon the wainscot of a room where the panels are painted of a different colour from the stiles and mouldings, we do not take the objects we behold for fancies or delusions, but for something real and material, yet we conceive of the paint on the panels as square substances, utterly devoid of thickness: it argues nothing to tell me the paint must have some depth and that if I scrape off a little with a penknife I shall perceive a colour still lying behind, for our business is now only with our manner of conception, which takes in nothing of the latent colour, nor do we apprehend our eye penetrating at all into the boards or the paint, but touching lightly upon the surface. So if I see a carpenter draw a line with his lead pencil, perhaps I might easily discern a space between the sides if I looked for them, but this I do not, so the breadth does not enter into my idea of the line, which I conceive as a black substance (for I do not suppose it an apparition) extended only in length. Should I, upon hitting my pen against something, chance to dash out a few sparkles of ink upon my paper, I should see them plainly and apprehend them to be substances, yet might neither discern nor conceive any dimensions they had. What shall we say of the smaller stars? I do not deny them to be immense bodies much larger than this whole earth we inhabit, yet every common man who looks at them in the night conceives them as no more than points, and as astronomers tell us that if they were brought a hundred times nearer than they are, we should not find them having any perceivable magnitude. So then, whether there be such things as points, lines, and surfaces, in nature or no, certain it is from experience that we have sensations and ideas of them.

8. Men of thought, like children pulling their playthings to pieces to see what is in the inside, endeavour to separate the objects striking their senses from the rest of the body whereto they belong, in order to turn them round, and as it were handle them on all sides in their contemplation; but in so doing, as has been observed before, there constantly grows something more to what they so take off, reflection adding other ideas out of her own fund to those sensations exhibited: so that a point, a line, a superficies, considered apart, is not what it was when lying in the body. Thus they deceive themselves, thinking to find dimensions in objects which have none: they do indeed find them in their idea, but then they find only what their own imagination had laid there just before.

9. The like may be said of figure as has been observed concerning magnitude, for the one cannot well subsist without the other, whatever has magnitude must have some figure, and contrariwise: but possibly neither may reside in bodies any otherwise than as qualities affecting our senses in such

a particular manner; therefore it is hard to say what figure belongs to things so immensely great or extremely small as to baffle all our methods of admeasurement. We are apt indeed to conceive of points and of infinite space as being round, and the Stoics confidently assigned that figure to the universe, but then where shall we place the centre? why always in that spot where we happen to stand ourselves, because we can conceive no otherwise of immensity than by spreading our thoughts to boundless distances on all sides of us: but then this centre must move as we move, and according to the time when we make our reflection, whether in June or December, will stand a hundred and sixty millions of miles apart from itself. We imagine points round because we can conceive them equi-distant from every part of a circle drawn about them, which we could not conceive of any other figure lying in the middle; but then the circle cannot be drawn within the point nor unless at some distance from it. So that our spheres of both sorts are incomplete, the one being a centre without a circumference and the other a circumference without any or with a movable centre. In short, the notion of rotundity in these things seems grounded on the following syllogism. They must have some figure, but they cannot have any other besides roundness, therefore they must have that. The minor we may prove well enough, because in all other figures there must be angles or protuberances which we may conceive broken off and what remains only will be the point; and we may conceive the sides between those angles and protuberances swelled out, therefore the figure before such swelling was not immense. But the major we assume without any foundation, our faculties not being sufficiently acute to inform us with certainty whether there may not be bodies or spaces without any figure at all: thus much we may rest satisfied with, that we can neither conceive a sphere consisting of no parts, nor yet how finite parts can make up an infinite compound.

10. Upon the whole matter it seems too hasty a conclusion to pronounce that all body must have magnitude and divisibility because we cannot conceive of it otherwise: for we have produced instances of our seeing and conceiving bodies without sight or conception of their having all or any of the three dimensions required to make a solid; and if we cannot comprehend them apart in our imagination without dimensions, why should we presume that imagination is a competent judge in the case? For our ideas being all received originally from sensation, reason has no other materials to work upon besides those furnished by the senses; and the objects striking upon them, even when assisted by the best contrivances of art, are all undeniably compounds, so that we have no experience of anything else whereon to ground our judgments. But had we senses piercing enough to discern that first matter whereof all bodies are composed, how know we what other appearances might exhibit different from any we have ever yet beheld? which might enable us to understand what now remains inconceivable. Therefore the argument drawn from our manner of conception, which we must needs own imperfect, is scarcely sufficient to overthrow that taken from the existence of body, which you can never come at until you get to something uncompounded; for a compound is not a Being, but a number of Beings, nor has any other existence than what belongs to component parts. So then we must necessarily either admit individuals or deny all existence to body, and suppose it only an idea or phantasm of the brain. And that there are such atoms seems to stand confirmed by the current doctrine of cohesion wherein the strength of beams, bars, long stones, and

other solid bodies consists, enabling them to support heavy weights; for their parts are not held together by any cement or strings, but, as Sir Isaac Newton, and from him our modern naturalists, suppose, by the external pressure of ether. Now let us imagine an iron bar sliced out into a multitude of plates as thin as paper and perfectly smooth: I do not say this can be done by art; but, if matter be infinitely divisible, the bar is certainly capable of being so divided and its length is actually made up of such plates standing upon their edges side by side of one another, and it seems incredible they should be made to cohere so firmly, as experience shows they do, by a lateral pressure against the two outermost. You might easily hold up a quire of paper by pressing it with your flat hand against the wainscot, the same I suppose you might do with a ream, or perhaps two or three, only you must shove with both hands and all your might; but if you had glass plates, as finely polished as art could make them, to try with instead of paper, and enow of them to reach almost across the room, you would never be able to prevent the middle ones from slipping through between the rest, especially if you laid a parcel of boxes and trunks over them. Possibly you might contrive by means of strong screws to keep even this glass beam compact, because glass and all other the most finished productions of human industry still have some little roughness, which hinders their sliding down when very forcibly squeezed: but the plates composing our iron bar, were matter infinitely divisible, must be mathematically smooth, so that the greatest pressure could never make them cohere. Therefore we must conclude that the thinnest plates whereinto a beam or bar is capable of being divided are not mathematical planes, nor perfectly smooth surfaces, but have a roughness not separable from the rest of the plate, whereby when forcibly compressed they take hold of the like roughness in the next adjoining plates.

11. Nevertheless, as one must not expect to bring every one to the same mind upon so abstruse a question, I will desire those who still hold the infinite divisibility of matter to consider that infinity is an inexhaustible fund, and how capable soever matter may be of such division, it can never be effected completely. Let water, air, fire, or whatever causes you please, rend asunder the parts of matter ever so long, they can never reduce them to nothing, but their minutest divisions will still be body, having figure and magnitude: so that we must necessarily conclude there are particles in nature which, notwithstanding all the divisions they have undergone or may suffer hereafter, never were and never will be less than they are. Therefore the most obstinate unbelievers of individuality may without scruple admit the doctrine of atoms actually, if not potentially, indivisible, and that there is a Minimum, below which, though bodies may be capable of being reduced, there is no power in nature that can reduce them: these then we may be permitted to take for our first matter whereout all the bodies of the universe are compounded.

12. I said at first that infinite divisibility of matter was the doctrine now in vogue amongst the learned, but upon second thoughts I believe I have misrepresented them, and the mistake arose from want of distinguishing between infinite and indefinite divisibility. For I have observed that men of sober judgment forbear to decide anything concerning the former, which they own to be an unmanageable subject, too perplexing for the human faculties to determine either way: but concerning the latter, they unanimously agree that we cannot set any bounds to the division, nor assign the precise number of parts into which any given parcel of matter may be crumbled. If my notion of existence has persuaded me that nature must

make a stop somewhere in her dividings, I shall not hesitate a moment to subscribe to the article of indefinite divisibility: for our thought knows no bound in the operation, nor does reason ever find an obstacle against contracting or extending her scale without end, in measuring the objects she would contemplate. This is enough to serve the purposes of mathematicians and naturalists, and less than this being not enough, I shall endeavour to confirm it by some observations which, though a digression from my course for the present, yet will not be useless by-and-by, when I may have occasion to divide further than everybody will let me. For there are people whom you can please neither full nor fasting; they will battle tooth and nail for divisibility at one time, and at another will not allow you to use the principles themselves have laid down, but if you go to spin finer than they have been accustomed to, cry out against it as an inconceivable absurdity. Now as in the progress of these inquiries I may be driven to a necessity of supposing very small bodies to contain a multitude of various and dissimilar parts, that I may not shock anybody with an idea he might think quite out of the way if presented to him at once, I shall endeavour to prepare for its reception, by producing instances wherein little parcels of matter are actually divided beyond what is commonly apprehended possible.

13. Those who have gone upon the same undertaking seldom fail to put us in mind of perfumes, which they say will put forth an odour for many years without losing sensibly of their weight; and of leaf gold, a single grain of which we are told will cover a wire of 1625 feet long so entirely as to leave no spaces open between. But as the little corpuscles of light are probably the smallest bodies affecting our senses, I shall try to make some computation, though far within bounds, how many of them may be thrown off from a certain quantity of inflammable matter. I have been informed that a wax candle, of four to the pound, may be seen in a clear night at two miles' distance: this then held up two miles high in the air, would diffuse its light throughout a circumference of four miles in diameter. Let us now consider how near the rays of light must lie to one another in this circumference, so as to be discernible in every part of it, and we cannot well suppose them further apart than one eighth of an inch, for else an eye moving gently to the right or the left would find intervals of darkness when it came between the rays; therefore there must be so many rays as there are square eighths of an inch in such a periphery, and we shall find them upon computation amounting to 354,816,000. But this is not all, for each ray probably consists of successive corpuscles continually following behind one another, and the business is to find out how many of these successions may proceed from one substance whose quantity is assigned. A candle of the size above mentioned will burn about six hours, therefore a grain of wax, reckoning eighty pounds of Troy to seventy-three Avoirdupois, feeds the flame sixteen seconds. Now in order to discover how many successions of light must be sent out in that time, let us have recourse to the pretty childish amusement of making gold lace, spoken of at the beginning of our chapter on Reflection. Let a live coal be fixed upon a wheel, and upon turning the wheel a little briskly, you will see the coal draw a trail after it; as you increase the velocity of the wheel, the trail will lengthen more and more. Let the motion be accelerated until the trail just closes into an entire circle, and then observe in what time the wheel performs its circumvolutions, for this will determine the length of a sensation; because it is plain the impression received by the eye from the coal at one point lasts until it comes round to the same point again, or else the circle would

not appear complete. We suppose the wheel to turn in this case (for I have never tried the experiment) ten times in a second: it will follow that an eye seeing the candle without discontinuance must have a fresh succession of light strike upon it in every tenth part of a second. But we have not done yet, for the circle made by the coal will not appear so bright as the coal itself when standing still, from whence we may infer that several successions, following one another before the effect of the former is worn off, are requisite to give us a perfect view of the objects we behold: we must think of some other contrivance to discover how many of these successions fall within the compass of a sensation. And for this purpose let a room be darkened excepting a long slit a quarter of an inch wide cut perpendicularly in the window shutter: let a large circular pasteboard be placed so as to turn very smoothly upon an axis laid horizontally upon a level with the bottom of the slit: cut a slit likewise of the same width in the pasteboard from the circumference to the centre; cause it to be whirled round with an even motion just ten times in a second, if that be found the length of a sensation, and place your eye directly over against the window, but on the opposite side of the pasteboard, by which means you will have no light but what comes through both the slits. In this situation I apprehend you will see light continually near the end of the pasteboard but none at a distance, because there the aperture will be too small to admit it. If you can observe exactly the limits between light and darkness, you may determine how many successions at least must follow during a turn of the pasteboard: for the rays having no admittance unless during that interval wherein some part of both slits fall in a line with your eye, in which time the pasteboard will have moved half an inch, the proportion this bears to the whole circle described by that part where you see the light terminate will give the successions falling within the compass of a rotation. Suppose for instance you can discern light so far as eight inches from the centre, a circle drawn upon such a radius will measure fifty inches round and contains a hundred of those spaces the rays have to pass through: since then you still perceive them, you may rest assured they keep flowing in every hundredth part of a turn of the pasteboard, and if ten of these were performed in a second there must be a thousand successions following in that time. Therefore to find the number of corpuscles produced by our grain of wax, during its sixteen seconds' burning, we must multiply the prodigious number before set down by sixteen thousand, which will give a produce of 5,677,056,000,000.

14. I have proceeded upon a supposition that the rays of light are not continual streams, but little balls or corpuscles following one another at certain distances: and if there runs out no more of them than a thousand in a second, the distance between every ball and the next behind will be a hundred and sixty-six miles and two-thirds upon a calculation from the known velocity of light. Wherefore if you will imagine a ray to be an entire thread or string of balls touching one another, you must multiply the product we have already by as many balls as you can suppose lying within a length of a hundred and sixty-six miles and two-thirds. But this would be carrying the matter too far, for we learn upon the authority of Sir Isaac Newton, that light is emitted by vibrations in the parts of luminous bodies, which vibrations can act only at intervals in that part of their swing when they are moving outwards and not when they are returning, wherefore the matter they throw off cannot flow in a continual uninterrupted stream. Nevertheless, we may find several reasons making it probable that we ought

to increase the sum of corpuscles already computed: for as there are creatures much quicker sighted than man, if you could teach a cat to make and communicate the observation, it is not unlikely that puss might give the signal for seeing light much higher up the pasteboard than you could perceive it, which would convince you there are more successions than you had found yourself. Nor could you still be sure of having them all, for a single ball may be too feeble to cause vision at all, and it may require the united force of many to excite a sensation in the optics of any animal whatever: so that you cannot know for certain that the light does not find a passage at a height where neither you nor the cat can distinguish it. We may consider further, that the rays at two miles' distance from the candle may lie closer together than one-eighth of an inch; that light itself is a compound body consisting of seven different coloured parts, as appears by experiments with the prism; neither does the wax turn entirely into light, for we know a great part of it goes off in smoke and vapour; nor yet perhaps is the substance of the wax at all converted into light, which some hold to be a body of its own kind dispersed among the pores of luminous bodies and not entering into their composition, in which case it must bear a very inconsiderable proportion to the grain we suppose the wax to have weighed. From all which considerations it may be concluded we have been very moderate in our computation, which is more likely to fall greatly short of the truth than to exceed it.

15. Now, how astonishing soever it may appear, to find a drop of wax scattered into such a multitude of pieces, our astonishment must increase when we reflect on the great tenuity of the wax, and how far it is from being a solid substance. Sir Isaac Newton assures us that gold, the most substantial body we know of, contains more of pore than solid substance: therefore wax, which will swim in water, does not really occupy one fortieth part of the space it seems to fill. Some have gone so far as to suppose that all the matter of this visible universe compressed into a perfect solid would form a cube of but a few inches on every side. I shall not attempt to make calculations of this sort, having no sure foundation to build upon: but I think it may be made appear by experiments of the firmest and compactest bodies that the solid matter contained in them bears a very trifling proportion to their apparent magnitude. I believe few will deny me that whenever a heavy body lies upon another, they touch, for nothing else besides their solidity and contact prevents the uppermost from falling still lower. Some perhaps may controvert this point; because it being held by the best authorities that every particle of matter has a certain sphere of attraction, immediately beyond which there begins a sphere of repulsion, whose force decreases in more than duplicate proportion the farther you recede from its internal limits, therefore a body falling towards another, when come within the other's repulsion, will be stopped thereby before contact and kept suspended in the air, the force of repulsion exactly balancing that of gravitation. But this, however plausible in theory, will appear not to be true in fact; because bodies laid on greasy or dirty places upon being taken off again will draw something from thence sticking to their bottom, which shows they were in actual contact before, for the adhering particles can never be supposed to follow what they had constantly kept aloof by the vigour of their repulsion. Besides considering how very small the sphere of strong repulsion is, if a book laid gently upon a table did hang suspended, yet by a smart stroke upon the upper side you might drive it down within the inner sphere of attraction. From hence we may conclude, that bodies lying upon each other have some of their parts in actual contact, and con-

sequently, since all body is indued with an attraction of cohesion, they must adhere in such parts, and the largeness of their contact may be determined by the strength of their coherence.

Now suppose two plates of gold, the heaviest of substances, as perfectly polished as art and industry can make them, let one be laid flat upon a table and the other suspended horizontally by strings upon one arm of a balance, hanging a weight to the other arm that shall exactly counterpoise it, then let down your balance gently till the plate rests upon that on the table, touching it apparently on its whole superficies. If you increase your weight and the balance be very good, I apprehend a very small one would suffice to draw up the upper plate from the under and consequently to overcome the cohesion between them: a pennyweight might do it though the plates were a foot square, or perhaps a hair could you get a balance perfectly smooth without any friction. Now were a needle worked into the two plates so strongly as that they could not be parted asunder without breaking the needle, it might require many pounds' weight to separate them when so fastened. But the parts of compound bodies being held together, not by any glue or cement between, but solely by their mutual cohesion corresponding with their contact, the strength of the needle to resist breaking must be according to the contact its two pieces had together before their disruption: which strength being found so vastly greater than that exerted by the plates to keep themselves united, it is plain the whole superficies of their touching parts bears no discoverable proportion to that of the transverse section in a slender needle. From hence we may gather that the superficies of the plates resemble a net-work of wire, whose meshes are immensely larger than the thickness of the threads, and whose threads do not correspond with those of the other plate, but only cross them in some few points. And since if instead of the plates you had a regular cube of gold, and were to try with one of the sides, which make the thickness of the cube, instead of the bottom, the experiment would succeed the same, it follows that the compactest bodies are mere net-work in all their dimensions, containing incomparably more of empty pore than solid substance. But it is happy for us that they are so, for else we should have no use of our goods and utensils, by reason of their perpetually sticking together beyond our power to detach them; nor could you venture to lay your flat hand upon a table for fear of being never able to draw it off again.

16. If it should be thought hard of digestion to imagine that iron and steel, which force their way so readily through other things, should be themselves such hollow shells or wire cages as we have represented, let us remember that all strength is relative, and there is no absurdity in imagining that one hollow shell may penetrate through another a great deal weaker: nor should I despair, if any virtuoso that has nothing else to do would undertake the trouble, to see a knife made of the tinder of coarse cloth that would cut tinder of muslin as cleverly as we do cheese with a knife of steel: but then the experiment must be tried in *vacuo*, for fear any little motion of the air should bend our instrument, and make us haggle or cut awry. On the other hand, I do not doubt that if we could toss a little ball of perfectly solid substance ever so gently against iron, marble, or other the compactest body upon earth, we should see it make its way through them as easily as a leaden bullet would if laid upon the top of a whipped syllabub. Having thus vented my thoughts upon the divisibility and rarity of matter, which, if good for nothing else, may serve to entertain the curious, I shall resume my journey and proceed from the consideration of body to that of mind.

CHAP. IV.

EXISTENCE OF MIND.

How little success soever I may have had in proving the divisibility of matter indefinite, but not absolutely infinite, it will not affect the exclusive title of individuals to existence: for be the smallest particle infinitely divisible, it is still existent only in respect of the infinity of existent parts it contains. And upon this hypothesis we must admit a gradation of infinites, some greater and others less; because, if half an orange contains an infinitude of parts, the other half must contain another, and consequently the whole orange will carry an infinitude double to each of the halves. Now that infinity of parts, whereof the whole material universe consists, although it seems capable of being enlarged by the accession of more matter, will not admit of increase by composition: for there will not be one more Being, nor a larger infinitude in nature upon those parts running into clusters, than there would have been had they continued for ever separate. So that compounds have no place among the rank of Beings, nor does their formation add anything to the number of them.

2. Therefore, in order to determine between the divisibility and unity of Mind, let us examine whether it has a distinct existence of its own, and whether upon the production of one, there must not be a new Being, not barely a new sort of Being, in nature added to those existent before, their infinitude being increased by the accession of that one. And for this question I need only refer to the sense and understanding of every man to answer, whether he does not perceive himself to have a real existence, distinct from all other Beings beside. I do not mean in kind, for there are innumerable other beings of the same species with himself, but in numerical identity, and whether there must not be one more Being in nature for his existence, than there would be without him: but if he consisted of parts, there must have been the same number of Beings existent when he was not, and before the combination of those parts in their vital union, which are become thereby a different kind of Being, that is, the same substance in another mode of existence. Some have doubted the reality of body, of space, of distance, of magnitude, of all sensation, imagining these to be no more than perceptions rising unaccountably in the mind: but I believe no man ever doubted of his existence, at the instant time when he reflected on it. If there be a man of so uncommon a turn as to make this doubt, and he must have another doubt beside, to wit, whether he doubts or no, for nonentity can no more doubt than be assured, he may even turn his back against me, for I pretend to work no conviction upon him. For the rest of us we shall all readily allow, that we have an idea of existence, but whence should we first get it unless from ourselves? for if we are not, we can perceive nothing and know nothing, and consequently can have no assurance of the reality of other things: so that our persuasion of all existence besides must begin and have its foundation in that of our own.

3. But our ideas being taken originally from sensation, and we having accustomed ourselves to regard whatever appears constantly together as parts of one whole, we contract a grossness of conception which makes us apprehend ourselves as comprising the whole human composition. For our

flesh and members accompanying us wherever we go, and the operation of external objects ending at the surface of our bodies, we conceive sensation diffused throughout them, and our very selves extending to the extremities of our organs where we receive the impulse: for because we see with our eyes, and touch with the ends of our fingers, we apprehend ourselves actually present in those parts where we take the impression of objects. But not to insist upon the discoveries of anatomy, by which it appears that their impulse must be conveyed along the nerves before it affects us with any perception, everybody knows, that men may be deprived of their limbs or their organs by diseases or accidents, and yet retain their existence. Let a man lose a leg or an arm, an eye or an ear, he still continues the same man, and holds his rank upon the list of Beings as much as he did before. Whatever can be separated from him, he may look upon as a possession, an instrument or organ of conveyance, and that alone which remains after all imaginable separation is properly himself. Besides, our organs have their separate offices, not interchangeable with one another: the eye which sees cannot hear, and the ear which hears can never see; but they being numerically distinct, if they were the perceptive substance, it would follow that what sees is a different thing or substance from that which hears. Therefore they can only be channels of conveyance to some one individual thing: for no man can doubt but that it is the same himself which sees and hears and receives all other perceptions; and we cannot conceive this self divisible, because what might be taken away upon division would not be him, for he cannot be parted from himself. Compound bodies consist of parts, having the same nature and primary properties with themselves, nor is it conceivable that any assortment of unsolid or immovable parts should form a solid and movable body: then if composition prevailed in Mind too, every Self must contain a number of little Selves, every Mind many little Minds, and every Sentient principle a multitude of Sentient principles. But this is a supposal that will not bear the mentioning, for who would not be shocked to hear talk of a half or a quarter of a man's self? Besides, if things sentient were divisible, the parts might be dispersed throughout the four quarters of the world, and a man might have perceptions at the same time in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America.

4. To avoid this absurdity, there have been those who have asserted that Self, Mind, or a perceptive Being, may be produced by a combination of unperceptive principles; not to repeat what I had urged before, that then there may be a creation effected by compounding, let us remark, that upon such combination, the parts considered singly cannot have, nor are they pretended to have, any other properties than they possessed before, neither can they club to take their several share of a perception; for perception has not parts without parts, and therefore cannot be received piecemeal, but the perceptivity resides in the whole compound jointly. Now, it seems very hard to understand how a collection of distinct substances, for such every compound must be, can perceive what is not perceived by each of them. I can conceive a whole camp to hear the evening gun, because every man in the camp hears it, but I cannot comprehend how they can all hear a sound that escapes every single person. And the case would be the same if they were tied or glued together, or if the brains of all could be crowded into one head: nor can I for my life distinguish between their all hearing it, and every one of them hearing it: so neither can I discern with the utmost stretch of the microscope a perception in any compound or collection of substances, however compacted or united together: which must not be

complete in each of them. The ancient Hylozoists, as we learn from Cudworth, ascribed an imperfect perception to their atoms, which was not perception till it was rendered complete by the junction of several of them together; and he seems to have had a notion of this imperfect perceptivity himself, in his plastic nature of elements and vegetables, though he never attempted to complete it by junction. But I can no more comprehend how an imperfect whisper, heard by twenty persons, shall become an audible voice, than how they can all hear a sound heard by none of them singly: I would as soon undertake to explain how a letter might be sent a hundred miles in an hour, by employing twenty men who could walk five miles a piece in the time.

5. We commonly apprehend things to remain the same while they continue to serve the same purposes, and exhibit the same appearances; thus you call a canal the same, notwithstanding a perpetual influx and efflux of the waters and after you have new turfed the banks, but though it be the same canal, no man will esteem it the same substance; for it seems necessary to substantial identity, that the component parts should remain unchanged. So if the mind be a compound, then upon some of the parts being slipped away and others substituted in their room, though it might still remain a mind it must be a different one from what it was before: and as Lucretius tells us, the mind grows and decays with the body; every man would have a different Self in his childhood, his maturity, and his old age.

6. But it may be said, that mind is not so much a collection of particular atoms, as a figure or harmony resulting from the order wherein they lie, and therefore may continue the same although some or all of the atoms be shifted: for if you place twelve shillings in a circle, change your shillings as often as you please for others, you do not alter the figure, which still remains a circle. But what then becomes of our own existence? for form has none, but is only a modification or particular manner of existence in body; and harmony has none, being nothing more than the concordance or mutual congruity of sounds whereby they affect the ear in a particular manner. Besides, where shall we place personality? for there is no difference between similitude and identity in forms: an egg at York is of the very same shape with an egg at London, and a concert of the same music, played upon the like instruments, gives the same harmony in both places: therefore two minds composed of atoms, having an exactly similar disposition, must be the same person, and thus there may be a thousand same persons in so many different parts of the globe, as there may be a thousand same forms and harmonies. The same circle may be drawn at once in Tartary and in Chili, or the same tune played at Canton in China, while it is playing at London. Therefore if one particular form or harmony be you, and another particular form or harmony be me, there might be as many you's and me's in the world as there are clusters of atoms capable of running together in the same manner as ours have done. For it may be remembered, that we are not now supposing mind to consist of a number of particles combined together in such or such order, but to be the order itself, considered apart from the particles, and equally capable of residing in any other that should be brought within its compass. Or if you make any other identity of form than that of equality and similitude, then upon having flatted a globe of wax, by which you absolutely destroy the roundness it had, it will be impossible to restore it to the same figure again: because, if the roundness of one piece of wax be a different thing from the roundness of another, by the same reason the roundness it receives upon a second moulding will be a different

thing from that it had before being flatted, as being a figure newly produced, not one drawn back again from some place where it had lain dormant in the interim.

Nor will it be easier to preserve the identity of Mind in one collection of particles than we found it to distinguish the diversity of minds in several: for if each particular mind were nothing but a certain order of the particles composing it, we must lose our identity upon every turn of thought; for we may perceive a change in our mind upon passing out of pleasure into pain; but there can be no change among forms, without a locomotion of the component parts, which must destroy the order they stood in before. If you change the place of any two in your circle of shillings, you spoil your circle while they are passing into each other's stations: therefore, if their personality depended upon their circularity, the shillings during that interval must make none, or at least a different person; or should you fancy the varieties of thought made by a variety of motions of the whole compound, we could never think of two things together, the same body being incapable of moving with two different velocities or in two different directions at once. Let us consider likewise the variations of character, disposition, and expertness, frequently happening in the same subject: the sucking child who knows not his right hand from his left, may when grown up become master of several sciences; the cross-grained, peevish, unlucky boy may sometimes by good management be made to turn out a sober, discreet, and well-behaved man. But if they were nothing more than compositions, these permanent changes, which render them a different sort of creatures, could not happen without a change of structure in their component parts; which must produce a diversity of compositions and consequently a diversity of persons: contrary to the apprehensions of all mankind, who esteem themselves the same persons from the cradle to the grave, notwithstanding any variations of character or capacity they may have gone through in the interval.

7. There seems to lie the same objection against Mr. Locke's doctrine of consciousness constituting identity: it would be presumption in me to contradict a man of his clear and steady judgment, therefore shall suppose I have somehow or other misunderstood him; but to the best of my apprehension he seems to have placed our existence in a quality rather than a substance, for by the term Consciousness I cannot understand a Being, but only a power or property of some Being, nor do I apprehend a man loses his existence or personality every time he loses his consciousness, by falling fast asleep. Could Mr. Locke himself imagine that his person was annihilated every night when he went to sleep, and re-created again when he awoke in the morning? The most I can allow to consciousness, unless I grossly mistake the word, is, that it should be in most cases the evidence to us of our identity, for scenes that we remember convince us of our being the very persons present at them. I said in most cases, but not all, for who does not know that he was once a baby wrapped up in swaddling clothes? and who does not believe that baby to be the very same person with his present self? yet I never heard of anybody pretending to have a remembrance or consciousness of his being in that condition. Nor do I find little difficulty in settling the identity of consciousness, for in quality, as I observed before in form, I know no difference between identity and similitude: whatever has a like quality with something else, to my thinking has the same. If I have done anything I would conceal, yet I am conscious to myself that I have done it, and I suppose you would be the same upon the like occasion and so would

every other man; therefore we are all one and the same person. Well, but you all are not conscious of the same fact with me, so the identity of the consciousness depends upon the identity of fact: but this will not do neither, for I am conscious of several actions I have performed, and therefore should be so many different persons. The only way remaining in which I can understand an identity of consciousness, is by placing it in the consciousness of the same person, in which light the idea of person must precede that of consciousness: so it is no help to tell me I may find my personality by my consciousness, because I must fix my idea of personality before I can make use of the explanation.

8. Mr. Locke has somewhere unluckily let drop that he conceives it possible the faculty of thinking may be annexed to a system of matter, and this notion has been eagerly laid hold of by my lord Bolingbroke to confirm his opinion of the corporeity of all thinking substances. For my part I am not so confident of my own understanding as to pronounce it impossible for nature to do what I cannot conceive possible to be done: but this I will say, that I cannot conceive it possible perceptivity should be annexed to a system, by which must be understood a composition of matter, or any other substance whatever, but must reside in something that is numerically one and uncompounded. For suppose an object to strike upon any one component part of the system, if it raises a complete perception there, then the rest are useless: if the perception does not begin till this part has communicated the impulse to some other, then is that other the perceptive substance and the first only an organ of conveyance: if both receive it equally, then does the faculty belong not to the system, but to the several parts. Nor can each take its respective share of the perception; for as we observed before, it is inconceivable that a perception should be received piecemeal or made up of what is no perception. And this matter will appear plainer if we consider the nature of judgment and comparison, where both terms of the one, and both branches of the other, must be apprehended together in order to determine between them. If this man knows the other properties of gold and the other knows what ductility is, they can never know the more for this, either jointly or separately, whether gold be ductile: so if one be ever so well acquainted with St. Peter's at Rome, and the other with St. Paul's at London, they can never tell which is the larger, the handsomer, or make any other comparison by virtue of this knowledge. But you say one may communicate his knowledge to the other: very true, but then each has the idea of both before him in his imagination, and the judgment is the act of either severally not of both jointly. Nor is the case different with respect to the parts of a percipient system: let the idea of an elephant be impressed upon particle A and that of a mouse upon particle B, they can never know either jointly or separately which is the larger creature; nor can a judgment be formed until the ideas of both coincide in one and the same individual.

9. And what has been said of perception may be applied equally to volition: for as a body could neither impel nor resist another unless all the particles of the whole mass, be they finite or infinite, had a quality of impelling or resistance; for it is unintelligible to talk of an impulse arising solely from the composition: so neither can any system have a power of beginning motion where there was none in the parts. A hundred men may certainly lift a weight that would crush any one of them, but a thousand would never be able to stir it unless each man had some strength of his own independent on the rest. Whence we may justly conclude perceptivity and

activity to be primary qualities, essential to the substances possessing them, inseparable therefrom, belonging to individuals, and not producible by any combination whatsoever of imperceptive and inactive ingredients.

10. If Self be not a substance but a system of substances ranged in some particular order, there appears no such necessary connection between any one Self and any precise collection of substances or percipient form (for we now proceed upon a supposition of forms being percipient) but that they might have contained any other Self: so that these substances and this form, which now constitute Myself, might as well have constituted the Self of John or Thomas, or any other person, without implying a contradiction or absurdity; and we must look for some cause yet undiscovered to assign each system its personality. This cause, then, before I was existent, might have assigned my personality to any other similar substances disposed in the like order in some distant part of the globe: now why may not this cause do the same at this present instant? for how should my existing in the spot where I now stand hinder the operations of nature elsewhere, or incapacitate her from doing what she could have done a hundred years ago? therefore there might have been two Myselves some thousand of miles apart. But if such a supposition would shock the ears and understanding of every man, it will necessarily follow that every Self must be a substance numerically distinct from all others, of whose identity no other substance or system of substances can participate. And if a substance, it must be one uncompounded of parts: for I am nothing else besides Myself, nor can contain anything that is not Me, nor yet can I have parts which are neither me nor anything else. As a piece of matter divided makes several pieces, and a compound form dissolved becomes many lesser forms, so a perceptive substance divided would yield many percipients, and perception always implying personality, each percipient must have a Self distinguishing it from its neighbour: so that upon supposition of a divisibility in the substance of Mind, I should contain as many Selves as there are parts in my composition.

11. Thus have I endeavoured to place this matter in as many different lights as I could, and to turn it about in all manner of ways; but it happens sometimes in these abstruse disquisitions that the very pains we take for illustration renders the subject more perplexing, for being forced to spin our thoughts very fine they become liable to entangle in the reader's hands, and the multiplicity of ideas, into which we divide them by such refinements, distracts his attention and causes them to throw a cloud over one another. Therefore, since I apprehend this a matter of importance, I wish every one would consider it afresh in his own way, and satisfy himself, in a manner most suitable to his own liking, whether he has not a real existence distinct from every other being whatever, and whether Self be not an indelible character which cannot be taken from him nor exchanged with any other person. We often talk of what we would do, if we were Such an one, that is, if we were in his place, with his strength of limbs, endowments of mind, fortune, or circumstances of situation: but no man can even in imagination suppose himself to feel for another or act for another, to perceive his sensations or perform his actions, or that that other should be his very self. We have heard of metamorphoses and transmigrations from one form of being into another, I do not desire anybody to believe the truth of those relations, but the pleasure we receive in hearing them shows they are not unfamiliar to our imagination, nor do we apprehend a contradiction in supposing the same person to take various forms. But in all those changes the same Self

continues throughout: Calisto when a bear, and Ino when a cow, are the same persons, though different sorts of creatures, that they were while women, nor does Euphorbus lose his identity by becoming Pythagoras: and though they should lose their remembrance or consciousness, still we rejoice or grieve with them according as we think they have deserved in their former state. When the poet tells us that Aristotle's soul of old that was may now be doomed to animate an ass, or in this very house, for aught we know, be doing painful penance in some beau; though he goes too far in calling it a painful penance, for the beau perhaps is well satisfied with his present condition and would think it a terrible misfortune to be restored to the dry notions and musty metaphysics of Aristotle, yet we still apprehend the same percipient substance existing in both. We may imagine ourselves having new members added to our bodies, four legs, or twenty arms, or a pair of wings sprouting from our shoulders, yet still we should remain the same selves: or we may imagine ourselves losing our limbs, deprived of our faculties, and becoming senseless as the stones before us, yet even in that case we should not apprehend ourselves the same substance with the stone we see: whence it appears that we are possessed of an existence and identity of which we cannot even in imagination divest ourselves.

12. And for individuality if we cannot find that in ourselves we can find it nowhere, for all the bodies we behold are undoubtedly compounds, and we have seen in the last chapter how difficult it is to ascertain whether there be atoms or no, and if there should be, we cannot come at the apprehension of them either by experience or reasoning. But we cannot comprehend ourselves composed of parts so as that something might be taken away and the remainder make an imperfect self, or that such imperfect self should become perfect upon the accession of something else. A house may be half built and then is something of a house but not an entire one; a fœtus may be half formed and then is an imperfect man: but in personality there is no medium between completion and nonentity, we cannot half be, but must either be completely ourselves or not be at all. By such considerations as these I apprehend a man may convince himself of his being neither a form, nor a harmony, nor a system, nor yet a quality or consciousness annexed thereto; but a real existent substance numerically distinct from all others, uncompounded, and consequently indivisible.

CHAP. V.

SPIRIT.

Having settled with ourselves that Mind has a being of its own distinct from that of all other things, and is a pure, unmingled, individual substance, nevertheless for any thing that has yet appeared it may be a single atom of matter, since we have supposed existence and individuality to reside in atoms: now, in order to discover whether it be so or not, let us examine wherein our idea of matter consists. The essence of things arises from the qualities we find them have; for to ask what a thing is, implies a presupposal of some substance, and a want of information concerning what qualities it possesses, or what appearances it exhibits. Mr. Locke pronounces our idea of substance very confused, and so indeed it is if we go to consider it singly, for you cannot form a clear idea of naked substance divested of

all its qualities or manners of making itself known to us: but there are some things we apprehend well enough in the concrete, though we cannot in the abstract, as has been made appear with respect to surfaces, which we conceive easily while lying upon the main body, yet cannot by any effort of our imagination detach them therefrom without pulling up a lining besides; so if we cannot form an idea of substance apart from all other ideas, yet when we see qualities affecting our senses, we may have an unconfused idea of something exerting them having a real and actual existence independent of everything else. For forms and qualities are not beings, but modes of existence in other beings, and the appearances they exhibit must come accompanied with another idea of actual existence in the subject containing them. Therefore, if I were to make our idea of substance the same with that of actual independent existence, which we cannot conceive apart from every manner of existing, though we can easily with it, I should not deserve much blame from Mr. Locke, who doubts whether space may not be ranked among the class of substances, because it has a reality independent on any other substances lying within it.

2. But I believe nobody ever suspected the substantiality of space before Mr. Locke, and he goes no further than to declare his ignorance whether it be substance or accident; yet few have denied the reality of space, or that we may conceive a vacuum without any substance whatever to occupy it: this is one of the most familiar ideas to our imagination, for any common person entertains it every time he thinks of an empty bottle. Whence we may conclude that substance, in our ordinary notion of it, is that species of existencies which has perception and action, or which affects our senses, or causes discernible alterations in other substances: wherefore space is not usually ranked among substances, because it does nothing, produces no effect, but is the most passive of things, permitting all else to remain in it, remove from it, or pass through it; we neither see nor feel it, nor does it touch any of our senses, but is rather an idea of reflection, for upon discerning objects in different quarters, and observing their distances, we gather by inference that there must lie a space between them.

3. I shall not pretend to be wiser than Mr. Locke, nor to ascertain whether space be properly substance, but our comfort is that it matters not for our present purpose whether we can decide the point or no, since nobody ever dreamt of Mind being mere empty space: so the question lies between its being a corporeal atom, or distinct species of substance of a kind peculiar to itself. We get our first idea of substance I conceive from ourselves, our perceptions convincing us of our existence, not as is commonly supposed by logical inference, I see, I feel, therefore I am, for we know our own Being long before we learn to make such abstractions, nor can one imagine a child to form syllogisms, or draw consequences of this kind: but the idea of being is contained in that of perceiving, for you cannot understand a proposition without apprehending the several terms composing it, and in the proposition, I feel, the term I expresses something real and substantial, or else it would not be different from the proposition Nothing feels, which rather implies a denial of feeling than carries an evidence of it, nor can there be an idea of actual feeling without something that feels.

4. On the other hand, to complete our idea of feeling there must likewise be something felt, and this gives us our knowledge of substances without us: for when we grasp a stone in our hand we find it press against our fingers, so that we cannot close them into a fist as we might have done

before, whence we apprehend it to be a solid substance: and if we cast it behind our back, where we can neither see not feel it, still we conceive it retaining its solidity. But we discover its solidity by other ways, for if we see the stone squeezed hard by a pair of pincers, or struck by another stone hitting against it, though there be no feeling concerned in the case, yet we perceive the stone makes a resistance against whatever presses or strikes upon it: but this resistance between bodies never happens until they touch, wherefore I look upon solidity, resistance, and tangibility, as the same thing, or at least to depend upon one another, and to be inseparable from our idea of body. Lucretius asserts roundly that nothing besides body can touch or be touched, whether he knew thus for certain is more than I can tell, but thus much we must allow him, that if there be anything which cannot be touched, it is not body, and where resistance necessarily ensues upon contact there must be body: but when astronomers, in describing an eclipse, talk of the shadow of the earth touching the outer limb of the moon, I suppose Lucretius would not allow this to be touching. And indeed our touch gives us the first evidence of external substances, which do not discover themselves to our other senses, until we have been convinced of their reality by that: wherefore the vulgar apprehend savours, odours, sounds, and light, to contain nothing substantial, and the learned will hardly deny that the effluvia causing smells and tastes, the undulating particles of air exciting sound, and the little corpuscles of light, might be felt as well as a stone, had we fingers fine enough to pick them up, and squeeze them singly; and how much soever they may contend that light touches neither the coloured bodies reflecting it, nor the substance of our eye, but operates and is operated upon by attraction, yet since it is a received maxim that nothing can act at a distance or where it is not, they must admit it touches the ether, or whatever else by its pressure causes that attraction.

5. I know not whether I am singular in the notion, but to me resistance seems a kind of acting power essential to body; impulse I know it cannot give until received from something else, nor increase it beyond the degree imparted, but when a body resists another striking against it, it does not do so by virtue of any force imparted therefrom, but by an inherent quality of its own. Nor can it be doubted that others have entertained the same notion before, if I translate their Latin expression aright, wherein they style the perseverance of body either in motion or rest a Force or Power of Inertness. However, as activity has all along been understood of a power of beginning motion, I shall not comprehend the power of resistance, if it be one, under that term.

6. Thus solidity, resistance, or tangibility, seems the only positive ingredient in the essence of body, mobility being rather an accidental property than anything essential. But besides this, we apprehend body to be senseless and inert, which are only negative terms importing no more than a denial of perceptivity and activity; but these negative terms seem the distinguishing characteristic of body. The Hylozoists, indeed, by Cudworth's account of them, held a mean between perceptivity and senselessness, between motion and rest, something that was neither perception nor stupidity, neither action nor inertness, but resembled the thoughts of a man half asleep, or muddled with porter; and that a multitude of these drowsy atoms clubbing forces together might form a genius penetrating, alert, and sprightly: all which whoever can understand must be a much shrewder

man than me. But bating this whimsy, it has been universally agreed that matter is of itself void of activity and perception; and though the Stoics and other corporealists conceived that thought and volition might result from a combination of matter luckily disposed into an organized system, yet since we have satisfied ourselves of the distinct existence and individuality of Mind, we may safely conclude that it is another species of substance, essentially distinct from body, and which we call Spirit.

7. As no bounds can be set to the imagination of man, and new fancies arise in proportion as old ones are exploded, it may come into somebody's head one time or another to improve upon the Hylozoists, and ascribe a complete perception and volition to the atoms. For he may imagine it possible that the mutual action of bodies upon one another may arise from a voluntary exertion of power upon motives, that when they cohere it may be from some satisfaction felt in their contiguity, and when they resist or repel, from some uneasiness brought upon them by the impulse; from which two actions all the operations of nature proceed. So that what was supposed to be spoken figuratively by the ancients, that all things were produced by Love and Hatred, whereby they were understood to mean attraction and repulsion, may be literally true. And here the abettors of indifferency will have an advantage over me, for they may infer from bodies acting constantly in the same manner, under the same circumstances, that they have not an elective power, which they conceive an essential property of spirit: but I, having said so much, and being like to say more concerning the certainty of human action, and having remarked that the conduct of persons who have the fullest freedom of will and command of themselves is more steady and accountable than that of the giddy and sensual, am deprived the benefit of this argument. Therefore I shall not undertake to prove demonstratively that the fact is not so as above supposed, but I must observe that if it could be made out to be true, though it would follow that there was but one kind of substance in nature, it would not follow that this substance was body: for the idea of body including inertness and senselessness, if the atoms were sentient the consequence would be that they were spirits, and mankind would have been all this while under a delusion in taking the trees, the stones, the earth, they see for bodies, when they are not in reality such, but clusters of spirits held together by the delight they take in one another's company: and if any impertinent particles of light come to intrude among them, they drive them in great hurry away to our eyes. But as this is a mere imagination, like Berkeley's ideal world, Leibnitz's pre-established harmony, and Hartley's mechanical volition, built upon bare possibility without support of any proof, I shall remain persuaded with the rest of the world, that the bodies we see and handle are substances of a different kind from ourselves who see and handle them.

8. Now to compare body and spirit together, we must acknowledge the character of substantiality belonging in common to both; but they are generally held to differ in these respects, that spirit is penetrable, unextended, having perceptivity and activity, by Mr. Locke called motivity, to which some add illocality, and others self-motion; body solid, extended, senseless, inert, occupying space, and moveable upon impulse. I have already laid down the capacity and incapacity of perception and action for the distinguishing marks of either, so have nothing more to add upon them: but concerning the other qualities, as I happen not to enter thoroughly into all the current notions of the schools, I shall take leave to deliver my sentiments with the freedom of one who would judge for himself, but without the arrogance of

one who would suffer nobody else to do the like. I shall begin with penetrability, which, though confidently asserted, appears to me a doubtful point whereon we have not sufficient foundation to determine either way: we see by a thousand instances every day that bodies protrude and resist one another, nor can the most yielding of them be forced into the same place by all the contrivances of art or powers of nature; but how know we what would be the case with spirit could we see the experiment tried? We live immured in walls of solid bone, so that we cannot come at our sentient part to push against it with our finger, or apply it to the sentient part of another person, in order to know the result. Could we pick a spirit out of its cell and move it along a line upon the table where there lay another spirit with some little body before, we might satisfy ourselves what it would do. If we found it stop at both, or protrude them forward, we must pronounce it equally solid with body: if it passed easily through the body but stopped at the spirit, we must conclude body and spirit alike solid with respect to substances of their own kind, but penetrable by those of the other: if it found resistance from neither, we might then pronounce penetrability the distinguishing property of spirit: but these are trials we can never have an opportunity of making.

Were I permitted to conjecture in a matter wherein nothing better than conjecture can be had, I should suppose spirit naturally penetrable, but capable of rendering itself solid upon occasion with respect to particular bodies, and that hereon our activity depends. I have formerly given my reasons for imagining that the force wherewith we move our limbs is derived from the animal circulation rushing into the muscles through certain nerves, and that the orifices of these nerves are provided with stoppers, which the mind draws up at pleasure to give the animal spirits admittance: now what should hinder our conceiving these stoppers pushed up by little hairs or fibres whose other ends lie within our spiritual part, which by its natural penetrability admits them into the space where itself resides? but upon the mind rendering herself solid with respect to any particular fibre it is driven forward, thereby lifts up the stopper and opens the passage into the nerves; until volition forbearing to act, the penetrability returns, the fibre no longer pressed falls back to its former station, the stopper following closes the passage, and muscular motion ceases. Whoever should think this conjecture probable, would see that spirit possesses the united powers of body and space: for body resists but cannot admit, space admits but cannot resist, whereas spirit can either resist or admit as it pleases. Nor let it be made an objection, that upon the fibre entering the residence of the mind there must be two substances existing in the same place; for I see no inconsistency in imagining substances of different kinds to co-exist together: if space be a substance, all bodies coexist with some portion of that, and if there be a Being which fills all immensity, all other substances must co-exist with it, or they will have nowhere to exist at all.

9. I have already owned that I have but an imperfect notion of what the schoolmen understand by extension: if it imply a consisting of parts I cannot be suspected of ascribing that to spirit after the pains I have taken to prove that perceptivity can belong only to individuals. But I have an idea of a thing being extended without parts, and so have other people, if one may judge by their discourses: for I have heard of the stench of a brick-kiln reaching into the houses in London, and of a noise extending many miles around, yet I never heard anybody talk of the half or the quarter, or

any other part of a smell or a sound. And though these be not substances, yet having once gotten the idea of extension without parts, I do not see why we may not apply it to substance, which we may conceive existing and present throughout a certain portion of space without losing its unity. I cannot well be denied the possibility of such a diffused presence by far the greater part of mankind who hold a simple indivisible Being present in all the regions of immensity. But that we ourselves have this extension in my sense of the word, though bounded within very narrow limits, we may be satisfied by considerations drawn from facts falling daily under our notice and principles universally agreed upon. It is an uncontroverted maxim, and may pass for a self-evident truth, that nothing can act or be acted upon where it is not, and though bodies seem to act at a distance, there is always some medium passing between the agent and the patient, nor is anything done to the latter before the arrival of the medium. Thus an engineer may batter down a wall a mile off, but the ball does no execution until it touches the wall. In like manner we see and hear, and are otherwise affected with bodies lying far from us, but then something must be thrown from them to strike upon our organs and raise motions there which are propagated onward to the seat of perception: nor can we receive sensations of any kind, unless the nerve, or animal spirit, or ether, or whatever else it be immediately exciting them, either penetrates the mind itself, or at least comes into contiguity with it.

Now let us suppose a chess-board with double sets of men, a red and a green besides the yellow and black, so that every square of the board may be covered with a piece: set this board upon a table before you, and I believe it will be granted me that you may have a distinct view of all the pieces at once. We cannot imagine that matter raises different sensations otherwise than by a difference of size, or figure, or velocity, or direction, or composition, or other modification; but the same particle of matter can be susceptible of no more than one modification at once, therefore there must be sixty-four particles at least operating upon the mind together in the above experiment, I say at least, for it is more than probable that each object upon the board employs many particles to convey its idea: which sixty-four particles cannot possibly enter, nor become contiguous to a mathematical point, and consequently the mind must at the same instant be actually present throughout such a portion of space as may touch or contain them all. This space I shall call the sphere of our presence, not that I pretend to know it must be round; but because it is the fashion to apply that term to every figure we know nothing of. If the reasonings above used be just, and I can discover no flaw in them, they will demonstrate a remarkable difference between spirit and body, for the sphere of a spirit's presence will be found at least equal to the space occupied by sixty-four particles of matter: therefore though the atoms should be sentient they cannot receive near the number nor variety of ideas whereof we are capable.

10. Nor is this sphere of presence a novel thought of mine, but at least coeval with Aristotle, of whom it is currently believed that he held the mind, called by him Entelechia, coexistent with the whole body, being all in all, and all in every part: by which it is plain he apprehended it to be a true individual, yet present and perceptive throughout the whole space occupied by the body, for had he thought it a compound, it would not have been all in every part, but one portion of it in one limb and the others severally in the rest. Indeed this notion of his is generally exploded and ridiculed, because he carried the sphere of presence a great deal too far, for we are now

assured by experience, that when the nerves are anywhere obstructed in their passage to the brain, no sensation will ensue though the external organs continue to perform their office, whereas were the mind actually present in the eye she might discern what passes there notwithstanding any obstruction of the optic nerves within. But the same objections do not lie against me who suppose the sphere of presence to enclose an exceeding small compass situate probably somewhere in the brain, yet large enough to contain many variously modified particles of matter, though not large enough to hold the hundredth part of those floating about in our sensory; for which reason we remember much more than we can at any instant recollect, and sometimes have an expression or a name at our tongue's end which we cannot bring out, because we cannot draw the particle, whose modification is the idea of it, into our presence for inspection. And there is another particular wherein I have the misfortune to dissent from Aristotle, for if the entelechia be commensurate with the body, it must grow as that grows, and contract when that is diminished, having a much larger scope in a man of full stature than it had in the sucking child, or if a man lose an arm, it must withdraw from the space occupied by the arm. But I apprehend the presence of a spirit incapable of becoming either larger or smaller than ever it was: for as a solid particle of matter must always occupy, so a spirit must always be present in the same extent of space, magnitude in the one and presence in the other being an essential primary property annexed indissolubly by nature to the substance possessing them.

11. It is true there are insuperable difficulties among our ideas relating to magnitude, which whoever delights to puzzle himself with may receive good assistance in the sport from the notes in Bayle's Dictionary, under the article Zenon. One way by which he disproves the reality of magnitude is because in all continued motions the moving body perpetually changing its place must be in two places at once, that is, in every instant or moment of its passage, for it never stands a moment still. But to add to the foresaid sport I would beg leave to ask Monsieur Bayle how he knows there are moments of time any more than mathematical points of space or atoms of body, or that a minute may not be infinitely divisible as well as an inch of whipcord or of empty vacuum: which if it may, then his argument of the moving body being in two places at once will fall to the ground. These amusements may serve to convince us there are subjects in nature beyond our comprehension, some questions to which the wisest man can give no better answer than, I do not know, and to confirm what I have laid down in my chapter on judgment, that absolute certainty was not made for man: yet do they not impeach what was added there, that man is so constituted as to do very well without it, being capable of rational moral assurance to the exclusion of all doubt, which is knowledge enough for the direction of conduct and to answer all the uses of life. And since what knowledge we have derives all originally from sensation, that is best to be depended upon which lies nearest the fountain head, being drawn from experience by the fewest deductions of reasoning. Now constant experience testifies that bodies cannot have different magnitudes, forms, velocities, directions, or other modifications, at the same time; that while under the same modification they cannot act variously upon one and the same subject; that many of them must have so many several places to exist in, which cannot lie in contact with a mathematical point; nevertheless, that they act very variously upon us in the business of perception at the same instant, and that it is the same Self which receives all their various actions: from whence the

sphere of presence belonging to one individual substance follows by a single consequence, without that long chain of subtile deductions hung upon one another which must be travelled through before you can discover the force of Bayle's objections, every step wherein still increases the hazard of an unperceived fallacy. As this notion of an indivisible substance existent and present throughout a divisible portion of space will be made use of upon several occasions by-and-by, I wish it might be maturely considered before proceeding any further: for I do not pretend to infallibility, nor desire to lead any man into an error through hastiness, therefore let him not trust to my conclusion, but turn over the matter in his thoughts till he has digested it maturely and satisfied himself whether this, which is one of my foundation stones, has a solidity sufficient to bear any superstructure I may hereafter raise upon it.

12. There is one quality more belonging both to body and spirit to which we can neither give a name nor a description, but wheron their vital union together depends. We know that wherever the body goes, the mind constantly accompanies it, and keeps her station always in the same part of the human frame, but by what power of either this happens we cannot discover. It cannot proceed from solidity, impulse, or perceptibility in the one, nor from penetrability, activity, or perceptivity in the other, but must be a distinct quality of itself. If I could come into Stahl's notion of digestion and nutrition being an operation of the mind, and that she can perform a voluntary act without the least idea of any thing relative to what she is about, I might suppose the mind held in junction with the body by her own unperceived volition: but as I happen not to enter into his sentiments upon that point, I cannot take the benefit of them to draw such conclusion. Yet perhaps the junction may be so far owing to the mind as to depend upon the forbearance of her volition, and that she might detach herself at any time had she ideas of the proper manner how to proceed for effecting it: for we may have powers which we cannot exercise for want of knowing them, ideal causes being a necessary preparatory to action. But in our present condition it is fortunate that we have not such ideas, for our perceptions all coming to us by the action of our bodily organs, were we to quit them we might lose all our ideas, and so never know how to get back again. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable, as we shall endeavour to show in another place, that the mind may stand in a situation to receive perceptions without corporeal organs, and then may join herself to particles or systems of matter occasionally without losing her ideal causes flowing from another fund.

13. The notion of illocality is at least as old as Aristotle, but has been continued down to the moderns, for Cudworth declares himself of that opinion: but though he will not allow spirit as such to have any place, he admits it may have one with respect to the body whereto it is vitally united, wherefore he tells us some held that spirit must always be vitally united to some body or other that it may have a place in nature: which seems to make the very existence of spirit to depend upon body, for I cannot conceive a thing to exist at all which has no place in nature. I apprehend this doctrine of illocality arose from the defining extension a having parts without parts, for those who held this definition could no more conceive a mathematical point in space than in body; therefore whatever had a place must possess some portion of space, which being divisible, so much of the substance as lies in the right-hand half of this portion will be a distinct part from that which lies on the left. And that this was Aristotle's way of

thinking appears manifest, because he allowed a where to spirit though he would not allow a place; which seems to me a distinction without a difference, for to be somewhere, or in some place, are in my comprehension synonymous terms. But I do not apprehend the individuality of a substance depends upon the individuality of the space wherein it exists; if we cannot conceive the one without the other it is because our conceptions are taken from the bodies we see, whose divisions always correspond with those of the spaces they occupy: but we must, upon many occasions, admit conclusions we cannot conceive; therefore our want of adequate conception is not sufficient to overthrow the reasons before given for the individuality of spirit and at the same time its presence throughout a space consisting of distinguishable parts.

14. But which way soever we express ourselves, we cannot well appropriate mobility to body, nor deny that spirit partakes of the like quality, without which there can no more be made a change of Where than a change of Place. While in my chamber this morning I was one where, now I am come down into my study, I am other where; this Aristotle must needs grant me: but how I could get either from one where or one place, to another where or another place, without locomotion, let him that can comprehend it explain.

15. Some have supposed the mind able to move herself by her own energy, which cannot well consist with what I observed long ago, that our idea of Operation requires there should be two substances concerned, one to act and another to be acted upon: but waving this difficulty, if the mind has such power, we can never know it, because she cannot exert it in her present state. We live imprisoned in walls of flesh and bone, and like a snail can stir nowhere without our houses accompanying us: when we walk, we act upon our legs, which thrust the body forward, and that moves the mind along; so that in walking we are as much carried as when riding in a coach driven by our own orders. Nor let it be thought the mind moves herself, because in our ordinary movements she goes willingly along with her companion, for this is not always the case; a man may be pulled forcibly from his seat, though he resist and struggle ever so much, or be ever so averse to stirring; or he may be carried in his sleep, when there is no exercise of volition: but in these cases, when the body is dragged away, the spirit will not stay behind, which manifestly shows it passive to receive a motion it cannot avoid.

16. Since we find a passive locomotion in spirit, we must acknowledge it capable of impulse from body, for body can give motion no otherwise than by impulse; and that spirit is capable of imparting impulse we know by our moving our limbs. But impulse, whether given or received, does not necessarily excite perception, for we have none either of the particles vitally united to us or of those ends of fibres whereon we begin our action. Therefore we must look for some other property in body rendering it perceivable, and this we may call perceptibility, without which perceptivity in spirit would be of no avail; for to produce an effect there must be an active power in the agent, as well as a passive power in the recipient. Whether spirit has the like perceptibility too, we can never certainly know, because we can never try the experiment necessary to discover it. If I may be permitted to conjecture once more, I should suppose this not a primary quality in body, but resulting from a combination of many particles thrown into particular figures, or other modifications, because primary qualities must act uniformly, nor could they exhibit that variety of ideas we perceive.

Why then may not spirit, by virtue of its indifference either to solidity or penetrability, imitate the like modifications? Suppose a piece of marble skilfully engraven so as to leave the letters of a word standing out from the rest of the surface, if the marble were laid upon your hand, you might feel and understand the word. What then should hinder but that a spirit, being contiguous to another, might make itself solid in the parts of the sphere of its presence corresponding with the shape of the letters, leaving its natural penetrability in the spaces between, which then might produce the same effect as the marble did upon your hand. And thus spirits, when disencumbered from the shackles of matter, may communicate the same perceptions, besides thousands more that we receive from our organs, both of sensation and reflection.

CHAP. VI.

DURATION OF MIND.

From the individuality and distinct existence of Mind may be inferred her perpetual duration; for the powers of nature can neither increase nor diminish the stock of Beings; they may throw them out of their assortments, and so dissolve the compounds formed thereby, or destroy the secondary qualities resulting from their composition; but what has existence cannot be annihilated, and what is one cannot be divided, nor can primary qualities, essential to the subject possessing them, be taken away. Perceptivity and activity have appeared to be the properties constituting the essence of spirit, and distinguishing it from other substances: as to what has been offered concerning solidity, extension, locality, and mobility, whether it shall be received or no, affects us not at present.

2. So far then as relates to the individuality, existence, and inherent perceptivity of spirit, I may be counted orthodox, but I will not undertake to preserve that character always, for I am now going to side for a while with the corporealists, whom I take to have the advantage in some particulars over their antagonists. Nor can this be called a desertion, for I have never sworn implicit obedience to any master, but have claimed to use a sober freedom to examine whatever I shall hear suggested from any quarter. I laid down in my general introduction, as a reasonable presumption, that the tenets of every sect among mankind must contain a mixture of truth, for else they would never have gained credit, because men do not wilfully embrace error, but are led into it by unwary conclusions from something for which they have a solid foundation. If such presumptions be thought a prejudice, and who can keep perfectly clear from prejudice? it is a more excusable one that that which proceeds from the spirit of opposition. For this engages men to treat an antagonist as an enemy, and even to deny him the rights of an enemy, but my propensity to judge the best of every one inclines me to seek excuses for him in the fallibility of human reason, which draws false conclusions from true premises: therefore how erroneous soever I may judge the corporealists in the main, I am better satisfied in discovering some latent fallacy misleading them in their deductions, than if I could find nothing similar in their way of thinking with my own.

3. Now the particulars wherein I apprehend them not so grossly mistaken as commonly supposed, are these, that sense, thought, and reason,

result from an organization, therefore whatever possesses those faculties must be a compound. No doubt I shall be thought to contradict myself herein, having all along used sentient, percipient, and perceptive, as synonymous terms, and contended so strenuously that every substance to which those epithets belong must be one and uncompounded. We have had no occasion hitherto to distinguish between those terms, and to have done it, while needless, would have tended only to perplex and burden our thoughts; but I am now under a necessity of making a distinction between percipience and perceptivity, which though a pretty nice one I hope to make it understood. The powers we ascribe to ourselves in our discourses depend partly upon our natural abilities, and partly upon the instruments we have to employ: a man may be called a good rider that is expert to keep a firm seat upon the saddle, but while marching among the infantry he is no rider at all; or he may be pronounced able to ride a hundred miles in a day, if he have strength to support the fatigue, but he is not able to ride twenty without a horse, or with a lame one. So when we find a person asleep, or meet him in the dark, we may affirm of him that he has a very piercing sight, if we know his optics are good; yet in these situations he can no more see than the table. In like manner a substance is perceptive, that has a quality of perceiving objects upon application of them; yet it cannot perceive without a proper conveyance to bring the impression of objects to it: therefore if it be so placed as that no impression can ever come at it, it is no more percipient than any clod in the fields. Thus perceptivity is nothing else beside a bare capacity in the subject to receive perceptions when excited, but sense or precipience is the standing so circumstanced as that the impulse of objects striking upon us may be transmitted so as to raise perceptions: and this requires an organization, which implies a compound of many parts; for I can no more see without eyes, hear without ears, nor meditate without organs of reflection, than I could without a perceptive spirit to receive the notices transmitted thereby. What notices a separate spirit might receive from other substances accidentally approaching it I need not now inquire, for all the percipients we have any knowledge of being vitally united to some organization, and their perceptions depending thereupon, we may safely pronounce all the percipients we know to be compounds.

4. And the case is plainer with respect to the faculties of remembrance, consciousness, reasoning, judging, dividing, comparing, and all other modes of thinking; for we cannot remember or be conscious without inspecting the records lying in our memory, we cannot judge without a discernment of something distinct from that which judges; in reasoning we employ our organs of reflection to bring the proper materials before us for our contemplation, and when we divide and compare, there must be something within us exhibiting the objects wherein we observe a difference or similitude. Therefore those who define the mind a thinking substance necessarily make it a compound whether they discern the consequence or no, for cogitation cannot be performed without the command of certain instruments, to bring ideas before us for our inspection, to change, to marshal, to separate them, and trace their connections or relations from one inference to another. For this reason I remarked in the chapter of sensation that Mind was an equivocal term used to express two very different things, which I called the philosophical and the vulgar mind, though I cannot help acknowledging that men of thought and learning for the most part understand it in the vulgar sense, or rather confound both together. Th

former I take to be a pure uncompounded spirit endowed with perceptivity and activity, but incapable of actual perception or action without an organization suited to its purposes: by the latter I understand this same spirit together with so much of its organization as is concerned in the business of thinking and reflection, which must be a compound consisting chiefly of corporeal parts separable from one another, and all of them from the spirit whereto they are united. In this mind our faculties of reason and memory, our knowledge, our talents, our habits, our passions, our sentiments, and whatever else distinguishes the characters of men, reside: and this mind I apprehend to be the same with what is commonly called the human soul.

5. If any shall take offence at my making the soul compounded, dissoluble, and perishable, let them consider it is not I who make it so but themselves by their application of the term: for words are mere arbitrary signs, capable of taking any signification that mankind shall agree to put upon them. Were I left to myself I should apply the name of Soul to our spiritual part alone, and shall do so sometimes where the matters I handle will admit of it; and then after all that has been delivered already nobody can suspect me of holding it perishable. But the misfortune is that men in their division of body and soul do not make the separation clean, but take in some finer parts of the former into their idea of the latter, as appears manifest by their ascribing faculties to it which cannot subsist without an organization: for a naked spirit is no more a thinking substance than it is a walking substance, it can indeed think whenever joined in composition with proper organs of reflections, and so it can always walk in composition with legs and crural muscles. Thus, after the usual division of man into body and soul, we may again subdivide the latter into organization and spirit; but this subdivision being not ordinarily taken notice of, the term Soul becomes applied indifferently either to the perceptive spirit or to the whole percipient containing that in conjunction with its system of reflective organs. While men remain unsettled and variable in their notions of the soul they must not blame me for speaking of it in a manner they do not like, or that seems contradictory to what I have spoken concerning it at other times, for this will unavoidably happen so long as in compliance with custom I am obliged to vary the idea belonging to the term. So then the question concerning the corruptibility of Mind or Soul is a question of language rather than of fact, and may be truly answered Ay or No, according to the different senses wherein you understand them. And the like question capable of contrary answers may be proposed concerning Person: who does not acknowledge himself mortal, that he was taken from dust and shall crumble into dust again, and in a few years shall be no more; we hear such expressions used every day, and they are justly used while we consider our whole human frame as ourselves. But in our seasons of abstraction, when we restrain Self to the spiritual part, we change our tone, for then we claim to be perpetual, unperishable, and unchangeable, to flourish in immortal youth, unhurt amidst the war of elements, the wreck of matter, and the crush of worlds.

6. Thus in disputes upon the nature of the soul, while it was defined a reasoning, thinking, sentient, substance, the corporealists seem to have had the advantage. For issue being joined upon its simplicity or compoundness, it seemed admitted on both sides that if compounded it was material: therefore finding it uncontroverted that every compound must be made up of matter, and being unable to conceive the faculties of reason, thought, and sense, residing in a simple substance, they were not quite

absurd in concluding the soul to be no more than a very curious assortment of corporeal particles. But if we take along with us our foregoing distinction between percipience and perceptivity, we may admit a sentient composed of unsentient parts, yet deny that such composition could consist solely of matter, but must contain one perceptive ingredient to receive the notices brought by the rest. For if a grain of sand were placed where the spirit resides in the most exquisite organization that can be contrived, there would be no more thought or percipience in this compound than there is in the Venus de Medicis.

If any one shall still make a difficulty in distinguishing between a capacity and a power of perceiving, let him consider whether he does not apprehend a difference between a blind man and one with good eyes shut up in a coal-hole: both lie under an impossibility of seeing, yet both have not lost their sight. When Ulysses stopped the ears of his crew with wax, on sailing by the Syrens, he did not destroy their sense of hearing though he put it out of their power to hear the enchantments. And a strong man bound hand and foot becomes unable to stir, yet retains his vigour and natural ability to move. So a spirit may retain its perceptivity, that is, capacity of receiving perceptions whenever excited, after losing its percipience or power of perceiving by being removed from everything which might bring objects to excite them.

7. Having satisfied ourselves that our spirit or soul, if I may give that appellation to the spiritual part singly, shall have a duration beyond all the powers of nature to cut short, our next step will be to examine what we shall carry with us upon quitting our present habitation: and we can assure ourselves of no more than our two primary faculties of perceptivity and activity, which being inherent in our constitution nothing can divest us of. But these will avail us little of themselves, for we shall neither be able to perceive nor act without something added thereto, furnishing ideas for us to perceive or materials for us to act upon. Therefore, the knowledge of our perpetual duration and perceptivity affords us no light to judge of our condition hereafter: we know that we shall continue existent and capable of receiving perceptions, but what perceptions shall accost us, whether those of pleasure or pain, of sagacity or dullness, or none at all, we are utterly ignorant. Nor can we tell that our percipience shall remain, nor whether we may or may not carry with us that part of our organization wherein our faculties of reflecting, judging, thinking, reasoning, reside. After what has been said of the extreme divisibility of matter, it appears possible that we may have a complete system of organs within us so small as to elude all our observation, too fine to be discerned when going, or to be missed when gone: so that notwithstanding all the appearances upon death, and though the carcass seems to lose nothing of its weight, there may be a little body composed of members fitted for sense and action which flies off unperceived. But should this be the case, and should our sensitive and rational faculties accompany us, they may be reduced to bare capacities without power of helping ourselves to a single idea, unless some foreign aid shall befriend us. For we have seen in the progress of these inquiries how the mind, in her acts of recollection, of reasoning, of habit, and passion, communicates with the animal circulation: how know we then that she can perform her operations at all when separated therefrom? We find ourselves more or less ready at those operations according to the disposition of our body, and when the communication is cut off by fits or sleep we cannot perform them at all. Therefore it is not impossible that the causes bringing us all our

ideas may reside in the grosser parts of our body, that upon parting from them we may lose our remembrance, our knowledge, and all our acquirements, and pass into another state as much a blank paper as ever we came into this, capable of taking any writing that shall be marked upon us, but having all that was written before quite erased.

8. Or it may be that our whole material frame shall be dissolved, and the spirit fly off naked and unattended by any organ, yet retaining its perceptivity, we know not how it may be affected by any corporeal particle into contiguity, or entering the sphere of its presence. Some have asserted that our perceptions are excited, not by animal spirits or fibres, but by vibrations of ether pervading their interstices: if this be true we shall not want for ether wherever we go, but how the stronger vibrations of ether at a distance from gross bodies shall affect us we are utterly at a loss to guess. Neither can we be assured concerning the perceptibility of other spirits, whether they may exhibit ideas to one another, whether such operation be necessary or voluntary, nor how they may stand disposed either to comfort or torment us.

9. In either case our condition will be determined by the objects accosting us, and company we fall into. We are here luckily situated in an organization enabling us to help ourselves to the conveniences and enjoyments of life, but when turned out of this we know not where to find such another, nor how to get into any other at all. Though surrounded with dangers on all sides, we have sense and experience to avoid them, but when divested of our sense and experience, we may be like a blind man turned out into a crowded street, having nothing but chance to direct our steps, insensible of mischiefs before they fall upon us, and unknowing which way to escape them. We may be tossed about among the elements, driven by streams of air, or whirled round in circles of fire, the little corpuscles of light may hurt us, and the ether tease us with its continual repulsion: in short, we have everything to fear and little to hope for. Thus the discovery of our durable and perceptible nature affords no comfort, for while we confine our contemplation to that, the prospect lies dismal, dark, and uncertain before us. Let us then turn our thoughts upon external nature, in order to discover what rules and powers there may be governing that, in hopes of learning something how they may affect us, and in what manner we are likely to be disposed of.

CHAP. VII.

EFFECTS AND CAUSES.

Though we are all convinced of our short continuance in this present state, we are well satisfied that the course of nature will not be interrupted by our departue: the sun will still rise and set, the tides ebb and flow, the trees continue to bear their fruits, the cattle to multiply, the earth to yield her increase, and the business of mankind to go forward, after we are dead and gone. But the contemplation of these things gives us no instruction how to provide for our future accommodation, nor furnishes us with any light to discover what accommodations may be provided to our hands. Shall we heap up riches? those we must leave behind, or could we carry them with us, our money would not pass current in the other world. Shall we plant gardens or breed up numerous flocks? their produce will

not suit our digestion. Shall we raise a family or spread our fame amongst mankind? we may not remember our own names, nor have an intercourse with the living to know what they say of us. Shall we improve knowledge and cultivate the sciences? our ideas may be totally different, and our sciences unintelligible to us. Shall we rectify our dispositions of mind, and lay in store of virtues? these are habits wherein the animal circulation is concerned, nor can we be sure they shall continue when that is removed from us. Shall we be careful to nourish the little body that is to serve us for our next habitation, to invigorate its limbs and quicken its organs? we know not where they lie, nor what we can do to improve their growth. And as we can do nothing of ourselves, so neither have we assurance of any thing that will be done for us: we know not what nests shall be provided to hatch us into life, nor what parents we shall have to protect our tender infancy, and teach us the learning necessary for our conduct; what sustenance the air may afford, or where to find it, or whether we shall want any sustenance at all; what variations of weather may prevail in the ether answering to the pleasing warmth of a vernal sunshine, or the storms and inclemencies of winter, nor how to shelter ourselves from the latter. The subtile fluids causing gravitation, cohesion, electricity, and magnetism, may strike our new senses instead of lights, sounds, savours, and odours, and fill us with agreeable or troublesome sensations. We may meet with different species of animals proportionable to our size, answering to ravenous birds and beasts of prey or such as serve for our uses in life. We may fall into societies of fellow creatures among whom we may find friends and enemies, who may give mutual delight by their conversation, or vex one another with their contrariety of tempers and opposition of interests. Since then we can find nothing certain by considering the constitution of particluar things, let us search for the general laws prevailing throughout all nature: for perhaps we may see that their influence must occasion some resemblance or similar tendency in the municipal laws of the several regions of nature, and we may discover some methods of conduct whereby to put ourselves in a situation to receive benefit and escape damage from that influence. But as those laws depend upon the causes operating in the productions of nature, we must endeavour to investigate the causes from their effects discernible to our senses or discoverable by our reason.

2. We may distribute our prospect of nature into three parts, primary qualities, motion, and situation, which concur in every operation we see or can think of. When a cannon-ball dashing into a heap of sand disperses it all about, the situation into which the particles are thrown, follows from their several situations in the heap and the contact or propinquity of the ball when striking, from the violent motion wherewith it struck, and from its solidity to give, and their own solidity to receive, an impulse. So the growth of plants is owing to the near situation of nutricious particles in the earth that bears them, the position of their little parts in fibres and tubes fitted for containing the sap, to the action of sun and air, and to the properties of matter whereon that action depends. Nor is the case different with respect to the acts of free agents, which cannot proceed without a close situation of that which is to be the subject of their action or object of their perception, nor could their organs take a different modification whereby to exhibit different ideas without a motion in their parts, nor could anything be perceived or done without perceptibility and mobility in body, or perceptivity and motivity in spirit. And there are three causes commonly observed in the phenomena we see, Chance, Necessity, and Design.

When the wind drives about the seeds of thistles, they fall in particular spots by chance; where they light, the peculiar contexture of their parts makes them necessarily produce plants of their own species; and when we cultivate and dress our ground, sow our corn, keep it weeded, and harvest it, we proceed by design.

3. I shall begin with the consideration of motion without which the courses of nature cannot be carried on: but this we may satisfy ourselves is not a quality of body, which is a moveable but no more a moving than a quiescent substance, being alike indifferent to either state, and continuing in either until put out of it by some foreign force. We see bodies moved by other bodies striking or shoving against them, but the mover gives no more motion than it had itself before, and always loses so much as it has imparted to another. And though motion sometimes seems to proceed from the pressure of quiescent bodies, there is always some external impulse occasioning the pressure; for two bodies meeting with equal force in opposite directions, after having stopped one another, will lie forever close together, gently touching, but not pressing each other unless something pushes or strikes against them on the outside. It is true we see motion frequently produced without discerning the cause, but then experiment and reason assure us that bodies never produce motion, but only transmit it by an impulse arising from their natural property of persevering in a motion once received. Thus, while we confine our thoughts to matter, it will appear that every motion is the product of some preceding motion, transferred from body to body, and incapable of increase by the translation. That there is an inexhaustible source of impulse somewhere, though undiscernible by our senses, we may rest assured when we consider the dissolving power of menstruums, the violence of fire, the strong contraction of our heart and arteries, the stability of heavy masses held down by gravitation to the earth, and the firm cohesion of metals: all which must have some prodigious fund, we know not where to find, from whence to derive the force they exert. It seems not improbable there may be streams of a most subtile matter much finer than ether itself darting incessantly along in all directions with inconceivable velocity: that the solid parts of quiescent bodies lie in the spaces between these streams, which likewise throw and preserve the atoms in their longitudinal position of wire before supposed, that upon the touch of fire thrusting any of the particles aside into the streams, it dashes them about against other particles, driving these likewise upon other streams, and so causes that explosion we find in gunpowder. Just as if an army were marching briskly along in very wide ranks, another army in like loose array might march quietly between them: but if a few men were pushed into the others' ranks, it would cause a violent commotion and tossing to and fro among them. We may help ourselves a little in this idea by considering a cube of glass hung up between candles on all the six sides of it, the rays would pass continually through without being stopped by the glass or jolting against one another; and this whether the glass remained still or were swung to and fro; but if by a smart blow the parts of the glass were to change their position, forming a multitude of little cracks, it would become opaque and not afford them a passage, in which case if the streams of light were strong enough they must rend the glass into atoms and keep buffetting them about until by frequent tossings they had brought them to lie in the interstices between themselves.

4. It may seem at first sight impossible that such streams of subtile matter should be able to run in all directions without stopping or jostling

one another: but let us consider that we find by experience the same thing happens in the passage of light. Hang a multitude of candles round the room and you shall be able to see any one of them distinctly through the light of all the rest. The stars scattered about in all parts of the upper hemisphere find their way to our eyes, but they must traverse many miles of thick solar radiance before they can come to that shadow of the earth which makes our night: and their rays falling upon my eyes must cross those falling upon the eyes of other persons a mile around me in a variety of angles: yet all this without any stoppage or deviation from their course, for if they were at all affected by the other rays they pass through, it must cause perpetual refractions and we should see them dance about like so many Will-i'the-whisps. But what makes the difficulty in this case is our conceiving the rays of light to be so many continual streams like those of water, the parts touching close upon one another, whereas it has been observed in CHAP. III. that the corpuscles composing a ray of light may possibly keep a distance of a hundred and sixty miles behind the next preceding them, though they follow so exceeding quick that we think their impulse upon our optics continuous. Now the particles of subtile matter, being much smaller and swifter than those corpuscles, their bulk may be estimated to bear an infinitely less proportion to the spaces between them than a ship does to the length of one hundred leagues. Let us then imagine ships to sail from every port in Europe to America and others from every port in America to Europe, each ship a hundred leagues behind that which parted last from the same port, and their courses be ordered in such manner as that they should cross over one particular spot of the ocean: those ships would so rarely fall foul of one another as to make no perceivable interruption in commerce: why then may not the little particles be allowed to collide so seldom as to cause no disturbance or interruption in the courses of nature.

Another difficulty springs from the extreme minuteness of those particles, which can hardly be thought capable of holding bodies together in such strong cohesion as we experience in metals: but let us remember that the momentum given by all mechanical powers is found by a compound ratio of their quantity of matter and velocity, so that any deficiency in the former may be made up by a proportionable increase of the latter. Nor need we wonder that very small agents should produce great effects, since we know that the burst of a cannon will shake a whole street, but the particles of air giving immediate impulse to the houses can scarce be supposed to weigh many grains. The like appears in explosions of gunpowder where the quantity of matter operating is a very trifle in comparison with the heavy masses it raises and compact bodies it rends. I shall only remark further that this subtile matter, being the cause of gravitation, cohesion, and repulsion, in other bodies, can neither gravitate, nor cohere, nor repel itself, because it will want a prior cause to give it those qualities: nor has it other power than that of impinging like a stone, by virtue of the prodigious velocity wherewith it darts along. Nevertheless, we may count it the primum mobile, or first material agent in all the operations of nature, as driving her two main wheels of attraction and repulsion, from whence all the lesser works, the power of salts, acids, alkalies, of fire, fluids, electricity, and magnetism, circulating vessels of plants and animals, spring; glues and menstruums derive their activity; according to their several structure and position of their parts fitted to turn the motion of those principal wheels upon them. Nor is it hard to conceive how two bodies may be made to attract by the

action of this subtile matter, because they must cover each other from so much of the stream as they receive themselves, which would else have fallen upon the nearest sides of the others, so that this force being wanting to balance that on their opposite sides, they must necessarily be driven towards each other. Then those streams which fall very obliquely, like a cannon-ball bounding from the ground, will drive off other bodies lying at a certain distance, from whence arises repulsion, which cannot take place between bodies too near together, because in that situation they cannot receive a very oblique rebound, for it must pass beside them. This likewise accounts for the inequality between the two attractions, that of cohesion being found stronger than that of gravitation, because bodies cohering have the whole force of attraction without a competitor to keep them together, whereas those at a distance repel as well as attract, so that their gravitation is no more than the difference between those two counteracting forces.

5. But wherever the sources of this fund may lie, or how copious supplies soever they may contain, they cannot for ever answer all demands made upon them. We see bodies continually strike against one another, and when they do so, if not elastic, the motion of both ceases, or if elastic, the force whereby they rebound must be drawn from some such fund as that above mentioned: every time a man claps his two hands together he takes something from the stock of motion which is to carry on the operations of nature. But the collisions occasioned by human action are very trifles in comparison with that great quantity of force spent by nature in all her works: the bearing of rivers against their winding banks, the dashing of seas against the shore, the opposition of winds from one another, or from mountains, the systole or contraction of circulating vessels in animals and plants, but above all these the gravitation of bodies to earths and suns, the cohesion holding the little particles of compounds together, the opposition of centripetal and centrifugal forces keeping the planets in their orbits, the repulsion of air and ether, must make a vast consumption of motion every moment. So that the largest stores of force we can suppose nature once to have had must have been long since exhausted, as being subject to perpetual diminution without any means of recruiting: and all matter must have been reduced to a state of quiescence by this time, unless perhaps some few straggling atoms which might move about in spaces where they should meet with nothing to obstruct them.

6. Yet though the corporealists can find nothing to renew the decays of motion, we who claim motivity as an essential property of our own may fancy we find it in the action of spirit. Now should this be thought to serve for restoring motion it could not serve for beginning it at first: for we do not act without causes, as well final as ideal, wherefore the activity of spirit is set at work by the perceptibility of matter and the modifications it falls into by the motion of its parts presenting us with the motives and guidance of our proceedings. For if nothing moved without us we should have no ideas brought us to perceive, and without perception there could be neither inducement to exert our volition, nor direction which way to turn it. So that upon either hypothesis we must needs adhere to our former conclusion, that every motion is the consequence and effect of some preceding motion, and that it must begin in matter before it can be produced by any such spirits as we have experience of.

7. And the like may be said of situation which follows constantly from some preceding situation. Matter is generally held homogeneous, and that infinite variety of forms constituting the essence of bodies falling under our

cognizance, depends upon the structure and order wherein the parts of them are placed. So that the same first matter makes a stone or a metal, a plant or an animal organization, according to the position wherein the several individuals of it are ranged. Thus all secondary qualities arise from order; neither a clock nor a tree would be what it is, nor could perform its proper functions, if the wheels or the fibres were placed in any other manner than they are: the faculties of sense, thought, and reason, could not subsist unless the spirit resided precisely in that spot whereto all the organs of sensation and reflection tend; and the modifications exciting our several perceptions vary according to the position wherein the component parts of our organs lie. And that particular forms of order generate one another we may be satisfied by the growth of vegetables, where the peculiar structure of the seed causes it to produce a plant of its own kind: and the structure of plants occasions them to yield flowers and fruits of various shapes, hues, odours, and tastes. In these things we are ready enough to acknowledge an order, but as has been shown in CHAP. X. of the last volume, we do not so easily admit it in positions not corresponding with our trains of imagination: nevertheless, it has been made appear there that strictly speaking there is no such thing as disorder in nature, for every number of particles must lie in some situation with respect to one another, and that is their order, however irregular it may seem to our apprehension. Nor are those apparently confused positions unfrequently serviceable to produce what we call order, for the particles nourishing a plant lie undistinguished in the earth, the air, or the vapours, yet they must have an apt position there, or the plant could never draw them in to contribute to its growth. Thus in particular things their order does not depend solely upon the order they had before, but partly upon other things, which are or may be brought contiguous to them, or mingle among them. But the Universe, having nothing external, must receive its order continually from that it had in every preceding moment; so that if the position of all substances could be known precisely at any given point of time, it might be determined from thence what position they would take at any time hereafter. For if it were known how the air, the mountains, the burning sands, the frozen seas, the subterraneous vapours and other causes affecting the weather, stand disposed, we might prognosticate what weather it would be to-morrow, or this day twelvemonth. Nor would the action of free agents disturb the calculation in changes of position wherein they are concerned; for if we could ascertain the exact situation of objects surrounding them and structure of their organs, we might foresee what modifications these organs would fall into, what ideas and motives they would present, and consequently how those agents would act, and what alterations they would make in the position of bodies within their reach. But then in calculations of this sort the article of motion must not be left out of account, because it is that which generates one order out of another: nor is it enough to know the quantity of motion in the whole, but likewise among what particles it is distributed, and in what direction each of them proceeds: for it is obvious that the same motion in different directions must produce very different figures.

8. Secondary qualities, resulting from the order wherein the substances forming a compound lie situate, are continually destroyed and renovated according to the changes made in that order by motions of the component parts. But primary properties belonging to individuals admit of no change; for what has no parts cannot have an order of parts: therefore these pro-

perties, being not generated by motion or situation, must remain constantly the same in the subjects possessing them. Body will always continue solid and spirit perceptive, whether in motion or at rest, whether in this part of the world or any other, whether contiguous to other substances or separate from them all. So that primary properties spring from no assignable cause among the powers of nature, as motion and situation do from former motions and situations.

9. But the inquisitive mind of man looks for something further to account for the different properties of individuals; we find spirit active and perceptive, matter inert and incapable of sense, or should we fancy the atoms sentient, it has been shown the sphere of their presence would be less than that of ours; it is natural then to ask, why there should be such a difference in substances? why they are not all homogeneous and primary alike? And these properties, being inherent in their nature and inseparable from them, must be as old as themselves, and consequently whatever occasioned the difference between them must have been the foundation of their existence. Nor will the mind be satisfied without a reason limiting the quantity of matter existing: there is no impossibility or absurdity in its being double, or treble, or decuple, to what it is, for there is abundant room for multitudes of atoms more in the empty spaces between those already in being.

10. Neither will there want the like questions concerning motion and order: for it will scarcely satisfy to tell us that every motion and situation follows from a prior, that again from the next preceding, and so backwards throughout all eternity; because if we contemplate a series of changes following one another, there will arise an order of succession as well as of position. In the effects we see produced, things pass out of one form into another through several intermediate changes: a seed cannot produce the full-grown tree at once, but first shoots up a tender twig, which then becomes a sapling, a waiver, a tellar, and at last a perfect oak laden with acorns: a fœtus grows through the stages of infancy, of childhood, of youth, unto the full maturity of manhood: and these gradations in the several productions of nature may be called their order of succession. Now if the situations of all the substances in the universe have followed one another for ever, there must have been an eternal order of succession prevailing throughout: but if it should be asked why some other succession might not as well have prevailed eternally, what shall we answer? for I know of no natural repugnance in things against taking any position or series of motions, but their changes might have succeeded for ever in a manner quite different from that they have done. Besides, there are some positions which never generate any others, and consequently produce no order of succession at all. Lucretius' atoms falling perpetually downwards with equal velocity could never have changed their order without his whim of a declination, for which there is no foundation either in experience or reason. Actual motion is not essential to any substances we know of, which therefore might all have remained eternally quiescent in their several stations: or if we will needs suppose them to move, it is most natural to conceive them all moving with the same velocity and direction, in which case they could perform no more feats than the Lucretian atoms. Therefore it remains to seek a reason for their having an eternal motion rather than an eternal rest, or for their escaping those unavailing similar motions which could produce nothing, and for their having eternally taken different directions, from whence flows that order of succession we call the course of nature.

11. Another question may arise concerning Time, why such a particular point of it must be the present. To-day must follow yesterday, and precede to-morrow, this I know very well, but how know I that yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, might not have been long since past, or that they might not have been yet to come? Can we fix the beginning of eternity, and compute how many ages have lapsed since then, so that the year 1761 must necessarily be the present year? That year follows year and the second precedes the third there is no dispute, but why might not the whole course of time have been anticipated or retarded, so that it might now have been the reign of Henry I. or George X. instead of George III.? We shall look in vain for a solution to this question in the properties of substances, the effects of motion, or the results of order.

12. Neither can we learn anything from them to determine the original stations of particular substances in the universe whereon all their succeeding ones depend, which we shall want some cause to assign them. We may think this not worth inquiry with respect to matter, for it is all one whether particle A lie in the east and particle B in the west, or the contrary, the course of nature will go on the same, for either particle will answer the same purposes in either place: but with respect to sentient beings it is very material, for had I been stationed in some distant planet and some other spirit here in my room, though the course of nature and business of mankind would have proceeded just as it does, yet my own lot might have been very different: I might have had enjoyments now out of my reach or fallen into disasters I know nothing of. This consideration may put us upon searching for a reason, not only why all nature wears the form and follows the order of succession it does, but why each particular substance possesses its own place in that order and has not the place of any other.

CHAP. VIII.

CHANCE, NECESSITY, AND DESIGN.

These three have been severally assigned as the causes producing that order we observe in nature, and as they convey very different and opposite ideas we shall consider each of them apart. Some have laid great stress upon chance, as being the original giving rise to the other two by strewing the particles of matter throughout infinite space, and throwing them into combinations from whence the secondary qualities of compounds necessarily result, and forming others into an organization rendering them capable of thought and design. And in our common discourses we speak of Chance or Fortune as a power influencing the affairs of men and having a principal share in the direction of all events: this is thought frequently to baffle the skill of the wise, the valour of the brave, and strength of the mighty, to turn the scale of victory, and determine the success of all enterprises. But if we examine the proper idea of chance we shall see that it is neither agent nor power, nor has any other existence except in our own ignorance, but whatever is ascribed to that we might see performed by other causes if we had sagacity to discern them. Even in games at cards and dice we deal the one and throw the other ourselves, and both fall out according to the motion and position we have given them: but as we are not so perfect

masters of our motions as to know exactly what they will produce, it is this uncertainty that makes the chance; for there are persons who have learned to pack the cards and cog the dice, and with such there is no chance what hand or what cast will ensue. It is remarkable that we sometimes know the exact proportion between our knowledge and our ignorance, which enables us to calculate chances with a very great nicety: but if there were a person who could discern minutely the little inequalities of the table you throw upon, the roughnesses of the box, the vigour of your arm, the degree of confidence or distrust with which you throw, and all the ideas rising in your fancy, he would make an other-guised calculation than our common gamesters. Therefore chance is relative, being greater or less, or none at all, according to the degree of knowledge in different persons: an event of which there is very little chance to one man, may be probable to another, and inevitable to a third, according as each stands in a situation to discern the causes operating to produce it. To him that sees two hands at whist, there is less chance on which side the odd trick will fall than to the players: if he look over all the cards, he may still give a shrewder guess; and if he knows exactly each person's manner of playing, he may compute, without hazard of a mistake, how much will be scored that deal.

2. What is done cannot be undone, therefore a power once executed ceases with respect to that particular event, wherewith it has no longer any concern: whence we may learn that the power of fortune is only ideal, because in many cases we suppose that remaining after determination of the event imagined to depend thereupon. When a merchant risks his all upon a venture to some distant part of the globe, we say he puts himself under the power of fortune, because the casualties of winds and seas, of fire and enemies, are supposed to lie at her disposal: but what if this merchant sells his venture to another after the time lapsed in which the ship must have succeeded or absolutely failed in her voyage, but before any news of her can be arrived home? does not the purchaser put himself as much under the power of fortune? But if fortune had any power during the voyage, she has executed it, and has nothing more to do, nor is there any chance of the success falling out otherwise than it has fallen. Nevertheless, because we know not the event, we still apprehend ourselves under the power of fortune: for when advice comes of the ship being arrived safe, the cargo advantageously disposed of, and the money deposited into safe hands, then, and not before, we conceive the power of fortune determined, and ourselves secure against her caprices.

3. Thus chance is no cause of anything, but serves only to express our ignorance or uncertainty of the manner in which other causes operate: therefore may be properly applied to the most cogent necessity, or most deliberate design, where we know not the tendency of the one, nor purpose aimed at by the other. What is esteemed more casual than weather? yet nobody doubts of the air moving, the vapours rarifying, or the clouds condensing, according to a certain impulse received from mechanical causes: but because no mathematician nor naturalist can investigate those causes, so as to calculate what they will produce, therefore we say, the farmer depends upon chance to bring his corn to maturity, and give him a favourable season for harvesting it. So likewise to us who are not in the secret, it may be a matter of fair wager whether the council will sit on such a day, whether they will send more troops to Germany or agree to a cessation of arms, nor would the chances alter, though the whole wisdom of the nation were to be consulted in determining these points: and if our stake were very consider-

able we should as much put ourselves under the power of fortune, as if we had ventured upon the cast of a die, or a lot drawn by a child, or the choice made between two crumbs of bread by a sparrow. So then an event happening by chance does not elude the operations of necessary causes, nor the acts of free agents, nor the provisions of wisdom, for the effects of all three will be casual so long as we cannot foresee them. And though it must be acknowledged, that fortune has a great influence upon all our affairs, no more is to be understood by this expression than that we know not what causes are in act around us which may affect the success of our measures.

It is not uncommon for words to take a little different signification, according to the phrases wherein they stand: it is one thing to say there is a chance of an event falling out so or so, and another to say it was an effect of chance. How ready soever you and I might be to lay a wager upon the meeting of the council, as deeming it a casual event, we shall never think the members meet together by chance, taking it for granted they have some reason either for going or staying away. So if we see a mathematician busy in drawing figures upon paper, though we may offer to bet with one another whether he will make a circle, a parabola, or a parallelogram next, we shall hardly imagine he constructs his schemes by chance. So likewise, if lightning falling upon an oak should tear it into shatters, though it fell by chance upon that particular tree, there was no chance against its rending asunder whatever it should light upon, nor was there any chance of its not bursting from the clouds when the air was in a disposition to produce it. Since then among events we cannot foresee, we distinguish between those happening by chance and those which do not, it will be proper to examine what we understand by this distinction. In effects produced by necessary agents we esteem those casual which depend upon other causes besides what fall under our cognizance: when we see water poured upon a rising ground, we know it must run downwards by its natural gravitation; but into what streams it may divide, or in what meanders it may wind, is casual, because depending upon the inequalities of the ground, and obstacles lying in the way, of which we can take no accurate account; but still there must be water poured, and gravitation pulling downward, or no stream or meander could ensue. In works of design, it is common for other effects to follow besides those intended: a man walks along meaning only to get from one place to another, but in his passing he treads upon a snail; this is casual, because he had it not under contemplation, nor was it any part of his design; but he must have had some purpose in view, or he would not have walked at all, and the snail remained safe. So then in both cases, chance has no place, unless there be some agent at work, some power in act, from whose operations chance may produce something that was unforeseen or unthought of. Therefore those who pretend the world was made by chance, or assign that for the beginning of all things, talk absurdly; for there must always be something in motion previous to chance, nor can this begin until there be causes operating, of which it may be a chance in what manner they will operate. Besides, if we consider the source of chance itself, we shall find it always rise from the situation of things which may interfere with those at any time under contemplation: for upon seeing a body move, or knowing the purpose of a free agent, there is no chance what will ensue supposing all obstructions removed: but we have seen in the last chapter, that every situation follows upon a preceding situation, therefore, if we could know completely the motions, the purposes, and situations, of all substances in the

universe, we might learn from thence the order of succession, and should see there is no chance of anything that could happen.

5. I proceed next to Necessity, with which I shall have less to do, as being a more stable term, appropriated chiefly by the studious, and not so subject to the usual variations of vulgar language. Our idea of necessity we take from the action of bodies, which have no force of their own, but transmit that they have received from one to another: even resistance, although inherent in body, can effect nothing without an external impulse. So that necessity cannot be assigned for the origin of things, because itself must have a beginning in the previous condition of things from whence their operations may be necessarily inferred, for no effect is necessary until there are causes at work fitted to produce it: therefore, necessity is at most but a channel of conveyance, transmitting efficacy from cause to effect, and even this purpose it will not answer completely, having no fund to repair the loss of motion, continually occasioned by the collision and pressure of bodies. We may then admit this as one of the laws by which nature preserves the tenor of her course: but can by no means employ it to account for the present order of succession, be it eternal or no, taking place preferably to any other, or to those unavailing situations which could have produced no succession at all.

6. Nor shall we find less difficulty with Design, such as we have experience of, for reason requires materials to work upon, and intelligence cannot subsist without objects previously existing to be understood. Something must suggest the design, and present ideas of the means tending thereto, before we can enter upon the prosecution. So that what power soever spirits may have to renew the perpetual decays of motion, and carry on the order of succession, their action cannot account for there being such an order: because there must have been some previous situation of matter before that action begun, exciting perceptions which gave occasion to their exerting this power.

7. And as we have found these three causes insufficient to account for the order of succession in the situations and motions of things, so can they as little account for that third part of nature, the primary properties of substances: for those are not the consequences of prior properties or positions, but coeval with the subjects possessing them. They cannot spring either from necessity or design, to both which they gave birth: for the necessary agency of matter results from its solidity and inertness, as design does from the perceptivity of spirit: and chance lies still further remote, having no place until necessity or design have begun their work. Neither will the contemplation of these causes furnish us with an answer to the queries before proposed concerning the course of time, why it might not have run earlier or later than it does; nor concerning the particular stations of sentient Beings, why each possesses the place it holds among the whole number, and so receives that series of perceptions which might as well have fallen upon another standing in its room.

CHAP. IX.

THE FIRST CAUSE.

Thus having examined all the powers and properties of nature, so far as they fall under our cognizance and observation, we find that the contextures, qualities, and operations of particular things, follow from prior situations and motions, these again upon others preceding, and so on without limitation in a continued chain, whose links we cannot number, and whose length we cannot measure. When we endeavour to account for the whole chain, whether finite or infinite, hanging in such a particular manner rather than any other, or being connected in links at all, and consider the general causes hitherto assigned for that purpose, we find them ineffectual, as taking their rise from the positions and qualities of substances existing before, and therefore themselves the effects of some preceding cause. When we reflect on the different primary properties as substances, which are essential to them and inseparable from them, and yet require a reason occasioning the difference, we must conclude that the cause which made that difference gave them likewise their existence, and at the same time appointed them their several stations; for these too require a cause, every station being naturally indifferent to receive any particular substance equally with any other, and each substance having had some station in every point of its existence. But this cause we have no direct knowledge of, as we see none of its operations; wherever we look around us, we discern nothing at work besides chance, necessity, and volition: neither our senses nor our thoughts can pierce to the end of the chain, nor can we contain the whole of it in our imagination: we have no remembrance nor experience of an existence given together with primary qualities, nor of a substance which had no place in nature first taking its station. From whence we may rationally infer, that all the causes operating to produce the phenomena within our notice are themselves effects of some prior cause, of which we can know nothing more than may be gathered upon the evidence of those effects.

2. There is not a more evident truth or more universally acknowledged among mankind than this, That nothing can produce nothing; therefore if there ever had been a time when there was no Being in nature, there could have been none now, and the bodies we daily see and handle are an irrefragable evidence to us that something has existed from all eternity; because either they themselves did so, or they were called into being by what was existent before them, and had nothing prior to itself. Thus we must needs acknowledge there is a Being somewhere existent without a cause, for till we find such an one we shall have no cause whereon to found the existence of other things: and such we may safely assign for the First Cause of all existencies, modes of existence, properties, and order of succession in the universe. To this species of existence we commonly apply the terms Self-existence and Necessary-existence, rather for want of properer than for their being fully expressive of the thing understood by them: for self-existence literally implies something that was not, but assumed a being by its own power, than which no imagination can well be more absurd: but we mean by the expression a Being underived and unproduced either by itself or any other, or in other words, existing per-

petually without a cause. I will not undertake to expound the term Necessary, having but a confused idea of the import it carries in this place: it cannot mean a Being that has no power to lay down its existence: for in this sense you and I, the dog and the chimney-piece, are necessary beings, because we can none of us annihilate ourselves, or cease to be: but Necessary, I take it, stands here in opposition to Eventual, as not depending upon the concurrence or operation of other causes, and so amounts to the same as I said before, a Being perpetually existing without a cause.

Nevertheless, we have observed formerly, that one may pronounce some things clearly concerning confused ideas: therefore how obscure soever the term may be, we may affirm without hesitation, that it cannot be local nor temporary, for we cannot conceive such a difference in places or times, as that a Being should be necessary in one spot or year, which is not necessary elsewhere or other when. Therefore bodies are not necessarily existent because we see that any place may be without them, but if there were an absolute necessity, independent on any cause, that yonder rolling stone should exist where it is, it could never be removed therefrom: and the same necessity would require its existence in the next adjoining place, and so in every other, until the whole universe became one enormous mass of stone. For whatever has necessary existence at any time or anywhere, must have it always and everywhere, throughout the whole extent of time and space.

3. But though the existence of the First Cause be necessary, its operations are not so, for necessity always proceeds uniformly under the same circumstances: wherefore the variations of nature may convince us, that there is a choice belonging to the First Cause determining the precise number of substances, allotting them their primary properties, stations, and motions, assigning their positions with respect to one another, and so ascertaining the particular order of succession which constitutes the course of nature. For we cannot conceive otherwise of Non-existence than as alike indifferent to take Being or remain in nonentity, or to receive any properties and modifications that shall be given it: nor of the First Cause otherwise than as proceeding by choice, determining where and in what manner they shall be given. This choice we must call Intelligence, for want of a properer appellation, though very different from our own understandings, which how improved soever, could never act as a first cause, because they do nothing without previous motives, and ideas derived elsewhere: and from this choice or Intelligence the First Cause is denominated God. For I take the point of intelligence to make the fundamental distinction between theists and atheists: all who hold the world and the affairs of men governed by a superior wisdom and foresight, whether they conceive it residing in one or in many, whether limited in their powers and prescribed to by the laws of nature, or even if they suppose them generated and perishable, must be allowed to believe a God. On the contrary, how highly soever any may think of the eternity, self-existence, and efficacy of their first mover, yet, while they ascribe its operations to unthinking chance or blind necessity, they cannot escape the charge of atheism.

4. Besides, it seems incongruous to reason, to imagine that any cause should give active powers, unless it has the same or greater within itself. A man indeed may beget a son that shall far outstrip him in understanding and quickness of parts, but then there are many other causes concurring to the production of a child besides the father; but that a sole cause working on no pre-existing materials should do this, is inconceivable. Since then

we find a degree of intelligence, prudence, and forecast in ourselves, we can with no colour deny the same to the origin from whence we sprung. He that made the eye, shall not he see? he that formed the ear, shall not he hear? and he that gave man knowledge, shall he not understand? Our own perceptions indeed come to us from without, but we may consider perception in the mind as a different thing from the modifications of our organs immediately exciting it: we may then conceive the like and other perceptions in God, without the adventitious helps we stand in need of to strike them upon us; or if he have not perceptions of the same kind with ours, we must suppose him to have something else which answers the purposes of them more effectually.

5. Nor is it a contemptible argument for the Being of a God which is drawn from the universal consent of mankind: for our reason when proceeding most carefully being liable to error, we gain a greater confidence in it upon finding it confirmed by the opinion of others, and the more general this confimation is, the stronger assurance we shall have of our being in the right. But the force of this argument has been invalidated by alleging that far the greater part of mankind take their opinions upon trust, and that crafty persons have found an interest in leading the world into the persuasion of a superior power they did not believe themselves. Therefore to avoid this objection, let us consider the sentiments of those only who have been most careful to judge for themselves, and we shall find them agreed in the course of their reasonings, but some few led to dissent from the rest by their misapprehension of a point of fact, which I conceive may be determined by our experience and observation. The atheists, I believe, to a man were all corporealists, holding no other substance in nature besides matter: and though they could not but acknowledge a sense and understanding in themselves, which was wanting in the stones and clods of the earth, and the most curious works of art, yet they supposed those to be secondary qualities, resulting from an organization wherein the particles of matter were disposed. The Hylozoists indeed, by Cudworth's account of them, ascribed a little more to their atoms, imagining them endued with a quality which, though not perception, might be styled the seed or principle whereout by the junction of many of them together perception might be completed. Thus both conceived perceptivity to arise from a certain combination or aggregation of imperceptive particles, and that there was nothing existent which was not originally and separately imperceptive, that is, corporeal.

On the other hand, none who admitted perceptivity as a primary property, or held immaterial substances uncompounded of matter, ever denied a God. And it may be remarked for the credit of the spiritualists, that they were more unanimous upon this article than the materialists: for though the stoics, according to Cudworth, must be ranked among the latter, they were so far from atheism that they run into the contrary extreme and all the superstition of dreams, omens, auguries, with other methods of divination: and indeed, if a composition of mere matter consisting of flesh, blood, and fibres, may form sense and understanding in man, it will be hard to show that other compositions may not do the like, or that the order and composition of all matter which we call the Universe may not as well produce a superior intelligence. So Bolingbroke, whom, from his deriding the doctrine of spiritual substance under the name of pneumatic philosophy, we may pronounce a corporealist, nevertheless acknowledges a God: for catching hold of Mr. Locke's notion, he would have us believe that God

has annexed the faculty of thinking to that system of matter composing our human frame, so that upon the dissolution of our system we must lose our faculties, our existence, and our personality. But the spiritualists, however varying in other respects, have never disputed the being of a God: some few of them, as Berkely, have denied the existence of body, the reality of space, distance, time, and all external objects; but then they attributed our perceptions to an immediate act of God impressing ideas of them all upon our minds. Thus we see the matter reduced to this single question, whether perceptivity results from a combination of matter or is a primary property in the subject possessing it: for which reason I have been the more careful in the foregoing chapters to suggest what observations I could think of for showing our distinct existence, individuality, and personality, together with the difference of primary properties between spirit and body: for these facts once well established we shall have the unanimous consent of all serious and thinking persons to conclude from thence that there is an intelligent cause of all these things. Besides if there were nothing but matter there could be no more activity than perception, for all exercises of activity contain something of motion, but supposing matter to have a power of moving, yet being indifferent to take any direction and utterly destitute of choice, it must exert that power every day alike, which consequently must destroy its own operations. A body in this case would be like an iron plate, tied by many strings drawn extremely tight to all sides of the wainscot, which must hang motionless in the air although continually pulled with a mighty force, each opposite string counteracting its antagonist, unless you suddenly cut the strings on one side when it would fly violently towards the other where they remained whole. But matter thus propelled to all quarters by its inherent power would want a preference to cut off its impulse on all parts except one, in order to produce a motion that way. Add further, that what has been offered concerning the stationing of substances, the appunctuation of time, and perpetual order of succession, might serve to confirm the same conclusion, if it stood in need of a confirmation.

6. There are people who puzzle themselves with nice speculations concerning space, which they will needs have to be necessary because we cannot conceive it non-existent, nor any portion of it removed, nor other substances to exist without a place to contain them. But how much soever we may suppose space necessary, it does not affect the foregoing argument for an active intelligent cause, for space understands nothing, does nothing, and produces nothing, but is perhaps the most unmanageable idea in our imagination: the most sagacious of us know not whether it be substance or accident, whether finite or infinite, whether one continued thing or consisting of parts, nor whether those parts be determinate points or infinitely divisible; for suppose a particle in the circumference of a large wheel to move only from one point to the next, what must the particles lying near the centre do? for they all move at the same time, but they cannot move a quarter, nor a tenth, nor a hundredth of a point. The like difficulties might as well be started upon time, whereof we cannot conceive an utter absence, nor can the future be made to precede the past, nor can any substances nor even space exist without a present moment for them to exist in. But time was never yet suspected of being a substance, and though we talk of its producing great events this is only a figurative expression denoting that it gives scope for other agents to work in. Wherefore, these speculations concerning space and time make no advancement in our knowledge but only serve to convince

us of the imperfection of our faculties, which cannot fully comprehend the nature of everything whereof they can entertain ideas: nor do those who employ them pretend to draw any certain conclusions from them, but only throw them out as a rub in the way of their adversaries. I never heard of any who were converted into atheism by contemplating the necessary existence of space, but being first prepossessed against the admission of one active, intelligent, and self-existent cause, they endeavour to perplex the question by suggesting another Being alike self-existent and necessary: so that this is an after-thought, not weighing with them in their determination, but used only in the schoolmen's phrase as an argument to the man. We discern neither time nor space by our senses, they being ideas of reflection gathered from the situation of objects and the successive changes observable in them. We find the idea of both necessary to the existence of substances, and if we suppose those substances annihilated, still the idea of that space and time wherein they might have existed remains: if we go to imagine those again annihilated, it will amount to the supposition of a place wherein there is no place, and a time wherein there is no time, which is contradictory: but this depends upon our conception, which cannot penetrate so thoroughly into substances but that they may exist in a manner we cannot conceive. We have seen that time requires a cause to determine what particular point of it shall be the present: and if space be anything real or more than a mode of existence in other things, it likewise requires a cause to assign it properties distinct from those of body and spirit. Nor should I be singular if I were to suppose both time and space receiving their reality from the First Cause, but having so firm an establishment given them that we can neither by experience discern, nor in imagination conceive, their nonexistence.

CHAP. X.

INCOMPREHENSIBILITY.

Perhaps there has been no transaction throughout all history more frequently quoted in theological treatises than the conversation of Simonides with king Hiero, who desiring him to explain what God was, Simonides asked a day to consider of it; at the end of this day, instead of giving his answer, he asked for two more, and when these were expired he requested four: for, says he, the more I consider the subject I find the difficulties double upon me. This answer of his being so frequently taken notice of shows how well it tallies with the sentiments of all who have turned their thoughts upon the like contemplation. Nor is there any wonder that it should, for we knowing nothing of causes unless by their effects, seeing none of the immediate operations of the First Cause, and being confined to a narrow corner of nature, cannot expect to have a full comprehension of the Author of Nature, from whom flow many other effects besides those falling within the reach of our observation. We have just now seen insuperable difficulties in the contemplation of time and space, we have before met with the like in the divisibility of matter, the propagation of force from body to body, and have found mysteries in the action of our own minds, which must proceed always upon motives and ideas, and yet we have no idea of those fibres or other parts of our organization which are the immediate subject of our action. Since then we lie involved in obscurity with respect to

our very selves and the objects most nearly surrounding us, how can we attain a perfect knowledge of that cause concerning which we know nothing more than can be gathered from those materials? The very idea of a First Cause is unsuitable to our imagination, for we see all things proceed in a chain wherein there is nothing first, each cause being likewise an effect of others preceding. Nor can we, who are confined to certain measures in our conceptions, comprehend that wherein everything is infinite, as having nothing external to limit it. But since our ideas and our language are taken from objects familiar to our experience, it is unavoidable that we must think and speak very imperfectly of God: the terms we employ are for the most part figurative, containing some remote similitude, but not fully expressive of the thing we would signify.

2. We hear it currently asserted that God is a spirit, nor do I find fault with the appellation, as having no properer to substitute in its room: for we know of no more than two substances, Matter and Spirit, therefore since we are sure he is not matter nor contains any material mixture, we can call him no otherwise than spirit. But we cannot suppose this an adequate term, for we may discover so much of him as to show that he is as different from the spirits of men as they are from matter. We know that our own spirits are moveable and passive, residing in some particular station and confined to objects touching the sphere of our presence, receiving an impulse from that matter whereto we are vitally united, transferring us from place to place, necessarily affected with pleasure, pain, and other perceptions, by the various play of our organs, extremely scanty in our knowledge, liable to error and delusion, and never exerting our activity without ideas to instigate and direct us: none of which particulars can be ascribed to God, whom we must therefore acknowledge a being of his own kind not to be ranked in the same class with any others.

3. So likewise when we declared God intelligent, it was because we had no other word to express our meaning by, for if we had declared him non-intelligent, it would have conveyed the same idea we have of senseless matter, acting necessarily by transmission of impulse, and therefore by no means capable of being a first cause. He that made the eye, shall not he see? and he that formed the ear, shall not he hear? but those who propounded these questions never intended to represent God as provided with optic and auditory nerves, or receiving sound and vision in the manner we do. So likewise if we go on to ask, he that gave man knowledge, shall not he understand? neither does it follow that understanding is the same in him as it is in us: for the thoughts of God are not as our thoughts, nor his ways like our ways. We understand by organs of sensation and reflection, by traces lying in our memory, and slow deductions of reason: nor could we understand anything unless there were something exterior to be understood; or how much soever we may fancy ourselves containing our stores of knowledge within ourselves, they were first deposited there by objects striking upon us from without. Divines tell us that God is a pure act, by which I suppose they mean that his acts contain no mixture of passion, nor require materials or instruments to make them take effect as ours do; for we cannot act without organs of motion, nor subjects to receive our action, nor ideas to determine our volition: but in creation God acted upon Nothing, without instruments to assist, or objects to direct him in the execution. I must own this pure agency is to me an inexplicable idea, yet is this no reason for rejecting it: for we have found upon a careful survey of nature, that all substances and operations conceivable require a cause to

assign their several stations, properties, and directions; but this cause must necessarily be inconceivable, for else there would be something conceivable that did not require a cause, which is contrary to the result of our survey taken from experience and reason, the only two sources from whence we can derive any knowledge.

4. Nor was it ever controverted among theists that God is incomprehensible, being of a nature peculiar to himself, and different in species from all other substances. It has been said that man was made after the likeness of God, but this likeness prevails no otherwise than our being less dissimilar than the stocks and stones we toss about; just as the top of a mole-hill is nearer the sun than the bottom, and therefore resembles that glorious luminary in being raised above the surface of the earth: for we cannot imagine but that the faculties and operations of man differ in kind as well as degree from those of his Maker. Perhaps it might be said with more strictness of truth, that the idea of God is taken from the likeness of man, for our conceptions being all derived from ourselves and the objects affecting us, we can form none other than what is made up of materials furnished us by our experience and our reflection. Therefore we select whatever powers and endowments we can find among ourselves, separating from them all we deem a weakness and imperfection, and heightening them to the utmost pitch imagination can reach; the aggregate of all these makes our idea of God: whose image it is no wonder we resemble, the features of it being formed from archetypes in our own mind: nor are we without excuse in taking this method, as being the only one in our power to take. But a similitude employed from mere necessity will not justify us in pursuing it too far, nor drawing the conclusions we might do if we had a clear and perfect knowledge of the subject. Wherefore I can see nothing in the doctrine of likeness warranting those high-flown expressions used by some, that the soul of man is a ray and emanation of the divinity, and that God has communicated some sparks of his own perfections to us, or that the divine intelligence is no more than perfect reason, proceeding in the same manner with ours, but having a larger field of premises to work upon.

5. From this inability to apprehend the divine Being, any otherwise than by ideas taken from ourselves, it follows that our conception of him must be very imperfect, and what is worse, frequently erroneous: for we are not always competent judges of what is power or weakness, but often mistake the latter for the former, which induces us to ascribe our own passions, frailties, and imperfections, to God, under the notion of excellencies. And this may plead some excuse in extenuation for the atheists; for perhaps the description which any man would give of the Supreme Being might be demonstrated in some parts of it impossible and inconsistent: besides that the ideas sometimes inculcated by designing persons for their private ends and those entertained by the vulgar are manifestly absurd. But it is no rule that a thing may not be true, because some on purpose, and others by mistake, have blended it with a mixture of falsehood: wherefore it would become such as profess a freedom of thought and due exercise of their reason, to examine whether everything suggested concerning a Deity be without foundation; for there is no reason to reject the whole of an opinion, because the frailty of man has grafted some inconsistencies upon it.

6. For how incomprehensible soever the divine nature may be, there are some propositions we may affirm with certainty concerning it: nobody can doubt that the power of God is the same in America as in Europe, the same yesterday and to-morrow as to-day, that he was not born of parents, is not

nourished by food, nor shall grow old and decay like ourselves; that all created substances take their stations, from whence fortune arises, by his appointment; that the order of succession, which is the course of nature, proceeds according to his direction; with many other the like assertions which need only the proposing to be assented to. Let us then endeavour to collect what we can discover clearly concerning the divine nature from such observations as we are able to make upon the things about us upon the best exercise of our reason, which though small in quantity may prove sufficient for us to draw any inferences therefrom that we may want to regulate our present conduct, or ascertain our future expectations; leaving all unavailing speculations for the amusement of those who may want something better to employ their leisure.

CHAP. XI.

UNITY.

THERE will be little room to expatiate upon this article, it being too clear to admit of a proof: for it seems a self-evident proposition, that the First cause must be One, because if there were more they would want some prior cause to assign them their several stations and properties. And indeed this point with respect to the active cause has never been doubted of, unless by Zoroaster and the Magi, together with their followers the Manicheans; for the heathen polytheism was no exception, their gods being no more than celestial men with a little larger powers than those upon earth, but limited in their provinces, confined in their operations, and subject to the infirmities and disappointments of men. Besides, this was only a popular persuasion, never gaining credit among the studious.

2. We hear the Stoics speaking of the sun, the moon, and the stars, as so many gods, but then they did not understand the term in the same sense as we do now; for they held them to be animals having a superior intelligence to man, and moving in their courses by their own energy, but created Beings subordinate to the supreme God, the governor of all things, whom they supposed to be the Universe. How they could imagine God a compound consisting of so many parts as there are substances in the world, which is making many to be one, we need not now inquire: for whatever notions they held inconsistent with unity, they did not see the inconsistency, and therefore we cannot deny them orthodox upon this article.

3. Some of the ancients assigned two causes concurring to the production of all things; Thales, Mind and Water; Anaximenes, Mind and Fire; the Stoics, God and Matter, to which they might as well have joined Space and Time if they had thought of them: but then they held their active principle to be One, and the others purely passive to take such forms as should be impressed upon them. Plato and the Pythagoricians asserted the eternity of ideas and forms, the former of which served the Deity for a plan guiding him in his works, and the latter to constitute the essences of things by being applied to Substance, of which they seem to have had a more confused idea than Mr. Locke or myself, for one knows not whether they conceived it as having an existence of its own, or receiving it from time to time upon the application of form. Our modern freethinkers talk confidently of a nature of things, eternal and unalterable, controlling the Deity, so that he cannot

do this or the other, but as that shall permit him. I wish they would explain what we are to understand by this nature of things, with which they seem to be so well acquainted, as to tell us precisely what it will require upon every occasion: by their manner of speaking, they seem to make it another cause independent on the First; or rather make the First Cause dependent upon this for the measures it shall take; for they say God would be more beneficent and merciful than he is, delivering us from our vices with the miseries consequent upon them, but the nature of things will not let him. How they would avoid the imputation of two First Causes I know not, for they deal altogether in objections, and are wisely cautious never to give us a complete creed of their own, lest there should appear more holes in it than they can pick in any other. But the ancients, holding the eternity of forms and ideas, supposed them subsistencies inexisting within the divine Mind: what is the proper import of Inexisting, or the distinction between a Subsistence and a Substance, I shall not pretend to explain, having no clear apprehension of it myself; but I think the invention of these terms shows that those who employed them found it agreeable to their reason, that there should be nothing external to the Supreme Being which was not produced by his own power, and consequently that the First Cause should be one sole and simple substance.

4. The difficulty of imagining good and evil to proceed from the same cause induced the Magi to suppose two principles, one to be the source of either: but then greater difficulties will arise upon such a supposition. For the primary properties of substance must be given them together with their existence, nor can we conceive such a property superadded to what had it not in its nature before: now the capacity of receiving pleasure or pain, satisfaction or uneasiness, in spirits, is the foundation of all the good and evil befalling them, and had they not been endued with such capacity there could have been neither, but had they been rendered incapable of uneasiness only, there could have been no good, or of satisfaction only, there could have been no such thing as evil in the universe. But we cannot suppose two opposite principles should concur in one operation, nor, could they agree so far, is it conceivable creation should be the joint work of several agents. I know that many workmen may join in the productions of art, for these being made up of pre-existent materials, and completed by piecemeal, each may take in hand some of the several parts, while others work upon the rest; but creation is a single act, instantaneous and admitting no gradations, so that were there a hundred creative powers, the primary qualities of each particular substance must proceed from the same cause, and be received at the same time with its existence. Nor did the Maji themselves imagine otherwise, for they attributed the creation of sentient Beings to Oromasdes, who made them capable of happiness, wherein they would have continued without intermission, unless Arimanius had introduced disorders and mischiefs among them. But his malicious purposes could have taken no effect upon Beings that had not likewise been capable of misery. So then the difficulty remains entire as before, because the good principle must have furnished his antagonist with fitting subjects to wreak his malice upon, and concurred in the production of evil, by giving his creatures a capacity of suffering by it. I do not know whether this argument against the quality of principles has been employed before, nor was there any need of it; for the absurdity of two first causes, which must require another prior first to determine the difference of properties and extent of powers between them, was so glaring, that it has quite exploded

that notion off the stage: nor are there any now carrying their thoughts so high as to a first cause, but what are satisfied of its individuality and unity.

5. But our knowledge of the Being and unity of God will avail us little, unless we can gather something concerning what he is. Now the knowing what any substance is implies our knowing the qualities belonging thereto, its manner of existence, and particularly whether it may stand so circumstanced as to affect ourselves, for else all the rest would terminate in mere speculation. But qualities and modes of existence, when applied to God, are termed attributes: these then I shall endeavour to investigate so far as I can find a solid foundation in the phenomena of nature, and clearest deductions of reason. For I do not pretend to give an exact description of what is incomprehensible, nor do I design to pursue my inquiries further than my own line of conception shall reach, leaving all beyond with an acknowledgment of my ignorance: neither would I proceed upon a fondness to gratify my curiosity, but with a sober and earnest desire of so much understanding in the divine attributes, as it may concern myself and my fellow-creatures to attain.

CHAP. XII.

OMNIPRESENCE.

Little need be said in support of this attribute, which is inseparable from the idea of necessary existence: because as we have remarked before, there can be no such difference in places as that what is necessary in one spot should not be so elsewhere. And this holds good as well with respect to a particular substance as to a species: therefore there cannot be many necessary substances, though of the same species, because each being absent from the places occupied by the others, there is no other necessity for their being where they are, unless what is brought upon them by a superior cause assigning them their several stations. Therefore whatever has necessary existence anywhere must be One in number as well as in kind, and exist alike everywhere throughout all the immensity of space. Nor is there any variance of opinion upon this article: all who acknowledge a God, the cause and fountain of all things, believe him to be one pure, undivided, unbounded substance, pervading, containing, and co-existing with all the things he has created.

2. It must be owned this is an incomprehensible idea, too large for our imaginations to grasp, therefore no wonder we find difficulties in it: but these arise all from our narrowness of conception and not from any shadow of positive proof that can be produced against it. For no man ever attempted to show the limits that might circumscribe the divine essence, or point the place from whence it might be absent. But it is hard for us to reconcile omnipresence with individuality, because all the substances falling under our cognizance having a locality, we cannot conceive the same thing present at immeasurable distances unless successively by removing from one place to another. Large bodies we can apprehend taking up a large compass of space, but then the several parts of them occupy their several points; and body being the only object familiar to our senses we take our idea of occupancy from that. Wherefore some I have met with

object, not as an argument overthrowing omnipresence, but as a difficulty wanting solution, that we seem to make God extended, and consequently consisting of parts, because it is the accession of parts that extends everything we know of into magnitude. But how are thy assured there can be no extension unless by means of parts? even in matter we have already found infinite divisibility so inconceivable, and the difficulties on either side so much wanting a solution, that the most sober and judicious persons have forborne to decide peremptorily upon it: and in our own spirits we have found an extension of another kind, for our sense assures us of our individuality, and daily experience furnishes us with reasons which to me carry the force of demonstration evincing a sphere of presence, in every part whereof we are actually existent and perceptive, because receiving sensations from a variety of objects at the same time; but neither can the same particle of matter conveying our sensation take various modifications at once, nor can many particles act together upon a mathematical point. And this experience of our own undivided extension may a little help our comprehension of omnipresence, for though we cannot make a new idea we may compound and enlarge those we have in store. Our own manner of existence in a sphere or portion of space sufficient to receive the action of many corporeal particles, we may term a totipresence throughout the contents of that sphere; we may then conceive another substance totipresent in the sphere of an inch, an ell, a rod, a mile, and so rise by degrees to the greatest extent we are able to contain in our imagination; and a totipresence throughout all immensity amounts to the same as omnipresence.

3. But we are unable with our utmost efforts to conceive an immensity of space, much less omnipresence wherein that idea is contained, nevertheless, what we cannot apprehend at once or in the gross, we may by piecemeal: whatever portion of space we fix our thoughts upon at any time we may conceive God to be there, and thus soar from height to height, with a denial of his absence from every point in the progress of our contemplation. And this method has been recommended of old: "Whither shall I go from thy spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I go up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in the grave, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me and thy right hand shall hold me." To which we may add from ideas suggested by modern discoveries: If I follow the planets in their orbits, I shall find thee directing their courses; if I enter the assembly of fixed stars, there art thou holding them in their stations; if I penetrate the minute fibres of vegetables or examine the little corpuscles of air and ether, there art thou also marshalling their order and invigorating their motions. Thus, though we cannot comprehend God absolutely everywhere, we may comprehend him wherever we can think of: this is an idea easy to our imagination, involving us in no perplexities, of an extension without parts, and this we may satisfy ourselves with as being enough to answer all our useful purposes.

CHAP. XIII.

ETERNITY.

No proof seems requisite to establish this point, it being self-evident that something must always have existed, and what can that be besides the First Cause from whom all things else received their being? Nor can we find a difference in times any more than places with respect to necessary existence, but what was once and anywhere necessarily existing must be so always as well as everywhere. And the same rule extends to the attributes as well as the existence of God; for if there were a time when he was without any of them, I know not where he could have acquired them, or from what sources derived them. Therefore eternity infers immutability, nor was ever separated from it in the minds of men: for all who believe a God, believe not only that he always was, but likewise that he continues, without variation or shadow of change, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

2. I know not how we can conceive otherwise of eternity than as a succession of time, with a negation of beginning or end. But the schoolmen are not satisfied with this idea, for they look upon succession as a continual perishing and renewing of things existing in that manner: for I am not and perceive not yesterday, the existence and perceptions I had then being lost and gone, and those I have now being new ones, such as I had not then, but are brought me by lapse of time; yet my yesterday's existence was the cause of my present, for if I had not been then I should not have been now: which manner of existing they think unworthy to be ascribed to God, as wanting that stability and independency on prior time suitable to our idea of a necessary Being. Wherefore they supposed eternity a standing point with God, or a perpetual Now, so that all past and future ages are as actually present before him as this instant moment is with us. And we hear divines still talking in the same strain of an eternity before all time, or when time was not, or when time shall be no more, and asserting positively that the past is not gone, nor the future yet to come with respect to God. Perhaps they pronounce too confidently upon a matter whereto the human faculties cannot reach, for if we pursue our abstractions to the utmost, either upon time or space, I fear we shall find them both unmanageable subjects, concerning which we can determine nothing with certainty. Nevertheless, they would not want foundation for what they say, if they would deliver themselves a little more reservedly, and give it only as the more probable opinion, that the efflux and succession of time is owing to the power and Will of God, and therefore may take place only among his creatures.

3. We have already remarked there is no visible repugnancy against supposing the course of time might have been accelerated or retarded: I do not mean that twenty years might have passed in ten or taken up forty to run them out, for this were a contradiction, but that the whole order of them might have been removed higher or lower, so that the Augustan age, or that of our remote descendants, might have been the present. In which case the efflux of time would require some cause to fix it where it is: and therefore must depend upon the Will of God to determine that no more or no less of it should be expired. Nor are there no grounds to suspect that

even with ourselves the present moment may contain an interval of time though extremely short, for else how should we get the idea of time at all? Mr. Locke says we get it by observing a succession of ideas, and in this way I can readily allow that we come by the measures of minutes, hours, days, and years, which we use in computation: but succession implies a previous idea of first and last before it can be attained, for a variety of ideas affords us no notion of succession unless we perceive one come before the other; nor can it be imagined that their degrees of vividness or faintness will do the business, for let a man stand with a candle in his hand between two looking-glasses, he will see a number of flames in the glass before him, each fainter than the others, yet the whole scene will appear quiescent, nor exhibit any idea of succession. And the ideas of things in our remembrance, though fainter as more remote, would do the like unless we had another idea of precedence annexed to them. So then our idea of precedence seems to be an original, not derived from any other, but gotten by our manner of existence extending to a length of time wherein there is a first and a last.

4. And I may offer to the consideration of the curious whether this does not stand confirmed by the evidence of our senses in their discernment of motion, of which they have an immediate sensation in some velocities but not in others. For you may see the motion of a stone thrown across you very plainly, but you cannot see that in the short hand of your watch. If indeed you look at it again an hour after, you will see that it has moved, because finding it in a different place from where it was before: but this is a logical inference gathered from the joint testimony of your present sense and your memory of the figure to which it pointed the first time: whereas your knowledge of the stone moving came by direct sensation without aid of the memory or reflexive faculty. Now to see a body move I apprehend we must have an actual perception of it at once in two distinguishable places though it cannot actually be in those two places at once, from whence it seems to follow that our acts of immediate perception have a certain duration containing a beginning and end both present to us together, and whatever moves so slow as that the spaces it passes over within that duration are not distinguishable by our senses appears to us quiescent. If any one shall think the discernment of motion effected by that continuance of play in our sensitive organs after the impulse of objects ceasing, mentioned in the chapter on reflection, he will not find it warranted by experience: for a stone may be thrown very swiftly yet without drawing any trail behind, though you observe it ever so carefully, and a live coal whirled very smoothly round upon a wheel will present no idea of movement at all, but appear a quiescent fiery ring. The distinction of places to our sense depends, not upon the real distance between them, but upon their apparently subtending an angle at our eye, which the same extent of latitude may do when near us that cannot do it when removed farther off. Therefore the moon seems to stand still when we look upon her, because the change of place she makes during a single perception does not suffice to subtend an angle: whereas did she hang so low as almost to touch our atmosphere we should see her whisk over us with an amazing rapidity. Hence if any curious person can ascertain precisely what is the least discernible angle and slowest visible motion, he may compute how many of our moments or present times there are in a minute: for by contriving to make a body move equally with that slowest pace in a circle whose centre lies

at the eye, and casting up how many of those least discernible angles compose an entire circle, he may reckon just so many moments in the time of one circumvolution made by the body. But if we have a measurable Now of our own, the whole of which is present to us together, we may augment it in the same manner we did the sphere of our presence, until it stretch to the utmost length we can contain in our imagination, and that will make the fullest idea we can form of eternity.

5. Many persons perhaps will not readily enter into what has been here said concerning the standing point or perpetual Now, and truly if they do not find it occur easily to their comprehension they may even pass it over, as being scarce worth the while to take much trouble in studying it. For we do not find the conception of a continual perishing and renewal of time by an uninterrupted succession of moments debases our idea of God; and it would be difficult to make a common man feel the force of the schoolmen's objection or see any hurt in supposing him to exist in that manner, so long as we apprehend the succession to have had no beginning and to meet with no stop. We have indeed a certain period set to our lives, and therefore the lapse of every moment takes away something from the stock of futurity we had in store: but eternity is an inexhaustible fund, therefore time may go on continually perishing without being ever totally destroyed, so that though we should imagine God existing by moments, he will never want moments to exist in. And as he has been pleased to give our spirits an individuality which all the powers of nature cannot dissolve, the efflux of time is no loss to them, who have the same inexhaustible fund for a perpetual supply. Wherefore there is no occasion to alter the common conceptions of mankind upon this matter, or perplex them with objections requiring an answer that few can understand.

CHAP. XIV.

OMNIPOTENCE.

The very train of reasoning, leading us to acknowledge a God, evinces his omnipotence, or rather, if I may so speak, finds omnipotence in the way towards his existence: for we infer a God because we want a cause from whence all the effects and powers we have any knowledge of must originally proceed. Whatever is done or possible to be done must be done by some agent, and the aggregate of all powers and possibilities make up omnipotence, which we can place in no other subject than God, whom therefore we justly style Almighty. It is true we find power divided among the substances falling under our notice, one wanting what another has: but then the powers of all must derive from some one cause, whom we cannot suppose to want the powers he has given to other things, besides another power not found in any of them, that of creating and allotting primary properties and original stations. Mr. Locke tells us, that active powers alone properly deserve the name, and I think we need make no difficulty of ascribing all those we find in substances to God: for we cannot well doubt that he might if he pleased resist and impel, that is, stop or confer motion like body, or excite perceptions and judgments like our organs; and that he does admit like space appears manifest from the substances we see, each whereof must coexist in the same place with that which is omni-

present throughout all immensity: nor can we any more doubt of his possessing in an eminent degree all the active powers discoverable in spirits. And for passive powers, such as mobility, inertness, and perceptivity, particularly that of pain, or uneasiness, though we must not attribute them to him, yet are they all effects of an active power exerted at their creation. We see the course of nature proceed by second causes having their several portions of power allotted in small parcels among them, and these allotments requiring so many operations of active power in conferring them bespeak an omnipotence in the First Cause.

2. Thus the contemplation of the works of nature and all the powers we can discover operating therein, gives us our first notion of omnipotence: but the mind of man does not rest here, for there requires something further than actual operation to complete the idea of power. We find many instances in ourselves wherein we might have acted otherwise than we have done, and conceive ourselves able to take another course in our future measures than that we shall pursue: nor can we avoid thinking the same of God, for if we were to confine his power to the works he has actually performed, we should destroy that choice which distinguishes him from blind necessity, unthinking chance, or whatever else has been assigned for a first cause: neither can a power pinned down to one particular way of acting be properly called a power. This extends our idea of power to possibilities as well as real events, and what has never happened nor will ever happen is esteemed its object equally with what has already or will hereafter come to pass. And now we conceive omnipotence a power to do anything without those impediments and restrictions which obstruct us and all created substances in our operations.

3. Yet still there arises another idea perplexing our imagination with the suggestion of absolute impossibilities, which appear such even to omnipotence itself, and therefore seem to restrain and limit it within a certain compass: such as making a body exist in several places, causing two and two to make five, annihilating time and space, undoing past events or producing contrary ones. But all these things imply contradictions, and contradictions are generally held to be no objects of power, as their possibility would infer a defect rather than an enlargement of power: for if upon a power being exerted to produce a particular event, another might likewise ensue, it would show a deficiency in the agent as being unable to prevent another issue from taking effect besides that he intended. But after all I do not know why we should pronounce anything absolutely impossible, but rather conclude that what appears so has been rendered impossible by those laws which God has established immutably: and to suppose him acting contrary to them is supposing him to do otherwise than he has determined to do, which I am sure is no instance of power. He has made body local, and to exist in several places it must be a different thing from what he intended it: he has fixed certain relations between numbers, and to alter those relations would be introducing a confusion he has not thought proper to throw upon us: he has annexed the ideas of time and place to all our ideas of substances, and to separate them would be giving rise to other conceptions than he has thought fitting for us: he has made the past unalterable, and determined that no operation shall have any more than one issue, and to suppose otherwise would be supposing him to have done what he has not done. Therefore, wherever there appears a palpable impossibility we may depend upon the thing never happening, without ascribing the impossibility to any other

than the appointment of God, who has established the properties of substances and issues of events so firmly that we cannot conceive them altered.

4. But there is another limitation of omnipotence invented by our moderns in what they call the nature of things: for they say God could not make man impeccant, could not prevent moral and physical evil, the latter being a necessary consequence of the former, and that he must have a gradation of beings in all stages from nothing up to his own perfections. For my part, I can understand nothing else by the nature of things beside the properties of substances, the situations given them and motions impressed upon them, together with the mutual operations resulting therefrom: and these being given to the substances at or after their existence, could not control the acts of the Almighty whereto they were posterior. It is the nature of plants to vegetate, therefore before there were any plants or growing bodies there could be no such thing as vegetation: it is the nature of fire to burn, but before there was any fire there could be no such thing as burning. In like manner physical evil began with the capacity of sentient Beings to suffer by it, and moral evil depends upon this together with the constitution of man occasioning perpetual struggles between reason and appetite: for if he were not liable to suffering he could not take his measures amiss, and if he were void of reason, he could not do wrong in following appetite, having nothing else to follow. That there is a scale of Beings I know, but that it reaches within one step of Divinity, I neither know nor believe: nor if it did could I ascribe it to anything prior to the good pleasure of their Creator; for I can see no necessity hindering that all beings might have been made of the same species. Therefore the capacity of man, his sensitive-rational constitution, the various orders of beings, the properties, stations, and motions of substances, could not prescribe rules to the Almighty, from whose power and appointment they proceeded.

5. If it be alleged that we may conceive a nature of things abstracted from the things themselves, let us remember that our abstractions are all taken from our observation of substances, and their mutually affecting one another, and that the abstract is made by an arbitrary separation in our thoughts of what nature has exhibited in the concrete. It is said the rules of natural justice are unalterable, and so they may, because resulting from the nature of man, which does not change with time and place: for he is made a sociable creature, capable of assisting or hurting his fellows, invested with reason and appetite. The brutes wanting reason have no justice belonging to them: nor would there be any rule of it in man had he no temptation to do wrong; or were he shut up alone like a maggot in a nutshell there would be no place for justice. I see no contradiction in imagining that God might have placed all his sentient creatures apart by themselves without any knowledge or perception of one another, in which case there would have been no such thing as justice in nature: therefore when he gave man his faculties, and placed him in a situation to have intercourse with his fellow-creatures, then he made justice, and then the nature of it began.

6. It is said that God cannot act arbitrarily, and therefore must have some rule or nature of things to guide him. If by Cannot, you mean that he never does, I have no objection; but let us consider what we understand by arbitrary action in men, which is when they act upon whim, or humour, or passion, all which must certainly be denied of him. But why must an action be arbitrary unless confined by some restriction from taking another turn? we find many instances of the contrary in ourselves. It is true if I promise

to meet a company upon any occasion, whether of business or pleasure, though the appointment was voluntary at first, I am now under an obligation to keep it, so my liberty to do otherwise is gone: but this is not always my case; I sometimes lay out a plan of several places I will go to, or several things I will do wherein no other mortal has any concern, and having a little steadiness in my temper I pursue it accordingly, without any restriction upon my liberty to depart from it at any time; and since I look upon this steadiness rather as an advantage to my character than otherwise, I am willing to ascribe it in the highest degree to the Almighty, the tenor of whose conduct I conceived fixed, not by law or rule, but by voluntary determination. Wherefore there is no occasion for attributing what we find unalterable to an antecedent nature of things limiting and prescribing laws to God, because we may ground it as well upon his immutability. This seems an idea more worthy of him, and more consistent with our notion of omnipotence; and we may draw as many good uses from the opinion that he will not as that he cannot order the course of nature otherwise that he has done. Provided we take along with us this caution, to be very careful in our judgment of what things are unalterable: a point wherein those, who talk most loudly of a nature of things, have been sometimes grossly mistaken.

7. Many divines, particularly Bishop Beveridge and Dean Sherlock, endeavour to heighten our idea of omnipotence by asserting that God is not only the Creator, but likewise the continual support of all substances, who would lose their being the moment he should withdraw his operation upon them. The bishop, after his usual manner, speaks positively as if he knew the thing by ocular demonstration, and uses the comparison of a book, holden in one's hands, to explain his meaning. For, says he, if I take away my hands the book will fall to the ground without any act of mine to throw it down: so I myself should intantly drop into nothing, were God to withdraw his sustaining power from under me, without his needing to do anything for thrusting me out of Being. Whether the case be so with us I shall not pretend to determine so positively as his Lordship, it being a matter beyond the reach of my understanding to penetrate; but I may say we have no direct evidence of the affirmative, there being rather an appearance of the contrary in the abiding quality of bodies, which, after all the divisions and separations that can be made by fermentation, putrefaction, dissolution, and burning, we still know are not lost out of nature. Nor does it much heighten our idea of omnipotence to imagine powers not derived therefrom, for substances, it seems, have an inherent power of annihilating themselves if omnipotence were not constantly at work to counteract them. There are inconveniences attending this hypothesis, which the Dean labours for many pages to remove; and though it may help to give us a full persuasion of our intimate dependence upon the Deity, the same might as well be attained by contemplation of his omnipresence. Nor would it a little weaken our assurance of our own immortality, built upon the individuality of spirit, to suppose individuals too perishable unless sustained by the immediate hand of God; for though he may still continue to support us, we can never be so sure of his future acts as of those he has already done, for the latter are our proofs of the former, therefore his having given us a durable nature is the strongest evidence we can have from the light of reason that it is his Will we should continue for ever. And it is most agreeable to our ideas to conceive a permanency of existence in substances which nothing less than omnipotence can destroy: the powers of nature

may form compounds, throw them into different combinations, increase, diminish, alter, or entirely dissipate them again; but cannot take existence from any single particle either of material or spiritual substance: this has been always esteemed a privilege reserved to omnipotence alone, and that it requires an exertion of the same power to annihilate as to create. Nor will our thinking in this manner lessen our apprehension of the divine sovereignty; for nobody doubts that he who made us may destroy us again with a word, nor that we receive the materials for our well being, without which Being were nothing worth, by his appointment, and in this sense he may truly be called our continual support.

8. God is incomprehensible in all his attributes, and if we go to fathom the depths of omnipotence we shall lose ourselves in darkness and perplexities: therefore, letting alone all the subtilities of absolute impossibilities, of an independent nature of things, and of the sustentation of existence in substances, let us fix our view upon a prospect we can clearly discern. Let us conceive of God as performing by second causes all the mighty works we see performed, and able to do whatever we can comprehend possible to be done. Let us consider him giving existence to substances, solidity to matter, perceptivity to spirit, and understanding to man: limiting the ocean, spreading out the earth as a garment, and stretching forth the vast expanse of heaven: rolling the planets in their orbits, fixing the golden sun, and appointing the stars their stations: causing gravitation between large bodies, cohesion between small, elasticity in air and ether: giving motion to the wheels of fortune, stability to the laws of nature, and directing both their certain courses: forming the fibres of plants to fit them for vegetation, the vessels of animals to carry on circulation, and the mental organs to serve as instruments for the understanding: making the earth yield her increase for our sustenance, feeding the cattle upon a thousand hills for our uses, supplying us with air to breathe, water to drink, clothes to put on, and innumerable objects all around to employ and entertain us: commanding the issues of life and death, and having the future condition of spirits at his disposal. The contemplation of these, and a multitude of other things, that a little thought might easily suggest, will, I apprehend, give us the fullest idea of omnipotence that we are capable of, and make us sensible the Lord is our continual support, and that in him we live, and move, and have our being.

CHAP. XV.

OMNISCIENCE.

We have remarked before, that intelligence is not the same thing in God as in ourselves, for our intelligence would not suit a First Cause: we cannot work without motives and ideas suggested by objects previously affecting us, so that there must be something already existing from whence we may receive the information necessary to conduct us in our proceedings. Besides, intelligence is a particular mode of perception wherein the mind is always passive, taking such judgments as are impressed upon it: for judgment properly is the act of the objects under contemplation, and not of the percipient, otherwise than by his bringing such of them into his thoughts from whence some judgment may result. We may fancy but not under-

stand peaches growing upon an oak, rivers running upwards: nor in general can we understand anything different from what it appears after the most thorough examination. Therefore how imperfect notion soever we have of pure agency, such as is generally ascribed to God, we may see clearly that perception as in us being passive is incompatible with it: for we cannot imagine him passive to receive impressions from the impulse of objects, nor yet can we deny him understanding before there was anything external to be understood, much less refuse him knowledge of the things he has created.

2. The vulgar have an advantage over the studious in some respects, for they discern not the difficulties which perplex the others: they make no boggle at creation, believing they see instances of it in striking fire, which they take to be something new, not existing before, but produced by the collision of flint and steel, for they think nothing of particles detached from the colliding bodies, nor of a subtile matter emitted from within their pores, nor of a circumambient ether, agitated by their vibrations, which being put into a certain violent motion appear in the form of fire. So likewise they seem to have experience of pure agency in their own meditations and voluntary reflections, wherein they imagine themselves acting within themselves, without instrument or material, without other object than their own acts. But our experience, that when our organs are indisposed we cannot think at all, may convince us that we have instruments to employ, and materials to work upon in our mental operations: and upon a closer attention we shall find that even in the most abstracted thought there must be something to be perceived numerically distinct from that which perceives. And in general the further we pry into the secrets of nature, we shall find her abounding in mysteries that do not occur to common apprehension. Since then it is the view of nature that must give us any conception of the Author of Nature, the more difficulties arise in the phenomena the less able shall we be to comprehend those attributes by which they are to be accounted for: so that it is no wonder Simonides asked still longer time the further he pushed his inquiries upon this subject.

3. Our inability to conceive knowledge without prior means of information, together with the absurdity of refusing God that knowledge he has given to ourselves, obliges us to ascribe him intelligence, and at the same time to acknowledge this attribute ineffable, being something of a higher nature, but comprehending under it all that belongs to understanding as in the mind, abstracted from the idea of any conveyance bringing it thither. Since then it would be in vain to go about to describe the manner of his knowing, which in the nature of it must be different from ours, and yet we can form no idea of any other knowing than that we experience ourselves, we are excusable because necessitated to think and speak of him in a language suitable to what we have experience of. Thus we say he sees all things, looks backward upon the past, and forward into the future, discerns all possibilities, together with the consequences of his own immediate acts, or those of second causes, to the remotest chain of events, and knows whatever is the object of knowledge. The highest term we have to employ is Intuition, the same as Beholding, a term taken from our sense of vision, and serving only to exclude the slow process of reason, whereby we advance gradually to the knowledge of what we cannot discern directly by our senses or our judgment.

4. The difficulty of apprehending any voluntary act, even that of creation, to proceed without a prior intelligence, or of intelligence subsisting without objects to be understood, has set men upon contriving objects for the

divine intelligence coeval with itself: for the ancients held forms, ideas, and truths, to be eternal, obtaining a place from everlasting in the divine mind, and I suppose these are what our moderns would understand by their unalterable nature of things. If you examine what those forms and ideas were, you will find they were not God, nor attributes, nor yet distinct substances, but inexistencies in him: which Inexistency was a very convenient term, implying something that was both a substance and not a substance, and so carrying the advantages of either; as a substance, it was capable of eternal duration, and of furnishing objects for undestanding to perceive; as not a substance, it avoided the plurality of necessary Beings, of dividing God into parts, and of making substances uncreated. Nevertheless, admitting the reality of inexistencies, it will be hard to comprehend an inherent eternity belonging to them, for truths are propositions concerning substances, or something relative thereto, therefore cannot be older than the subjects whereof they are predicated: that justice is better than iniquity, springs from the powers of men to benefit or endamage one another, and the consequences resulting to them therefrom which renders actions of one sort better than those of the other. We have seen that if there were no creatures capable of doing good or hurt, there would be no such thing as justice in nature, and if there were no such thing, there could be nothing affirmed or denied concerning it. The epithet Eternal given to some truths, implies there are others not so, and the very distinction made between eternal and temporary truths shows their duration to depend upon that of the subjects whereto they are applied. The same may be said of forms, which are only modifications of substances: form as denoting figure could have no place before the existence of matter, nor perhaps before the combination of it, for we know not whether the atoms have any figure or no: and extended to a larger sense including the form of Being in other substances, it depends upon their primary properties, situations, and connections, which cannot be older than themselves. But it may be urged that although all external objects were annihilated yet we might retain an idea of the forms they had exhibited, therefore there is no inconsistency in supposing the like idea to subsist in some mind before they were existent. But let us consider that the ideas we discern are modifications of our organs, which are exterior to the mind that discerns them: and if we distinguish the perception from the idea and suppose the former in some mind without the latter, it must be a pure act and of course posterior in order if not in time to the exertion of some power by the agent: so that perception must be the act and produce of the divine intelligence, instead of the object or fund in store giving scope to it.

5. It is remarkable that those, who will not let God understand or do anything without ideas, are the very persons who stickle most strenuously for a liberty of indifferency in man: so that they will not allow the supreme Being to enjoy a privilege they assume to themselves. Which by the way shows the inconsistency of this supposed privilege with our notions of freedom, since we cannot conceive the most powerful and uncontrollable of all agents to act indifferently without making him liable to humour and arbitrary proceeding: from whence we may justly infer that what they take for proofs of indifferency are rather instances of weakness and imperfection in man. Perhaps I shall be asked whether I can conceive God to act in creating without a view to some purpose, or without a plan containing that order of succession he was about to establish; and I shall readily acknowledge that I cannot. But when I consider why I cannot, namely, because

of the narrowness of my conception which is confined within the compass of my experience, and because I can comprehend no other manner of knowing than I have experienced myself, my not conceiving amounts to no more than a negative proof which in a matter of this nature is no proof at all. For though want of conception be a proper evidence in things familiar to our observation, whose properties and operations we are well acquainted with, as that a stone cannot mount upwards without an external impulse, that water alone cannot compose a vegetable, that solid bodies cannot penetrate one another, and the like, yet in subjects whereof we have no direct experience but only such partial knowledge as may be gathered from their effects, we can expect to comprehend nothing further of them than their ability to produce those effects : whence arises the distinction between things above reason and things contrary to reason. Since then we find an understanding, such as ours in kind, though extended to the highest degree, incapable of assigning properties, allotting stations and directing other circumstances attending creation, but are satisfied nevertheless that all these things require an understanding, let us conclude the divine intelligence a subject above our reason, and forbear to pronounce anything more concerning it than that it is sufficient to work all that admirable contrivance which we discern in the works of nature. Or, if we still think pre-existent ideas necessary, let us ascribe their origin to some attribute yet unknown and unthought of; for we must not imagine that what little we know of God comprises the whole of his essence, but there are not improbably other attributes of which the mind of man has not so much as entertained a suspicion.

6. The like difficulties with that concerning prior information being necessary to complete understanding, may be started concerning remembrance and foresight, the former being in ourselves an inspection of traces in our memory, and the latter an inference from our observation of past events. If the schoolmen's standing point could be made clear to our apprehension, we need ascribe neither remembrance nor foresight to God, as things superfluous; for the past and future, being alike present before him, might be discerned by intuition as well as events now actually occurring. But since it is not easy for us to separate time from succession, and since to common apprehension it does not derogate from our idea of God to suppose him existing by perpetual duration, we may without hurt imagine him to remember as we remember, and to foresee as we foresee events within our own power by knowing our own intention, where we know perfectly what may be done with the instruments and materials we have to employ: taking this conception as the best we can form and not absolutely pronouncing it adequate to the subject.

7. And indeed the fullest conception we can obtain of the attributes arises from contemplation of their effects, for if we go to penetrate into nice abstractions, we shall find them oftener obscuring than enlightening the mind, oftener contracting than enlarging the prospect. Therefore, as we did before upon the article of omnipotence, let us now take a short survey of nature, to find the clearest footsteps of omniscience. Let us consider the Creator determining the precise number of substances, allotting them their properties and capacities necessary to complete the grand design he had in view: forming a plan to make a world, which was to last for ages with infinite varieties and successive changes, out of homogeneous matter, where every particle must have its appointed station, every motion its determinate velocity and direction, calculating exactly at one glance all the combinations

they will run into, the species of compounds they will produce, together with the secondary qualities, operations, and mutual affections, resulting therefrom. How stupendous must be that wisdom which directed infinite power, and by which everything was established in number, weight, and measure! He knew the exact quantity requisite of that invisible force whereon fermentation, heat, explosion, repulsion, and the four attractions depend, which had it been greater or less might have produced nothing but disorder in nature. He proportioned the elements that none of them might predominate or fall deficient, and contrived springs for mingling them together, that they might concur in forming the productions he designed. He appointed the degree of influence in the sun and moon, the inequalities of the earth, the rise of exhalations, the variety of soils, and other causes which bring on the change of seasons, vicissitudes of weather, and various dispositions of the air, causing the earth to yield her increase in proper measure, neither redundant nor wanting. He contrived the curious structure of vegetables, the more admirable organization of animals, where every vessel, gland, and fibre, every part, performs its several office for the growth and preservation of the whole. He adapted the contexture of his plants to the wants of his living creatures, so that each species has its proper food, its nests, and places of harbour, and finds uses in that which is unserviceable to others. He ranged his elements in such order, as to carry on the course of nature without perpetually needing his own interposition: so that they produce minerals and fossils below, vapours, clouds, dews, and rain above, insinuate themselves into the seed to make it germinate, and into the plant to make it bear fruits and seeds again, into the fœtus to bring it to maturity, and into the perfect animal, causing it to fructify and renew the species. He gave various instincts to brutes and appetites to man, urging both to effect purposes they do not think of themselves. He allotted their several provinces to the causes of destruction, as well as those of formation and preservation: he maketh the storms his ministers, directing them what to overthrow and what to spare: he commandeth the earthquakes how far to lay waste and where to stop; the lightning whom to strike and whom to pass over. Blight, famine, and pestilence, have their limits in what quarters and what extent to spread their havock, chance and casualty their directions when and where to fall: and all this by the intervention of second causes, which are so wonderfully contrived and exactly adjusted as never to disturb that order of succession he has established.

8. Nor is his wisdom less conspicuous in the moral than in the natural world: he has put much into the power of free agents, and left many things to their choice and management, yet he directs their choice by such unseen springs, as lead them to execute his purposes when they least intended it. He has distributed various constitutions, talents, endowments, passions, and desires, among men, so that some are fitted as well in ability as inclination for every office wanted in society, and all the conveniences of life depending on human industry supplied. Commerce, agriculture, and the mechanic arts, want not hands to carry them on, nor policy, learning, and science able heads to improve them: the jarring interests and opposite views of private persons serve to balance one another, and are made to produce order by their proper commixture out of that which separately would tend to confusion. He knows how and when to raise up peculiar characters that may found empires and overthrow them, or erect new kingdoms upon the ruins of old ones. Nor does he only provide for the establishment, the security, and general welfare of nations, but so directs the

behaviour of men to one another and the dispensations of fortune, that each individual shall receive the precise portion of good and evil intended him. Nor are his cares confined to this sublunary stage, for we have seen that the spirits of men are of a nature to endure after their dissolution from the body, and we cannot suppose their primary properties given them for nothing, but that they shall receive perceptions by other channels than those which convey them now: so that there must be a different set of laws for the several forms of Being we are to undergo, and, as we may reasonably presume, a connexion of interests between the visible world and the invisible: to adjust which, requires a more stupendous wisdom than anything falling under our notice can exhibit, though that is enough to excite our wonder and exceed our comprehension.

9. And this consideration may help to remove some objections that have been raised upon the seeming errors of nature, as that she wastes her strength in unprofitable efforts and sometimes thwarts the purposes we supposed her to have intended. Lucretius urges that the world could not have been made in wisdom, being so full of defects: ravenous beasts, poisonous herbs, and pestilential vapours abound, the rain falls upon the sea where it can do no good, the sun shines upon barren rocks, where it can produce nothing, and man is liable to continual disappointments and disasters. But nature is not thought to work in vain when she contrives a curious structure in the grains of corn fitting them for vegetation, although that purpose be defeated by the corn being made into bread for the nourishment of man: but rain falling into the sea where man receives no benefit by it is exclaimed against as a want of contrivance, because we judge of prudent and vain solely by what relates to ourselves; as if nature had nothing else to do besides tending our services, and whatever was of no use to us were absolutely useless. Besides that we may be mistaken in our premises, for what is not of immediate use may be remotely so; perhaps the fresh water mingled with the sea may prevent its sending up exhalations that might be hurtful to us, and the sun darting heat upon rocks communicates a warmth to the ground below or air above, which does a good we know not of, or at least we may allow it to influence the weather and thereby affect the growth of fruits and corn. But supposing these things were of no service to us, they may do service to the fish, the insects or other creatures, who deserve some share in the cares of nature together with ourselves. As to the disasters and disappointments befalling mankind, we many times find reason afterwards to rejoice at their having happened, and many more times there may be reason though we do not discern it: but if there be any from which we receive no real benefit, and that the condition of life were better upon the whole without them, yet they may be some way serviceable to other Beings or to ourselves in another state of being. Nor is it an exception against our argument that we proceed upon what may be without showing what is the case, for the burden of producing evidence lies upon the objector: there are innumerable marks of wisdom in many works of nature, therefore a possibility of there being the like in those where we cannot trace it is a sufficient defence, and whoever would arraign this wisdom ought to show that the latter cannot terminate in any good effect. For our not discerning the expedience in some performances of an agent does not overthrow the opinion we had entertained of him from others, nor has it that effect upon us in the common occurrences of life: if a man of whose skill in language and knowledge we had experience were to deliver himself darkly and mysteriously upon some occasions, we should not presently con-

clude he had no meaning in what he said. If we went into the workshop of an artificer, where we found many things admirably contrived and put together, besides others whereof we could not possibly guess the uses, we should not infer from the latter that he proceeded foolishly and unthinkingly in all we saw before us. In both cases we should attribute the seeming uselessness of anything we saw or heard to our own want of discernment: and much more ought we do so with respect to the operations of nature, whose tendencies and mutual dependence we have so insufficient faculties and so little opportunities to investigate.

10. When we reflect what a wilderness of thought must be requisite to govern innumerable worlds and order all the particulars belonging to them, we shall find it inconceivable that so much can be contained together in one understanding: therefore some have made it an objection that such a boundless variety must perplex and burden even the divine intelligence. But let us consider why a multitude of thoughts are perplexing and burdensome to ourselves: we perceive by organs, and can have no more perceptions than they from time to time excite in us, but the sphere of our presence being too narrow to admit many of them to work upon us together, we are forced to labour and toil in bringing such of them into play as we want, and generally others intrude with them which disturb their operation and perplex our ideas. But how much difficulty soever we may have found in connecting a chain of reasoning or forming a train of thinking, when once become familiar to us by frequent contemplation, we find no difficulty in running it over afterwards and comprehending so much of it as we can contain in one view: for whatever occurs readily to our thought we discern easily and distinctly, nor find any trouble or perplexity in perceiving, where the prospect lies full and clear before us. If then we will needs imagine God to understand as we understand, by the perception of objects, let us remember that the sphere of his presence extends throughout all immensity, that he wants not the ministry of organs to bring objects before him, none being ever absent from him or removed out of his reach. And perceptions take up no room in the thought nor interfere with one another, but it is the want of them that causes perplexity.

11. There are some truths, as was remarked at the end of our chapter on Judgment, reputed self-evident because they strike the mind irresistibly, yet we cannot trace their origin nor deduce the train of reasoning whereby we arrived at them: among this class may be reckoned the Divine Happiness, which we do not discover from the works of nature as we do the other attributes. The mighty fabric of the world manifests an omnipotence, and the apt concurrence of causes to answer their several uses and purposes declares an omniscience: but we cannot infer the happiness of the Supreme Being from that of his creatures any more than we can the contrary from their miseries. For satisfaction in ourselves is a perception, it is a state the mind is thrown into by the act of objects striking upon our senses or reflection, wherein we are entirely passive nor can help receiving either pleasure or pain while the proper causes are operating: but we cannot ascribe passivity to God nor imagine his condition to depend from time to time upon the agency of anything external. Nevertheless, the very sound of a miserable or an insensible Deity is shocking to the ear and repugnant to all our notions, nor was there ever any one who admitted the Being of a God that did not conceive him unspeakably happy. We find happiness the only thing desirable, or that which renders all other things desirable, and constantly employ our efforts to procure it: therefore we might suppose

that where there is almighty power and infinite wisdom, all means of happiness would be put in practice: but God uses no means to obtain it, evil cannot approach him, nor does he want objects or channels to convey him happiness. He made not space for his own reception, matter for his own uses, nor sentient beings for his own solace and society, but possessed infinite happiness in himself from everlasting, without receiving increase therein, by the works of creation. This is what every man's judgment will agree to, and we find no suspicion arise of the contrary: therefore we may pronounce God ineffably happy, but that happiness in him is not just the same as we feel it in ourselves.

CHAP. XVI.

GOODNESS.

Of all the divine attributes there is none concerns us more nearly, or the just notion whereof is more desirable than this of Goodness; and yet none perhaps wherein we find more difficulty to form a satisfactory idea, not liable to objections and inconsistencies. Infinite power and wisdom avail us nothing of themselves, but are rather objects of amazement and terror than of comfort and confidence: and it were better for us to live under a kind beneficent governor, though a little defective in knowledge and ability, than one unlimited in either, but regardless of our weal or wo: for the former would procure us more good than harm, but what befel us from the latter would be mere chance and accident. The contemplation of omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience, without goodness, has most of anything driven men into atheism: for they looked upon such a Being as a universal spectre hovering continually over them, prying into all their affairs, able and skilful to affect them in what manner he pleased; and as we are apt to expect the worst from uncouth appearances, they chose rather to put themselves under the guidance of chance or necessity, therefore used all their wits to persuade mankind that a notion of a God was only a phantom, raised in their imagination by crafty persons who found an interest in affrighting them. Thus we find the idea of goodness inseparable from that of God in the minds of all men; for those who could discern no marks of it in the works of nature, concluded from thence that there was no God, admitting that if there were, he must be good: and all who have acknowledged a God, have ascribed goodness to him as an essential attribute. Even the Magi, when they asserted another co-eternal principle, they did it to assign a cause for some things they thought could not proceed from that unlimited bounty and goodness which they believed residing in God.

2. But the attributes of God must all be infinite, for there is nothing external, nothing prior to limit him in his powers or his operations: here then arises the difficulty, for if the goodness of God be infinite, whence comes there any evil in the world? Yet that there are innumerable evils the phenomena of nature sufficiently assure us: storms and tempests, earthquakes and inundations, lay fields and cities desolate with all their produce and inhabitants, blighting winds and pestilential vapours wither up and destroy, ravenous beasts devour, villains assassinate, thieves break through and steal, tyrants oppress, diseases torment, cross accidents vex,

old age debilitates, our necessary employments fatigue, our wants interfere, our very pleasures cloy, and man is born to sorrow as the sparks fly upwards. We are necessitated to destroy vermin that would overrun us, to slay our fellow-creatures for our sustenance, to weary them out with toil and labour for our uses, to press one another into wars and sea services for our preservation. Nay, evil is so interwoven into our nature, that the business of mankind would stagnate without it, most of our cares being employed in delivering ourselves from troubles we lie under, or warding off those that threaten. If a man were placed in such a situation as that no pain or mischief, no satiety or uneasiness, no loss or diminution of enjoyment could befal him, he would have no inducement ever to stir a finger: but it is the perishable nature of our satisfactions that urges us to a continual exertion of our activity to renew them. Now it has been asked, that if these unfavourable circumstances attending human nature could not be prevented, where was the almighty power of God? if he knew not how to prevent them, where was his wisdom? if he could and might have prevented them, but would not, where was his goodness? Nor will it suffice to answer that many of the evils before mentioned tend to produce greater good, and it is probable the rest of them do the like: I am so far from denying this probability, that I may offer some reasons by-and-by for confirming it; but admitting that good springs out of every evil, this must be owing to the necessary connection between both in the present constitution of nature; but when we consider that nature is not only directed and governed, but was originally constituted by the hand of God, the difficulty still recurs. For if he wished to have given his creatures unmingled good, but saw no other constitution of nature possible besides that he has established, this seems to limit his power, and we are at a loss to account for such limitation: if there were other constitutions possible, containing no mixture of evil, this perplexes us with respect to his goodness, which we cannot conceive to choose a frame of nature disagreeable to itself.

3. Several solutions have been attempted for this difficulty, none of which reach to the bottom, for they stop all at second causes, without reflecting that the properties and powers of second causes depend upon the First: therefore, as often happens in trying to unravel an entangled thread, while they loosen the knot in one place they draw it tighter in another. Seneca lays the fault upon the materials, which he tells us were disobedient to the artist's hand, for he says there are some sluggish elements not susceptible of active and lively forms: how far this assertion unravels anything I leave others to find out, but it certainly supposes two first principles, a blind necessity or unsentient nature to furnish materials, and work them up into elements, and a divine artificer whose office was only to form such combinations as they were capable of being placed in: for if he had created his own materials, we may presume he would have given them qualities suitable to the purposes he intended them for. Some ascribe evil to our immersion into matter: I know we receive all our evil from the action, or by the intervention of material causes, but so we do all our pleasures and satisfactions too. This only points out the channel through which evil is derived to us, but does not go to the fountain head: for why should we pronounce it impossible that a matter might have been created with different properties from the present, fitted for exciting pleasant perceptions, but not painful? or what contradiction is there in spirits having a capacity given them of the former without any of the latter? or who can show the necessity of an immersion into matter at all? Might not spirits have been

made capable of affecting one another with perceptions? or might they not, as Berkeley supposes, have received such succession of ideas as was thought proper for them, by the immediate hand of God? Others attribute all the mischief in the world to the abuse of free will: if they mean a free will of indifference, they ought to show there is such a power, for we have found no footsteps of it in our survey of human nature; if they mean a free will choosing upon motives, this acts always according to the state of the imagination representing distant good in fainter or equally vivid colours with present pleasure: and I believe all who admit a spiritual substance, hold that there are societies of spirits in nature, whose imaginations are so rectified, that they never choose amiss, and, though they hold their happiness by the tenure of their obedience, are in no danger of forfeiting it. Nor how little foundation soever there may be in fact for the doctrine of irresistible grace, can it be shown impossible in theory: for if desire, that is, the prospect of satisfaction, be fixed upon the proper point, free will never fails to follow it: and a prospect depends upon the objects lying in view, which in this case are the modifications of our mental organs, capable certainly of receiving any changes from the divine operation upon them, whereby our sentiments and actions may be influenced without the least impeachment or control of our liberty. Or if reason and free will must unavoidably draw some mischiefs after them, who will presume to say that almighty power had not other faculties to bestow not attended with the like inconveniences? Nor at most can this cause account for all the evil found in the world, for the brute creation though incapable of misconduct have their share of it, and though much of their sufferings springs from the tyranny and capriciousness of man, all does not: for there are pains and hurts, terrors and slaughters, wants and distresses, among the beasts, the fowls, and the insects, in wild forests, where the foot of man never trod, nor the Will of man ever interfered.

4. There are those who allege the absurdity of creatures being equally perfect with their Creator, and that imperfection necessarily implies a liableness to evil: but this consequence I cannot discern; for there is a manifest difference between actual pain and the absence or diminution of pleasure. A child is less perfect than a man; but the uneasinesses befalling a child arise from diseases, ill management, or accidents, not from the imperfection of its organs. A creature with dull capacity, small powers, and few materials of enjoyment, might nevertheless be placed in a situation to exempt it from all want and trouble. The wise man of the philosophers and glorified saint of the Christians, although supposed to stand above the reach of all evil, are still very imperfect in comparison with the author of their Being: wherefore evil is not so connected with imperfection, but that the one may subsist without the other. Besides, if it were otherwise, one should expect to see them always accompany one another in equal proportion, but the contrary appears manifest from experience: for persons of the brightest parts and most extensive knowledge are not always the freeest from troubles; an intelligent man has no less his share of them than the foolish ostrich or the stupid beetle. Nay, that quick sensibility, which is the groundwork of all advances towards perfection, increases the pungency of pains and vexations. Many talk of a scale of Beings which, they say, must rise in a continual gradation from Nothing to the divine perfections: yet they cannot deny that there is an immense gap between the highest rank of creatures and their Creator, and why might not there have been a gap

between Nothing and the bottom of the scale, so as to exclude all those degrees which necessarily contain a mixture of evil, if there be any such, which we have just now seen cause to doubt of? But neither do they show why there must be a scale of Beings, nor what inconveniency would ensue upon the lowest being raised to the condition of the highest. Do they make an attribute of curiosity, and imagine the Supreme Being like some great nobleman, who will have animals of all kinds in his menagerie to divert himself with looking upon them? Or did it cost omnipotence more trouble to make an angel than an oyster, so that being fatigued with working up the former, the latter was undertaken by way of play and recreation? Or does one take up more room in nature than the other, and after the universe was filled with Beings of the superior order, there remained space only for the inferior classes in the interstices between them? In short, it seems laying a restriction upon Almighty power to imagine that things could not have been constituted otherwise than they are, and to conclude that because we see a scale of Beings, free will liable to abuses, pains and troubles brought upon us by the action of matter, therefore God was under a necessity of ordering the world after this manner.

5. Sometimes we meet with persons who in handling this subject endeavour to stop our mouths with rhetoric instead of convincing us with logic, for they tell us that starting these difficulties concerning goodness is murmuring against Heaven. Hath not the potter power over his clay to make one vessel to honour and another to dishonour? This comparison was very proper for the purpose it was intended to answer, namely, to silence the unreasonable clamours of such as fancied themselves injured by the dispensations of Providence; but by no means helps us forward in a sober inquiry into the nature and extent of the attribute under consideration. For the question is not what the clay has a right to expect, but what we conceive it likely that a beneficent potter would do, if he knew his vessels capable of enjoyment or suffering according to the mould wherein they were cast. The measure of bounty is not the rights but the wants and capacities of the subject whereon it is exercised; nor does bounty begin until justice ends, for there is none in giving every one barely what is his due. Were there a man who should provide necessaries and conveniences for his children, lead them into all useful accomplishments, indulge them with variety of pleasures and amusements, they ought to think themselves happy under such a parent, notwithstanding he might have some humours which were troublesome to them now and then; yet another who were clear of this exception were better. So we, when we weigh the blessings against the troubles of life and find how greatly the former exceed the latter, have abundant reason to be satisfied with our lot: yet when we reflect on the character of our heavenly Father in whom there can be nothing of humour, or ill-will, or grudging, the preponderancy of good does not account for the few evils scattered up and down among men, because though we can still acknowledge him good, we are apt to imagine that if these were removed he would be better. So that our want of title to better fortune than is allotted us does not help to reconcile the phenomena of nature with our notion of infinite goodness: for the difficulty springs from our idea of the Donor, not from our own merits, nor from any exception to the value of his gifts.

6. Thus all that has been suggested to account for the origin of evil has proved unsatisfactory, and it still remains an inscrutable mystery which has perplexed the thoughts of men from the days of Job down to the present times, and probably will continue to do so as long as there shall be men on

earth to descant upon it. Though we have not an adequate idea of infinite power so as to determine in all cases what is absolutely impossible, or implies a contradiction, yet we may clearly see that whatever has been done might have been omitted, and that the capacity of suffering is a property given to creatures with their being: nor can we imagine a necessity constraining God to form a world in a manner not suitable to his intention, or attended with inconveniences he would wish to have removed, without derogating from his almighty power and without admitting two First Causes interfering with one another. Therefore we must needs acknowledge that God created evil as well as good, and that nothing of either happens to his creatures unless by his appointment or permission: and if this seems to derogate from his goodness, let us consider whether we have an adequate idea of goodness, or know precisely what is belonging and what repugnant to it.

7. Goodness in ourselves is the prospect of satisfaction annexed to the welfare of others, so that we please them for the pleasure we receive ourselves in so doing, or to avoid the uneasiness we should feel on omitting it. But God is completely happy in himself, nor can his happiness receive increase or diminution from anything befalling his creatures: wherefore his goodness is pure disinterested bounty without any return of joy or satisfaction to himself. Therefore it is no wonder we have imperfect notions of a quality whereof we have no experience in our own nature: for we know of no other love than inclination, which prompts us to gratify it in the same manner as our other inclinations. In the next place let us examine our idea of infinite goodness taken in the abstract before we inquire whether God be good or no, and we shall find it incompatible with that of infinite power: for infinite goodness, according to our apprehension, requires that it should exhaust omnipotence, that it should give capacities of enjoyment and confer blessings until there were no more to be conferred; but our idea of omnipotence requires that it should be inexhaustible, that nothing should limit its operations so that it could do no more than it has done. Therefore it is much easier to conceive an imperfect creature completely good than a perfect Being, for if he pursues invariably all opportunities of doing good to the utmost of his power and knowledge, he deserves that character, and if there are any injuries sustained which he cannot redress, any distress unrelieved which he knows not of, his weakness and ignorance are a full excuse for his omission. But where there is almighty power, unlimited knowledge, and perfect wisdom, we can neither conceive that infinite goodness should extend to the utmost bounds of that which has no bounds, nor yet that it should stop until it can proceed no further. Since then we find our understanding incapable of comprehending infinite goodness joined with infinite power, we need not be surprised at finding our thoughts perplexed concerning them: for no other can be expected in matters above our reach, and we may presume the obscurity rises from something wrong in our ideas, not from any inconsistencies in the subjects themselves. In the last place, let us remember that the attributes of God are infinite, therefore if he were not infinitely good he must have been infinitely malicious, for either in him must be pure and original independent on further views which might sometimes render one expedient and sometimes the other: but this the most melancholy imagination never yet suspected of him, for there is nobody so destitute of enjoyment, or so overwhelmed with pains and distresses, as not to be sensible that almighty power might have made his condition still worse.

8. Having thus taken off the force of those objections urged against Divine Goodness, by showing that such will naturally start up upon matters whereof we cannot have a full comprehension, and that greater will arise upon the contrary supposal, let us now try what clear ideas we can form of it, and what evidence we can gather of its reality from our experience. And we need not go far to seek for proofs; the very air we breathe, the food we eat, the relish we find in our enjoyments, the materials ministering them to us, the benefits and mutual solace of society, the faculties of understanding and volition, the value of life which renders it generally desirable, are so many striking marks of a beneficent disposition in the Giver of all these things. Even our troubles come attended with their alleviations: we have remedies and assistance in diseases, comfort in distresses, and hope lies ready as a salve for every sore, nor are there any in so forlorn a condition but may find something to thank God for, if they will look about to seek it; for he remembers mercy in judgment, and gives us a glimpse of his goodness in the very seasons when he afflicts us. Epicurus, though disposed to find all the faults he could in the system of nature, yet made it one among his collection of Masterly Maxims, That pain if grievous was short, if long it was light. Nor are the brute creatures disregarded by the author of their Being: he supplies them food for their sustenance, clothing of hides, feathers, or shells for their defence, harbouring places for their security, appetites for their preservation and entertainment, instincts for their direction: the beasts and fowls breathe his air, the fish take their pastime in his waters, the reptiles live upon his bounty, and the most contemptible insects receive their portion of enjoyment from his hand.

9. The epithet Contemptible happening to occur in the last line suggests a train of thought that may lead to something serviceable upon the present occasion; for nothing is contemptible in the eyes of God; it is the vanity and selfishness of man that sets him in conceit at an immense distance above other creatures, and thereby renders them objects of scorn and contempt: so I run the hazard of offending the delicacy of my cotemporaries by representing almighty power and wisdom employed in providing conveniences and enjoyments for the pismire, the earth-worm, and the mite, the ugly spider, the filthy maggot, and the venomous adder. Nor might have succeeded with them much better had I extended the observation no further than to the human species; for they concern themselves not with what happens to the Indian, the savage, or the Hottentot, they care not for the greasy ploughman or the dirty cinder-wench: persons born in a cottage are thought below their notice, all who want their own knowledge and politeness deemed incapable of enjoyment. So that we lose the view of all the good done to objects we esteem unworthy of any regard, and when things happen amiss to ourselves we forget how often they have happened to our wishes. This narrowness of mind contracts our prospect of nature, and as she has some dark spots upon her face, if the eye fixes upon one of these, it sees nothing but gloom and despondency; whereas were our vision a little enlarged we might perceive every dark place surrounded with a splendour of light.

10. It is observable that men commonly take their estimate of nature from themselves and their own situation: while success attends them they think they shall never meet with disappointment, and when disappointment stands across their passage they think they shall never see the lucky moment again: while in the vigour of youth, the constitution strong, the spirits alert, desires eager, and materials of gratification continually at hand,

they find no fault or blemish in nature, the world is then a glorious world, and pleasures expected without end: we hear of no murmurings against Providence, nor mistrusts that things are not so well ordered as they should be, but they are rather apt to think God, as I may say, too good, so as to wink at their miscarriages, indulge them in their follies, and suffer them to do what mischief they please to their fellow-creatures without control. But when pain, disease, disappointment, or distress, pinches them, the tables are turned, they see not nor sympathize with the enjoyments abounding elsewhere, but take their judgment of nature from that little spot wherewith they have immediate concern, and then doubts arise concerning the condition of things: why was not this mischief prevented; where was almighty power that could not, or where was infinite goodness that would not, prevent it? Thus we see that infinite goodness ebbs and flows according to the state of our minds: when we are at ease in ourselves, we find no difficulty in entertaining the idea of it: when dissatisfied with our present condition, nothing is harder for us to comprehend. Nor is this to be wondered at, for vexations of every kind give a melancholy cast to the mind, destroying the relish of those pleasures which used to delight us before, so that we have nothing similar in our imagination wherewith to compare the sensations of others: for our only way of estimating other people's enjoyments is by imagining ourselves in their circumstances, and reflecting on the joy we should receive thereby, but when the mind is so disposed as to care for nothing, and find a relish in nothing, we cannot readily conceive others wishing or caring for what would not affect us; and therefore being unable to form a clear conception of enjoyment either in ourselves or elsewhere, we lose the idea of that goodness which can be apprehended only by its effects.

11. Thus we find our unfavourable suspicions of nature, owing to the wrong turn or disordered condition of our imagination, when our own ill management or unlucky circumstances confine our view to the least favourable of her features: for so a man may take distaste to a fine building, if he be locked up in the necessary, or resolve to look upon nothing else. Therefore it behoves us to take the opportunity for forming our judgment when the mind is most in tranquillity, not ruffled by vexations, nor pressed by importunate desires, when the understanding is clearest, when we can extend our view all around and consider everything impartially: and we may help ourselves not a little towards enlarging our mind by contracting a habit of benevolence. I have already taken notice in the chapter upon that article, as one of the advantages accruing from a benevolent temper, that nothing contributes so much to open the heart, to enliven the imagination, and give a cheerful cast to the scenes around us. For what we wish well to, we think well of, and if we wish well to everything, we shall be attentive to the successes and pleasures that happen to everything: and by turning our observation constantly that way shall find subjects to rejoice at which the selfish and narrow-spirited never know. We shall cease to measure others' satisfactions by our own standard, or think nothing desirable to them which we would not choose for ourselves: but shall discern a variety of tastes adapted to the several conditions wherein men are placed, and things which were irksome at first becoming pleasant by custom. We may see that children have their plays, the vulgar their amusements, coarse jokes, and may-games: even folly does not exclude pleasure, nor poverty banish contentment. There is as much mirth in the kitchen as the parlour, and as great diversion in a country fair or a cricket match as a card assembly

or a ridotto. The cobbler whistles at his stall, the dairy maid sings while she is milking, the ploughman munches his mouldy crusts with as good a relish as the rich man eats his dainties, for he has that best of sauces, hunger, to season his victuals. Labour purifies the blood, invigorates the limbs, strengthens the digestion, insures quiet sleep, and renders the body proof against changes and inclemencies of weather, all which are considerable articles in the enjoyment of life, nor can their loss be compensated by any advantages of family, fortune, learning, and politeness. Nor is the lowest herd incapable of that sincerest of pleasures, the consciousness of acting right, for rectitude does not consist in extensiveness of knowledge, but in doing the best according to the lights afforded; and many artisans, servants, and labourers, find as much satisfaction in fulfilling the duties of their station, as the philosopher in his researches into Nature. Nor need we stop at the human species, for the brute creation too exhibits scenes agreeable for the good-natured man to look upon: he may rejoice to see the cattle sporting in the fields, or hear the birds singing or chirping out their joys, to behold the swallow building nests to hatch her young, the ant laying in store of provisions for her future accommodation, the flies in a summer evening dancing together in wanton mazes, the little pucerons in water frisking nimbly about, as if delighted with their existence.

12. Whoever has a heart to enjoy such contemplations will be apt to pursue them until he has satisfied himself there is a much greater quantity of enjoyment than suffering upon earth: for pleasures spring from steady permanent causes, as the vigour of health, the due returns of appetite, and calls of nature to exercise or rest: but pains proceed from accidents which happen rarely, or diseases which are either slight or temporary. And he will entertain a favourable idea of that bounty which supplies desires and means of gratifying them to every species, from imperial man down to the scarce perceptible insect. When he has filled his imagination with this idea, he may draw comfort from it in his seasons of affliction and distress, for though he finds no pleasures within his own reach, or have lost the relish of any that might be offered him, he may reflect how many thousands at that moment are dancing and singing, marrying and giving in marriage, advancing towards the accomplishment of their wishes, and pursuing all kinds of enjoyment with full gust and satisfaction: how many millions of animals are eating their food, providing for their accommodations, taking their pastimes, or ruminating in their lurking holes; and this consideration may alleviate his trouble. I do not mean nor expect that he should carry his benevolence to such an unattainable height, as to make the joys he feels in sympathizing with the joys around him stifle the smart of every evil that can befal him: but he may gather this consolation from them, that there is an inexhaustible spring of bounty flowing incessantly upon the world, and from thence conclude that himself shall partake in due measure of the stream at some time or other, if not in his present at least in some future state of being.

13. For the great preponderancy of good over evil, in this part of the creation lying within our view, manifests a beneficence in the character of the Author, which must operate likewise no less in all other parts of his work: for so we reason in matters familiar to our acquaintance. We know nothing of causes unless by their effects, nor the characters of persons unless by their deeds. We know that fire will burn because we see wood consumed by it, that water is fluid because we see it fluctuate and disperse. If a man has been used to cheat, we expect he will cheat again, or if he has

long behaved with honesty and truth, we expect the like behaviour from him for the future. Thus our whole dependence upon the qualities of bodies we daily handle and persons we daily converse with rests upon our experience: and we have or may have, if we will take pains to acquire it, the like experience of an unwearied bounty pouring blessings all around us: so that we have as good ground of assurance that God will continue to do good as we have that fire will burn, that the stone will resist the touch, or that our bosom friend will not betray us. Were we entertained in the family of some nobleman, if we found him kind and condescending to his dependents, humane to his servants, careful to establish salutary orders for the regulation of his household, watchful to see that even his cattle had their proper food and conveniences, we should naturally conclude the same good management prevailed in all his other houses. We have lived some years in this family of terrestrial animals, and we may as naturally conclude that the same beneficence which provides so amply for their welfare according to their respective wants and capacities, extends to every other family of sentient Beings throughout the universe.

14. By this means we may attain as full and clear an idea of goodness as may satisfy us of a character of benevolence in the Disposer of all things: but the evil we likewise experience cannot infer a defect of goodness, because the attributes must be perfect and infinite; nor yet an opposite character, because our clearest judgment informs us that contradictory characters cannot subsist in the same subject. Therefore we must acknowledge evil to be unaccountable, and unaccountable phenomena we never extend further than we can see of them. It is possible that what portion of evil there is in nature may be confined to the visible world and lie within the regions of matter, nor need we suppose it existent elsewhere until further reasons shall occur for the supposition. At least we may presume from the character of goodness that the quantity of good in the universe vastly exceeds that of evil, which is enough to give us an inviting prospect of our condition wherever we shall go, unless there be some unfavourable circumstances particularly attending ourselves which make us liable to fear the worst.

15. As to the perplexities involving our thoughts let us consider from whence they generally arise, and perhaps we shall find them not irremoveable. We commonly esteem goodness to consist in a compliance with our humours; a parent that indulges us in all our desires we look upon as supremely good, and if we should happen to desire what is hurtful, still we should think his denial of it a severity. But desire ordinarily fixes upon present satisfaction, and seldom runs along the whole line of consequences from whence the real value of things ought to be estimated: so that we often think ourselves hardly dealt with at the very time when we are receiving good. But when the trouble is once over, and we feel the benefits resulting therefrom, we can acknowledge that to be goodness we once esteemed hardship: and so we should have done at first had we had a clear discernment of the distant good and an earnest desire for it; for then we should have thought nothing a hardship that lay in the way to accomplish it; so that our discontents are owing to a misapprehension occasioned by the narrowness of our views.

16. So long as things succeed currently to our wishes we entertain no doubt of divine goodness: while we have the means of gratifying our desires we find fault with none of the laws of nature, not even that of rest after labours of the day, although sleep cuts off from above a quarter of the

enjoyments we might have had could we subsist without it. A moderate pittance of happiness contents us if we have no thoughts of anything higher, nor is there a man so unreasonable as to quarrel with the Almighty for making him an imperfect creature, or to think it an impeachment of goodness that he has not the capacity and enjoyments of an angel. Since then imperfection of happiness in any degree is not repugnant to our idea of goodness, let us consider whether this imperfection, although not necessarily implying a liableness to evil, may not well consist with a mixture of it. For the value of existence depends upon the quantity of happiness received therein, and every evil is the same as a substraction from that quantity: if then the good and evil compared together leave a balance of the former, which if given alone would be sufficient to denominate the creature happy, and be thought a gift becoming infinite goodness to bestow, why should not both together be thought so too, since they are of equal value? A salary of five hundred pounds a year, chargeable with a constant land tax of four shillings in the pound, is equal to four hundred without that deduction: and if a friend put you in the way of making a thousand pounds by laying out four hundred, you would think yourself as much obliged to him as if he had helped you to a clear six hundred. So if there be a profuse abundance of happiness together with a small mixture of suffering distributed throughout the universe, the condition of the creatures is as valuable as if the net balance of the former had been given alone: but this would have been thought to denominate the giver infinitely good; why then should the state of the world, as it is, occasion any doubts to the contrary?

17. Much of our good springs out of evil, for objects exciting pleasant sensations rarely occur, but it is the amusement we find in the exercises of our activity and the engagement of our pursuits that furnish us with most of the enjoyments of life, and it is the desire of delivering or guarding ourselves from something we do not like, that chiefly prompts us to bestir ourselves: so that if there was no such thing as danger, want, or satiety, we should have little to do, and life would become insipid for want of employment. Nor does our reflection upon the good we possess contribute less than the pleasures we actually feel to that complacence of mind which renders life desirable, but this reflection arises principally from the contemplation of those evils from which we are exempted: it has been constantly observed that we know not the value of blessings until we lose them, and those who meet with nothing to ruffle them are scarce sensible of their happiness. For as a foil sets off a beauty, so the disappointments we have experienced or distresses we behold others labour under, give us a just estimation of our present good fortune. When we turn our thoughts to thanksgiving we generally find them run upon topics relative to some wants that are supplied, distresses that are relieved, dangers from which we are secured, or mischiefs from which we are exempted: nor can we scarce bring our minds to thank God for the air we breathe, because it is so common: or for the constant returns of spring and summer, of morning and day-light, because we never miss them; and when we do discern the value of these things it is by reflecting on the forlorn condition we should stand in without them. A rescue from some imminent danger gives a stronger apprehension of kindness than a thousand good offices, and pleasure never comes so welcome as when preceded by pain; nay, ease alone after a deliverance from trouble affords a joy that satisfies the mind without any of those amusements necessary to content us at any other time: most of our vexations make us some returns of this kind, and many of them perhaps greater than

the uneasiness they gave us while present. The complicated machinery of our body, consisting of so many tender vessels and fibres liable to a thousand disorders yet preserved many years entire and unhurt, the variety of necessaries requisite for our food, our clothing, and our accommodation, continually supplied from innumerable quarters, fill us with a higher idea of the divine wisdom, care, and beneficence, than we could otherwise have entertained. Thus want, weakness, imperfection, and evil, tend to display goodness, and without them we should scarce have known what it was: so that whatever joy and solace we receive at any time in contemplating the divine goodness, we owe to that mixture of evil falling within our notice.

18. Having satisfied ourselves by these and many more the like considerations which our experience may suggest, that there is a character of goodness in the Author of nature, let us now examine what we may conceive agreeable or repugnant to such character, this being our only guidance to judge of matters not falling under our immediate observation and experience: and we shall find these two inferences naturally follow from our idea of goodness. That the proportion of good must greatly surpass that of evil in the universe, and that good is given for its own sake, but evil never sent unless as a means productive of some greater good. The former of these conclusions may give us a favourable prospect of nature in general, and the latter may yield us comfort in particular seasons of trouble. For we may consider evil as a tax imposed, not to feed the avarice and ambition of the great, but for the support and exigencies of the government; and though we do not always see the uses for which it is wanted, yet we may rest assured of the application being in good hands, and that no more is levied than will be disposed of to the advantage of the community; therefore we may look upon every payment as a purchase of something more valuable than the price that is paid for it, or as a call for money to be improved at interest upon the best security. Whoever can possess his imagination with a lively sense of suffering being a purchase, and this seems not impossible to be effected by a due and habitual reflection upon the nature of goodness, will be so far from being disturbed at the weight or sharpness, or continuance of the miseries he sees among mankind, that he will regard it as an evidence of some unspeakable enjoyment lying in store, which infinite goodness judges worth the purchasing at so high a price. Nor need it stagger him to reflect that suffering is sometimes inflicted for a punishment of wrong doing, for we have seen in the last volume that a righteous man will never punish unless with a view to some greater advantage accruing therefrom: so that even punishment may be looked upon in the light of a purchase. Neither can this representation of it give an encouragement to do wrong for the sake of purchasing that greater advantage, for besides that persons inclined to catch excuses for doing wrong are not likely to attain the persuasion above mentioned, the purchase in case of punishment either redounds to the benefit of others, or consists in an exemption from those worse punishments which impunity would draw upon the delinquent.

19. Since then we find the estates of happiness in this sublunary kingdom subject to taxes, we must take the whole together, the rents and profits together with the disbursements. Or since evil is so interwoven with good that one cannot be had without the other, we must not pick out single threads but regard the whole contexture as one piece, and in this light it will appear that every dispensation is good and worthy divine bounty to bestow. As to the existence of evil and its being so interwoven into the fortunes of creatures, we can do no otherwise than refer this to some

unknown attribute. For as has been observed before, the little we know of God being drawn from those few of his works lying within our cognizance, we cannot expect they should discover the whole of his nature, but there may probably be other attributes belonging to him of which we can entertain no conception. We have already found the necessity of some such in the article of omniscience: for though wisdom may discern what capacities and stations are requisite for completing the grand design in view, it cannot determine what particular substances shall have such or such capacities, or occupy such or such stations preferably to any others. So upon the present article we have found it repugnant to our notions to suppose either that infinite bounty could stop until there was nothing further to bestow, or yet that creatures should be raised to the perfection and ineffable happiness of their creator. Therefore we must necessarily conclude there is some other attribute to moderate between goodness and omnipotence, to set the proper limits of imperfection ascertaining how near it may approach towards perfection, and what distance it must always keep therefrom, and to be the origin of evil: with all which we need not perplex our thoughts either to raise doubts or attempt discoveries concerning them, since they spring from a source whereof we can have no comprehension.

CHAP. XVII.

EQUITY.

If this shall appear a novel title, it is so no otherwise than by making that a separate article which used to be included under a more general term; Equity being a species of Justice, which has always been ascribed to God in the most perfect degree. For justice is commonly divided into distributive and commutative, and though the latter epithet be not properly applicable to the proceedings of God, with whom we have nothing to commute in return for the blessings received at his hands, yet neither do all our dealings with one another relate to matters of exchange or such wherein our own interests are concerned. In apportioning the cares of a parent among his children, the protection afforded by a prince to his subjects or countenance given to his servants, there are certain rules which a just man will observe, and these belong to that branch of justice usually styled the commutative, nor can we conceive the like rule of equity disregarded by him who is righteous in all his ways.

2. This attribute seems the easiest of any to our comprehension, for it is no more than a perfect impartiality inclining God to be good alike to all, and to spread his mercy over all his works. It involves us in none of those difficulties we met with before on contemplating omnipotence, omniscience, and infinite goodness, which we cannot well conceive either with or without bounds. For the opportunities of success given to one man must be possible and may be afforded to another, nor can wisdom want methods of bringing about events similar to those it has already contrived, nor do we see any hindrance that whatever measure of bounty is thought proper for the creatures may be diffused equally among them. And it is agreeable to our notions of God that it should be so, for his bounty is pure, unexcited by objects, but flowing solely from himself, and we naturally expect that the same cause should produce the same effect wherever it operates, unless

by reason of a difference in the subjects; but there could be no difference of one man from another in their state of nonentity: what difference lies between them was of God's making, and if he has been more sparing of his favours to some, we may presume he will make them amends upon another occasion. Nor can we fail of being confirmed in this notion when we reflect what it is that makes men partial or unequal in their good offices: we perform them to those from whom we expect the like return, or in gratitude for services done us, or to gain credit and reputation in the world, or for relation or intimacy sake, or because their humours suit with our own, because we find a pleasure in their company, or have taken a favourable liking to their persons: but the more a man improves in reason and virtue, the more equal we find him in his sentiments and behaviour towards those with whom he has intercourse. Thus we find the seeds of partiality in wants and weaknesses of human nature, none of which can have place in the Divine. I shall not presume to limit the authority of God, or set up a claim to the like proportion of blessings that others enjoy; for we are the work of his hands, and he has not only full power but lawful right to dispose of us as he pleases, to bestow a larger measure of his bounty upon one, and less upon another: but the question here, as before, in the case of goodness, is not what the creature has a right to expect, but how our idea of the dispenser of all good things makes it likely he should deal with us. And for my part, when I consider the nature of pure unmerited love, I can see nothing that should cause it to make a difference in objects where those objects have not a prior intrinsic value. Therefore we may abide by our theory and conclude the love of God extended in equal measure, to all who are objects of it, until we shall find our theory corrected by experience.

3. But it may be thought experience does contradict our supposition by the very unequal distribution of good and evil we see prevailing among mankind: some abound in superfluities, while others want even the necessaries of life: some enjoy exuberant health, while others struggle continually with distempers and infirmities; some increase knowledge without measure, while others scarce know their right hand from their left. Fortune, honour, accomplishments, success, and ease, take up their abode with a chosen few, and leave the rest of the world to labour, trouble, and anxiety. But in the first place, let us examine the conditions of men narrowly, and we shall find them not so very unequal as may appear at first sight, for there are many unobserved joys and vexations which we do not take into account: therefore we are very bad estimaters of happiness, for we judge of it by our desires which fasten upon intense pleasures, and run eagerly after those things which would give us the greatest joy in the acquisition, or the most pungent sorrow upon losing them: but it is the continual produce of satisfaction and complacence yielded by possessing, not the first transports on obtaining, that constitutes the real value of things. The poor man wishes for riches, the diseased and weak for health and vigour, the ignorant for knowledge, and such as are possessed of those advantages would think it a grievous misfortune to lose them: so that it is acknowledged by the concession of all, that they are better had than gone without, nor can it be doubted that the giving of them would cause extraordinary joy in the receivers, and the deprivation of them as great grief and vexation in the losers. But could we lay open the thoughts of those who have been used to either fortune, without having ever known the opposite, and penetrate into their sentiments and feelings, we should find that pleasures grow insipid, and misfortunes light, by custom, that wants increase by success, and content springs out of

disappointment; that both have their joys and their vexations, their comforts and their troubles, their amusements and their dislikes, their satisfactions and their uneasinesses, perhaps in nearer proportion than can easily be imagined. At least, it must be admitted that all receive some share in the bounties of heaven, and pay their quota to that tax of evil imposed upon human nature. Nor do salubrious or pestilential airs, vernal suns, or the scorching dog-star, seas or winds, make any difference between high and low, strong and weak, wise and foolish.

4. In the next place let us remember, that notwithstanding we cannot, with all our allowances, make the lot of all men exactly equal, the spirit will remain entire after dissolution of the body, still capable of receiving good and evil, of satisfaction and uneasiness; and though all the channels conveying either now should be taken away, we know not what new faculties it may acquire, or what materials may be provided for exercising them in the world whereto it is going: so that we can no more pronounce upon a man's lot by that small period of his existence within our inspection, than we can upon his enjoyment of life by seeing him pass a single day. For what was wanting here may be made up in another state, and what was redundant may be retrenched. Wherefore our experience is too imperfect to warrant our altering the theory of this attribute, which is the clearest of any to our conception.

5. A little observation may show us how naturally men's reason may lead them into an opinion of the Divine Equity. Such as do not much exercise their reason conceive of God as having his favourites and his aversions, because they have so themselves, and value themselves upon it, for we form our idea of God upon the model of what we esteem most excellent in ourselves: but those who practise thought and consideration see that an equitable temper is a commendation in a man's character, and consequently ascribe it in a most eminent degree to that Being which is the fountain of perfection. Therefore the unequal distribution of good and evil upon earth has always been made an argument to prove a future state, that the account might be set even there which was left unsettled here: and opinions have been embraced without other foundation than because they were thought necessary to reconcile the different lots of men with the perfect equity of that power by whom they are disposed. Xavier, the great apostle of the Jesuits, taking for granted that the only way to happiness lay through the Roman Church, and yet being sensible that thousands are born and die without ever having an opportunity of being admitted into it, asserts positively that every Tartar and savage has a revelation of the Romish faith made to him in the very article of death. He could have no evidence to support this assertion; for who knows what passes in the departing soul after it has lost the use of speech by which it might declare what it felt to the standers by? but he had recourse to this wild imagination as the only way to salve that equity which he could not but acknowledge must deal alike favourably with all and propose the terms of happiness to every human creature. To this cause likewise we may attribute the invention of a free-will of indifference, that men may make their fortunes unequal where the favours of heaven bestowed on them were equal; as a child for whom the father has made an ample provision with the rest of his brethren may yet run himself into poverty by his own extravagance: but if the Will were constantly determined by motives, it was thought the lot of every one must depend upon what motives were furnished. Since then we have the concurrence of the sober and considerate part of mankind in behalf of this doctrine of God

being equitable and alike good to all his intelligent creatures, and we find men so firmly rooted in this persuasion as to practise all contrivances to bring their particular tenets to coincide with it, we need make no scruple of ranking equity among the attributes and using it as a principle whereon to build what judgment we can concerning the constitution of things unseen.

6. These are all the attributes whereof we have any distinct knowledge or conception, and I call them primary as being essential to the Divine Nature. Nor let it be thought an omission that I have taken no notice of Justice, Purity, Majesty, and Holiness, which have always been esteemed attributes equally with those before mentioned: but I look upon these as secondary attributes, not arising from contemplation of the Divine Nature considered in itself, but in conjunction with the nature of man and constitution of things in the universe; upon which I shall want to make some further observations before I can explain my thoughts concerning them. Therefore shall postpone the consideration of these secondary attributes for the present, and hope it will be left to me to choose the proper time for entering upon it according to the course wherein my reasonings shall carry me.

CHAP. XVIII.

TWO CHARACTERS IN GOD.

We are told that no man can see God and live, by which I do not apprehend it necessary to understand that the sight of him is so terrible as to destroy us, but that our faculties are incapable of a full discernment of him: so that no man can see God while he lives encumbered with this veil of flesh, nor until invested with a finer organization, or enabled to see intuitively even as also he is seen. And we have found this truth exemplified upon our inquiry into the attributes: we saw clouds and difficulties gather around us, and discovered a necessity of other unknown attributes, whereof the understanding of man has never yet received a glimpse, to furnish objects for infinite wisdom, and set the measure to infinite goodness. On the other hand, we may be said to see God continually before our eyes: our own existence and that of the objects we behold lead us to the knowledge of his Being, the curious structure of our bodies, the wonderful agility and variety of ideas in our minds declare his wisdom, the blessings poured daily around us manifest his goodness, the sun that rules by day, the stars that twinkle by night, the vast expanse of heaven, display his power and greatness.

2. Since then God is incomprehensible, and the thought of him an unfathomable abyss where the line of reason can feel no bottom, yet at the same time an object obvious to our notice, and which it is highly incumbent upon us to pursue so far as our faculties can reach with clearness, let us endeavour to separate what we find clear in our conceptions of him from what is dark and mysterious. And I believe this may best be done by considering him in two capacities, as Creator, and as Governor of the world: for creation being a matter whereto we find nothing similar in our experience, we have no idea of it, nor anything belonging to it. We know that substances owe their existence and properties to an almighty power; but in what other manner they might have been created, or what others might have been added to their number, or whether any or what induce-

ment there was for creating them, we know nothing of. All the difficulties before started concerning absolute impossibilities, the necessity of previous objects to serve as materials for wisdom to work upon, the limitation of goodness, and origin of evil, relate to the first constitution of things; from which we had better withhold our thoughts, for the further we push them, the more we shall find ourselves entangled in perplexities and contradictions.

3. But the governance of the world lies nearer to our apprehension, as proceeding upon a constitution of things already established, disposing and giving motion to substances according to the properties assigned them, ordering the laws of nature and directing events falling under our cognizance, and by various structures or combinations, either of matter alone or in conjunction with spirit, raising secondary qualities perceivable by our senses. For our own volition being determined by motives, and our actions constantly aiming at some purpose suggested either by fancy or judgment, we have no conception of a power exerted without previous objects to direct and guide it: which has given rise to the notion of a nature of things eternal and unalterable by any Will or power whatsoever. But we may escape this absurdity and bring our ideas to tally with one another by considering a Governor of the universe, working upon a nature of things already assigned him, and acting according to certain rules established by the Creator from everlasting. I am far from intending hereby to divide the Divine Unity, or deny that it is one and the same God which created and still governs the world: I only propose this as an imaginary division rendering the subject more suitable to our narrow faculties, which may comprehend in part what they cannot compass entire. Nor do I see any hurt in imagining that to be two which we know to be in reality one, for we have observed formerly that our conceptions often vary from our knowledge, and may find further occasion hereafter to show that it is expedient they should do so. We conceive the sun to run his race every day through the heavens, though we know the fact to be otherwise; for it is more convenient to speak and think of that seemingly little orb as moving about, and the wide stretched earth with all the buildings and mountains upon it as stationary. And so I apprehend it more convenient for our imagination to conceive the world and affairs of men administered by one power limited and prescribed to by another.

4. The Creator dwells in unaccessible light, where the eye of man cannot approach or sees little distinctly, being dazzled by the bright effulgence. We know that he is almighty, self-existent, uncaused, without beginning, and unspeakably happy, and this perhaps is all we can affirm safely concerning him: unless that to him belong those unknown attributes of which we can say nothing more than that there are such. He has established some things so firmly that their existence seems almost as necessary as his own: Time and Space, the imperfection of creatures, the relations between numbers, lines, angels, and forms, we cannot conceive ever to have had a beginning. His ways are unsearchable and his actions past finding out, therefore it is in vain to attempt accounting for his proceedings. We see there are substances around us, but why they were created in such numbers and no more, or with such particular properties and no others, or in such certain stations: why our ideas are variable and the face of nature continually changing; why productions are formed and events brought about, by a long chain of second causes, and not by an immediate exertion of omnipotence; why evil was intermingled among the good, or in what exact

proportion; of all these points we are utterly ignorant. Nor can we know any more concerning the time than the manner of creation, or determine whether the creatures may not have been co-eternal with the Creator: for though they be effects requiring an efficient cause to produce them, yet an effect may well be eternal where the cause is so. I could easily believe the Thames to have run eternally if I could persuade myself that the springs supplying it had flowed for ever: and if there had always been a sun, there would have been no beginning of day-light. So, though the creation depended upon a superior power for its existence, it may nevertheless have subsisted from everlasting, because that power was never wanting whereon it might depend. Nor let it be urged that the Will and good pleasure of God must set omnipotence at work before there could be anything created: for when we reflect on the immutability of the divine nature, we can no more assign limits to the determination of his Will than to the exercise of his power. Therefore it behoves us to know our own ignorance, for this is the strongest mark of such wisdom as the frailty of human nature can rise to: as it is an instance of folly to conceit oneself understanding everything and to decide confidently upon every subject. And if we be at all sensible of our ignorance, we shall be very cautious in our assertions concerning creation or the Author of it, esteeming him an object of our admiration and adoration rather than of our inquiry. Nor need we be disturbed at the want of further knowledge, which could avail us nothing if we had it; for we must take things as we find them, our capacities and the qualities of other substances affecting us as assigned them, nor can we expect they should be altered to please us. If we know what are proper for our uses, how should we be the better for knowing why they were so constituted? If we can discern the sources of good and evil, this is enough to direct us what to pursue and what to avoid, nor could we do it more effectually were we able to trace those sources up to their original causes. Besides, when the Creator had laid the foundation of nature he rested from his works, and having once made us, retained, as I may say, no longer any concern with us, but delivered us over to that Providence which governs and disposes the things already created, exercises the capacities, and employs the qualities already assigned.

5. But the Governor of the Universe is a more discernible object, easier for our imagination to comprehend, clothed with milder rays of glory, the subject of our hope and confidence as well as of our admiration. For we may behold him provident, wise, gracious, and beneficent, protecting us against the confusion of Chance and hard hand of Necessity, having all nature under command, so that no disturbance or disorder can intrude against his liking. To him belong those attributes of which we can form any distinct notion: omnipotence, to give what motions and directions he pleases to substances, to change their situations and throw them into what combinations, or associate them with what company he thinks proper; omniscience, to discern at one glance the whole number of substances existent, their capacities, qualities, and positions; wisdom, to know exactly what secondary qualities will arise and what effects shall be produced by the operation and concurrence of second causes, so that among all the various impulses of matter and actions of spirit, nothing shall fall out contrary to his design and expectation; omnipresence, that nothing may escape his notice, but every particle of corporeal or spiritual substance be directed with the same vigilance as if it were the sole object of his attention; unwearied goodness, to provide all the happiness for the creatures which their

capacities can receive or the pre-established nature of things will admit; and impartial equity, to allot the just proportion of good and evil among sentient creatures, so as that none may have cause to complain at being unequally or arbitrarily dealt with. These things we find no difficulty to comprehend, and these are enow to assure us that the course of nature and fortune is ordered for the best, and that we live under a government which a prudent man would choose for himself if it were left to his option.

6. To consider God as Governor of the world is the light wherein we ordinarily behold him, that which gives us the clearest conception we can entertain of him, which best answers all useful purposes, and has this peculiar advantage that it represents his goodness, the attribute we are most interested with, in the fairest colours, as attentive to produce all the happiness possible for his creatures in the nature and constitution of things. This, when well calculated, satisfies the minds of the vulgar, and would satisfy those of the speculative too, if they would abstain from idle questions concerning creation, and forbear to ask why things are not otherwise constituted so that more happiness might have been produced than is now possible. For if we survey so much of nature as lies within the reach of our observation and reason, we shall find there is a balance of good sufficient to content any reasonable person.

CHAP. XIX.

EXTERNAL NATURE.

By Nature I understand here that disposition and order of things wherein we are likely to have any concern; so much of this as relates to ourselves in our present state of Being we must discover by observation and experience, or learn from the information of others, as being our surest guides: for no man who is going to the East Indies recurs to theology to know what manner of living he may expect, but inquires of those who have been there before him; or if he find himself indisposed, applies to a physician, or recollects what has done him good on the like occasion formerly. But we know that this body of ours shall be dissolved, when whatever was of use or solace to it shall be no longer serviceable: though the trees continue to bear fruit we cannot taste it; though the sun goes on to shine, we cannot see it; though trades and manufactures be still carried on, we can receive no benefit from them. Yet the spirit shall remain entire with her two faculties of perceptivity and activity; but what organs, what instruments, what materials, she shall have to exercise them, experience informs us nothing of: for we have no ground to expect that anything wherewith we have intercourse here shall be the object of our perception or action hereafter. Nevertheless, our curiosity and concern for the future naturally incline us to look forward; but we find nothing affording any glimpse of light, unless in the character of that power which disposes of things visible and invisible: therefore, we must content ourselves with such judgment as we can form from thence of our future condition and expectations.

2. And this leads us to the consideration of final causes, which the most judicious persons have always taken into account, and made the principal foundation in forming their opinions concerning things invisible: for if at any time we can discover what are the views of our Almighty Governor,

we may rest assured he wants not power nor wisdom to compass them. Some indeed carry this argument too far, applying it to the affairs of this world, and inferring what is or shall be done from what they imagine should be done. Thus the Papists prove an infallible judge of controversies upon earth, because they conceive it necessary there should be one: and many good people expect deliverance from all distresses and injuries, or that in wars and contentions the better cause will always prevail, because they apprehend it agreeable to their idea of God that things should be so ordered. Our murmurings and repinings against Providence arise from our unwarrantable expectations, which upon finding them disappointed, tempt us to suspect the ways of Heaven unrighteous, rather than acknowledge ourselves mistaken in our idea of what righteousness requires. But our business here is to learn, not to decide, nor can we ever depend upon what will happen solely by our idea of final causes, nor otherwise than by remarking what has usually happened in similar cases: for our knowledge of God and his proceedings is very imperfect at best, and he has given us experience and a capacity of observation to correct our errors in theory from time to time. But with respect to the invisible world, he has given us no experience nor means of observation; if we were ever there ourselves, we have utterly lost all remembrance of it; and those who are gone there before cannot return to communicate their discoveries: but he has given us some knowledge of himself discoverable in that portion of his work we have seen, and this we may depend upon in matters whereof we have no other evidence to direct us; for we need not doubt that he knows how to adapt his means to their intended effects, and therefore may be assured the knowledge we have is sufficient to answer our purposes, until we shall find him imparting further lights. It is true we cannot enter into the counsels of God, nor discern his manner of proceeding with the same exactness and certainty as we can the qualities of bodies and characters of persons familiar to our acquaintance; but we may reason upon them in many cases with a clearness that shall work as full assurance upon the mind to the exclusion of all doubt, as even experience or demonstration: provided we keep chiefly in generals, and do not enter too minutely into particulars, which we have no opportunity of knowing nor are necessary to be known by us.

3. Our own final causes lie behind each other in trains, for we desire one thing for its tendency to procure another, and that other because it conduces to a third; but good, or satisfaction, stands at the end of every line, recommending the whole to our pursuit: nor can we conceive of Providence otherwise than as aiming its dispensations at particular purposes productive of others, and those again leading to others beyond; the business then is to settle with ourselves what we may reasonably suppose to be the point, answering to satisfaction in ourselves, wherein all dispensations ultimately centre. For we may immediately discern that this cannot be satisfaction, such as operates upon us; for the desire of satisfaction implies a continual want of something to better our condition, to make our lives valuable, and prevent our time from passing away unprofitably, but our clearest apprehensions of the Deity will not allow us to imagine him wanting anything of his creatures, or capable of accession to that happiness he enjoys from everlasting in himself, or administering the government of the world for his own amusement, to pass his time more agreeably, to provide company for his conversation, or produce pleasures from whence he might re-

ceive a moment's entertainment. This consideration overthrows the supposition of Glory, which some have made a predominant attribute and ultimate end of the divine views; for they say God created and still orders all things solely for his own Glory. But when we consider that a fondness for applause is a weakness in human nature, engendering pride, vanity, and affectation, which denote a little mind: that the sounder a man's judgment is, the less solicitous we find him to display his accomplishments to others, and that honour at best is but an expedient to supply the shortness of our views, and lead us into those courses which we want discernment to see the prudence of; we shall think it unbecoming to ascribe this motive to the most perfect of all Beings, with whom there can be no weakness or frailty, no concern lest he should miss his due tribute of praise, no loss or disappointment if it be not regularly paid. Nor do the phenomena of Nature agree with the supposition of such a principle, for of all the innumerable variety of creatures upon earth, man alone is made capable of acknowledging his Maker, and among men, how few are there that rise to conceptions worthy of him! far the greater part being drawn off by their occupations and necessary engagements in life from that attention they might else have given to his excellencies, and those few best furnished with opportunities of knowing him, how imperfect is their knowledge! perplexed with doubts and difficulties which they are forced to solve by their own incapacity and want of discernment. Nevertheless, I do not deny that God is extremely jealous of his glory, and does all things for that end, because he knows his glory is of the utmost consequence to his intelligent creatures: for entertaining unworthy notions of him would fill them with darkness and despair, lead them into vices and fatal errors, induce them to break those laws he has established for their happiness, and introduce a general disorder and confusion: so that glory is a secondary end subservient to goodness, not an original principle, but springing from the love he bears to the works of his hand.

4. Wherefore goodness remains as the ultimate principle beyond that of glory, and though we have supposed an unknown attribute to set the measure to goodness, and restrain it from exhausting omnipotence, this belongs to the Creator whose ways are unsearchable, and concerning whom we can pronounce nothing safely: but the Governor of the Universe we may apprehend as infinitely good, and if there should be any higher source of his actions, we cannot trace it out, therefore must refer to this as the first motive of all his dispensations, and if there be anything repugnant to goodness, we may be sure it will not be permitted. For we may conceive him producing all the happiness possible in the nature and constitution of things: only we must not expect his goodness should regard ourselves alone; for the nature of it requires it to flow where the greatest numbers may receive benefit by it, where there are the highest capacities for enjoying it, and where it may be attended with the fewest inconveniences. For we may observe that good and evil often generate one another, but it is the whole design in view that denominates the action: he that mingles poison with a palatable dish acts maliciously, though he does all in his power to enhance the present pleasure; and the surgeon who performs a cure by some painful operation acts kindly, though he gives a present pain. And sometimes consequences of both kinds follow each other in succession, but they must all be taken into account, in order to determine the quality of the action: the physician who sweetens an emetic for a child does not act unkindly though he entices him thereby to drink that which will make him sick as stomach, because he intends the removal of a disorder by bringing on that

sickness. So the severities that befall us, or the pleasures that lead unwarily into trouble, may be instances of kindness, if in their whole consequences they tend to greater advantage than detriment: and that they do so, we may justly conclude from the character of goodness, which requires that every evil should terminate in good somewhere or other; and that if there be any which yield no fruits in this present state, they should produce a plentiful crop elsewhere, which will abundantly repay the trouble sustained by them here.

5. For, from the unity of the Divine Nature, we may justly infer, that the universe is one immense kingdom governed and administered by the same legislative and executive power: and though this consideration alone will not hinder but that it may be divided into many distinct principalities, each separate within itself, and having no communication with the rest, yet, when we reflect upon the mutual dependence of things in this world, and how much their interests are interwoven, we shall find reason to believe there is a like connection of interests running throughout the whole. We commonly say, that all things were made for man, and so we well may, provided we do not add, for man alone, but allow him likewise to be made for other creatures. The sheep and oxen feed upon his pastures; the horse receives provender and tendence from his hands; the birds eat the grain he sows; the little mouse shares in the provisions of his table; the swallow nestles under his roof; the mastiff and spaniel earn their wages in his service; the flea and the gnat regale on his blood; the harvest-bug burrows in his flesh; and his carcass breeds and nourishes the worm and the maggot. He employs his cares and reason to provide for the uses of animals subservient to his uses, and those of others he provides for in providing for his own. And there is a constant intercourse between the animal and the vegetable kingdoms: man sows the corn that is the staff to support his life, plants and prunes the trees that yield him fruit, cultivates the flax that serves him for clothing: the cattle manure the pastures that feed them, the birds carry about the seeds that grow up to supply their future occasions. It is thought the misletoe would be lost out of nature if it were not continually propagated from tree to tree by the thrush. And every species of living creatures has an interest in the curious structure and alimentary qualities of those plants which furnish them respectively with proper sustenance. Nor are the properties and courses of the elements, the subterraneous works of nature in forming minerals, fossils, exhalations, and vapours, of little consequence to the things upon her surface: the blights that bring disease upon corn and trees threaten us with famine, that unknown vegetative principle promoting their growth, and making the difference between one soil or one season and another, fills us with plenty: the docility and capacities of brutes furnish employment and uses for man; the various passions and characters of mankind affect one another; and that long and intricate chain of events we call Chance or Fortune, determines the time and condition of our birth, and influences us in every part of our lives.

6. Thus nothing stands alone, but each depends for its preservation and welfare upon many others around, with which it stands in some respect or other connected. From hence we may gather a little more knowledge of nature than we could by a bare contemplation of the final cause: for goodness would have been equally satisfied whether the due measure of happiness had been dealt out to the creature directly by an immediate act of omnipotence, or conveyed by the intervention of second causes, or how many soever of

them had intervened to operate upon one another. But since we find that God governs by a long subordination of second causes in this spot of nature exhibited to us for a spectacle, we may reasonably presume he takes the like method in other parts of his dominion. And we may observe, that he not only employs a concurrence of causes to produce one effect, but likewise produces various effects from one and the same cause. The air that supplies us with breath assists the growth of vegetables, sustains the clouds and vapours, and purifies the earth with its continual agitations: the sea that contains the stores of rain and dew, that wafts our ships from coast to coast, serves likewise as an element for the fishes: and there are seldom any events befalling among mankind, which concern no more than a single person. From hence we may infer the probability of there being other uses in the works of nature, besides those we discern, much more that there are uses where we cannot discern any.

7. It is this manner of proceeding by second causes that discovers the divine wisdom, which could not so well be manifested by a direct exertion of omnipotence: the raining manna from heaven might display power, and a kind concern for the wants of mankind; but it would not give evidence of wisdom like the admirable contrivance in a grain of corn, made to protect and nourish the tender germ, fitted with little tubes for straining such earthy particles as are proper for our sustenance. If almighty power were employed at every turn, there would be no room for wisdom, because nothing more would be requisite than to choose what should be done, and to do it accordingly; as a man who carries a bowl in his hand wants no skill to place it where he has a mind: but if he rolls it along the turf, he ought to know exactly the inequalities of the ground, and what force and direction must be given to make it rest just in the spot where he would have it lie: much more when a mulitude of causes are set in motion to produce a variety of effects, does it require a consummate wisdom to adjust them so nicely as that nothing may fall out contrary to intention. And the subordination of causes gives admittance to subordinate ends, wherein we may sometimes discover a wisdom and contrivance in the manner of compassing them, though we cannot trace their tendency to the ultimate end: for we may discern a curious contexture in the parts of weeds and noxious plants, of toadstools and moss, of pyrites and other useless productions of the earth, though we cannot see wherein they promote the benefit of any sentient creature.

8. But wisdom cannot be disjoined from goodness, for it must have some purpose to proceed upon, and none other can be conceived worthy of it; it may direct to proper means, and so far furnish itself with employment in supplying other means to procure them, but must receive its ultimate end from some other quality. Wherefore the most considerate of makind have laid down as an incontestable maxim, That nature does nothing in vain, by which must be understood unproductive of good, either directly or remotely, for this would be vain with respect to the point it has ultimately in view. And Plato, with some others, carried this notion so far as to say, that if any single event had happened otherwise than it did, the whole universe would have been damaged thereby. Whether we may run such length as to assert that every creature has some concern in every dispensation that happens, there is no occasion to examine; but our idea of infinite goodness warrants us to suppose that the course of nature or fortune could not be altered in any particular, without a loss of happiness somewhere or other: and this supposition will necessarily infer an intercourse of interests between the known

world and the unknown. For we find nature often defeated of the purposes she seems principally to have intended; she forms her grains of corn in a manner fitted for producing plants of their different kinds, but how few of them ever attain that end? Such as man employs in his uses make no difficulty, for we suppose her to have had the service of man in view equally with the continuation of the vegetable species: but what quantities are destroyed by blights, by mildews, by storms, or scattered about by accident, where they neither grow up to fill the reaper's hand, nor yield a sustenance to any creature! She forms the eggs of birds with curious integuments, one within another, to foment and nourish the growing fœtus: for such of them as man converts to his uses we think her pains not ill bestowed; but how many of them are addled, chilled, or broken, unprofitable either for the nest or market! What multitudes of fruits of all kinds fall to the ground, where they decay and perish without being of service either to man or beast! What quantities of fertile soil are annually driven down into the sea! What havoc do tempests, inundations, and earthquakes make, as well among the works of nature as of human industry! In short there seems to be a general waste around us, a great deal of pains and contrivance thrown away, and half the provisions that are made fall short of their destined purpose. If we turn our thoughts to man himself we shall find, that after all the wonderful cares of nature to form children in the womb, many of them never come to the birth; of those that do, one half are cut off by diseases, accident, or ill management, before they arrive at the use of reason. Sleep renders a considerable part of our time useless; many of our waking hours pass irksome and insipid, unprofitable to others, and unpleasurable to ourselves. Ignorance and error frustrate half our undertakings; infirmities, passions, and fantastic humours, make us troublesome to one another. Such observations as these have tempted men to deny a Providence; and Lucretius urged it as an argument that the world could not be made in wisdom, being so full of faults. But we have too many proofs of a superintending vigilance in the many provisions actually tending to our preservation, our sustenance, our accommodation, and our enjoyment, to be overthrown by these negative ones to the contrary; from which we may more safely infer, that Providence has something else to take care of besides ourselves; therefore all cares are not thrown away which do not turn to our particular account.

9. I know that such as set themselves impartially to examine the ways of nature, daily find more and more uses in things that at first appeared nugatory; but some of the phenomena are of such a kind as not to be applied with any colour to the benefit of man, and many, wherefrom we do receive some use, are of too noble a fabric for us to claim them as our sole property.

Man has no further concern with this earth than a few fathom under his feet: was then the whole solid globe beneath made only for a foundation to support the slender shell he treads upon? Do the magnetic effluvia course incessantly over land and sea, only to turn here and there a mariner's compass? Are those immense bodies the fixed stars hung up for nothing but to twinkle in our eyes by night, or find employment for a few astronomers? Is that prodigious effusion of light darted every way throughout the expanse of heaven for no other purpose than to enlighten and cherish two or three little planets? Does the vast profundity of space contain no more inhabitants than we see crawling about us, or may conjecture abiding on other earths like ours? Surely he must have an overweening conceit of man's importance, who can imagine this stupendous frame of the universe fabri-

cated for him alone: and he must be too partial an admirer of visible nature, or entertain too mean an opinion of infinite wisdom, that can persuade himself things could not have been contrived better for the accommodation and happiness of man, had he been the sole object of divine attention. To consider only the turns of the human Will, which constantly follows present motives and judgments, would anybody deny that man's understanding could have been more illumined, and his imagination rectified, so as clearly to discern, and strongly to desire, his truest interests, and this alone might have made a paradise upon earth without changing the face of nature.

10. Nevertheless, we may so far acknowledge all things made for man as that his uses are regarded conjointly with those of other creatures, and that he has an interest in everything reaching his notice, either for the sustentation of his body, the improvement of his mind, or entertainment of his thoughts. We know he has some concern with the remotest objects; the satellites, that turn the night of Jupiter into day, assist him in ascertaining the longitude, and measure for him the velocity of light: the mighty Sun, that like a giant holds the planets and comets in their orbits, enlightens him with its splendour, and cherishes him with its warmth; the distant stars, whose attraction probably confines other planets within their vortices, direct his courses over the boundless sea and the inhospitable desert, and display the magnificence of that power which stationed them. Nor can we suppose him forgotten in the laws respecting other worlds, which are so framed as not to interfere with his interests, or infringe upon that measure of good thought proper to be allotted him: for the omnipresent vigilance of our Governor overlooks nothing, and his wisdom is so consummate as to form his several systems complete, without their disturbing or breaking in upon one another.

11. But it is the narrowness of our understandings, confined to work upon such materials as are thrown in by the senses, that makes it difficult to conceive there should be creatures totally different from those falling under our observation for Providence to take care of, and therefore we expect that every provision of nature should be calculated solely for our uses. For many ages this little spot of earth was thought the only habitable part of the universe, nothing else being deemed capable of receiving a colony. Xenophanes was laughed to scorn for asserting the Moon bigger than all Peloponesus, as an absurd and extravagant notion: and though later discoveries have persuaded many persons of the Planets being habitable earths like ours, yet they think no further than of peopling the surfaces of them conformably to what we see in this of our own, and even this appears a wild imagination to common apprehensions, which cannot deviate a step from the track whereto they have been accustomed. Epicurus insisted there could not be intelligence out of the human shape, because he had never seen a reasonable creature of any other: and we cannot comprehend an animal without muscles, fibres, vessels, and organs, such as we find in those we are acquainted with. I suppose if we had never known of fishes we should have been positive that life could not subsist without air to breathe, or that there could be generation without sexes if we had never heard accounts of the Polypus. But who can set bounds to Almighty power or reckon up all the varieties that infinite wisdom can contrive, or show the impossibility of orginizations dissimilar to any within our experience? Who knows what cavities may lie within the earth, or what living creatures they may contain, endued with senses to us unknown, to whom the streams of magnetism may serve instead of light, and those of electricity affect them

as sensibly as sounds and odours do ourselves? Why should we pronounce it impossible there should be bodies formed to endure the burning Sun, to whom fire may be the natural element, whose bones and muscles are composed of fixed earth, their blood and juices of molten metals? or others suited to bear the frozen regions of Saturn, having their circulation carried on by fluids more subtile than the highest rectified spirits raised by chymistry?

How does it appear necessary that sensation must come by that long train of channels leading into one another through which we receive it? The light strikes upon the corneous tunicle of the eye, thence passes on through the aqueous, the crystalline, the vitreous humours, till it falls upon the retina, there it excites tremulous motions, which are propagated onwards in winding mazes along the optic nerves quite to the brain, causing it to excite the sensation of sight. The mind receives her notices from particles penetrating or lying contiguous to her: such as their modifications are, such from time to time are her perceptions; and why may not they take various modifications from the action of external objects without that tedious process of organization employed in terrestrial animals? Hartly and some others pretend to demonstrate that sensations and all our ideas are produced by an ether lodged in the interstices of our brain: if the case be so, when disengaged from the grosser parts of our machinery, we shall have a denser ether surrounding us, which might excite stronger sensations and of other kinds than any we now experience. May there not be bodies fitted for the purposes of sensation and reflection, consisting of simpler organs, and lying within a narrower compass than anything we can imagine, all eye and ear without, all memory and understanding within, small enough to permeate the densest metals with the same ease as we walk about in a grove of trees, too minute for wind to take hold of or fire to penetrate and rend asunder, which may expatiate in the boundless fields of ether and find a pabulum there to support them, or have such contexture as not to be liable to continual waste, and consequently needing no recruit? Or who will undertake to demonstrate that spirits may not act and perceive without any organs at all, finding objects for one faculty to discern, and subjects whereon to exercise the other, in the particles passing perpetually through the sphere of their presence? or that they may not affect one another with perceptions in greater variety and vigour than we receive them from the play of our organs? not vitally united to any system of matter, but joining themselves occasionally to whatever falls within their reach, whereby, if locomotion be expedient, they may transport themselves easily from place to place; for considering the swift and incessant fluctuation of many subtile fluids in all directions, they need never want a conveyance to carry them whithersoever they desire.

12. It is true these are all no more than possibilities, nor do we pretend to bring evidence in proof of their being fact; but the suggestion of a possibility which cannot be contradicted is enough to convince us that we have not the whole extent of almighty power in our view, nor all that nature can perform exhibited in the scenes she has displayed before us: for we find there are other ways of proceeding feasible, and if she has chosen none of them, it may be because she has still others in store whereof we cannot form the most distant imagination. But that she has other methods of supporting life and dispensing enjoyment unknown to us, we may satisfy ourselves from the vast profusion of second causes she puts in act, yielding no proportionable benefit to the reptiles on this lump of dirt, nor any others we can reach with our glasses or our conjectures. So that in our Father's house are many mansions, many not only in number, but in variety of plan

and disposition, built partly of the same kind of stone and timber, but fitted up diversely according to the occasions of the respective inhabitants, and serving for little else than ornament to the rest. Since then there are mighty works fabricated which contribute little to our uses, but we must conclude from the principle of nothing made in vain, that they contribute more largely to those of other creatures, this evidences a connection between the two worlds in having so many things the benefit whereof they share in common. Nor is it probable only that the several systems of Beings have partly the same materials supplying their conveniences and enjoyments, but likewise that their actions in the consequences of them mutually affect one another. It were mere guess-work to go about explaining in what particulars this happens; all that we can pronounce assuredly is that we are equally incapable of discerning whether what passes among other Beings does or does not concern the affairs of men: whether, as toads and adders suck up the poison from the earth, there may be some invisible animals which purify the air, or else prepare it for our respiration as milk is prepared for our nourishment by passing through the bodies of cattle; whether the emission of rays from the sun be owing to the action of some creatures upon his surface; or whether the ministry of substances purely spiritual be employed in the four attractions and putting other laws of matter in execution.

13. But there is one respect wherein it cannot be doubted that other Beings have concern in what happens among us. Whoever admits the doctrine of final causes and nothing made in vain, will scarce imagine that our two faculties of perceptivity and activity were given us only for a few years' employment upon this sublunary stage, to lie buried ever afterwards in eternal sleep, but that the soul upon quitting this country passes into some other, whose districts are continually peopled by colonies sent from hence. Now when we reflect how much the births and deaths of human creatures depend upon the constitution of nature and disposition of affairs here, how men increase and multiply more or less, and their lives are lengthened or shortened by the condition of the air, fertility of the soil, concurrence of accidents, regulations of states, introduction or decay of arts and sciences, manners and customs, humours and fancies, virtues and vices, prevailing among them, it will appear that the inhabitants of the other world are interested in all these things, to have them so disposed as that our annual exports may just answer their demands. Nor is it likely they are concerned only with the numbers and times of our migrations, but likewise with the qualities and characters of the new comers to be incorporated amongst them. We see that nature forms none of her productions at once, but brings them slowly to perfection by many gradations rising upon one another: the seed shoots up a little bud, from thence springs forth a slender twig, which by degrees hardens into a stem, spreading in branches and leaves until it becomes a full-grown tree: the little animal comes into the world small and feeble, but grows through several stages to full stature and vigour: our judgment takes forty years in maturing by the rudiments of infancy, the improvements of education, converse, and experience. When the plant has stricken root, the seed that before involved it rots and perishes; when the chicken is hatched, the shell and other remains of the egg crumble and moulder away: so we may presume that this gross body of ours, which will decay and return to dust, is an integument to preserve and form the embryo of some future animal.

We know of but one pre-existent state, I mean that of the womb, and though it be not clear what Hartley's German friend, Stahl, affirms, that

all the automatic motions of the heart, the arteries, the glands, the digestion, were originally voluntary actions of the child, yet we must needs acknowledge that upon what passes there depend our constitution, our strength, the acuteness of our senses, the quickness of our parts, the retentiveness of our memory, much of our passions, desires, and tempers: and by parity of reason we may infer that upon what befalls us here depend our constitution and all that may be called the natural endowments we shall be born with into another state. Some skip over life entirely, passing directly from the womb into the other world; some are allowed but just a taste of it, being snatched away in their infancy, conversant only with a few objects striking their senses, unexercised in their understandings and unpractised in the ways of men: and of those who fill up their full term of years, how various are their professions, their manners of living, and ways of thinking! From whence it follows that not only this life in general is preparatory to the next, but each man's particular fortune is calculated to fit him for the functions he is to fulfil hereafter, and that there is a society wherein the talents of individuals are given for the service of the whole; so that, like the Israelites gathering manna, he who carries little away with him has no lack, and he who carries much has nothing over. Nor is it necessary the consequences of human action should be confined to himself or his future compatriots; for nature works several uses by the same spring. The sheep applies diligently to his pasture, and thereby fattens his flesh and lengthens his wool for the service of man: the silk-worm weaves her web for a safeguard to herself, and at the same time furnishes us with materials for our clothing and ornament: the fly injects her juices into the oak-leaf, to raise an apple for hatching her young, and therein supplies us with ink for our correspondence and improvement. So man by his ploughing, his planting, his felling, his burning, his draining, his mining, his manufacturing, may be reckoned among the second causes operating upon matter wherein the invisible world has some concern: nor are there wanting Beings to whom his joys and sorrows, successes and disappointments, frailties and miscarriages, may serve for a spectacle, an instruction, and a warning.

14. In short, the more we contemplate the complication of interests, of causes and effects in the visible world, the more ready we shall find ourselves to take this for a sample of the whole: and the more we reflect on the character of goodness and wisdom, the more easily we shall persuade ourselves that every provision terminates in good worthy the largeness and extent of it; that whatever brings evil, or little advantage, or none at all to man, redounds to the greater benefit of something else; and whatever appears unaccountable, either in the works of nature or courses of fortune, has a purpose which it does not fail to answer. Thus we may look upon corn and cattle as made for the uses of man, because he receives his uses largely from them, but the central earth which serves him only for a basis to support the ground he stands on, the vast effusion of light whereof a few rays only reach his eyes, the wide-extended constellations which furnish him with nothing more than a spectacle to admire, must be designed chiefly, and those more distant stars beyond the reach of human ken solely, for the service of other creatures: and man himself, much of whose time is lost in sleep, whose actions are in great part unavailing or even hurtful to himself, must be supposed set at work for the benefit of some invisible Beings. Yet as the brutes have their enjoyments while employed in the service of man, the ox indulges his appetite in fattening flesh for his master's table, the hen gratifies her desires in hatching and breeding up chickens

for the larder: so care is taken that man shall enjoy all the accommodations and happiness consistent with the services he is destined to perform.

15. Thus the dispensations given to the several sets of creatures regard partly themselves and partly the interests of other species, and it may naturally be expected that those of the highest class should be preferred: for mischief falls lightest upon the dullest capacities, and the interruptions occasioned by pain make the least loss of time to those who have the least important and delectable employments, therefore wisdom and goodness require that evil should be lodged there where it does the smallest hurt. When we consider how much of skin, bone, and tunicle, how much of vital juices, flesh, and parenchyma, enters into the composition of all terrestrial animals, we may look upon them as upon a man encumbered with a load of clothes, who cannot have so quick a feeling through them as he might upon his naked body. An organization framed all of nerve and fibre must strike stronger sensations, and unembodied spirits receiving their notices from one another must have more numerous, clearer, and livelier perceptions than any we experience. So that man, although the highest actor upon this sublunary stage, has perhaps the lowest stage to act upon in the whole theatre of the universe. From these considerations joined to our idea of infinite goodness we may reasonably conclude that evil, although here bearing an inconsiderable proportion to the good, is still more thinly scattered in other regions of nature; and the most thinking and considerate persons, from earliest antiquity, have been persuaded that there are some states of Being abounding in unmingled happiness, without any tincture of uneasiness or suffering.

16. We have observed before, that some have ascribed the origin of evil to our immersion into matter, and to the ill use of our active powers; but though these cannot be assigned to account for the first origin, they may well be the channels through which it is dispersed among sentient Beings: and the last, as has appeared upon our examination of human nature, is consequent upon the first, for it is the obstinacy of our habits, and turbulency of our passions, deriving their strength and violence from the state of our organs or courses of our animal circulation, that raise those inordinate desires continually leading us astray. But the inhabitants of the visible world, being more deeply immersed in matter than any others we can imagine, and having many parts in their frame not subject to the action of the mind, must be supposed to receive more copiously of the noxious stream flowing from that channel.

17. But when we consider what is probably the use of evil, namely, to excite the mind to bestir herself in avoiding it, there does not appear a necessity it should be dispersed everywhere, to answer that purpose. Satisfaction and uneasiness are the two hinges whereon our actions turn, nor can we conceive any creatures so constituted as to proceed upon other motives: if there were no mischiefs to be feared, and no loss of satisfaction to be incurred, there would be little inducement to act at all, for why need a man do anything who is in a state of complacence from whence he can never be removed? He that should have no notion of danger would run among horses and carts into the fire, and all kinds of mischief: and he that should think his pleasures could never depart from him would take no pains to secure them. But though the knowledge and apprehension of evil will suffice to put us in motion without feeling it ourselves, there must be real suffering somewhere to raise that apprehension. Yet a little actual evil may spread the idea of it very wide: if one man hurt himself grievously

by his carelessness or obstinacy, it may make thousands sensible of the danger attending such a behaviour; and the mischiefs befalling one set of creatures may inspire others with a caution to guard against their approach. For the avoidance of evil having so large a share in the action of spirits, may justly persuade us, that those placed in the best conditioned state are liable to innumerable mischiefs, but such as they can easily escape, and therefore make no diminution of their happiness; but the idea of danger, prompting them to take measures for escaping it, they receive from the contemplation of actual suffering among inferior Beings, not from an experience of it in themselves. Since then a few objects may suffice to furnish matter for that contemplation, we may suppose them exhibited by creatures deeply immersed in matter: and that there may not want samples of evil in all the regions of the universe, the stars are stationed at immense distances, which, by themselves or the planets rolling round them, are fitted for the reception of such creatures. The repugnance of evil to our ideas of goodness I think will warrant our extending the supposition of it no further than necessity requires, and we see this necessity does not hinder our confining it to the regions of gross matter, which will reduce it within a very narrow compass: for if everything corporeal, within the orbit of the furthest Comet, were compressed into a perfect solid, I suppose it would not form a mass bigger than the body of the Sun; then the proportion this bears to the whole solar vortex will exceed the proportion of evil in nature to good, because even embodied creatures have their balance of enjoyment in life. Nay, we might have grounds to hope that this gross corporeal state is the only seat of evil in nature, and from the moment we get rid of it we shall continue exempt from all mixture of uneasiness; but we shall find reasons by-and-by to caution us against too great security, for that there are states of suffering elsewhere, into which we may plunge ourselves by carelessness and ill-management.

18. Nevertheless there is no reason to imagine from anything occurring either to our observation or our thoughts, but that there are more states of complete happiness than of suffering, or those containing a mixture of both; or else that the former are infinitely fuller stocked with inhabitants: for this idea agrees best with our notion of infinite goodness, which we must take for the foundation of our theory in matters whereof experience gives no information. But what measure of evil is found necessary in nature stands confined to particular forms of Being, so that a few regions share the whole of it amongst them: nor will this appear an unequal distribution since the same inhabitants migrate from one region into another, whereby every one has an opportunity of taking his full share in the good as well as in the evil; and many glorified spirits have attained the height of happiness by passing through the vale of misery. If such Beings are totally disjoined from matter, and receive their perceptions by communication from one another, we may reasonably suppose them equal in their condition and their enjoyments; for we know of no difference in the capacities and primary properties of spirits, and cannot well imagine them partial in their dealings among themselves. Hence it follows there must be one or more intermediate states to pass through, wherein the lot of individuals is unequal; for inequalities here require the like inequalities elsewhere, that every one's account may be set even at some time or other. But this consideration alone does not make it necessary that evil should extend beyond this terrestrial mansion, for the balance may be brought even, as well by an abatement of good as by actual suffering. He that has struggled here with disease, mis-

fortune, and distress, may have ample amends made him in his next state, by receiving a larger share of bounty than others around him, although the portion allotted them be not alloyed with any pain or uneasiness. For an increase of enjoyment will repay actual suffering; and so we often judge ourselves, when we choose to pass one day disagreeably, for the sake of more than ordinary pleasure in the next, rather than pass both in our common amusements.

19. Nor is it a contemptible argument of this terrene habitation being the lowest part of the creation, that so little value appears to be set upon life by him who is the best judge of what is valuable: every one takes notice upon how slender a thread it hangs, daily liable to be snapped short by a thousand accidents. Few complete their full term of years; one-half never arrive at manhood; and multitudes are denied an entrance into the world at all. We may observe nature almost as careful to provide for means of destruction as of preservation: ravenous beasts, venomous animals, and poisonous herbs, are fitted for the instruments of death; diseases, famines, wars, damps, suffocating vapours, and pestilential airs, sweep away by numbers: appetite urges men to pernicious excesses: many necessary occupations run them into dangers; folly leads them into fatal errors; vice plunges them into destructive courses; even virtue sometimes drives them upon hazardous enterprises. So that life seems to be given, not for the benefit of the individual, but for some service done therein to the whole: and those enjoyments poured plentifully upon it proceed from that unbounded goodness which appoints wages to every service, and comforts to render the burden of it easy; and one might be almost tempted to believe, with some of the ancient sages, that the luckiest thing could have befallen us was never to have been born, and the next lucky, to have been taken away again immediately.

20. Now to sum up the whole of what has been offered in this chapter; we may gather from the perishable nature of our bodies and durable nature of our minds, and little use appearing in many extensive and operose productions observable around us, that there are forms of Being besides this, wherewith we are invested: from the method constantly taken by nature of bringing her works to perfection slowly through several stages, of generating one thing by the corruption of another, and the mutual dependence between the several parts of this visible world, that there is a like connection of interests running throughout the whole: from the gross composition of our frame taking in notices only through a few very complicated channels, that we may be capable of stronger, clearer, and more variety of conceptions than any we now experience: from the nature of the mind that it was designed for action: from the nature of action that evil is a necessary inducement to excite it; and from the nature of judgment which renders the idea of hurt without actual suffering a motive urging to avoid it, that a very little quantity of evil may suffice to set the spiritual world in motion. Thus far we discover what may be, but not so fully as to satisfy us in the main point we want, for the quicker sensibility of a refined state may render us liable to acuter pains as well as more exalted pleasures, and the greater variety of perceptions may give room for more of the irksome as well as the agreeable kind, nor can we see enough of second causes to discern what proportion of evil they tend to produce. But when we raise our thoughts to the First Cause, and contemplate the character of wisdom and goodness therein, manifested by the works of which we have familiar knowledge and experience, our possibility turns into assurance: for they will not suffer us to entertain a

suspicion of evil being inflicted needlessly, or dispersed in greater quantities than the welfare and good order of the whole creation require. Therefore we may look upon the enjoyments dispensed in every state of Being as given for the sake of the members, but the troubles and uneasinesses annexed as a means conducive to the far greater benefit of some others.

21. Nor need we perplex our thoughts with inquiring whether things might not have been originally so constituted as that evil should not be necessary for the production of any good: for if every hurt yield a greater advantage elsewhere and we ourselves have an interest in whatever redounds to the good of the whole, this may make us contented under it as long as we can retain a firm and lively persuasion of its so doing. I do not expect that this should entirely take off the smart of every violent pain, or weight of every pressing uneasiness: for evil were no evil, nor the good purposes intended by it answered, if a remedy were constantly afforded to prevent it from hurting: but whenever we have the free use of our thoughts, these reflections may give us a favourable opinion of the universe, whose regulations are all established in loving mercy and kindness, and a reasonable expectation of exchanging our present condition for a better; provided we do not, by our own ill conduct, cast ourselves upon those few inhospitable spots, which are the sink of nature, as draining away all the evil from the rest. But our hope and dependence rests solely upon the character of our Governor, not upon anything we can discern in the tendency of second causes to our advantage: yet this need not disturb us; for if we receive good it is no matter of what sort, or by what instruments or channels we receive it. He that should be assured of an ample supply from a wise and indulgent parent need not be anxious whether it were to come by the post, or the carrier, or an express messenger; whether in money, or negotiable notes, or marketable wares. Therefore we may content ourselves with the assurance of happiness in general, having no clue to direct us to the particulars whereof it consists. Our reflections and sensations here come to us by corporeal organs, which we must expect to leave behind, and without them there can be neither eating nor drinking, marrying nor giving in marriage, gardens nor prospects, writing nor language, but everything totally dissimilar from what we now experience: and the occupations and enjoyments of another state, as well in kind as degree, such as eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.

CHAP. XX.

HYPOTHESES.

Nevertheless, the heart of man finds little scope for contemplation, without a prospect of something it can conceive; for imagination wants a ground more solid than mere abstraction to walk upon. Though complacence be the only thing valuable to the mind, we can never obtain it without some other perception to usher it in, nor can we be pleased without some agreeable sight, or sound, or taste, or event, or reflection, to please us; and when we go to frame the idea of pleasure, we find ourselves unable to do it unless by recalling another idea of those things that used to introduce it. Therefore, as men turn their thoughts upon another state they find ideas rise bearing a similitude to what they have known in the present; and

moralists comply with the bent of human nature in this respect, leading imagination in such tracks as she is capable of pursuing; for finding naked happiness too thin for the mind to lay hold of, they represent it under such veils as may render it discernible. Hence arises the so common use of figure, allegory, fable, and parable, which shadow forth things unknown, by allusion to things well known and familiar; and are not intended as an exact description of what shall happen, but only to give an idea of the joys that shall be received by comparing them with those we should receive in the circumstances represented. Therefore, when we are told of sitting in white robes with palms in our hands near the throne of glory, this is not to be understood literally, but only to signify that the pleasure to be expected will not fall short of that a common man would feel, if honoured with such array and such a situation. Therefore, those are to blame who draw conclusions concerning the manner of existence in other forms of Being, from the expressions used in parables: and those who employ figures ought to be very careful in choosing such as may not hurt the imagination by leading into gross ideas that will have a bad influence upon the conduct.

2. But figure and parable being employed occasionally, and often varied as occasion requires, men of thought and contemplation, desirous of forming their ideas into a regular plan which may serve them upon all occasions, invent hypotheses comprising in one system all that they can imagine concerning things unknown. So that Hypothesis is a kind of continual allegory, connected in all its parts, calculated to answer all the purposes intended by it, and formed upon one uniform design. It differs from Fable and Parable in this respect, that fable represents an action impossible to have been performed, parable one that is possible and similar to those frequently happening, but not proposed to our belief as an historical fact; whereas hypothesis exhibits such a representation of things as may be the real case for anything that can be shown to the contrary. It requires no positive evidence to build it upon, the framer of it always being looked upon as a defendant, and the burden of proof lying upon him that would overthrow it: but its strength lies in the consistency and mutual dependence of its several branches upon one another, its not contradicting any known phenomena or received principles, its helping to join into a regular body those which before were detached and independent; and is thought to receive great confirmation if it can be made appear an improvement or explanation of former hypotheses embraced by men of judgment and reputation. Your hypothesis makers are commonly so fond of their schemes as to take them for demonstrations, and try the truth of every thing else by its conformity therewith: but this is an abuse, for hypothesis requiring no certain proof, nor anything more than plausibility, cannot justly be offered to prove anything certainly; nevertheless I think it may be brought in support of truths for which we have a solid foundation elsewhere, to make them more clearly apprehended and more readily received. For as the law admits of parole evidence in favour of an heir or an executor, but not against them, so the tissues of imagination may be employed to adorn and illustrate what solid reason has established, but not to cover it over nor as a foundation to support any superstructures of itself: they may rather be looked upon as engines of rhetoric to familiarize and persuade, than as weapons of logic to overthrow and convince; yet in this capacity may perform excellent service, by turning the conviction of important truths into an habitual persuasion.

3. Nor should there be caution wanting against throwing in too many particulars, for the more of them there are to maintain, the more difficult it will be to ward off the attacks of an adversary, and if he can undermine any of them it will bring a disrepute upon the whole. The general laws of nature affecting all her inhabitants can be supposed but few, nor can there be many instances of resemblance imagined between the visible world and the invisible. For most of our employments and ideas must be peculiar to ourselves, as springing from the constitution of our present frame, composed of complicated organs affected by our animal circulation, and a gross body subject to many wants requiring materials and long preparations to supply them. The vibrations of air are not likely to effect us with sounds, nor the rays of light with colours; nor savours, odours, or tangible objects, to operate upon us in the same manner they do now. The cares we take for clothing our backs, the provisions we daily make for our stomachs, will be no longer needful. Honours, preferments, estates, trades, professions, that now take up the time and thought of men, will cease: nor will there be room for the arts and sciences, which find their encouragement in the uses and conveniences they procure for life: neither can we converse together in the manner we do now, after having lost the organs of speech. And when we consider how much our organs of reflection are affected by the state of our bodies, how much our knowledge depends upon the traces remaining fresh in our memory, we cannot expect to carry our mental acquisitions with us, nor to think and reason in the manner we do at present. Therefore we can hope at most to frame but an imperfect and partial account of matters wholly unknown to us, and if we can do this so far as to give a general idea that there may be methods of employment and objects productive of happiness, it will suffice for the purpose intended.

4. Nevertheless, it can scarce be doubted there are some general laws running throughout the creation, which to distinguish from the municipal, prevailing only in the regions we inhabit, seems the proper province of philosophy. We receive all our perceptions here from the action of body, they varying as that is variously modified: the like source then may be presumed to supply us with perceptions in another state, perhaps by modifications very different, exciting in us sensations and reflections whereof we have no knowledge now. The pleasures of life for the most part lie in exercises of our activity, nor is there cause to deny this general law which will never leave us destitute of employment, in providing for our benefit and avoiding our hurt, how much soever the goods, and evils, and measures, respecting them shall then be dissimilar from those which engage our attention at present. We have a curious contexture of organs, serving as a medium or channel of conveyance for the impulse of external objects, which cannot come near enough to operate upon us directly; and though we know this will be dissolved, what should hinder but that another may be provided for us which shall perform the same office more perfectly, without that long transmission of objects from one vessel to another, whereby their appearance may be altered, and we made to discern them otherwise than they are. We have risen here from the mere vegetative condition of a fœtus to the helpless simplicity of an infant, and afterwards by many gradations to the maturity of manhood; from whence many judicious persons have augurated that we are in the ascending part of our orbit, expectant of further improvement in the next stage assigned us: not by advancing onward in the progress we have already begun, for our

present knowledge and habits scarce seem likely to prove of future use to us, but by being endowed with quicker parts and higher faculties capable of making larger acquisitions than any known among the sons of men. Thus by observing what circumstances of our present situation are not necessarily confined thereto, we may rise from them in framing a system, which may be such as shall receive a good countenance from them though perhaps not an infallible proof.

5. Since the method of hypothesis has been fallen into more or less by most who have attempted to treat of the unknown state, and since there is a good use to be made of it, why should I be debarred the liberty of trying my hand as well as another? But I shall use my liberty sparingly, observing the rules and cautions before laid down, regarding use rather than curiosity, and forbearing to launch into minute particulars which may be either unwarranted or inexpedient. For imagination may be lawfully employed in the services of reason, but ought to be restrained from all sallies which those services do not require. I have endeavoured all along to draw my reasonings from observation and experience in as close a deduction as I was able, and intend adhering to the like method for the future: therefore, if I should be catched hereafter at proving anything from hypothesis, it must be looked upon as an inadvertency, for I expect no more therefrom than to render those truths more intelligible that have their foundation elsewhere. We have already seen reason to conclude from the contemplation of that Power which governs both worlds, that they stand connected in interest with another, and that what befalls us in this will affect our condition in the next; and I propose no more now than to draw a slight sketch, which may make us more sensible how this may be effected: for a general idea of mutual dependence weighs but little upon the mind, unless we can imagine some particular ties whereof it consists; and as physicians mingle their subtiler medicines with more solid ingredients that they may not be lost in the mouth, so our abstracted ideas must be clothed with others more sensible to make them sink down into the imagination.

CHAP. XXI.

VEHICULAR STATE.

When death puts an end to the animal circulation, we see the body remains a mere lump of sluggish matter, showing no signs either of perception or activity, from whence we naturally conclude that the spirit is departed from her: but whether or no it carries anything away with it we are wholly uncertain; we see nothing fly off upon the last groan, but our senses are not acute enough to assure us that nothing does fly off. Therefore, by virtue of the privilege constantly claimed in making an hypothesis, I may fairly assume, what nobody can disprove, that the spirit, upon quitting her present mansion, does not go out naked, nor entirely disengaged from matter, but carries away with her an integument from among those wherewith she was before invested. And I am far from being singular in this notion, for many wiser men have assigned a fine vehicle for the habitation of the spirit, after its being divested of flesh and blood; and the ancients generally painted the soul of Psyche with butterflies' wings, to represent that she came out with a new body as a butterfly does from the

chrysalis: nor do I want the best established authority in my support, for the apostle Paul compares the body to a seed which rots and perishes in the ground, nevertheless a germ survives producing another plant bearing some resemblance to that which generated the seed.

2. But we must suppose this vehicle extremely small, so that the nicest eye may not discern it when going, nor the finest scales discover an abatement of weight in what remains after it is gone: yet it must contain an organization capable of exhibiting a greater variety of ideas than we now experience. No doubt it will appear strange and extravagant to the generality to imagine, that so many organs of sensation and reflection, and instruments of action, as a man possesses in his present condition can ever be contained in a body so small as to be undiscoverable by the finest balance or the most piercing eye; for so must everything appear that differs widely, whether in size or composition, from the objects we have been constantly conversant with. The young fellow, who has never been in a nursery since he left his own, the first time he sees a new-born babe is apt to wonder at its littleness: and if he dips into a treatise on the formation of a fœtus, can scarce believe the lineaments of a human body could be comprised within so narrow a compass as he sees there described. Thus every further reduction of size gives a fresh shock to his imagination, until familiarized thereto by frequent contemplation; for things are no longer strange than while new to the thought. For which reason I was willing to prepare for my present subject in the third chapter of this volume,* where I have endeavoured to put the reader upon reflecting on the great divisibility of matter, and to show that the least conceivable particle is capable of containing as great a variety of parts and machinery, as the whole human body. But what clogs our comprehension in these minute divisions is, that we commonly think of making them by dividing the whole without dividing the parts, which must certainly spoil the composition. If St. Paul's Church were cut in halves, each half would not be a church; if into quarters or lesser portions, they would still be more remote from the plan of the architect; but were all the stones, the timbers, the ornaments proportionably lessened, the whole form, disposition, and symmetry might still remain the same, though reduced to the bigness of a nut-shell. This indeed is what the clumsy hand of man could never do, but nature is a finer artificer than man, and I doubt not might succeed if she would undertake it. So if she were to waste away one half of a man from the head downward, without destroying his vital and animal functions, yet he would have but one arm and one leg, and must lose many of his powers: but if she lessened all his component parts, his bones, his muscles, his fibres, the globules of his blood and other juices in equal degree, he might still continue a man, how small soever reduced, with the same variety of powers and faculties as before. He could not indeed exercise them upon the same objects he used, but she wants not means of furnishing him with other materials, useless and unknown to him before, but suitable to the condition she has thrown him into. And it may be presumed he would be better able to manage them, his strength not decreasing in proportion to his size, because small bodies are more compact and solid than the larger made up of them, for composition always adds to the quantity of pore in the compound. A bushel of peas has less specific gravity than the single peas it contains, because there will be hollow spaces between each pea and its neighbours, besides the pores within their sub-

* Vol. I. p. 286 of this edition.

stances: and if a multitude of bushels be packed up in a room, there will be vacancies between them, besides those among their contents. Therefore the finer parts a body contains, the fewer atoms they must severally consist of (for these cannot be divided), the less of pore there will be among them, and consequently its nerves and sinews will be so much tougher and stronger.

3. And as the limbs and instruments of action in such a little body will be stronger with respect to the materials they have to deal with, so likewise must they be more agile and pliant: for this we find to be the case between animals of similar make, whose motions are commonly more unwieldly in proportion to their largeness. A little horse shifts its legs quicker than a tall one; the vulture and the eagle cannot flutter their wings so fast as the sparrow; nor did you ever see a hornet crawl so nimbly along the table as a fly; and little men are generally the quickest in their motions. Imagine a race of giants as big as Hampstead-hill, placed on an earth which, with all its animals, fruits, corn, trees, and vegetables, should be proportionably vast: they might then have the same accommodations as we have, but could not find the same uses and convenience in them, by reason of the tediousness of their motions. Consider how long they must be at dinner; if they sat down at eight in the morning they would scarce finish their repast by night, having a mile to carry every morsel from their plate to their mouths; when they went to bed, it must take an hour to get up stairs, and after having unbuttoned their coat, they must give their arm a swing of two or three miles round to pull down the sleeve behind; when they talked together it would require four or five seconds for their voices to reach one another's ears; and as it may be supposed their mental organs are conformable in size to their bodily, if you asked what's o'clock, it might be necessary to consider half an hour before they could think of the proper answer. In short, they must needs be a slow, solemn, and heavy generation, without any spark of wit or liveliness belonging to them. If one of us were migrated into their enormous hulks, should we not, think ye, wish ardently to get back again into our less than six-foot bodies? And by parity of reason it may be presumed, that when delivered from our present cumbersome bodies, if we remember anything of our situation therein, we shall be as much rejoiced to find ourselves in a body proportionably less and proportionably more alert and vigorous, wherein we may despatch as much business in a minute as we can now in an hour, and perhaps be able to read through Guicciardine in the time we are now poring over all the nothings in a four-columned newspaper. Nor do there want objections against the supposal of bodies equally large with those we possess: for besides that it may be asked, how comes it we never see them? if they are gross bodies, composed of flesh, blood, and bones, like ours, where shall they inhabit? They cannot live in the fields of ether, for they must have food to support them, solid ground to walk upon, an atmosphere to breath, and to keep their veins from bursting by its pressure, or to buoy them up if you should fancy them provided with wings. They cannot live under ground where no corn can grow, no pasture to feed their cattle, no light can reach them, and the air, if any, must be too dense for their respiration. In what other earths then will you dispose of them? for they will want more than one, considering the vast multitudes that have incorporated among them since Adam: what planets are there among those we know of, that will not either melt them to oil, or freeze them to statues? or could you find a commodious habitation, how would you get them thither

without a miracle? But if you suppose them hollow skins, or mere surfaces, as vulgarly fancied of ghosts or apparitions, they can have no strength nor firmness in their limbs, no consistency of parts to prevent their being torn in pieces by winds, no solidity to keep them steady from being blown about by every breeze of air, nor power of motion, being unable to overcome the resistance of whatever medium they may have to pass through. Therefore, when we reflect on the endless divisibility of matter, the extreme porosity of solids, the vast spaces lying between the particles of all fluids, it seems easier to comprehend our vehicles so sized as to slip between such corpuscles as are too bulky for them to cope with, rather than empty shadows or gross composures of flesh and blood like ourselves.

4. I have hitherto spoken of vehicles as little diminutive men with arms, legs, and so forth, such as we have; but I do not think so narrowly of nature as to pronounce with Epicurus, that she cannot form a reasonable creature unless in a human shape. It seems to me more agreeable to reason, at least more soothing to the imagination and better suited to our expectations of exchanging this present mansion for a more commodious, to suppose them not made in the shape nor provided with the limbs of any animal whatever, but consisting all of muscle and fibre, tough and strong, but extremely flexible and obedient to the Will, susceptible of any shape, and in every part capable of being cast into any member of any animal, of being made soft as a feather or hard as a bone. We have some few imperfect samples of this changeableness in our own composition: our tongue lies round and yielding in our mouths, yet we can thrust it out to a considerable length, make it push with some force or support a small weight hung upon it by a string. If a man not very fat sits resting his leg carelessly upon a stool, his calf will hang flabby like the handkerchief in your pocket, let him stand upright with a burden upon his shoulders as much as he can well bear, and you will find his calves hardened into very bones. We can open our hands into five moveable fingers for any nice or nimble work, or we can close them into a kind of hammer for striking, or bend them in rigid hooks for pulling. We have but one windpipe to sing, to talk, to whine, to rant, to scold with; nevertheless, we can cast this single instrument into as many various forms as there are voices and tones of voice we utter: whereas were it necessary to have a different pipe for every articulate sound, our throats must have been made bigger than a chamber organ. Thus we see how great advantage and convenience must accrue upon the members being convertible to many uses: and at the same time this may lessen our amazement at the multitude of powers we suppose comprised within so narrow a compass, for there may be more powers of action without requiring more works than we have in our present machinery; especially if the works be simpler, not consisting of a multitude of parts whose operations must be propagated from one to another, and all concur to perform every single action, whereby the variety of our motions must needs be greatly contracted. You may have a bell-handle hanging by your chimney side with which by means of strings and pulleys you may ring a bell at the other end of the house: but you can only jerk it towards you, and cannot give it so many shakes up and down, to and fro, quick and gentle, as if you held the bell itself in your hand. In like manner we act upon external bodies with gross members lying at an immense distance from the seat of our activity, requiring a long contrivance of strings and

pulleys to give us any command of them; we move our limbs by our bones, the bones by tendons, the tendons by muscles, the muscles by nerves, and the nerves perhaps by a series of imperceptible fibres which no anatomy can investigate: whereas were the externals needful for our uses so sized as that we could apply our first fibres immediately to them, we might manage them a hundred times more handily, expeditiously, and cleverly.

5. And the same advantage, accruing from the great flexibility of fibres to cast themselves into the form of any limb occasionally as shall be wanted, may be extended likewise to the organs of sensation, which are only so many textures of network variously woven from similar threads. The retina of the eye, whereon all our visible objects are painted, takes it name from a net; the auditory nerves are represented to us by anatomists as expanded in a reticular form at the bottom of the ear; the like is told us of the olfactory nerves spread over the lamellæ composing the ossa spongiosa of the nose; of the gustatory papillæ of the tongue and tactile papillæ of the fingers and all the rest of our body. Now if we had the power of changing the position of our threads, what should hinder but that we might cast them into any texture fitted to receive the vibrations exciting any sensation we pleased; so as to see, or hear, or smell, or taste, or feel with the same organ, according to the qualities of external objects striking upon it? Here I must beg indulgence from modern delicacy to allow me a childish experiment for explaining my idea: boys almost fit for school have an ingenious play they call cat's cradle; one ties the two ends of a packthread together, and then winds it about his fingers, another with both hands takes it off perhaps in the shape of a gridiron, the first takes it from him again in another form, and so on alternately changing the packtread into a multitude of figures whose names I forget, it being so many years since I played at it myself. If then we should be enabled to erect the interior fibres of our little body like so many fingers, we might take off the exterior therewith, still shifting them from one set of fingers to another, sometimes in retinas, sometimes in auditory or olfactory expansions, or perhaps others capable of conveying new sensations whereof now we have no conception. Nor let it be objected that the retina cannot perform its office without an eye-ball consisting of cornea, uva, the three humours aqueous, crystalline, and vitreous, before it; nor the auditory nerve without an ear containing a meatus auditorius, a tympanum with its malleus, a cochlea and fenestra ovalis with its stapes: for these are only wonderful contrivances to gather the rays of light into pencils, or modulate the vibrations of air, that they may be compact and vigorous enough to affect our gross and dull organs; but the finer vehicular fibres may be so agile and sensible as to take an impulse from single corpuscles of whatever shall serve them instead of lights and sounds, without needing a long process of refracting media or winding ducts to marshal numbers of them in a proper order for their reception.

6. Such little bodies likewise must be directly under the action of the mind in more of their parts, without needing the complicated machinery of strings or engines to propagate it to them: for the mind's immediate activity reaches no further than the sphere of her presence, which can never be enlarged, therefore the smaller body she inhabits, the greater proportion of it will fall within her presence and subject to her command. But the sphere of presence must be extremely minute because the bodies capable of containing it are found to be so, for nobody will doubt that every spirit vitally united to a corporeal organization is wholly surrounded and covered

thereby. The great Boerhave assures us that the human fœtus was once no bigger than an ant, that the doctrine of animalcules is generally received among the moderns, that he has seen them himself, that his friend Leuwenhoek has demonstrated them to be ten thousand times, and believes them ten million times less than a grain of sand. Who then can doubt that this ant and this animalcule were our very selves, or that that living principle, appearing to actuate the animalcule with great vigour and sprightliness, is the same perceptive individual which afterwards acts, and feels, and understands, in the full grown man? If we would seek for the place where this individual resides in our human composition, there seems no likelier method to find it than by tracing the channels of conveyance through which sensation is transmitted from external objects to our notice; for they, one would think, must all conduct to some one spot, which is the royal presence chamber, where their messages are ultimately delivered: but no investigations by dissections, by microscopes, and by ceraceous injections, have yet been able to discover this chamber, for they all lose their clue before they can be supposed to reach the mind herself. Those channels are now generally agreed to be the nerves, propagating the impulse of external objects to the brain, and others of them carry back from thence the voluntary motion by which we move our limbs. The same Boerhave tells us, they are innumerable in multitude, all conducting to the brain, whose medullary substance is made up of them: that each has its distinct office, for the optic nerve is not capable of conveying sound, nor the auditory of colours, and so of all the rest; therefore they must all have some communication with the mind, for else we could not receive the variety of sensations we do by their ministry: that they all terminate in the two anterior ventricles of the cerebrum or brain, where their last operation is performed, and of whose arched surface they are the component parts; which surface he therefore calls the sensory, or place of our ideas. In section 574 of his lectures, he has these words: "The spirits must have a free course [through the nerves] from their origin in the brain, from every point thereof, even to those muscles which are under influence of the Will. Hence follows, that the sensory is a part of the brain, where all those points are collected together.——The sensorium is that part of the body where the action of all the sensitive nerves terminate, and from thence the influence of the Will first begins to operate upon certain muscles. This common sensory seems to be seated where the ultimate lymphatic arteries unite with, and fill the beginnings of the nerves with spirits through all the ventricles and inequalities of the brain. But the territories or limits of this sensory seem to be very large and various, so that each nerve has its particular part where those ideas dwell, which are conveyed by the same: the ideas of odours about the termination of the olfactory nerves, of colours about that of the optic nerves, and of motion about the nerves subservient to voluntary muscles, &c. It cannot be in the pineal gland, for so many thousand nerves can never take their origin from so small a particle, but in the arched medulla encompassing the cavity of the ventricles." This cavity then we may take leave to entitle the palace of the mind, where she keeps her constant residence, but can with no propriety be styled the royal apartment, as being by much too large for her personal occupancy: for that sphere of presence which once lay enclosed in the ant-like fœtus or diminutive animalcule can never fill the whole circumference of so spacious a building. Therefore there must necessarily be some connecting medium between, and from hence we may draw no feeble argument for the reality of our vehicle,

whose imperceptible fibres we may reckon her domestic servants, who continually bring her the messages they receive at the doors and windows of her palace from the medullary nerves, and carry back her orders to the like nerves for them to forward to the muscles. Thus the mind lies enveloped with two bodies, the inner, or vehicle, which I beg leave to style the Ethereal, not that I pretend to know it is made of ether, but to distinguish it from the gross outer body, which I would call the Elementary, as being taken from the dust of the ground aptly mingled with the three other known elements of fire, air, and water.

7. We learn likewise from the above cited lectures, that the little animalcule gets into the ovum through the fresh wound of the calyx or stalk newly broken off from the ovary. If this animalcule has a slender elementary body (as it may be presumed no animal is without one), we may suppose it presently to dissolve, and the pieces discharged back again at the same aperture of the calyx, upon which the vehicle being left naked may adhere to the ovum in many points, which, as that grows and expands, are drawn out thereby into strings, until in process of time they take the form of a spider's web, stretching throughout the whole compass of Boerhave's sensory or arched vault of the ventricles in the brain. For that interior part of the ovum whereto the vehicle coalesces may be counted an incipient brain, because it is observable that the formation of all animals begins by a brain; from thence grow the cerebellum and spinal marrow, from them the heart, arteries, and bowels, then the muscles, tendons, gristles, and lastly the bones. For all parts of an animal are nothing else than bundles of exceeding fine threads or fibres, variously knit together; which in their loosest texture compose nerves; when a little more compact they form muscular flesh, glands, and membranes; as closer and closer bound they make tendons, sinews, vascular coats, cartilages, and when tightest become bones, in one of which, the os petrosum or rock-bone of the ear, they grow into a substance hard as steel. This web-like expansion of the ethereal strings being an unnatural state, it may be presumed that when upon death they get loose from the medullary fibres, they will contract into their main body, like the horns of a snail upon your touching them: but it is not impossible they may carry with them some particles from the grosser nerves whereto they had adhered, whereof may be formed another slender elementary body minuter than that which invested them before in the animalcule. It is easy to comprehend that the vehicle lying so long enclosed in the body wherewith it is connected, to whose action it must be perpetually subject, may receive some alteration in its make and texture therefrom; and thus every form of being it undergoes may affect its condition in the next. It will appear evident that the animalcular state has an influence upon the human, when we reflect how much children take after their fathers, as well in their outward lineaments as in the temper of their minds: but the father contributes nothing more to the composition of his child than by furnishing the animalcule. Therefore there seems ground to imagine that the animalcule, differently constituted according to the humours of the body wherein it was bred, either moulds the little ethereal inhabitant enclosed in it variously; or when having nestled in the ovum, breaks in different places and so causes it to catch hold of different fibres thereof. From hence may be understood how the course of this life may naturally have an influence upon the next; for the vehicle may be differently affected according to the manner wherein it stands connected with the gross body, receiving some change of disposition from the deeds, and words, and thoughts passing during its conjunction

therewith, more especially from the settled habits of acting and thinking practised therein. And since the laws of nature are all established in perfect wisdom, tending unerringly to good and holy purposes, it seems more than likely that vicious courses will endamage the little ethereal body; incrustating its fibres with terrene concretions so as to render them stiff and useless; or fixing too many and too gross elementary particles upon them, which when drawn into their main body, will prove grievous hindrances and painful disturbances there; or stretching them beyond their strength with the eagerness of sensual appetites, which will render them feeble like a strained sinew or flaccid like a paralytic muscle: whereas the practice of virtue will strengthen, supple, and mature them, and suffer no more elementary matter to adhere than will grow into an agile healthy body adapted and subservient to all their uses.

8. There is one stumbling-block that may lie in the way of many against admitting the doctrine of animalcules, because for one that finds entrance into an ovum there must be millions that perish: but let us consider that when they perish (as we call it) they are not annihilated, they are only cast into the same condition with every soul just then departed, that has lived fifty, or eighty, or a hundred years. For death levels all, not only the prince and the beggar, but the frisking animalcule, the sleepy fœtus, the sucking child, the wanton schoolboy, the positive strippling, the state-mending citizen, the doating great-grandsire, and the longevous antediluvian: all go into the same world and all partake in the same form of Being, only with different constitutions according to the length and circumstances of the corporeal stages they have passed through. Which if it be a better world than ours, best fares it with him who can soonest get admittance into it: so that as before observed, it may be true what some ancient sages have affirmed, that the luckiest thing could have befallen a man was never to have been born. Nevertheless this ought not to lessen the due cares of our self-preservation, for life considered in itself is undoubtedly a blessing for which we have abundant reason to be thankful, and if it be a misfortune it is only comparatively so by detaining us from a happier state: yet even in this light we ought to value it as believing ourselves stationed here for some service accruing therefrom to the community whither we are going; and to resign it willingly upon summons, because that is an evidence that the necessary service is performed, and we are called to receive the wages earned thereby. Therefore we cannot do better than follow Milton's advice, What thou liv'st, live well: how long or short permit to heaven.

9. But small as these ethereal vehicles are, we need not apprehend lest their slender bodies should be driven to and fro by storms, or tossed about in whirlwinds, for whoever pleases may imagine them conveyed by some law of nature to the fields of ether where all is calm and serene: or taking shelter in the pores of solid bodies as we do in our houses until the tempest is blown over. But these expedients are not requisite, for their own minuteness will preserve them against such like injuries. We are told by naturalists, the particles of air lie at a great distance in proportion to their bulk, so that there is room enough for them to pass on each side of those little bodies without touching, as we know the rays of light from innumerable stars cross one another in all directions without interfering: or if any one of them should happen to strike, it would do them no more hurt, considering their lightness, than a stone thrown against a feather hanging loose in the air.

10. Perhaps it may give disturbance to some folks to think of being

reduced to such contemptible animals, tenderer than a worm and weaker than a flea: but let them consider that the strongest creatures upon earth are not the most favoured by nature; the mighty elephant, the vigorous horse, and the unwearied ox, are governed by man, and among our own species the most robust and athletic are generally of the lowest rank. If strength be desirable, why do our fine gentlemen throw away what they might have of it by intemperance, sloth, and effeminacy? But the strength of creatures need only be proportioned to their wants of it: what would the ant be better for the vigour of the horse, or the polypus for the mighty sinews of the whale? those insects have force sufficient to carry in their provisions and draw in their prey, and more would only make them dangerous to one another. We in our present state have large works to do in providing for our sustenance, our clothing, our habitation, and accommodations of life, powerful enemies to cope with, and great beasts to employ in our services, all which we could not manage without a consistency of flesh and bones, and some competency of bodily strength: but the vehicular people have no such bulky wares to move about, such massive stones to heave, such beasts of prey to contend with, nor such beasts of burden to break to labour: therefore, though their strength be trifling in comparison with ours, it is greater in proportion to the objects they have to deal with, and sufficient to serve them in the employments and amusements suited to their station. Or if it were a little defective, they may supply their want of force by their greater sagacity and agility.

11. For their bodies contain nothing superfluous, nor that number of vessels concerned in our animal circulation, but consist chiefly of sensory and motory fibres: so that every part lies within the observation and under command of the mind. If anything insinuate into their composition which might create diseases, they can remove it as easily as we can wash the dirt off from our hands: their faculties are more piercing, their understanding better furnished with materials, and less liable to be overclouded than ours: and they can throw their vehicle occasionally into such form as to receive what kind of sensation they choose from external objects, so as to make it all eye or all ear, or some other sense we know nothing of, or a mixture of several. Nor need we fear, lest a multiplicity of ideas should perplex and confound them, for perceptions take up no room in the mind, nor does she ever find herself unable to receive as many as her organs can excite. Confusion springs from the darkness and imperfection of our ideas, not from an incapacity in the mind to perceive such as are presented clear and distinct. And as they are fitted for discerning minuter objects than we can distinguish, they will have an opportunity of observing the motions of those subtile fluids whereon gravitation, cohesion, magnetism, electricity, heat, explosion, vegetation, muscular motion, and sensation, depend, which will furnish them with sciences to us unknown. We find that light discovers to us the form and situation of bodies at an immense distance, and when we reflect how extremely moveable and elastic the ether is known to be, we may conclude that no single particle of gross matter can stir without affecting its vibrations to a prodigious distance: this then may answer their purposes better than light does ours, and inform them accurately of the positions, the distances, the magnitudes, the motions, of all the visible universe. By which means they will have a full display of nature before them, from the most magnificent of her works to the most curious and minute: nor can they fail of rising from thence to a completer knowledge of the Author of Nature, his greatness, his wisdom, his goodness, than we

can attain. And perhaps they may fathom that to us inscrutable mystery, the origin of evil, so as to reconcile it perfectly with their ideas of unlimited power and infinite goodness.

12. Nor can we deny them the means of discourse and correspondence with one another: ours we know is carried on by arbitrary signs, either of sounds or letters, and any other marks that might be exhibited with equal facility, variety, and distinctness, would do as well: therefore we cannot but suppose that such agile creatures, all nerve and sensory, may form characters upon their vehicle, or throw off little particles of the fluids surrounding them, or find twenty other ways of communicating their thoughts. Nor can we deny them methods of transporting themselves from place to place, not in the manner we walk, by pushing our feet against the stable ground, but rather like the steerage of a ship, whose sails are set before or sidelong to the wind, receiving the direct or oblique impulse of the little streams passing continually on all sides of them, with such dexterous management as not to be thrown aside from their intended course. It would be in vain to conjecture what are their common employments and amusements, but enough has been suggested to show they do not want for either, and perhaps we may find more subjects to occupy their time than these: but amid the variety of objects and ideas continually presenting, it cannot be doubted there will be some of the agreeable and disagreeable kind, which will demand their care to procure the one and avoid the other, or to assist one another upon occasion, from whence will arise desires and aims, prudential maxims and rules of conduct, the one perpetually instigating their activity, the other directing their measures. And if the idea of evil be requisite to action, they will not want samples of actual suffering in some of their compatriots, who will come infirm and maimed into their world by reason of hurts received in ours.

13. But how much soever they abound in methods of business and enjoyment, sciences and accomplishments, we must imagine them totally dissimilar from those which occupy and entertain us here, for our ways of thinking and acting would neither be of use nor could be practised among them. What service could our knowledge of agriculture, of manufactures, of painting, of politics, of navigation, do them, or what materials could they find to exercise it upon! Where is there room for optics among those to whom the corpuscles of light are so gross as to be objects of touch rather than of sight? of mathematical lines and angles among bodies continually moving? of our virtues when the passions they restrain solicit no longer? of our moral theory, when human nature is exchanged for another? of our natural religion to those who may quickly strike out a better from the fuller display of nature lying before them? Nor are our mental acquisitions of a kind to be portable with us upon our departure hence; our first stock of materials is all thrown in by the senses, nor have we anything else but what is made up by working upon them: our abstractions have all some reference to sensible objects of their motions or changes, or actions upon them. Our imagination we find connects with the animal machinery, and so does our memory, the foundation and repository of all our knowledge; for the images and traces in both appear stronger or fainter, or not at all, according to the temperature and disposition of the body, according to the stages of infancy, manhood, and old age; and that fatigue, that briskness or lowness of spirits, that earnestness or flushing of the face, that tremor of the nerves, brought upon the grosser part of our frame by our several courses of thinking, make it more than probable that not a thought stirs in the mind without some

corresponding movement in the vital circulation. Therefore the springs employed in working all our various turns of thought being removed, we can expect to have no more of the same ideas return: and we shall be better without them, as they would be troublesome to us, by continually raising wants that could not be satisfied, and putting us upon methods of exerting our power that would not be feasible, as not having the same limbs nor instruments, nor materials nor objects, as are provided for us here.

14. We have shown in CHAP. VI. that percipience and rationality are secondary qualities, resulting from a composition of fine matter curiously organised, together with a perceptive spirit vitally united thereto, and this spirit so circumstanced is what we understand in common discourse by the rational soul. For we are currently held to be born reasonable creatures, that is, capable of reason or having the rational faculty, for we do not attain the use and exercise of reason, until some years have passed over our heads, wherein experience has furnished us with materials to think and reason upon. So then this vehicle or inner sensory constituting us rational creatures we received before our birth: it continues with us during our lives, enabling us to perceive and understand the notices brought from external objects by our bodily organs, the traces lying in our memory and all those stores of knowledge contained in the repository of our ideas: it remains entire after dissolution of the body, and though it can neither think nor reason after losing all its former ideas and materials to work upon, yet retains its rationality and cogitative faculty ready to be exercised upon whatever objects a fresh set of senses shall throw in or new experience supply. Nor let it be objected that I make the memory one of those parts that shall be left behind, so that the naked soul how quick soever its perceptions may be, will have no retention; for though I have supposed the vehicle almost all nerve and fibre, it may contain a small mixture of other parts capable of working into traces, or those parts which are kept soft by their present covering may harden upon being more exposed and become stiff enough to retain impressions, or new particles adhering from without may form a membrane fitted for the like purpose. But without troubling ourselves to conjecture the particular manner, we may depend upon that wisdom, by which all the laws of nature are established, to provide means of exercising so necessary a faculty without which there can be neither understanding nor reason, neither prudence nor judgment. Thus we may conclude that the soul will be born into another life as much a blank paper as ever she came into this, having all the characters formerly written upon her totally expunged but capable of receiving any new ones that shall be written from thenceforward. And though we shall not be wholly disengaged from matter, it will be of a very different frame and texture from our present: for we are told there is a carnal body and there is a spiritual body, and that what grows from the seed is not that body which was sown, but God giveth it another body. And this he gives, not with his own hand, but by the stated laws of nature and instrumentality of second causes.

15. But this vehicle, lying so long enclosed in the human body, cannot fail of receiving some little changes in its texture from the continual play of our sensitive organs and action of our animal circulation thereupon: for every sensation and every suggestion from our memory or reflection passes through that in its way to the mind, and though each singly may affect it no longer than for the moment of its passage, yet by being frequently repeated they will work a durable effect. Just as if you press your nail upon the

back of your hand, the flesh will return to its smoothness as soon as you take it off, but if you do this for hours together every day, the skin will part asunder and leave a dent between. The variety of our ideas can be owing to nothing else than the various figures or modifications of the organs exhibiting them, and as they act upon the sensory, this during their action must correspond with those modifications: so that every time a man sees a colour his sensory takes one modification, when he hears a sound another, when he meets with something to make him laugh another, when he meditates seriously another; so when he is angry, affrighted, afflicted, or joyful, every affection gives a different disposition to his sensory. And as we have each of us particular courses of thinking, wherein we are led to travel more frequently than in any others by our several habits, our passions, our desires, our education, our situation in life, and the objects most familiar to our senses, the ideas passing almost continually in the same track will work the tender sensory thinner in some places, and leave it thicker in others, separate the fibres or drive them closer together, stretch or contract them, and cause various alterations in their condition and texture. So that every man goes out of the world with a differently modelled vehicle, according as he has been a soldier or a scholar, a merchant or a mechanic, a gentleman or a labourer; according to the pursuits and expectations that have taken up his thoughts, the successes and disappointments, the joys and afflictions, that have hung upon his mind, the occupations and amusements that have filled up his time.

16. Nobody can help observing how much the condition and tenor of our lives depends upon the constitution we bring into the world with us, upon the strength and health of our body, the sagacity and natural talents of our mind; and we must acknowledge these affected by what passes in the womb: it is there the eyes and ears, the legs and hands, the lungs, the instruments of speech, the tablet of the memory, the organs of reflection, are formed, all which are of no use to the fœtus but of necessary use to the living man. Nor can we well avoid concluding from the similitude discoverable in the ways of nature, that we carry about within us a little fœtus continually forming and fashioning by the gross body wherein it lies enclosed; that according to the nourishment and action received therefrom will be its future lineaments and character, constitution and quickness of parts; and that as men are said to be born here poets or painters, politicians, mathematicians, navigators, or mechanics, so they will be born hereafter with talents fitted for particular acquisitions and employments. Neither must we imagine the forming fœtus uninfluenced by our manner of conduct in our several professions and stations: the practice of virtue invigorates and supplies the little limbs, strengthens the senses, quickens the faculties, improves that small mixture of unfibrous matter which may serve as an integument or instrument for the uses of the soul. Whereas vice debilitates, distorts, overclouds, and benumbs the soul, and fixes too much of the terrene concretion so as to disturb the operations of the nobler parts. As opposition is not my favorite passion, I shall not dispute that punishment may be inflicted by the immediate hand of Heaven, or the ministry of devils employed to torment those who are judged objects of the divine wrath: but I think the same purposes may as well be answered by supposing misery the natural consequence of wickedness. For who but God holds the reins of nature in his hand, establishes her laws, and ordains her courses? so that whatever they bring forth is as much his doing as what is done by other instruments: nor is there the less discouragement to sin if evil follow inevita-

bly upon it, whether this be brought about by the operation of necessary or voluntary agents. But that a mighty weight of suffering may be thrown on in the way I have assigned, we may easily comprehend when we reflect on the miserable condition of those wretches who are born into this world, diseased, maimed, and imperfect, and how small a quantity of foreign matter in our bodily frame causes great inconveniences and disturbances. A grain or two of sand gives racking pain in the kidneys, and a much less concretion of terrene particles is likely to give acuter anguish in the more sensible vehicle: a drop of rheum in our joints disables us from using them, and the like obstruction in a finer body would render it incapable of helping itself against impending dangers, so that it might incessantly be rapt in whirlwinds or buffeted about by the agitations of fire for want of power to extricate itself: a little thickness of blood in our brain fixes an incurable madness, and a similar foulness in the naked sensory might overwhelm the soul with perpetual delusion and perplexity, tormenting fears and jealousies, intolerable horror and despair.

17. Thus we work out our future fortunes by our present behaviour, and fit ourselves unknowingly for the several parts we are to act upon the next stage by practising those assigned us in this; so that we may look upon life as a necessary preparation to qualify us for the employments of another state. And when I consider the vast variety of engagements and amusements among mankind, the very different characters and employments of the several nations upon earth, the many unavailing hours passing over our heads, the great loss of time in sleep, all which cannot be accounted for from their uses here, I should regard this conclusion as more than hypothetical if it were not for one objection occurring, which is, the multitudes of human souls passing directly into another state, without touching upon this, and so capable of receiving no preparation thereby. From this observation we may gather that the rational soul is completely formed in all its essential parts before entrance into the human body, and that the fashion and lineaments it afterwards takes by long habitation therein are not necessary for its subsistence in the vehicular state, but preparations fitting it for some particular functions useful or convenient there. Perhaps the arts and sciences, the rules of public and private conduct, may be struck out or quicker attained by souls who go thus prepared, and the others may enter into their new life in a state of infancy similar to that they would have been born in here. I know we reckon children more docible than grown persons, but then it is of such childish instructions as are forgotten again afterwards, and serve only to give the mind a firmness for the reception of more solid knowledge. But those who want this preparatory firmness acquired by the exercise of their faculties upon earth will have a singular advantage in another respect, for they will be free from that terrene concretion and remains of the carnal part bringing on the inconveniences, disabilities, pains, and mental disorders, spoken of in the last section; and as they can do nothing to improve their future condition, so neither can they do anything to hurt or incommode it.

18. And if the next life begins for the most part like the present in tender infancy, this will require the care of the old inhabitants to overlook and cherish it: so that the business of nurture, education, and parental fondness, will be no less considerable sources of employment and amusement among them than among us. For there being neither marriage nor generation in that country, they will provide themselves families by a kind of adoption out of the new comers continually flocking in upon them. Nor will

they want means to direct them in their choice: for though we have denied them all remembrance of what passed during their abode here, there are other ways of discovering former relations and connections beside that of inspecting the traces in our memory. If it were not so common among us we should be astonished to think how a man by looking upon a few scratches upon paper, according to the shapes in which they are drawn, shall come to the knowledge of what his senses and his experience could not have informed him. By this way my friend at a hundred miles' distance may know where I was yesterday, what I was doing, and what I thought of in my most retired meditations: and by this way we know what was done two thousand years ago in the days of Hannibal and Scipio. But though this be accomplished by the consent of mankind affixing certain ideas to certain characters, let us consider whether the like intelligible writing may not be exhibited by nature in the dependence of effects upon their causes; so that disembodied souls, having acuter faculties than ours, and improved them by long application and exercise, may acquire a dexterity at investigating causes from their effects, know precisely what has happened from what they see happening, discover their own pre-existence, trace out all that has befallen them in their former state, become acquainted with the history of mankind, learn by the manner and condition wherein the new comers arrive from what parts they must come, and discern from a resemblance of features that the same causes must have operated upon them which have affected themselves. By these marks they may find out a wife, a child, a brother, a friend, a neighbour, a compatriot, and what is more than we could do with our remembrance, may distinguish their descendants who never came to the birth or were snatched away from their cradle. The endearments arising from these discoveries must double their diligence in the tendency of those who come helpless and relief of those who come contaminated with such impure mixtures of their former composition as can possibly be removed. Nor if particular inducements were wanting, would they want the spur of general benevolence to the rational species which is ever more glowing in proportion to the clearness of judgment and extensiveness of understanding.

19. Upon this view of the two worlds it appears there is a mutual connection of interests between them: for we are interested in what befals us here, not only as it affects our present condition, but our constitution and talents hereafter; and likewise with what befals other people in distant corners of the earth, with whom, though we have no dealings now, we are likely to have in time to come. And the people of the invisible world have an interest in all that happens among us, as it tends to form the genius, abilities, and characters, wanted for future services among them. Nor yet need we fear their interfering in our affairs, for their forces are too small to set masses of matter in motion capable of affecting any of our senses: or were they able, they have something else to do than to amuse us with idle dreams or terrify us with ghastly apparitions: neither can we suppose them so imprudent as to disturb the courses of nature and fortune, which they must be sensible are wisely provided with regard to the benefit of their own community.

20. For that a community they have we cannot well doubt when we reflect on the variety of dispositions wherein we quit our present mansion to take up our abode in theirs. For if we were to live single and apart from each other, one kind of preparation would serve us all; but the great difference among us in our manner of living and dying indicates a like difference

of occupation in the country whereto we are going: and as a nation cannot subsist here without a variety of professions to supply the wants and conveniences of the whole, so there will be a public interest there to be served by members variously qualified, contributing their several parts to the general emolument. For where one individual wants what another can supply, this will naturally lead them to seek each other's assistance, and unite them into a regular society.

21. But though the rational soul or vehicle survive the body, we cannot conclude from thence that it will live for ever: on the contrary, the numbers daily pouring in from hence upon the next world, seem to require a proportionable drain somewhere or other, for else the country might be overstocked: but where to dispose of their superfluous members is the question. Some have supposed the soul to migrate to and fro between the two worlds, and that after passing some ages in the other, it shall return back into a fresh body, and so be born again, as at first, in the usual manner of generation. But this notion prevailed no longer than while the thoughts of men were narrow, while this globe of earth, with the atmosphere surrounding it, was esteemed the whole of nature, while the most enlarged understandings could conceive the sun and moon as little bigger than Peloponesus, and the stars as fiery meteors rolling round the upper regions of air: so that the soul could never soar above the reach of terrene exhalations, which, adhering and gathering round it, might weigh it down again to the earth from whence it rose. And perhaps after all, the doctrine of transmigration was never seriously held by those who taught it, but employed only as an hypothesis, to make the future advantages of a virtuous life more intelligible and striking to such as could conceive no other enjoyment or suffering than what may be conveyed through bodily organs. Nor is it likely the soul should return again to her former confinement: for we see everything that has life grows therein, animals as well as plants, and whatever lay enclosed in integuments bursts forth too large to be contained in them any more: the little silk-worm, just crawled from its egg, or the moth from her chrysalis, could not creep into them again, nor could any art replace the seeds of vegetables in their husks. But if the vehicle be not sustained by nutriment, which might increase its growth, nor swell instantly upon coming out of its case, nevertheless it may gradually expand by the continual action of the spirit within, so as to be no more capable of lying within its former receptacle than a man is of re-entering his mother's womb. And this expansion cannot fail of introducing stages into the vehicular life similar to those of youth, maturity, and age; the last not indeed attended with the pains and infirmities accompanying it here, but distending and separating the fibres of the vehicle, until at last they open and let loose the enclosed spirit, which will then fly off naked and alone. But though the spirit, no longer vitally united to any corporeal particles, either ethereal or elementary, which used to serve for a conveyance of ideas and instrument of volition, must lose its rationality, percipience, and active powers, it will retain its two primary faculties of perceptivity and activity: and whoever admits the doctrine of final causes, and nothing made in vain, can hardly suppose they can lie overwhelmed in eternal sleep, or that means shall ever be wanting of exercising them. But what means of perceiving and acting we can imagine supplied to pure spirit, totally disengaged from matter, and divested of all organization whatever, we shall reserve for the subject of the ensuing chapter.

CHAP. XXII.

MUNDANE SOUL.

When I consider Bishop Berkley's notion of the non-existence of all bodies, and that the appearances they seem to exhibit are only perceptions raised in our imagination by the Divine power, I cannot help wondering that he did not go on to deny the existence of all spirits too; for we have no better evidence of the latter than of the former. How know I there are any other persons in the world, unless by seeing them before me or hearing them speak? and if they have no real bodies, nor there be any real air, whose vibrations bring the sound of their discourses to mine ears, what reasons have I to believe there are any real Beings, whose action occasions the motions of those bodies, or that air, which are purely imaginary? So that if when I see the sun rise in the morning, ascend to the meridian, and set again in the evening, trees buffeted about by winds, or rivers rolling along their foamy waves, the whole be nothing else than a succession of ideas in my own mind: by the same rule, when I behold my friend enter the room, and hear him talk to me of various subjects, perhaps I am alone all the while, and what I take for the sound of his voice is nothing else than a like succession of perceptions excited in me by the same power that excited those of the sun, the trees, and the rivers, before mentioned. From hence it will follow, that possibly there may be no more than two Beings in nature, God and myself. Thus, if we give way to the suggestions of a lively fancy, and think ourselves warranted to take anything for certain the contrary whereof cannot be mathematically demonstrated, we shall never know where to stop. But as these notions are apt to hang upon the minds of the speculative, I know of no better receipt to cure ourselves entirely of them, than by setting up opposite notions equally possible, and equally incapable of being demonstratively disproved. If it cannot be made appear with absolute certainty that there is that multitude of objects existing without us, which we daily see and handle, neither can it be made appear with the like certainty that there are not multitudes of sentient Beings in the composition of every man. We know so little the nature of spirits, that we cannot tell how a number of them, lying contiguous together, without any bars of flesh intervening, would affect one another: perhaps a perception raised in any one of them, by some particle of matter, would run instantly through them all quicker than fire does among the grains of gunpowder. If this be the case, for aught we know, there may be many spirits contained in one sensory: nor is there any need the corporeal organs should operate upon them all, for whatever sensations, judgments, or ideas, are exhibited to each of them, will immediately be apprehended by the whole number. I have shown in Chap. V. § 9. that every time we look upon a chess-board, covered with double sets of men, we have at least sixty-four particles of matter operating upon us at once, and considering how many corpuscles of light are requisite to give the sight of every single piece; if I had said sixty-four thousand I had been likely to come nearer the mark: now if there be the like number of spirits in the human soul, each may receive the action of one particle, and yet, their perceptions being communicated, every one will have a distinct sight of the whole

chess-board. Thus, instead of being the sole inhabitant of the universe, as I might persuade myself upon Berkley's principles, I shall not be the sole inhabitant of my own pericranium, but one member only of a most numerous family lodged there.

Nor let it be objected that it is much I should know nothing of my fellow lodgers, if there were such multitudes of us together in one chamber; for I know nothing of those inner ends of my organs which impress sensations upon me: besides that, receiving no other perceptions from my companions than they first received from matter, I have no mark whereby to distinguish them therefrom. Neither can it be urged that there would often arise an opposition among us, some would be for walking while others chose to sit still, some would want to stretch out the hands while others had rather keep them folded in the bosom: for if there be a variance of opinions in all numerous assemblies of mankind, it arises from their having their several views, designs, and judgments, and seeing things in different lights; but we coparceners of the same sensory should constantly have the same ideas, the same appearances, the same motives, exhibited to us, and discern satisfaction resting upon the same point. When our stomach grew empty, we should all at the same instant feel its cravings; if a well-spread table were set before us, we should all be guided by the same palate to stretch out our hands towards the same dish: and thus we should proceed in all our measures with such perfect conformity that each would think himself the sole author of our actions, and our every motion appear to bystanders as actuated by one agent. It is pity somebody did not hit upon this thought, at the time when disputes ran high upon original sin: he must certainly have made his fortune by it, and perhaps risen to be a cardinal, for he might have demonstrated (as a little matter will amount to demonstration on the right side) that the spirits of all men were contained in Adam's pericranium, and of all women in that of Eve, and so were actual partakers of their transgression; which would have overthrown the objection of infidels against the punishment of descendants for the sin of their primogenitors. But as such a notion now-a-days is not likely to raise one to preferment, I may even reject it as an idle fancy, fit only to be opposed against the no less idle fancy of Berkley's, that all about us is nothing but idea and delusion. Nevertheless, I have received this benefit from letting my thoughts roam a little upon it, that the communication of perceptions among spirits, whereby many of them may discern ideas exhibited by one sensory, has furnished me with a hint for understanding that old notion of a Soul of the World, in such manner as to make it a fit receptacle wherein those who depart from the vehicular state may be absorbed. I shall now pursue my ideas upon that subject, not barely as a commentator, expounding what has been said aforetime, but taking the liberty to new model it in some few particulars, which I think may render it more intelligible and answerable to our present purpose.

2. The doctrine of a Soul of the World, otherwise called the Mundane or Universal Soul, must be acknowledged of very ancient date, as old at least as the Ionic philosophy; and seems to have been generally embraced by the most eminent sages of antiquity. They held it eternal, immutable, completely wise and happy, extended throughout the universe, penetrating and invigorating all things, the maker of the world and all creatures therein, the fountain of sense, life, and motion, from whence the souls of men and animals were discerped, and, after dissolution of their bodies, absorbed thereinto again; and they gave it the appellation of God. Their calling it

by this name has made it generally believed that they meant thereby the Supreme Being: so Pope understood them when he talked of one stupendous Whole, whose body nature is, and God the soul; so likewise many of their followers understood them, which gave occasion to those pompous expressions of the human soul being a ray of the Divinity, an efflux or emanation from the substance of God himself: expressions which have no other foundation than in human vanity and arrogance. The doctrine thus interpreted became liable to just objections; as that it made God to consist of parts, some of which might be discerped from him, and that the Divine substance, being clothed in body, might become imperfect, passive, weak, ignorant, susceptible of error, sin, pain, and misery.

3. But I apprehend the mundane soul originally was not intended to be understood of the Supreme Being, but a created God dependent on him for its existence and faculties, produced from everlasting by his almighty power and good pleasure: and though it was supposed the maker, it was not supposed the Creator of all things, but to have formed the world out of preexistent materials according to a plan assigned it. The ancients, even those who held the unity of the First Cause, did not, like us, appropriate the term God to him alone, but applied it to other Beings of an order and intelligence superior to man. Seneca speaks of the Sun, the Moon, and the Planets, as Gods, and I suppose he would have called the four elements so too, for he ascribes sense and understanding to them; yet he acknowledges one supreme God over all, whom he styles the Rector of the universe: and we read in our bibles that there be Gods many and Lords many. Therefore when we find the ancients talking of God, we must not always take them in that restrained sense wherein we now use the word: and that it is not to be so restrained, when applied to the mundane soul, may appear from the Timæus of Plato.

4. By this exposition we escape the objections afore mentioned, for the human souls being now no longer thought parts of the Divine substance, may be supposed capable of pain and weakness without the absurdity following upon the former construction. Yet there still remains another objection arising from the individuality of the mundane soul, which we find spoken of as one entire thing, one Mind, and therefore cannot, like compound bodies, consist of distinguishable and separable parts to be discerped from it. Besides that this doctrine seems to confound and destroy the distinction and personality of particular souls, for they were not created upon their discerption, the substance of them being already existent in the universal soul, but before any of them were discerped, there was but one created mind in nature, therefore they were then the same person with that mind and consequently with one another: yet upon their immersion into matter we see they are distinct persons and things, one doing and perceiving what the others do not and perceive not: again, upon their separation from body they will lose their personality and distinction, being absorbed and resolved into their original principle. The ancients perhaps did not think themselves affected by this objection, having no correcter notions of individuality and substantial identity than our modern vulgar, who imagine that even bodies may impart something from their substance without diminution of the mass from whence it issued, if they perceived no visible alteration therein. Thus the vapours rising from the sea were part of its substance and drawn up therefrom, but when formed into clouds we deem them distinct substances, nevertheless we consider the sea as remaining always the

same body of waters notwithstanning the vast quantities continually exhaled by the Sun. In like manner the rivers seem to have a being of their own no longer than while running in their channels, for when intermingled with the sea, we look upon them as lost and swallowed up in that, which nevertheless we apprehend to be the same substance it was before their influx.

5. But it has been observed in the beginning of this volume that compounds are creatures of the imagination, nature making all things by individuals, therefore compounds having an ideal existence only may well preserve their identity notwithstanding an increase of diminution or change of their component parts, provided those changes be made imperceptibly, and do not work any change of appearance in the whole. Thus the Thames is always esteemed the same river, because we always see waters running between the same banks, although the waters running to-day are not the same that ran there yesterday: and if in a summer's evening we see a mist rise up out of the Thames, the mist exhibits a new idea we did not discern before, therefore we conceive it a new Being produced from the substance of the river, which yet we suppose remaining the same without diminution because we do not find it abated in its fullness. So likewise if we throw a handful of salt into the river, we lose the appearance of salt we had before, and apprehend it destroyed by being diffused among the substance of the water. But when we turn our thoughts upon individuals, the only real existences in nature, we cannot reconcile them to any transmutation of substance or production of one thing out of another. We have made appear in CHAP. III. that there are atoms actually, if not potentially, indivisible, and each of them, however disposed of, or wherever placed, whether in a drop of rain, in a river, or in the sea, must always continue identically the same, numerically distinct from all others how closely soever united to them, or how indiscriminately soever mingled among them. And with respect to spirits, the case is stronger, for they have a personality annexed from which they cannot be divested without losing their existence. I have been a child and am now a man; I have been in joys and in troubles: I may imagine myself transformed into a lion, a sheep, or an ostrich, inhabiting the vehicular state, or wholly disengaged from matter and mingled among similar spirits: yet in all these changes I should still continue to be myself, for from the moment I began to exist I must have been myself, and must remain so until I cease to be at all. Nor is it possible to understand that what was once another person should become me, or I should become or be contained in another person: that there could ever have been perceptions in this substance which is me without my perceiving them, or actions performed thereby which I did not do.

6. Now without troubling ourselves to conjecture how the ancients would have removed this objection, or resolving to understand their theory in all parts precisely as they did, let us endeavour to explain in a manner conformable to our ideas, whether discordant from theirs or no. And in this view I shall lay down that the mundane soul is one no otherwise than as the sea is one, by a similitude and contiguity of parts, being composed of an innumerable host of distinct spirits as that is of aqueous particles: and as the rivers continually discharge into the sea, so the vehicular people upon the disruption of their vehicles discharge and incorporate into that ocean of spirits making the mundane soul. As for the discerption of souls from thence to inhabit human bodies I have no concern with that, the doctrine of pre-existence being now universally exploded: for every good woman knows for certain that we were created some little time before our birth, for

this plain reason, because if we had existed a hundred years before, some or other of us to be sure must have remembered what passed with us in our former state. And since many learned divines admit an intermediate state between death and the final consummation of all things, I hope that what has been offered in the last chapter concerning the vehicular people will not be counted heterodox. Nor let it be objected that the mundane soul, already full and not having a proportionable discharge, cannot contain the fresh supplies continually poured in upon it: for some have supposed that the fallen angels have actually occasioned a considerable discharge therefrom. Or if this will not satisfy, let us consider that since creation is currently esteemed so common as to be practised every day in furnishing souls for children in the womb, we may as well suppose the same creative power constantly employed in producing new spaces, extending the bounds of the universe, and giving room for the mundane soul to expand according to the new members it continually receives.

7. We have found reason to conclude in the course of this work, that all created spirit, as well as all matter, is homogeneous, and as bodies receive their difference and secondary qualities from the various forms and combinations whereinto the similar atoms composing them are thrown, so spirits derive their characters, their percipience, their rationality, their powers and faculties, from the organizations whereto they are united, or means of conveying perceptions supplied them: so that the spirit of an angel, a politician, a shoe-cleaner, an ideot, a man, and a child, are intrinsically the same, differing only in their being variously lodged and circumstanced. From hence it follows that the spirits composing the universal soul are all of similar nature, having the same capacities, the same primary properties of perceptivity and activity, and altogether such as ourselves, except these bonds of flesh wherein we lie imprisoned. But since we receive all our perceptions from our corporeal organization, and have no other sensations than what come to us through the windows of our prison, it remains to inquire what sensations or reflections they can have after being disunited from all material composition whatsoever. As we live here separate and alone, each immured within his several cell, we have nothing to discern besides the modifications of the organs in our sensory, nor can we converse together unless by the intervention of some bodily medium, as of sounds or letters; but if we could have immediate intercourse with one another, who can say how much more expeditely, easily, and clearly, we might carry on our conversations? Suppose any two of us could thrust out that centre of our ethereal cobweb, which is the royal apartment or presence-chamber of the mind, through the pores of our cranium quite to the outside of our head, without hurting ourselves or cutting off its communication with the bodily senses, and then laying our two heads together could, by opening some door of the said chamber, bring our spirits into immediate contiguity with one another, who can tell what would ensue? Perhaps whatever either of us saw or heard or apprehended, by any of our senses, or rose up in our imagination, might instantly be discerned by the other. Perhaps this might not be a necessary consequence, but the effect of choice, for both being possessed of volition, we might select what perceptions we thought proper to impart, and keep the others to ourselves; as in conversation, a man is not obliged to utter all he knows, but selects such of his thoughts as he judges worth hearing by the company: so that if I were eating apple-pye and cheese, and knew my companion had an aversion to the latter, I should communicate the one

taste but suppress the other. We will now if you please draw in our ethereal web again for fear of its catching cold, and suppose one of us intending to partake in the diversions of Scarborough while the other stays in London: as soon as he is gotten there, we will suppose a string of spirits reaching from him to me. As they are mighty little folks, and perhaps penetrable by body, they can easily insinuate themselves into our presence-chamber without our feeling them, so that one end of the string might lie in contact with his perceptive part and the other with mine. Having this channel of conveyance ready at hand, we should despise the tedious method of correspondence by the post, wherein we might sometimes be misapprehended or imperfectly understood, or at best could give but a partial account of what had happened to us: for our intermediate friends in the line of communication might transmit all that either of us saw or heard in either place, together with our judgments and observations thereupon, with a precision, clearness, and vigour, equal to that wherewith we discerned them ourselves. Imagine further that we had a friend at Plymouth, another at Paris, another at Amsterdam, and that there were the like spiritual strings of communication from every one to every one: we should then all five have immediate knowledge of all that was worth knowing in the five places, by perceptions continually transmitted along those conveyances.

8. I will not undertake to prove, logically, that perceptions may be thus imparted from spirit to spirit, when all corporeal obstacles are removed from between them, having no positive evidence, that I remember, within the compass of my experience, whereon to build an argument, nor ever conversed with another person, unless by the usual means of discourse or writing, or significant looks and gestures; but on the other hand it would be a bold undertaking for any one to prove the contrary, for I suppose nobody remembers his having ever been in contiguity with other spirits, and attempted an intercourse of perceptions but without effect. Therefore in a matter so uncertain I may lawfully take the privilege annexed to an hypothesis and assume the affirmative. Having laid down this basis I must proceed to one assumption more, wherein I am as safe against confutation as I was in the former, and this is that all space not occupied by matter is replete with spiritual substance called the mundane soul, each part whereof, that is each component spirit, lies contiguous to others: so that there runs a continuity throughout the whole as there does throughout the waters of the ocean; for lines might be drawn from any drop in the Atlantic sea to every spot in the European, African, or American shores surrounding it, which should pass over rows of drops contiguous to one another. This being premised it will follow that by the mutual communication of perceptions every one may have those arising in every other. But though I have assumed a power of imparting perceptions I cannot assume that of making them, for this would be running counter to experience. We cannot impart more knowledge than we have first ourselves, nor can the mind call up a single thought without employing some instrument to introduce it: for in all perception we are purely passive, receiving such from time to time as the modifications of our organs excite in us. Since then such is the nature of our minds we must conclude that all perception must begin by the action of matter, how much soever it may be carried on by a spiritual substance: and as although a man may come to the knowledge of transactions he never saw by information from other people, yet somebody must have been present at the transactions to begin the relation; so neither can the mundane soul perceive anything without an object exhibited to some of its parts. But

this need make no difficulty, for when we consider how the stars with their several systems of planets are dispersed up and down, how light, ether, and perhaps many other subtile fluids we know nothing of, are diffused everywhere, and that all these bodies, great and small, must lie contiguous to some parts of the mundane soul, we shall see there will not want objects for it to perceive. And as our sensations, reflections, and judgments, are impressed upon us by the configuration or motion of the particles in our sensory, so the bodies floating about in the mundane soul may exhibit a greater variety of ideas thereto, whereby it may discern them all, their combinations and modifications, together with the comparisons and other relations resulting therefrom.

9. If we suppose every component spirit to perceive all that every other does, it will appear impossible that so vast an infinitude of knowledge can be contained in any created mind; and we find a multitude of objects, although distinct in themselves, confounds us merely by their number; but this is owing to the scantiness of our organs, for according as they are more copious in one person than another, we find the same number of ideas appear clear or confused. Cæsar could dictate to three amanuenses at once, and call all the Roman citizens by their names; and if it would perplex any of us to attempt the like, it is because we have not the same quickness of parts, that is, the same fineness of organization. When we have so many visible objects before us that we could not admit another without confusion, we may still apprehend a sound or idea from any other sense distinctly. So that in our present condition, it is our organs that set the limits to our understanding, nor do we know what our mental capacity is, our sources being too scanty ever to fill the vessel. We may possibly be capable of twenty senses, but being provided with inlets only for five, have no more conception of the others than a blind man has of light. Therefore we have no reason to confine the extent of the mundane understanding to the narrowness of our own, but rather to believe it much larger than anything we have experienced or can imagine. Nevertheless, large as it is, we have no need to suppose it infinite, or that the objects discerned by every part are communicated to every other, for this communication being not a necessary but voluntary act, each spirit may impart such perceptions to his neighbour as he knows will be of use or entertainment to him, suppressing the rest: and thus every one having all the knowledge he wants or can be serviceable, may be styled completely knowing, although he does not absolutely know everything. Thus the parts of the universal soul will serve for organs to each other, conveying perceptions instantaneously from the most distant regions of nature, distributing to every one whatever information it concerns him to receive: for we know of nothing so quick as thought, nor that it takes up any time in its progress. And their knowledge being derived from one common fund, they will all have the same sentiments, the same motives and rules of conduct: not that I imagine they will all have the same parts to act, for these must vary according to their several situations and the bodies falling within the sphere of their activity, but they will contribute their respective shares in perfect concert and unanimity towards carrying on one general plan. For we are not to think they have nothing else to do than transmit perceptions to and fro: but since we ourselves have a power of giving motion to our limbs, we may allow them the exercise of the like power, although they have no limbs to move, for the bodies dispersed among them may serve for subjects of their activity instead of limbs.

10. Now in order to find what work there may be for them to do, let us cast our eye upon two known laws of matter, Gravitation and Cohesion. Sir Isaac Newton, who best understood them, declares that they are not inherent properties of matter, but effects of some external force, which he supposes to be the repulsion of ether, acting by different rules in the production of either. This ether, he tells us, is more dense, and consequently more elastic, in proportion to the distance whereat it lies from any gross body: therefore the ether on the most distant sides of any two bodies being stronger than that lying between them, drives them together, and so causes their gravitation, and makes them seem to attract one another. Therefore weight is made by the differential, not the absolute pressure of ether; for this, like all other elastic fluids, expands equally on all sides, pressing upwards as well as downwards: so that the ether beneath whatever we have put into a scale heaves it up, but the ether above, being a little further from the earth, impels it more forcibly downwards. Wherefore the weight we find it have measures to us the excess of force wherewith one ether surpasses the other, but discovers nothing of the precise force belonging to either. It may seem astonishing that so small a difference of distance from the earth, as between the upper and under side of a common leaden weight in the grocer's shop, should increase the density of ether in so sensible a degree that it may be felt by taking the lead into one's hand: but since there are many astonishing things in nature, we will make no objection of this, but try to form some notion of what the absolute force of ether must be. If we could make an ether-pump, as we do air-pumps, we might ascertain by experiment what is the pressure on all sides of an exhausted receiver; but this being impossible, let us seek for some expedient to supply the place of it as well as we can: and though I am afraid we shall find none that will enable us to make an exact computation of the strength of ether, we may hit upon such as shall convince us it must be exceeding great. If we toss a guinea upon the ground, we know that it weighs there about a quarter of an ounce, therefore there is that pressure of ether upon it: but the ether repelling equally on all sides, if another guinea be laid upon the former, will heave that up with the like force wherewith it pressed the other down. Nevertheless we know this other guinea gravitates likewise downwards with the weight of a quarter of an ounce, therefore the superincumbent ether must press with the force of half an ounce, the weight arising from the different repulsion of the two ethers. By the same rule, if you put on a third guinea, it will have a pressure upon it of three quarters of an ounce: and so on, how high soever you raise the pile, the uppermost guinea will always be pressed down with a force equal to the weight of the whole pile. Let us now imagine a hole drilled in the ground quite down to the centre of the earth, and then filled up with guineas, how many would it contain? To take whole numbers, I shall suppose twenty to fill up an inch, and the semidiameter of the earth to be just four thousand miles: upon these data we shall make the whole number of guineas amount to five thousand sixty-eight million eight hundred thousand. But we must not reckon all these guineas to have their full weight, for whatever is carried under ground loses of its weight in exact proportion as it approaches the centre, and when it comes there, weighs nothing at all. But arithmeticians know that where numbers decrease in arithmetical progression down to nothing, the sum of them all is just half what it would be if they were all of the highest number; therefore our column of guineas would weigh what half their number, that is, two thousand five hundred thirty-four

million four hundred thousand, weigh in a scale above ground. Our next step will be to compute the weight of that prodigious sum. I have been told that at the mint they cut out a pound of gold into forty-four guineas and a half: upon this footing we shall find our column amount to the weight of twenty-eight thousand four hundred seventy-six tons troy. Supposing then the pressure of ether at the centre nothing, which cannot be certainly inferred from the want of weight in things there, which is thought owing rather to the contrary attractions of the several parts of the earth around them balancing one another than to their having no attraction at all; but supposing the pressure nothing at the centre, still that of our ether at the surface of the earth must act with a force equal to above twenty-eight thousand tons within so small a compass as the superficies of a single guinea.

11. Having found such an amazing force in ether, we might think it sufficient to account for the attraction of cohesion too, which may well be stronger than that of gravitation, although depending upon the same cause: for the latter results only from the differential strength wherewith the upper ether exceeds the lower, whereas particles in actual contact can have nothing between to thrust them asunder, therefore will be held together by the absolute pressure against their outsides, which we have found is more than enough to make them cohere stronger than any substances we know of; for I suppose a bar of any metal whatever, equal in thickness to the breadth of a guinea, would be broke asunder by a weight of twenty-eight thousand tons suspended at the end of it. But there is this difficulty in deriving gravitation and cohesion from the same source, that since the density of ether increases so fast as we have found it to do upon receding from the earth, things would cohere much more tenaciously at considerable heights than they do near the ground, and a wire upon the Peak of Teneriffe would support a greater weight than might suffice to break it here below: but I never heard of its being found to do so by any experiment. Indeed the difference upon examination will not come out so great as at first sight one might expect, for the highest mountains being, I think, not above four miles above the level of the sea, the cohesion there will bear the proportion only of five hundred and one to five hundred compared with the cohesion here below; a difference too small to be discovered by any experiments upon the strength of strings or wires. But then, on the other hand, it is found that attraction prevails between particles very near together, though not in actual contact: in this case ether must find room to rush in between and push them asunder, therefore their attraction will depend upon the differential, not the absolute, pressure of external ether, and cohesion become gravitation, which we are told is not strong enough to exert the efforts made by the other. This brings us back again to Newton's position, That the two attractions result, if not from different causes, yet from different operations of the same cause. And we may conclude the same of fire, heat, muscular motion, and sensation, wherein he likewise suspects ether to have a hand; but it seems to operate differently in producing those several effects: which indicates a kind of choice and discernment not to be found in the motions of matter, unless where directed by some understanding; and this direction it may receive from the action of the mundane soul.

12. But how much soever we may resolve attraction into repulsion, this will not put an end to our inquiries; for repulsion is no more an inherent property of matter than attraction was. The learned tell us, that the par-

ticles of ether do not touch, but keep one another always at a distance: but it is an established maxim, obvious even to common sense upon a little attentive use of it, that no substance can act where it is not, nor operate upon anything at the least distance from the place where it exists, therefore there must be some medium between the particles of ether pushing them asunder. Thus we shall be reduced to the condition of the Indian philosopher, who asserted that the earth was supported upon the back of a huge elephant, and the elephant stood upon a tortoise, but what the tortoise rested upon he could not tell: so after having demonstrated that all motions we see result from attraction and that from repulsion, what if we should be asked for the cause of this latter? for a cause it certainly requires, as matter cannot exert it by its own energy. We have observed before, that there is a prodigious consumption of force every moment, occasioned by the collision and pressure of bodies throughout the universe: and where shall we seek for a fund from whence to draw supplies for repairing the continual decays of motion? The shortest way would be to recur to Almighty Power, which certainly does not want efficacy to complete whatever is wanted to be performed by it; and I know that how far soever we may trace our chain of second causes, we must come sooner or later to the First. But it is the mark of a weak mind to be forward in ascribing events to the divine operation which cannot presently be accounted for otherwise: and the soundest philosophers have made it a rule never to call in Omnipotence without absolute necessity. Since then we experience in ourselves a power of giving impulse to matter, and there is none of it but must lie within the reach of some spirit contiguous thereto, why need we scruple to believe it liable to the like action therefrom, as we exert upon our motory fibres? Thus we may assign spiritual substance for the first of second causes, from whose action the repulsion of ether, whence all other material agents derive their vigour, begins; by whose ministry the laws of nature are executed, the continual decay of motion repaired, the world and all things therein kept in order. Nor will the admission of such a power derogate from our idea of the Supreme Being. For since all, both material and spiritual substance, received their existence, their powers, and properties from him, and not a particle of either stirs unless by his permission or appointment, they are to be regarded only as instruments in his hands, and whatever mighty works they perform ascribed ultimately to him.

13. As to the force a spirit is able to exert, we have no measures in our own experience to determine it by: for though we can lift heavy weights, it has been shown in the former part of this work that we do not this by our own strength, for we receive considerable assistance from our animal circulation: yet we must begin the motion upon some little nerve or fibre to pull up the valve for letting in the vital stream upon our muscles, but what momentum we impart thereto I know of no method to ascertain. Our power must certainly be confined to very narrow limits because the sphere of our presence is so, for as nothing can act where it is not, we can act only upon such particles as may be drawn within that compass, and consequently can give no greater momentum than those little particles are capable of receiving. Yet for aught we know our strength may be very great in proportion to our sphere of activity, nor can we tell what limits to set it: therefore a multitude of us acting together might perform mighty feats upon huge masses of matter. If cohesion depend upon the action of spiritual substance, let us consider what weight a bar of iron as thick as the breadth of a guinea would sustain, and if the theory of gravitation be-

fore laid down be right, we have seen how vast a pressure lies upon bodies of the same dimensions: this then will be the force exerted by so much of that substance whose presence can extend throughout the surface of a guinea. And the same force that can hold the particles of bodies so strongly together, may suffice to dart them along, when detached from one another, with a proportionable rapidity: so that we shall not want a cause for the velocity of light, vibrations of ether, or other the swiftest motions that human sagacity has yet discovered.

14. If anybody objects that by giving a spirit extent of presence I ascribe it bulk, and consequently a consistency of parts; I shall desire him to resolve me two questions, Whether he denies God to be present throughout all immensity, and whether he conceives him to have bulk or to consist of distinguishable parts? And I shall refer him further to CHAP. IV, V. where I have made it evident, at least to my own apprehension, that we are individuals not consisting of parts, nevertheless that there is a certain portion of space throughout which we are totipresent, because we can receive the action of many corporeal particles at once which cannot be brought into contact with a mathematical point. Since then we have each of us a certain sphere of presence, a multitude of these spheres may extend to any magnitude in proportion to the numbers of them, and the spirits residing in them, having a communication of ideas, will join in exerting their activity throughout the whole magnitude composed of their spheres. Thus though the strength of each singly, by reason of the narrowness of their presence, be very trifling, perhaps scarce able to lift a mote in the sunbeams; yet by their united force they may perform more stupendous exploits than Milton's angels, and without the trouble of loosening to and fro, from their foundations may pluck the seated hills with all their load, rocks, waters, woods, and by their bases broad uplifting rear them high in air, or toss with rapid whirl o'er ocean's furthest bourne. For we know the efficacy of union to produce strength out of weakness, as well in the works of human industry as of nature. When a number of men are disciplined to act at one signal, or obey one command, what masses cannot they move, what performances cannot they achieve! We know of few things weaker than water, or more yielding than air: yet what havoc and devastation do storms and inundations make by the combined force of little corpuscles, thousands of which one might blow away with a breath! How feebly does one grain of sand attract another? so that we cannot discover it by the nicest experiment: yet it is the aggregate of such attractions from all the grains in all the earth that holds down the moon in her orbit. But the mundane spirits, intimately persuaded of the benefit of unanimity, and by their mutual participation of perceptions having the same understanding, the same motives and apprehensions of things, enow of them will always be ready to concur in completing every work that shall be discerned expedient.

15. An objection may be started here against the possibility of our spirits doing the mighty things ascribed to them above notwithstanding their strength and unanimity: for action and re-action being reciprocal and opposite, whenever a spirit goes to impel a particle of matter he will thrust himself backward with equal force, and though he may have some good friend behind to keep him steady, he will thereby impart the same force to him, who will likewise transmit it to the next beyond, and so on until the thrust be propagated to the outermost bounds of the mundane soul, which expanding by degrees, the parts of it must open, and thereby

losing their contiguity with either corporeal or spiritual substance, must lose both their percipience and active powers for want of materials to exercise either within their reach. But though we find re-action constantly prevailing between bodies, it does not necessarily follow from thence that the like prevails between body and spirit, one acting by impulse and the other by volition: nor have we reason to think it does from anything happening to us in our common actions. We feel our limbs move and the outer parts of our body, but we feel no resistance from the inner fibres we employ in moving them: in short, we are so little affected by those first instruments of our action, and have so little notice of them, that Hartley and some others have denied that we ever move them at all, but insist upon their being moved mechanically by the vibratiuncles bringing us our perceptions. And this consideration may obviate a difficulty concerning the laboriousness of those tasks we have assigned the mundane spirits in exerting their utmost strength incessantly to produce repulsion, cohesion, and gravitation in matter, which may be thought incompatible with that happiness we have supposed them to enjoy. For there is nothing operose or toilsome in volition, our limbs indeed tire upon being over worked because they can bear no more than a certain measure of exercise, our reflections satiate by a constant repetition of the same ideas, because our organs lose their relish and return us uneasy perceptions instead of the agreeable ones they gave at first: but if we can find employment for a fresh set of muscles, or bring a fresh set of objects to our imagination, we find as much amusement in them as if we had done or contemplated nothing before. The mind is never tired of commanding from morning to night, so long as the instruments are not tired of executing; therefore the actions of spirit are always performed easily without either weariness or satiety.

16. As we have supposed all space replete with material or spiritual substance, it may be doubted whether in that case there could be any motion of either, because there would be no vacant place for them to move into. But it is the more generally received opinion that spirit is penetrable by body, therefore can oppose no obstruction against the motions of that: and as I never heard it determined even by conjecture whether spirit be penetrable by spirit, it remains wholly uncertain whether they will obstruct one another. But admitting them neither penetrable by one another nor by body, though I have supposed them contiguous I have not supposed them present in every point of space; for the waters of the sea lie contiguous, yet are there many pores and vacant spaces between them: therefore spiritual substance may be considered as an extreme subtile fluid, continually at motion within itself, and admitting bodies to pass through it with more ease than fishes swim through the water. But this is offered only upon supposition of their being impenetrable, which I have before declared my sentiments that they are not; and of locomotion being necessary for them, which is more than I know to be the fact: for as they will have perceptions brought from every quarter, they will hardly want to change their situation in order to change their scene, and examine objects they could not discern before. But if locomotion be requisite, I do not imagine they can move themselves nor one another: but as we are vitally united to some part of our body which carries us about with it wherever it goes, so they may join themselves occasionally to some particle of matter, which is going the way they desire. Nor need it be wondered that the courses of nature should go on so steadily as they do, if guided by voluntary agents, some of whom we might imagine would proceed in a different manner from others

because we find them do so among ourselves: whereas bodies gravitate and cohere, air condenses and rarefies, light reflects and refracts, always exactly in the same manner under the same circumstances. But when we consider that our own contrariety and changeableness of behaviour springs from the ideas starting up in our imagination, which each man has peculiar to himself, nor does his neighbour discern or stand affected by them, and that in proportion as every man possesses a more enlarged understanding and judgment we find him more steady and uniform in his conduct, we shall cease to wonder that these spirits, whose knowledge by their participation of ideas must extend much wider than ours, not liable to overlook things which when discovered must alter their judgment, should pursue constantly the same tenor of conduct; that what appears expedient to one should appear so to all, and what they judge proper to do at one time they should adhere to at all others without variation.

17. This entire unanimity of sentiment and perfect harmony of action may well warrant us to look upon the whole as one thing, to which the material world will serve as a sensory exciting sensations and reflections, and exhibiting ideas, and the spiritual part as a percipient to receive them and a vivifying principle to invigorate and actuate the motions of the other; having in a manner one understanding, one design, and one volition, making all together one compound as the human soul and body make one man. So that with the Stoics we may call the universe an immense animal, or say with Pope, All are but parts of one stupendous Whole, whose body nature is, and God, not the Almighty, but this created god we have been speaking of, the soul. This god, or animal, or glorified man containing all men (for it matters not what name we use so our ideas be clear) which is the world, will have a full discernment of all his parts with their combinations, proportions, symmetries, situations, and uses: nor will anything minute escape his notice, for being not confined like us to one little cell in the brain, where we know nothing of the many secretions, circulations, and other transactions, passing in our frame, but his spirit, insinuating and penetrating everywhere, not an atom can stir without his knowledge and observation. Nor must we imagine him to receive sensations only from all these objects, for as the modifications of our organs furnish us with judgments, relations, abstractions, and other ideas of reflection, resulting from the notices of our senses, so his sensory the material world will supply him with the like in far greater abundance, free from that disorder and perplexity attending them in us, as being selected and purified in their passage through spiritual substance by the channel of communication: so that he will be all intelligence, perfect reason, and unerring judgment. And though we must needs admit him passive in perception, he will have such absolute command over the causes and instruments of perception that no thought can intrude against his liking. Yet we must not imagine him subject to those sudden starts and wanton sallies which too often hit our own fancy, for this would occasion strange irregularities in the visible world, but best pleased with that regular scene of contemplation exhibited by the stated laws and steady courses of nature, and therefore constantly employing his activity to execute and preserve them in order. For his activity being coextensive with his intelligence, every limb of his immense body will be under his immediate government, so that all the motions therein will be voluntary: nothing automatic, or at least the automatic be exactly directed by the voluntary: and ether, whose various repulsions are the grand springs of all natural movements, may be considered as performing the office of nerves

and muscles in moving the larger members. By his strength he rolls the huge planets along the boundless sky; by his agility he dashes the light on all sides with inconceivable velocity; by his energy he produces gravitation, cohesion, heat, explosion, fluidity, contraction, and dilatation of the circulating vessels in plants and animals, and all other operations discernible throughout the visible world.

18. In him as parts are contained all the powers that men can imagine concerned in the phenomena of nature or affairs of mankind; for we might style the god or angel of the sun, the god of the moon, of Saturn, Jupiter, or the other planets, so much of his substance as actuates their motions and operations, and so much of it as surrounds every particular man may be called his guardian angel or demon: so that by this theory one might almost reconcile the pagan theology with sound reason and probability. Yet I would not suppose the same particles of spiritual substance to attend the moving bodies throughout their progress, but transmit them to others having the same dispositions, purposes, and activity, whereby there will be no variation nor irregularity in their courses. For we divide the ocean into seas, gulphs, and bays, the waters whereof continually change, so that those which compose the German Sea to-day may make the British Channel to-morrow, the Bay of Biscay the next day, and afterwards the Mediterranean. And as the wake of a ship, by which I think the sailors understand the stream drawn after the stern by its motion, follows the ship throughout her voyage, yet consists every moment of different waters: so wherever a man goes he may always have his guardian angel about him, the same in kind and quality, in character and ability, but not a minute together the same in personal identity. Nor can it be doubted that this spiritual substance, having so minute a discernment and perfect command over the particles of matter, might form them into any shapes or appearances he had a mind; or by throwing our sensory into proper modifications impart any knowledge, even such as could not naturally enter into the human imagination. Not that I mean to decide whether such things have or have not been done, but whoever believes they have, may find here a fit agent by whose ministry any commands of the Almighty may be executed, as well ordinary as extraordinary. For without such command, or some very substantial reason, we may rest assured he will not deviate a step from his usual method of proceeding. Therefore we need not fear any fantastic surprises nor hurts from him; not for the same reason which secured us against the vehicular people, because they were too feeble to affect any of our senses, for he wants neither skill nor ability to raise dreadful phantoms or rattle chains or terrify us with horrid dreams as well in broad sunshine as at midnight, nor to work all the feats of witchcraft and magic: but because such more than childish pranks are inconsistent with his consummate wisdom and importance of character. To entertain these apprehensions of him would be as idle a fear as if, upon our friend of the best credit and character coming into the house, we should disturb ourselves lest he might steal a silver spoon, or take some sly opportunity to slit holes in our furniture: and we ought to be as backward in giving credit to reports of that kind as we should be in believing anybody who told us he saw a group of persons of the highest dignity and most venerable character playing at taw together in the street, or robbing an orchard, or practising the little mischievous tricks of an unlucky school-boy.

19. But as we are perpetually sustained and protected, and the springs from whence we receive our uses and enjoyments actuated, by the mundane soul, so it may be presumed that we are likewise of some use to him. For

embodied spirits, each confined within his several cell and having no ideas unless what his particular sensory exhibits, must be allowed to operate differently upon the matter environing them from those which lie at large in the mundane substance, and thereby diversify the scene, presenting ideas he could not find elsewhere. For though I do not suppose him contiguous with our spirits, because then we should become one with him and participate of his knowledge, yet he may be so with the outside of our sensories, and by observing the motions there and knowing from what operations of spirit they must proceed, he may read our thoughts as currently as we read one another's thoughts in a letter. And if evil be necessary in nature, as we must conclude from its having admission therein, it may be dispersed among the corporeal and vehicular states that the inhabitants of the mundane, by applying to the sensories of the other two, may attain the knowledge of evil without actual suffering. Thus our pains and displeasures, our vexations and disappointments, our errors and follies, which we look upon as oversights or neglects in nature, promote the service of more exalted Beings, doing them more good than hurt to ourselves. Our various constitutions, talents, passions, desires, professions and fortunes, all the transactions and dispensations befalling us, which we regard only as they affect our present condition, have a twofold use besides : as they prepare us for our several functions in the vehicular life, and as they present objects wanted for the purposes of the universal soul whereon his happiness in some measure depends. Perhaps our interests may furnish him with a principal part of his employment, for being completely happy and placed out of the reach of evil, he may have nothing to desire for himself, and nothing to do but exert his power and contrivance in lessening the burdens and enhancing the enjoyments of animal life as much as possible : so that for aught we know, the most glorified Beings may be constantly attendant upon the services of man, not for the greatness of his importance, but because he is the only poor creature that wants their cares.

20. Having given the fullest explication I could of that exalted Being the universal soul, the head and principal of creatures, let us now consider how well he may deserve the glorious things said of him in former times. And first we need not scruple to admit him for maker of the world, that is, the agent employed in executing that stupendous work : for penetrating into every pore of material substance, being all intelligence and activity throughout, he might discern all the particles in Chaos, if ever there was one, know what they were severally fit for, assort them into elements, and of them compose habitable earths. Upon the word given, Let there be light, he might twist the sevenfold rays and dart them about in all directions, or upon a second word collect the main body of them into a Sun. He might give the heavy planets their tangential motion by one strong and exactly poised stroke. He might gather the waters from the dry land, having first scooped the capacious bed of ocean, and raised the equatorial parts, lest the diurnal rotation should cast up the sea above them. He might give the earth a twirl as easily as a child twirls round his whirligig, to produce the vicissitudes of day and night. He might thrust the poles askance twice ten degrees and more, that summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, should never fail. He might draw out strings of viscous juices from the ground, and perforating them into tubes, and interlacing them artfully together, compose therewith the tree yielding fruit after his kind and the herb after his kind, whose seed is in itself. He might form the dust of the earth into animal organizations with proper members for walking or flying, or

creeping or swimming, as soon as the breath of life should be breathed into them: and extracting the finer particles from the grosser, might work them into mental organs and sensories, fit for the reception of perceptive spirits who should be created for them to begin the race of men upon earth. And as he went on completing his task, the Lord Almighty looked forth from heaven, and saw every handy work of his minister, and behold, it was very good. The six days' formation being ended, though God rested from commanding, his agent did not rest from acting; for his reason could now direct him how to proceed in sustaining the work he had been taught to make. He still continued to turn the grand wheel of repulsion, that first mover in the wondrous machine of visible nature, all whose movements follow one another uninterruptedly for ages according to stated laws and in regular courses without failure or disorder in any single wheel. Until the fulness of time being come, or the signal given from the throne of Glory, the same agent turning the wheel of repulsion the contrary way, will rend the mighty fabric asunder, throw the parts of compounds out of their order, dissipate them with a sudden explosion, and reduce all into Chaos again. From whence upon a new plan assigned, new systems may be formed, new earths stretched out, new vegetables and animals produced to cover and inhabit them.

21. I think offence cannot be taken against our ascribing the generation and sustentation of the world to a created Being, as it seems rather to raise than depress our idea of the divine majesty; and everything done by the deputy commissioned for that particular purpose is always esteemed the act of the principal. The very expression commonly used that God made all things by his word warrants our supposition of an intelligent agent who should understand and obey the word when spoken; and those writings which speak of supernatural effects many times declare them performed by the ministry of an inferior hand. It was not the Lord himself, but the angel of the Lord, who smote the host of Sennacherib: and when a promise is made of peculiar protection to some particular person, it is said that God shall send his angel to direct thy steps that thou hurt not thy foot against a stone. Nor do I apprehend any danger in removing the divine power as far as possible from those operations we see or know of, provided that we bear constantly in mind that all other powers must be referred originally thereto. Therefore how mighty works soever are performed, so long as we can conceive God having a minister in his kingdom capable of executing them, we need not call in omnipotence: reserving only to that the prerogative of giving the powers and lights requisite for obeying his orders, and fulfilling his word.

22. The powers and operations of the universal soul being settled, we will proceed next to consider his state and condition within himself: and we may agree with the ancient sages in pronouncing him immortal, unchangable, completely intelligent, wise, and happy. For having nothing external, he will be secure against dangers and accidents from without: being not vitally united to systems of matter, their dissolution can affect him no otherwise than a change of objects or of one thing for another taken into our hands does us: and consisting of similar parts, whose qualities do not depend upon their order or combinations, he will not suffer by their taking new positions, as we should do upon the misplacing an eye or an ear or any little fibre in our bodies; for every component spirit would be able to perform the same office with that into whose place it succeeded. Or if anything were to happen in his immense body tending to his damage,

being active and discerning throughout, he would know how to prevent the mischief in time. The extensiveness of his intelligence communicated perpetually from every part to every part, must render him universally knowing in all the combinations of matter, their situations, order, motions, and secondary qualities, together with the judgments, reflections, and sciences resulting, or consequences and uses expectant, therefrom. All this, together with his exemption from passion and error, must make his wisdom consummate to provide effectually for his own interests and those of inferior creatures committed to his charge. For if in a multitude of counsellors there is wisdom, how great must the wisdom be of this innumerable host of spirits mutually imparting their lights from all quarters of the universe! Therefore he will act invariably right, doing always that which virtue requires, though without any other virtue than that of prudence; because he will want none other. For to us the virtues are necessary marks directing to that happiness we want clearness of sight to discover, and strength of mind to pursue: but he having a foresight of remotest consequences, and an intuitive discernment of their just amount, will see clearly what is best, and need no spur to instigate nor mark to direct him in the pursuit of it. The clearness and largeness of his understanding will secure him against all partial views and unsteadiness of conduct; for it is folly and ignorance that makes us capricious, changeable, and inconsistent with ourselves; but wisdom is ever uniform and the same throughout; therefore he will have no variableness in his sentiments, his designs, or his measures, but approach as near to the divine immutability as can be conceived possible for created substance.

23. With all these accomplishments and perfections, we cannot doubt of his being unspeakably happy; and if any sparks of evil should be sprinkled upon him by contemplation of the miserable wretches in the two embodied states, they would be so overwhelmed with the joys flowing from elsewhere, that he would feel no more disturbance thereat than a man, having just received news of some great good fortune befallen him, would feel upon happening to break a China saucer. Nor need we apprehend his being satiated with the samenes of his prospect, having no other objects beside his own immense body to entertain him, with which, being long since perfectly acquainted, he can make no new discoveries for his amusement. For though pleasure cannot subsist without novelty in ourselves, because our bodily organs, losing their quickness upon repetition of the same objects, will not continue the relish they gave at first: yet where the spirits serve as organs to one another, it is not certain the same inconvenience must ensue. But supposing variety of objects and employments necessary to happiness, he will not want for plenty of either: for his immense body, the universe, though but one, and he have nothing external to gaze at, consists of numberless systems, each containing a multitude of under parts, whose incessant movements perpetually change the face of nature and exhibit a diversity of scenes as well among the larger members as in the minuter particles. Nor is it necessary that every component spirit should have the whole in contemplation at once; for large as their capacity may be we have never represented it as infinite; therefore their streams of communication may be varied by the pouring sometimes one kind of perceptions upon each other and sometimes another; or they may travel to and fro to visit different regions and take a nearer view of objects that lay at a distance from them before. Add to this, that the follies, the passions, and miscarriages of embodied creatures will probably furnish them with new scenes unknown to

wisdom, and dissimilar to anything of her production. Nor need we fear their want of employment to engage them, for considering the vast consumption of motion everywhere, which requires their continual efforts to renew it, besides the mutual communication of perceptions, and choice of those proper to be communicated, they will constantly have enough to do in giving impulse to the matter falling within their reach. For as they do not run along with the bodies they actuate, but hand them on to one another, they will have different functions to execute: sometimes busied in pushing forward the corpuscles of light, spreading the tails of comets, or regulating the vibrations of ether according to their proximity or distance from masses of gross matter: sometimes in gravitating heavy weights to earths, or holding the parts of metals in cohesion, or giving fluidity to liquors, or agitating the particles of fire, or contracting and dilating the circulating vessels in plants and animals.

24. We have heard talk of a beatific vision supposed to constitute or enhance the happiness of disembodied spirits, nor shall I attempt to disprove the possibility of such a supposition, for we know not the extent of our perceptivity. We may be capable of new senses, higher faculties, and sublimer reflections, than our present organization can exercise. When totally disengaged from the veil of matter enwrapping us, we may be able to see even as also we are seen, and discern sensibly that glorious object which no man can behold and live. But without this extraordinary privilege we may well imagine the universal soul must attain a completer knowledge of God than we can, though by the same way that we do, namely, by the contemplation of his works. For having the whole book of nature constantly open before him, and by the largeness of his understanding and mutual communication of perceptions throughout his substance, being able to comprehend the spacious pages at one glance, he will read there the whole divine economy, discerning the uses and wisdom of those parts which to us appear superfluous or mischievous, and forming a clear conception of the divine attributes, not excepting those unknown and inscrutable to man. Nor will it lessen his adoration to know, as from the account herein before given it may be inferred he must know, that nature is the work of his own hands and the regularity of her courses carried on by his own energy: for as a man who has done extraordinary things, if he thinks justly, will derive from thence a greater veneration for the power which gave him the sagacity and talents enabling him to perform them; so the universal agent will always bear in mind that he is but a minister and instrument in the hand of a superior upon whom he continually depends. For if God were to withdraw his material world for a moment, the spiritual would instantly lose its percipience and action, having neither object to discern, nor subject to act upon, nor means of communicating perceptions where none were excited. Nor can he forget that how well soever he may continue the order of succession in the courses of nature, his operations must have had a beginning, his intelligence some premises furnished for it to work upon, and there must have been some original order and position in matter to be the basis and foundation of his resolutions before he could make or act in pursuance of them. The existence of evil, which proves to us a stumbling-block, would teach him a useful lesson, for we may presume he would not admit it willingly in any part of the universe under his care: but the necessity of its being scattered somewhere must convince him that he is not omnipotent, but under control of a higher power by whom that necessity was imposed. And if the courses of nature are sometimes to be changed, new systems to be formed, he will perceive

modifications in his sensory directing them, thoughts and designs occurring there which he did not introduce himself. With all this we cannot doubt of his having as full an insight into the divine nature as is possible or requisite for created Being: he will find no perplexities in his ideas of the attributes, nor appearance of their clashing one with another: he will clearly comprehend the nature of infinite goodness, and be able to reconcile the permission of evil therewith: therefore will apply himself heartily to every task assigned him, well knowing that all are calculated for the benefit of the creature. He will be so intimately penetrated with the idea of the divine equity, that there will arise no opposition nor struggle for preference among the component parts of his substance: for each discerning that no hurt can befall another but what must redound to his own damage, the general interest will actuate them all, and self-love become benevolence. That sole virtue which accompanies us in the last stage of our existence, when the persuasions of reason shall be lost in intuition, and the expectation of future good swallowed up in the fruition of present.

25. This host of happy spirits called by one name, the universal soul, from their uniformity of action and sentiment, we suppose the receptacle for particular spirits as they can disengage themselves from their vital union with matter; and that upon disruption of a vehicle, the perceptive inhabitant will be discharged therein and incorporated therewith: whereby the communication with spiritual substance being opened, it will instantly partake of all the knowledge and designs of its neighbours, and immediately take its share in their operations according to the station wherein it happens to fall. And though leaving the traces of its former memory behind, it will have the records of the universal sensory to inspect, wherein is preserved the remembrance of events happening throughout nature more exactly and fully than can be comprised in any animal organization. Thus, in this state, there will be no infancy nor growth of faculties or advancement in learning, but the new comers upon their first arrival will stand upon the same footing with the old members, as if they had resided among them from everlasting. As they act in concert carrying on one plan of operation, the act of all will seem the act of every one, and each feel a kind of consciousness of what is performed by the whole company. For as among men concurring heartily in one undertaking, all claim the credit to themselves; the majority at an election exult as much as if the choice had depended upon their single votes, and a tradesman at a coffee-house triumphs in a victory and thinks himself entitled to say, We have beat the enemy, because he pays some trifle towards the supplies, or is a member of the nation whose quarrel it is; so the members of this mighty agent, the universal soul, although singly feeble, will partake in the joy of those stupendous works carried on by their united strength. For all contributing their activity to roll the celestial orbs in their appointed courses, to diffuse light throughout the vast expanse, to keep the elements in order, to distribute all things upon earth by number, weight, and measure, to produce and preserve the several species of plants and animals, to direct the affairs of men and turn the wheels of fortune, to fulfil invariably the Will of God and execute the mighty plan assigned them, the pleasure of the performance will redound entire to every one as if he had been the sole agent employed.

26. With all these sources of enjoyment, the contemplation of universal nature, the science of all operations as well in the largest as the minutest bodies, the possession of an enlarged understanding and perfect reason, the

assurance of an immortality and unchangeableness of character, the constant occupation without labour or difficulty in the most magnificent, delightful, and important works, the consciousness of acting invariably right, and the clear conception of the divine attributes, we may well admit this the happiest state created substance can be placed in, therefore we need seek no higher, but may take this for our idea of the kingdom of heaven. In that kingdom almost everything is the very reverse to what we find it upon earth: here we live single spirits vitally united to unwieldy masses of matter which but ill perform our services, for most of the parts of our composition lying out of our notice we have no command over them, their motions are for the most part mechanical and automatic, nor can we prevent diseases and disorders from gathering among them, nor passions, habits, and thoughts, cast upon us involuntarily from them; we depend upon things external for our uses and enjoyments and the sustentation of our bodies, therefore are liable to continual wants, disappointments, and accidents. There the spiritual substance being diffused everywhere has no more of matter to deal with than it can manage, directs the movements of every limb and fibre in this immense body, which containing everything requisite for his uses and enjoyments within itself, and being subject to no decay, needs nothing external; and each corporeal particle by the communication of perceptions serves the purposes of many spirits. Here we have the whole portion of actual evil distributed among us in all its various forms of pain, disease, disappointment, vexation, trouble, and uneasiness: there they have only the idea of it, which perhaps they find necessary to their happiness; for perception being transient and momentary, and probably not excited without some motion in matter, if they had not an apprehension of damage to ensue upon their forbearance, they would have no inducement to exert themselves in giving those motions to bodies from whence they receive all their perceptions. The narrowness of our views occasions private aims and contrariety of interests, so that half our cares are laid out in opposing one another's designs, whereby much of the power we might have is lost: but they, using one common understanding, proceed with perfect harmony, so that their strength, though singly far inferior to ours, becomes immense by their unanimity. We follow the gratification of our desires thinking of nothing further, and God works out his own purposes from them, giving an issue to our endeavours contrary to what we intended: they keep their eye steadily fixed upon the Will of God which it is their constant desire and delight to fulfil, therefore as nothing can happen anywhere contrary to that Will, nothing can happen contrary to their wishes. We labour for the most part to serve ourselves, not much regarding what ensues therefrom to our neighbours, nor can we do otherwise in many of our actions wherein nobody else has any concern: they pursue always the general good, so that love, pure judicious love, actuates all their motions, displaying itself in a cordial obedience to the fountain of blessings and sincere attachment to one another's interests.

27. This spiritual community being heaven and all space not occupied by matter being replete with spiritual substance, it follows that heaven is not local but everywhere, all around, above, below, on each side, and within us, filling not only the starry regions, but likewise the air, the earth, and the seas, and permeating the pores of all compound bodies. Therefore that we are out of heaven, is not owing to any distance we stand at from thence, but to our being pent up in walls of flesh which cut off our communication with the blessed spirits, and shut us out from all participation in their light;

and their joys. We are like persons inclosed each in a sentry-box having all the chinks and crannies stopped that might let in the least light or sound, and in this condition set down among the splendid throng in a full Ridotto: they would be alone in the midst of company, as knowing nothing of the gaiety and diversions passing round them. If they had strings reaching to one another's boxes they might make signs by them, learn in time to understand one another's motions, and carry on a sort of conversation together; but very imperfect in comparison of what they could do if let out and permitted to converse like other people. So we, while imprisoned in these earthly tabernacles, see little and know little of all that passes around us, and converse together imperfectly by the corporeal mediums of sights and sounds. Upon the dissolution of this gross body, we may find an inner integument still clinging round us; but when the appointed time shall deliver us from this too, we shall not have far to travel before we join our company: for wherever our vehicle leaves us, there we shall find heaven, and take our place and occupation therein immediately without any of that surprise, or awkwardness, or agitation, usually thrown upon our corporeal organs by scenes wholly new, but with the same readiness and familiarity as a man coming off a journey, having his own house, his own family, his own furniture and conveniences about him; for we shall then understand and apprehend, not by our old ideas, but by those of the universal mind, and partake in the expertness and full-digested remembrance belonging to that.

28. Though this notion of the mundane soul was first broached by the old philosophers, I hope the moderns will not be offended with me for attempting to revive it, since I have brought it at least to my own thinking compatible with some of the most important articles now received among us. For one cannot well imagine a more intimate communion of saints than that above described: the exemption from evil implies a release from punishment, and full forgiveness of sins: the unchangeableness and immortality of this soul are but other words to express a life everlasting: our incorporation thereinto, whereby we shall have the whole frame of material nature to supply us with objects and serve as instruments for us to act with, may be reckoned a resurrection of the body; for though this body were existent before, yet we may be said to rise again upon our admission into it, by being restored to our percipience and animal functions. Indeed, the vehicular state is a resurrection too, therefore that may be reckoned the first, or resurrection into the kingdom of Christ, and this of the mundane state of the second, when he shall deliver up all power to the Father; and whereas we are taught to expect a spiritual body on our rising again, we cannot thereby understand one composed of spirit, for that were a contradiction in terms, nor can any material composition better deserve such epithet than that whose every member, limb, and fibre is actuated by spirit. As to the vulgar notion of a resurrection in the same form and substance we carry about at present, the various ways in which it has been expounded, and many difficulties raised upon them all, sufficiently declare it untenable: and the reason ordinarily given, because the body being partaker in the deed ought to share in the reward, as well requires a resurrection of the sword a man murders with, or the Bank note he gives to charitable uses; for our mind is the sole agent, and our hands are as much instruments as anything we hold in them. But since the mind can neither perceive nor act without matter, there must be a resurrection in some

sense or other, that is, a re-instating in some composition answering the purposes of a body, to render her capable of another life. Lastly, the occupation proposed for us there is the glorifying our Maker, which cannot better be performed than by steadily fulfilling his Will, constantly attending his services, carrying on his appointed courses, executing his laws of nature, and heartily concurring in his beloved work, the general good and happiness of his creatures. This seems a more acceptable praise than singing hymns and psalms to all eternity: for obedience is better than sacrifice, and to do the Will of God than the fat of lambs.

29. I know of but one exception can be taken against the idea here given of heaven, which is, that it leaves no room for the blessed spirits to differ in their degrees of happiness as one star differeth from another star in glory. But since the communication of perceptions which constitutes their happiness is voluntary, whoso pleases may suppose them communicated in greater or less measure to every one according to his deserts, as we give more or less countenance to different persons in the same company according to our esteem of them. Yet it being customary to consider no more than one world besides this sublunary, and to speak promiscuously of the intermediate and final states, I should rather choose to interpret whatever is said of the different degrees of happiness as relating to the former, than admit a partiality and particular favour among the most perfect of created Beings.

30. I have now offered what I can conceive may be the condition of our intermediate and final states after we shall leave this world and be seen no more. My intention herein was to give a livelier idea of some important truths, which I think discoverable from our observation of nature and knowledge of the Divine Attributes, than could be entertained while they remained in abstract and general terms: namely, that there may be life, enjoyment, and action, out of this body; that there are other beings to whom what appears useless to us may be serviceable; that there is a connection of uses and interests throughout the whole creation; and that whatever befalls us here, though seeming nugatory or hurtful, will turn to our account some time or other. So far as any one shall find what I have here suggested answer this purpose, and impress stronger upon his imagination or display in more sensible colours what he knew before to be true, I shall be glad he will attend to me: for I did not propose it as an article of faith, and pretend to prove nothing by hypothesis, nor am so wedded thereto, but that if anything therein shall be made appear contradictory to the judgments of sound reasons, or hurtful to the mind or good manners, I shall be the foremost to reject it.

CHAP. XXIII.

THE VISION.

Speciosa dehinc miracula promat,
Antiphaten, Scyllamque, et cum Cyclope Charybdin.

One day, after having my thoughts intent all the morning upon the subject of the two foregoing chapters, I went out in the evening to a neighbour's house to recreate myself with a game at cards. After some time spent in this amusement, we sat down to supper, during which, according to the English custom, we began to settle the affairs of the

nation, particularly that important point now in agitation, a Spanish war, whereon we could not come to a satisfactory determination. For though we depended upon the valour of our fleets and armies to take Portobel, Carthagene, and the Havannah, at one compaign, we could not be sure that would end the war, and were a little doubtful how long we might be able to continue raising twelve millions a year, and conveniently pay the taxes necessary for the interest of such enormous sums. Under this difficulty, and finding that our own politicians could not agree, we wished for some of those to extricate us, of whom we had read wonders in former times, the Godolphins, the Burleighs, and the Walsinghams: and some of the company, who held that mankind degenerates every age, as well in bodily strength as in mental sagacity, wanted to conjure up the souls of Julius Cæsar or Philip of Macedon. This latter thought turned the discourse upon necromancy, and leaving the national concerns, which we believed would go on full as well without us, every one fell to consider how he might best gratify his curiosity if he were possessed of that art, what persons he should evoke from the shades, and what questions he should put to them. One was for seeing his relations and friends again, another for a tête-a-tête conference with Elizabeth or Mary of Scots, others for calling up Belisarius, Cicero, Archimedes, Alexander, and the heroes of antiquity: till I happening to say, I had read somewhere that Socrates learned to play upon the fiddle at threescore, that Plato made love-verses in his youth, and putting them in mind that they had all heard how Orpheus used to draw the trees and beasts after him by his music, the ladies declared they should be vastly delighted to hear a solo on the violin by a philosopher, or hoped his scholar would accompany him with an amorous sonnet of his own composing, and that the entertainment might conclude with a dance of forests full of lions, bears, and tigers, to a jig of the Thracian harper. Being thus drawn to think of the ancient sages, we proceeded to some of their peculiar doctrines, wishing to hear them explained by themselves, as likewise to know some particulars concerning their occupations and manner of living in the regions where they now inhabit. With conversation of this kind, partly serious, but mostly jocose, we passed the time until the company parted, which they did pretty early, some of them having a great way to go. When I came home, finding it not my hour of bed time, and being unwilling to fatigue my spirits with anything that might be called study, I walked to and fro in my chamber, giving my thoughts a liberty to run as they listed. I found ideas start up promiscuously from what I had thought of in the morning or heard in the evening, each introducing the next by any slight connection in that transient variety and wanton assemblage customary with imagination when judgment throws the reins upon her neck. In this manner I continued to be amused while undressing, and until laid upon my pillow: when having neither crudities, nor crying sins, nor debts, nor hopes of preferment, nor schemes of cajoling a county, or buying a borough, to break my rest, I presently fell fast asleep.

2. I cannot tell how soon afterwards it happened, but methought something broke on a sudden in my head, in the manner I have heard described in an apoplectic fit. Instantly I found my limbs and all my outer parts benumbed so that I had no feeling in them, yet I had still a feeling of my muscles, whose motions I could distinguish plainer than before: for I could perceive myself swell them in thickness and contract them in length, thereby drawing the tendons fastened to them, but what these tendons drew I could not perceive, having no knowledge of anything beyond. But this lasted only for

a moment, for the muscles quickly lost their feeling too, and I could perceive no further than the nerves or strings of bladders by which I injected a subtile fluid into them. Thus my sense seemed gradually to retire inwards, and as it withdrew, sensation seemed always to reside in the extremities of those parts wherewith I still retained a connection, and to convey notices from them which it had not done while it had any to convey from others beyond them. Just as a man straining to look at a distant prospect, overlooks things close before him, but if clouds intercept his sight from the remoter scenes, his eye contracts and presents him with a distinct view of those lying nearer. At the next step, my perception was confined to the valves closing the orifices of my nerves, which I could open and then feel the animal spirits rush in like the stream of a river when one pulls up a floodgate. At length I found myself reduced to my censory, where I could discern ideas of reflection and abstraction like pictures hanging round the walls of a room; or rather like those machines shown about for a sight, where the images continually change their places, or vanish, and others are made to start up by unseen springs: but I had not leisure to observe their motions, for the whole of what I have related passed in less time than I have been relating. The last thing I perceived was that I seemed clinging to something hard like a stick, much in the condition of a man who hangs by both his hands clasped round the bough of a tree, only with this difference, that the bough I clung to moved with a prodigious swiftness and dragged me along after it. Not liking to be hurried on, I knew not whither, with such impetuosity, I let go my hold, when instantly the stick slipping away left me behind utterly destitute of all sense and perception whatever

3. How long I remained in this state of total insensibility I know not, but was first roused out of it by something brushing along nimbly by me: I felt it touch me gently as it passed sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other. These sensations set my ideas afloat again, and though they appeared very obscure and confused, like those of a man not half awake, I had discernment enough to persuade me that I was now a defunct: that the stick I had clung to was that part of my human composition whereto I had been vitally united, which, as I afterwards learnt, being carried on with the annual motion of the earth after the rate of about nine hundred miles in a minute, had departed from me upon my quitting my hold: or in other words that I was actually departed into the other world. I rejoiced, however, to find I still retained my existence and perceptivity, and having been piously educated, cast up a short but fervent ejaculation to that power who governs both worlds, with an assured confidence of his being alike able and willing to provide for me in this as well as he had done in the former: but knowing that we have no title to expect assistance until having done the best we can by our own strength, I resolved not to be wanting to myself; for I presumed my activity remained with me too, but how to exert it was the question, for I knew of no limb or organ of sensation belonging to me, nor could find any muscle or instrument to act with. However, I determined to use my endeavours, and believing that the brushes I received were to be the first rudiments for laying the foundation of my future understanding, I made one strong effort at random with an eager desire of catching hold of whatever occasioned them, that I might feel what it was made of. Immediately I seemed to stretch out a hundred arms all around me, but with no better success than a man who should thrust his arms out at window, while the bricklayers are sweeping down tilesherds, brickbats, and pieces of mortar, from the gutters above him:

for I felt my limbs knocked about incessantly by a shower of hard balls, which besides hurting me grievously, turned me round and round by the violence of their strokes, as a chaff is whisked about in a whirlwind. This made me the more earnest to grope about for some stay which might keep me steady, but the more I strove the worse it proved, for no stay could I find. I do not know what might have been the consequence if I had not presently perceived something hold me and draw me aside from the troublesome stream of bullets: but as some of them still struck against my fingers, I judged it prudent to draw in my arms and give myself to the management of my new protector.

4. I now lay quiet and easy awhile, well pleased to find I had no bruises remaining, and that my blows smarted no longer than just in the instant of striking: but soon a new desire started up in my mind of seeing what it was that took so friendly care of me. As I did not know whether I had any eyes nor where they lay, I cast my attention every way in hopes of finding a peep-hole: upon this effort I presently saw little flashes of light sparkling and vanishing again on all sides of me, together with various objects, but all indistinct: being now satisfied I had the faculty of seeing, I attributed the little use I could make of it to my own hurry and want of management; so resolving to proceed with more calmness and caution, I confined my endeavours to a part near that that I was held by. After repeated trials I found I could form a set of optics, but they would return back again, almost as soon as I had thrust them out; till by a little further practice I learned to keep them steady so as to observe anything before me. I then beheld a kind of sack or bag filled out like a bladder with air, uniform everywhere excepting that from one place there came out the arm which held me, and from another a longish neck with a head upon it, having a meagre lank-jawed face, very like the prints I have seen before some editions of Locke's works. It looked upon me steadfastly with a mild and benign aspect, and the lips moved as in speaking. This made me quite impatient to hear what was said, but I was as deaf as a post: however, having already found myself provided with hands enow, and eyes enow, I did not despair of finding plenty of ears too, if I could but tell how to open them. My whole attention and desire being now bent upon hearing, my eyes sunk in directly and left me in the dark, but I heard a confused jumble of whispers, short, broken, and inarticulate at first, yet that did not discourage me, believing I should manage better by degrees as I had done in the use of my sight. Accordingly I could soon distinguish my own name repeated, which surprised me agreeably to find I was among friends. How's this! thinks I to myself, that the retired Ned Search, scarce known to twenty people in the other world, should be so well known here that the first person he meets accosts him by name! It must certainly be some old acquaintance whose face I have forgotten departed hither before me. Sure it can never be really John Locke himself sewn up here in a sack for his sins, for he died before I was born. After this soliloquy, reflecting that the more haste the worse speed, I moderated my impatience, and observing my motions carefully and minutely, it was not long before I formed a complete ear, with drum and everything requisite for the auditory function.

5. My good friend perceiving me prepared for an audience addressed me as follows. Welcome, Ned Search, into the vehicular state: you are in the hands of one who is not an utter stranger to you, though not your cotemporary: for know that I am John Locke, with whose writings you are

not unacquainted. I have observed a faint resemblance in your way of thinking with mine, which, though mingled with a great diversity of character, has given me a family kindness for you. I was apprized of your being to make a visit here, and came this way on purpose to assist you. I have already given you a seasonable relief when you were tossed about among those flying balls yonder, and am ready to do you further service in any way you shall want. Consider you are but a baby just born into this new world, and may find it expedient to put yourself under some tuition.—It is natural to suppose I wanted very much to thank him for his kind assistance and offers of continuing it: and to declare my willingness to submit to his guidance until he should teach me how to manage without giving him that trouble; but I knew not how to express myself. The business now was to attain the use of speech, which I no sooner attempted than I felt myself hung round with mouths and tongues innumerable. I was yet so inexpert in my faculties that I could exercise no more than one at a time: if I went to look I could hear nothing, if I listened I could see nothing, and now I tried to talk I could neither see nor hear: so wanting the guidance of my ears to direct me in the formation of my words, I strained all my mouths to make as much noise as possible that I might be sure of being heard; like those disputants who make up for their want of sense by their vehemence of vociferation. After some little time spent in this violent exercise, I returned to listening again, for suspecting my pronunciation might be somewhat defective I did not doubt my good tutor would set me right. I heard him laugh most immoderately, and when his mirth was over, Prithee, Ned, says he, what didst thou make those hideous mouths at me for? If you could have seen yourself you would have been frighted. Why you made a worse figure than the picture of Fame in a folio Virgil. I guessed at your meaning by your gaping, that you wanted to speak to me, but not a single sound did you utter. Don't you consider that though you do not want for tongue you have neithsr lungs nor respiration, and without breath the other organs of speech are useless. We do not talk by the mouth in this country, and if I showed you one in my face, it was only to put you upon exerting yourself, by exciting a desire of conversing with me, because I knew you had no notion of any other way of speaking. Look at me once more and observe how I manage: but contrive if you can to hold out an ear at the same time, for else you will not believe but that I play you tricks.——I endeavoured to do as I was bid, and as use makes perfectness, after two or three unsuccessful trials, I learned to see and hear together. I then saw his face had no mouth nor opening below the nose, but from thence downward was all enormous chin; nevertheless I could hear him speak distinctly. I took notice indeed that his voice was something different from the human, having a little twang like that of string music. ——Nay, says he, do not stand staring me in the face, you will learn nothing there: look down upon my vehicle.——I did so, and observed little fibres bouncing up with great strength and agility in a kind of net-work, consisting of various shaped meshes. I can liken them to nothing so well as the little wrinkles continually changing their form in the skin on top of warm milk set in the window to cool, only they moved much quicker, and with a more tremulous motion.—— There, says he, that is our way of talking: now try if you can copy the style.

6. I tried and tried again with might and main, but all to no purpose; for though I found myself all over in agitation, like a Quaker when the

spirit pours plentifully upon him, yet not a single sound or whisper could I get out: so that I began to despair of ever making progress in this new-fashion string language. My good patron saw my distress and laid a little innocent plot to relieve me. Your strokes, says he, are too gentle, and have too long intervals between. Do not you know the strings of a harpsichord will shake a long while after they cease to give any sound? such feeble quiverings will do no good: you must make your pulsations a great deal stronger, with nimble jerks following instantly upon one another. But I find you do not care to exert yourself: nay, if you grow idle, I must take another course with you.——On a sudden his head changed to the form of a lion's, with great gaping jaws full of monstrous fangs, and he shot out twenty paws armed with claws pointed as sharp as a needle. I was horribly frightened at this unexpected freak, in a friend and a philosopher, which I took for a fit of frenzy that had seized him. But not knowing how either to get out of his way, or defend myself, I exerted all my strength, and cried out O! with a more violent scream than that wherewith Belinda rent the affrighted skies when the rape was made upon her lock.—Very well, says he with a smile, having instantly resumed his human benign countenance, now we have broken the ice we shall go on swimmingly; I did not intend to hurt you: do not be angry with me for frightening you into a scholar when I could not make you one by instruction. But do me the favour to try whether you cannot repeat your O, without being in a passion: you need not brawl it out quite so vehemently as you did just now.—My terror had left so strong an impression upon my fancy that I had a clear idea of every little motion it had occasioned within me: with this help I found I could say O, in cool blood, as often as I pleased, and with as careless a tone as a very polite congregation, while adjusting their dress or thinking of their routs, when that little particle occurs in the responses of the litany. —Courage! my boy, says the preceptor: now you are perfect in O, we shall soon teach you A, E, I, and U: but mind me, child, you must ply close to your lesson and follow my directions, they will make your learning the easier.—Ay, thinks I, that I shall with a willing mind, for I long mightily to be asking you questions.

You know, continues he, that our faculties assist one another: therefore try now to thrust out a neck and head, with a pair of eyes and ears to it, that you may see yourself speak. I obeyed orders, and turning my face downwards, saw that I was made just like my neighbour: both like two tortoises, only inclosed in bags instead of shells. I did not think of amusing myself with brandishing arms and legs about, for being overjoyed at having recovered my speech, though as yet consisting only of one simple sound, I kept plying my O's with great delight in all pitches of voice from the highest to the lowest, all the while diligently watching the little fibres as they jumped and vibrated upon my skin.—Bravely done! says Locke. Why, you perform as dexterously as if you had served an apprenticeship: it is not every body can bend his neck so easily the first time. This is an advantage attending us who have used ourselves to reflection, for most of those who come from the other world have a great stiffness in their necks, they can see anything sooner than themselves. But since you have such a facility at retrospection, I would recommend to you to pull in your head, and examine what passes within your vehicle while you perform any of the functions you are already master of.—By following this admonition, I discovered that my bag or case was lined all over on the inside with little hairs like the nap of velvet, which were the first instruments for me to act upon: for by squeezing

any one or more of them, as one squeezes the kernel of an apple between finger and thumb, I could shoot them out, and in this manner performed all my actions; and I observed that many of them produced no external motion, but served only to present me with ideas of reflection. But my discovery of such a multitude of springs I had to employ, subjected me to one inconvenience: for those of different uses being promiscuously intermingled together, and every use requiring several of them to concur in operating towards it, I made frequent mistakes by touching the wrong springs. If I went to stretch out an arm, I should sometimes loll out a long tongue; if I wanted to form an ear, I should kick with a foot: if I endeavoured to look earnestly at an object, I should find a mathematical problem start up in my imagination. So I resolved to have recourse to my instructor to teach me the proper command of my faculties, and I did not doubt but he would begin with that of speech, which was what I wanted most earnestly to attain.

7. It would be tedious to relate all the particular lessons he gave me; let it suffice to say that he proceeded much in the same manner we teach children to read, instructing me first how to form the sound of letters, then syllables, and afterwards words. But I found the most difficulty with diphthongs, vowels preceding one another, and syllables having as much vowel as consonant. I could not say Chariot nor Extraordinary, but Charrit and Extodny, like the ladies, nor Beloved or Moveth, but Blovd and Moves, like most young parsons in reading the exhortation: nor could I presently get the knack of joining my words into one continued sentence, for in my first essays, making a kind of stoccato music, there seemed a stop between every sound; so he was forced to begin with sentences that we should account the most harsh. The first he tried me upon was that line of Ausonius, Sic mihi nux, nox, nix, nex fuit ante diem: then we went to Drayton's Court of Fayrie, Hop and Mop and Drop so clear, Pip and Trip and Skip, that were to Mab their sovereign ever dear, her special maids of honour. Fib and Tib, and Pinck and Pin, Tick and Quick, and Jill and Jin, Tit and Nit, and Wap and Win, the train that wait upon her. But he brought me pretty soon to Pope's harmonious versification, While melting music steals upon the sky, and softened sounds along the waters die, Smooth flow the waves, the breezes gently play, Belinda smiles, and all the world is gay: then to the Italian of Tasso, Ed al pavone spiegar la pompa de l' occhiute piume: Virgil's Avertens, rosea cervice refulsit, ambrosiæque comæ divinum vertice odorem spiravere; pedes vestis defluxit ad imos, et vera incessu patuit Dea: and lastly to some flowing Greek words, as Genet argurioio bioio, and Met okeanoio roaoon.

But, says he, we have another language among us we call the Sentient, in distinction from the Vocal, wherein I have been speaking to you. This is carried on by applying our vehicles close to one another, and raising certain figures or motions on our outsides, which communicate the like to our neighbour, and thereby excite in him the same ideas that gave rise to them in ourselves, making him, as it were, feel our thoughts. This is a much completer way of conversing, being not liable to misapprehension, provided the recipient takes care to remove all his own ideas, that none of them may confound or interfere with those delivered: but to do that effectually, requires great dexterity and long practice, therefore I will not attempt to teach you. You have gotten one language and that may serve your purpose while you stay here, so you be careful to employ it well.

8. It is easy to guess what was the first use I ought to make of my voice, as soon as I had attained a competent skill in the management of it: the

polite Reader's own imagination may suggest, better than I can relate, what fine speeches I made to thank my benefactor for the pains he had graciously bestowed upon me, to express the joy I felt on hearing that I had a particular share in his favour, and to assure him it should always be my utmost ambition to improve those features wherein he was pleased to say I bore him some faint resemblance.—Truce with your compliments, says he; we deal but little with that coin in this land of sincerity: we find an immediate pleasure in doing a good-natured thing, so want not the spur of applause to instigate us: we follow virtue for its own sake, that is, for the secret complacence of mind constantly attending it. But lest you should think the liking I have taken to you only a sudden fancy that may wear off again presently, be assured I look upon you as a relation. You know I had no children upon earth—I beg pardon, says I, for interrupting you: but though you left no issue of your body, you had a more prolific head than Jupiter, for he brought forth one single Minerva, but you have a most numerous family: the whole body of sound reasoners in the nation I came from, of which I should be proud to be admitted an unworthy member, derives from you.—He smiled at this conceit.—No, no, says he, it is not that way I make out the kindred; I trace it from a higher stock: it is but since your arrival here I consider you as my child, before I regarded you only as my cousin. I had no descendants below, and we being here Isangeloi, without marriage or sex, have no means of raising up any. Such of us as stand so circumstanced, especially those who have been tired out with the comfortless state of an old bachelor, provide themselves families by adoption, wherein we commonly choose among those of the same lineage with ourselves: for similitude of sentiments conciliates affection, and it has been observed in the race I am going to speak of, that the same turn and disposition of mind runs through the whole line.

You must have read that in the early ages such as applied themselves to the study of nature were reputed conjurers by the vulgar, thought knowing and expert in everything, and dignified with the appellation of wise men: not that they ever assumed this title to themselves, as being more sensible than anybody how little human science deserved it, but they could not help what other people called them. At length Pythagoras prevailed to have the name of wise man changed into that of admirer of wisdom, by which he intended to take upon himself the character of a person assiduously employed in the search of knowledge, without ever pretending to have attained it completely. Thus he became the founder and father of Philosophy, and his descendants for a while preserved the same tenor of conduct and temper of mind; always inquisitive, always improving, sensible their greatest wisdom lay in the knowledge of their ignorance, and unsolicitous to conceal it. But in process of time another set of persons mingled among them, whether really of the family, but tainted with a corrupt mixture of foreign blood, or whether a spurious issue gaining admittance through the negligence of the heralds. These folks, finding how great submission had been paid to the ipse dixit of the founder, and from thence supposing he delivered his doctrines as oracular truths, never to be controverted or examined, thought to prove themselves his offspring by an air of positiveness and self sufficiency: so they set up for oracles too, issued their ipse dixits like the edict of an emperor, and re-assumed that claim to wisdom which he had taken so much pains to reject.

From thenceforward the family became parted into two branches, the Searches and the Knowals. The former, retaining the spirit of their an-

cestor, were perpetually searching after knowledge without ever thinking they had enough, pursuing always the useful rather than the curious or regarding the latter only as it might be made subservient to the former. Diffident of their understanding they examined their premises carefully before they built upon them, and submitted their deductions to a review upon proper occasions: and though despairing of absolute certainty in anything, they wanted not moral assurance to keep them steady in following the best lights of their judgment. In their intercourse with others they were docible, humble, and modest, willing to learn of anybody, and ready to communicate what they had were it ever so small: desirous of reputation only as it might gain them the better hearing, wishing to be believed no further than as they could offer reasons convincing to the hearer: lovers of unity and reconcilement rather than opposition, striving to interpret a different opinion so as to bring it compatible with their own rather than to overthrow it.

On the contrary, the Knowals, confident in their abilities, soon thought themselves masters of whatever they undertook: they scorned to examine their principles minutely as betraying a want of genius and penetration, so they commonly took up their tenets at hap-hazard, and then pleased themselves with showing how dexterously they could maintain them: more solicitous to gain the applause than promote the benefit of mankind: assuming, peremptory, and overbearing, proving everything by demonstration, or expecting their word should be taken in lieu of demonstration: impatient of contradiction themselves and delighted to overthrow all who but seemed to differ from them. This branch produced the Sophists of Greece, the Academics of after times who would maintain the pro and con upon any subject proposed, the schoolmen and popish doctors in the dark ages of Christianity. According to the humour of the times they lived in, they would brag being skilful in all arts whatever, even to making the shoes upon their feet and ring upon their finger; or of running ye off two hundred lines while they stood upon one leg; or of writing a gallop and furnishing sheets for the press faster than they could be printed off. In modern days there have been two off-sets sprung out from them: the Methodists, who pretend to know the secrets of Heaven and deliver all their fancies with a Thus saith the Lord: and the Freethinkers, who though sole masters of reason, do not use it for the information of mankind but only to pick holes in the works of others, and if they can make themselves laugh esteem it the same as making an adversary submit.

The Search branch, not fond of putting themselves forward, have scarce ever composed a visible Church, but lie dispersed up and down, minding their own business quietly according to their several talents and stations. To this branch belong those who have made any real improvement, not only in philosophy, but in any art or science conducive to the benefit of mankind, and those who, wanting ability to strike out improvements of their own, endeavour fairly to understand and make a good use of those imparted to them by others. For many of the Searches have very moderate parts, but then they do the best that is to be done with them: on the other hand we often find shining talents among the Knowals, but then they seek no more than to shine with them, and it is well if they do not turn them to mischievous purposes.

9. As I was a Search myself it is natural for me to favour my own relations, and I need not use flattery to persuade you of your being one: for it is not brightness of parts nor extensiveness of learning, but an honest, industrious temper, a cautious freedom of inquiry, a sobriety of mind, and

humility of disposition, that characterize our line. If I had found no other mark I should have known you for a true Search by the pliableness of your neck. The Knowals have a wonderful stiffness in the vertebræ, therefore they judge of their size by the noise they make, and having most of them pretty loud voices they despise the rest of us as so many pigmies. Pray now did you not fancy yourself bigger than you are before I made you thrust out a head to look? Very true, says I, and I wondered how such a shrimp as you could drag about such a great carcass as mine: but that was not the first time I have found the benefit of retrospection. When I first set out to pursue the Light of Nature, I thought myself a stout fellow capable of mighty things, till having thrust out half my body and surveyed my person exclusive of the clothing, I found it strangely dwindled into a button.—If you can contrive, says he, to work a few golden threads into your button it will be better worth than a bladder full of air.

But to speak my mind freely, you have worked up your button in a manner not very suitable to my taste; you have a great many more flights than ever I pretended to. I should never have thought of likening the human machine sometimes to a mill, sometimes to a study hung round with bells, sometimes to a chamber organ; nor of proving by a chess-board that the sphere of a spirit's presence is wide enough to contain sixty-four particles of matter, nor of computing the corpuscles of light in a grain of wax, or absolute pressure of ether upon a guinea: much less should I have ventured to introduce Hatchet the carpenter, or the cook making plum-pudding into a metaphysical discourse, or bring a cat to assist in an optical experiment. Therefore I told you before that you have some resemblance mixed with a great deal of diversity: but whatever other features you have, since I discern the attentive prying eye, the modest brow, the serenely serious countenance, and flexible neck of the Searches, and find you here in the helpless condition of a new-born babe, it raises a kind of paternal extinct towards you.—And I, says I, feel myself possessed with a filial reverence and dependence. I begin to wish I had not taken notice of your annexing the faculty of thinking to a system of matter, I am afraid you think me an ungracious boy, but indeed it was nothing but my zeal to defend the spirituality of the mind, which that position of yours had been employed to overthrow, that drew me in to contradict you.—Oh! says he, you need no apologies: we Searches are the last people in both worlds to take offence at anybody for differing from us. As we desire nothing but truth, whatever liberties are taken with us out of an honest regard to that, if they do not convince, neither do they displease us. I assure you I do not think a whit the worse of you upon that account, nor for your battling my doctrine of consciousness and the uneasiness of desire. I see plainly you did not go out of your way to meddle with me nor dispute in the Knowal spirit of opposition and rivalship, by the pains you take to explain the forbearance and continuance of action, and to distinguish between want and desire, so as that we might both retain our opinions consistently with each other.

Neither do I absolutely blame you for your sallies of imagination, for I know every one must follow the bent of his genius; to do otherwise would be like dancing in fetters: but I doubt you have been dabbling with the French and Italian authors. Take care you do not catch the grimace and levity of the one, the quaintness and marvellous of the other. Thank you, Papa, says I, for your kind advice. As to the French and Italians I never had much notion of them, I endeavour rather to take my taste in matters

of humour from our cousin Addison. But I cannot yet be quite out of conceit with my flightiness, because but for that perhaps I had not enjoyed the pleasure of your conversation here, nor ever seen that lion's face of yours, which first made me a spokesman in this vehicular language. Besides, if I remember right, many of our ancestors have soared upon eagle's wings before now. Your great uncle Plato gives large scope to imagination especially in his Phædrus and Timæus, and introduces images as low as the carpenter, the cook, or the cat, in many of his dialogues. Nay, I have been told by Prince Maurice's parrot, who you know deserves credit, being a rational animal, that you yourself were not utterly averse to the familiar and the marvellous. You are a saucy Jack, says he, smiling, to come over me thus with my parrot. But I related no more than I believed myself: you tell stories that no mortal can believe.—So did uncle Esop, says I, Hesiod, Homer, and even great grandpapa himself when he talked of his golden thigh, and having fought Menelaus at the Trojan war.

10. But, continued I, though I suppose the true reason of my blending the serious and the trifling, the useful and the curious, might be the turn of my imagination drawing me so to do, yet with submission I seem to have found a good reason to justify me in following the bias. You know everything is not proper to be said to everybody, therefore our predecessors had their esoterics and exoterics, and delivering their lectures by word of mouth, adapted their discourses to their audience: but we moderns, having no other channel to convey our thoughts than the press, cannot pick and choose our company, but must pour out meat and milk into the same dish; leaving it to the men and the babes to help themselves, by which means some of the latter might swallow viands that would not only offend their palates but might really prejudice them in their healths. Now if we can cook up our messes of both sorts in such Frenchifyed manner as that the eye cannot presently distinguish which is which, our guests must cull and carve for themselves, and taste before they eat, each taking what suits his palate and digestion, looking upon the hard and odd tasted bits as intended only for garnish of the dish. I have said so much in recommendation of virtue, that I hope nobody believes I ever intended to lessen her influence in the least, but as the same observations seem to weaken it in the minds of some, which tend to establish it more firmly in those of others, I endeavour to mingle jest and earnest, speculation and argument, promiscuously, wishing that one man might take me in jest in those very places where another understands me in sober sadness. Therefore, if anybody finds anything that appears to overthrow the common rules of religion or morality, let him suppose that I am only amusing the speculative, or that he does not comprehend my drift; or that I have no other than to exercise my talents, or show how dexterously I can walk in slippery places, or anything rather than he should mind me seriously.—Well, says he, I can absolve you for your uprightness of intention, and honest care to avoid hurting the scrupulous. Perhaps I might have taken the like method had I had a more lively vein of fancy; but then I should have studied to imitate our progenitors, who were never superficial though they sometimes showed a sparkling outside. When they talked the most familiarly, it was to gain the readier attention to some important truths. If they introduced coarse and vulgar images, there was always some valuable substance within. While they seemed only to set their hearers agape with an idle story of a cock and a bull, they would slily steal in some solid reflection one might be glad to remember. They were wanton with discretion, and careless by

design. Therefore I will not enjoin you against following their example, provided you follow it throughout: do not trifle for trifling sake, nor unless you have some good purpose to attain by it.——If my execution, says I, shall prove answerable to my design, I dare undertake to satisfy you: but I can promise only for my endeavours, the success is not in my power.

11. But that I may not degenerate from the worthy ancestors you tell me I am descended from, let me give way to the inquisitive temper of the Searches who want to be informed of every particular they think worth inquiry. And since I have learned from you to seek for knowledge from contemplation of the phenomena exhibited, give me leave to ask some questions concerning those I have already experienced. I found an easy passage from the other world, one momentary pang I felt upon the breaking of some vessel in my head, but afterwards my senses retired still further and further inward until I lost them quite without pain or uneasiness. Pray, is the stroke of death always so gentle, or was I favoured in a particular manner? I have read in grave authors that the soul cannot be torn from the body without more pungent anguish than drawing all the teeth from one's jaws or tearing the skin from one's flesh: and the poets describe the gates of death as surrounded with terrors, pains, regrets, and despondencies.—Prithee, says my patron, do not mind either of those gentlemen; they pronounce confidently upon things they know nothing of: but you must distinguish between the gates of death and the avenues leading thereto. Men are generally brought to their end by some violent distemper or grievous wound or bruise, and these are certainly painful, but so are they to those who recover from them. I remember, says I, to have heard an eminent physician, now with you, say, that a man who recovers from a bad fever suffers more than him that dies of it.—The doctor, says he, was in the right: for it is the struggle between nature and the disease that makes the pain; when either ceases to resist, the patient finds ease. It requires as much vigour in the organs of sensation to give pain as pleasure, and when they have lost their tone, they can excite neither. The same may be said of those of reflection, for when imagination is become stupefied it can no more exhibit ideas of terror and melancholy than it can those of joy and content. As for the convulsions called the agonies of death, they are merely mechanical, not expressions of uneasiness, but like the twitchings we sometimes feel in our limbs, or habits men get of cutting faces. Therefore, whoever has gone through a painful, dangerous distemper, and given himself over as past recovery, knows the worst: nor has death itself, abstracted from the harbingers of it, anything terrible.—I am glad to hear you say so, says I, for the sake of those who are to take the same passage after me.

12. But how came I among that river of stones? what are they, and who threw them at me so violently?—Upon quitting your vital hold, says he, which you might have done at any time before, but for want of knowing what kind of action to exert, for you know we can do nothing without an idea of the thing we are to do, your body, carried along by the Earth's motion, left you behind: while the nocturnal shadow protected you, you remained insensible and quiet, but that soon departing too exposed you to the rays of light, which follow one another in several lines, leaving large spaces between, and you being of very light substance, they only shoved you gently from one line to another by very oblique strokes, which gave you those brushes you first felt and awakened your ideas: until upon thrusting your arms directly into the stream, they buffeted you about in the

manner I found you. So the streams you complain of, are no other than the corpuscles of light, darted incessantly from the Sun and Stars.—Nay, now, Papa, says I, you treat me like a child indeed. Am I to swallow this, or is it an esoteric, that we babes are to take for garnish of the dish? Sure the light of this country must be a vastly grosser element than ours in old England: instead of being fit to enter the tender tunicles of the eye without hurting, it is enough to knock out one's brains. I am sure I found no colours, nor anything but bumps, and bangs, amid the bright effulgence poured round me. You forget, says he, your own doctrine, that all magnitude is relative. The light here is the very same with that below, but you are not the man you was. You are but an atom in respect of your former body, and that makes you think the corpuscles of light so much bigger, by comparison with yourself.—Truly, says I, I seem to myself a good proper sized person: what though I am but a bag and not a man, methinks, I could hold two good Winchester bushels of corn, without bursting.—No no, says he, little gentleman, thousands such as you might creep into a single grain. But your present composition being much finer than your former, that which before was the object of vision becomes now an object of touch. ——Touch, indeed, quoth I, with a witness! if we have nothing softer to touch I shall never desire to use my fingers again as long as I am a vehicle.

13. Since then, continued I, we can only feel the light, how come we to see one another so plainly? Is ether such a jack of all trades, as to serve for light, and sound, and everything?—Our ether, says he, contains various mixtures, though you folks below use to call it all by one general name, because you cannot distinguish them. And so you do water and air, yet you may know by the different tastes and sediments of the clearest waters, and the substances extracted from them by chymistry, that they are not homogeneous. The same you may know of air, by the clouds, vapours, lightnings, and meteors formed there, by the dust falling upon your furniture, the concretions gathering upon tops of walls and bark of trees. In like manner ether consists of many dissimilar fluids respectively performing the office of light, sounds, flavours, odours, and objects of other senses you know nothing of. It supplies us likewise with a pabulum for our sustenance. Will you taste it? I think you look a little faintish as if you wanted refreshment. —Now you put it in my head, says I, I do find myself very hungry, though I was so busy in attending to you I did not perceive it before.—Come, says he, put out an arm at one end of your vehicle for me to pull you along, for our pasture does not grow everywhere, it comes from the tails of comets, dispersed up and down in long gleams throughout the vortices. I know of a very good layer about a hundred miles off; we shall be there in an instant. —No sooner said than done: he set me down in the stream, and bid me open my mouths, but not gape so wide as I had done before.—But, says I, mayn't I overeat myself? Now I have left my old cravings behind, I should be sorry to let any new ones get the better of me.—Never fear, says he, you will contract no vices here, if you have not brought any with you.— Upon opening my lips, I found a delicious clamminess hang about my tongues and palates, and though I could not swallow, I felt it insinuate into my pores, as the vivifying spirit of air does into a man's lungs, and refresh me prodigiously. As soon as I had enough it would cling no longer, but I perceived my mouths empty.—Well, says Locke, how do you like our celestial ambrosia?—Charmingly, quoth I. It is better than all the sauces of a French cook; better than venison, turtle, or even than a slice of good

mutton after a whole morning's air and exercise; and which is best of all to a Search, one may indulge freely without danger of excess.

14. We came back as quick as we went, and I, all life and spirits, without any of that heat or listlessness usual upon a plentiful meal of earthly cates, began to throw my legs and arms about and exercise all my faculties with more dexterity and alertness than I had done yet. I was so pleased with my pastime that I could not help crying out, Methinks I perform a multitude of feats for such a little fellow; I like this agile body hugely: it is a thousand times better than that great clumsy carcass I was stifled up in upon earth.

But if I am really the minute insect you would persuade me, thousands of whom might creep into a grain of corn, how is there room for that variety of parts I contain? I have arms, and legs, and eyes, and ears, and mouths all around me, every one of these must have muscles and fibres to move them, besides organs of reflection, vocal fibres, and those numberless springs, composing the velvet nap in my inside, by which I move everything else.———You forget again, says he, your chapter upon the divisibility of matter, and that the smallest conceivable particle may contain as great variety of works as the whole human machinery. But you multiply the parts of your composition too fast: do not you know that all matter is homogenous, and the secondary qualities of compounds result from their form? The same texture may form an eye, or an ear, or any other organ, according as the threads of it are variously disposed, provided the agent have a command over every particular thread to hold it in what posture he thinks proper. We have a little mixture of flesh with vessels fitted for vital circulation, carried on mechanically, but this is very little in proportion to our system of sensory and motory nerves, which lying within a small compass, our spirit, bearing as large a share in our whole composition as our body, is present throughout the greatest part of them, and operates almost immediately without that long string of channels beyond one another, propagating motion to the human members.

Not that you have acquired any new instruments of action upon coming hither, for you had all you now possess before you left your terrestrial mansion, but the gross veils encompassing you there were an impediment to your functions: all the velvet springs that did not communicate with some nerve of your outer frame being wholly useless to you. Upon being delivered from our corporeal manacles, we have the command of every part belonging to us as soon as we have learnt the ready use of them by competent practice. You shall see me now throw myself into a variety of shapes to satisfy you of what I say.—At this word he played all the pranks of a Proteus, first a man, then a horse, an eagle, a dolphin, a serpent, a stream of water, a flame of fire, a Briareus, an Argos, a Virgilian Fame, a polypus.—Upon my word, says I, this is very pretty sport: you can never want divertisement, being such a nation of Harlequins.—We do not amuse ourselves with these gambols, says he, we have something else to do: I only played them now to show you what you are capable of.

We have another slight of hand we are more fond of practising: we have our imagination as perfectly under command as our limbs, so can raise passions and desires of any sort we find expedient. Passion you know assists greatly in the exertion of activity, and you have found a secret unknown to former moralists, that happiness consists chiefly in the gratification of desire; therefore it may be said of passion and desire, as of fire and

water, that they are excellent servants, but very bad masters. We never let them get the mastery over us; as we take them up we can lay them down again the moment we please, so to adopt your distinction, never have any wants though we abound in desires.—O, charming! cries I, this is a most desirable accomplishment. Pray, dear good father and tutor, cannot you instruct me in this art? I had rather you would begin to teach me this than put me in the way of exerting those new senses you spoke of.

15. You will not have time, replied he, to make much progress: it is a difficult lesson, not to be learned presently. As to more senses, you have enow already: the two of sight and hearing, together with the vocal language you have acquired, will suffice for all you have to do during your short stay among us.——Alas! alas! cries I. Now you strike me quite down. What, then! Am I to be snatched away from this new life in my cradle? I was in hopes I was settled here for two or three thousand years at least.——I tell you, says my tutor, you are not come now to reside among us, but only upon a visit, in order to carry back an idea of this place and people to your countrymen. It will not be many years before we shall have you here again to take up your abode among us, and the manner of it will depend very much upon your conduct below. Possess your mind with becoming sentiments of that power who presides over both worlds, and do all the good you can to your fellow-creatures: no matter how small your powers be, the part you are to act is of divine appointment, it is your business to act it well. Endeavour what you can towards moderating your passions, and bending desire to the ply of reason: it will make you apter to learn that science when you come here again. We have many regions in this country: perhaps upon your return you may not find everything just as you have seen it now, nor may I be in the way to assist you: but wherever you fall, if you come rightly prepared, God will find you a protector, and a commodious habitation, fitted for a life of happiness. I listened attentively to his advice, hoped to retain it strongly in memory, and that the idea he had already given me of things here would instigate me to follow it. And am I then, says I, to travel back the irremeable way? I thought nature had opposed indissoluble bars against the return of a departed soul to its old habitation.——Your present journey, says he, is supernatural, so being out of the course of nature, I will not pretend to account for it. The like has never happened within my remembrance nor that of any I have conversed with. That stroke you felt in your head was not a real apoplexy, for your body lies below as sound and entire as before you fell asleep, without rupture or disorder in any of its vessels, still performing its vital circulations and secretions, though destitute of all thought and sensation.

16. And you came her differently accoutred from other travellers, for you have brought away your memory and imagination along with you; not that they have not the tablets of those faculties too, but without any writing or figures whatsoever upon them; all their old traces, their science, their sentiments, their habits, their desires, their experience, and in general their ideas, totally effaced: so they come into this world as much a blank paper as ever they were born into the last, ignorant and helpless, and having everything to learn. Sensation begins the fresh writing upon them, from whence grow ideas of reflection running into combinations and associations, generating comparisons, distinctions, and relations, and at length forming judgment and understanding: thus they rise to knowledge slowly and gradually, in the manner they did in their former state. Some or other of

us are constantly near at hand ready to undertake their nurture, to lead them into the ambrosial streams as they have occasion, to assist in opening their new faculties, and instil instruction into them as they can receive it.—With your leave, says I, good master, I would beg your information concerning two difficulties that occur upon this theory of the blank paper. One is, how you can remember what you knew below so well as I find you do: the other, how your condition here can be affected by your former deportment, if you leave all your old sentiments, habits, and passions, behind you. Is there any judicature to assign your several fortunes according to your merits.

17. He replied, let us consider your difficulties one at a time: but we will begin with the last, because that may help to explain the former. We receive not our portions by the decision of any visible judicature, but all things fall out among us according to the operation of natural causes: nevertheless, we know that nature does not work by chance, but her courses are established in wisdom and justice, so as by a chain of inevitable consequences to answer the purpose of a strict and impartial judicature. Our vehicles, by lying so long enclosed in human bodies, receive a change in their texture from the continual action thereof, so that we come out diversely modified with different talents, natural parts and genius, according to the way of life we had followed before; we leave indeed all our old acquisitions behind, but bring with us a particular aptness to make new ones similar to those we possessed before. The laws of nature are so provided, that vice weakens the animal powers, distorts the mental organs, and introduces particles of gross matter into the delicate body, which give racking pains and cause grievous disorders of mind. Whereas the practice of virtue strengthens the constitution, purifies the faculties, and gives a happy facility to acquire the same virtues again. As no man is perfectly virtuous, none arrives here without a mixture of terrene concretion, which proves very troublesome and a hindrance to his operations. In some it is so deeply infixed as never to be moved, so as to be forced to abandon those poor wretches to misery and despair: the rest furnish us with a great part of our employment to clear them of their obstructions, which requires much time and pains, the more or less of both and attended with the greater or less inconvenience to them in the mean while according to the degrees of foulness they have contracted. Thus every man receives the just reward or punishment of his actions by the ministry of second causes without needing a formal trial and judgment.

18. To come now to your other difficulty: it is easy to comprehend from what has been said upon the first, that we may know by the condition a new comer appears in, what have been his courses of behaviour, his way of living, the company he has consorted, or objects he has conversed with, and consequently the particular country he came from supplying him with them: and by tracing back our own residence in like manner we may discover who has been our relation, our friend, or our compatriot. You may suppose likewise that ether being extremely voluble and elastic, not a dust can stir upon earth but must affect its vibrations and disposition of its particles here: and we, having a very piercing sight to discern the minutest objects together with a great readiness at investigating causes from effects, can read in the situation of the fluids composing ether all that passes or has passed below. But as I doubt it will be difficult to make you sensible how we can do this, I shall pass on to another method you may more easily

comprehend. You remember I told you of our sentient language, wherein, by withdrawing our own ideas, we can perceive those arising in any other vehicle applied close to our side: now we can do the same with respect to living men, for by applying ourselves close to their sensories, though their coats being thicker they would hear nothing of us if we were to speak to them, yet we can discern all they know or remember or think on. We are not very fond of this employment, the sublunary air being not agreeable to us, but some of us go down from time to time to bring accounts for the benefit of the rest. As other vehicles have played the same game with us formerly while we were alive, they can inform us of particulars happening or relating to ourselves which we had utterly forgotten. And thus I may be said to remember occurrences I am not conscious of, as you could remember the transactions of ancient times which you had read in history. When you come to converse with our people you will find that, notwithstanding their coming here a mere blank paper, they have since got written upon it an exact memorial of their past life and conversation.

19. I readily apprehend, says I, this last method of recovering your former traces, though I cannot say the same of the other two. But if these new-born vehicles advance so slowly in their learning, how came I to make such a rapid progress as I seem to have done? You do not consider, says he, you brought your imagination with you and old stock of ideas, so had little more to do. I needed only lead you to the exertion of your new senses, you had judgments and reflections in store, by which you could make use of their notices; only bring you to your voice, for you had matter ready for utterance as soon as you could pronounce it. And let me tell you your progress has been more rapid than you think of. How long do you imagine you have been among us?——Why, I cannot tell exactly, says I, having observed no distinction of days and nights: but by the many trials I made before I could get the tolerable management of my faculties, and the many lectures you have favoured me with, I should guess myself about a fortnight or three weeks old.——What sort of time, says he, do you reckon by? ——Time! says I. I do not understand you: I know but one sort wherein sixty minutes go to an hour, and twenty-four hours to a day.——Ay, but, says he, I mean celestial or sublunary time. You know, I have told you below, that we measure time by the succession of ideas: now our ideas here flow in so much quicker succession than those of heavy mortals upon earth, that we pass a great deal more time between sun and sun. The clocks you left at home have gone but one hour, forty-two minutes, and fourteen seconds, since I first found you boxing with the corpuscles of light.—Surprising! says I. Now this ends another wonder of mine, that I never felt myself drowsy all this while.—No more would you, says he, if you were to stay ever so long. We never sleep, nor ever find the want of it.—Then, says I, how do you find employment for your time of which you have so much more than other people? Does it never hang heavy upon your hands?

20. Never in the least, says he. We have an inexhaustible variety of employments: when we have enough of one, we find others ready at hand to which we can turn with fresh relish: you do not know what a field we have to expatiate in. There is the nurture and education of our adopted families, the providing instruments to pick out the terrene concretion gotten into them: these we procure from the planetary systems, for you know that Newton tells you, that air is an extract of little particles from the most solid bodies, so it furnishes us with fine spiculæ of steel, silver, gold, or any

other hard substance we want. The dividing the ambrosial streams to disperse them about more equally, as you disperse your New River water for the uses of the several quarters of the town. The journey down to earth, to learn what passes there. Studying or practising that art of reading I mentioned before, by the disposition of ethereal fluids, and investigation of causes from effects. Observing one another's talents and characters, which we may call the knowledge of the world. Purifying ourselves from any fæces remaining within us, or removing any new concretions that might gather: for we have the seeds of diseases among us, though we suffer none of them to grow, because we can expel them almost as easily as you could have washed the soil off your body. Besides the benefit of conversation by our sentient language, wherein we can mutually impart and receive information of all kinds, and from all quarters, with the greatest readiness and precision. Then we can travel with incredible swiftness to distant regions of the world, follow the motions of the heavenly bodies, study the systems o nature and economy of Providence, and from thence rise to the Divine Attributes: which let me tell you afford larger scope for contemplation and delightful wonder than I can explain to you in a manner suitable to your conception.

These are noble occupations well worthy the attention of a rational creature and copious enough in their several branches to engage our attention incessantly: if we had any vacancies, we should not want means of filling them up with divertisement, for we could gather materials of all sorts from the several atmospheres, and as those little particles, which repel so strongly at a small distance, would cohere as strongly if brought into contact, we might practise the mechanic arts, fabricate various machines, and weave curious textures for our entertainment; but we have no use for those things and no leisure to throw away upon trifles. Add to this the great agility and pliancy of our bodies, of which I have given you ocular demonstration, and our absolute command over desire. We have none of that sullenness and perverseness which often sets you mortals against things in themselves agreeable: on the contrary we can turn desire on the most insipid objects or make those pleasant which naturally had nothing alluring, upon proper occasion, if nothing more inviting or important should offer. I was as much pleased in running through those metamorphoses I showed you a little while ago as you could be in the novelty of the sight, and could this instant, if there were good reason for it, apply as eagerly to a game at push pin as any child of four years old. With all these advantages you may well conceive we have work enough before us to take up an eternity without weariness or satiety.

21. What then, says I, are you to live for ever in this vehicular state? Not so, answered he, we are longevous, but not eternal: yet we reckon ourselves immortal because we do not look upon our departure as a death. We have not all the same length of life allotted to us, some depart sooner, others later, but we all wear out our natural terms, having neither diseases nor wounds nor destructive accidents among us; for the threads of our texture, though extremely pliable, are of so tough a nature that nothing can break them: when the appointed time comes, our vehicles, worn thin by age in some particular part, suddenly burst and let loose the inclosed spirit. Those who have gone through the most arduous and painful trials below commonly go first: next to them such as have died before their birth or in their tender infancy: but none were ever known to be advanced, for so we term our departure, before they have entirely purged themselves from all remains of their terrene concretions. By our thorough insight into nature,

we know assuredly that there is still a third world beyond this, a world of purer love, stricter harmony, higher capacities, and more exalted happiness, than we now possess, replete with spiritual substance wherein we shall be absorbed: therefore, instead of condoling, we congratulate one another upon discovering signs of an approaching dissolution. Nevertheless, being so amply provided here, we live perfectly well satisfied with our present condition, content to stay here forever if it so pleased God, yet desirous and glad to be advanced upon receiving the summons to a higher station.

22. You give me, says I, a most inviting description of your situation and way of life: methinks it is worth any pains I can take, for the time I am still to grovel upon the earth below, to fit myself for a state so abounding in sources of present enjoyment, with such glorious expectations beyond. But since you have mentioned conversation as one of your principal amusements, pray where do you find your company? I suppose they gather together in cities, and we are here in some remote desert, out of the way of any road, for I have not seen a soul besides yourself since I could use my eyes. That is, says he, because you have not made the full use of them. Put me out twenty now all on one side, and direct them upon the same point: then look about ye and observe what you can see. Oh! now I see, says I, a multitude of long lank bags flitting by me like shadows; but they all go the same way. Have they any wings? for I protest I cannot discern. They whisk along so nimbly I cannot get a distinct view of them. And now I recollect, when you carried me to the ambrosial fountain, you kept kicking behind you all the way, like a dab-chick in diving, with a pair of sprawling legs, one on each side of me. But I cannot guess what you did with them; for though I can sprawl out legs too, I feel neither ground to tread on, nor water to push against, and I am afraid to stretch them out too far, for fear of those plaguy rays of light knocking against my shins.

Those very rays, says he, so formidable to you, are the springs to convey us on all our journeys. Do not you know that in mills, watches, and other complicated machines, one power is made to produce various movements? The stream, for instance, driving a throwing mill, runs always directly forward one way, yet the artist finds means of turning this force laterally or obliquely, or circularly, upon any of the works. In like manner we make a more simple machine of ourselves, for thrusting a leg against some corpuscle of light, we take any momentum we please therefrom, and any direction within the compass of a quadrant. You are sensible it is expedient for our speed that we should take a very oblique direction, making as small an angle as possible with the line of the ray: but as this must still throw us away from it, in time, we quickly find another ray on our other side, from whence we take with another leg a direction equally oblique, but turned the contrary way. Thus we pass along between two rays, one for right foot, and the other for left, much in the same manner as a Dutchman skating upon the ice. Our motion indeed is a little serpentine, but the rays being no more than one thousandth of an inch apart, and we going about ten miles at a step when we are in haste, this small undulation may well pass for a right line. As the ether makes resistance against our light bodies, we throw out lengthways in the form of worms when we go forwards, and draw ourselves out dish fashion when we would stop.—Oh pretty! says I. Be so kind as teach me to skate a little. I am loth to give you the trouble of lugging me always about, like a beggar's brat. Be content, says he, since I do not grudge the trouble. Think with yourself how much time and dexterity is requisite to practise this art: for we must

give our touches with the nicest exactness imaginable, the least mistake would carry us out of our course, or throw us into the middle of those streams you found so troublesome. Therefore, this is the last thing we learn to be perfect in ; there are some among us have been here these two hundred years, and can scarce waddle yet.

Those who were bigots below, being always used to leading strings, come on very slowly : they will let us carry them about where we please, and tell them anything, but it is the hardest matter in the world to get them to help themselves, or try to find their feet. On the other hand, the Knowals will not submit to be shown anything, so they kick and cuff about at random, and get themselves tossed from ray to ray, without ever learning a step. It is well our vehicular flesh is of so healing a temper, or they would be beaten to mummies before they had made any progress.—Ay but, quoth I, you do not consider what an apt child I am, having brought my imagination and memory entire with me. Besides, as I am a Search, I shall have the benefit of my own reason and other people's experience too.—No, no, says he, I tell you the difficulty and danger of the attempt is greater than you apprehend.—Are there no go-carts in this country ? quoth I. Do, nurse Locke, get me one if there is such a thing to be had. You understand the mechanic arts, and are there no wooden particles in the air of which you might make me a pretty one now ? I would willingly learn to creep if I cannot run.—Prithee, child, says he, be patient : I never knew a Search urge things so pressingly before. Besides there is another art necessary to qualify you for practising this : if you were now to take a strong impulse with your foot, you would find yourself doubled in like a nightcap, and your knee driven through your body, would bump up against your head : therefore when we go to receive a stroke, we at the same time give a rigidness to every fibre of our vehicle, which makes us compact like a body of steel, and the whole of us moves together.

I beg pardon, says I, for my eagerness : but if I must not think of the practice, may not I wish to understand the theory of your motions ? I took notice before that all the travellers I saw were passing the same way, and as the rays keep continually flowing from the Sun, I can easily comprehend how you may skate along them, quite to the regions of the comets : but how do you contrive to get back again ? Can you strive against the stream, or sail like a ship with the wind before the mast ?—There is no occasion, says he, for we never want favourable gales which way soever we are bound. Do not you consider that there flow rays from the stars too as well as from the sun, and as they come in all directions we never fail to find some or other of them that fit our purpose to a hair.—But then, says I, you must go very slow, for their feeble impulse cannot carry you near so fast as the vigorous solar rays.—Pardon me there, says he : you know the inert force of matter by which a body would move on for ever with the same swiftness, unless stopped by something else ; therefore these transverse rays do not abate at all of their pace for their immense distance from the star whereout they issued. You below see the sun brighter than any other luminary, because more of its rays enter your eye together, but each ray taken singly, whether of solar, or stellar, or culinary light, moves with the same strength and velocity. Indeed the stellar rays being wider asunder, make our path a little more serpentine, and our progress slower, but this is a trifling difference not worth taking notice of : and we are obliged to be a little more circumspect in crossing the sun's rays, that we do not dash against them. He then drew me a little aside to a place where I could see tra-

vellers hasting several ways by help of different rays : and it delighted me to admire how, though they went at a prodigious rate, they managed with such amazing dexterity as never to touch the crossing streams of light, nor jostle one another.

23. While I was entertaining myself with this spectacle, I heard my friend call out with a loud voice that almost stunned me. Holla ! here we are. Presently there came up a vehicle that stood and stared at me wistfully as I did at him again : he then entered into close conference with Locke in the sentient language ; after which he surveyed me a second time from top to toe, and having perused me as much as he liked, I saw him strike his foot against a solar ray, which wafted him over to a stellar, from whence he took a direction almost at right angles with the former, and was instantly gone out of sight. Pray, says I, who might that very curious gentleman be ? He should be a Search by his prying eye, but methinks he looks like a weak brother. He examined me all over so strictly, that if I had not heard you call to him, I should have suspected he had some design upon us.—So he has, says Locke, but no bad one. You cannot know his face, he having been dead above a thousand years ago, but you have read his compositions. He is Aulus Gellius, author, or rather collector of the Attic night's entertainment ; for having a very moderate capacity, he could produce little of his own, but made it his business to pick up and gather the scraps of his oracle Favorinus : however, as he was a diligent honest creature, we acknowledge him for one of our line. You find him often quoted by the learned, for though his writings contain nothing of much importance, yet such minute matters as he has recorded are sometimes turned to good use by others.—I am glad of that, says I, for the sake of my microscope : for if I am not useful myself, I may be the cause of other people's being useful.—As industry and exactness, continued he, are his talents, we put him upon employments here wherein those qualities only are requisite. He is now gone down to earth, upon an errand of that sort for you.—I thank him kindly, says I : but what service can he do me there ? He cannot carry news of me to my family, for you told me you could not make your sentient language understood by the living.—No, says Locke, it is a business relating to your own proper person. You have now no intercourse with your body, so can leave no traces there of all you do or see : now he is gone to engrave traces of every particular in your sensory with a fine pencil or style he will pick out of the air as he goes along ; for else when you awoke you would think you had slept sound all night, without anything extraordinary happening to you. I gave him an exact account just now of all that has passed hitherto, and shall take care to send down intelligence from time to time of what further shall fall in our way.—I hope, says I, you will suppress what we have just said of the gentleman : he might have reason to take it amiss that we have spoken so freely of his character and performances, especially at the very time when he is doing us a friendly office.—Never disturb yourself about that, says my patron ; we have none of that vanity clinging more or less to all mortals, and which is the first speck of terrene concretion we endeavour to pick out of them, as being the most troublesome. We value ourselves here not upon our talents but the application of them : natural infirmity and shallowness of capacity are no disgraces among us, therefore he is not ashamed of having them, nor will be offended with us for taking notice of them. So I shall suppress nothing, neither will he, but you will find a completer narrative of your journey than if you had pen, ink, and paper, to set down everything as you go along.—

That pleases me much, replied I, for I would not lose a tittle of all the very remarkable occurrences befalling me here.

24. But with your good leave, Master, I would beg your explanation of one or two particulars relating to this errand of my cousin Gellius. As I have my memory with me, and actually remember all that has passed since my arrival, cannot I recollect it again when I go back without troubling my cousin to write it down for me? Then if I have brought away the tablet of my memory, what is there left for him to write upon? And how can you, or anybody, send him intelligence of my private thoughts?—I will tell you, says he, how the case stands. The human memory consists of several membranes lined one within another: the innermost are softest and quickest to take impressions; the outer are tough and more retentive. The former serve you for common occasions, as in ordinary discourse, where you only want just to remember what was said last till you have given a proper answer, and then forget it again instantly. This membrane being extremely pliant, conforms readily to the impressions in the others, which enables you to recollect things recorded there many years ago. Now you have gotten only the innermost pellicle of all here, which answers your purpose well enough, while there is no outer stamp to dress upon it; but when you come to have it squeezed again into your old sensory, your present traces would be quite smoothed out, like a rumpled muslin upon being ironed, and all you know now vanish like an idle tale, if our industrious friend were not to work correspondent channels, fitted exactly to receive them in the outer coats. So much for your two first objections; the third you must remove yourself, by telling me all your thoughts: we shall have time enough to send after him, for he is a little tedious in his motions, and scrupulously exact: I warrant ye now he will be puzzling about in the atmosphere a whole day of vehicular time, before he will find a style to his mind.

25. But I cannot trust to any narrative you will give me by voice, you may overlook or omit something; I must have it in the sentient language. —Lack-a-day! quoth I, you know very well I cannot talk a syllable in that.—I know very well, says he, on the contrary, that you cannot help talking if you would never so fain; the whole art here lies in the hearer, and you may trust me for that. Come, hold your head still, and put out a pair of ears below: I may have occasion to speak to you at intervals. So saying, he thrust out a couple of broad arms, or rather slappers, something like the tails of Turkey sheep, with which he muffled up my head all round, as with the hood of a great-coat. I knew my business was only to ruminate on all that had passed in my thoughts from my first arrival, for he would feel the ideas as they rose. In this guise he held me some time, feeling and speaking alternately in a kind of dialogue, wherein himself was the sole talker, after the following manner.——Ay, but how did you feel yourself on first withdrawing from your body?——What were your first sensations on coming here?——What were your thoughts when you could hear me speak before you had gotten your voice?——Hay! Let's have that over again.——Well, now I have your history perfect enough. But I find you have some wishes you were shy of disclosing. Do not endeavour to conceal anything from me, you know I am your friend: and besides, it would be in vain, for I should ferret you out.—Oh! you want to hear something of your relations: and your wife is uppermost in your thoughts. ——I commend you however for thinking of your father and mother, though they came hither when you was a little baby, incapable of knowing

them: and your guardian and the others who took care of your education. They are all among us, employed in ways suited to their respective characters and inclinations.—No, you cannot see them; they are all a vast way off, dispersed up and down in different regions, for having but lately attained the art of skating, they are gone to make themselves acquainted with the country.——Well, well, you shall hear more of your dearee presently. We seldom meet with husbands so anxious about their wives, unless now and then a Search that has happened to match with one of the same blood.——Nonpareil! Ay, so they are all, either the best or worst that ever man had.——Yes, yes, I know she was a Search: we all look upon her as such, and bear her a brotherly affection.——We had very little trouble with her, as she brought few terrene concretions, and those are in a great measure cleared away, as she was very patient and desirous to have them removed. Having a soft hand and great tenderness of temper, we employ her in picking out the spots from prudes, demireps, and ladies of fashion who have lived in a continual round of genteel diversions, doing neither good nor harm.——Ay, ay, she would come to see you with all her heart, but consider she is but seven years old in this world and has not yet learned to go. But what would you say now if I should carry you to visit her? She plies close to her picking trade with some of the finest aerial needles we can get for her, not above fifty thousand miles off, we may skate there easily upon a couple of rays of Spica Virginis in two hours vehicular time.—Nay, none of your coaxing and cajoling, your Pray Sirs, and Do Sirs: when I offer a thing, I do it readily without needing to be pressed.——He then unmuffled and let me go: I durst not speak before for fear of putting him out of humour, but now thought I might open, yet was forced to moderate my joy by his last rebuke. So believing a short speech was best, Thank ye, thank ye, says I, dear kind patron: she was the most agreeable if not the most valuable gift heaven bestowed upon me below, and this offer is the most acceptable I could have wished. You have taken pains for my good and instruction before, but this instance shows your benevolence here is tender and indulgent as well as judicious. I then presently stretched out an arm for him to take me by. Hold, hold a moment, says he, till I give you some instructions for your conduct upon this visit.

26. We gave her an inkling some time ago of your coming to visit her in the shades like another Orpheus. Ever since she has taken it into her heard to call herself Euridice, for we have our innocent fancies, allegories, and fables here as well as you mortals. We were willing to humour her, so she passes currently by that name and you must mind to call her by none other.—Oh! anything, quoth I, that will please her best. Euridice! methinks it is a pretty name, and I am sure the real Euridice could not better deserve such a journey after her.—In the next place, says my instructer, she is not a woman here, so you must consider her as an intimate friend, not as a wife. Let us have no kissings nor embracings, no raptures nor transports: remember your own distinction between love and fondness, and what I have told you already that we are here all Isangeloi, therefore your love must be pure, sedate, and angelical.—I will try my utmost, says I, to satisfy you, and hope to succeed the better because I always endeavoured below to make my love as refined and sentimental as possible. And indeed I found no great difficulty in the task, for she had so many angelic qualities when a woman, that she was fitted to captivate the understanding as well as the heart. But we waste time: two long hours seem a tedious

while. He then took hold of my arm and we went on swimmingly, after the rate of forty thousand miles in a minute of Paul's clock. He clasped me fast round the wrist, nevertheless I clung round his too like a drowning man to a bough. I was in high spirits all the way, as you may suppose, more alert and joyful than on the morning of my wedding day, for in the lottery of marriage there is always a hazard, let a man take what care he can. I can give no account of all we met or passed by, for my whole thoughts were taken up with one object, so that I had not a glance to spare for anything else. At length we stopped, and I beheld a vehicle intent on picking out the dross from another with a needle. My friend whispered something to it in the sentient language, when instantly there shot out the dear, well-known face, not that of the blooming bride which enchanted my youthful eyes, but that of the serenely cheerful matron endeared by eighteen years' cohabitation, when we used to take sweet counsel together upon the measures of our conduct, the economy of our affairs, the education of our children; or remark to one another the growing seeds of sagacity appearing in their little contrivances and prattle as they played around us.

27. My dear, dear Euridice, says I, do I see that face once more which used to be a continual feast to mine eyes! expressive of a most amiable and valuable character within, innocence, sweetness, sincerity, constancy, penetration, judgment, discretion, affability, politeness, easiness, sprightliness: my pleasure at home and my credit abroad. I never knew what a happy life was till you taught it me, and have never felt it completely since your departure.—Welcome, thrice welcome, says she, to these happy mansions, my sincerest, tenderest, truest, best-beloved friend. How happy is it we can thus meet without reflection of having done anything which might make one another unfit for this place! We lived in harmony and love, contented within ourselves, yet not forgetful of the duties we owed to others, delighted to please each other even in trifles without neglecting our more important concerns, enjoying the present moment, but careful to enjoy it in such manner as might leave no remorse behind.—Thanks to you, my Euridice, says I, that I have no more to reflect upon with remorse. Your sprightly temper gave me spirits, enabling me to improve my faculties, and your innocent gaiety taught me to make some use of them, by rendering me more sociable and active. I hope to come here one day with the less terrene concretion, for having had the benefit of your company. You can scarce have brought any here, you were all innocence and unreserved goodness. And indeed I see by the serene satisfaction in your countenance, that you have nothing to trouble you. Oh! how charmingly different does it look from that I saw last in convulsions and agonies!

Name them not, my Search, says she: the avenues of death were grievous, beset with pains, restlessness, and regrets, at leaving my husband and children: but they quickly end in a quiet sleep, from whence we awake to new life and enjoyment. Everything is new to us, yet nothing appears strange, because we remember nothing of our former scenes. We soon discover that we are in a society, and it is not long before we learn to converse among them. By means of our sentient language, which your friend tells me you do not understand, we quickly receive information of what we have been, what we have done, and what we have gone through: and believe me, my Orphy (your friend will permit me to call you so), the troubles we have undergone appear as nothing in comparison of the state they lead into. We have here an infinite variety of enjoyments, without anything to disturb us except the dross we bring from below, and though the clearing it away be

painful, we submit gladly for the greater suppleness of our limbs and command of our faculties we have upon getting rid of it. The people of this country are universally obliging and benevolent: everybody is helpful to me, and I have the pleasure of being helpful to others. Though I am yet as a child, unable to stir, they carry me about wherever I desire, so I make visits more entertaining and improving than those merely harmless ones I used to make below: for instead of dress and trifle, the discourse runs upon the characters and occupations of the inhabitants here, the quickest and easiest methods of picking out terrene concretions, the intelligences continually received from earth, the creatures, productions, and histories, of the other planets; and in such an ample field we always find something new, interesting, and instructive. Your conversation has prepared me for a relish of the deeper sciences. I can attend to lectures of philosophy, upon the laws of nature, the courses of the planets, the various particles of air, the commixtures of ethereal fluids, the systems of Providence, and the glorious Attributes of God. O, Search! could you discern these Attributes as fully as they are discerned here, you would always fear but never be afraid of him, you would look upon his commands as advices kindly given for your interest, you would possess a sure and glowing hope which would prove a sheath to every natural evil and an effectual bar against every moral evil. But with all these engagements you may well think I have no temptations to the vapours, no vacant or insipid time; nor had I more than one thing to wish, and am thankful it is now granted me though but for a moment. Heaven send it may be granted me one time or other for a long, long continuance.

Amen, amen, says I, may we meet in such happiness as you have given me the idea of, never to part again. Your remembrance is my continual solace from morning to night: the image of my Riddy goes with me into company, attends me in business; entertains me in my walks, and steals in upon my studies. Heaven made us the principal instruments of one another's happiness upon earth, and I think the prospect or even possibility of our being so again adds to my diligence in the prosecution of those duties that lead to a better state.—It was with that view, says she, I suggested the thought. You know I always wished your good most ardently and cordially: the same desire possesses me still, and directs me in employing the few moments we have together. While the thought of Riddy does you any real service, indulge it; but let it not interfere to interrupt you in anything you ought to do. You call me yours and I call you mine, but we were only lent, not given, to one another, as we now find by sad experience. Therefore your only chance of having the loan returned is by making yourself agreeable to the lender. For know, Orphy, that our works follow us, not indeed in themselves but in their certain consequences. We rise with different talents and capacities according as our little bodies have been formed and fashioned in the mould wherein they have lain enclosed. You cannot know directly what effect your outward actions will have upon the growing fœtus within you, but the same power which gave laws to man, established likewise those of nature, and has made them both so to correspond, that while you fulfil your duty, you will unknowingly furnish yourself with powers for your use and enjoyment hereafter. Therefore serve God by doing service to his creatures: endeavour to make such acquisitions as will be most useful to them, for those will be most useful to your own main purpose; nor suffer any fond indulgence to retard you in completing the remainder of that work you have still to do.

My kind benefactress, says I, you were born to do me solid good as well as to give me delight. Your advice was never wanting if at any time I happened to forget myself. Your example taught me to be more obliging and tender to others. You encouraged and assisted me in anything laudable and becoming a reasonable creature. The happiness conveyed me by your means was one topic of my thanksgivings, and I used to join more heartily in the public prayers as knowing that Riddy was one of the congregation. Shall then the remembrance of my Riddy do me a prejudice when she herself was incapable of doing any? Your loss was a heavy and grievous stroke upon me, but I strove and struggled rather to thank Heaven for the gracious loan I had had, than to repine at its being withdrawn. I then reflected it was not wholly withdrawn, for I beheld your likeness in your two girls, and began to cast about how I might exert my love for you in my cares and contrivances for the benefit of your children. I still call them yours, for I love them better in that light than while I consider them only as my own. They answer my cares as I could wish, and the poor things do what they can to repay them by their observance and tenderness: but nothing upon earth can fully compensate for the want of you.

28. I hear very good accounts of your girls, says she, for I call them yours for the same reason you call them mine. Somebody or other in the neighbourhood is going down continually, and I told you we were very sociable, so scarce a day passes but I hear of you all. It is one of our amusements to communicate all the good news we can pick up of each other's friends and relations: but ill news quickly stagnates, for we have no taste for scandal, nor are we solicitous to inquire after things we cannot remedy. Unless when any one recovers from his evil courses, for then we have them all displayed to us in full colours, and you cannot imagine what congratulations there are among us upon such occasions: there is more joy for a while than over ninety and nine just persons who needed no repentance.—I hope, says I, your children will never deviate into those bye-paths which must be trodden before they can give that extraordinary joy: you will be better pleased with the continual calm satisfaction of hearing they persevere in the road you have set them into.—Undoubtedly, says she, for you know we always used ourselves to prefer a lasting complacence of mind before a sudden transport. But since it has been known you were to come here, nobody would tell me a word of our family, for they said they would not anticipate the pleasure I should receive in hearing the relation from yourself.

But how in the name of goodness, says I, could they know that? for my good patron Locke has told me that my journey was extraordinary, and did not depend upon natural causes, by which they might investigate it.—No matter for that, says she: you do not know what discoveries our people can make by their understanding the sentient language: they can discern your secret thoughts and motives, better than you can yourselves, and know by the state of your imagination what future imaginations it will produce. When you mentioned me in your argument upon the uneasiness of desire in your chapter on Satisfaction, they foresaw you would never be quiet till you had contrived one way or other to have some converse with me. So I know nothing of your history for that two years and a half.

Why, says I, it has run much in the same tenor with that you have already been informed of. Your girls go on in such improvements as I can give or procure for them, and in forming their characters to make themselves useful and agreeable, though in different ways. Serena has the

modest brow, the flexible neck, attentive eye, and true countenance of a Search. Sparkler, you know, we used to call little Mamma, and she still preserves your likeness: the same sprightly look, the same lively action, and the same inoffensive archness of tongue. I would instruct them in the foundations of religion and morality, but my notions are so abstracted, that though they may do tolerably for myself, they are unfit for common use. When I act like other people it is seldom upon the same grounds, my principles are so selfish, I dare not own them; even virtue with me is self-interest, for I endeavour to practise it, not because I must, nor because I ought, nor because it is good in itself, nor to gain credit or escape censure of others, but because I believe it the surest way to procure my own advantage. So I scarce ever give them any documents, but as I am much with them, attend to their prattle, and endeavour to lead their thoughts gently into such trains as may tend to their improvement. If they let drop any inconsistencies, I take notice of them with a smiling air; if they consider a thing partially, I turn it about for them in various lights, and by short observations, similies, and examples, apposite to the occasion, I strive insensibly to make their reasonings just and connected, their views clear and full, their aims directed rather to the useful than the showy; and not so much to teach as show them how to strike out lights for themselves. As they delight in figure and allegory, I tell them the family arms of the Searches are a microscope and a balance, with a bit of gold in one scale outweighing a gaudy plume of feathers in the other, in a field of natural green, interspersed with common flowers, and a bee extracting honey from any that falls in his way: the motto for the men, Esse quam videri, To be than to appear, and for the women, Be merry and wise. That the Knowal arms are a concave mirror, placed near the eye, to see itself in, and an inverted telescope to look at everything else, upon a brazen shield, ornamented with butterflies, and trophies of victory: the male motto, Veni, vidi, vici, I came, I saw, I conquered; the female, None so pretty.

With these little helps, your girls have acquired for themselves as much soundness of judgment and considerateness of thought as may content a parent. They carry an unaffected openness and gaiety upon their countenance, a watchful observance and discretion in their hearts. They have just sentiments of their Maker, esteeming him as their sole benefactor, as an indulgent but not fond parent, who gives his commands for their benefit, but will not suffer them to be disobeyed with impunity. They are careful to remember his blessings with thanksgiving, persuaded that every evil terminates ultimately in some good; assiduous, not scrupulous in their devotions, strict, not superstitious in their religion. They can sympathize with the distressed, rejoice sincerely with the prosperous, and are glad to assist in any good office within their power. They can conform their minds readily to the circumstances of their situation, pass whole winter months with me alone in a retired country, without vapours of discontent, or hankering after company, and then enter into all the innocent diversions of the town, without being fond of any; can find resources in themselves, without cards, or plays, or foreign aids, or can enjoy the busy world without being enslaved by it.

You delight my heart, says she, with this charming account of my babes: their welfare makes one of my joys in this place, and it is no small comfort to reflect that I have done my poor endeavours towards setting them into the right way that leads hither. God grant they may persevere in it to the last, and escape every inordinate passion and evil habit that might fix a

terrene concretion upon them. Those foul remains of our former state, my Search, are exceeding troublesome and a long while before we get entirely rid of them; in the mean time they prove grievous hindrances to us in all our operations, both of body and mind. But I have still one anxiety for my children: as they are now women grown, they may probably ere long come into other hands; and what changes that may make in their tenor of life and conduct cannot be foreseen.—This, my Riddy, says I, is my greatest difficulty: I cannot help them so well as I would, my knowledge lying more among books than men. Never did I want my Riddy more than at this juncture: you could have assisted me with your counsels: your converse would have given a freer issue to my own thoughts. But I miss you every day at home and abroad, in business and in amusement, in my troubles and my successes. O! that it were permitted to take you down with me to make a paradise again upon earth! O! that I might accompany you here in your improving visits, attend you in your lectures, and learn of you the sciences I used to teach! The laws of this place lay a severe restraint upon the fondness of love, a love pure and innocent, like that David bare Jonathan, surpassing the love of women. My rigid tutor here has forbid me one civil salute: am I not allowed to take your hand, whose soft touch used to steal a thrilling joy into my heart?

At this the dear eyes seemed ready to overflow with tears of joy and love. There came out a taper arm and pretty hand, having on one of the fingers the semblance of our wedding ring, that pledge of our plighted troth and seal of our union. I shot forth half a dozen eager arms to take hold of it: and now perhaps had eagerly grasped it so fast that nothing could have parted us without disruption of our vehicles, and perhaps the course of fate had been broken, had not that severe, relentless pedagogue, that hard-hearted old bachelor, Locke, who never knew the tenderness of love, been too nimble for me. For he darted out a great brawny arm and mutton fist, with which he catched up the skin of my vehicle, as one catches up a dog by the nape of his neck, and away we flew with incredible swiftness.

29. As soon as he let me go, I began to lament and expostulate after a woful rate. Prithee, says he, do not pretend to be angry with me, when you were to blame yourself. Did not you promise me to be more discreet? to make your love pure and angelical? instead of that you have burst out into all the flames and raptures of an earthly passion. I told you we employ our passions here as servants, but never let them become our masters, nor slip a moment out of the hand of reason: for the very best of them is not to be trusted. An injudicious love often has the effect of malice. What a wish was there, to carry her back with you! Was that your kindness to wish her grovelling again in the filthy mire of earth, liable to womanish fears, bodily distempers, infirmities of old age, and the hazard of being disabled from ever regaining these blissful seats? Then you do not consider what an injury you were doing her if I had not prevented you: we have almost cleared her of her concretions, the only one remaining was a little too much fondness for you, and this you would have fixed deeper in her again by your indiscretion. Did not you observe her swimming eyes, which showed a womanish weakness stealing upon her?—I stand corrected, good Master, says I, and am convinced you favoured my wishes most when you seemed most to thwart them: for I would not do her a prejudice, no, not the least momentary hurt, for all the pleasures in the world. But what must the dear creature think of me for leaving her so abruptly?—Never trouble yourself about that, says he: she saw plainly enough you

could not help it, and before this time is sensible I acted kindly: she would presently recover herself, and go again to her needlework. Do you apply yourself to improve the state of your own mind: the news of that will be the greatest pleasure you are now capable of giving her, and the purer you come up, the sooner you will be fit for her company. I perceive you have store of concretions about you, and to them were owing your intemperances: we shall have some work with you when you return, and you must undergo some discipline. Do, my boy, while upon earth, strive to lessen the need of it as much as possible. Take my word for it, the practice of virtue, the moderation of all your desires, and vigilance against evil habits, will save you a great deal of inconvenience, vexation, and self-reproach, by-and-by. But I must leave you a moment, to send the particulars of our last adventure to Gellius. I see nobody within call going down. I shall find somebody or other before I have gone five hundred miles. I will be with you again presently.

30. Being left alone, my thoughts ran again upon the dear object of my wishes. I endeavoured to moderate my fondness with as much care as possible, yet perhaps indulged it a little too freely. While I was in this amusement, I felt myself on a sudden seized all over by something hard, rough, and scorching, a hundred cords seemed to wring me round, a thousand points stuck into my flesh, and I felt rough teeth grinding upon my skin. Ideas of resentment, cruelty, avarice, injustice, lewdness, debauchery, blasphemy, terror, shame, regret, and despair, poured upon my imagination, and pierced me to the very soul. I found myself tempted to all kinds of wickedness, to snatch the bread from the hungry, tear out the bowels of children, pluck out the eyes of my dearest friends, dash out my own brains against a stone, wallow in all the impurities of a brothel, rebel against the throne of heaven, and worship the devil. I struggled, with all my powers of body and mind, to deliver myself from my distresses in both, and call up ideas opposite to those that oppressed me. Upon the first effort I found myself relieved, the cause of my grievances was removed, but though I was free from pain, it left a strange dismay and uneasiness upon my mind. My good friend came up instantly to me. What's the matter? says he, you seem all over agitation and disorder.—God bless me, says I, I never was in such a taking in all my lives. All pain, smart, and burnings without, rage, horror, anxiety, despair, and torment within. Sure these are not fits occasioned by the terrene concretions. Heaven save me from any more returns of them: I would not undergo such another moment for all the pleasures in the universe.—No, no, says he, thank Heaven your concretions are not so bad as that. Oh! now I see it. Look yonder: there is the enemy that has done you all this mischief. I looked the way he pointed, and saw a black bottled spider as big as myself, sprawling and cuffing with his nasty claws against three or four vehicles, who thrust out arms as long again as usual, to push him away: however, they managed him pretty easily, and drove him before them to some tellar rays that pointed directly down to earth. Pray, says I, what hideous monster is that? The very sight of him, though so far off, makes me shudder, and almost renews the pains I suffered from him. That, says he, is one of those wretched vehicles I told you of before; his name, while upon earth, was Cæsar Borgia. I do not know how he came to stroll up here from the regions of darkness, for they very rarely appear among us. Rarely, says I, is too often: I shall be afraid of them as long as I stay here.

My dear good friend, pray never leave me alone again.—Do not be

frighted, child, says he ; we seldom see them ; they are afraid of the rays of light which they know not how to deal with cleverly, and when they do come, they never meddle with us : nor would he with you if you had followed my precepts. I am confident now that the moment my back was turned, you gave a loose to your passion again, for he would never have dared touch you if he had not observed you under some impotence of mind. Therefore for the future keep your desires in order, your reason sound, your mind pure ; and you may defy the devil and all his imps.—But how, says I, could he overspread my imagination with such a dreadful cloud of foul thoughts, which never entered there before ?—There, says Locke, you had a specimen of the sentient language : I am sorry you took your first lesson under so bad a master. By applying himself close on all sides of you, he threw in his own sentiments : it was well you exerted yourself in raising up contrary sentiments that made him glad to quit you immediately, for those evil spirits feel an envy against everything better than themselves, which increases their torment.—Heaven defend me, says I, from the venom of these spiders. The dread and remembrance of it hangs still upon me. I have no command of my thoughts. I shall never be myself again.—Come, says he, let us try what a second lesson under a gentler master will do. We will endeavour to cure you in the same way by which you were hurt. Come, flatten your side a little, that we may have as large a contact as possible. He then applied himself close to my side, and though I could discern nothing distinctly for want of skill in the language, felt such a general gleam of piety, sound reason, benevolence, courage, temperance, cheerfulness, quiet, and satisfaction, spread over my imagination, as dissipated all my troubles, and restored me perfectly to myself again. Thank ye, says I, incomparable master, I find you can assist, instruct, reprove, soothe, and everything just as is proper. This is an excellent language when spoken by a good orator : would I could learn to talk like you, or at least to understand your eloquence completely, so as to let none of it fall to the ground.

31. But now I have the spirit of sobriety upon me, with your permission I would fain receive some instructions which might prevent those mistakes that occasioned my failing in it before. I have always been told that love was a virtue, and though this be understood in the first place of a general benevolence to all rational creatures, yet I never knew we were restrained from fixing a larger portion of it upon some particular objects. Husbands love your wives, is one precept of the Gospel, and all the Searches of name have recommended an affection to our relations, friends, and benefactors. I know this is best exerted in doing them service while they are with us : but are we to forget them as soon as they are gone out of our sight ? or how are we to distinguish the virtue from the passion of love, so as to retain the one without touching upon the other ?—Truly, says he, I am not so well qualified to descant upon that particular branch of love, which I know you are most solicitous to understand, having never had experience of it myself. I will only say this, that true love of any kind forbears everything detrimental to the party beloved, and never urges to things inconsistent with the interests of any other kind. But there is Plato yonder, who having composed amorous sonnets in his younger days, knows more of that subject than me ; and as he has a lively imagination, will talk to you in a manner more suitable to your own turn. I can carry you to him if you will : he is not a vast way off, we may be with him soon, provided we make haste.—I shall be very much obliged to you, says I, for the favour : I long

to see that venerable founder of the Academy.—Do not expect, says he, to see a formal old Doctor in him; he lived so long at the court of Syracuse, in intimate familiarity with the king and ministers there, that he is quite a fine gentleman.

32. Pray, says I, is it necessary we should travel so fast as we have done in our journeys hitherto? As my time here is to be short, I would willingly make the most of it, and not lose the benefit of your conversation upon the way; but though I tried several times to talk to you, I could not hear myself speak; for we outstripped the vibrations of ether conveying the sound: I suppose anybody a mile behind might have heard me plainly, for I took notice that the passengers sometimes called to one another as they went along.—You mistake the case, says he, for we never travelled so fast as the rays we went upon, and Newton has told you that the vibrations of ether overtake the light. The truth is that you did not speak when you fancied yourself talking, for the swiftness of our motion, causing a draught of ether against your sides, hindered the play of your vocal fibres, just as a man riding a race-horse finds his breath stopped by the wind. As we have gotten a stronger tone to our fibres by exercise, we can make ourselves heard notwithstanding; and so perhaps may you too if we abate a little of our pace, but then you must exert yourself as if you were hallooing to somebody at a distance. He then took me by the hand, and we went on at a less violent rate than before.

33. As we proceeded I began to try my talent at vociferation, wherein I found the more difficulty, for having never been used to speak in public, and perhaps had not succeeded at all, had I not been conversant with some deaf and inattentive people below, who forced me to prepare myself for this exercise, which, though laborious and painful for the time, left no fatigue or faintness the moment I desisted: however, I made shift to be heard just enough for him to comprehend my meaning. After apologizing for the curiosity natural to the Searches which his goodness hitherto had encouraged me to indulge, I begged to know where lay those regions of darkness wherein he said the unhappy vehicles resided. In the pores and caverns of earth, says he, or the atmospheres surrounding them. For the foggy vapours, abounding there, a little stupify their faculties, and make them less sensible of their torments. When they rise above ground, they keep in the nocturnal hemisphere, and if by great chance they mount up into ether, it is always along the shadowy cone of night, which leaving them exposed to the thick solar effulgence, they are buffeted about, not knowing which way to go, until some of us drive them down again.—Pray, says I, are they made like other vehicles?—Exactly, says he, and have the same natural powers and faculties that we possess, for nature designed us all for the occupations and enjoyments of this delightful country: but they have debilitated themselves by the vast quantity of terrene concretions worked into them. For these gross particles of heterogeneous matter prick their flesh incessantly like so many needles, feel like worms boring into their vitals, obstruct their circulation, thereby raising feverish scorchings, and distort their imagination, laying it open to all unruly passions, and rendering it incapable of a pleasing or a comfortable thought. Imagine only with yourself what a man must suffer who should have thorns buried all over in his body, worms gnawing his entrails, the foulness of a distemper filling his flesh with burning heats, and his head with melancholy, frightful phantoms, and horror.—Terrible, indeed! says I. But you told me, that our vehicles lie enclosed in our mortal bodies; how comes it they

do not feel inconveniences from their concretions while alive?—So they do, says he, sometimes in the mental part: but I told you likewise that the vehicle, while enclosed in the body, can exercise its functions only where it communicates with some nerve of the outer machine, the rest is covered and kept motionless by the gross body whereto it adheres. But when the percipient soul (to use your words) comes out naked, and begins to exert all her powers without external impediment, at every motion she makes she finds the sharp concretions standing cruelly in her way. Just as a child in the womb might bear a load of phlegm upon the lungs without inconvenience, but immediately upon birth, when the lungs began to play, it would give great pain and trouble. And as volition never ceases working, they never cease being tormented: so that the boring worm dieth not, and the feverish fire is not quenched. You may remember I told you we abounded in desires, but had no wants: their desires are all wants. They are restless and impetuous, but never satisfied, always eager in action but to no purpose, perpetually flying from one evil into another as bad. Add to this, that instead of alleviating one another's miseries, they strive to increase them: continually in broils and quarrels, actuated solely by envy, spite, and rancour; melancholy and distracted with their own thoughts when alone, teazed, abused, and plagued in one another's company.—Do you never, says I, try to deliver them from their concretions?—It has been tried, says he, but without effect: for there is no possibility of removing a moral concretion, unless the patient will do something to help himself; we can only open the fibres with our needles to give it passage, but he must discharge it at the aperture by an effort of his own. But these poor creatures are so perverse, they fight and struggle against us whenever we go to assist them: so we are forced to abandon them to their wretched fate.—Does not the thought of their miserable condition, says I, stir up a compassion in you sometimes that abates your enjoyments?—I told you before, says he, we never suffer any passion, not even love or pity, to intrude upon us without leave: when there is room for any relief to the distressed, we can raise a strong sentiment of compassion to invigorate our endeavours in administering it, but when we know compassion is wholly unavailing, productive of no good to others, but of uneasiness to ourselves, we can utterly throw it aside as a weakness.—Happy temper, says I. But since I have not attained it, permit me to hope that, as you say these wretches have a continual burning fever upon them, the violence of that will in time unhinge their constitution, and deliver them from this loathsome prison.—That cannot be, says he. I have told you already, that the threads of our composition are so strongly spun, nothing can dissolve them before they wear away of themselves at the appointed time: outward accidents may hurt, inward foulnesses distend, distempers may disorder, but none of them can destroy us.

34. What then, says I, is their misery eternal? for I remember you said the disruption of a vehicle was never known before all concretions were entirely purged away.—That is a point, says he, which I cannot resolve you with certainty. There are different opinions among us, none founded upon experience of facts: for as we avoid all intercourse with them, we know not whether their numbers lessen or no. I can only say, their continuance in this condition is very long, at least seventeen hundred years, for it was but the other day that Nero was seen here kicking among the solar rays, trying to raise a combustion, by throwing them against one

another, and so set the world on fire. But divines generally hold the affirmative. Some heretical doctors maintain that they will be advanced, as well as ourselves, after a certain period: for they say, the disruption of our vehicles never happening before an entire clearance of the concretions, is at most only a negative proof of the contrary, and they do not imagine that any material composition is made to last for ever. Many of the philosophers suppose they will be reinstated in mortal bodies, wherein the distempered parts being kept quiet and motionless, the old concretions will work out of themselves, and they will return pure if they do not contract new ones by their ill conduct. However the truth be, their present condition is the same to them as if it were eternal, for they have no prospect or notion of any deliverance, so have not the least glimpse of hope, that last refuge of mortals and cordial for every trouble.

35. What principles then, says I, do your disputants build upon, since they have not the foundation of facts?—The Divine Attributes, says he, the only foundation for our reasoning upon matters where experience affords us no lights to direct them.—Pray, says I, if I may be so bold, how do the maintainers of the affirmative reconcile their opinion with the divine goodness and mercy?—The counsels of God, says he, are unsearchable, even to the most intelligent of creatures, and his Attributes incomprehensible. We agree unanimously, that God is equal in his dealings, and righteous in all his ways, that his goodness is infinite, and his mercy over all his works: nevertheless, we are sensible that we are not competent judges to determine precisely what belongs to equity, goodness, and mercy. Yet thus much we assure ourselves of, that the purposes of God never terminate ultimately in evil, neither does he punish in anger, nor unless for some greater good to result therefrom. Perhaps we should grow remiss and thoughtless in these scenes of continual ease and delight, if we had not those dismal spectacles to rouse and alarm us: perhaps their sufferings are some way or other necessary to secure the happiness of the blessed spirits above. Some young vehicles talk largely of a free-will of indifference, but they are little regarded here; for we know of no merit in ourselves, and acknowledge those virtues and happy dispositions of mind which brought us hither to be the pure bounty of Heaven: for though we worked out our own happiness for ourselves, it was God who gave us the powers to work with, the springs and motives determining us to employ them. According to the opinion most generally prevailing, we regard the state of these wretches as eternal, never to be remedied by natural causes: nevertheless, there is an Almighty Power which can alter the course of nature, and may interpose in their favour, but when or in what manner we do not pretend even to conjecture. Thus as the recovery of fallen man was a mystery to our predecessors which they desired to look into, so the deliverance of these unhappy victims of divine vengeance remains a mystery with us, which we still desire to look into.

36. I thanked my instructer, and added, that as this was a melancholy subject I should be glad to divert my thoughts, if he pleased, during the remainder of our journey, with looking about me upon the objects occurring in our passage. I saw travellers passing along upon other solar rays near me on the right hand and the left, others upon stellar rays crossing above, below, before, and behind me: and the ethereal fluids running into various commixtures by their perpetual undulations. I beheld the moving scene with more pleasure than a citizen escaped five miles from the hurry of business into a summer-house hanging over some dusty turnpike road. I could retire within myself when I pleased, and enjoy my thoughts secluded

from all external objects, which is more than the citizen can do, for when he has not his senses to entertain him he falls asleep. But my curiosity to make new discoveries soon drew me from this merely amusing prospect to observe the rays of light as they whisked by me. I found that by carrying my eye along with some of the corpuscles, I could discern them pretty distinctly. They appeared to me something like the chain or cross bar shot used in sea engagements, only instead of a bar between, the whole consisted of seven balls, flatted on the sides, by which they adhered to one another. I wished to see a refraction but could not, so can only suppose their flatness makes them more apt to rejoin when collected by a Lens after refraction, and unite again into a white ray. I perceived the vibrations of ether overtake them, and when they were in the back part of a wave, their motion was retarded, which put them into that state, called by Newton their fits of easy reflection; as when in the fore-part, they were in fits of easy transmission. But my greatest pleasure was to observe the expertness of my conductor: he did not skate with a stump leg, as I had imagined before, but put out a broad foot with which he could have a good flat tread upon the corpuscles, and though they moved with different velocities according to their fits of reflection or transmission, yet he so humoured their motions by the pliancy of his joints as always to take just the force he wanted to direct his step with such exact nicety, that when we came over to the opposite ray, we never fell into a vacant space but always close upon some corpuscle which served us for our next step. My curiosity being satisfied, my mirth began to operate. Methought I made a very ridiculous figure dangling behind him. I fancied myself like a bone that some unlucky boy has tied to a dog's tail and then turned him into the street. However, my merriment was all to myself, for the passengers, used I suppose to such phenomena, took no more notice of me than we should on meeting a good woman carrying along a child in her arms.

37. While employed in these amusements, which entirely dispersed all my gloomy thoughts and gave a cheerful turn to my mind, I found we stopped. There lay a vehicle before us wholly collected within his bag, and seeming wrapped in profound meditation. My conductor gave him a gentle tap, when presently there came out the honest, open, lively, but sensible countenance and broad shoulders of the first Academic. Hah! says he, my good English cousin Locke, I am always heartily glad to see you. I shall never forget the honour you have done my Ideas by bringing them into greater repute in the Tin Islands than ever I could do in Athens. But who is this honest looking young spark you have gotten with you? Have I ever seen him before? I beg pardon if I have forgotten his face.—A countryman of mine, says Locke, just arrived among us, and a distant relation, of an under branch of the Searches. He is ambitious, it seems, of imitating my seriousness and your vivacity, and I have made bold to bring him to request a favour of you.—With all my heart, says Plato, anything in the world I can oblige my cousin in. Pray, young Englishman, what are your commands? You must know, says Locke, he is a disconsolate turtle that has lost his mate, and since he cannot get her out of his head, he wishes to have a lecture from you upon the subject of love, that he may learn to love like a philosopher. The polite founder of the Academy very readily engaged to recollect what he could upon that head, that he had learned from his master Socrates.

38. My master, says he, used to tell us there were two Venuses, distinguished by the names of Thalassia and Urania. The former sprung from

the foam produced in the sea by an oily mud, driven into it by torrents. She is completely formed for enchanting the eyes of mortals: her cheeks smooth and blooming, her lips moist and pouting, her aspect sprightly and engaging, her round neck and swelling bosom generally bare, her shape neat and elegant, her limbs delicate and pliant, her vestments loose and flowing, brocaded with cooing doves and sportive Cupids. She glides in easy swimming motions, or trips lightly along with wanton airs and winning graces. Her eyes are bright and striking, but a little short sighted, so she follows the pleasures nearest at hand, seeing nothing of those at a distance, nor of the pains sometimes close at your elbows. She plays a thousand little artful tricks, dissembles, casts herself into any form, to gain her ends, but incapable of laying an extensive well-concerted plan. Urania, heaven-born Fair, offspring of almighty Jove, Father of Gods and men, is his best beloved daughter. She carries a dignity in her aspect, blended with mildness and benignity, commanding at once both love and respect. Her motions are graceful and easy, her deportment majestic and uniform, her clothing magnificent but not gaudy, being a rich tissue woven of threads, covered with two celestial metals called Prepon and Kalon. Her eyes are strong, clear, and piercing, though she follows pleasures too, she discerns the remotest on all quarters, and counts the pains mingled among them: she looks backward upon the past and forward to the future, and extends her influence upon everything around her. Her face and person cannot be particularly described because she comes down always in a veil, so that mortal eye can scarce obtain a glimpse of her; but it is said, if we could fully discern her beauties, we should be so enamored with them as never to think anything beautiful beside. She was present with her father when he made the worlds, and the blessings he poured forth upon them passed through her hands: she still moves him to shower down his mercies from time to time upon mortals, and solicits him for leave to descend herself to rescue them from their miseries and errors. But they cannot approach her unless introduced by some inferior Goddess, of whom the Thalassian Venus is best qualified to perform that office; yet neither do the inferior powers take conduct of them upon their entrance into life, nor until arrived at some maturity in their faculties.

39. For when Psyche first falls from the unknown regions, she lies help less and grovelling upon the ground; the dust of the earth gathers round her and forms a case, which would wrap her in perpetual sleep, but that there grow little hairs or stumps of feathers in all parts of it: these being brushed against by external objects and appetites continually rolling over her, prick, and stimulate, and awaken her out of her lethargy. She then starts up and plays about within a small enclosure surrounding her, called the garden of Self. Everything is new to her, everything engaging: she admires the wild plants growing there, which quickly shoot up large and vigorous stems, bearing flowers alluring to her sight, and fruit suitable to her taste. If anybody controls or endeavours to guide her motions, she resists, and frets, and breaks from them as soon as possible to run to the gardener Selfish, who indulges her desires, finds her abundance of diversions, and makes her store of pretty playthings. The last of these is a neat, light, and easy car to be drawn by two horses, called Concupiscible and Irascible, which the gardener takes care to feed and pamper continually with his own hand. With this she courses about the smooth walks of the garden without much damage, only now and then a slight bruise or gentle overturn.

But in a little while the garden gates fly open, and Psyche upon her car

launches forth into the wide world. She finds an open champaign before her, and the passengers obliging to give her way. The horses gambol about without rule or guidance, for she knows not how to manage them, but looks back to the gardener upon the foot board behind, who knows as little how to manage as she. He has gotten a basket of his wild fruits, with which he wantonly pelts the people on each side. They find them harsh to their taste, and some are hurt by their hardness. This makes them clamorous, upon which the horses are frighted, grow rampant and quickly overturn the car, dragging poor Psyche along until she is torn to pieces, unless some conductor luckily step in to her rescue. Happy is she if Thalassian Venus chances to pass that way: the brisk Goddess mounts the Concupiscible horse, and with the whip of Desire in her hand keeps them both in tolerable order, making them pull together, and singles out some object whereto she drives them in a line. She sends the gardener back to graft learning, politeness, and accomplishments upon his wild stocks, with orders to bring back the fruits they shall produce, which she deals out among the persons near her that they make way and assist her progress. It is she first opens the heart of Psyche, teaches her obligingness and to look a little beyond herself. Nevertheless, the Goddess is apt to change from object to object, or if she fixes upon one, drives so eagerly as not to heed the rotes in her way, and sometimes even to hurt the object she pursues: for she aims at pleasure not good, and her own pleasure rather than that of others whom she most fondly affects. She plies her whip too furiously upon the horse she rides, and urges the other to be mettlesome: so the car hobbles, the clay of satiety clogs the wheels, and Psyche is brought again into imminent danger.

Her only refuge now must be in Urania, who never refuses her assistance to those that implore it sincerely. The celestial Power descends into the car, corrects the errors of the sea-born Goddess, takes the whip from her hands, delivers it up to Psyche, and instructs her how to handle both that and the reins. She sends the gardener Selfish back again to graft the virtues, for they, being exotics in the sublunary climates, will not grow out of the earth, but must be engrafted upon the wild stocks that nature has thrown up spontaneously; and the stronger those stocks are, the more vigorously they flourish. When he has brought her the fruit of these celestial scions she dismisses him quite, for she will not suffer him to load the car, nor Psyche to look behind upon him any more. She purges her visual ray with euphrasie and rue, and from the well of life three drops distils, and sheds her own benignity upon her. She instructs her to follow good principally, and pleasure only when not interfering with the other. She enlarges her heart, rectifies her judgment, extends her views, and teaches her to distribute the last brought fruits wherever they may be serviceable. She keeps the postilion Goddess constant to the pursuit of one object, and if that be snatched away by fate, she sometimes, as I find was done in your case, discharges her. She presents its picture to Psyche emblazoned with golden rays by her sister Elpis, but will not let her lament nor sigh over it, nor interrupt the distribution of her fruits.

Elpis was the second daughter of Jove: she goes clad in virgin white and has the softest hand of all the Goddesses, for the touch of it soothes the smart of every evil in Pandora's box. She keeps always in the line between her father and the earth, so that whoso turns his face aside from Jove will never have a glimpse of Elpis. The car then rolls tranquil and steady along until they arrive at the gates of the country, which being beset with terrors and ghastly apparitions frightful to Psyche, the Goddess

makes her look back upon the road they have travelled and the people eating the fruits they have distributed. She then beckons to the satin-robed Elpis, who lets down a golden anchor: the Goddesses place Psyche thereon, and the elder sister holding her firm while the other pulls the cable, all three mount up into the blessed abodes.

40. When the divine Plato had ended, his voice still chanted in our ears, and left the same effects as the charms of poetry upon the imaginations of the whole circle; for several vehicles had gathered round us as soon as they perceived him beginning to open. There was one among them whom I could not but take particular notice of: his nose was flat with wide open nostrils, his features large and hard, his whole face the plainest I ever set eyes on; nevertheless there was such a sensible simplicity, such a good-natured humourousness, in his countenance that one could not help being prejudiced in his favour. He stared at me, and we surveyed one another for some time. You look at me so wistfully, says the Flatnose, that I fancy Uranian Venus has sent down one of her own Cupids to strike us with a mutual affection. I do not know how you came to be taken with me at first sight, but it is no wonder I am smitten when I see before me the Displayer of the Light of Nature the hope of the Searches, the ripened fruit of our illustrious branch. For every age improves upon the former, and the sons successively grow wiser than their fathers. The divine Plato here has put finer words into the mouth of Socrates than ever he could utter himself: your father Locke has refined upon the ideas of Plato; and you like another Achilles have proved yourself a better man than your father. I was abashed grievously at this high-flown compliment, and turning to Locke, Pray, says I, is it the fashion in this country to flatter folks out of their senses? I thought you had been all sincerity and plain dealing here. For goodness' sake who is this courtly gentleman? Sure it must be one of Dionysius' lords of the bed chamber, that Plato has brought with him from Sicily. And now, upon a second view, methinks he has some features that show as if he did not dislike to have his miss and his bottle.—You are not the first, says Locke, that have judged so of him before they knew him. But look at him again and recollect whether you have read a description of somebody you think like him. After taking another survey I cried out to Locke, I will be pierced if this is not Socrates himself! Oh! now I am more mortified than ever.—What is the matter with you? says Locke. Can you desire better than to receive such a testimony from a person whom the oracle has pronounced the wisest man in Greece?—No, no, Papa, says I, I am not such a child neither to be catched so. I have heard enough of his irony, and that his words are to be turned topside the other way to understand them. I have not forgotten Elian's story of the horse rolling upon his back. If I had any money in my bag, I would lay a hundred guineas now that he sees me to be an errant sophist: for he used to deal with them just in this manner.—Phoo! says Locke, so he does with all strangers the first time he accosts them: if they take him in earnest, it puts them into prodigious good humour with him; if they see through the veil, it makes them smile, and that has the same effect. You had better humour him in his own way, it will draw on the conversation the easier; from whence it is a great chance but you will pick up something worth carrying away.

41. I endeavoured to follow his advice, and plucking up a good courage, turned again to Mr. Flatnose; Pardon me, says I, amiable Socrates, that my eyes were drawn off a moment from contemplating your admirable beauties; but I was willing to consult my patron here how to behave so as

to appear most agreeable in your sight: though, without asking, I might have known better manners than to contradict the person beloved: therefore shall readily acknowledge myself the wisest man that ever lived. And I have good reasen for what I say, for you were the wisest before, but the oracle declared you so because you knew no more than one thing, which was, That you knew nothing: now I go a step beyond you, for I do not know whether I know anything or not.—I rejoice, says Socrates, that we both value ourselves upon the same account: for conformity of sentiments promises a lasting and cordial love that will not fade. Here I jogged Locke, and whispered him, how it would divert our ladies below to hear two such Adonises talking so sweetly of our reciprocal passion!—Oh! says Locke, they do not understand the language of Uranian love any better than we old bachelors did of the Thalassian. Socrates went on; is not love a flame?—I was always, says I, taught so.—And does not a flame require some fuel to keep it alive?—To be sure, or else it will go out.—Methinks I should be very sorry to have this flame, that is lighted between us, vanish like a meteor. What fuel shall we find to keep it burning?—I protest I do not know, says I. If I had my Euridice again with me I could find a thousand ways to express my love and foment hers; but it is quite a new sort of amour: I do not know how to proceed in it.—Does not love, says he, incline one to please the party beloved? and does not that encourage the like flame in the other?—Most of anything that I know of.—Then if you have fallen in love with me, you will do everything to please me?—Yes, very readily.—If I should ask you to take a skate with me upon a pair of solar rays, you would do it?—That I cannot, for I have not learnt to go: but I would if I could.—Well, but suppose we were both upon earth again, and I wanted a peach out of your garden: you would give it me?—Certainly: you should be heartily welcome.—Or a cup of small beer: you would call for it?—Instantly.—For no other reason than because I had a fancy for it?—No: for I should want no other.—Suppose the Athenians had not condemned me to drink the Cicuta, but I had taken a fancy to a draught myself: you would have procured me a bowl without delay?—No, indeed: that would be no instance of love, I am sure.—What! not if it pleased my fancy?—Not if it pleased your fancy would I give you a thing that should destroy you.—Did we not agree just now that love consists in doing everything to please the party beloved?—We did, but I believe we were mistaken, and ought to have placed it rather in the good than the pleasure of the beloved object.—Well then, says he, as you love me, you will attend always to my good?—To the best of my skill and ability.—If I was hungry and desired trash, you would refuse it, and give me wholesome food?—You will never put me to that trial.—But suppose I should, what would you do?—I should show my love best by giving you the good victuals.—If I were sick, and liked rather to swallow a draught of honey than the medicine proper for me, what would you do?—Get you to take the potion if I could.—Because you would consult solely my good?—Yes, for that reason.—And if the potion were nauseous, and I desired a little honey to sweeten it, you would refuse it me?—No, that would be mere crossness.—If the physic would do me the same good, whether sweetened or not, would you give me the honey?—Ay, surely.—Why?—To make it less unpleasing to your palate.—But did not we agree last, that lovers were always to pursue one another's good, and not their pleasure?—You have drawn me into a dilemma, says I; do so much as extricate me out of it again.—I can extricate nothing, says he; I only practise my mother's trade

of midwifery to bring your thoughts to the birth, you must deliver them by your own efforts.—I suppose, said I, if the same thing be good and pleasing too, we may do it without scruple.—So it should seem, says he, for that agrees with both our positions.

42. But, added he, do not lovers use to take pleasure in pleasing one another?—I can remember the time, says I, when the pleasure of pleasing was my sweetest delight.—Then, if you love me, should not you think of something I can do to please you, that I may taste some of that sweetest delight?—You can do nothing to please me better than by improving my knowledge in any way you think proper: you know best how to choose.—How can I improve your knowledge, when I have none myself but of one thing, that I know nothing?—Then teach me to know the same of myself.—Let us consider first, what good it will do you: for you know we have not yet settled whether a lover may please his paramour, unless in something that will do him good at the same time.—Well then, tell me what it is good for: you must certainly know better than any other, because you were the sole possessor of it.—Nay, do not ask me, you know we agreed that you were the wiser man.—Very true, I had forgot that. To be sure, I have a vast deal of wisdom in me, but I protest I do not know how to get a crumb of it out.—Then we must try to assist you in the delivery.—Come, Mrs. Lucina, to your office; for you have raised a great rumbling within me, but I cannot tell whether it be a true labour, or only a wind cholic.—We shall see that presently. Did not you desire me just now to improve your knowledge?—Yes.—And you looked upon the improvement of your knowledge as a good? for the wisest man that ever lived would hardly have desired a thing that was not good for him.—Certainly, for I look upon the attainment of useful knowledge as the greatest good that can befall a rational creature.—And you think yourself a rational creature?—I hope so: for I can walk along without running against a post, and cut my meat without cutting my fingers.—Then you know how to cut your victuals without hurting yourself?—It should seem so, for I practise it morning, noon, and night.—But tell me, is knowledge improved by learning what we are ignorant of, or what we knew before?—What we were ignorant of.—Suppose Hippias, Prodicus, Protagoras, or some other of those great men, who understood everything, and made themselves the admiration of all Greece, should come down upon earth to read lectures in Gresham college; and my cousin John Locke should come and tell you, Ned Search, if you will go to Gresham college to-day, you may hear an excellent lecture upon the art of cutting one's meat without cutting one's fingers. You would go?—No sure: why should I?—Nay, why should you not? It is an excellent art, and saves a man a great deal of smart and inconvenience.—Very true: but I know that art well enough already: I do not want to be taught it.—But though you have this art, yet if you did not know you had it, should you want to be taught it?—Yes, certainly.—And if there were any other art you were ignorant of, but did not know it, should you want to be taught?—I am afraid not.—Could you learn anything without wanting to be taught it?—Not very well; for if anybody went to teach me I should not attend to them.—And could you improve without learning?—Very indifferently.—Can you improve without first being ignorant of something?—There would be no room for improvement in that case.—Or without knowing you were ignorant of it?—Neither then, for I should fancy myself too wise to learn.—Then is not the knowledge of one's ignorance a necessary step towards improvement?—I see plainly that it is.—Are not all sciences more produc-

tive of good fruits the further they extend ?—That is a natural consequence. —Then if you could know that you knew nothing, should not you always want to be taught ?—I suppose so.—And always be ready for improvement whenever it were to be had ?—Well, says I, you have delivered me of a hopeful issue, and I beg you will take care to nurse it up well. To say truth, I have taken some pains in this science of ignorance below, and examined myself as carefully to find out what I did not know as what I did. I have made strange discoveries of my ignorance in points where one would least have suspected it, but am afraid there are more behind, which I have not yet found out: therefore should take it very kindly if you would teach me the science completely.—I cannot teach it, says he: nor can any mortal beside.—Where then did you learn it yourself ?—I was divinely inspired.

43. I never knew that before, says I. We were all willing to allow you as much light as human reason can give, but we did not think you pretended to revelations.—Did you never hear that I had a Demon constantly attending me ?—Ay, but as we knew you were a joker, most of us thought you in jest. The very orthodox divines insisted positively that you dealt with the Devil, that you died an idolater, having in your last moments directed the offering of a cock to Esculapius, that your virtues were so many shining sins; and demonstrated from thence that the very best of heathens were under the power of Satan. Those who entertained the most favourable opinion of you, could never believe you in earnest, for none of us but would be frighted at the thought of having such an imp at his elbow. —I am surprised, says he, you should be so much afraid of them. Are they not common among you ?—So uncommon I do not know any body that ever saw one.—Strange! It was the current persuasion among the Searches in my time, that Jove sent down his guardian Demon to every man to protect and warn him against mischief. Do you never hear their voices ?— Never myself: nor did I ever meet a man in his senses who said he had. I know a madman who sees and hears them too very frequently.—Recollect yourself. Did you never meet with a person when most in his sober senses, who, after having acted very wrong, complained that something upbraided and stung and pricked him sorely ?—Here Locke whispered me. Do not you understand him now ?—I think I do, says I, but not perfectly. Then turning to Socrates, I said, Now you put me in mind of it, I have heard of such things, and our doctors tell us from the pulpit that they happen very frequently.—And do you think, says he, that Demon gives these prickings only to torment the patient, or for his benefit, to make him take better heed for the future to his first admonitions when he is going to do a wrong thing ?—For the latter cause.—Then why should you think him an imp of Satan ? would Satan do anything to overthrow his own kingdom ? —We are told not, upon the best authority.—Should you not rather esteem him a faithful monitor sent by Jove in kindness to mortals ?—I see no reason against it. But some I have heard of play him a scurvy trick, for they sear their flesh with a hot iron, which makes it insensible to his prickings. —Did you ever know them get any good by this trick ?—Never, for they always run into grievous disorders, or drew themselves into inextricable mischiefs.—But you yourself, when you have been eagerly set upon some fancy, did you never hear a secret whispering that you had better desist ?— Many a time.—And in the course of your meditations, when some thought has come strongly upon you with the glare of a demonstration, have you never perceived the like whisper to beware ?—More than once.—What did you do thereupon ?—Revise it more carefully.—And what was the conse-

quence ?—Either I discovered it to be fallacious or found some better bottom to build it upon.—And when in pursuing the light of nature, you have stooped down to pick up something very shining have you not heard the still voice pronounce the words Offence or Dangerous ?—Yes, and have suppressed many things upon that admonition, and perhaps should have suppressed more had I as quick an ear to hear the voice as you.

44. But I have some doubt, continued I, whether I know the right voice from all others, because it seems to speak to me in a different manner from what it used to you. I cannot think myself more highly favoured by Heaven than you, although you were never christened according——Hush ! hush ! the Demon whispers Offence.—Then I must suppress something. And yet my Demon seems to be more friendly than yours : for that only dissuaded and never impelled you to anything ; but sometimes when a laudable action has occurred to my thoughts, and a humour of indolence has withholden me from entering into it, the Demon has instigated and never left me quiet till I bestirred myself.—Should you not have bestirred yourself without him, if that humour of indolence had not stood in the way ?—I suppose I should.—Then did he need to do anything more than dissuade you from indulging that humour ?—Why no, as you say, I think he did not need. But what then impelled me to the action ?—Might it not be some inclination or appetite ?—I flatter myself it was a virtue, but virtue cannot be the same with appetite, because its office lies in controlling and restraining them.—Do you remember what the divine Plato told you just now ?—Very well : I have not lost a word of it.—Did not he say the virtues grew out of the wild stocks thrown up by nature ?—He did. —And may not the grafts partake something of the stocks that nourish them ?—So the gardeners agree.—Then may not the virtues grow into appetites ?—I don't know. That seems too hasty a conclusion.—Did you never hear of a hunger and thirst after righteousness ?—Yes, ex Cathedra.—Are not hunger and thirst appetites ?—Undoubtedly.—And are not that hunger and thirst virtues ?—That nobody can deny.—Did not Plato tell you that Thalassian Venus grafted many scions upon the wild stocks in Psyche's garden ?—I remember it very well. —And Urania grafted more ?—He said that too.—And you allow that after taking strong hold of the stocks, they become appetites ?—We may allow that of the rest, as well as the hunger and thirst you mentioned.—Then Psyche having so many appetites, natural and acquired, need never want a whet to action of every kind.—Why no, it should seem she need not.—Did you never know these last-mentioned scions run luxuriant, and shoot into extravagance ?—We have numberless instances of that below in our methodists, devotees, and very sentimental super-refined ladies.—But tell me now from your own experience, for you have some of those scions in your own garden.—Some few, I hope, but feeble enough, God knows.—Well, but feeble as they are, did you never observe them sprouting into an extravagance ?—Sometimes, to my shame be it spoken.—What do you think put you upon observing it ?—The whispers of the Demon.—Since we have agreed there is such continual excitement to action of all kinds by the appetites, what has the Demon left to do unless to dissuade when any of them urge to things improper ?—Nothing else that I know of.—But now you have convinced me there are several voices within us, how shall I know the voice of appetite from that of the Demon ?—Did you never perceive a difference in the voices you hear ?—One recommends to good, the other to pleasure.—That is not it : for good and pleasure are sometimes the same, and appetite often urges to good. But do not you perceive the voice is sometimes quick,

eager, vehement, and clamorous, at others sedate, soft, and gentle; that sometimes it impels to gratification, at others, checks and restrains? And do not you think these the proper marks to distinguish between them?

45. But come, now, answer me once more. Do you remember when the Thalassian Cupids sported around you, before they were disciplined in the school of Hymen?—Ay, as well as if it were yesterday.—In those days, if you chanced to walk in the Park and were told Euridice was there, have you not sometimes run eagerly after some other person at a distance dressed like her?—Those accidents would happen now and then.—And after the Uranian Cupids came to inspire you with a love of mankind, have not you run almost as eagerly after some shining truth that appeared self-evident?—Many a time and oft.—Or to come with the force of demonstration?—Yes.—Or some useful and important discovery?—Ay, and that too.—And in those cases did you never hear the whisper?—Several times.—You said that upon such admonitions you revise the thought over again. What follows thereupon?—Generally I find the appearance fallacious or the discovery trifling.—But before the whisper you knew the truth, the demonstration, and the use for certain?—As certainly as any Knowal.—And after the revisal you knew that you did not know it?—I did.—Then since you have this way to learn the science of ignorance, why do you come to me to teach you, and not rather apply to the Heaven-born Teacher sent down on purpose from Jove?—I see, says I, you have a very peculiar turn: you will not give a man a drop of drink if he be ever so dry, but you lead one round through a number of intricate mazes to the fountain where one may quench one's thirst.

But I want your assistance upon occasion of a voice I hear just now.—Which sort was it?—Oh! the eager and clamorous.—What did it say?—That I should make a visit to the Founder—What says the still voice?—Something, but I cannot tell what.—Cannot you tell whether it says Forbear?—No, that is not the word, I am sure: nor can I make out any other.—Shall I try my Demon? They all speak the same language, though they are not equally heard by everybody. Oh! now I have it.—Well, what does yours say?—Mine says Listen.—Oh! that is that we should be attentive not to drop a word of anything the Master delivers.—No, that would have come from the other voice. You know the Demon never impels, but only checks.—What does he mean then by Listen?—That you should not pick up everything delivered, but listen carefully to himself in case he should whisper the word Offence.—I'll do as well as I can, but sometimes my ears are a little dinny. Oh! now I hear the loud voice again urging me to go this minute.—What says the other?—He is quite silent.—So is mine: therefore get ye gone, there is no time to lose.—But will not you go with me? I am loath to lose your agreeable company.—The Demon will not let me, but he gives my scholar leave: he has an interest with the Master by means of his disciple Timæus.—Then Plato offered his service in the politest manner imaginable: Locke took me in tow, and after taking an amorous leave with By'e sweet Socrates, and By'e little Searchy, remember me and my Demon when you go down to earth again; we parted to set out for the school of the Samian sage.

46. My conductors informed me as we went along, that Pythagoras generally resides in the intermundane spaces, for the convenience of hearing the music of the several spheres on all sides of him in full concert: but he was now come down upon some particular occasion below the orbit of Mars, so we should not have a great way to go. This was all the discourse they had

with me upon the road, for the rest of the way they entertained one another. I could not hear the particulars of their conversation, but found it turned upon forms and ideas, which Plato seemed to hold as unproduced and existent from all eternity in the Divine Mind; and the forms in bodies and ideas in created minds were copies of those archetypes, similar to impressions made in wax by a stamp. Locke could not admit them to be unproduced, for that, he said, implied two principles, an unsentient nature to whose impressions the Deity must be passive: nor could he conceive that every time a man moulded a round piece of wax into a square, or entertained ideas of theft, adultery, or murder, these alterations were impressions made from archetypes in the divine mind. Their debate was carried on in a friendly manner without the least warmth or acrimony, and at last they agreed those subjects were too deep for them to fathom. They then praised God who had given his several creatures capacities sufficient for their respective uses, if they would but make a good use of them, and placed out of their reach only such points as were merely speculative.

Scarce had they made this reflection before we arrived at the place of our destination. We beheld the venerable Father of Philosophy dictating his precepts to a crowded audience with the authority of a magistrate. He appeared in a human form, like that the painters have drawn for Olympian Jupiter: his locks rising in large curls, his eye-brows thick and dark, his aspect majestic with the solemnity and mysteriousness of one who had been used to govern an ignorant and barbarous people. I looked earnestly for his golden thigh, but his robes, made I suppose of aerial woof, covering him quite down to the feet, I could not so much as see whether he had a golden toe. On Plato appearing, the obsequious crowd gave way, and he whispered Timæus that here was a stranger just arrived extraordinarily from earth, whose stay was very short, who had come upon the recommendation of Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, with an earnest and humble desire to receive some sprinklings of his wisdom to carry down for the benefit of mortals below. As soon as Timæus delivered his message the sage gave a gracious nod, like that wherewith Jupiter shook Olympus, on granting the request of Thetis, and with something like a smile began.

47. Adore the sacred Quaternion: the Quaternion containeth under it One, Two, and Three; but One, Two, Three, and Four compose Ten, and from Tens are all higher numbers produced. The Quaternion Four alone is One and uncompounded. One had no father, but One produced numbers, and numbers are all things. One is unchangeable, but numbers generate numbers, they fluctuate and migrate into one another: yet they perish not, neither was there a time when they were not. Whatever creepeth, or walketh, or swimmeth, or flieth, or thinketh, was produced by the first numbers, and the first numbers subsisted by the power of One.

Hearken unto me for I am ancient: I was Panthoides Euphorbus at the Trojan war, slain by Menelaus fighting in defence of my country; yet he could not destroy me nor hurt my country, neither remove me from it. I have known all things except One, but One is inscrutable.

Revere the Oath, For the Oath cometh from One, and bindeth all things: it cannot be broken, neither is it good that it should be broken.

Stand firm upon the golden thigh: let that be thy support: nevertheless use also the thigh of flesh when thou goest forth among men.

Purify the ears of thine understanding that thou mayest hear the music of the spheres, for their harmony is melodious to the adepts, but the vulgar hear not their sound.

Worship the immortal Gods according to the rights of thy country: for the same Gods made the wise and the ignorant, and thou thyself, if thou hast a thigh of gold, hast also another of flesh, neither livest thou for thyself, nor by thyself.

48. The gaping crowd listened with a kind of stupid astonishment. Some still held their mouths open, as if not knowing whether the Master had done or not. Timæus, Charondas, Zamolxis and the adepts, seemed all the while thinking on something else. Plato, like a complete courtier, joined with the many in expressions of wonder and admiration. And Locke, having observed something in my countenance that excited him strongly to laughter, was forced to draw in his head a moment for fear of scandalizing the company. But as the vehicles have a great command over their imagination, he very soon thrust it out again, and asked me with a very grave face, Whether I did not find myself prodigiously illumined. Illumined! says I; ay, with such a glare as dazzles me quite, for I can see nothing. I am as much mortified now as when Socrates played me off with his irony. Certainly great grandpapa sees I am a degenerate brat, not fit to be trusted with a little common sense, that he puts me off with his Rosycrucian jargon. Why I know no more what he has been talking about than the man in the moon. Oh! says Locke, this is only the bark: perhaps we may get the pith by and by. He always talks mysteriously till he knows people very well. I fancy they have given him an imperfect account of you; but I will try to get speech with him if I can to set matters right.

He then by the interposition of Plato and Timæus requested a private audience. The Master bared his bosom that Locke might apply his vehicle, and they had a conference together in the sentient language: after which, the Master, first mumbling a few words to himself, such as Light of Nature; microscope! Mundane Soul! One self-existent! cried out with a loud voice, Hence ye profane. Let not the uninitiated approach the sacred mysteries. Ye that are pure in heart and clean in hands draw near; that have kept the five years' silence: that have lifted up your minds above the earth upon the wings of contemplation: that have cleansed your mental eye from the films of superstition and obstructions of self-conceit, so that it can bear to look against the light.

Come, says Locke, now we may expect something a little more intelligible: he always makes this preface before he brings out his esoterics. As soon as this edict was pronounced, I perceived a great bustle among the company: all who were conscious of not being adepts slunk away one after another and our number dwindled strangely. Seeing some of great repute below both for learning and piety march off, and fancying somebody whispered the words Mallebranche, Dacier, practice of piety, Beveridge, Whole Duty of Man, as they passed, I thought it decent to withdraw too; but it was out of my power, for having not yet learned to go, I was forced to lie wherever my nurse laid me down. Locke observed my perplexity. Prithee, says he, do not be disturbed: this lecture is on purpose for you. I told him you had kept more than a five years' silence, having never spoken till you were about fifty years old: that you had conversed with bigots and free-thinkers, without being perverted by either, and that you had been initiated in the mysteries. Thank ye, says I: but I wish you could prove your words true. Hush! quoth he, the oracle begins to break forth.

49. Attend and learn. The Quaternion is the holy Tetragrammaton, the same awful name variously pronounced among the sons of men: whether Jeva,

Isis, Jove, Θεος, Zeus, or Deus; or in modern times, Tien, Alla, Dios, Idio, Dieu, or Lord; for these are all Tetragrammata. I speak not of Olympian nor Dodonean Jove, nor him the son of Chronos, but of the Uranian, whose offspring Chronos was. Uranian Jove alone is one, unproduced, without father, containing all powers within himself. All things beside are numbers: the Mundane soul is a multitude: the immortal Gods are portions thereof: the bodies thou seest are divisible into numberless atoms: men and animals are the divine particles mingled with lumps of clay; our vehicles contain a number of threads and fibres.

Jove produced the two first numbers, the Mundane soul and Hyle: he made Hyle inert and stupid, but to the Mundane soul he gave activity and understanding. They both depend on him for their Being and subsistence, nevertheless, there was not a time when they were not: for an effect may be as old as the cause, yea must be as old as the concurrence of all the causes requisite to produce it. Their production cost Jove no time nor trouble, nor did he from everlasting want power to produce them. Love or glory moved him to the work, but Jove is unchangeable, nor has there been a moment in all eternity wherein he was destitute of love or glory. Those two first numbers extend throughout all the immensity of the universe, but Hyle bears no greater proportion therein to Soul than the drops in a cyathus to the waters of the ocean.

Jove from everlasting disposed Hyle in certain characters expressive of his Will, which the Mundane soul reading therein, gathered the portions of Hyle dispersed up and down, into regular systems and worlds, formed thereout organizations of men, animals, insects, and plants, and lodged in each of them a particle of its own substance. Hence it is that men and animals perceive, and see, and feel, and act: for Hyle, however nicely arranged, can neither perceive nor act, but the particle of divine air enclosed therein perceives and acts according to the objects exhibited, and instruments at hand for it to employ.

The Mundane soul is homogeneous throughout, therefore the divine particles drawn from thence have all intrinsically the same nature, and stand differently capacitated according to the finer or grosser contextures of Hyle investing them: for the various degrees of percipience, sense, or rationality, arise from the action of Hyle upon them. If thou doubtest of this, consider what the brightest genius could do confined within the dull organs of an oyster: why then shouldst thou impute the stupidity of the oyster to its natural incapacity, rather than to the darkness of the habitation wherein it dwells? or how canst thou pronounce what the sentient principle of the oyster might not perceive if it had all the ideas of a man to survey? In plants there are channels of perception, but no instruments of volition, so their activity lies dormant in them: neither do they feel pain upon amputation of their limbs, for pain would be useless as warning them against mischiefs they cannot avoid. And they have different mundane particles in the several parts of their composition, so that there may be one for every offset planted from them.

But thou, O man, who pridest thyself upon thy reason, and expectest to be raised one day to the intelligence of an angel, wilt not conceive that a creature like thee can be debased to the condition of an insect or a vegetable. Reflect with thyself what thou art when asleep, how little better than a stone, insensible and motionless like that. What wert thou in the cradle? sleeping, feeding, and crying, with less signs of rationality than the brutes thou despisest. What wert thou in the womb growing like a plant from

the umbilical root, and receiving a few perceptions but performing nothing. The modern discoveries of animalcules by the microscope show, that before conception thou wert a little frisking worm, of less consequence in nature than the pismire and the mite.

50. The Mundane soul read in the characters inscribed by Jove, that there should be various states of life, various forms of Being, and prepared and sustaineth them accordingly: some with a mixture of evil, and some yielding nothing else. Individuals change, but the species remain constantly the same: and as the systems they inhabit are broken up, others are formed for their reception. The divine particles migrate from the Mundane soul into those states, each taking his turn in rotation that the fate of all may be equal; and he that passes through a more inconvenient state at one migration, takes the better at another. But as the particles in the Mundane soul are infinitely more numerous than those immersed in Hyle, they pass millions of years before it comes to their turn to migrate again, and all that interval they remain happy and immortal. For though the continuance in some of these states be an eternity to the spirits inhabiting them, who know nothing of their Pre-existence, and scarce anything of their Post-existence, yet the Mundane soul, to whom a thousand years appear as one day, looks upon these migrations no more as a supension of its immortality than a man esteems the suspension of enjoyments by a night's sleep a discontinuance of his life. Thus life is a journey through the vale of mortality, but the deliverance from Hyle a return home and resurrection to immortality again.

Therefore the Mundane soul, having found permission in the characters written by Jove, contrived to shorten the passage through Hyle as much as possible: many children escape from the cradle, and bringing no concretions into the vehicular state, obtain their advancement the sooner: many fœtuses never come to the birth, and multitudes of animalcules never arrive to the stage of a fœtus: these all regain their native seats directly, without passing through any other forms. The migration is not out of one species into another, but each species contains several stages: for the divine particle or Psyche, upon being first discerped from the Mundane soul to immerge into Hyle, receives a fine integument thereof; wherewith being enveloped she becomes an animalcule. This is her first stage, and many times the integument bursts before she arrives at any other: if it does not, she roams about until she finds a proper nidus wherein she nestles, whereto adhering and uniting as a part of the same composition she becomes an egg, or a fœtus, and the fœtus being in due time excluded becomes an animal. If the nidus being young, the adhesion close and strong, it chances to be dissolved by some disease or accident, it tears open the fine integument too, and sets Psyche at liberty: but if the animal holds out its period of life, the integument gradually loosens, and disengages itself from the gross outer covering, and upon dissolution thereof issues forth entire, but a little altered in its contexture, and distended so as to be incapable of re-entering a nidus of the same or any other species, and remains naked without any covering of the grosser Hyle for an appointed time, which is the last stage of the journey. But in whatever stage the first integument breaks asunder, Psyche becomes reabsorbed into the ocean from whence she sprung. Therefore the most desirable thing for Psyche would be not to have been born at all, and the next desirable to have died as soon as born.

Nor think thou, vain man, that thine is the most favoured state, or that

thou alone hast an interest in futurity. Knowest thou not that some animals drag on a life of labour, pain, distress, and misery? which thou canst not say they brought upon themselves by the abuse of their indifference; for this thou claimest as a privilege peculiar to thyself. Does not then the justice, the equity, the goodness of Jove require, that amends should be made them elsewhere? Psyche wishes most to pass through the species of short-lived animals, that her return may be the sooner: therefore the Mundane soul has provided infinitely greater multitudes of them than of the human and longevous. Thus Psyche has many short excursions to one long journey: for she must migrate successively through the several species of insects, animals, and men, savage or civilized, but after immense intervals between each migration.

51. I was Panthoides Euphorbus who fought in the Trojan war: not that sung by Homer, but another in another world innumerable ages before. The spear of the younger Atrides could not destroy nor remove me from my country, but advanced me one step towards it: for my country is the Mundane soul. During my long residence there I contemplated the Universe: I surveyed the systems, their order, and courses: mine eye penetrated into the minute portions of Hyle, their properties, and operations. I comprehended all things, all except the One: but the One is inscrutable, dwelling in unaccessible light, whither the intelligence of numbers cannot approach. Nevertheless, I beheld clearly the image of his splendour in the characters marked upon Hyle, in the powers and excellencies of the Mundane substance around me.

52. Reverence the Oath, for it is the Oath of Jove. Hast thou not heard how Jove made a covenant with man, that day and night, summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, should never fail? This is but one article of the covenant which the One made from everlasting with the first numbers: and he confirmed it with an oath: but having none greater to swear by, he sware by himself. As I live, saith the One, my order of succession shall not fail, neither shall my words pass away. Am I a man that I should change, or the son of man that I should repent? Behold now, the laws of nature which I have established, they shall not be broken: the mazes of fortune I have planned out, they shall not be obstructed: the measures of good and evil which I have set, they shall not be altered. Systems shall be formed and dissolved again, each succeeding the other: various forms of Being provided, the number and length of their stages, with everything befalling in them, duly regulated by the courses of nature and fortune: the Mundane substance assigned its proper migrations after stated intervals.

If I have interspersed a small portion of evil among my works, it is for the greater good to redound therefrom: for as I live, saith the One, I have no pleasure in the sufferings of my Numbers, but that they should enjoy and praise me for their Being. I have contrived my Order in wisdom and loving-kindness, and directed my second causes to operate ultimately for their benefit. This my percipient first number knoweth, and obeyeth my voice gladly. When Psyche lies immersed deepest in Hyle, I afford her such lights through the chinks of sense and appetite as direct her to serve my purposes unknowingly: if I open the windows of reason, then Psyche can discern good and evil, and I leave it in her power to choose between them; nevertheless, however she shall choose, she cannot defeat my designs, but promotes them when she least intends it, for I compass them secretly by ways she knows not of. I govern all things above and below,

Hyle by impulse, the Mundane soul by understanding and motives: I know certainly how every cause will operate, so that nothing falls out contrary to my Will. I have reserved the dispensation of evil to myself, for I alone know how to produce good out of it: let not Psyche presume to interfere with my prerogative.

If any provision of nature terminate ultimately in evil, I will interpose in good time with my almighty power for the deliverance of Psyche; but let her beware how she brings evil upon herself or her fellows, for though offences must needs come, woe be to them by whom they come; for I have marked out a secret path in the courses of nature, by which Nemesis shall overtake them, and overwhelm them with greater evils than they have occasioned; and the slower the steps of Nemesis are, the larger flood will she gather. Attend, O, Psyche, to the terms of my Oath: where thou understandest them not, I will not be severe to mark what is amiss, I will even bring strength out of thy weakness, wisdom out of thy foolishness, and success out of thy misconduct; but where thou discernest whither they direct, Reverence and Obey, lest mischief come upon thee.

53. Thus said the One: and it behoves Psyche to observe diligently what nature requires, especially her own nature, and examine to what uses her several faculties are applicable. The faculty of reason she will find eminently precious and solid above the rest, as gold is above other metals. This then is the golden thigh, whereon only thou mayst stand firmly: let this therefore be the support of thy meditations, the basis of thy conduct, the pillar whereon thou raisest thy schemes: nevertheless, when thou goest forth into the world, use also thy thigh of flesh, that thou mayst walk with freedom and conform thyself to the motions of others.

When retired from the noisy world thou standest upon thy golden thigh, thou mayst contemplate the regularity of the heavenly systems, their complicated motions, swift and slow, making an admirable harmony, singing forth the praises and magnificence of Jove. Thou mayst then turn thine ears upon earth and observe how the discordant passions, jarring interests, and opposite views of men combine to maintain order in communities, and work agreement out of that which seemed the most unlikely to produce it. Thou mayst attend to the windings of fortune, wherein events appearing the most harsh and grating to your wishes often terminate in a perfect concord, and unexpectedly bring on a close most contenting to the mind.

54. Worship the immortal Gods according to the rites of thy country: let this be thy general rule, nor admit thou exceptions without urgent cause. Rites are indifferent in themselves, and may be turned as well to good as bad purposes: popular doctrines are for the most part figurative, and may by proper interpretation be accommodated to sound reason. The same Jove made the adept and the ignorant; he careth equally for all his works; he gave forms and ceremonies to the vulgar: do not despise what thou thinkest needless to thyself. Yet neither be they wholly needless even to thee, for if thou hast a thigh of gold thou hast also another of flesh, a vulgar part in thy composition: nor is it given to mortal Psyche to guide all her steps by reason alone. Remember, thou livest not by thyself nor for thyself: if thou hast knowledge keep to thyself that which would hurt another: dispense to every one discreetly what will do him benefit, and in a manner he can understand and relish: delight not to thwart the conceptions of others, but turn them gently the way that will be most advantageous to them: neither regard the lawful only, but also the Expedient.

55. The Master then withdrew himself into his vehicle, gathering his vestments around him; so that he looked like a portmanteau lying under a heap of clothes. Plato, after making a handsome compliment to Timæus for his good offices, told us we had nothing more to do but return home again. So we set off directly, and as I expressed a desire of conversing with them upon the way, they contrived a method of carrying me, by which I might do it more commodiously: for taking me each under one arm they placed me in the middle on a level with themselves. In this manner we went on, all three making one compact body with two legs only for steerage of the whole: Plato skated upon the right hand ray, and Locke upon the left. I asked Locke whether he intended to send down all he had heard to Gellius. Ay, to be sure, says he. Why not?—Nay, says I, only because I thought two or three times while the master was speaking that the Demon whispered Offence.—Well then, says he, tell me those passages where you heard the whisper, and we will leave them out. Come, why do not you begin?—I was going, says I, but he checked me again. I do not know what to do, he puzzles me so with contradictory directions.—It is my opinion, says Locke, that we send all down, but you reserve them for your private use until you can get some friends to consult their Demons, who perhaps may be more explicit.—Oh! now, says I, he says Listen.—Very well, says Locke, that is a sign we are to follow our impulse for the present, only holding ourselves upon the watch for future admonitions.

56. I then desired, the Demon not forbidding, to know whether I might not be introduced to some of the Apostles. No, says Locke, that you cannot, for they, having gone through severe trials below, were all advanced long before I came up. Perhaps my partner may tell you something of them.—They did not much care to converse with us, says Plato, for they could not quite get rid of that shyness remaining from the notion they had first entertained below of our being reprobates and unclean, before Peter's vision of the sheet taught them otherwise. The last who stayed was the Cilician of Tarsus, detained by some acrimonious concretions he had contracted before his initiation. He could not help sometimes cursing and calling names: if anybody vexed him he would say, Thou hast done me much wrong, the Lord reward thee according to thy doings; or at other times, God smite thee, thou whited wall. Upon one of us asking him civilly to explain what was a spiritual body, he replied, Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die. I tell thee there is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body.

He had great knowledge, but no very happy facility in expressing himself; so though he was fond of disputing among us, we were very little edified, for he talked in a language peculiar to himself; till we put him in mind of his own rule, Become all things to all men, if by any means thou mayst gain some: he then began to conform himself to our ideas and figures, and when we could understand him we learned a great deal from him. He then owned that he had received heavenly gifts in earthen vessels, and though the liquor was not at all impaired thereby in substance or virtue, it might get some twang of the vessel. His education at the feet of Gamaliel led him, and the general taste of his countrymen obliged him, to deal in far-fetched, extravagant figures, which, as that taste subsided, lost all resemblance with the things signified, but were understood literally, thereby leading men quite wide of his meaning, involving them in useless subtilties, inextricable difficulties, and endless disputes. If he had stayed among us till my brother Locke here came up, he would certainly have been

a great favourite with him. I am persuaded he would have said nobody understood him so well since his own immediate scholars.

I flatter myself he would not have disapproved the thoughts I delivered when you first did me the honour to consult me. Perhaps he might have enlarged a little further, for besides the two celestial Goddesses I spoke of, he would have added two more, a pair of twins named Eisorosis and Pistis. Eisorosis, he said, remained always above to attend upon the Gods, and Pistis always below to succour mortal Psyche. She was of enormous strength, capable to remove mountains; and invincible courage, so as to pass through fire and endure tortures without changing countenance. When the car was overturned and Psyche dragged amongst briars, stones, and mire, he said no other power could rescue her besides Pistis; for Urania would not descend unless called by her. While Psyche holds fast upon her, no perils can hurt, no terrors dismay her. She carries an Eisoptron which, whenever Psyche looks too earnestly upon the ground, she holds under her and gives her by reflection therein a glimpse of the Glories above. He would not have omitted the golden anchor, only differed a little from us in the shape, for he said it was made like a cross, such as was used for the execution of malefactors, and that the three Goddesses mounting Psyche thereon proceeded with her through the Vehicular regions until they came to the gates of Heaven; where Elpis and Pistis, delivering over their charge to Eisorosis, descended again, but Urania entered with her into the blessed abodes. This Pistis was a great favourite of his, and he lamented grievously on hearing accounts from below that mankind had worshipped a counterfeit in her stead.

This Pseudo-pistis was a most furious power, imperious, violent, and cruel, carrying scourges, swords, and firebrands, to take vengeance of any that but dared to cast a disrespectful look upon her. She showed frightful images of dungeons, flames, and spectres, in her Eisoptron, and while Psyche was terrified in looking at them, she picked her pocket and sometimes stripped the clothes off her back. She practised a thousand frantic tricks and absurdities, till she became a laughing-stock to the scoffers. He said she might easily be distinguished from the genuine, being always accompanied by ambition, tyranny, vanity, avarice, luxury, or some of the infernal train: whereas the true Pistis never appeared far asunder from Urania. And she did everything by dint of arbitrary command, obligation, fear, and terror: whereas the real Pistis employed fear only as an instrument to work the beginning of wisdom, but when Urania took possession of the car, fear was banished quite away.—What then, asked I, do you think he would have said of our modern methodists, who pretend to quote him for their assertion that, provided a man believes himself one of the elect, it is not a farthing matter what his morals are? Perhaps, replied Plato, he would have answered, Thou fool, knowest thou not that faith is manifested by works, as the tree by its fruit? and that health of mind as well as body is preserved sound by constant exercise of outward actions? Socrates used to be much delighted with his description of the Uranian Venus.—I do not doubt but you remember it. Pray, says I to Locke, where is that? In the thirteenth to the Corinthians, says he.

57. The obliging Gentleman-philosopher proceeded to some other of his doctrines, which he explained after his own manner: but the ancient style and philosophy differing a little from the modern, I could not always comprehend him, till Locke explained them further in a manner accommodated to the present Theory. I would gladly relate what was said by them both,

for the Cilician doctrines interpreted by philosophers cannot fail of being very curious and instructive; but to my great regret I cannot recollect it yet. For Gellius, finding my sensory fill apace and not knowing how much more there might be to come, interlined these discourses, which he, being a heathen and a man of weak judgment, looked upon as matters of no great importance, in very small characters between the former writing: so that the inner membrane I carried with me being not yet fallen into the fine strokes of these little letters, I cannot possibly read them. But perhaps some time or other it may have worked in so that I may discern them plain enough, if not to transcribe, at least to recover the main sense and substance of them.

The next legible writing recounts that Locke and I, having dropped Plato at the Grecian quarter, came back to the place from whence we set out. As we passed along, after thanking my patron for the favours he had procured for me from the ancient sages, I added that if it was not trespassing too much upon his goodness I would beg an introduction to one of the moderns. Whom would you see? says he. There are but few of them within reach: for being new inhabitants here, they are gone to visit the regions round about; as your young gentlemen below are exhorted to travel for the finishing part of their education. Newton is run after the great comet that appeared in 1685, to try the justness of his calculations upon its trajectory. Huygens has undertaken a longer journey to measure the distance, magnitude, and brightness, of the Dog-star. Theory Burnet set out upon a visit to Jupiter, as being an earth in its antediluvian state. He wants to peep into the great hole Astronomers observe there, in hopes of seeing the great abyss beneath, and remarking how the earth stands in the water and out of the water. He then goes to Saturn to examine whether the ring be not a part of the paradisiacal crust not yet broken in. Whiston is engaged in a wild-goose chase among all the comets, to find which of them will bring on the conflagration, that he may calculate precisely in what year the Millennium begins, wherein he is to be chief Messenger, Arch-bishop, Metropolitan, and Primate of all the new earth. And the rest, almost all, are dispersed abroad, one way or other, in quest of some discovery hitting their fancy.—Oh! says I, it was none of those you named: though I should like well enough to have a conversation with them, but we shall not have time for everthing. The person I thought of was the famous German professor Stahl.—That is lucky, says Locke, for he being of very heavy phlegmatic temperament, has not learned to go yet, so we shall be sure of finding him at home.

But what can you want with him? Sure you do not design to study Physic at these years.—No, no, says I. I know more of that science than Socrates' one thing, and if I should dabble in it now, I might lose that single point of knowledge, and chance to quack myself into distempers. But as he has joined natural philosophy with medicine, I was curious to try whether some improvements might not be gotten from him, and have read so much of his True medical Theory as relates to subjects in my way; as likewise his controversial tract, entitled the Idle Business, alias the Shadow-fight: but can make neither head nor tail of them. Yet I am the less mortified because I find other people cannot agree what his opinions were, and therefore some of them must have misunderstood him. Boerhave makes him hold, that the mother's imagination forms the fœtus. Hartley, that the fœtus forms itself, and that all our automatic motions were originally voluntary actions of the child. His antagonist in the Shadow-fight charges

him with believing the soul divisible, for which reason the pieces of an eel cut asunder continue to wriggle because there is a bit of soul left in each of them. And, to my thinking, he allows nothing automatic even in the grown man, but that we place the particles of our daily nutriment every one in its proper station by our own Will: particularly in his section upon the Sphacelus, where he seems to ascribe the spreading of a mortification to the laziness of the mind, which withdraws her activity from the sound parts adjacent, and so lets the putrid humours continually gather ground upon her. Now I love always to go to the fountain head, and should be glad to know from his own mouth which or whether any of us be in the right.

Well, says he, I will carry you to the conference to humour you, but question whether you will be much the wiser for it. Your desire of recurring always to the spring head is commendable, but I cannot promise you much benefit here: for our spring runs ice rather than water, that one had more need bring a hatchet to cut out a slice than a pitcher to draw with. For as Plato told us just now of a better man, he has no happy facility of expressing himself: besides, he is not a very conversible creature, having brought up hither plenty of grumous concretions and fæces of cystic bile, which make him sullen, peevish, and fractious. You must behave very respectfully, seem to comprehend him whether you do or no, and contrive if you can sometimes to imitate his language without mimicking it: it will please, and perhaps make him more communicative. He has a large fund of honest industry and indefatigable zeal for the good of his fellow-creatures, which will prevail at length over his concretions, discharging them gradually with the help of our needles; for true hearty charity will cure as well as cover a multitude of sins. The faculty below hold themselves much obliged to him for many useful improvements he has made in the science. So you must learn not to think meanly of a man that has any valuable talent with a right disposition to use it, because he cannot make a handsome bow, nor run ye off an elegant period.—Oh! no, says I, the solid always carried the preference in my estimation before the specious. Yet methinks the example you have just now laid before me is a further justification of my aiming to get assistance from the polite arts for lifting up my profound speculations nearer the common surface, that more people may be capable and willing to pick them up.

58. But since I presume we have still some length of way to the end of our stage, give me leave to ask who is that antagonist whom he bumps and pummels so furiously in his Shadow-fight, for he never calls him anything but Mr. Author.—That, says Locke, you might have known could be none other than Leibnitz, by his claiming the first thought of a pre-established harmony.—What! says I, that veteran polemic who battled so long with Dr. Clarke? Indeed he shows himself the better disciplined soldier of the two in the Shadow-fight, and handles his arms much cleverer, at least so far as relates to the style.

Pray, has not he an adopted family among you? for two of our countrymen, Hartley and Berkley, visibly derive from him, besides the foreigner Mallebranche.—How so, says Locke, did they maintain his doctrine of pre-established harmony?—I do not say that, replied I, but they broached opinions which might naturally result from it. For he laid down for his foundation that spirits being Monades and matter infinitely divisible, there was no proportion between them, and therefore it was impossible they should in any manner affect or operate upon one another. No doubt he

overlooked the horrid consequence that must follow from thence, namely, that neither can God himself operate upon us: for though he be a Monas and we are Monades, yet there can be no proportion between that which fills all immensity and that which lies circumscribed within narrower limits than imagination can define. However, upon this foundation he concluded there must be two courses of Providence established, wholly independent on each other, governed by separate laws: one for the motions of matter, by a necessary chain of causes and effects, the other for the perceptions of spirit by an unalterable succession of ideas: but both so admirably contrived as in every step of their progress exactly to harmonize and correspond with each other. So that when upon finding myself cold I go to stir the fire, I can do nothing to make it burn, nor does it contribute anything towards warming me; but a convulsion seizes my arm, which makes it mechanically catch hold on the poker and fall a poking; in the mean while a correspondent series of ideas introduce one another in my mind; for my coldness ushers in the idea of taking the poker at the very instant when the convulsion seizes me; as the coals burn briskly, though I really see nothing of them, I have an idea of a great blaze in mine eyes just when the flames begin to mount; and in consequence of this, but without being anywise affected by their heat, comes the idea of feeling warmth.

From thence Hartley seems to have drawn his notion of the mechanical necessity of all human action: but he follows his original only half way, for though utterly rejecting any operation of spirit upon body, yet he allows body to operate upon spirit, and asserts that our ideas are all brought us by the vibratiuncles of a material ether.

Berkley will have it that spirit neither acts nor is acted upon by body, therefore not unreasonably denies the existence of matter as a thing wholly useless. For what need I have an arm by my side or coals in my grate, if I have no power to do anything with them, nor they of affecting me in any manner, and if they do not bear the least share in exciting those ideas of poking, of seeing a blaze, and of feeling warmth, which follow in succession by laws of their own? Nor is it probable that God, who does nothing in vain, should create a material world to be of no use to his spiritual, for whom he had provided other laws for bringing forth all the good and evil he foreordained should fall upon them.

As those two gentlemen were certainly good and pious men, it is much they did not reflect that their doctrines must be utterly subversive of all religion, morality, and even common prudence. What encouragement or what room is there to aim at attaining a right tenor of conduct and sentiment, or exhort others to the light? since endeavours we can make none, but must wait contentedly for such thoughts, opinions, desires, and designs, as it shall please God to send us, either by the ministry of vibratiuncles or by the pre-established order of succession among ideas.

And the system of the latter does great injury to two of the divine Attributes: for the corn, the fruits, the plants, the variety of provisions for our sustenance, our accommodation, and our enjoyment, the wide-extended Ocean, the realm-bounding mountains, the immeasurable expanse of heaven, the numerous host of Suns stationed at immense distances bespangling our night, are striking evidences to us of the power and magnificence of our Creator: which evidences will be utterly lost, if the Suns, the heavens, the hills, the seas, the animals, the vegetables, have none other existence or reality than in our own deluded imagination.

Then for Wisdom, the very essence of that consists in the apt disposition

of causes for producing effects: and is displayed by the admirable contrivance apparent throughout the natural and moral world, wherein jarring elements, an endless variety of differently qualified bodies, incompatible interests, and discordant passions, co-operate to maintain regularity in nature, society and good order among mankind, bringing forth unerringly their destined events by a thousand successive gradations, and through a thousand intricately-winding channels. Whereas there is no wisdom in stringing a succession of ideas, for this depends upon arbitrary Will and pleasure. The idea of a plentiful harvest, had God so pleased, might as well have succeeded the idea of a cricket match as the toils and cares of the husbandman. And the ideas of health, activity, and enjoyment might as naturally have flowed from the idea of sawing a block of marble into slabs as from that wonderful structure of bones, muscles, bowels, vessels, fibres, in the human body discoverable by dissections of anatomy. Thus the Maker of this stupendous universe is debased to the character of a fanciful poet or romancer, occupied solely in leading imagination along an endless variety of trains, which have no truth nor Being elsewhere than in our ideas.

Nevertheless, in dealing among these and such like persons of deep speculation, I have observed one particular in confirmation of my own sentiments, that they all in general (for I will not except Stahl, because I do not believe he ever thought of cutting the soul of an eel in pieces) seem to hold that every perceptive Being must be a true individual; and that every compound or divisible substance, such as are all the bodies falling under our senses or knowledge, is not one thing, but a collection or aggregate of many.

59. I do not know whether my patron attended to my prattle: it is best for my credit to suppose he would not interrupt me for fear I should not have time to say out all my say: for I had but just vented my last shrewd observation, when I found we stood still close by a bag which looked more lumpish and made of coarser stuff than any I had seen. There, says my guide, there is your oracle. Perhaps I may not get you an audience now you are come. He gave it five or six gentle taps and hallooed to it as many times; but nothing ensued. Pray, says I, had not you better talk to it in the sentient language? He does not understand that, says he, though we can understand him plain enough: for he has a wonderful propensity in thrusting his own notions upon other people, but as great backwardness in receiving theirs or even entering into their meaning. Suppose, says I, you should give him a good hunch with your foot. That will not do, says he, our vehicles are so light and the resistance of ether so small I should send him a bow-shot from us: and it would be an odd way of asking a favour, to kick a man about like a foot-ball till he grants it. So he thrust out two brawny arms, and gave him a lusty punch on the opposite sides, that the force of one might counteract the other. We then heard a grumbling voice mutter out, Who are ye? What do ye want? Let me alone. Do ye think to foist, or like the Plautine Sosia fist, your notions upon me? Your skirmishing parties, call them cohorts or cow-hearts, shall never drive my statarianly disciplined battalion from its ground. Why your infinitely-infinite monades in infinitely-never single bodies, producing upon a thing non-existent a non-existent effect, cannot get the better even of my light armature, my skipping scampering hussars, yea, with Parthian dexterity pugnacious even in flight. Locke whispered me. Now he is dreaming of Leibnitz all this while. And then addressed the shadow-fighting champion in these words. Celeberrimous Doctor, sole master of medical science, we

mean no attacks either upon your battalion or light armature: they are too respectable a body. You know my voice, that I am not Mr. Author nor one of his adherents. I have made bold to bring a new adopted son of mine to beg a detachment of your statarian soldiers to escort him into the regions of physiology and pathology.—A commendable attempt! says the bag, yea a laudable, not to say, noble ambition! But what need he plague me? Is not my True Theory to be had? He may learn there everything that is to be learned.—He has had recourse to that, says my patron, but being diffident of his own capacity he is not sure of comprehending everything exactly, and wishes earnestly to be set right from your own mouth. Has your boy any brains, quoth the bag, yea, is he attentive, not to say, docible, nor yet tractable? As for brains, replied my patron, it does not become the partiality of a parent to pronounce upon them: but I have always found him very desirous of learning while under my tuition. Well, well, quoth the voice, let him propose his difficulties. But, added my conductor, my son has been so constantly used to sensible objects that he cannot hear what anybody says unless he has a face to look at. Do so much as put out a head to humour him and make his improvement easier.—Pish! Phoo! grumbles the bag. Putredo and Sphacelus take it! What a deal of pother is here to please a young fellow's whims, yea, vagaries, not to say fooleries, nor yet impertinencies! We then beheld a head with a stern hard-featured countenance rise slowly up, like a ghost through the trap-door of a stage. Come, says my guide, be quick. Do not waste the Doctor's precious moments.

60. Venerable Sir, says I, son and heir of Esculapius, that I may not stick in the first threshold, I would be glad to know whether I rightly comprehend the force of those introductory terms which open the door to all the rest: I mean a mixture, a compound, a machine, an engine, or instrument, or organ.—Prithee, says the professor, none of your fashionable, yea, vulgar, not to say gossiping, nor yet finical language. You must learn to use the scientific terms if you would be good for anything, and say mixtion, composition, mechanism, organism, as well in entire systems as in their sundry parts, yea, members, and moreover, the speciallest species of them.—I thank you, learned Master, says I, for your correction, which shall not be thrown away upon me. Now I apprehend those four things are under-species of one another: so that a particular kind of mixtion is a composition, a particular kind of composition is a mechanism, and some mechanisms are organisms. If I throw two pecks of peas into a bushel measure, that is a mixtion; if I pour in two pecks of oats upon them and shake both well together, that is a composition: when a watchmaker has completed a watch so that it can point the hour and minute and make several automatic movements spontaneously, that is a mechanism; when an artist has finished a fiddle to give all the notes in the gamut but not without a hand to play upon it, this is an organism. The same appellation belongs to a rolling stone, a wheelbarrow, a cork-screw, a pencil, a knife, which are fitted for peculiar uses of mankind but will do nothing of themselves without somebody to handle them. Thus our poet said, or should have said, of a pair of scissors, He takes the gift with reverence and extends the little organism on fingers' ends.—Good boy! good boy! says the venerable, your child may come to something in time.—But, continued I, my fear is that I have not yet gotten the true characteristic, yea criterion, not to say, diagnostic, nor yet line of separation dijunging the province of organism from the rest of the mechanism territory, so as to know precisely upon every particular

occasion which is which. For though I can easily see that a man's hands and feet and tongue are organisms, because they will not handle nor walk nor speak unless he sets them at work; yet to my apprehension the heart and arteries, bowels and other vessels, seem to fall under the idea of mere mechanisms. Whereas you have taught us that the whole human body, together with all its viscera, yea, chylepoietic digestories, not to say, sanguiferous trunks, nor yet minutissim glands, and moreover speciallest species of secretory ducts, and even cellules of the adipose membrane, are so many distinct organisms.—I see, says the professor, your son is a little dull of apprehension: but that, you know, he cannot help. Therefore though we are confident that everything set forth in our Theory radiates, as the saying is, with its own lustre, yet we shall cast a further blaze upon it by one or two familiar examples in condescension to shallow capacities. Mind me, then, child. Suppose you bespeak a clock of artificial and workman-like construction, with everyway-multiform-exquisitely-mechanical circumstances belonging to it. The artificer brings it home, puts it up properly upon the dimidiate platform of your staircase, and sets it exactly by the equation table: now it is an organism. But if you let it go down, and after winding it up again should either through oscitancy or want of sufficient skill, set it at hap-hazard, so as to make it strike four when it ought to strike one; or lengthen the pendulum, so that it loses ten minutes an hour: then it is nothing but a mechanism. Again, suppose in some remote, yea, hitherto perhaps by human industry unreached regions of the terraqueous globe, there should be large tracts of country or islands, which by the spontaneous condition of their soils, their waters, their hills, and their valleys, should be beautifully adorned with woods, and fields, and animals of various kinds; nobody, I think, would contradict that all this proceeds from mere mechanism: and it must appear, I think, with the same evidence that there is nothing in act organical among all these circumstances. Send a colony to one of those lands, who shall build houses, dig cellars, raise provisions for themselves and their domestic animals, plant trees and corn which the ground may nourish and bring up quite to maturity: then it immediately becomes an organism.—I am a little suspicious, says Locke, that my boy does not fully comprehend you yet.—No? cries the venerable in surprise, He must be a blockhead, yea a numskull, not to say a beetle, nor yet a blunderbuss, if he does not.—Oh, yes! says I. The celeberrimous Doctor has made the thing as clear as the sun. I can easily understand how any tract of land or water may become an organism. I remember when I was a stripling, the vast Pacific Ocean, commonly, yea, vulgarly, not to say, news-paperically, nor yet, teatabellically, and moreover, among the speciallest species of ale-drinking, burthen-carrying, fish-selling rhetoricians, called, appellated, as the saying is, and annominated, the South-sea, was made an engine, I mean organism, to pick people's pockets and ruin half the nation. The like had been done but the year before in a neighbouring nation with the great river, the river Mississippi. And it is not impossible that a few years hence the three rich Nabobships of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa, may be turned to the same laudable purposes.

61. It quickly appeared I had committed murder, his features, which before were hard as oak, became now as hard as rock, and he began to draw in his head with as much speed as his great gravity would permit. But Locke, being a good deal nimbler, clasped him under the chin with two stout ploughman's hands, crying at the same time, Pray, Mynheer, dear Doctor, celeberrimous Doctor, insignite illustrissim Doctor, Hallensian star

culminating in the zenith of brightness. Never mind what a child says. I am sure he meant no harm. It was only his vanity made him pretend to understand you when he really did not.—I durst not utter a syllable all this while for fear of making matters worse, but kept drawing myself up with the hand I was holden by till my vehicle touched Locke's, expecting he would feel my thoughts. He then let him go, when instantly the head shot in, like a large knife into a new sheath, when by pressing with might and main you had just overcome the stiffness at the entrance. We now had only a shapeless bag before us: but we saw the vocal fibres agitate all over, and heard a vehement eager grunting, such as the hogs make when a strange pig comes into the yard.

So we left Mynheer Celeberrimous to compose himself and make peace with his own shadow as well as he could: and being gotten to some distance, Locke owned I was in the right not to wish the conference might be renewed, for I should never have profited by it.—So I believed, quoth I, for he is a bar's length more profound than Pythagoras.—Pythagoras, returned he, had his reasons for being profound; but this man is profound because he cannot help it. But how came you to be so careless as to disgust him after all the hints I had given you?—Why, says I, did not I follow your injunctions to a hair?—Truly, says he, scarce to the thickness of a cable. Instead of appearing to comprehend him, you showed yourself resolved to misapprehend him, nor did you observe the charge I gave you to distinguish between imitation and mimickry. There is one caution very needful for you airy gentlemen to bear in mind. Never hazard giving offence for sake of a joke.—Well, says I, this is the second time I have suffered by my indiscretion: though I have some excuse here, for he so be-blockheaded and be-blunderbust me about as was enough to hurry anybody, and throw them off their guard.

But since the mischief is past remedy I must rest contentedly under it: unless you will be so kind as to repair the damage by giving me a system of his sentiments. I am sure you can do it accurately, for you told me he could talk currently to you, though not with you in the sentient language. —But then, says Locke, you must tell me what part of this system you would have: for the medical would be of no use to you, and the physical, most of it, stands nearly connected with the other. That part, says I, relating to the formation of the fœtus. My patron asked what good it would do me to know that. I told him, perhaps it might furnish me with an argument from analogy in confirmation of a point I have been labouring to maintain, namely, that our conduct upon earth may naturally have an effect upon our condition afterwards. For if it could be made appear by the labours of an eminent physician and careful examiner into the secrets of human nature, that our terrestrial happiness is effected by our behaviour in the uterine state, a probable inference might be drawn from thence, that all the several forms of Being we pass through are by the laws of nature made dependent upon one another, and each of them preparatory to the next. Now my curiosity to consult Mynheer Celeberrimous was first raised by Hartley, from whose hints concerning him I was simple enough to expect he would show me by undeniable arguments, drawn from his medical science, that our health or distemperature of constitution, our vigour or weakness of body, our quickness or dullness of parts, and even our natural aversion or propensity to particular vices, were owing to the prudent or careless management of ourselves before birth. But alas! how was I disappointed! when instead of clear demonstrations from experience and

discoveries of anatomy, I was presented with a confused Chaos wherein I could discern nothing distinctly, and even suspected the Celeberrimous did not always understand himself. I was in hopes too of finding something concerning the animalcules: for though their existence seems generally believed among my learned cotemporaries, it is not admitted by everybody. Might I be so bold as to ask what is the real truth upon that article? My patron rebuked me for this last presumption.

Prithee, says he, don't think to palm your notions upon the world below for vehicular truths. I shall not give my sanction to such an attempt, I assure ye. Whatever might tend to the improvement of your religious and moral sentiments I have already told you. All informations that have been sent from above were given with that sole view, and whoever seeks for anything further in them grossly mistakes their meaning. As for matters merely speculative you must be content with such glimmerings as human sagacity can strike out. Your new acquaintance has made some alterations in his system by his converse among us, which render it a little less perplexed and incoherent: and I believe you had rather I should give it you in this condition than precisely that it stood with him in upon earth. Nevertheless, having store of concretions remaining, as you might perceive just now, he has not quite gotten rid of human prejudices and human errors: so you must still look upon what I shall tell you from him as the opinions of a mortal, not as the knowledge of a vehicle.

62. He had no thought of the animalcules below, but since Leuwenhoek and Boerhave came up, has been made a thorough convert to that doctrine. He says the animalcule gets into the Ovum at the broken end of the Calyx, where it finds a tube growing narrower by degrees, into which it pushes with vehemence, until being straightened on all sides by the closeness of the passage, it can move neither forwards nor backwards, nor even bend its little body; nevertheless, being all nerve and fibre, it exerts itself strenuously in every point of its surface. Those points in the internal surface of the Ovum, which are soft and susceptible of its action, adhere to it and receive its impulse, which continually protruding them forwards, causes them to grow first into an embryo, then into a fœtus, and lastly the full-formed child. But as there are multitudes of fibres capable of extension in different degrees, and they often stick to one another, if the ends of those which have done growing should fasten to the sides of the others, it must necessarily stop their direct progress, and cause them to double into folds. Thus the heart, which at first was a straight canal, becomes doubled into ventricles and auricles. Thus the six bowels affording a passage to the victuals from our stomachs, are one continued tube esteemed six times the length of the man, but folded among one another so as to lie commodiously within the Abdomen. Thus likewise the smaller fibres become convoluted into Plexuses, Ganglions, Glands, and winding ducts.

If this extension was not owing to the action of the animalcule, why should it never take place in the Ovum before being impregnated therewith? for that receives continual nourishment from the Ovary wherein it was produced. Nor does the child wholly leave off this exercise upon birth, as appears by the grunting noise it frequently makes, especially after being fed, which the nurses call thriving, because they find by experience that it contributes to the growth and nourishment of the babe. And even when arrived to years of maturity, we cannot forbear sometimes yawning and stretching, supposed owing to some perspirable matter wanting to be discharged, which this effort helps to push forward and throw off. Thus the

fœtus does not want for employment, being perpetually occupied from its first union with the Ovum in distending its fibres; which it is led to do by an instinct, that is, by sensations sometimes perhaps painful, occasioning maims, distortions, and imperfections, but for the most part pleasurable, assisting in the growth of the viscera, limbs, and members: for good plight of body bespeaks an easy mind, and anxiety is observed to vitiate the juices, and corrode the flesh. Boerhave has remarked that pleasure and pain proceed from the same mechanical causes operating only in a different degree: a nerve moderately stretched yields a pleasing titillation, when almost ready to break it gives anguish, and when quite broken ease ensues. In the former case the mind strives to thrust forward the hither part of the nerve to meet the titillation, and feel it more sensibly; in the latter to draw it back either for closing the passage or attaining ease by a complete rupture. Thus whenever exerting her activity to extend, she is in a state of pleasure: when to contract or withdraw, in the contrary. And this may account for those sudden amputations of an arm or a foot, sometimes happening on frights of the mother; for a violent contraction may snap short the tender fibres just in the place where the uneasiness was felt.

Therefore what Boerhave asserts of the fœtus passing far the greater part of its time in sleep without any ideas, must be understood of such ideas from external objects as engage the notice of men: for ideas may spring from inward feelings, while the limbs and outer parts lie motionless, as in sleep. But as the sensible nerves grow in length and become gradually connected with remoter parts of the distended Ovum, sensation follows their progress, and seems always taken at the very extremity of the nerve conveying it: hence we apprehend ourselves perceiving at our eyes, or our ears, or our fingers' ends, and esteem ourselves present throughout the whole surface of our body; or rather beyond, our imagination renewing that antiquated notion of something going out from the eye quite to the object, so that we account done in our presence whatever is done in our sight. It must not be supposed the fœtus proceeds with skill or forecast, or knows the uses of the limbs and vessels it forms; but is directed to exert its activity from time to time at the proper places, by sensations of present pleasure and pain, excited mechanically by the circulating juices and gross composition surrounding it.

He says further that the animalcules are variously sized and constituted, according to the origin whereout they sprung, and so are the Ova: whence it comes that the child takes after both father and mother jointly: but as the same tree bears differently conditioned fruit, so both animalcules and Ova of the same growth are not all exactly alike; and hence it happens that children of the same parents differ widely in their disposition, make, and features, yet there is another cause which increases the difference, namely, the occurrences befalling the mother during gestation: for the state of her imagination affects the burthen she bears, not immediately by mechanical operation, but by influencing the imagination of the fœtus. This he attempts to prove by many instances, as well from his own experience as the testimony of Boerhave, of very extraordinary effects produced by the frights and longings of women. He owns, however, that some persons of great knowledge do not admit the reality of those instances, but thinks their bare denial of the cause without accounting any other way for the facts, which are incontestable, not sufficient to shake the authority of the greater numbers who maintain it.

63. Here I begged leave to put in a word of what I had heard among

my contemporaries relating to this affair of the mother's imagination: for that I knew a man eminent in his profession, perhaps the best anatomist in Europe, who treated this as an idle notion, insisting that the supposed marks are mere sports of nature, like the spots and marks often found upon apples: but when anything of this sort happened, the mother hunted about for some fright or longing she could recollect, and by an after-thought assigned that for the cause. On the other hand, I was told by a man-midwife of very great repute in our Metropolis, that once upon a delivery, wherein nothing appeared amiss to his observation either in the mother or the child, she pressed him earnestly to examine the hands: accordingly when the child was carried into the next room, he took the first opportunity to examine the hands, and found on each of them a supernumerary finger, which adhering only by a bit of skin, he snipped them off with a pair of sissors, and presently healed up the wound with a little salve. It was thought proper in the family that this should be concealed from the mother: so upon asking him he was forced to tell her he had found the hands such in all respects as might be expected in a healthy vigorous child. She then cried out in a transport of joy that she was extremely glad of it, for that on such a particular day, being in a chariot, a beggar woman had thrust in a pair of hands with six fingers, which had alarmed her greatly, and ever since it had run strongly in her head that the child would be born with the like. Now this could not be an after-thought in the mother to account for a phenomenon she never knew of. If I were ever to see the Celeberrimous again, I would recommend to get some of his neighbours, who go down to earth, to bring him a report of the cases cited from very good authorities by Dr. Douglass, in his Criterion of Miracles, wherein are several accounts of astonishing effects produced upon the bodies of persons in years by a strong impulse of imagination. For if that faculty has so great a power over the dry and stiffened fibres of an adult, it may well be presumed to act with much greater force upon the tender filmy flesh of a fœtus. I will give him your hints, says my patron, which I doubt not he will thank you for: and perhaps they may atone with him for your late rudeness. And possibly he may learn something from Gellius by the sketches observed in the tablet of your memory. I am afraid, says I, they will be very imperfect, for it being some years since I read the book, the traces are in great measure worn out. But probably Gellius may be good-natured enough when he hears what we have been talking about, to inspect the sensory of some other person who has the impressions fresher.

But, continued my instructor, with respect to the objections of anatomists, our professor says the point does not lie within the compass of their art to decide: for between the Placenta and Uterus, there lies a Mucus or thick humour, which Boerhave will agree with him is not properly a humour, but a congeries of exceeding fine vessels, too fine for any instrument of the anatomist to trace out; nevertheless they may suffice to carry on the communication of ideas between the mother and the infant. Yet you must not imagine the very same ideas propagated from one to the other; for when the mother is terrified with threatening words, the embryo cannot be supposed to have the sound of them in its unformed ears, much less to understand their dangerous meaning: nor when she longs for a peach, can it be thought to perceive the fine flavour or beautiful bloom that strike her fancy. But the modifications and motions of matter may excite ideas correspondent to those which occasioned them, yet without their being similar: and of this you may find examples in common life.

When a man writes a treatise, the ideas in his head direct him to the matter and manner of his composition : if he sends it to the press, the compositor cannot place his types without ideas, which he takes step by step from the copy before him : yet are his ideas very different from those of the author, who may be presumed continually attentive to the strength of his reasonings, the aptness of his figures, and propriety of his language, without much regarding the grammar and spelling, which flow spontaneously from his experienced pen ; whereas the compositor's mind is wholly occupied with the letters and orthography, he thinks nothing of the argument, nor manner of handling it. Then again the reader pays little regard to letters and syllables, it is enough if there be no gross misprint or egregious blunder to draw off his notice, he takes in whole sentences and paragraphs at a glance, and directs his attention to observe the main tenor and disposition of the performance. Nevertheless, the ideas he receives perhaps may vary greatly from those in which the author wrote : what struck the one as something sublime, humorous, or elegant, may seem low, insipid, and vulgar to the other ; what one thought demonstration, to the other may appear a rope of sand ; what was dictated to the one by a spirit of rational piety, may raise in the other an idea of profaneness or superstition. Thus the ideas of all three, though far from being similar, correspond and depend upon each other : for had the author had other thoughts, he would have written in another manner, the compositor would have ranged his types otherwise, and another train of ideas would have been suggested to the reader.

He is grown so zealous an advocate for the animalcules, as to insist that they are rational creatures, because their being never found, unless in the cellules producing them, in the Epididymis, the Vas deferens and the Vesicles, although the humour they float in is known to diffuse over the whole human body, indicates a choice and discretion that withholds them from entering places unfit for their accommodation. Besides, it stands to reason that the ethereal body should have a fuller use of all its powers, the thinner and finer the elementary covering is wherein it lies enveloped : as a man has the fuller use of his arms and fingers in kid gloves and a silk waistcoat than if he put on a great horseman's coat, and a pair of heavy gauntlets. And the rationality of man proceeds from there being some hollow cellules in the Ovum, which do not adhere to the animalcule : whereas in the brutes and insects the gross elementary body presses everywhere close upon the little inhabitant within, so that it cannot act in any point except in those alone where the gross covering is yielding and moveable by it. Therefore though they distinguish and judge, they have such judgments only as their senses from time to time impress upon them : but man possesses a power of acting upon his own thoughts, and calling up ideas of reflection without aid of external objects. Yet is this power less than in his original state, for those ethereal strings which are drawn out to an immoderate length by the distention of the Ovum in its growth, must hinder the operation of the others : just as a man who should have the fingers of one hand thrust into a low waxen ceiling, which kept them always stretched at arms length, would not have so full a use of the other arm as if both were at liberty.

64. He has battled strenuously with some who denied there could be much scope for action and enjoyment within so narrow a prison as the animalcules were cooped up in : for, says he, all magnitude is relative to the size of the creatures observing it. Upon earth we used to take for the basis

of our admeasurements the breadth of a large man's thumb, which we called an inch: twelve thumbs were supposed the length of his foot: something more than five of those feet made his pace in walking fast: a thousand of his paces made a mile: and by miles or thousand paces we computed the largest tracts of country, the circuit of the globe, the distance of the Sun and planets. Thus our highest computations still bore a reference to the parts of our human body. Now imagine animalcules to take their rise n measuring from the width of their tail, which we may suppose the same to them as a foot was to us: let five of those feet, or better, go to a pace, that is, such length as they can throw themselves forward by one wriggle of their tail: then reckon by animalcular miles or thousands of such paces, and you will find more of them in the many winding ducts open to their passage than you would have miles to pay for a post-chaise to carry you about all the roads in England. But you would hardly think a man kept in close imprisonment, who should have the whole kingdom of England to range in.

He will needs have it that the entrance of a particular one among their number into the Calyx is not matter of chance, but settled by certain rules founded upon solid reasons: nor is it claimed as a privilege, but submitted to as a burden unreluctantly upon a motive of public spirit; because if the race of men were to fail, the race of animalcules must cease too for want of a proper habitation to subsist in. It has been objected against him, that the violent frisking motion with which they are always found to dart to and fro, does not give the appearance of a prudent considerate animal. To this he answers that this is not their natural motion, which is more sedate and regular while in their proper places of abode: but they are never seen with the microscope unless in a dying state upon being driven out of their element. Yet are their agitations neither effects of wantonness nor expressions of pain or uneasiness, for death is terrible to man alone: of all other creatures the inferior know not what it is, and the more intelligent know it is nothing more than a passage from one state of existence into another. Therefore though the wanton waste and destruction of them be a species of murder, they lie under no such terrors as mortal man upon falling into the murderer's hands: they perceive their material integument beginning to break, and exert all their efforts to rend it asunder the sooner. Have you not observed the little insect producing a gnat dart up and down with sudden jerks and great velocity in the water, till one being gotten open is thrust up to the surface? when immediately issues forth the winged captive from its imprisonment, in joy, no doubt, and transport, soaring aloft to take possession of its new aerial country. So Psyche enclosed in the animalcule, upon finding the walls of her prison crack, struggles hard to hasten the total rupture, that she may get a complete deliverance from her immersion in matter, regain her native heavens, and mingle among the host of her congenial spirits.

65. I have now, added my patron, given you as much of his notions as you can want. You are not to take them all for Gospel; but parables are employed in the Gospel, and even popular opinions not discountenanced when they can be turned to useful purposes. Much more the imaginations of learned and close-thinking men may serve, when rightly applied, to enlarge your mind by enuring your imagination to follow more readily the judgments of reason. They may give you a quicker apprehension of an important truth built upon solid grounds, namely, that happiness is not con-

fined to the enjoyments and accommodations of human life. For the arm of the Almighty is not so short, nor the treasures of his wisdom so scanty, as that he should have but one way to make the existence of his creatures pleasurable. He can give them what measure of gratification he judges proper in the body of a giant, an insect or an animalcule, by intelligence and reason or gross sense and appetite, on earth or under ground, in water, air, or ether, or naked and unembodied in any material composition whatsoever. As he changes their nature, he changes their situation too and the circumstances of it, adapting each to the other: for various natures require various situations, and what would be wretchedness to one is enjoyment to another. You could not subsist in the waters where the great Leviathan takes his pastime: and the pure air that gives you spirits would prove his certain destruction. You would be miserable without society, light, and exercise: but the fœtus lives satisfied and thrives, pent up in a dark and lonesome dungeon. Therefore consult your present nature so far as to provide by what methods you can for its preservation and well-being: but when called to another, where the meats and drinks, the lands and houses, the diversions and pursuits of men, could be of no use to you, yet follow without reluctance: for the same Power, who has furnished you so amply by a thousand wise and wonderful provisions in one state, will supply you as commodiously with the requisites needful for your accommodation and enjoyment in another. Trust then steadfastly in him, and fear nothing: for wherever you go, you cannot go from under the eye of a beneficent governor and indulgent parent.

My good patron had his particular reasons for summing up with this very grave conclusion: but though he did not disclose them, they became apparent presently. For no sooner had he done than we saw ourselves surrounded with a group of vehicles, who came up with great joy and alacrity to congratulate me, for that they perceived I was just going to be advanced. I could not help being startled, notwithstanding his last seasonable admonition, having brought up some of those apprehensions natural to mortals upon an approaching change. I surveyed my outside, but could see no alteration there: neither did I feel anything unusual within, except some considerable tremors which I knew were owing to my fears. However, in a few minutes my vehicle burst, and I became instantly absorbed into the Mundane soul.

66. As upon a man awaking in the morning out of sleep, the dreams and visions of the night vanish away, his senses which had been kept stupefied throw open their windows, his activity that had lain suspended returns, he resumes the command of his limbs, recovers his ideas and understanding, and goes on with the schemes and occupations he had begun the day before: so upon my absorption I found myself, not translated into another species of creatures, but restored to myself again. I had the perfect command of my limbs, and their motions were familiar to me: I had that knowledge and judgment which is the result of experience. My body was immense yet I could manage it without trouble, my understanding extensive yet without confusion or perplexity: for the material Universe was my body, the several systems my limbs, the subtile fluids my circulating juices, and the face of nature my sensory. In that sensory I discerned all science and wisdom to direct me in the application of my powers which were vigorous and mighty, extending to every member and fibre of my vast composition. I had no external object to look upon, nor external subject to act upon: yet found an inexhaustible variety to employ my large thoughts and unwearied

activity within myself. I rolled the bulky planets in their courses, and held them down to their orbits by my strong attraction: I pressed heavy bodies to the earth, squeezed together the particles of metals in firm cohesion, and darted the beams of light through the expanse of innumerable heavens. I beheld the affairs of men, discerned all their springs of action, and knew how to set both them and the courses of events so as to guide the wheels of fortune with unerring certainty.

Nor did I find the least inclination to use my power wantonly or disorderly in any single instance; for wisdom is ever steady to itself and pursues invariably one grand and well concerted design. Good was my constant motive, and an exact knowledge of everything tending to promote it my perpetual direction. I knew my own immortality, nor did I look upon the short excursions into matter as a discontinuance of it. I was beyond expression happy, the regular motions of my great body giving me a cheerful flow of spirits and more pleasing sensations than the most vigorous youthful health: my imagination entertained with a multitude of varying, never satiating objects; my understanding capacious and clear; my judgment sound and piercing; my conduct blameless, wise, and satisfactory. Nor could anything fall out to disturb me, for all the parts of composition lay under my control and inspection: my circulations were not mechanical but voluntary, and if at any time I had a mind to change my position within my vast body, I could fasten to some particle of the circulating juices I had moved, which would transport me whithersoever I wanted, yet without losing sight of the place I came from.

67. Yet with all these mighty powers and privileges I had no temptation to pride or vanity, for I knew that in my own individual I was weak and ignorant, unable to stir a mote in the Sunbeams or produce a single perception from my own fund: but all my knowledge was brought me by communication, and my operations performed by the joint concurrence of innumerable hosts of substances of the same nature with myself surrounding me. For there being a general participation of ideas throughout the whole community, we had all the same apprehension, the same discernment of things, the same aims and purposes: so there was no variation of sentiment nor discordance of desire among us. The thoughts of all were the thoughts of every one, and the actions of the whole the acts of each particular: for each was consenting to whatever was done by the others, and no sooner wished to have a thing done than he saw it instantly performed. As we had but one mind and one Will, everything happened according to that Will; for pervading and being mingled with the corpuscles of matter throughout the universe, we actuated the vast mass, each contributing his share, which though singly small, yet when united with the rest, sufficed for every work how stupendous soever that was requisite. We were sensible that our strength lay in our unanimity, and in promoting the general good we promoted our own, which made us apply our endeavours with alacrity and delight. We took pleasure in communicating our pleasures, and transmitting our lights as fast as we received them: by which means we had each of us a full display of nature, and by reflection therein, of the Author of nature.

For though we could move and range the particles of matter as we pleased, we were sensible that we did not create them, but they owed their existence, their solidity, their mobility, and other primary qualities, to a higher Power. We perceived likewise that sensation was the ground-

work of our knowledge, that sensation proceeded originally from matter, that if matter should be withdrawn or lose its quality of affecting us with perceptions, or our mutual communication cut off by removing us out of contiguity with one another, we should utterly lose our percipience and power of action. This convinced us that we ourselves, although a nation of kings governing the universe with absolute sway, were subordinate and dependent. We considered that though our present views and judgments arose from the position wherein we had placed the several bodies of the universe large and minute, yet were we moved so to place them by contemplation of some former position: thus position followed position, but the whole must have had some beginning, which we could not give it, because there must have been some prior order to serve for our motive and direction before we could begin to act. We saw further that our own existence could not be necessary, we being many; because what was necessary in one place must be so everywhere, and consequently One, not in similitude and communion only, as we were, but numerically and individually One. Therefore though we were conscious of our community having subsisted from all eternity, nevertheless it must have been produced from eternity by a prior Cause, prior in order and efficacy if not in time.

68. Thus the consideration of our own nature, together with the nature and disposition of bodies throughout the universe, led us to the knowledge of God, whose work we were both in body and soul. We found ourselves subjected to laws we did not make, to migrations into matter wherein parts of our substance lay enveloped as in a shell, cut off from all communication with the rest. As we had both a retrospect and prospect of eternity, we regarded the longest of those migrations but as a moment, no more than the smart a man feels on plucking out a hair from his face, therefore submitted to them readily in our several turns, nevertheless we submitted out of necessity, not out of choice. We observed the condition of our substances when immersed in matter, their actions and events befalling them, and discerned uses therein to ourselves unthought of by them. We perceived a small mixture of evil among their good; we would gladly have prevented it, but could not without greater mischief to ourselves, for it was made necesary to our well-being. We sometimes, upon rare and extraordinary occasions, discovered motions we did not produce, events we did not bring to pass; which convinced us of an interposition to restrain the growth of evil, and to rescue those immersed substances to whom the courses of nature had rendered it perpetual. These observations displayed to us the divine Attributes, we saw them consistent and aiding each other, with a clearer and fuller view than mortal eye can reach or mortal heart conceive: we beheld Glories ineffable which it is not lawful, or rather not possible to utter; nevertheless there were greater Glories behind, which no created intelligence can penetrate.

69. The contemplation of these Attributes, which we saw were parts only of the Divine Essence, inspired us with a transcendant admiration, an ardent love and filial reverence, towards our Almighty Father, who was our continual dependence and support, the fountain of our immense powers and unspeakable happiness; and prompted us to employ our eternity in returns of incessant adoration. But our adoration did not exert itself in hymns or empty praises or verbal thanksgivings: we discerned his Will written in legible characters upon the face of his creation, and applied ourselves industriously to fulfil it. The courses of nature carried on by our agency were our hymns the government of matter administered by our hands was our

praises, and a ready obedience to his commands was our morning and even ing sacrifice. We knew that in all our functions we were only his ministers delegated and empowered for that purpose: but it was our joy and our glory to be employed as his ministers in executing his works. For they were not arbitrary commands nor exertions of despotic authority: he wanted not our services for his own use, but gave us our tasks in mercy and loving-kindness to be a blessing to his creatures; so that in working for him we worked for ourselves, and for one another. We caused our inferior ministers, the heavenly bodies and elements, to pay the same active adoration. By our energy we stationed the golden Suns, and strengthened them to hold their several Vortices in concord. The silver Planets completed the harmony by their various aspects, their change of seasons, and vicissitudes of light and darkness. One day told another, and one night certified another: their sound went forth to the several earths, their voice was heard among the innumerable hosts of heaven. Gravitation and cohesion whispered their share of praise to the attentive ear, the subtile fluids of air and ether joined in the chorus: and the whole creation was one incessant Hallelujah.

Nor did we forget those of our fellows imprisoned within the walls of matter, but provided for them all the accommodations and enjoyments permitted by our common Master. The dispensations of his Providence were conveyed to them through our means, by the laws of nature which we executed, and disposal of second causes which we put in act to bring forth the destined events. With our plastic virtue we worked upon the multitude of habitable globes rolling round their appointed centres through the fields of ether: we clothed their surfaces with the green herb, the flowery shrub, and tree yielding fruit; caused them to produce fossils and minerals below, dews and vapours and benign influences above. We wove the little fibres of vegetables in curious textures, sorted them into a thousand various species, and fitted them for a thousand different uses. We interlaced the more curious vessels of animals in many intricate mazes among one another, hollowing them into tubes respectively filled with their peculiar juices, that partly they might perform regular mechanical motions of their own, and partly serve as convenient instruments for the spiritual agents within them. We guided the sensitive tribes by instinct, directing them unerringly to the necessary means of their preservation and increase, and to answer the purposes they were designed for with regard to other creatures. The upper species we governed by wants, and appetites, and passions, together with some glimmerings of reason flashing at uncertain intervals. He had his free choice to conduct him in every action, but we knew how, by the springs of inclination and opinion, to draw his choice upon what particular point we pleased. He acted mostly upon short aims and private views, yet we contrived that in so doing he should work himself out a remote benefit he thought nothing of, and co-operate to the general good. Even his vices and foibles were not useless under our management: ambition, avarice, luxury, vanity, shame, fear, lust, laziness, petulance, fraud, resentment, envy, had their tasks assigned them: evil became productive of good, and the wicked was made for the day of the Lord: folly and wantonness had their several lines allotted them to fill up in the glorious all-perfect plan given us by infinite Wisdom. The proper station was marked out to every creature, from whence it could not be spared without detriment to the whole: they all answered their destined ends, without knowing what those ends were, or having any desire of attaining them. For as the strings of

an instrument perform their parts in the tune yet without any knowledge or perception of the notes they give: so the sublunary agents bore their several parts in the general harmony, and contributed to carry on that order of succession among events of which they had no thought or conception.

Thus by directions issued from above, and our faithful ministry thereof, it was brought to pass that all things, animate and inanimate, co-operated in displaying the wisdom and goodness of that Power which first ordained their motions. The serpentine rivers and unfathomed oceans, fire and hail, snow and vapours, wind and storm, fulfilling the tasks imposed on them, mountains and all hills, fruitful trees and all cedars, beasts and all cattle, worms and feathered fowls, kings of the earth and all people, princes and all judges of the world, young men and maidens, old men and children, all united in the universal song to the glory and praises of their beneficent Creator.

And upon some extraordinary command received, enow of us were found ready at hand to throw the particles of matter into various forms and appearances for producing any supernatural effect. But whether we act ordinarily or extraordinarily, we do both invariably according to the general plan assigned or occasional decree issued: wherefore let not mortals address their prayers to us, for we have no discretionary power, nor shall any entreaties prevail upon us to depart a tittle from our orders. Neither were entreaties needful to make us fly to their relief whenever found allowable, for we bore them no grudging or envy, we had no vanity nor fondness for superiority and power, nor contempt of them in their degraded state: but sympathize with their distresses and weaknesses, as with congenial spirits, children of the same Father, fallen from their original perfection; and laboured incessantly by all means permitted us, to raise them from their debasement to rank upon a level with ourselves in equal participation of all the powers, privileges, and unbounded enjoyments, wherewith we were blessed. We watched over nations and empires without neglecting the affairs of private persons; for being diffused throughout all corners of the universe, some of us were ready everywhere to attend the minutest offices, and having one understanding and design in coming among us, we knew how to adjust the actions of single men to the interests of communities. We paid due regard to matters of importance, nor did we overlook the merest trifles; for nothing was trifle to us because our capacities were so large that nothing took off our attention from other duties. Therefore we did not suffer a sparrow to fall to the ground, nor the hairs of a man's head to diminish in number, without the Will of Heaven.

70. With this unceasing attention to the minutest objects, it may be concluded we did not overlook Gellius as he sat close to his task in my human sensory: he could not receive intelligence of what passed with me now from the vehicular people, so it was necessary we should convey it to him ourselves. We wrought upon his imagination by our secret energy, casting his mental organs into modifications exhibiting the ideas to be set down, which we excited successively in their order, not giving him a view of whole sentences together: so that he worked like a man in a trance, or one walking in his sleep, or like the Pythian priestess under inspiration of the oracle: he wrote by impulse things he did not understand, and wondered at the words he wrote. It was now judged expedient that I should return to my vehicle, but before my return we thought proper to send an illusion upon Gellius of events that had not happened: he wrote according to what we dictated, and the tenor of the illusion he wrote ran as follows.

71. We gathered together certain particles of matter, and disposed them into two forms, the one human and the other angelical; a sufficient number of us undertook the management of the latter, and I was enclosed within the former: so I became a man with human limbs and senses, with the understanding and thoughts of a grown man who had spent his life in study and contemplation. And there stood before me an Angel, his countenance was mild and lively, his raiment white and shining, he had spangled wings growing from his shoulders, his sides, and his legs. And he said, O man, come along with me: I will teach thee what to think of Glories thou canst not comprehend, and make thee more sensible of the infinite distance between the creatures and the Creator. So saying he took me up and carried me to the utmost bounds of the universe. And he said, Try now if thou canst create a new world beyond this. And I said, Far be it from me to attempt encroaching upon the Divine prerogative: thou knowest I am poor and weak, unable to act without corporeal instruments, and the little power I have is given me. And he said, I know thy weakness, that the power is not thine, nor do I expect that thou shouldst operate: but I am commissioned for thine instruction. Know, then, that creative power awaits thy direction for a trial of what thou canst perform by it. Alas! said I, I know not where to begin nor how to proceed.

And he said, Stretch forth thy right arm: thrust it straight from thy side. And I essayed but could not thrust it out: not that I found anything resist me, but when my arm came to the utmost verge of the universe, it seemed as if I had lost the use of it, so that I could not move it further. And I asked the angel, Wherefore cannot I move mine arm this way? I can thrust it above or below, before or behind me, but I cannot stretch it out from my side. And he said, Because there is no space to receive it. And I said, Since it hath so pleased the creative Power, and this is for mine instruction, May there be space. And he said, Put forth thine arm again. And I put it forth with ease straight from my side, as I could have done any other way.

And he said, Wave now thy fingers to and fro, moving them in order one after another. Accordingly, I endeavoured to do as I was bidden, but could not perceive whether my fingers moved or not, for I had the same feel all along as at the first instant when I stretched out mine arm: wherefore I asked, Why cannot I perceive whether my fingers move or no? And he answered, Because there is no time, neither without time can there be a succession of ideas or motions. Then I said, May Time begin her course. And presently I felt my fingers move to and fro in the manner I had intended to move them.

Then said the Angel, Now will Space continue and Time run on her course for ever, until the same Power which gave them birth shall interpose to destroy them. What purposest thou next? And I said, Is it meet that Time and Space should be useless? Should there not be creatures endowed with perception and activity to solace themselves in the habitation provided for them, and also bodies to serve for instruments of their action and objects of their perception? Proceed then, said the Angel, to furnish and people this new world. But I said, O, Messenger of Heaven, thou knowest there requireth wisdom as well as power to do this great thing: I understand not what number of creatures this space might contain, nor the proportion of matter requisite for their uses, neither how to assort it into elements and marshal the particles thereof in their proper order.

On a sudden I found myself illumined with more than mortal intelli-

gence; though there was yet no light, I could distinguish every corner of the new created space, comprehending the whole at one view. I knew precisely what quantity of matter was requisite, what places to assign the particles, and how to give each the proper motion and direction to exhibit a plan to the precipient creatures directing them to carry on the order of succession once begun. But the vastness of mine intelligence perplexed me: for mine aim was none other than to communicate happiness to the perceptive creatures who should be created, but was utterly at a loss in what manner to execute my intention. I saw the creatures could not be made equal in happiness to their Creator, yet how far they should fall short of it or what limitations to set them, I had no measure to ascertain: neither could I find a rule to determine whether their happiness was to continue always equal in degree, or to vary and receive interruption at stated intervals. And if this obstacle were removed, still I saw there was an infinite variety of ways by which the same portion of blessing might be conveyed to them: it might be dispensed continually with no trouble or perplexity to the creative power by an immediate operation without the intervention of second causes, in which case they would want only the faculty of perceptivity but have no use for that of activity: or they might be endowed with powers affecting one another: or if matter were employed, there were a thousand various primary properties with which it might be invested, and a thousand different orders of succession in which it might move, all equally answering the same purpose. But I could find no preference nor make election among them: for to do this was a pure act which I was incapable of exerting, or of forming a choice without some pre-existent motive to incline me. I could not guide myself by the nature of things, for where there were no things in Being there could be no nature of them.

Then said the Angel, Take that scheme of material nature which thou knowest established in the present universe. As I had all knowledge lent me, I comprehended the whole plan of Providence, all the laws of nature and mazes of fortune, the qualities of substances, their relations and mutual dependencies; and began to attempt a plan similar to that of the old world. So I said, May there be such and so many bodies, so and so placed, with such impulses in particular lines of direction among them, according to the archetypal idea in my mind. And it was so. And I looked forth upon the works that were made, and behold they were not good. For I perceived that the bodies continually colliding, the motion imparted to them would in time be exhausted and the whole reduced to an inactive lump.

Then the Angel said, Why dost not thou provide active creatures to repair the decays of motion from time to time by their energy? But I answered, though wisdom and knowledge be given me, these are not sufficient for the purpose, for I foresee that if good only be allotted to the creatures, they will want a spur to their activity and become careless: but wisdom instructs me not what proportion of evil, to intermingle, nor what quarters to assign it; yet goodness forbids there should be any more dispersed than absolutely necessary.

I had then revealed to me the exact quantity of evil indispensable, the several forms of Being and stages of life to be passed through, which of them were to be exempt from evil which wholly overwhelmed with it, and which to contain a mixture of it with good; and that moral evil was to be made the road to natural. Nevertheless, I could not proceed, for though goodness was satisfied by the small quantity of evil sprinkled among the good throughout the whole, and equity was satisfied because the creatures,

taking their turn in rotation through the several forms of Being, would receive their exact share both of the good and of the evil, yet wisdom had no sufficient materials to begin upon. For it was not enough, there were stations provided to receive such a number of percipient creatures, but an allotment must be made of each person to his particular station: among the rational creatures there were mechanics, and soldiers, and scholars, but who was to be the mechanic, the soldier, or the scholar? Here was no proceeding in the gross, a distribution and choice of persons in their stations was necessary, yet was there no diversity of objects to determine the judgment in making the choice: for there was neither merit nor demerit in nonentities, nor difference of qualities rendering them fitter for one station rather than another. Neither could I begin with the next that came to hand, for there was neither proximity nor distance among nothings; they were all equally near and equally ready to be produced into Being in this place or that by creative Power. Thus I remained at a full stand, and while I stayed, the half-formed world was wiped away, mine illuminations were taken from me, and I was reduced again to mine ordinary narrow understanding, that of a common man.

Then spake the Angel unto me in a loud and majestic tone which sunk deep into mine ears. Hear, O Man, and remember. This is the lesson thou art to learn from all that has passed in thy sight. Thou couldst not create a world even though thou hadst almighty power and infinite wisdom to assist thee: for power and wisdom do not suffice for the work of creation. Power performs nothing without wisdom to direct it, nor does wisdom direct without goodness to move it: goodness may permit, but will not produce evil, and wisdom is not herself without pre-existent ideas to contemplate. Yet was there nothing prior, nothing external to God, which might exhibit ideas, but they were suggested by his own pure act precedent to themselves and to the wisdom they generated. Thou beholdest the works of nature and readest therein characters of power, wisdom, and goodness, greater than imagination can fully comprehend: but know, there are other Attributes whereof thou canst not imagine even a glimpse, yet must acknowledge there are such, because thou seest effects which could not be worked by those whereof thou hast any imagination. The necessity of evil compelleth not the Lord to admit it, for necessity bindeth him not, but his decrees make necessity. He alone can act where no motives are, and choose between things indifferent: he thereby openeth the sources whence wisdom floweth, and beginneth the order of succession which she carrieth on: he establisheth the nature of things to be an unalterable rule for his own proceedings, and determineth what shall be absolutely impossible, setting bounds as it were to his own Omnipotence.

The Angel having said this, took me up in his arms and carried me back to my vehicle: he opened a cleft in my head, which having applied against the rent in the vehicle, he injected me thereinto and closed up the rent; so that the bag became entire as before disruption.

72. Immediately I thrust out my head, and opening my eyes saw my patron Locke with the rest of the vehicles standing round me in amazement: for though they had suspected I should return because they saw my vehicle did not begin to unravel like a torn stocking, as it seems was usual upon disruptions, yet extraordinary events are apt to surprise even when expected. They were very curious and importunate with me to relate the particulars of all I had seen, and give them an account of the country they hoped in due time to inhabit themselves. Indeed, says I, Gentlemen, I do

not know what you mean. I relate particulars! All I know is, that you told me just now I was going to be advanced, and I thought I felt my vehicle tear asunder, but to be sure it was only fancy, for I find myself sound and whole now. I believe I may have been in a fainting fit for a moment. A moment! said they, why you have been gone from us a full week of our time, and must have seen a great deal in that space. Why will not you communicate? had you any injunctions to secresy? I vowed and protested upon the honest word of a Search that I had nothing to tell them, and that if I had been gone so long as they talked of, I remembered not a tittle of what had passed in that interval. But they would not believe me, and some said they would get it out, whether I would or no, by the sentient language: so I was in great danger of having a rape committed upon my imagination, if Locke had not interposed. Good friends, says he, you will not get anything of him by violence: I know my cousin better than you do: he has such an abundance of odd thoughts, and jumbles them so together in motley mixtures of serious and trifling, abstruse and familiar, earnest and jest, that you will not discern anything he knows or thinks of if he has not a mind to let you. But I know he will be sincere and open with me. Come, Ned, make a flat side. I did so, and after a short application of his vehicle thereto he assured them that I had really no information to give them. Besides, says he, consider, he went from hence a naked spirit, without any corporeal organs or tablet of memory to retain the traces of what he might see during his absence. Locke's authority satisfying the company that there was nothing to be learned from me, they dispersed about upon their several occasions and left us alone.

73. When they were gone, I observed to Locke that there seemed to be a variety of brogues among them: some spoke in a kind of guttural pronunciation, others as if they had been singing.—Can it be, says I, that the Americans and Chinese find their way hither? Can it be, says he, that you are so narrow-minded as to doubt it? Has not the story of Cornelius the centurion convinced you, that whoever fears God in any nation finds favour in his sight? He gives to every man the lights necessary for discovering to him the duties he requires at his hands, but men make their own fortunes by the manner in which they use them. There are even of our line of the Searches to be found among the uninstructed and the savage. Those who come with fewer improvements find no inconvenience in the want of them, for everything lies here in common: we look upon our talents as deposited with us for the public service, and that our neighbours have an equal property in them with ourselves, therefore such as have them do not endeavour to enslave or overreach such as have them not, but employ them to procure their advantages and enjoyments equally with their own.

But it is time you should think of returning to your body again: the day has appeared some time upon your hemisphere, and if you should stay beyond your usual hour of rising, it will put your family in an uproar; they will think you defunct in earnest, and finding your vital motions continue but no signs of sensation, they will send for Doctors and Surgeons to wrap you in blisters and scarify you all over.—But, says I, may not your clocks go too fast? Could not we take a little turn first somewhere or other to see more of the country?—What, says he, then you do not care to leave it? But we do not go by clocks—I see the earth yonder, though you cannot, posting away before us; the verge of night is already gotten beyond the British Islands.—Well, says I, since it must be so, here is my arm: but I go half reluctantly, for I like this place so well I could be glad to live here

always; and yet methinks I should want to see my girls again. So he took hold of my arm.—But, says he, you shall take a sip of Ambrosia first to fortify you for the journey, for we shall find damps and foggy vapours when we come down into the atmosphere.

He led me directly to the ambrosial streams, where having drank my fill, we pushed forward to overtake the terraqueous globe, which we did with as much ease as a wagoner, having stopped at an alehouse door to wet his whistle, runs after his creeping team. We took a little compass to avoid lengthening our way through the atmosphere by passing it aslant: this obliged us to cross a part of the shadowy cone of night. In one place of this dark region I heard a most dismal howling, shrieks and clamours, of all grating kinds. Pray, says I, what makes those hideous noises? It seems as if a thousand people were cutting one another's throats.—Says he, it is a parcel of the unhappy vehicles vexing and plaguing one another.—Oh! says I, for heaven's sake let us keep out of their way. If I should meet another Borgia among them what would become of me?—So I will, says he, not upon our own account, for I should not scruple pushing through the midst of them for any hurt they could do us, but the sight of our people increases their torment, stirring up their envy, remorse, and despair. So out of compassion to them we went round just enough to escape their observation, and very soon emerged into light. When we came into the zenith of the great Metropolis of commerce, we shot directly downwards like a falling star, Locke making the neucleus and myself the trail.

74. In our passage through the atmosphere I diverted myself with observing the variety of different particles, metallic, stony, vitreous, ligneous, vegetable, aqueous, and sulphureous, dancing in nimble mazes, never touching but thrusting one another away, as the contrary pole of a loadstone does the magnetic needle. The aqueous, upon the action of heat within them being withdrawn, were overcome by the stronger repulsion of the rest, which forced them together into contact and gathered them into drops. In this state they turned the course of the rays falling upon them obliquely and broke the bars into their constituent balls, which proceeding then with different velocities, if they chanced to overtake one another, they adhered by their flat sides and formed complete bars again.

Being now arrived at the top of mine own house, the rays we had skated upon would not attend us further, but it pleased me to see how nimbly we glided through the pores of the tiles and timbers, like a snake along the twigs of a hedge. My conductor stopping, asked me what I saw before me. I see, says I, a prodigious torrent rushing directly upwards in circling eddies with a tremulous motion.—That, says he, is the flame of a candle your maid has left upon the stairs while she is gone down to fetch some chips for lighting your study fire. Come, shall we go into it? I can show you something very curious in the inside.—You do not say so! cries I. We shall be burnt up in an instant, like a spider thrown into the kitchen fire. He laughed at my simplicity. No, no, says he, we are not afraid of material fire, if we can keep from inward burnings. The distempered vehicles indeed being debilitated in their limbs cannot manage them properly: so the agitations of fire beat them about incessantly, giving them as violent smart by outward pulsion as they do the human flesh by stretching the parts of it from within. Then laying hold of me he gave a strong jump, which threw us upon the middle of the snuff. But we could not stand still there a moment, for there was such a commotion of the particles moving in all curvatures about us, that we were forced to shift our quarters every instant: but my conductor ma-

naged so dexterously, by pulling or pushing me to the right or the left, that he kept me always in the interstices between them, so that none ever struck directly against me, and though I felt them continually brush my sides, I did not receive the least hurt from them. I observed the corpuscles of light did not touch the substance of the tallow or the cotton, but by their attraction detached particles from them; upon which the corpuscles and particles rolled round one another as their centres, until being drawn off by the attraction of other centres, whereto they chanced to approach nearer, they moved in another circle, and so danced in a kind of figures of eight: but those on the outside, being thrown beyond the attraction of any centre, flew off by their tangential motion in a right line and contributed to form the flame. Look ye here, says Locke, what pretty country-dancings, and hayings, your five million of million of corpuscles make! You see a grain of tallow can do as much as a grain of wax: but I suppose you choose the latter as the genteeler and cleanlier of the two.

75. He then carried me down stairs and set me upon the floor. Now, says he, you may use your legs: here is ground to tread upon. I was overjoyed to find my feet again. I scampered to and fro like a wild colt upon a common, shifting my little legs faster than a fly upon a table. I found the boards and nails of the floor and other bodies I met with were not solid, but rather a net-work consisting of very large meshes: neither were the threads between them any other than a finer net-work composed of smaller meshes resembling the shrouds of a ship: I run up and down the wainscot by help of these shrouds without difficulty or danger of falling. There happened a chimney sweeper to pass along the street, whose shrill cries made the strings of the net-works vibrate considerably, but in different directions according to the difference of their position: I found that by means of these vibrations I could jump above twenty times my own height, or throw myself a considerable way from a side of the stiles to some protuberance I could catch hold of in the pannel, like a squirrel vaulting from tree to tree; for after one or two trials I learned to form my fingers into claws, with which I could hang to anything like a cat. Once indeed attempting a swinging leap from the wainscot to the floor, where the boards, being decayed with too frequent washing, were more porous than ordinary, I did not take my distance exactly, but falling in the middle of one of those wide meshes might have slipped quite through to the chamber below, if there had not chanced to lie a hair across the lowermost mesh of all: this having caught hold of, with a good stout spring I got my feet upon it and presently ran up the side of the pore to my conductor again. I bragged to him how nice this vibration-exercise was for teaching me to walk upon moving ground by taking a certain impulse and direction therefrom, whereby I should learn the sooner to skate upon the solar and stellar rays whenever I returned to ether. He smiled, and, Come, says he, enough of these gambols. Let us proceed to your chamber.

We did not go through the key-hole, as they say spirits usually do, for that would have been out of the way, but through the chink under the door: yet I held up my head as erect and found as good room over it as a goose in going through a barn. I followed my guide to the right hand or the left, up hill or down, as he led me, still skipping from mesh to mesh with higher bounds than needful, while he walked soberly along the strings.

We clomb a high pinnacle that appeared like the Peak of Teneriffe tapering up to the top, where was a spacious flat big enough for five hundred of us to have danced a Lancashire hornpipe. What are we got upon now?

says I.—The point of a pin, says he, sticking out of your pillow. But look up over your head and all about ye.—I used to think, quoth I, the world was round: but this is a square world.—It is your bed, says he: the curtains drawn round except one place at the feet.—Good lack! says I, what fools are mankind to terrify themselves with notions of Ghosts throwing open their curtains and staring at them with saucer eyes! A million of us could not stir one of those heavy textures, nor reflect corpuscles of light enow to make the apparition of a flea. But what is that huge mountain over against us, with a monstrous gaping chasm on one side and a great ridge turned this way, from whence issue black streams of fuliginous vapour?—That, says he, is your head, mouth, and nose.—Surprising! says I; have I lain so many years, like another Enceladus, under that smoking Etna? How could I escape being suffocated with that load of filth upon my lungs?

Hark! says he, I hear the cocks crow in the stable yard, which is a signal for spirits to depart. So we descended the pinnacle, ran along the pillow, and he conducted me through one of the pores in my head, having first made me cast myself into the form of one of Lewenhoek's animalcules. I had much ado to wriggle along, for it was all sticky and miry, like a Sussex road, with the insensible perspiration which in sleep is more copious. When we arrived at the anterior ventricles he took a hearty leave, wished me a happy return to the vehicular country again, and bid me take my station. I hung back, and with a lamentable groan, Must I, says I, must I lie imprisoned again in that loathsome dungeon?—Prithee! says he, no words. Reverence the Oath, for it is the Oath of Jove. Be ready upon call either to enter the body or quit the body. In matters put within thine own power, use thy judgment and discretion: but when thou seest whither the laws of nature or dispensations of Providence point, revere, resign, and obey. He then beckoned to Gellius, who leaving off writing, I knew nothing of what passed afterwards.

76. It was now broad day-light, when Somnus, taking off his poppy garland from my temples, fled away, but with him fled not the visions of the night; for the faithful Gellius had engraven them in strong characters upon the tablet of my memory. I started up full of the wonders I had seen: I turned eagerly to look for the pin, which I found sticking with the point upwards about six inches from my ear. Is this the summit, says I, where Locke and I found so much room to expatiate? And the sides are all smooth and polished. Where are the shrouds by which we ran up and down so easily? I then threw myself upon my back, and was astonished to see the bed tester so near me, which I beheld just before like the spacious canopy of heaven stretched over me at an immense distance. I tried to get a little nap for composing my spirits, but could not. So I got up, and after breakfast finding my head too confused for application of any kind that morning, I sauntered it away at auctions, coffee-houses, and the like. I could not help every now and then talking to myself, muttering out some mysterious words, such as Euridice, vehicles, Cæsar Borgia, riding upon the rays, and complained of my chocolate for not being so good as Ambrosia; till I perceived people began to look strange upon me and suspected that, as the French Ambassador said of Monsieur D'Eon, I had a little alienation of the organs. This made me more circumspect and careful to bring myself down to sublunary affairs to save the credit of my intellects; for had I run Opera-mad, or Assembly-mad, or Methodist-mad or Election-mad, I might have found companions enow to keep me in countenance, but such a peculiar species of insanity as Vehicle-madness must have been

pointed at by everybody; so I strove hard against the impulse, and with a little practice came to think and talk again like other folks.

I then proceeded with diligence to reduce into writing the records engraven by Gellius upon my sensory, and I think I have done it very exactly, not omitting the minutest circumstance that could be discerned clearly; so if there be anything in them not consonant to the truth of facts, it is his fault for misleading me. It vexed me that I could not recover his interlineations, for by the imperfect notion I have of them, I imagine they tend to harmonize Reason with Religion, and to show that objects rightly placed either in the light of Nature or of the gospel, will appear the same in substance and quality, varying only by a difference of colours, suited respectively to the different optics of the man of speculation or the man of business. I thought it very obliging in my kind patron to lead me through a variety of entertaining as well as instructive scenes: no doubt he had the latter principally in view, but interspersed the former to make the others the more palatable to my compatriots, who it must be owned are too squeamish in their taste, and fonder of the toothsome than the wholesome. I hope they will not frustrate his good intentions by doing like the children when one sweetens a pill for them, who suck off the sugar and spit out the medicine.

CHAP. XXIV

NATURE OF THINGS.

Having now dismounted my Pegasus and gotten safe upon firm ground again, without any bruises, or broken bones, or crack in the pericranium, that my friends can perceive, let us turn him loose upon the common for the use of others who may be disposed to take the like adventurous flight, and let us proceed for the rest of our way in the safer tracks that reason shall beat out upon the solid bottom of experience and observation. But since in the Illusion § 71 of the last chapter, I have happened to mention a nature of things which could not subsist before the things themselves whereof it was the nature, and there are many persons who insist that we may know, by experience of our own thoughts, there are things and a nature of them which must have subsisted eternally, uncreated, independent on the Will and power of the Almighty, which he cannot alter nor depart from, but serve for an indispensable rule of his conduct in the creation and government of his worlds: since this doctrine is so zealously maintained, it will be worth while, before we canvass the truth of it, to inquire what is to be understood by that expression, The nature of things. It has been employed by the orthodox, Cudworth, in particular, building largely upon it as upon the sole stable foundation, but seems now to be chiefly in use among the freethinkers, who are very forward to tell you precisely what God can or cannot do: he cannot work a miracle, cannot give a revelation, cannot guide the motions of a free agent, nor make such a one impeccable, nor annex reward to an assent of the mind, nor make all his creatures of equal degree without a continued gradation from his own perfections down to nothing; for these are contrary to the nature of things. If you ask what things they mean, or what by the nature of them, they will not vouchsafe, or rather cannot give, an explanation, but are angry with you as a captious person for putting the question; yet still go on to

lay a mighty stress upon those words without having any clear or settled idea of their import. It seems extraordinary that persons who are so severe upon others for using expressions they do not understand, should fall into the like absurdity themselves, and pretend to build demonstrations upon principles whereof they have no clearer nor more adequate idea than the vulgar they affect to ridicule have of the mysteries: both lay an implicit dependence upon words without a meaning, and both expect that a constant repetition of positive assertions chimed into their ears by others, should pass for proof and explanation.

2. Since then we can get no light for understanding the language from those in whose mouths it passes most currently, let us try what we can strike out for ourselves: and upon asking what is meant by things, the first obvious answer occurring is, that they must be the substances existing. For the rudiments of our knowledge come all from sensation: when we see or hear or feel, there must be some agent: some substance to operate upon our senses: and from hence we derive our evidence of external objects, as we do that of our own existence from the perceptions impressed upon us by them, together with the alterations produced in them by our activity; for there must be a substance to perceive as well as an object to be perceived, and an agent to act as well as a subject to be operated upon.

But our knowledge of substances seems to consist wholly of the differences among them; our definitions and descriptions contain the particularities of the subject distinguishing it from everything else. For which reason we know nothing of our internal organs, the nerves and fibres of our brain, because whatever discoveries anatomy may have made, we have no experience of any diversity of operation among them, but for aught we can discern our sensations of every various kind may come conveyed to us through the same channel. For the same reason many remain so ignorant of themselves, and make such difficulty to fix the idea of their own perceptive individual, because it is the same self that receives all their sensations, reflections, and perceptions whatever: therefore the difference of their perceptions does not lead them into the knowledge of themselves, though it does into that of externals affecting them therewith. For we cannot penetrate the essence of substances, we can apprehend them only by their qualities or powers of affecting us, or of producing and receiving alterations among one another, causing them to exhibit other appearances than they did before.

But the same substances possess so many qualities, and vary them so often according to their situations, their mutual affections, relations, compositions, and associations, that it would be inconvenient for use, and indeed impracticable, to call them all to mind: therefore our ideas in common discourse and even in meditation, are for the most part, if not always, partial, containing some only but not all of the qualities or circumstances we may know upon mature consideration belongs to the subject in our thoughts. And there is the less wonder at this because the appearances to our senses are likewise partial: nobody ever saw the whole circumference of a ball, nor all the sides of a cube. When a man stands before us, we see only his face and hands and the fore part of his dress; and when we would think of him in his absence, the same appearance occurs without the least idea of his back, although we know well enough he must have one. And when we speak of him sate down at table, we would not choose to think of that unseemly part without which there can be no sitting: our idea contains no more than so much of his body as would appear without legs or feet, and in a lower situation than if he stood upright.

But the similarity of one or a few qualities found in many substances, differing widely in other respects, suits our convenience extremely well, enabling us to talk intelligibly of numbers by one name expressive of those qualities wherein they agree: whence come our ideas of Genera and Species. For as Mr. Locke observes, the name of a species denotes those qualities, wherein a set of individuals agree, selected from those wherein they may differ; and a genus is a further selection out of those qualities, of some wherein a greater number of individuals agree who do not agree in them all. Thus the word Horse expresses such particulars as belong to every horse exclusive of size, shape, or colour, wherein they are not all alike; as the word Animal does such of these particulars as belong equally to an eagle, a dolphin, or a frog, separated from those peculiar to the species of horses. Hence likewise we form our judgments, which commonly run upon species and genus or upon adjectives denominating some quality considered apart from the substance. Thus we say a horse is an animal, a crow is black, an elephant bigger than a sheep. But sometimes we turn our adjectives into substances, and then can make genus and species of them as well as of substances: for red is one sort of colour, green another, and Colour is the Genus or Kind comprehending those two with all other particular colours under it; as Sound is the genus comprehending all the several Sorts of sound that can be made.

3. Of these partial ideas one species is the abstract, for abstraction signifies the drawing off or selection of one or a few things from others wherewith they were by nature connected. When this selection is made by the senses, we do not call it an abstraction, nor unless it be done by a voluntary act of the mind: and these abstractions are of two sorts, those strictly so called, as when we talk of abstract notions or abstract reasonings, which are such only as the speculative make with labour of thought for their particular use; and others which we are led into without trouble by the common occasions of life. For there are many abstract ideas extremely familiar to the vulgar, such as man, bird, noise, white, large, and so forth, of which they can talk currently yet without any thought of the substances whereto they belong. Wherefore it seems strange that Berkley and some others should deny that we have any abstract ideas, for all partial ideas are in the same case, whether the separation be made by our own act or by the operation of our senses; and it is so far from being true that we are incapable of partial ideas and appearances, that daily experience testifies we have scarce any others: but if my senses can exhibit to me a half man sitting behind a table without legs or lower parts, and my memory can make a further separation by certifying to me a week afterwards that I had seen a man sitting there, yet with so little remembrance of his features that I should not know him again if shown me, surely I can make another separation of a human figure having eyes, nose, mouth, and so forth, without thinking whether the nose be long or short, what colour the eyes are of, or what width the mouth.

And here I have the pleasure of joining in alliance with my Lord Bolingbroke, for the spirit of opposition so little possesses me that I am glad to concur in sentiment with anybody where I can: I have once or twice stood up on behalf of Epicurus, and am now as ready to follow his lordship upon the possibility of abstraction and the dependent nature of things, whereon I think he argues closely and soundly; though for the most part his philosophical essays, as he calls them, seem rather House of Commons harangues, as unfit for the schools of philosophers as their lectures would be for the

other place, better calculated, like some modern orations, for amusing and tripping up than for counselling and conducting: yet even here he appears to have proceeded with more zeal for running down poor Cudworth than maintaining the cause of truth. And in the course of his argument he seems to have deserted it by apostatizing into Berkley's notion, that we cannot have the idea of a species unless by some particular individual to stand as a representative of the rest: which notion contradicts the constant experience of facts. For we talk every day of species, as men, cattle, birds, noises, colours: we know what we mean in using these terms, and are understood clearly by one another; but a man can scarce be said to understand himself who has no ideas of what he says, nor to be understood by another without ideas of his words. The hearer may have different ideas from the speaker, and then misapprehends him, but to understand aright, the very same ideas must pass from the one to the other.

Now the representative individual, to be clearly apprehended, must rise in the imagination with some determinate size, shape, colour, posture, in motion or quiescent; therefore if this idea were necessary for understanding the specific name, no man could certainly understand another in the most common conversation, because he could never be sure the same representative which was in the mind of the other passed unaltered to himself. Should I send to my bailiff in the country to buy me a couple of milch cows against my going down, I should seem to understand myself fully, I believe he would understand me as fully and execute my orders punctually: yet I am not conscious that in giving such orders I have any particular cow in my thoughts; but his lordship it seems knows them better than I do myself, and he assures me that I must have a representative individual in view, for else I could have no meaning in the word Cow. Be it so: then this representative must be of some determinate colour, for there is no individual cow without, and I must intreat his lordship to tell me what that colour was, for I protest I do not know. Suppose it red as being the most common: but my man must have a representative too, because else he can have no idea of my orders: perhaps he has been that morning among a drove of Welch cattle and takes a black one for his representative. Well then, away he goes to Fair, where he sees two fine cows, one brindle and the other white: he judges them excellent beasts, in good milk and well worth the money asked for them: so he buys them both and thinks he has done bravely. Now when I come to see them am I to quarrel with the poor fellow for disobeying my orders, or to call him a blockhead for not understanding so plain an expression as, Buy a couple of cows? or if he goes to excuse himself upon being not so learned a man nor so exact in abstract knowledge, should I tell him that the cows being of different colours, it was impossible they could both answer either his idea or mine, because neither of us could know what was meant by the specific term Cow without a representative, which must be of some one determinate colour.

4. It is not uncommon for deep thinking persons to draw a confusedness over their thoughts by their refinements which the vulgar escape, and I think it plain that such as we have been arguing against in the last section have not always a clear and adequate idea of what is meant by that expression, To have the idea of a thing. They seem to understand by it such particulars as will arise to the imagination when we take a single object under contemplation in our leisure hours: now I must own that whenever I contemplate a species there does generally, perhaps always, occur an in-

dividual before me, with colour, shape, members, clothes, or hide, or fins, or feathers thereto belonging, and I hold it right to indulge this custom: for since our abstracts derive all originally from the concrete, and are liable to fluctuate and fade in our remembrance, there is no likelier method of renewing and fixing them than by sight or contemplation of the concrete as being the fountain from whence they sprung. But this serves only for restoring ideas known to us before, when we go to new form an idea upon a more perfect model, I never could find a single representative answer the purpose, but am forced to employ several.

If I would settle with myself what is justice, I think first perhaps of a man paying money that he has borrowed, which is a just action; then with Tully, of one selling a house but concealing that there are bugs in it, or of running prohibited goods, or of the gross partiality of a father to some of his children above the rest; and thus by turning over a variety of actions in my thoughts, endeavour to fix a complete and precise idea of justice, which when gotten, no one of those actions can stand for a full representative afterwards, because destitute of some circumstances which constitute the essence of justice in others.

So if I met with a person that did not know what a triangle was, I might show him a piece of paper in that form: perhaps the piece is rectangular and he may take that particular into his idea; I may then cut him several other pieces having various angles, and make him observe that they all agree in that circumstance of their having three straight sides lying between three corners: if I found him imagining that a triangle must be made of paper, I might then produce one of wood or ivory, and remark to him that these two agree with the former in the circumstance before mentioned. Possibly he still thinks a triangle must be somethiug of a size to be turned about commodiously upon a table, when I discover this, it will be expedient to carry him into a three corner field, or point to some star in the zenith and another in the horizon, and tell him that they, together with the spot of ground we stand upon, form an immense triangle.

Thus these contrivances serve gradually to abstract or draw off the ideas constituting triangularity from all others, which any particular substance or space of that form may exhibit: and if I can succeed in making the separation clean and complete, he will then have the specific idea of a triangle containing neither the idea of rectangular, equilateral, isosceles, nor obtuse, neither softness nor hardness, neither solidity nor empty space, yet compatible and connectible with any of them.

We have all of us some of those abstract or general ideas, which we use in our daily transactions with one another; they answer our occasions, nor could the business of life go on without them: but in the hurry of business or currency of common conversation, it is not to be supposed that we have the particular subjects, whereto our ideas may belong, passing continually in review before us. Or to rise to higher instances, a man used to it may harangue in public for hours together upon the most important matters with great judgment and perspicuity, so as to be readily understood by his audience, many of them perhaps persons of dull capacity and narrow imagination: yet it is not conceivable that he, much less they, should draw along in their thoughts a succession of representative individuals corresponding respectively with all the specific terms employed, in the same rapidity wherewith they were spoken. Whenever his lordship in either house had occasion to mention Prerogative or Liberty of the subject, had he always pictured upon his fancy some particular exertion of royal autho-

rity together with the person of the Queen or her minister making that exertion? or of a private man with a steady determinate countenance expressive of resolution to disobey an illegal command? And if he had not those pictures, must we pronounce that he did not understand himself, nor had any idea of what he talked of?

5. These abstractions furnish us with another set of things which are not substances: for we say justice is not the same thing as bounty; colour is one thing and sound another: sporting is a different thing from poaching, or poaching signifies quite a different thing when applied to destroying game and to dressing of eggs; prudence and tranquillity of mind are desirable things; war, famine, and pestilence, dreadful things; there is such a thing as sincerity, but no such thing as absolute certainty among men. Now it is upon this sort of things only that the dispute turns, whether they are independent, unproduced, and necessarily existent: for with regard to substances, I believe all Theists now-a-days agree with the soundest of them in former days, in holding that there is but one deserving those epithets, who therefore was called in Greek, To On, or the Being, and in Hebrew, Jehovah, or the I AM; but that all other substances whatever were created, their primary properties assigned them, their positions, affections, assortments, and relations, brought upon them by the provisions of that One or First Cause.

But substances are the only existent things containing in them all other things, which belong to them as modifications, relations, and circumstances, begin and end with them, and are so far from being independent on the Almighty, that they depend upon the manner of existing in those substances which depended upon his Will for their existence. For we have seen that the abstract is drawn from the concrete: it is a selection of one or a few ideas exhibited together with others by the concrete; we may think of it apart, but it cannot exist apart, nor without some substance possessing it. For our idea of a thing is not the thing itself: I may think and reason upon motion, when lying abed in a still night with everything quiescent about me; yet will anybody say there would have been such a thing as motion if there had been no moveable substances ever in being? I can fancy the chairs dancing about the room spontaneously; but does that give a reality to such a species of movement? Who will insist there must be a specific existence of Cyclops, Chimeras, and black swans, because artists have had so full an idea as to delineate them exactly in prints and paintings?

But men of abstruse learning are led into mistakes upon this article, because many of their abstractions are not drawn immediately from substances, but from one another; and that by several gradations of new refinements, serving as a channel into others still more subtile. Like a wire-drawer who takes a little bar of silver, forces it through the hole of his engine, and by driving it successively through smaller and smaller holes, brings it to a fineness fit for winding round a thread of silk. Therefore, forgetting the steps by which they arrived at an abstraction, they discern no source to give it birth, but suppose it to have an existence of its own independent on everything else. Thus the rules of justice are apprehended immutable and unproduced, because you cannot draw them directly from any object before you. If you see a man sit musing in a chair, you may discern his complexion, his size, and all the parts of his human figure, but he exhibits no idea of justice in the whole appearance you have to inspect. Nevertheless, let us consider whether the rules of justice do not

derive from the contemplation of man, for they relate solely to his dealings with others: if there was no such thing as justice there could be no rules respecting it, if there were no transactions among mankind there could be neither justice nor injustice, and if there were no men there could be no such transactions. Therefore justice and the rules of it cannot be older than man, nor perhaps so old, for while Adam lived alone there was no room for justice. But you say there may have been other creatures before him governed by the rules of justice: probably there might, and in that case justice was older than man, yet it was not existent before, nor necessarily coeval with, the substances capable of exercising it, who might have lived some time apart before being brought into one another's company.

6. Well but I might have an idea of justice though there never had been a race of men to practise it: this I much doubt of, for my ideas are all taken from experience of what I have seen, and if I had never observed a difference in the behaviour of men to one another, I should never have known what justice was. Yet this will not satisfy, for you urged that now I have gotten the idea, I should not lose it though all the men besides myself were annihilated; and the like idea might subsist elsewhere, before there were any creatures to practise it, judgments might be passed and propositions formed concerning it: but there can be no idea of Nothing, therefore justice must have a real existence distinct from every just action and the agent performing it. Why, by this logic, I can prove there are Chimeras and black swans, for I have a clear idea of them, can pass judgments and form propositions concerning them, as that the Chimera must be a dangerous creature in any country, and might eat up all the black swans: but I cannot have an idea of a Nothing, therefore the Chimera and the black swan have a reality and existence independent of everything else. So you do not perceive that you have changed the state of the question, you do not indeed change the terms, but you change the signification belonging to them: for whereas justice before was understood of something without us, whereof we might entertain an idea, it now becomes appropriated to the idea itself, which possibly may not be conformable to anything external. Let us then examine whether such idea can subsist independently on any substance.

I have generally employed the word Idea to stand for that state of our internal organs, which is the immediate cause of a perception: in this sense it is nothing more than a particular modification of matter and motion, which cannot subsist unless in a fine texture of material organs capable of taking such modification. But oftentimes Idea denotes the very perception of the mind, and in this construction can have none other reality than that derived from the mind perceiving; for there cannot be a perception without a percipient. Thus in all lights wherein we can consider justice, it has no claim to independency and separate existence: for whether we conceive it to be something external which we can apprehend, it then depends upon the behaviour of creatures among one another exhibiting it to our apprehension; or whether we understand it of a corporeal idea, it can be no older than the organizations capable of being modified thereinto; or whether we take it for a mental idea, it must begin and end with the perception of some mind affected therewith.

7. Let us now come to the nature of things, and this very expression might convince us that it cannot be necessarily eternal; for substances are acknowledged to have been created, and we have seen that things unsubstantial depend upon them for their existence: then the nature of both cannot

be older than the things themselves whereof it is the nature. There could not be a human nature before there were men, nor a nature of justice before there were agents capable of mutual dealings which might be regulated by the rules of justice. But so short an answer will hardly satisfy: we will therefore inquire more minutely into the proper import of the word nature, which is somewhat difficult to settle because so variable in common use.

For nature is often placed in contradistinction to education, to art, to design, to chance, to miracle: and what is currently ascribed to it upon one occasion, has a different cause assigned upon another. Every country fellow makes the distinction between natural grass and clover, nonsuch, or others that are sown, and between the natural produce of the ground and corn, which is the effect of cultivation: yet if a man takes a farm it is natural for him to plough and sow, and he depends upon the nature of the soil for the growth and goodness of his crops. Then again in discourses upon commerce, we count the corn and other fruits raised by industry among the natural produce of a country, because it is not imported nor manufactured of foreign materials. In distempers some people trust to nature for a cure, others send for a physician in hopes that his skill may throw off a burden she must have sunk under. Yet when corn is gotten from a field where nature would have yielded nothing but weeds, or a dangerous disease conquered by the cares of a physician, nobody reckons these in the class of supernatural events. So the excrescences and monstrous productions found in plants and animals are sometimes styled preternatural and sometimes the sports of nature. Therefore nature signifies the properties, powers, relations, or affections, of the substances whereto we apply it. It is the nature of oaks to bear acorns, that is, the texture of their parts is such as to render them incapable of yielding peaches, apples, or any other crop than what they do. It is the nature of mustard to bite the tongue: here the term denotes a relation between the seed and the member, for if the latter had no sensibility the other could not bite. It is the nature of justice to stop the motions of self-love, that is, so far as a man has a sentiment of justice he will shape his measures thereby, although contrary to his private interests or his passions. When we speak of the Divine nature we understand thereby such Attributes and methods of proceeding as we conceive belonging to that first of substances.

This may account for the changeable meaning of the word, because it must unavoidably contain a different set of ideas according to the occasion or particular substances whereto it is applicable. For in speaking of natural grass, we regard only the spontaneous powers of the ground, which will yield nothing else: on mentioning the natural produce of a country, we think of the powers, opportunities, and materials, for raising commodities, which the inhabitants have within themselves without foreign aid. When we leave a wound or a disease to nature, we mean thereby the mechanical circulations and motions of our human body: when we talk of supernatural events, we compare them with the powers of all created agents within our knowledge, among which the skill of the physician stands included. Yet whoever believes the reality of those events will not think it contrary to the nature of God to work them, and whoever believes them so contrary will deny the truth of the facts. But sometimes the term Nature does not so much as import one of those unsubstantial things before treated of, as when we say it is the nature of matter to be inert, which is a bare negation of any power to begin motion.

Nature, used alone in the most extensive sense, stands for the whole

aggregate of powers we know certainly, or seem to know of among substances: but because substances qualified alike perform different operations according to what others they fall into connection with, and we cannot always investigate the causes bringing them together, this gives rise to the idea of Fortune. So that Nature has no more claim to be deemed an agent than chance: one expresses those operations of substances which are reducible into a system, the other those which are wholly uncertain, and can be brought under no rule of observation. Therefore we talk of the stated laws of nature, as the courses or mazes of fortune; yet these mazes may sometimes gain an entrance among those stated laws, when we have found out a clue to them: for the eclipses and phases of the planets, which were anciently esteemed fortuitous, are now numbered among the regular phenomena of nature; whereas the weather still continues casual, not that we do not acknowledge it to proceed from natural causes, but because no human sagacity can discover those causes, nor foresee how they will operate.

Upon the whole it appears that nature is something more abstracted than those unsubstantial things treated of in the preceding sections, but being still further removed from its original source, is harder to be traced thereto. nevertheless that it must have had a source derived either immediately, or by their intervention from substances, and consequently cannot be independent, nor have an existence prior to the substances giving it rise. As is implied in those expressions, The birth of Nature, and when Chaos is called the womb of Nature and perhaps her grave: which though understood only of physiology, yet metaphysics and ontology, or the nature of Beings, must depend for its eternal or temporary duration upon that of the Beings which are the objects of this science.

8. Nevertheless it will be asked, shall we deny God to have had a perfect knowledge of the Nature of Things before he created them? I cannot undertake to pronounce peremptorily upon the manner of divine intelligence having none other conception of intelligence than what I can draw from my own manner of thinking; and I will not presume to say that the thoughts of God must be just such as my thoughts. Therefore, if this question were proposed by an angel I should be dumb, expecting that whatever I could say would appear to him the idle roving of one who would needs be talking upon a subject above his comprehension: but since I am discoursing only with men, whose understandings are narrow like my own, the foundations of whose knowledge are similar to those I have to build upon, I may be allowed to think them not so greatly an overmatch as that I should give up the point without an argument.

Now I observe in the first place that the question implies a time wherein God was alone without any creation, but on a sudden began to resolve upon having an universe peopled with perceptive Beings capable of receiving the blessings he would pour forth upon them: which seems to me inconsistent with the principal tenets of the persons I have to deal with. For if God be good, communicative of happiness by the necessity of his nature, and there were an eternal unproduced nature of things rendering one plan of operation more productive of happiness than all others, this must have prompted, I will not say obliged, him to carry that best plan into execution immediately as soon as he was able, that is, from everlasting, for his omnipotence never had a beginning; before which there could be no time of solitude wherein he might contemplate the pre-existent nature of not yet existent things.

I remark next that as in the case of justice taken notice of in § 6, we have now shifted the sense of our term; for this nature antecedent to crea-

tion is not a nature of things but the idea of it, and in this ideal state cannot be older than the mind contemplating it. Well, but that need not hinder its being eternal because the mind entertaining the idea undoubtedly was so. But how does it appear undoubtedly that such idea was eternally entertained? What Attribute or what expedience shall we assign that should require it? Was it for the Divine solace and amusement while there were no worlds to uphold, no government of Providence to administer? It is true we can imagine no happiness without some employment either of acting or thinking: but when we presume to talk of the Supreme Being, it becomes us to proceed humbly and reverentially, with a consciousness that our conceptions are all drawn from experience of what has passed among ourselves; and the same experience may evince that everything passing with us is by no means applicable to him. When at any time I am totally debarred from action, I must let my imagination roam upon some scenes occurring thereto, or else the time will pass insipid and irksome: but what ground have I to think the same of God, or that his time must pass insipid and irksome without an ideal nature of things perpetually to engage his attention? So the motive of entertainment affords us no evidence to prove the eternity of such ideas: and the motive of goodness yields as little, for what good could redound to the creatures, while there were none existent, from contemplation of a nature of things by which their fortunes were to be regulated?

But you will say it would be blasphemy to imagine the work of creation gone upon in a hurry without mature consideration of all the possibilities wherein it might be effected, and a selection of such method as should appear most proper in wisdom and goodness to be chosen. Here again we judge of the All perfect by ourselves. When I have some important business to take in hand, my thoughts are cloudy and uncertain; at first, I deliberate successively upon the several ways wherein I might conduct myself, I compare them together, and it is lucky if after running them over a while in my reflection I can at last discern clearly which is the most probable to answer my purpose. But shall I measure Omniscience by my own scanty model? shall I pronounce that it must study a thousand years before it can hit upon a perfect plan, and bring all the parts to harmonize and join in perfect symmetry with one another? Ought not I rather to believe that when God creates, his acting and his complete knowledge of the manner most expedient to be followed in acting are co-instantaneous; and that as he creates with a word so he plans with a thought, using length of time or process of operation in neither.

9. Yet if such contemplative solitude could be demonstrated eternal we could not thence pronounce it independent and unproduced, but owing to the Will and pleasure of God, who chose to employ himself that way rather than in the actual exercise of his creative power: for to suppose the contemplation forced upon him involuntarily, would be still building with our slender scantlings, and judging rashly of his intelligence by our own. We are passive in all our perceptions, they are excited in us by something else, most probably by the modifications of our mental organs. In sensation we know there are external objects operating upon us, and though in reflection we do not certainly know what it is that affects us, yet we may know assuredly there can be no affection without an action, nor action without an agent, nor agent which is not a substance: so that in our most retired meditations there is some substance exhibiting the objective ideas we perceive. Now what substance was there to act upon the Almighty before the worlds

were made? or what agency, what power of exhibiting objective ideas in an unsubstantial nature of things? Therefore we must conclude that God is purely active in the exercises of his intelligence as well as of his omnipotence, and that his thoughts are not affections raised by some object passing in review before him; although this be a manner of thinking far above our conception because beyond all our experience.

Nevertheless to speak as a man, and otherwise we cannot speak, there is no understanding without objects to contemplate, nor any object of knowledge that has not been forever discerned by the Omniscient: what kind of objects then shall we assign to the Divine intelligence? Must they needs be forms and qualities, genera, species, modes, essences, and abstract natures, possibilities of what will never be done, and hypothetic results from imaginary premises which never were nor ever will be realized? Here too we are misled by the necessities and weaknesses of our own faculties. We have frequent occasion to contemplate, to compare, to assort, to unite, to distinguish, a number of things, more than we can possibly bring together within the compass of our imagination: therefore we make abstractions, which are partial ideas more commodious for our grasp. For we have seen before that the abstract is drawn from the concrete: it is a shred torn off from the substances, needful enough for convenience of carriage in our shallow vessel. Like the woollen-draper's book of patterns, which I bring home in my pocket when I would consult my Serena and my Sparkler upon the colour of a suit, because I cannot carry the whole pieces: for if we went down to the shop and had the cloths themselves spread before us upon the counter, I should never think of calling for the book of patterns. So if I have any considerable purpose to effect and the sure means of completing it happened by great chance to occur at first view, I never troubled my head with the possibilities of other measures that might be taken, nor stand to make hypotheses of what would ensue had circumstances been different from those I find. Shall we then fancy those shifts necessary for the Author of Nature and all comprehended therein, because they are necessary for us imperfect creatures?

He has a full view of all the men upon earth, of all that ever were or ever shall be, so has no use for the specific idea of man: he knows all the actions of free agents, past, present, and to come, so has no need of an abstract idea of justice to pass a judgment upon them: he discerns distinctly all the substances ever created, their operations and affections, so wants not an unsubstantial nature of things for his guidance in the management of them. Therefore, with submission and reverence be it spoken, there seems a truer regard for his glory in believing that he discerns the abstract solely in the concrete produced or to be produced into Being by his own power, has no specific ideas or abstractions of forms and essences detached from their substances, nor ever contemplates an unsubstantial nature of things, nor thinks of possibilities never to be produced into act, nor frames hypothetic propositions of what would happen if such or such measures were to be taken: for all these are expedients rendered necessary by our infirmities, which we can with no colour of reason ascribe to him. It is indeed excusable, because unavoidable, upon many occasions to speak of his proceedings in a manner conformable to our own, and even to attribute to him human passions and affections, such as favour, detestation, resentment, jealousy, repentance, fondness for glory, pleasure at our obedience, or solicitude for our welfare; of doing him service, of grieving his holy spirit, of our sincere zealous resolutions and hearty praises casting up a sweet smelling savour before him:

but we ought to remember that these expressions are not adequate to the subject nor descriptive of his essence, but indulgencies only granted in condescension to our infirmity, which has none but grovelling ideas to apply to the sublimest of objects.

10. Still there may remain a suspicion of something antecedent, not only directive of intelligence but even restrictive of omnipotence : for no Will can make a thing be apprehended otherwise than it appears, nor understand it different from what it is ; and there are absolute impossibilities, as that two and two should make five, that the angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right ones, that an agent should at the same time be free and impeccable. And here I may call in aid the noble lord before cited, who declares that these propositions are identical, carrying a show of something profound but really expressive of nothing : for to understand a thing otherwise than it is would be not to understand it, therefore to tell me I cannot do so is the same as saying I cannot be ignorant of it when I do understand it ; but in the case of the Supreme Being he directs his own intelligence, for he determines how he shall understand a thing by making it what it is.

Then the necessity urged of two and two making four carries the face of an operation performed by two and two to produce the new Being Four ; together with some superior force restraining them from producing anything else, and indeed Product is the technical term among arithmeticians for the sum found by multiplication : whereas two and two were already the same thing with four before our multiplying them together, and differ only in idea according as we consider them separated or united. If I had two guineas in my pocket and somebody pays me two, I now have four ; but the guineas were four while in different hands, and you might have truly said there were four guineas in the room before the payment ; so that to say it is impossible two and two should make five, is the same as saying they cannot be anything else than what they are.

In like manner the essence of a triangle contains two particulars, The having three angles, and the quantity of their widths added together which is equal to two right angles : for you might easily draw lines upon paper making three angles greater or less than two right ones, but then those lines will not inclose a space and consequently be no triangle. The former of these particulars is as obvious as that twice two are four, but the latter is unknown to many persons ; and those who do know it were taught by long process of demonstration, which demonstration was only a new discovery to them of what was really contained in the essence of the subject. Therefore to urge, that it is impossible for any power to make the angles of a triangle unequal to two right ones, amounts to nothing more than that no power can form a triangle which shall be no triangle : for though the word Impossible makes a show of some limitation by antecedent causes confining the power to one particular manner of exertion, yet it is here a delusive sound without a meaning. Who would think it a limitation upon his powers, to have it proved impossible for him to do a thing that shall be quite different from what he does ? or lament at lying under control of an uncreated necessity, because he cannot write a letter without writing nor walk across the room without walking ? For my part I should esteem it rather a mark of inability and subjection, if when I were tired of sitting still, it were possible that I might walk ever so fast and yet continue all the while in the sedentary posture become irksome to me.

The same answer will do for the impossibility of a free agent being impeccable. Those who battle most strenuously for this tenet are cloudy

and fluctuating in their conceptions at first, but if after much squabbling and shifting ground you can dispel the clouds and dust they raise, so as to bring them to some determinate steady sense of their words, you will always find them meaning the same thing by Free agency and Peccability: so their assertion becomes merely identical, Whatever is peccable must be peccable; or as they affect hypothetic propositions, If God will give a creature peccability he must make him peccable, for it is not in the nature of things to do otherwise. Now to my apprehension free agency and peccability are different: freedom perhaps includes a power of doing wrong, but I understand by peccability a liableness to do wrong, which two I conceive not only distinguishable in idea but separable in fact, and think I find some few instances in myself of their being actually separated. I seem to have full liberty to burn my wig whenever there is fire or candle near me, yet while I can keep my senses and avoid the frenzy of election or party bumpers, I apprehend myself under no hazard of such an idle freak. And I am so far from believing God unable to deliver me totally from my peccability, without depriving me of my freedom, that I have hope he will actually do it for myself in particular, and for countless multituds of my fellow creatures, in some future stage of our existence whereto he is now preparing us by his laws of nature and courses of Providence in this sublunary stage.

11. Nevertheless, supposing an unalterable nature of things, this can be no sure ground of our reasonings, because we can never be sure of apprehending it exactly: for such nature must continue always one and the same, but our abstract ideas notoriously fluctuate in our thoughts and vary from those of other people. We have all of us some idea of justice, yet are perpetually doubtful whether particular actions coincide therewith or not: and no man can fix so perfect an idea of that virtue as that he may not afterwards find reason to add or relax therefrom. And among various persons how discordant are their notions of justice, of honour, of public spirit, and all other abstract ideas?

Notwithstanding all the cares I have bestowed upon metaphysics and abstraction, I find I have not gotten the true idea of perjury; for if I took a transfer of five hundred India to vote at an election and give it back again upon the opening, and on going to the ballot should swear the said stock was my own property and my name not used in trust for any other, I should think myself guilty of perjury: or if I had a thousand and lent half of it to a friend upon the like terms, I should think this a subornation of perjury. But there are much wiser people, because better skilled in the only valuable knowledge, the art of getting money, who see there is nothing to reproach oneself for in all this. And I suppose the same wise people would perceive, though I cannot, that there is no harm in swearing a man's life away, provided one could get a swinging sum, or serve a friend, or ruin a party by so doing. I dare not presume to argue the case with them, for they would only laugh at my simplicity or cry me down for my superstition. And here I am not so simple as to be insensible of their wisdom in employing this kind of logic: for a laugh and an outcry have the same effect upon the rational faculties as stopping one's ears has upon that bodily sense; and I can clearly discern that the wisest way can be taken in the nature of things for defending some opinions, is to stop one's ears against whatever can be said in opposition to them.

12. Again, if there were an abstract nature of things having a reality separate from the things themselves, so much of it as does not affect the

substances wherewith we have concern would be needless to be known by us. What should we be the better or the wiser for knowing ever so accurately the nature of Chimeras, Cyclops, or flying Dragons, since no such creatures will ever fall in our way? or for understanding the abstract foundations of prudence and good policy among Sylphs and Gnomes, which have no existence elsewhere than in imagination? Neither is it practicable, if it were desirable, for us to frame an idea of such unoperating nature or any single particular belonging to it: for our ideal knowledge all comes from experience, our most refined speculations are nothing more than recollections of what has been deposited in our memory by the operation of substances, being either external objects or the modifications of our mental organs. We may compound, assort, disunite, and recall them in another order or other company than they entered; we may join things which never appeared together; we may think of a cause and its remote effect without that process of operation by which it has always worked it, or annex the idea of a cause to effects it does not bring forth, and this way can make fantastical compositions and romantic events unlike to anything that nature has ever produced: yet still the materials are all picked out from scenes we have actually known exhibited. I have seen women, horses, birds, of various plumage, and fish, and by collecting several parts of these into one assemblage, like flowers tied in a nosegay, can easily make up that whimsical figure with which Horace begins his art of poetry. We have known admirals hang out signals and by them govern the motions of a fleet: it is but slipping out of mind the captains and crews obeying the signals, and we shall have the signals themselves remaining for the immediate cause of the movements in the ships; by which example we may learn to fancy a fairy raising a magnificent palace by a stroke of her wand. I have seen different animals, can recall one of them to mind and immediately discard it by substituting another in its room; by which power I could easily fancy an old witch turning herself into a tabby cat. And it is observable that conjurors of all sorts use certain mysterious words and gestures, whereby they teach imagination to join causes with effects not belonging to them: so that magic, witchcraft, and conjuration may be called the habit of culling causes and effects well known in experience, but connecting them together in a manner nature never did.

Nor is it unlikely that errors in philosophy should spring from the same source. Lucretius builds his theory upon the observation of motes in a sunbeam, which in general fall perpendicularly, but many of them decline from their line of descent at uncertain times in various and uncertain directions; never reflecting what experience might have informed him, that every little motion of the air will give an impulse to those light bodies: so by this lucky omission he struck out his ingenious contrivance for making a world by chance. Our abstract ideas of species, forms, essences, powers, modes, relations, and natures, are only remembrances of what we have noticed in substances or their operations: but the notice touching upon various points of the same object at different times and in different persons, and imagination being too scanty to contain all the stores of our remembrance, but having her scenes composed of such particulars as occur from time to time spontaneously or can be drawn up by recollection, it is no wonder that our notions are imperfect, unstable, perpetually varying among themselves and from those of one another. Our moral ideas all bear an ultimate reference to satisfaction or happiness, and have for their object such sentiments of the mind as, either by themselves or by the actions they prompt to, make an

increase or diminution of happiness. And hence it comes that they are so frequently discordant among mankind and fluctuating in each man: for the efficacy of a particular sentiment, and the consequences of an action, being infinitely various according to situations and circumstances, it is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to fix the essence of justice, of honour, of piety, of holiness, and all others of the moral class, so accurately as that something yet unobserved or slipped out of mind shall not cause an alteration of shape or colour therein. Therefore those ideal natures and essences are unfit to be taken for the basis of knowledge or first principles of action: they are good and needful directions for our conduct both in acting and reasoning, the sole means of making past experience profitable, but so far from being eternal, unproduced, and unalterable, that they were the offspring of observation upon substances and operations we have known; and are apt to change, like stale meat, so far as to become unwholesome, if locked up long in the speculations of the closet. They must be frequently brought out into the air of the world, applied to the occurrences passing there, and continual endeavours used by familiar example, comparison, distinction, fresh observation, and supposition of cases likely to happen, so to fix their figures upon the memory as that there may be nothing defective or superfluous, and they may rise uniform and steady every time they make their appearance in the imagination.

13. The doctrine of an uncreated nature of things seems to have gathered strength from a notion of its necessity to direct the choice of the Almighty in his creation: for choice must be founded on the discernment of one thing being preferable to another, which discernment does not make the preference, it only finds a preference subsisting before in the object contemplated. But this necessity will appear none when we reflect that, as already hinted in the above cited § 71 of the last chapter, many things must have passed in the creation for which no direction could be had from an antecedent nature of things. Supposing the characters, endowments, and offices, of all perceptive Beings ascertained by such nature, which is more than I can pretend to say that they were, yet how can that nature allot particular persons to the several parts and offices it had made requisite in the universe? What if there must be an Archangel to lead forth the hosts of the Lord to battle, and such a reptile as Ned Search to puzzle his brains with dry speculations that nobody heeds, why was it necessary that Michael must be the Archangel and I the reptile? It is true that in my present condition I am utterly unfit to cope with the arch rebel, for he would pinch me to nothing with a gripe of his iron claw, and this is owing to the infirmity of that nature which God has given me: but what was Michael better than me before either of us were created? both were then nonentities, undistinguishable nothings, capable of neither fitness nor unfitness for any office whatever. Then what antecedent necessity should so constrain omnipotence as that God might not have created me to the powers and intelligence of the Archangel, and made Michael the weak and sinful son of Adam? The plan of universal Providence would still have gone on as it does; Satan would still have been overthrown and the same chapters still have been scribbled. We may think it requisite there should be successive generations of men from the formation of this earth to its final dissolution, but what was there in the nature of things to make it requisite that I and my cotemporaries should be living just now, and not have been produced into Being among the antediluvians or reserved for some future century? Had their persons, with whom we had then exchanged lots, been born in our time with our

natural talents, received our education and consorted with our company, they would have performed their parts just as we have done, and the course of human affairs would have been nothing different.

Yet why was it necessary there must be an endless variety of creatures with continual gradations of power, intelligence, and office among them? was it impossible they could all have been made equal and alike? What can we see in the antecedent nature of things to make it indispensably requisite that there should be Archangels and reptiles, patriarchal simplicity and modern refinements? What higher cause can we assign for these things than the Will and good pleasure of the Creator?

If there be any rule of direction which we cannot separate from our idea of God, it is that of goodness; for we say that God is good by the necessity of his nature: but goodness respects only the happiness bestowed and production of creatures capable of being made happy; it has no concern with the manner of making them happy; so long as the same portion of blessing is distributed, it gives no preference to one particular method of distribution rather than another. What previous fitness of things do we discover, or what in the nature of goodness, that should hinder but that God might have given us the measure of happiness designed, by his own continued act without the intervention of second causes? was he not able, or would it have been laborious and troublesome, to have done so? In this case the creatures would have wanted no faculty of activity, for the perceptive alone would have sufficed; a corporeal world to supply them with materials of enjoyment had been needless, as likewise those wonderful courses of Providence producing order therein, nor could there have been room for wisdom to display herself. For the very essence of wisdom lies in the nice adjustment of causes among one another and to their destined effects, so that an infinite variety of them shall, by many intricate channels and discordant operations, bring forth the exact series of events projected. What is done by dint of power, requires no wisdom to perform it. If I have a bowl in my hand and want it to touch the jack at the other end of the green, the shortest way would be to carry it thither, but then there is no skill in doing this: the skill lies in rolling it along the ground so that, by taking a compass over several inequalities of the turf, it shall rest at last just in the spot I would have it. Or if there were blocks in the way that it could not reach the mark unless by a passage of twenty angles made by touching upon so many bowls, he that could make a sure cast under these circumstances would show a most surprising skill. Why then do we take so much trouble in rolling our bowls when we might carry them easier? The answer is obvious: for our diversion, or perhaps to show our dexterity to some bystander. But shall we say that God put his host of second causes in act, as we go to a game at bowls, for amusement? or was it to show what he could do?

It may indeed be thought an end worthy ascribing to him, to manifest his glory and his wisdom to the creatures, but this is because he has so constituted some of his creatures as that the contemplation of his glory and admiration of his wisdom becomes a principal channel of their happiness; yet he has provided enjoyments for multitudes of creatures without giving them any capacity of knowing him or his works, and of that species which he has endued with such capacity, there are many to whom the necessary occupations of that station wherein he has placed them, the turbulence of their passions, and continual action of sensible objects around them, has rendered it impracticable to exercise their faculties in the extent whereof they are capable. Thus what grounds there are for the display of glory must

be looked for in the constitution and nature given to the creatures on calling them forth into Being, not in anything prior to their creation: nor can we devise any previous necessity nor eternal fitness, that should determine him to satisfy the demands of goodness by the long-spun contrivances of wisdom, rather than by the direct operations of power. Since then, if we will needs judge of the Creator by our own ideas, there appears to have been many particulars attending the creation, for which we can form no idea of any direction to be had from a pre-existent abstract nature of things, we must acknowledge that in those particulars he could and did proceed without it, and from thence may conclude that he might do the same in all others belonging to his work.

14. Even goodness, that most important of all the Attributes to us, seems ascribed too hastily by many to such an abstract nature, for they say that God is good by the necessity of his nature: which expression I have used just now after their example, though without a full understanding of the terms, for to my apprehension they imply a necessity casting goodness upon him involuntarily, or making it requisite for him to act upon that principle; but for my part I will not pretend to say how it comes that he is good, nor assign a cause of his being so. Men are good because it is their duty, because it will obtain them his favour, because they think it their truest interest, because they have been led into it by good company, because it is soothing to their reflection, and grateful to their moral sense: but I can ascribe none of those motives, nor any other conceivable by me, to the Almighty.

Goodness, you will urge, is an excellence, and all excellences must centre in him. Let us beware that we do not slide back again into the notion of things abstract and unsubstantial subsisting independently on their substances; for what are we to understand by Excellence? The idea results from comparison, most frequently among us from a comparison of persons; we call a man excellent in his way when he far surpasses others: in this sense we may say without blasphemy that the excellence of God sprung from his creation, for a sole Being can have no excellence because it has nothing to excel. Or if you will apply the term, you might with equal propriety apply its contrary, for while the sole he was the lowest as well as the most excellent of Beings. Therefore when he had made a multitude of creatures far inferior to himself, then it was he began to be the most excellent.

In the other sense of excellence it rests upon a comparison of things, those being judged the most excellent which are most advantageous, or conduce to the most excellent purposes, that is, such as yield the largest income of happiness. It is true goodness placed in this light must appear the highest excellence, because that alone gives us an interest in omnipotence, omniscience, and infinite wisdom, which without it would become objects of mere speculation, or perhaps of dread and horror. But then it is an excellence relatively to us, and if we think to increase it by our prayers, oblations, and rectitude of conduct, we shall do well, as being the most excellent purpose we can drive at: yet this does not prove it an excellence to him, nor fixed upon him by the necessity of his nature. If a man have talents and a disposition of mind highly beneficial to the public, though productive of nothing but incessant cares and trouble to himself, we think him an excellent person, and he may think it himself an excellect possession, and why? either because of the satisfaction of mind redounding therefrom, or more rationally because it is every man's truest interest to do the most

good he can. For in that only nature of things which lies within our knowledge, the motive of every action regards ultimately some benefit of the agent, either real or fancied; and if there be another nature we know nothing of, we can never take upon us to pronounce what it does or does not require: the known nature of agency manifestly does not render an Attribute of goodness necessary, for what joy, what advantage, could accrue to the Almighty from effecting his gracious purpose of making creatures to be happy? or how was it better or more excellent for him to be good than to be evil?

But it will be asked, can I imagine a Deity otherwise than good? I frankly own that I cannot, because I feel so many effects of bounty in myself, and see so many blessings poured daily among the creatures on all sides around me, that I cannot imagine them proceeding from any other than a beneficent, gracious, and indulgent power. Thus I discover the cause by the effects, and rest contented in the discovery without wanting or pretending to look further for a cause of that cause which I esteem the First, thinking myself happy there is such a one from under whose influence I can never be removed. Nor is my method different with respect to the other Attributes, and even the Being of a God, for all which I could never yet enter into the force of arguments *a priori*. I see there is a world, and my reason convinces me it could not exist without a Creator, therefore there is one. I know from experience of works I have seen performed, that the world could not be made without power, and can discern nothing that should limit or obstruct that power, therefore the Creator is omnipotent. In this manner I go on investigating the other Attributes by comparison of causes and effects: if at any time I try to throw aside all my experience, together with the observations and theorems stored in mind therefrom, I find nothing but obscurity whereon I can neither judge, nor reason, nor argue.

15. What then! do we represent God as arbitrary, that it is wholly uncertain in what manner he will deal with us, that he follows none other guidance in his proceedings than mere will and pleasure? Far be it from me to draw this conclusion, nor do I think the premises laid down above will bear it. For arbitrary proceeding is acting with no regard to the condition of the subjects acted upon, and such action must always be uncertain; but without an antecedent uncreated nature of things I apprehend God does not want a guidance for his proceedings in the subsequent nature given to his substances on making them; and that he follows invariably those rules which he had prescribed to himself by the creation, which last opinion I gather from his immutability.

Yet neither can I venture to pronounce him immutable by the necessity of his nature, for I can see nothing previous that should make it necessary, but infer it from the steady regularity observable in his laws of visible nature and course of events respecting mankind, and from the absence of all conceivable causes which might work a change in him. Men are changeable either from ignorance, which leaves room for new lights perpetually to cast a new appearance of things upon their judgment; or from imbecility, rendering them liable to be hurried to and fro against their judgment by the spontaneous and uncertain impulse of their passions: and I have observed that in proportion as they can get rid of their ignorance and imbecility, they grow more and more uniform and steady in their sentiments and conduct. Therefore being fully assured those two causes are absent from God, I see no shadow of probability for their effects: nor can entertain a suspicion that he may be good and provident to-day but cruel or regardless of

us to-morrow : that at one time he could look forth upon the works which he had made and behold they were very good, conformable to his liking ; but at some subsequent season he might look forth again and behold they were stark nought, displeasing and odious in his sight; that he should choose a plan of operation, persevering in it for successive ages until at length he changed his mind, departed from his plan, and pursued another diametrically opposite.

Nevertheless, we must take care to settle the proper idea of immutability, which is not inconsistent with a variety of action, provided the whole scheme of action be laid out upon one plan : for we do not pronounce a man changeable and uncertain because he sometimes goes to bed, and sometimes gets up, sometimes sits down to eat, and sometimes rises to labour, or studies and uses exercise, meditates alone, and diverts himself among his friends at different times, if in all those changes of action he still holds on the same tenor of conduct, and acts upon the same principles throughout. So the measures of universal government are immutable although the dispensations made by it are various, sometimes building up and sometimes pulling down, sometimes cherishing with salubrious influences, and sometimes destroying with pestilence and famine ; although barbarism and good polity by turns overspread the several countries of the earth ; although at times we are in pleasure or pain, in hope or under dejection, gladdened with success, or vexed with disappointment. For these are various parts making up the symmetry of one uniform plan which never varies from itself : so that the universe continues always the same, but the members of it fluctuate, perpetually changing condition with one another.

16. It is this fluctuation among the members and individuals of an immutable Whole, that occasions so many mistakes in the doctrine of final causes ; for our unpiercing optics reaching a very little way into the chain of events around us, we frequently take the means for the end and deceive ourselves in their bearings and tendencies ; but if we could discern the final causes as they grow in order from one another, there would be no surer foundation whereon to build our reasonings, nor could there be a safer measure of our conduct than to exert our little powers in co-operating with them. Those final causes are best sought out by a diligent examination into the nature of things, that is, of substances, their qualities, mutual relations, and operations, falling within the compass of our notice : whose natures must of course have continuance in proportion to that of the subject whereof they are predicated. That there is a nature of the British constitution nobody will deny, nor that it requires the attention of every one who would strike out any measures of sound policy among us, for none that are contrary thereto can succeed : but this nature was so far from being eternal and unchangeable, that fifteen hundred years ago, before there was a British constitution, it had no Being, so could require nothing and direct to nothing : and a little smattering in English history will manifest, that it has received many changes from the Saxon heptarchy to the present flourishing condition of our American colonies. The absorption of six kingdoms by the seventh, the introduction of Papal authority, the Norman conquest, the wars of the Barons, the breaking of their power, the reformation, the growth of commerce and naval strength, the Revolution, the very recent discovery of representation being confined to persons having some interest in elections, have each of them given us a different nature.

Nevertheless there may be natures eternal, if the substances whereon they depend were so ; and unchangeable though the substances fluctuate

into different sorts of creatures, provided others perpetually succeed in their places: for the noble ally whom I have called to my assistance in this chapter will concur with me in maintaining a distinction between eternal and independent or uncreated. We do not deny that God might have created Beings from everlasting capable of right and wrong in their dealings among one another, in which case the fundamental rules of justice were eternal and immutable. What though there be evident marks of generation in this earth: possibly the universe never was without a race of men in some dirty habitation or other, and then human nature with all the abstractions belonging to it was eternal. Nor shall I scruple to admit that God has regard to those natures, making his dispensations conformable thereto, so that we may style them his guidance: but then it is in the government only, not the creation of the world, whereof they were the production, and consequently could not be the direction. We therefore having nothing better than those natures to make the basis of our reasonings, it would be an unwarrantable presumption in us to pronounce anything confidently concerning creation, the manner or causes of it; for we never had experience of a creation or anything previous or preparatory to it, so can have no ground whereon to build an hypothesis. It is enough, and a great matter too, for us if we can discern how things are constituted; for from thence, as from the only source we have access to, may be gathered so much knowledge of the Divine nature as is needful or possible for us to attain.

17. I should not have been so copious or perhaps tedious upon this abstruse subject, but that I apprehend it of great importance to such as push their thoughts beyond the common extent: for it is of little avail to the vulgar, who seek for nothing further than the Will and good pleasure of God, to account for the constitutions of things, the course of events befalling among them, the rules of duty or obligations to moral conduct; and in this instance are wiser than the speculative. But a trust in God is the grand corner stone of all Religion, and of all our hopes beyond what this present sublunary scene of affairs can afford: therefore it is of the highest moment to every person to take care that this stone lies firm upon solid ground, and while it seems to press close thereon, it do not indeed take its support from some side-props which keep it hollow. We may laudably search into visible nature to find what is the Will of God, for we may learn something of it from his works; but if when so found, our dependence rests upon anything else, whether in heaven above or earth below, in the wilds of abstraction or a divine nature subsisting independently on that Will, we shall find it fail us in time of need, how fair soever it may promise during the enthusiasm of speculative discoveries. For this enthusiasm, like the heat of argument, will often give a colour of demonstration to mere plausible appearances, so beguiling the judgment as to make men mistake their own sentiments and perceive not the real ground whereon their persuasions stand. They think themselves actuated by a zeal for the divine glory in maintaining that God is good, and just, and wise, and holy, by the necessity of his nature; which notion is really suggested by a secret mistrust of him. They apprehend their fortunes unsafe in his hands; they feel uneasy at the thought of lying under his absolute dominion: they suspect he may deal arbitrarily, unjustly, and unkindly by them; so they want some barrier against the dangers of unlimited prerogative, which barrier they suppose to be had in the antecedent, uncreated, unalterable nature of things keeping him perpetually in order.

But this is a novel doctrine unknown to the soundest of ancient writers either sacred or profane: Pythagoras taught that things were established, the powers of nature and course of events ascertained, by the oath of Jove: the Scriptures speak of a covenant of God fixing the laws of nature, so that day and night, seed time and harvest, should never fail; and represent even the supernatural interpositions therein recorded as made in consequence of the oath sworn unto David, and the eternal purpose of God before the foundations of the world. Now an oath and a covenant are free and voluntary acts, where there is no higher authority to require the one nor valuable consideration given to make the other expedient: therefore those could be only figurative expressions of the Divine immutability, yet were they thought sufficient securities without wishing or seeking for anything further to enforce their performance. Wherefore prudence should incline us to inure our minds to place their confidence upon this sole stable bottom, and to satisfy ourselves of its solidity by frequent impartial examination: for whatever better support we may flatter our imagination with in the fondness of refinement, when distress or an approaching dissolution threatens, the fondness will subside, our support be withdrawn, and we shall remain utterly at a loss where to find another.

18. If we are fully assured that God is good and that he will always continue so, what more can we desire for our dependence? what should we be the better if we could know why he must be good? or what addition would it make to our security, unless we entertained a suspicion of the other two? Those two points then it behoves us to take for the principal objects of our attention, examining impartially what evidences there are to convince our judgment of their truth; and then by frequent contemplation of such evidences, so to inculcate the result upon our minds that it may grow into an habitual steady persuasion rising spontaneously to the thought in full strength and colour whenever needful. Actual goodness is discerned by the preponderancy of enjoyments above the uneasinesses open to our observance, and the means of preservation, support, accommodation, relief, and comfort, amply provided around: but then we must take care to distinguish between goodness and fondness or a compliance with every sudden humour, nor confine our view to ourselves alone or our situation in the present moment, which may happen to contain nothing of enjoyment within its compass. And the continuance of goodness may be learned from the consideration that mutability springs always from defect or weakness; it is owing to something we did not think of before, or some unforeseen desire we cannot resist: still remembering that very different strokes may compose an uniform plan, and a variety of dispensations be consistent with an invariableness of design.

Nor is there a small confirmation of those points to be drawn from the concurrence of all mankind, for an opinion universally received may well be presumed standing upon solid grounds although the steps whereby it grew from thence should be utterly forgotten. But there is nobody to whose ears and understanding the very suggestion of an evil or a changeable Deity would not be shocking: and this alone gives rise to our perplexities upon the origin of evil. For if we could believe a mixture of beneficence and unkindness in the Almighty, nothing would be easier than to account for whatever happens contrary to our liking from the latter: when distress falls upon us the answer would be ready, it is an unfavourable season wherein he chances to be out of humour with us. But no man will hear such answers: therefore many devices have been framed to solve the difficulty

another way, by the mechanical action of matter, the imperfection of created Being, the gradation of stages among the creatures; some have subjected God to an eternal nature of things rendering it impossible for him to give unmingled happiness, others represent him casting the power out of his own hands by a free will of indifference given to men, which he cannot control without destroying. The three first appear to me secondary, not original, causes of evil; and for the two last I can find no proof of their being fact. For my part, I can neither see, nor find a use in seeing, any higher origin of things than the Will and pleasure of the Creator in making them; if there be a higher I am sensible my faculties can never reach it, and so far as I can discover how things are constituted, I may depend upon their being administered conformably thereto, and my own expectations will be ascertained.

Therefore I have recommended in CHAP. XVIII. to consider God under two characters, as Creator and as Governor of the world. In the latter only we may discern the grounds of his proceedings, and reason upon the doctrine of final causes: in the former it is not our business to examine why but what he has done. If I am asked why the world was established in wisdom and goodness, second causes employed, the perceptions of spirit made dependent on the actions of matter, and a sprinkling of evil rendered necessary: why there was a gradation of creatures, an interruption in the enjoyments allotted them and a peccability in man; I have none other answer for all such questions than, because it was the Will and good pleasure of the Creator so to order. But on observing the manner wherein things are constituted, I find the perceptive creatures endowed with activity whereby they are to help themselves to the enjoyments put within their power, that the apprehension of evil has as great a share in the exertion of activity as the desire of good, that since, as observed before, our knowledge of objects lies in the discernment of their differences, there would be no sense of good unless by comparison with its contrast; for it is a common saying that we know not the value of blessings until they are taken from us, and the appellation of a tree of knowledge of good and evil implies that Adam did not understand what good was before he had experience of evil, therefore there must be some actual evil interpersed to raise the apprehension of danger, but a very small proportion will suffice for that purpose. This establishment I regard as the oath or covenant of the Creator, and by a figurative expression denoting the Divine immutability, may call it an obligation binding upon God in his character of Governor to adhere inviolably thereto.

Thus there is a nature of things which our universal Governor takes for his continual guidance, not independent nor uncreated; antecedent indeed to the measures he takes, but subsequent to the creation, dependent thereon and created therewith. As much of this nature as we can discern, so much we may know concerning his future proceedings: and this is the only evidence human reason can produce for augurating what shall befall us beyond the extent of this present life. Hence likewise we may gather that there is a final cause whereon his views constantly terminate, namely the happiness of the creatures, to be pursued by such methods as their natures and the circumstances attending them render necessary: which seem to require a dispensation of evil, but in no proportion to the good and made for sake of the good, with a provident care that no more should be permitted than requisite, and that every evil be attended with a far greater profit redundant

therefrom. These surely are sufficient grounds of contentment, and of such expectations as we are warranted to entertain, provided they be deeply imprinted upon the mind. I only wish I could gain as full an unfading persuasion of them in my imagination as I have a clear conviction upon my understanding: they would overpower many distresses and alleviate all others, so long as I could hold them steady in contemplation.

19. Another benefit which may chance to accrue from the dissertation carried on in the foregoing sections is, that it may help towards introducing a greater sobriety and soundness into our reasonings upon moral essences, and make men readier to receive mutual improvement or find an issue to disputes in their conferences among one another. For when having gotten a strong persuasion of some point which they do not remember ever to have doubted of, nor from what premises or by what process of argumentation they were brought to entertain it, they presently pronounce it an unproduced, eternal, immutable truth, and think their assent the effect of an intuitive knowledge, which will always force assent upon a bare inspection. For though there may be persons who dissent from this truth, this they say proceeds from the films of error overclouding the sight, or the bias of prejudice not suffering the mental eye to look steadily upon its proper point; for essential truths must always be acknowledged as soon as seen and understood. Hence they come by the discernment of many things right in themselves and laudable in themselves, whose merits must never be questioned: because as in law there is no averring against a record, so in metaphysics there is no excepting against an essential truth intuitively discerned, nor can any circumstance render that wrong which was right in itself.

But since it happens that men's intuitions vary greatly, and they often discern the same truth in very different shapes and colours, when two of these intuitive speculatists meet, there is no room for sober argumentation between them; they can only charge one another with films and bias, blindness and obstinacy, and all must proceed in positiveness, clamour, and acrimony. Whereas could they be made sensible that, though there were an uncreated nature of things, we have not eyes to see it, but all our abstractions are only partial appearances drawn off from the substances we have been conversant amongst and their operations, they would then perceive that nothing is right in itself or laudable in itself, but those expressions are applied to such dictates of the moral sense and established rules as ought to be taken for first principles of conduct and sentiment by the generality, who cannot trace them to their foundations; nevertheless a foundation they have, and were made laudable and right by their tendency, nearly or remotely, to the interests of mankind. This would open a door to sober inquiry for discovering the nature of moral obligations, from the nature of man and so much of the nature of God as lies manifested in his works; rectifying one another's misapprehensions or oversights by examination of what conduces most largely to the general or private happiness, and by what several means it operates thereto.

And there are other persons to whom the like considerations might prove serviceable if they would heed them: for our godly and gifted wholesale dealers in lectures mimic the metaphysician without knowing it. Their system, like his, lies altogether in abstract essences and things unsubstantial, such as derivative wickedness, satisfaction to justice, the price paid for the ransom of sin, and the like. With them justification, sanctification, and imputed merit, are something that may be drawn up by faith, as water by a pump: grace is an unsubstantial thing transferable from one substance to

another, capable of being contained and conveyed in material elements. Thus, like the conjuror, they join the cause with a very remote effect or with effects not producible by it, and thereby turn religion into a kind of magic and charm. But of those terms some were figurative, of common currency among the Jews, which cannot remain intelligible now unless translated into a language familiar among ourselves: and to find a rational sense in any of them, recourse must be had to the nature of perceptive Beings, the connection between the several members of the creation and several stages of existence to be passed through, the nature of man, the rational and sensitive faculties, the great importance of a well-rectified imagination, the efficacy of forms, ceremonies, visible objects, and authority, to give a different cast and tenor to this faculty.

Nor are the generality among us wholly without their abstract essences and unsubstantial Beings: for what else is that nobility of blood supposed to run in the veins from father to son, exerting itself naturally in grandeur of sentiments? or that liberty called the birthright of every Englishman, which he sucks in with his milk, or draws with his first vital air? But nobility of birth is nothing more than the advantages enjoyed from very infancy, of a noble education, noble examples, and the conversation of noble company, together with the respect paid by the world restraining from such meannesses as might endanger the loss of it: for if the young lord be suffered to consort early among huntsmen, gamesters, and jockies, the blood will be found ignoble in his veins. And if we take our notion of liberty from intuitive knowledge, without examination by a reference to public order and public happiness, we shall never be able to distinguish ill nature, envy, petulance, and licentiousness, from that spirit of liberty for which we of these countries so justly value ourselves.

CHAP. XXV.

PROVIDENCE.

In my general introduction I compared the niceties of abstract learning to Achilles' spear, which was sometimes employed to cure the wounds itself had given. It is this service I have attempted to draw from them throughout the preceding chapter, which, as there hinted, was needless for the unhurt, but intended solely for the relief of such as have been stunned with a blow of the spear, in hopes of allaying the giddiness and confusion of thought thrown upon them thereby. If my endeavours should prove effectual for dispelling the perplexities concerning the origin of evil, the absolute eternity of uncreated essences and things unsubstantial, I expect none other benefit than that the healed will accompany me as undisturbedly as the unwounded along our future progress in the examination of the phenomena before us, and trying from thence to investigate that nature of things which was the work of God, not his superior, and which is the oath he has sworn and covenant he has established for the perpetual direction of his conduct in the administration of his immense kingdom the Universe.

We have already seen the primary properties of substances are few, but that the great variety of phenomena, which nature exhibits to our view, arises from secondary qualities resulting from composition. It is now, and has been ever since the time of Thales, the received opinion among natu-

ralists that all matter is homogeneous, and that the diversities we find amongst it are owing to the various forms and combinations whereinto it is assorted. The face of the earth apparently derives its features from the shape whereinto it is cast, for it is that makes the vallies and mountains, the capes, promontories, and winding shores, the bays, and gulphs, and oceans. It contains the same quantity of earth and water as when in that smooth antediluvian form supposed by theory Burnet, wherein there was neither mountain, valley, sea, nor ocean. And in the smaller productions of nature, it is the form and structure of the seed that fits it for producing such a particular plant, and the structure of the plant that causes it to bring forth such particular leaves, flowers, and fruits, with their several colours, odours, and flavours. Neither do metals, minerals, fossils, and soils, nor the elements themselves, differ any otherwise than by their internal contexture. But the form and texture of compounds depend upon the position of their parts with respect to one another, nor can change without their changing places, or some of them flying off, or new particles acceding to the mass. We see bodies continually vary their forms, being generated, increasing, and decaying, some by quicker and others by slower degrees; where we do not observe them grow or decay, we perceive them altered in quality or appearance: and though there be some solid bodies of which we have no remembrance nor evidence of their ever having been otherwise than they appear, yet is there reason to believe they did not always carry the form they now bear.

2. Therefore every present position of particles in any compound or collection whatever was generated, but before they came into their present order they must have stood in some other position with respect to one another, whether in different parts of the same compound or at a distance therefrom: and it was the situation they lay in then, together with the proximity and action of other bodies upon them, which brought them into the places they now occupy, and generated the form they compose. If the particles forming a blade of corn had lain anywhere else than where they did last year, either in the earth, or the air, or the vapours, they would not have come together into that blade: and if a grain of sand upon the shore had been in any other part of the ocean than where it was, it would have received a different impulse therefrom, and been thrown upon some other coast. Thus the station which every particle holds in any body, whether animal or vegetable, or earthly, or elementary, or ethereal, and the share it contributes to the form and secondary qualities thereof, depend upon the place wherein it stood before entering thereinto, but not solely; for they depend likewise upon the contiguity, force, and direction of other particles impelling it into the compound, as also upon the situation of parts in the compound itself turning it different ways, or affording it a place of rest.

But the universe having nothing external, the present station of all the particles therein must result from that they had before, together with the quantity and direction of motions among them, which generate the laws of nature and so much of the courses of fortune as are the product of material causes. So that the order wherein matter now stands arranged depends upon that of the last year, this again upon the preceding, and so on, without our being able to trace it to the beginning. But though we cannot trace out the first position which matter ever had, we have seen reason to conclude that all the principles thereof must, either in time or from eternity have received their respective stations and motions from the First Cause: and that whatever motion was then impressed thereby, occasioning mutual

impulses between them, threw them into that order and those combinations which constitute the compound bodies we see, and give them their form and their qualities. Thus upon any quantity and kind of motion imparted to matter, the changes it will undergo and various assortments it will fall into, follow in a necessary series until some new notion shall be impressed.

3. But though every thinking person will readily acknowledge the changes of quality, form, and position, wherein matter and impulse alone are concerned, to be governed by the laws of necessity, and to take place precisely according to the presence and operation of the causes effecting them: yet the same cannot be admitted with respect to the actions of voluntary agents, which have some influence in working alterations among the bodies around them, and a greater in bringing good or evil upon one another. For they do not act by necessity but by volition, nor like matter, barely transmit but produce the motion they give, and can stop or change the course whereinto bodies had been thrown by impulse. Yet though they do not act necessarily, they act exactly in consequence of certain causes: for there are other causes besides motions and impulse, and another law beside that of necessity to govern the turns of volition. After what has been offered by Mr. Locke and in the sixth chapter of our first volume, there remains no room to imagine a power of indifference in the mind, or to doubt that she steadily pursues satisfaction in every motion she makes, exerting her activity from time to time in that way which appears to her most eligible, which the judgment represents as most expedient, or the fancy as most agreeable upon the present occasion. Thus our actions follow precisely according to our present apprehension of things, according to the final and ideal causes starting up to our thoughts; neither can we conceive a created Being excited to voluntary action any other way.

Let us now consider whence those apprehensions must arise, for the mind does not make them for herself, it is not her act that causes a rose to appear red, nor three times four to produce twelve, nor virtue to be more laudable than vice: but she is always passive in perception, and only discerns objects exhibited to her by something else. But we have shown that the perceptive mind is one uncompounded substance, therefore that something else which exhibits the ideas can be none other than the corporeal parts of our composition, the sensitive or mental organs impressing different perceptions according to their different modifications: but the modifications of body can arise only from the position or motion of the particles whereof it consists; and the series of perceptions succeeding in spirit, must depend upon its position in a set of organs apt to take such particular modifications.

If any man makes a difficulty of perceiving how the perceptions and acts of his mind can follow according to the positions of body, let him take up any book to read: one book differs from another only in the position of letters combined in different words and expressions, yet he will find the train of thoughts springing up in his mind, as he goes along, run on according to those combinations: and if he reads aloud, his action upon the organs of speech will proceed conformably thereto. In this employment it is the satisfaction expectant upon the instruction or entertainment he shall receive, which carries him through the several steps of his reading: and so in all his other proceedings, some desire or satisfaction prompts him to read the modifications in his sensory, and to exert his activity in pursuance of the information they give. But then the action of external objects passing through his mental organs, will be somewhat varied accord-

ing to the condition those organs have been left in by other prior objects striking upon them. Therefore if he runs over two or three pages in the middle of a book, he will scarce receive the same ideas therefrom as he would had he come to them regularly from the beginning, for the little fibres of his organs will take a different position according to that they had been put into before. So likewise if two persons read the same discourse, it is odds but they will see the matters contained there in different lights; but this is owing to their degrees of sagacity depending upon their natural constitution, or upon the state their imagination has been formerly cast into by education, or experience, or study, or conversation. For whether in reading or whatever else a man can perform, his action proceeds always according to the notices of external objects, or according to the present scene of ideas in his mind, the desires, the views, the apprehensions, the lights, the directions, suggested by his judgment or his fancy. If we examine to what these are owing, we must ascribe them either to mechanical causes or to some former acts of his own or other persons: but then those acts in like manner followed from the scene of ideas exhibited to the agent at the time of performing them, and if we trace them backward to the first act that was ever done, we shall find it terminate in the condition of the sensory when exciting the first perceptions.

Thus with respect to our mental organs as well as the productions of nature, every position of their parts giving them their secondary qualities of affecting us with such or such perceptions, follows in consequence of a prior position: not indeed always mechanically, for our own acts and those of other people frequently interfere, but when we consider that those acts were determined by the then state of imagination directing thereto, it will appear that the changes made thereby proceed by as certain rules though not in the same manner, that is, not solely by mechanical impulse, as those worked upon one another by bodies. Hence it is manifest that the talents, endowments, and sentiments of percipient Beings depend upon the position of material particles and the place wherein they lie respectively stationed among them: and the operations of spirit as well as body must be referred originally to the power and direction of the First Cause.

4. As for those who hold that the materials of their knowledge lie within the mind itself, I know not how they avoid making it consist of parts, one wherein the ideas composing their knowledge lie dormant and unperceived, until the other fetches them forth by contemplation and recollection; nor what stuff they conceive the ideas to be made of, which remain in the mind for long intervals without her discerning them. But whatever their notions may be upon this article, I suppose they will hardly deny that the knowledge they have was either born with them or acquired since their birth: what was born with them was given by that Power which gave them their Being, and what was acquired they gained either by their own sagacity and experience or by the instruction and conversation of others. Their sagacity or aptness for making improvement, and the opportunities of their experience, must have been furnished by nature or external causes; and what they learned from others must have been first acquired by them from the same sources, or received from other instructors who gained it in the same manner: for instruction cannot increase the stock of knowledge in the world, but only spread it: and whatever is taught, was originally discovered by the teacher or somebody else. I believe it will be allowed that any two men, having exactly the same turn of mind, would act alike under the same circumstances; the circumstances of the case must be acknowledged to

depend upon external causes, and their turn of mind was either natural, and then they must ascribe it to the Author of their nature, or effected by some prior act of their own, which act must likewise have depended upon the turn of mind they then had when they performed it: thus turn will follow turn until you come to that they received at their birth.

He must have a very peculiar way of thinking who can persuade himself he should have gained the same acquisitions, had he been destitute of all those means of improvement that have been afforded him: and though some extraordinary advances in a particular science or profession under great disadvantages, every one is ready to acknowledge this owing to a happy genius and vigour of mind with which nature had befriended them. But because such persons work out their improvements by their own industry, they take the merit of it to themselves, forgetting that they were prompted to that industry by the ease they found in the first steps of their progress, and assisted therein by the greater acuteness of their faculties. Thus upon either hypothesis we may conclude, that the qualifications of free agents whereon their good conduct depends, spring from the gifts of nature or means of improvement: all which derive either directly or remotely from that origin which gave the first position and motion to matter, producing the order and variety we behold upon the face of nature: and which allotted to spiritual substances their respective stations among the corpuscles of matter.

5. Having satisfied ourselves that the course of things, as well in the natural as moral world, proceeds in a continued series or chain from the operations of the First Cause, which is God omniscient and infinitely wise, there needs very little reflection to convince us that this First Cause knew not only the positions and motions he gave to matter and stations of the spirits he had created, but likewise what changes and productions they would generate by their mutual action upon one another: and if he knew what would result from his work, we can as little doubt that he framed it with an intention that it should have that result. This choice and adjustment of the proper causes to work their destined effects, we call Providence: for as a man provides for his children by furnishing them with the education, portion, and other means, which may enable them to live a useful and happy life; as every provident person, who has any great work to do will prepare the materials, engage the workmen and labourers, and give the orders necessary for bringing it to perfection: so whatever God designs to produce by the operation of second causes, he provides sufficient agents, gives them the powers, the impulses, and the motives, requisite exactly to answer his purpose. If he determines to bring plenty or scarcity upon the earth, he disposes the air and the elements in such manner as necessarily to produce either; if he resolves to build up or pull down kingdoms, he raises up men with peculiar talents, fitted either for improving the arts of war and policy, or for throwing all things into confusion. From hence we may gather that the Providence of God is over all his works, and that in the formation of sentient as well as unsentient natures, he had in view that series of changes and events they would produce, and ordered his whole multitude of second causes so as to execute that plan of Providence he had in his intention. Which plan contained the order of succession we have spoken of in several places before, whereof the systems and courses of nature, the dispensations of good and evil, the fates and fortunes of men and other sentient creatures, are the several parts; which whether it has run on forever or had a beginning, owed its rise either from everlasting or at some certain time, to the power and action of the Almighty.

6. But though every one who believes God to be the sole First Cause of all things, and not to have formed the world out of uncreated materials capable only of being fabricated in such or such particular manner, will acknowledge that everything contained in the divine plan falls out according to the divine intention, yet some have doubted whether all events that have happened were comprised within that plan. For as in human affairs if a man lays his measures ever so completely, there will follow other consequences besides those he had in view: when the farmer ploughs his ground he disturbs the vermin and insects, tears up their nests, or destroys them without intending it: so in the plan of Providence there may lie unimportant events which God cared not whether they should happen or no, not belonging to it but necessarily resulting from the parts designed, such as the falling of particular leaves or floating of straws upon the water: and these will be absolutely casual, as being unforeseen by any created mind and unthought of by the Divine. Thus the Stoics, as we learn from Cicero, held that God took care of great matters but neglected small ones: my Lord Bolingbroke seems to have been of the same opinion: and if we attend to the common discourses of men concerning chance and fortune, we shall be ready to think this the idea generally prevailing amongst them.

Now if we examine why they entertain this idea, we shall find them induced thereto by two considerations: one because they look upon little matters as unworthy the notice of God, and esteem it derogatory from the divine majesty to suppose him attentive to the crawlings of an emmet or tossings of a feather in a tempestuous air; the other because the drawing a plan to contain every the minutest event without exception, they conceive to lie among the absolute impossibilities, and be impracticable even by infinite wisdom and omniscience.

But for my part I can see nothing unworthy notice in itself, the wisest men can attend to the motions of insects or floating of little bodies in the air, when they have nothing else to do; and if at any time they scruple attending to trifles, it is to avoid contracting a habit of being drawn off by them from matters of greater importance. For our notice lies confined within a narrow compass, we cannot fix our eye upon one object without overlooking others; therefore must accustom ourselves to disregard some objects as being unworthy to engross that observation we shall want for conducting us in affairs of moment. But there is not the like reason to deem anything unworthy the notice of God, unless we will suppose they must so engross his attention as that he will not have enough left to bestow upon the weightier affairs of his government.

Thus this objection resolves itself into the other, namely the impossibility of all, even the minutest, events being comprised within one plan and calculation: and indeed it must be owned an inconceivable thought that shall contain every little motion produced and to be produced throughout the universe: but so it is if we consider only the rise and fall of kingdoms, the lives and deaths, successes and distresses of mankind, which whoever will allow God to take care of anything, must admit to lie under his direction; for this alone requires a greater extent of design than our imagination can comprehend. But we must remember that the Attributes of God are incomprehensible, his thoughts are not like our thoughts, nor his intelligence like our understanding, dependent upon ideas exhibited by our organs which can take only a certain number of modifications, and if we endeavour to introduce more we involve ourselves in perplexity and confusion. Whereas God perceives not by organs, but being present everywhere and intelligent

everywhere, we may as well apprehend him to discern and direct events throughout the immensity of space as in any single point of it.

7. The theory of universal Providence being thus established, let us proceed to examine whether there is not evidence of it in the phenomena of nature. If God had thought proper to leave anything to chance or necessity, we cannot imagine otherwise than that he would have so ordered his plan as that those blind causes should not interfere to disturb or alter it in any part: but in fact we find events so interlaced among one another, that those of the greatest moment often depend upon others we should think the most trifling and unworthy regard. The causes of dearth and fertility depend upon the vapours and little particles floating about in the air: plague, murrain, and many distempers, derive from the same sources: therefore those little particles must have their commission when and where and in what quantities to flow, or health and sickness, abundance and famine, might overspread the earth without the knowledge or intention of the Almighty. Winds and weather depend upon so many complicated causes, the action of the Sun, attraction of the Moon, situation of the mountains, exhalations from the ground, that no human science can investigate them: yet how often has the scale of victory been turned by a particular wind blowing dust in the faces of one army? How often has a vanquished fleet been saved by a favourable gale wafting them into places of security? How then can we say God giveth victory, unless we allow him to take cognizance of everything conducive thereto? For though he gave better conduct to the general and greater vigour to the soldiers on one side, these advantages might be overbalanced by a certain temperature in the air, causing it to move this way or that.

Perhaps it will be thought enough if the causes, operating to produce this temperature, be set at work in the gross, and that it is no matter whether a few more or less particles be employed, nor what places or girations be assigned to each particle among the whole. For when the farmer sows his corn, he does not mind the exact number of grains he takes up at each time into his hand, nor whether any two of them fall the tenth of an inch further or nearer to one another. But man acts by the gross members of his body, to which he gives an impulse by one operation of his mind; and when he acts upon several little bodies, the motions they receive depend partly upon their figures, magnitudes, and situations, which are too numerous and too various for him to observe. Whereas God acts not by limbs nor by external stroke or pulsion upon the outside of a mass, but by actuating the component parts, whereof such and no more receive such and none other impulse than he impresses upon them: for he pervades and is present with them all, nor can remain ignorant or inobservant of what impulses he gives, or what subsequent motions they must necessarily produce by their mutual action upon one another.

8. If there be any who cannot readily comprehend the force of this argument, let them turn their thoughts to such incidents wherein the structure of particular bodies, and position of their parts, manifestly give the turn to the event. Men have been killed by the fall of boughs from trees or bricks from buildings as they passed under, but had the fibres of the bough, or mortar holding the bricks together, been ever so little stronger or weaker, or the least particles in either placed otherwise, they would have fallen a moment sooner or later and the lives of the passengers been saved. Some have been bitten by adders whom they trod upon as they walked along: others destroyed by swallowing wasps in their liquor: these owe

their deaths to the minute causes which brought the wasp or the adder to that particular spot; nor would the general laws of instinct guiding those vermin suffice to conduct them unerringly to the very place where their operation was wanted. There have been persons who have lost their lives by a gun presented against them in play, without knowing of its being loaded, and perhaps after having tried twenty times in vain to let it off; others have been saved by a pistol flashing in the pan: here the little particles of rust or damps among the powder must be exactly adjusted to make it take effect at the destined instant and not before. What is it marks out the paths of bullets flying about in an engagement? the strength of the powder, the manner of making up the charge, its being closer or looser rammed; and a hair's breadth difference of position in the muzzle from whence they were discharged, will cause them to miss or to destroy: which little difference may arise from inequalities of ground the soldier stands upon, from the manner of his tread, the stiffness of his clothes, or what he has eaten or drank a little before. Therefore all these minute circumstances cannot be neglected, even if we will suppose God only to determine how many shall fall in battle that day, but not to care whether John or Thomas make one of the number. How many have come to their ends by sudden quarrels owing to an inadvertent word, a slip of the tongue, or an expression misunderstood? What havoc and devastation do fires make, occasioned by a single act of forgetfulness or heedlessness?

Nor is the condition of men's lives less under the power of slight causes than the issues of them: the behaviour and diet of a fantastic woman cannot but influence the constitution and temperament of the child she bears: the giddy carelessness of a nurse may bring on maims, fractures, or diseases, which can never be cured. And how much soever we may fancy the number of such accidents regulated by general laws, yet it can never be ascertained upon whom the mischief shall fall, without attending to the fancies and other trifling causes concurring to each of them. It can scarce be doubted that the tenor of every man's conduct and fortune depends very much upon the situation whereinto he was thrown at his birth, the natural endowments and dispositions wherewith he was born, or that these depend as much upon the persons who gave him birth, as theirs did upon those from whom they sprung: so that he might either not have been born at all, or have run a very different course of life, had his parents, or his parents' parents, been otherwise matched. But who can help observing what trivial causes, what turns of humour, whim, and fancy, sometimes bring people together? an accidental meeting, a ball, or an entertainment, may begin the acquaintance, a lucky dress, a handsome compliment, or a lively expression, first engage the notice, or an officious old woman drop a word that shall give the preference. Nor do the consequences of such fortuitous engagements always terminate in the parties or their children, or children's children, but may spread wide among the human species: for they may beget a Genius who shall invent a new art, or improve some useful science, or produce peculiar talents fitted to make a politician or a general, who shall influence the fate of nations. Perhaps the Roman commonwealth might have subsisted longer, or the empire been established in another family, if Cæsar's grandmother had worn a different coloured ribbon upon such a certain festival.

Thus we see the scheme of great events can never be so surely laid but that they may be defeated by little accidents, unless these likewise be taken into the plan. And whoever will take pains to contemplate the whole con-

currence of causes contributing to govern the weightiest affairs of mankind, will find many inconsiderable ones among them, these again depending upon others as minute, and so growing still more numerous and complicated the further he goes backward, until perhaps at last he be ready to believe with Plato that the whole world is one tissue of causes and effects, wherein, nearly or remotely, everything has an influence upon everything. From hence we may conclude, not only that the young ravens are fed, and the lilies of the field arrayed in the glory of Solomon, by the Divine provision, but that of two sparrows which are sold for a farthing, not one of them falleth to the ground, not a hair is lost out of the number upon our heads, not an atom stirs throughout the material world, nor a fancy starts up in the imagination of any animal, without the permission or appointment of our Heavenly Father.

9. Having satisfied ourselves, as well from reason as observation of the facts we experience, that the smallest no less than the greatest events lie under the particular direction of Divine Providence, it remains to inquire to what kind of Providence we shall ascribe them: for there are two sorts, a disposing and interposing Providence. For though no Theist can doubt that God upon the creation so disposed his elements and other parts of nature, as that they should bring forth those productions and those changes in the affairs of mankind which he in his wisdom thought proper to ordain, yet there are many very pious persons who conceive that the causes of particular events were not provided in the original plan, but that his Providence continually watches over all his works, that by his secret energy from time to time he alters the motions of corporeal particles, governs the ideas of animals, and turns the thoughts of men, to work out his intended purposes. Now without denying that the case may be so, let us consider whether it necessarily must be so.

The art of man can make a clock that shall strike the hours, point out the minutes, and perform other more curious movements in their proper order, according to the extent of the works: he may set up this clock in his house for the direction of his family, to give them notice when to go about their particular employments; and thus may lay a plan containing the motions of mechanism and actions of free agents. But this plan will be very narrow and imperfect; the clock will want winding up or fall out of repair, his servants will not always obey orders punctually, nor his family be always ready at the appointed hour. For he must frame his work of such materials as he can get; the weather and other external causes will affect it, and the persons he intends to be directed by it will have schemes and humours of their own which he cannot foresee nor control. But the Universe having nothing external which might interfere with the play of its wheels, being composed of materials prepared by the Divine Artist with such powers and properties as he pleased to assign them, if it contained matter alone we might easily apprehend how it might go on like an immense clock, performing regularly and exactly all the movements projected. Yet when we reflect on the inertness of matter, and how much motion is consumed continually by the collision and pressure of bodies, it will appear evident that this clock could not go on for ever without winding up from time to time. Nevertheless, the experience we have of our own activity in moving our limbs, may persuade us it is not impossible that God may have given his spiritual substance sufficient power to repair the constant decays of motion, and keep the material clock work regularly wound up. Then again when we reflect that the action of this substance is alike certain with

that of body, having found it to depend either upon the disposition given it upon creation, or the ideas exhibited by modifications of matter thrown into them by the operations of other matter, or the acts of free agents determined likewise by the same two causes, we must acknowledge this action equally capable with the impulses of matter of being comprised within the original plan.

And that it might actually be so comprised, the infinitude of the Divine intelligence, to which an infinite multitude of objects cannot appear perplexing or intricate, leaves no room to doubt: neither that all events as well minute as important happening either among body or spirit, may have followed in a continued succession of effects and causes from the operation of the Almighty upon them at the creation. If we go on to inquire when this operation was performed, we can set no limits to the time. Was it ten thousand years ago? God was omnipotent, good, and gracious, to disperse happiness and manifest his glory among his creatures before that period. Was it a million of years? Neither then had the Divine Attributes their beginning, but were unchangeable and eternal: the same power, and the same immutable Will to exert it, having subsisted for ever. Therefore there is no absurdity in imagining that the act of God might have been completed an eternity ago, that he has ever since rested from his works, and all things have gone on by second causes in the order of succession established from everlasting.

10. On the other hand, an inactive Deity, doing nothing for many ages past besides contemplating the play of his works, seems repugnant to our idea of perfection, as that includes omnipotence and an absolute command over the creatures; which we cannot well apprehend without an actual operation upon them to govern and direct their motions: for power never exerted does to our thinking scarce deserve the name of power. And though we cannot suppose otherwise than that God is completely happy in himself, nor wants amusements to pass his time agreeably as we do: yet neither is it incongruous with our notions of him to whom nothing is labour or trouble, that he should not have dispatched his work once for all to solace himself ever after in quiet and repose, but should have reserved himself something still to do wherein he might find continual employment for his almighty power. Nor does this supposition derogate from his infinite wisdom, because it does not represent him as making the world imperfect out of necessity, for want of skill or ability to frame one which should run on forever without correcting, but by choice, because he so enlarged his plan as to take in, not only the motions of matter, and actions of sentient and intelligent creatures, but likewise his own immediate acts; which we may say were contained among the list of second causes, second not to any prior agent which might give them force or direction, but to the first determination of his Will, and to the plan or order of succession he laid down from everlasting. Thus we see the doctrine of an interposing Providence, or none, equally tenable in theory, and therefore remains a question proper to be determined by evidence of facts and contemplation of nature.

11. Now to consider first the nature of intelligent creatures, to whom a just apprehension of their dependence upon their Maker is necessary to preserve them in a happy tenor of mind, and to regulate their conduct with respect to one another: if we should imagine God abstaining from all action ever since his creation of all things, though we might still adore his excellencies and acknowledge his power, we should apprehend his power already executed and ourselves as having no further concern therewith; we

should look upon him as having abandoned us to the operation of second causes, and that upon them only we need fix our attention; we might be apt to live as without a God in the world, esteeming it matter of mere speculation whether the course of nature proceeded originally from him or no. For this reason in a former place I have represented God under two characters: the Creator dwells in unaccessible light whereto we cannot draw near, remaining there the distant object of our adoration only; but it is the Governor of the world on whom our hope and dependence rests, to his interposing Providence we look up for succour in our distresses, for a blessing upon our endeavours, for a happy turn to our thoughts, and the course of outward accidents so as that they may operate to our benefit: but without some interposition God would be utterly lost to us in his character of Governor. And though we have reason to believe there are other understandings larger than our own, we cannot conceive any who might not be liable to forget there is a power above them, if they never knew a single instance of its having operated among them. Since then God has so constituted his intelligent creatures as that some interposition of his power is requisite to manifest itself to their observation, we may presume that he has accommodated their capacities to his own manner of proceeding, and that he does sometimes interpose; for else he would have given them other faculties capable of entertaining a just sense of his Almighty power and dominion without it.

12. In the next place let us cast our eye upon the form of this earth we inhabit, which we find tending nearer and nearer every year to a smooth surface by the higher grounds washing into the sea. I do not pretend to say whether it will ever become a perfect level, nor that there may not be some rocky parts which no weather can dissolve, or gravelly soils which no rains can drive along; but I do say that if the earth had been eternal, all that was capable of being removed must have been gone long before this time, nor could there have been any mud left to foul our rivers, but they must have run pure as a limpid fountain bubbling from the ground. What quantities of soil stop up the channels of the Nile! Had the causes which brought them hither been always at work, why were they not driven down before the Phœnician times, when the seven mouths were all navigable? And now they are there, what powers in nature can we discover or even conjecture, that shall carry them back again to the mountains of Ethiopia from whence they came.

Then to turn our thoughts from the face of this globe to its annual course round the Sun and that of the other planets, Sir Isaac Newton assures us that the ether through which they pass, makes some though a small resistance against their progress: this resistance, small as it is, must by degrees render their orbits more and more eccentric, and consequently contract their shorter diameters. Let us suppose this contraction to be no more than one inch in a year, yet when we consider what an inexhaustible fund of years lies within the compass of eternity, if they had moved forever they must have lost inches enow long ago to reduce them, first to the condition of Comets, and afterwards to throw them into the Sun; from whence we know of no power in nature that could ever get them out again. We may fancy explosions in the Sun which may cast up huge masses from his body as big as our earth, but then if thrown directly upwards they would fall down again as soon as the impulse of the stroke was spent, like a stone tossed up with one's hand: or if thrown obliquely they might then make one giration in a long ellipsis, which would bring them back to the spot from whence

they set out. For a rectilinear or elliptical motion can never be brought into a circular without a tangential impulse received at the instant when the body comes into the circle wherein it is to move; but what force or what cause shall give it this tangential impulse we shall hunt for in vain throughout all the stores of nature. Since then we find that earths and vortices were not eternal, nor yet could be produced by any laws of matter, we must conclude that the divine power interposed, if never else, at least in their formation.

13. Perhaps somebody may urge against me my own hypothesis of the mundane soul, to whom I have ascribed power to assort the corpuscles of matter into any combinations, and thereout to form vortices, earths, plants, insects, brutes, and men, and to render the animal organizations sentient by infusing into them particles of its own substance. But let it be remembered that I have all along disclaimed the use of hypothesis in proof of any doctrine, as believing it too weak a foundation to support a superstructure alone, and proper only for illustration of truths already founded upon some more solid bottom. Nevertheless, if anybody will apply my hypothesis to the present subject, let him take the whole of it entire: for as a complainant in Chancery, who would avail himself of the facts discovered in an answer, must take them all together as set forth and not pick out those only which suit his purpose, so in arguing from an hypothesis, it is unfair to proceed upon a part of it separated from the rest. Now how much soever I have supposed the ministry of the mundane soul employed in the generation of worlds, I have never supposed him to enter upon the task without an express command and particular plan exhibited to him from above. I have assigned the material world for the sensory of the mundane soul, presenting ideas thereto by the various modifications of its parts, as our human sensories present ideas to us by the modifications of our organs: and these modifications are made to change partly by the workings of our corporeal mechanism and partly by our own voluntary operation. For we find thoughts start up in our minds spontaneously, and others we call up ourselves by recollection and study; many of those arising mechanically intrude upon us against our will, and against our utmost endeavours to keep them out. But the mundane soul being intimately present throughout all the parts of his immense body and having an absolute command over it, will in the ordinary course of his proceedings suffer no modifications to form nor ideas to appear contrary to his liking, nor can any happen unless by his own act or by the mutual impulses of matter consequent upon the motions he gave it. Nevertheless, upon extraordinary occasions when some great work is to be entered upon, he will find modifications in his sensory which he did not produce by his own action, nor were produced by the necessary laws of matter and motion: these then he will ascribe to an immediate operation of the Almighty, as well knowing there are no more than two active powers in nature, God and himself.

If we reflect further upon what has been observed a few pages before concerning the multitude of second causes influencing the affairs of this world, and how intricately they lie involved and complicated among one another, we shall be apt to believe them too much for the mundane soul to manage, whose understanding, although prodigiously large, is not infinite; and shall judge it more likely that he should want direction from time to time for conducting them, than that he should not want the like for the formation of a new world and calculation of all events and consequences to result from the combinations and motions he produces therein. These ma-

nifestations and directions may be looked upon as revelations of the Will of God, and of the measures which Divine Wisdom judges proper for executing his purposes; wherein the mundane soul will not be liable to the mistakes too frequently fallen into by mortals, who take their own fancies and the vapours arising mechanically in their brain for divine illuminations; but he having a perfect knowledge of all his own motions, will be able to judge unerringly what are truly such, and what owing to the act of some other agent. Thus this first of created Beings having manifestations of the divine Will and designs from time to time, cannot want evidence of a governing and interposing Providence: and though we have not the like manifestations, yet the phenomena which we know cannot have proceeded from an eternal chain of natural causes, are an evidence to us that God has interposed since his original creation; and whether we apprehend him to have done this with his own hand, or by his minister particularly instructed for that purpose, either opinion sufficiently attended to, will keep alive in us just sentiments of his being our Governor and the supreme disposer of events.

14. But how rare or how frequent soever we may imagine these interpositions, we always find the agency of second causes employed in bringing forth the destined effect. Not that the method of immediate operation could not have been taken, for whoever acknowledges the power and omnipresence of God must admit that he might have created his substances perishable, so as to have needed his continual support to uphold them in Being and actuate all their motions, as Bishop Beveridge and Dean Sherlock have supposed: or that he might have given his sentient creatures their portion of happiness without the intervention of matter or space, by exciting in them a succession of perceptions, in the manner Bishop Berkley has imagined: but experience supplies us with no ground to believe he has pursued either of these methods. We see our pains and our pleasures brought upon us by the impulses of matter or dealings of our fellow-creatures, and in every dispensation there is a chain of natural causes lying between the divine act and event produced thereby. The most zealous favourer of interposition will scarce maintain that, when a man is to be destroyed by a wasp in his beer, the cup was placed in the window, or the casement thrown open, or the wasp driven thither by a supernatural force, or the insect rendered invisible that the person might not discern his danger: but at most will suppose a secret energy influencing the fancies of the careless servant who set down the liquor, or the man who snatches it up, and the senses of the little animal, so as that they should all co-operate towards the destined event. Thus in every act of interposing there is a disposing Providence too, containing a plan of the operations that shall infallibly follow upon the impulses given to the causes set at work.

It is this manner of proceeding by second causes that opens the door to our deliberations and measures of conduct: for we cannot penetrate into the secret purposes of God, nor know when or what immediate acts he will perform, neither can we learn any more of the scheme of his Providence than what may be gathered from observation of the natural causes that are in act. Therefore it behoves us to investigate those causes as far as we have ability and opportunity for so doing, because from them only we can attain any knowledge of the divine economy, which whenever we can discover it will prove an unerring guide to our proceedings. The neglect of this duty, and inobservance of second causes, throws men into all the delu-

sions of superstition and enthusiasm: for while they imagine the divine power exerted upon every particular occasion, they overlook those rules of prudence which God has given for their direction: they deem it unnecessary even to think for themselves, expecting an especial guidance for everything they are to do: which lays them open to the deceit of illuminations, dreams, omens, prodigies, and such like trumpery. On the other hand, a too close attachment to second causes is apt to generate profaneness, making men forget the First, and substitute an undesigning change or blind fatality in the room of it. But this can never happen provided they bear in mind that, how far soever they may trace the chain, they must rest it in the divine operation at last, which whenever exerted they will find accompanied with a disposing Providence directing it in such manner as to produce the whole series of events to follow thereupon. And the longer the chain, the greater number and intricacy of causes and effects it must contain, and the larger must be that plan of disposition which gave beginning to it. Therefore the more a man thinks, he will discover natural causes lying still further and further behind one another: he will find his idea of interposing Providence gradually diminish, and that of the disposing proportionably increase.

Therefore let not men condemn one another too hastily of impiety or superstition, for both are relative to the strength of each person's sight: the philosopher may entertain so high an opinion of infinite wisdom, as that upon the formation of a world it might provide for every event that is to happen during the whole period of its continuance; therefore he is not impious in asserting that all things since have gone on in the course of natural causes, for his idea of the first plan is so full as to leave no room for anything to be interposed. This the plain man cannot comprehend, the lines of his view being short, therefore he is not superstitious in imagining frequent interpositions, because without them he cannot understand a Providence at all. He may likewise find it impossible to conceive that every motion of matter and turn of volition should be calculated or foreseen, but supposes a watchful Providence continually attentive to the tendency of second causes, interposing every day and every hour of the day to correct the errors of chance, and secretly turning the springs of action the way that wisdom and goodness recommend. And he is excusable herein, if this be the best conception he can form; for it derogates not from his idea of the divine wisdom and dominion to imagine there should be room left in nature for chance, so long as there is a superintending power who can foresee the irregularities of chance time enough to prevent them.

15. Thus how largely soever we may ascribe to interposition, or how much soever deduct therefrom to add to the disposing Providence, we cannot deny that every natural cause we see is an effect of some prior cause, impulse of impulse, and volition of motives and ideas suggested to the mind; therefore must refer all dispensations ultimately to the act of God: and as we cannot imagine him to act without knowing what he does and what will result therefrom, we must conclude that act to proceed upon a plan and disposition of the causes tending to produce the particular consequences following thereupon. The only difference between the man of common sense and the studious is concerning the time when the disposition was made, which the one thinks a few days or a few minutes, the other many ages ago, the one frequent and occasional, the other rare and universal; but both acknowledge that nothing ever happens without the permission or appointment of our Almighty and ever-vigilant Governor.

Since then there was a disposition made at some time or other of the causes concurring to produce every event, let us try whether we can gather any probable knowledge of the motives inducing to such disposition: for we cannot conceive a voluntary agent providing for the completion of any work without some design in view, which is the motive urging him thereto. But we cannot behold God as he is, nor apprehend his manner of proceeding any otherwise than by analogy with our own; we being the only intelligent Beings of whom we have any direct knowledge or experience.

Now it has been shown that our motives may be distributed into four classes, pleasure, use, honour, and necessity: these then we must ascribe to God, though with some alteration suitable to the difference between his nature and our own. With us pleasure or satisfaction stands at the end of every line in our views, it is that renders it the object of our desire, and urges us to pursue it: we perform all our actions, whether considerate or inadvertent, because we judge or fancy that we shall put ourselves into a better condition, or gain greater complacence of mind, by doing than omitting them. But pleasure in this sense we cannot with any colour of reason assign as a motive with God, whose happiness we conceive essential and invariable, so that nothing can be done either to enhance or diminish it; neither did he perform any act whether of creation or government to procure a moment's enjoyment for himself. We can descry no further point in the views of God than the goodness of his sentient creatures, whom he created capable of happiness, and showers down his blessings upon them, of his mere bounty and goodness, without any obligation engaging or benefit of his own inviting him thereto. But in our ordinary discourses concerning actions whereof we cannot discern the motive, we usually ascribe them to pleasure, and so we say God was pleased to create a world and fill it with good, thus pleasure seems again to stand at the end of the line: but then it does not carry the same signification as when applied to ourselves; it is only a vague term, employed for want of a more adequate, to express that pure bounty which we conceive flowing spontaneously underived from any higher source. Nevertheless, there may be some other Attribute giving birth to goodness, although we cannot conceive it: at least this much we must allow, that there are methods of proceeding taken which require some other inducement to the choice of them.

Nobody can doubt, as we have observed before, that God might have given his creatures their portion of happiness by his own immediate act, without that complicated tissue of second causes and extensive system of Providence through which it is conveyed to them; and I believe few will imagine him so confined to the present constitution of nature as that he could not have contrived some other equally productive of good and enjoyment. But goodness respects only the happiness imparted, nor casts a preference between the several means by which the same quantity may be conveyed: when a rich man sends money to relieve a person in distress, it is kindness which prompts him to the deed, but this directs not whether to send it in notes, or Portugal pieces, or English coin, whether by the steward, or the butler, or the groom; for if each species be equally convenient, and all the servants equally trusty, kindness is satisfied with any of them alike; therefore he must have some other motive to determine his choice among them. Thus that we receive blessings at the hand of God is owing to his goodness, but that he chooses this or that method of communicating them, must arise from some other cause: for we cannot suppose

him to proceed without some reason as well for the manner as the substance of his proceeding, which reason we shall try to penetrate in vain, therefore can refer it only to his good pleasure, the term we use for expressing every principle of action whereof we cannot discern the grounds.

16. Nevertheless, since God has been pleased to pursue this method of transmitting happiness to us through certain mediums, this gives rise to the next class of motives, those of use: for there being many materials and instruments without which we could not attain the portion of goodness designed for us, the provisions made for preparing them to our hand must be deemed as having respect to their usefulness. Not but that the divine views are large and piercing, nor ever terminate upon an intermediate point, but look forward to the particular uses which everything was intended to serve: but our views being short, incapable of stretching always to our ultimate end, but resting upon certain stages seeming to lie in the way towards it (for we bestir ourselves lustily in accumulating useful things, without knowing what we shall do with them, or whether any benefit shall accrue to us therefrom); therefore we are excusable in conceiving of the divine proceedings after a manner suitable to our imagination, that is, by piecemeal. For we cannot follow them to that crop of particular enjoyments they were calculated to produce, but must stop at the materials prepared, which we apprehend serviceable in general to our conveniences and uses. Thus when we consider the multitude of various plants with which God has clothed the earth, we regard the admirable contrivance of their fibres and vessels, and several parts as designed for the uses of the whole, to nourish it, to promote its growth, and cause it to yield fruit; and the curious structure of the seed as calculated to produce a plant of its own kind. But many seeds perish without producing anything, many vegetables tend to the benefit of no living creature we know of, and where we do behold a man receiving benefit or pleasure from them, we apprehend him applying to his own wants what was provided for the general service. In all these cases we discern a wisdom adapting the means proper to each production, the perfecting whereof is the use of those means; and as we sometimes cannot, and generally do not, carry our thoughts further than that end, we must apprehend use to be the motive in disposing such causes as bring forth the productions of nature.

17. God has given some of his creatures a capacity of knowing himself, of contemplating his works and adoring his power, his wisdom, his goodness, and mercy; and he has so ordered his courses of nature and Providence as to display those excellencies evidently to the considerate mind: therefore that disposition whereby things were so ordered, we must believe made with a view to the manifestation of his glory. Thus glory bears a considerable share among the motives influencing the divine operation. Yet we cannot well imagine glory the ultimate end, for this would imply a want of something external to complete the happiness of God, whose satisfaction might be augmented by becoming the object of adoration to his creatures: besides, it may be presumed there would be higher capacities and stronger manifestations among them than we find by experience. But he has so constituted his intelligent Beings that glorifying and entertaining just sentiments of him contributes more than anything to fill them with satisfaction of mind, to ennoble their views, brighten their prospects, and inspire them with a readiness to promote one another's benefit: therefore is he jealous of his glory as being a principal channel through which he conveys his blessings to them. If we go to examine why he made this a channel of his bounty, why man alone of all the visible creation is capable of partaking of

the stream, why he gave us such and no higher capacities, such and not more glaring evidences of his glory than we have, we can resolve this into nothing else besides that general cause which takes in every unknown principle of action, his good pleasure. It has been already shown in the proper place how in our own minds use grows out of pleasure, and honour out of use; for we are led to desire things useful by their tendency to serve our conveniences and pleasures, and to cultivate a principle of honour by experience of its usefulness to carry us through noble and arduous undertakings: but because we cannot carry our views to the last consequences of our proceedings, therefore we rest them upon use or honour as motives of action distinct from pleasure. In like manner when we contemplate the designs of Providence, good or happiness of the creatures is the furthest point we can imagine: the all-seeing eye of God looks always to this, or perhaps beyond, but our eye, not always able to reach so far, must necessarily terminate sometimes upon use or glory, further than which we cannot discern a connection. And by observing carefully the methods taken to bring forth these purposes, we may gradually improve our sense and knowledge of the economy of Providence.

18. The fourth class of motives, that of necessity, arises from evil, which we cannot suppose either man willingly to undergo, or God to inflict, without a view to some greater good which could not otherwise be obtained: neither is it ever sent from the fountain of goodness unless as a necessary means to accomplish some gracious purpose. But this necessity was not imposed by anything external, or by an independent nature of things absolutely eternal and unalterable, for this would destroy the unity of the First Cause, but by the Will of God upon his original constitution of them at the creation. It were in vain to search for the motives of that Will, for we know very little of him in his character of Creator, nor can pretend to account for his proceedings: not that we may therefore pronounce them unaccountable or arbitrary, but ought rather to believe them grounded on substantial reasons to us inscrutable, as being drawn from Attributes whereof we have not the least knowledge or conception. Yet we may gather from observation of what we see, that he has established certain laws which he has rendered unalterable, having confirmed them as it were with an oath or covenant binding even upon himself in his government of the world. Among these we may reckon the evil sprinkled over his works, which is so interwoven among the good that one cannot be had without the other. It is said that offences must needs come: now nobody can doubt the Divine power could have prevented them, but then the good which was to be worked out of them must have been lost. It is said likewise that God chastises those whom he favours most, and tries them with sufferings and afflictions as gold is tried in the fire: but then that purity which is the result of the trial would not have been attained without it. And though punishment be commonly understood as having respect only to the past, yet when we consider that a righteous and dispassionate man would never punish unless for sake of some benefit redounding to the public greater than the hurt brought upon the offender, we shall scarce imagine otherwise of God with whom is mercy as well as justice. Therefore whatever evil we find among the dispensations of Providence, we may conclude thrown thereinto upon a motive of necessity, a necessity which God in his Character of Creator has imposed upon himself in his character of Governor, by having constituted his sentient creatures in such manner as that happiness cannot be conveyed to them completely unless through the road of pain and uneasiness either in

themselves or others. And necessity, considered as a motive, always implies some advantage beyond; for we never deem it necessary to submit to anything against our liking but for procuring some benefit or preventing some more grievous mischief; nor can we conceive but that the like view renders necessity a motive with the disposer of all events. Wherefore we may look upon the evils dispersed among mankind, the helplessness of infancy, infirmities of age, the pains, diseases, distresses, afflictions, labours, and those inconveniences of life which we do not find turning to our account here, as necessary preparations for our better living hereafter, or productive of advantage somehow or other to higher species of Beings.

19. For there being one Creator and one Governor of the universe, it can scarce be doubted that there is one plan of government extending throughout the boundless dominion, and regulating the interests of all the sentient creatures inhabiting therein. In what manner those of the invisible regions stand affected by events befalling here below, it would be a vain attempt for us to particularize; but that there is a mutual connection of interests between them and the visible, we have found abundant reason in the course of this work to believe. Wherefore those phenomena which Lucretius calls the faults of nature, wherewith he says she so largely abounds, instead of proving that the world was not made in wisdom and goodness, may with better reason be looked upon as evidences that our heavenly Father has other children to provide for besides those falling under our cognizance; and that whatever appears wrong, or needless, or wasteful to us, is necessary for their uses. I know that some good people persuade themselves that the courses of nature and fortune are ordered for the best, even with respect to the interests of man here upon earth, nor could be altered in any single point without endamaging his condition in life some way or other; but it would be very hard to make this appear to an unprejudiced observer who has not more zeal than knowledge, or to convince him that infinite wisdom could not have contrived a better world, wherein our days might have passed more comfortably and happily than we find them do; nor need we disturb ourselves at the difficulty. For my part these seeming faults, and the vast profusion of second causes, whereof many serve but little to the uses of man, are so far from being stumbling-blocks to me, that I look upon them as an earnest of our future expectations. We have apparent marks enow of a wisdom displayed in this visible world, to satisfy us that the affairs of men and all nature lie under that guidance: therefore I care not how many instances may be produced wherein the purposes of that wisdom are frustrated or incompletely answered here, because I may reasonably infer from thence that they are fully completed elsewhere. Our continuance here is but for a moment in comparison with the long abode we are to make in the invisible world: therefore there lies our principal concern, and our opinion of its value must be heightened by the cares we observe bestowed upon it by Infinite Wisdom. But since we know that Wisdom does nothing in vain or superfluous, whatever we find superfluous to ourselves, the vast effusion of light, the boundless fields of ether, and many huge masses of matter which scarce afford us a trifling benefit, must be provided for the benefit of those Beings among whom we are to take up our chief residence: of which residence therefore we have reason to think the better, the more errors and superfluities we can find in nature.

20. Nor does animal or rational nature abound less in errors than the material; the foolish Ostrich drops her eggs upon the sand, where many of them grow addle and perish; the simple sheep licks up the autumnal dews

hanging upon her pasture which gives a rot to her flesh; the heedless fly observes not the cobwebs which entangle her in destruction. Birds, beasts, and insects overpower, ensnare, and lie in wait to prey upon one another: and it is necessary they should do so to keep their numbers within bounds, for nature produces more of every species than she is able to maintain. Then to turn our thoughts upon imperial man who boasts his being the lord of this sublunary kingdom, observe how he runs himself continually into vexation, disappointment, and mischief, by his folly and indiscretion: dangers hang over him which he cannot discern, measures escape him which would conduce most effectually to his purposes; if he consults his reason he finds it dark, doubtful, and erroneous, nor knows he half the tendency of his proceedings in matters most nearly concerning him; for prudence covers her face from him as with a veil, and truth hides herself at the bottom of the well. The honest-hearted labour under sickness, distress, weakness, and ignorance, so that they want ability to the good they desire: the wicked possess riches, power, strength, and sagacity, which they employ wholly in trifles or turn to the detriment of their fellow-creatures. Now will any body pretend, or does he think it for the divine glory to assert, that infinite wisdom could not have given his animals a completer instinct to warn them against everything tending to their damage, could not have formed those of the carnivorous kind so as that they might have been nourished by vegetables, nor have adapted his causes of generation to the provisions made for their sustenance, nor have given man a more piercing understanding to penetrate thoroughly into his truest interests, nor have dispensed his talents where they would have been most useful. If then we acknowledge these things ordered by a wise and beneficent Providence, yet that they do not answer the purposes of beneficence in this visible world, we must needs conclude them calculated for some benefit to the invisible: and in this light we may regard them as beneficial to ourselves, we having a concern in provisions beneficial to that community whereof we hope one day to be members. These considerations I think may persuade us that the departed spirits do not reside in empty spaces wholly detached from the material universe, whereof they remain mere spectators only, spending their eternity in hymns expressive of their admiration, or at most praying for us now and then to the throne of glory: but that this mighty fabric we inhabit, together with the transactions and events among men and animals, serve to some uses of theirs, and furnish them with employment for exerting their activity in obedience to the Will of God. Surely this idea is not unworthy the Majesty of our almighty and omniscient Governor: an idea which binds together heaven and earth, the host of separate spirits, the distant stars, the numberless planets, the elements of nature, the race of men, the brutes, the reptiles, the grains of sand, the particles of air and ether, in one all-comprehensive plan; wherein nothing stands alone, but all the parts connect with one another and all the springs contribute to the workings of all the rest.

21. We know not indeed how to trace out the connection, nor scarce to conjecture in what particular manner our little transactions, our pleasures and pains, affect the higher classes of Beings, nor yet is it needful that we should: for God knows how to direct the actions of inferior creatures to more distant and important purposes than they are aware of, and gives to every one the senses sufficient to guide it in acting the part he designed it to perform. The bee, when she lays in her honey, thinks nothing of the services it may prove of to man; the silk-worm spins her thread without

regard to the fine brocades and tissues that he will weave out of it: the horse pushes on before the plough to secure himself from the lash, nor has any conception of his preparing the ground to bear oats for himself or wheat for his master: in like manner our reason presents us with short aims and scanty prospects, but God has instructed this guide to mark out the stages leading to remote purposes of his own. Let us then make the best use of reason's candle, for though it cast light only on a few steps just before us, we may trust his Providence for having laid out the path to what length he thinks proper: and while we pursue our own little interests prudently, we shall without knowing it promote some advantage of other beings to whose uses he has been pleased to make us instrumental.

22. Our view of Providence must be partial and imperfect at best, wherefore much of the wisdom of God will appear foolishness to man; and so does wisdom always appear to such as have not capacity to discern the justness of her measures, nor the ends for which they were pursued: but the more attentively we observe the luminous tracts, we shall find them spread further and further into the dark and exceptionable: and they will quickly open before us an ample field for contemplation. For we may discover wheel within wheel, trace an admirable connection between many of them, discern an exact adjustment of them with each other, and perceive one contrived to serve various purposes.

It were needless for me to undertake what has been better executed by others before me, I mean, to particularize the phenomena wherein there appear footsteps of wisdom striking to the eye or easily discernible with a little attention; such as the apportionment of the elements, the form of this terraqueous globe, the variety of soils and fossils, the distribution of rivers, the curious structure of seeds and plants, their different qualities adapted respectively to the uses and conveniencies of living creatures; the wonderful machinery of animals containing within a small compass innumerable works severally performing the offices of nutrition, growth, circulation, and instrumentality of action, yet so dexterously laid together that the voluntary motions do not interrupt the mechanical; the degrees of sense and instinct given to the brute creation, sufficient to direct them in providing nests, in choosing proper food and harbouring places, but not sufficient to protect them against the assaults of other creatures who live by their destruction; the strength, sagacity, and docility which render them serviceable to man, the parts or excrescences of their bodies applicable to his uses, the honey, the wax, the silk, the oak-galls, and other works of their industry, which supply him with materials of commerce and accommodations of life.

As to the two faculties of the mind, enabling her to receive such an infinite variety of perceptions, and to exert her action upon any of the particles lying within the sphere of her presence exclusive of the rest, these are rather evidences of almighty power than of wisdom, as being primary properties given to her with her existence by an immediate act, and so requiring no disposition of causes to produce them. But when we reflect on the human sensory, the immediate object of all her perceptions and subject of her volition, we must acknowledge an admirable contrivance there. Whether this sensory be the pineal gland, the anterior ventricles, the centre of the ethereal cobweb, or whatever else we may imagine, it is evident from anatomy that the chamber of her residence is extremely small: yet within this little chamber, what multitudes of images hang round! Sensations, reflections, combinations, comparisons, distinctions,

judgments, vocabularies of language, forms of expression, figures of speech, remembrance of facts, faces of our acquaintance, fashion of things familiar to us, knowledge of common life, professions, arts, sciences, abstractions, rules of morality, measures of prudence, passions, desires, imaginations, all within this narrow compass, yet all so nicely disposed as not to cover or obscure one another. Besides these, within the same compass are contained the particles serving for instruments of her activity, connected severally with the other parts of the sensory or nerves of the gross body; and all in such orderly disposition as to lie under command, so that she can move any limb, call up any idea, or pursue any train of thinking she pleases, without mistake or disappointment. A little reflection upon these things may show us, that the mental organization is still more wonderful than the wonderful mechanism of our outward composition. And though it may be, as we have formerly remarked, that all those images do not exist together, (for we never have more than a few ideas in our view at one instant,) but that the same parts of our sensory are thrown into different modifications by the act of the mind, or workings of our animal circulation, and so exhibit successively the several stores of our knowledge as wanted, like a slate which may have written upon it successively all the pages of a large volume: yet when we reflect what multitudes of springs must be requisite to produce these changes of modification, in that orderly manner, and under that command of the mind which we experience, it will rather increase than abate our wonder.

Then if we turn our eyes from the courses of nature to those of fortune and the disposal of events, we may observe how men are cast upon their several professions, schemes of conduct, places of residence and alliances, whereon the colour of their future life depends, by various causes; by their natural temperament, by their education, the company they consort with, and accidents befalling them: how families rise to prosperity, flourish a while, and then wither and fall into oblivion: how kingdoms are formed out of a rude rabble, maintained with various successes and broken to pieces: how sects of Religion start up from small beginnings, possess the minds of the multitude, force princes to obey their injunctions, and in process of time become neglected and exploded.

Nor can we well fail to distinguish a Providence respecting mankind in general, conducting them through the stages of infancy, growth, and maturity, similar to those of human life. We find them living in the earliest ages with great simplicity of manners and narrow compass of knowledge: when nations were formed they scarce had intercourse unless with their next neighbours, the accounts brought them of all the rest were fabulous and romantic: by degrees arts and sciences sprung up among them, and new refinements as well in virtue as vice were the produce of every generation: accidental discoveries by private persons, such as the invention of printing, of gunpowder, of optic glasses, of the magnetic needle, have spread their influence over a great part of the globe: the growing extent of commerce tends to associate the nations with one another, to communicate customs, opinions, and improvements, to connect them in interest, and perhaps in time may unite the world into one community.

Thus we see the comprehensive plan of Providence, which by reason of the narrowness of our capacities we are forced to consider by piecemeal, appears to us containing innumerable under-plans relative to the interests of particular persons, of the families or societies whereof they are members, and of the whole human race: each provided with a disposition of second

causes proper to bring forth the issues intended, and so admirably adjusted together as to coincide instead of interfering with one another. And as we have already shown how much small events may affect the greatest, all this could not be effected surely unless not only the motions of bodies, but the senses of animals, the thoughts and actions of men, were comprehended within the plan.

23. But an objection has been raised of old against the doctrine of all events, as well those depending upon the acts of voluntary agents as upon mechanical causes, being directed either by a disposing or interposing Providence, as leaving no room for liberty of Will, for the justice of reward or punishment, of praise or blame, or for the expedience of consulting upon the measures we are about to take. For why need I deliberate on a Sunday morning whether I shall go to church or to the tavern, if it be contained in the decree of Heaven to which place I shall resort? The Will of God must be fulfilled do what I can to obstruct it, nor would it become me to obstruct it if I were able: therefore I may be careless of my conduct, as well knowing that he has planned out such a course of my actions as shall conduce to the accomplishment of his purpose. Then if everything that shall happen be comprised within the design of Providence, and the causes provided which will unavoidably bring it to pass, what praise or reward do I deserve for taking the better part, what blame or punishment for the worse, since either was an event settled beforehand which I could not turn aside? Again, if it depend upon my choice whether to drink or pray, and one of them be predetermined, there must be causes in act which will infallibly influence my choice one particular way: therefore I have no liberty of Will, no freedom of choice, nor command of my own determinations, and though the success be left to my option, yet the option itself is not left to me to make, but I am confined to that which the causes aforesaid shall dictate.

Nor do these difficulties lie upon the believers of Providence only, but affect equally the atheists of both sorts, whether Stratonics or Epicureans. The former took Necessity for the First Cause, or rather admitted no First Cause at all, but held that all events proceeded by a necessary consequence from the causes concurring to produce them, which causes were produced in like manner by others preceding, and so on in an unbroken chain from all eternity: now whether we suppose this chain upholden by an intelligent Being or self-sustained, it is all one to our present purpose, for in either case if the acts of voluntary agents follow necessarily upon the impulse of external causes, there will be a constant fatality upon them utterly subversive of liberty, estimation, and prudence. Epicurus indeed denied the reality of fate, insisting that many things happened which were absolutely fortuitous: but then he could not get over the argument drawn by his opposers from the certainty of either the affirmative or negative of every proposition that could be uttered concerning what is to come to pass hereafter, which is applicable to the issues of chance as well as those of necessity. If you are to throw a die, how independent soever the cast may be upon prior causes, yet if you say you shall throw an ace and I say that you will not, one of us is certainly in the right: we know not which indeed, but when the die falls we shall know without danger of a mistake. So if Epicurus in his lifetime had said that on this 14th day of January, 1762, it would rain here in the morning and be fair in the afternoon, now the day is ended we may know that he spoke a certain truth: but truth cannot be turned into falsehood by anything subsequent, therefore it was impossible any other weather should

happen than has, because otherwise that might have been rendered false which we know for certain was once true. Neither could the fact contained in a proposition, which was true two thousand years ago, become casual ever afterwards; for if it was always to come to pass, as we know it was from the event, it could never have been possible that it should not come to pass, but what was always impossible could never lie under the power of any cause or option of any agent to have effected.

24. On the other hand, men could never be persuaded out of their liberty, nor prevailed upon to relinquish their claim to the command of their own actions, a privilege they feel themselves possessed of by every day's and every moment's experience: so this has remained a constant topic of debate, both among orthodox and infidels, ever since men began to pursue abstract reasonings and examine into the nature of action. It seems to have been a point too difficult for human reason to clear up, and Milton represents it as above the reach of the fallen angels though superior to man in sagacity and penetration: for he says many of them sat on a hill apart retired, and reasoned high of knowledge, fate, and Will, fixt fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute, and found no end, in wand'ring mazes lost. But though mankind too have continually wandered in these mazes, they have often taken up their quarters for a while in each particular division of them. For it is observable that either side of the question has spread over large territories and among numbers of people, and has become alternately the received opinion of the age. To say nothing of former times, the articles of our Church savour strongly of predestination, which in the next century was exploded, and freewill bore all the sway. The Socinians of those days I think asserted that human actions were unforeseen and contingent even to God himself, and the orthodox attributed his knowledge of them to his being present throughout all futurity rather than to his knowledge of their causes. So his knowledge was not prescience but direct intuition: and lately the other opinion seems to have been creeping in again. Hartley declares expressly for the necessity of action; Berkley ascribes all those objects, appearances, and changes of situation or circumstance, which we conceive the effects of our own conduct, to an immediate operation of the divine power; and Locke had maintained before them, that liberty is as little applicable to the Will as squareness to virtue, or swiftness to sleep. This shows that both have an intrinsic vigour, which, though they may lie overwhelmed for a while by unfavourable accidents, enables them to rise again in their original splendour, from whence it may be presumed that both have some solid foundation in truth and nature: for as Tully observed long ago, time wipes away the inventions of imagination, but confirms the judgments of nature.

And we may remark that the partizans on either side remain safe while they keep within their own trenches, for the arguments proving that every effect must have adequate causes to produce it, that all causes derive their efficacy originally from the act of God, that he does not act without knowing the issues of his proceedings, are invincible: on the other hand, the common transactions of life, the resolves we daily make, and pursue in our conduct, are evidences that we have a choice and command of our actions to every one who will not distrust his senses and his experience, the only basis of all our other knowledge. Wherefore the litigants do not endeavour so much to invalidate one another's arguments as to overpower them with other arguments they think stronger, and the dispute may be drawn into the following syllogisms. An universal Providence disposing all events

without exception, leaves no room for freedom, But there is such a Providence, Therefore no freedom: or on the other side, There is a freedom of Will, Therefore no such Providence. Thus both parties lay down the same Major, without which they would make no scruple to admit the Minor assumed by their antagonists. But the most sober and considerate part of mankind, induced by the strong evidences both of freedom and Providence, have forborne to pronounce them incompatible, the only obstacle against the reception of either: yet look upon their consistency as one of those mysteries which we are forced to admit though we cannot explain. Nevertheless, there have been mysteries in nature which time and industry have unravelled, and as there are some observations we have picked up in the progress of this work which I conceive may loosen some of the knots in this intricate subject, I shall hardly be blamed for making what use I can of them, which I purpose to do in the following chapter.

CHAP. XXVI.

FREEWILL.

Behold us now arrived at the most intricate part of our journey, an impracticable wilderness, puzzled with mazes, and perplexed with errors, where many mighty have fallen, and many sagacious lost their way: for shadows, clouds, and darkness cover it; or what flashes of light break out from time to time, present the image of truth on opposite sides; the winding paths lead round the disappointed traveller to the spot from whence he set out, or involve him in difficulties wherein neither Protestant nor Papist, neither Divine nor Philosopher has yet found an opening, and which the sacred muse of Milton pronounced insuperable, even by the Devil himself.

In this dangerous road we may be allowed, with better reason than the Poets, to call in some superior power to our aid, but what Muse, what Spirit, what God shall we invoke? For here are no private transactions unseen by mortal eye, no dreams of Rhesus broken off by the sleep of death, no secrets of nature lying beyond our reach to be discovered: we need not dive into the bowels of the earth, nor ascend to mix among the dances of the planets, nor dissect the human frame to find all the curious threads of its organization. But our business lies with the common actions of life, familiar to every one's and every day's experience: we want only to know, whether a man may act freely who makes his choice upon motives suggested by external objects, whether he may know beforehand what his neighbour will do, or offer inducements which will infallibly prevail on him to one particular manner of behaviour, without infringing upon his liberty. Questions that one would think could scarce admit of a dispute; nor do they with common understandings, until men of uncommon refinements have, by their abstractions, spun them into a sense not naturally belonging to them, and introduced a confusion into their ideas, by an inaccuracy of language. Therefore upon this subject I conceive we shall have more to do with words than with things, nor find so much difficulty in ascertaining the facts to be taken under consideration, as the proper import of the expressions employed in speaking of them.

Come then, thou solemn power, Philology, pioneer of the abstruser Sciences, to prepare the way for their passage: enwrap me in thy close-

bodied leathern jacket, that I may creep through the brakes and brambles of equivocation without their catching hold of me; lend me thy needle-pointed pencil, that I may trace out the hair-breadth differences of language, assist me with thy microscope to discern the minute changes of ideas passing to and fro among the same words, as they change their places in different phrases.

If any one will follow me while I travel under thy guidance, let him look for other-guised entertainment than when bestriding Pegasus we bounded along the rapid rays of solar or stellar light, to visit the Athenian and Samian Sages, to behold the wonders of the vehicular state, and boundless glories of the mundane soul.

For thou, Goddess, consortest not with the Muses nor the Genii, the flights of imagination affright thee: figure and ornament are thine abhorrence, for they blend together in wanton assemblages those ideas which thou art most solicitous to keep asunder: familiar example alone, of all the flowery train, thou admittest to shed his lustre upon the print of thy mincing feet, and render the marks of them more easily discernible to the straining eye. But industry, and scrupulous exactness, are thy constant companions; labour and vigilance, thy delight; thorns and briars, the favourite plants of thy garden. Whoever undertakes to accompany thee there must prepare himself for toil and attention; he must observe the path exactly in which thou leadest him, mark all the outlets on either hand, pass and repass the whole length again and again before he venture into another turning: that he may fix so perfect an idea of it upon his memory, as never to mistake another similar ally for the same.

But say, Goddess, by what avenue shall we enter the wilderness? Does not thy methodical prudence direct, that upon every question we should first know precisely the terms concerning which the question is proposed? Where then can we better begin an inquiry into the Freedom of Action, than by ascertaining the proper import of freedom?

2. Liberty, says Mr. Locke, is a power, and so is Will; therefore they cannot be predicated of another, for it would be absurd to affirm of a power that it has a power. But with submission to the authority of so great a Master, I conceive Liberty a more complex term than he has made it, and though it includes an idea of power, it contains other ideas beside. And as I apprehend it to be a negative term implying more than a denial of restraint and force; for when we say a man is free, we mean nothing else than that there is no hindrance against his doing or forbearing what he has a mind; therefore it will be expedient to consider how we come by the notion of Restraint or Force.

We find ourselves possessed of several powers of action, we can walk, or speak, or think, or can let them alone: sometimes diseases or other accidents deprive us of our powers, and then we can no longer perform the functions of them; but at other times, though we remain possessed of our powers entire, yet we cannot exert them, by reason of something stronger counteracting them. Thus a man in the stocks has not lost his power of walking, the vigour of his muscles is not abated, nor is he less able to bear the fatigue of a journey on foot than he was before; nevertheless, he cannot walk at all, because the closeness of the wood resists the motion of his legs, therefore he is under a restraint which hinders him from using the power nature has given him. So if he be pushed along by another, stronger than himself, he must move forward whether he will or no; not that he has lost the natural command of his limbs to put them in motion or

keep them at rest, but because he is under a force greater than he can resist.

Thus Restraint is a comparison between some power and an impediment preventing it from performing its proper function, as Force is the like comparison between the power of forbearance, and some external impulse which renders action necessary, but forbearance impracticable; and Liberty denotes the absence of the other two; for when we pronounce a man free, we understand thereby that there is nothing either impelling him to do what he would not, or restraining him from doing what he would. So that all three, Restraint and Force as well as Liberty, include the idea of Power, nor can either of them subsist where there is none; for the bars of a prison are no restraint to a paralytic, nor will you give him liberty by unlocking them, neither can you force a man to fly, or a horse to speak.

We may observe further, that Liberty is so far from being the same with Power, that it may be restored by the loss, and lessened by the accession of it. Were an act of parliament made to prohibit me from going out of London for a twelvemonth, I should think it a grievous restraint upon my liberty; but should I be rendered unable to stir abroad by gout or palsy, or some other complaint which I could not hope to get rid of in the time, the restriction would no longer be such to me, and I should remain as much at liberty, as if the statute had never been made. On the other hand, our clothes are made to fit our bodies, so that we can move all our limbs freely, notwithstanding the many ligatures and coverings wherewith we are enveloped; but should it please God to cause a pair of wings to sprout out from our sides, we should find our clothes a troublesome restraint upon us; and we must send for our tailors to cut slits in them for letting out the wings, in order to restore us that liberty we had lost by the superaddition of a new power.

Hence we see that liberty is so far from being inapplicable to power, that it is properly applicable to nothing else; nor is it an absurd question to ask, whether a power be free, for it implies no more than to inquire how such power stands circumstanced with regard to any force or impediment which might compel or obstruct the exertion of it. And when we apply such questions to the agent, they bear a reference always to some power he possesses, therefore a man may be free and restrained at the same time with respect to different powers of action: for he that is locked fast in a room may be free to think or speak, though he is not to go abroad; but a power to do some particuler act cannot be free while constrained, nor the contrary.

Indeed there are degrees of freedom, not incompatible with a partial restraint, but rather implying it, as when we find some impediment obstructing us, though not so great as that we cannot surmount it; for a man with heavy jack-boots on can still walk, though not so freely and alertly as in a neat pair of shoes; such obstacles do not debar us the use of our powers, but render it difficult and laborious, or limit them in compass.

3. Let us now cast back our eyes upon the path we have trodden, in order to discover what equivocal outlets there may be to mislead the unwary traveller. We get our idea of power, says Mr. Locke, from the changes we see made in substances by one another: therefore the word Power originally and properly denotes a quality or property in something to cause those changes, and is synonymous with ability, and we have hitherto used it in that sense. But it often carries a larger signification, comprehending other circumstances besides ability; so that according to the various lights

wherein we place it, a man may have power when he has it not; that is, he may have it in one sense while he wants it in another.

Suppose a person of full health and vigour bound down in his bed by a multitude of threads wound all over him; another seeing him lie motionless, but not knowing the occasion, fancies him struck with some sudden distemper that has taken away the use of his limbs; he laments his unhappy condition, in being at once deprived of all his powers of action; must not we pronounce this complainant mistaken, for that the man has lost none of his powers, but they all remain entire as ever, though he cannot use them until the strings that tie him down be loosened? If a second person comes into the room who takes the case differently, ascribing the man's inactivity to a fit of laziness with which he upbraids him, shall we not plead in his excuse, that it is no fault of his that he does not rise, for that the bandages hold him down so tight, he has no power to stir either hand or foot?

Thus we see that power may be truly affirmed or denied in the same instance, according to the manner where the question is proposed, or thoughts of the person proposing it: and a man may have ability sufficient for performing a work, which yet he is not able to do, by reason of some obstacle, want of some instrument or material, or other circumstance standing in the way.

We may presume Mr. Locke understood Power in this extensive latitude, when he made it the same with Liberty; for where he observes that a man on the south side of a prison has power to walk northwards, but not southwards, this were not true, if spoken of natural ability: for the same vigour of limbs which might carry him one way, would suffice to carry him any other: therefore if he want power to walk southwards because the walls of the prison obstruct his passage, the term must be so construed as to include liberty; and in this sense it would indeed be as absurd to ask, whether a Power be free, as whether Blueness be blue, or Hardness hard.

4. We may remark further, that Knowledge is often confounded with Power; for ideal causes being requisite to direct us in the choice of proper actions, we can no more proceed without them than we can without ability. If I have a paper in my custody which I have mislaid, upon being urged to produce it instantly, I shall be apt to allege that it is out of my power so to do; not because I have not the key of the drawer where it lies, nor strength in my fingers to take it out as well as any other paper, but because I know not where to look for it. So if a countryman wants to speak with a person living at the further end of the town, he may say it is out of his power to find the house; not that he wants pliancy in his joints to carry him through all the turnings leading thither as well as any citizen, but because he should lose his way for want of knowing the right. But this idea does not enter into disputes concerning freedom, for ignorance is esteemed a defect of power rather than an abridgment of liberty.

It has been shown at p. 22 of this Volume that what we generally call an Action is not one, but a series of many actions; and when we go about to do a thing, we proceed to the accomplishment of it by several intermediate steps, each whereof requires a particular exertion of power to perform it. Now if there stand an impediment anywhere in the way, we cannot do the thing proposed; nevertheless we remain still at liberty to take the steps lying on this side the impediment, and at all events can use our endeavours, how ineffectual soever they may prove. Thus if a man be hindered from going to London by floods out in the road, he may yet go up to the edge

of the flood without obstacle: if he be locked into a room, he may push against the door: and if his fingers be bound round with a packthread, he may try to expand them, being at full liberty to give his muscles the inflation proper for spreading them open.

It is observable likewise, that restraint is often confounded with impotence, nor can we easily avoid doing so: for restraint being a comparison between our powers and anything that might obstruct their exercise, may cease upon their increase, or may be generated by a diminution of our powers, rendering that an obstacle to our motions which was none before. Thus Sampson, after being shorn of his strength, was brought under confinement by the same cords which were no infringement of his liberty aforetime, and if they had remained on him until his hair had grown again, he would have been restored to liberty by the return of his strength, without any alteration in the strength of the bandage.

Therefore we pronounce upon the same case, as being a defect of power or of liberty, according to the light wherein we place it: the laws prohibiting the alienation of church lands are called sometimes disabling, and sometimes restraining statutes; and we speak indifferently of a man being disabled to go abroad or confined at home by a distemper. But in strictness, the beginning of a fever works no disability, for there is generally then an unusual strength and flow of spirits, so that the patient might do as he did at other times, if it were not for the necessary regard to his health, which is a bar against his stirring out of the house; whereas a palsy does not properly confine, for air and exercise might be wholesome, and nothing hinders you from going abroad, but you are not able, the use of your limbs being suspended by the distemper.

Mr. Locke says, that active power belongs only to spirit: however this be, we certainly conceive it, and in our common discourses speak of it as residing in things inanimate; therefore we apply the terms Force and Restraint when we perceive them acting or moving in a manner different to that we should expect from their natural properties, as we do Liberty, when nothing hinders their operations: we talk of a free air, a pendulum swinging, or a river running freely, where there is no obstruction against their motions; of water being forced upwards by an engine, or a stream confined within its channel, by raising the banks.

Hence it appears that the force of inertness ascribed by naturalists to matter, and the force of impulse causing its changes of state from motion or rest to the contrary, does not carry precisely the same signification with force in vulgar language; for it is the impulse of gravitation, together with its own inertness, or perseverance in a motion once received, that makes a torrent rush violently into the sea; yet every common man apprehends water to run downwards of itself, nor ever esteems it under a force, unless when he sees it driven upwards by some other power, nor under restraint, unless when something obstructs the course it would naturally take. And though we talk frequently of the force of a torrent, we do not understand thereby any force the water itself lies under, but that we suppose it able to put upon whatever may happen to stand in its way.

Whoever will examine the language of mankind, may find that we apply expressions to bodies which belong properly to our own manner of proceeding; and how well soever we know the contrary, speak of them as voluntary agents, exercising powers of their own; thus it is said the wind bloweth where it listeth, and we say of water, that it will not mingle with oil, that it will yield to the rarefying action of heat, but will force its way through

the pores of gold rather than bear condensing by the greatest pressure; terms expressive of a choice, compliance, and resolution, similar to those exercised by man.

Nor do the learned abstain from the like catachresis, when they talk of the tendencies and nitencies, the conatus recedendi of bodies, the spontaneous or authentic motions of clock-work, or the laws of matter; and even when they abstract from the secondary properties resulting from composition, they seem to conceive rest as the natural state and choice of body which it exerts its powers to preserve itself in; as one may gather from their calling the momentum or quantity of motion in any body a force, which conveys an idea similar to that of a man carried along against his inclination by some impulse he strives in vain to resist.

5. I take notice of these niceties, not so much for any benefit they may be of towards determining the present question, as for a caution to beware of letting such variations of language lead us astray: for the proper and genuine signification of freedom being the absence of all obstruction which might thwart us in the exercise of any power we possess, we are free when upon employing our power it will take effect, but under restraint, when something impedes us in the exercise of our power, so that although we should exert it, the proper consequence of such exertion would not follow.

Thus a man is at liberty to walk, if upon using his legs they will carry him to the place he purposes; but if there stand any wall or bar in the way, so that with his utmost endeavours he cannot move forwards, then he is not at liberty. And so in all actions we have ability to perform, if they would not ensue upon our efforts, it must be owing to some hindrance which cramps and prevents them from taking effect.

From hence it appears, that Freedom relates to the event of our endeavours, not to the causes of them; for whether any or no inducement prevails on me to walk, I am equally free, provided nothing hinders me from walking if I stand so inclined. For Liberty does not depend upon anything prior to the exercise of my power, but upon what would or would not stand in the way after having exerted it, and therefore is not inconsistent with any antecedent causes or disposition of Providence influencing me to walk; for how much soever they may impel me to go out of the room, I am not at liberty to do it while the door is locked, and when the door is opened I am set at liberty, how much soever they may withhold me from using it.

But it will be said, all this may be very true, and yet affects not the case under consideration, as it relates only to freedom of action concerning which there is no controversy, not to freedom of Will: for no Arminian will doubt a man being debarred of his liberty by shutting him up in a gaol; nor will the most rigid Calvinist deny, that upon being let loose he is at liberty to go which way he pleases. So the dispute turns, not upon our freedom to do as we will, but upon our freedom to choose out of several actions in our power: and both seem to agree, that whatever act is contained in the plan of Providence must be performed, nor can we will the contrary if we would.

6. Before we enter upon the discussion of this question, it will be necessary to understand ourselves in the proposing it; for men seem to me not always very clear in the term Will, as it stands in either branch of the sentence.

We learn upon Mr. Locke's authority, that we are capable of no more

than one determination of the Will at once, and whoever observes the motions of the human mind will find her volitions transient and momentary; she varies her actions perpetually, willing this instant what she rejects the next; and if she perseveres for a time in one purpose, it is by a train of numerically distinct, though similar and correspondent volitions: therefore to ask, whether we can will this present instant, if we will this present instant, would be an idle and trifling question; it must indeed be answered in the affirmative, and so must every other of the like sort; for I can walk if I walk, ride if I ride, or do anything else you can name, if I do it. And such hypothetical affirmations may be true of things which categorically proposed were absolutely impossible: for it is true that I can lift the house if I lift it, or jump over the moon if I jump over it, as that I can take up a pin if I take it up: such propositions are merely identical, making a show of something profound, but adding nothing to our information.

Therefore the question, to mean anything, must relate to different Times or different Wills, and the drift of it be to inquire either, whether by willing a thing now I can cause myself to will it by-and-by; or whether if I happen to will opposite things at the same time, as to buy a costly trinket and to save my money, I can by one Will control the other, or by a third Will choose which of the two shall have the guidance of my conduct.

To the first of these inquiries, one cannot give a direct answer, it being notorious by every day's experience, that we do determine upon what we will do beforehand, and many times do it accordingly, but at other times do it not, and that upon two accounts; either because we have changed our mind, or because, though we continue in the same, we find some desire, or terror, or difficulty, rise upon us too strong for our resolution. But changes of mind create no doubts concerning liberty: for nobody imagines that our resolving upon a thing lays us under a necessity of performing it, although good reasons should occur to the contrary, or our judgment should alter; nor will deny, that how strongly soever I have determined to leave London seven years hence, I may remain perfectly free all the while to determine otherwise whenever I think proper.

Which by the way shows Liberty not incongruous with prior causes; for if I do something because I had resolved upon it beforehand, and this we practise every day of our lives, the volition whereby I perform it must be acknowledged an effect of my former determination, nevertheless will be counted a free act in everybody's estimation, provided nothing hinders but that I might omit it; therefore if my first determination were contained within the plan of Providence, the performance may make a part of that plan without infringement of my liberty. For even supposing me influenced to resolve by some irresistible grace, or supernatural impulse, though I was not free in making, I am yet free in keeping the resolution, nor does there need any more than to keep off all suggestions which might alter my judgment, or temptations which might overpower it, and I shall execute what was resolved on by virtue of the freedom remaining with me.

But when we change our conduct without changing our mind, and do not prosecute what we have in our intention, by reason of some appetite drawing the contrary way, then disputes and difficulties arise; because we conceive our Will still exerting itself, but prevented from taking effect by a superior force or impediment counteracting it, which presents the genuine idea of a want of Liberty.

Thus the question, whether by our present Will we may determine what

we shall will at some future time, becomes reduced into that other, whether one Will may control or confine another co-existent Will.

7. And no wonder we find perplexities in examining metaphysically a question, the terms whereof have no place in the metaphysical vocabulary; for there is a philosophical, and there is a vulgar language, and if studious men will mingle their abstractions among vulgar ideas, they must unavoidably bewilder themselves in mazes and darkness.

The notion of a diversity of Wills is unknown to him that carefully studies the motions of the human mind, for her acts are instantaneous and transitory; nor can she perform any more than one at the same time: we have various powers of action, and they all lie under the command of the mind to turn them upon one particular object; her giving them that turn is properly volition, and it is as absurd to imagine she should exert opposite volitions together, as that the wind should blow east and west.

We may be restrained in the use of our powers, because their operation passes through several stages; we work upon certain unknown nerves, they inflate the muscles, the muscles pull the tendons, the tendons move the limbs, and if there be an obstruction anywhere, we have not liberty to perform the action intended, how much soever we may endeavour it. But the acts of the mind upon the first corporeal fibre receiving her impulse are immediate, so there is no room for any impediment to interfere in stopping their progress: we may indeed imagine her to lose her power by the fibre becoming incapable, or being removed out of her reach; but we have seen that when power is gone, there is no place either for Liberty or Restraint.

Nor let it be asked, whether the mind be free to determine her own acts; for this implies, that one volition is the consequence of another, and so it may be remotely; but we have shown in a former place, that the mind never acts upon herself, unless by the mediation of motives: for there is no one action of our lives which we do not enter upon through some motive of judgment, or inclination, or present fancy; and even if we had an elective power besides our active, how much soever that might determine the latter, it must itself be determined by some satisfaction apprehended in the choice.

But the suggestion of motives to our thoughts is as much an action, as the moving of our limbs, and if anything obstructs their rising, notwithstanding our endeavours to call them up, we may be free or restrained with respect to that action; but in respect to our first endeavours, we are no more capable of either, in one case than the other.

Therefore we may agree with Mr. Locke in pronouncing Liberty as little to Volition, taken in the philosophical sense, as Squareness is to Virtue, or Swiftness to Sleep.

8. But if we listen to the common discourses of mankind, we shall find them speaking of several Wills, several agents, in the same person, resisting, counteracting, overpowering, and controlling one another: hence the so usual expressions of the spiritual and carnal Wills, of the man and of the beast, of self-will and reason, of denying our Wills, subduing our passions, or being enslaved by them, of acting unwillingly or against our Will, and the like. All which take rise from a metonyme of the cause for the effect; for our actions being constantly determined either by the decisions of our judgment, or solicitations of our desires, we mistake them for the Will itself: nor is it a little confirmation of the Will being actuated by motives, to find them so intimately connected therewith that a common eye cannot distinguish them apart.

When in our sober moods we deliberate and afterwards fix upon our measures of conduct, we look upon such determination as our Will, which we conceive not a transient act, but an abiding power, exerting itself from time to time as opportunities offer, until either the design be completed, or fresh reasons prevail on us to alter it.

But it often happens, that some inordinate passion or inveterate habit comes athwart our way, and puts us by from the prosecution of our design, without making us change it: this we likewise regard as our Will, being sensible that what we do by its instigation is still our own act; and because we find the same desire prompting us at different times, we apprehend this too a permanent power lying in us, ready to be exerted upon the proper objects presenting. Thus we get the idea of two Wills, opposing, impeding, restraining, and mastering one another.

Sometimes there ensues a contest between them, the mind hovering uncertain for a while, until at last she settles on either side: hence comes the idea of a third Will, determining between the other two; and I believe this gave rise to the notion of an elective, besides our active power.

But these struggles are owing to the fluctuations of strength in our motives, and the victory to some one of them catching the idea of Satisfaction away from the rest: for it is well known, that motives as well of reason as passion, do not always appear in equal colours, nor press with equal force, but urge vehemently or feebly by turns, with frequent and sudden variations. And we may perceive the like wavering in our coolest deliberations between two measures of conduct or two diversions; wherein the mind cannot be suspected of giving a preference, being disposed all along to follow whichever shall be found the best or most entertaining; but both appear such alternately, until at last the balance of judgment or fancy settles, without intervention of the Will to cast it either way.

9. Nevertheless, men cannot be put out of their accustomed manner of talking and thinking; therefore in compliance with their conceptions, let us suppose a diversity of Wills, that those Wills exert permanent acts, lasting for hours and days without intermission, and that we may will at one time, what we shall will at another. In this light there is certainly room for applying restraint and freedom to the Will; for its operations being now conceived passing through a length of time before they take effect, may be obstructed, or turned aside in their passage by something else: so if I do in the afternoon what I had determined in the morning to forbear, my former Will still continuing the same, I am under a force, and the Will I have at present is a different Will from that remaining with me from the morning's determination, and counteracts it.

But it being obvious that we can exert our power only one way at a time, we are apt to entertain a contradictory notion that, while we have a diversity of Wills within us, one of them only is our own, and esteem each of them such in turn according as we chance to be in the humour. Sometimes it is the Will of inclination, and must be so taken in all expressions relating to self-denial, to curbing our Wills, or to things we do unwillingly, or against our Will, that is, against our liking: but more commonly we understand the determination of our judgment to be our Will, because there are none of us without this Will; for I suppose nobody ever refuses to do what his present judgment represents as best, provided it give him no trouble in the performance, nor thwart any inclination, or fancy whatever; therefore this is a Will always subsisting in us, though not always taking effect.

As to the third Will, that of Election, this takes place only occasionally, when there is a contest between the other two: for as nobody ever chooses to act against his judgment without some inclination drawing him, or uneasiness driving him the other way; so likewise I imagine nobody ever chooses to abstain from doing what he likes, when he sees no reason in the world why he should forbear. When Reason and Inclination urge the same way, or one alone solicits, the other remaining totally silent, which frequently happens, there is but one object presented to the mind, who in that case has no room to make any choice or election at all.

Therefore the Will of Judgment or Resolution, in common propriety of language, is to be esteemed our Will; our freedom depending upon the presence or absence of any impediment which might prevent that from directing our motions: and so St. Paul understood it, where he represents the carnal man as omitting to do the things he would, and doing the things he would not, which he justly styles, a wretched bondage. Nor can that glorious liberty of the Sons of God, which we are exhorted to assert, be better expounded than by an exemption from all inordinate desires and temptations, so that we may perform whatever our reason and duty recommend with ease and readiness.

10. But there is a restraint which our judgment lays upon itself, when an action occurs we judge eligible regarded alone, but cannot be done without omitting something else we judge more expedient, we think ourselves not at liberty to do it. Thus if I am asked to do some little good office for a friend, when some business of importance calls me another way, I shall excuse myself by saying, I would gladly oblige him if I were not under a necessity of attending to my business.

It is this opposition of things eligible to the judgment, if considered apart, that gives birth to those we have called Motives of Necessity, to Obligation, to Duty, the command of a Superior, the regard for our Health, our Preservation, the avoidance of Mischief, or Damage; all which compel us many times to act otherwise than we wish, or than our judgment would choose, if these bars did not stand in the way: but this kind of necessity is a very unstable term, the same case being esteemed such in one light which is not in another.

A man having a seal put forcibly into his hand, and the hand with the same violence pressed down upon wax affixed to a deed, containing a conveyance of his estate, will be counted by everybody under necessity; but then the sealing is no more his act than it is the act of the seal employed therein, for both act by impulse without anything that can be called freedom.

But what if his hands being left at liberty, he be only locked up in a room, and threatened to be kept there without victuals or drink until he shall seal? Perhaps he has a wife and children who must be ruined by the loss of his estate, and being a man of resolution, he determines bravely to perish rather than bring them to destruction; in this forlorn condition, he lolls out at a window, where he sees an intimate friend of his, a lawyer, who advises him to execute, for that no damage can ensue therefrom: he then calls for the deed, sets to his seal, and obtains his enlargement. This the Philosopher will not allow to be an act of necessity, for it was in his power to have forborne: and he did actually forbear until his friend's admonition having altered his judgment, he chose voluntarily to seal, upon a prudential motive of saving his life without detriment to his family. The Grantees bring ejectment for the land in Westminster-hall, where the whole case appearing upon evidence as above, the judge and jury pronounce the

deed void, for that the man was under duresse, and his act not voluntary but imposed upon him by force. Thus we find the same act adjudged necessary in legal construction, which was free and voluntary in the philosophical.

Now to change the case a little, imagine the confinement were in a public gaol for a lawful debt, which the party has no means of paying, nor credit to procure bail; somebody offers to purchase a farm contiguous to his house, and which it would be greatly inconvenient for him to part with, nevertheless he considers his health is infirm, and if he remains in prison it would inevitably prove his death: so he accepts the offer as the only possible means of extricating himself. If he be afterwards blamed for so imprudent a bargain, he will allege the necessity of his affairs compelling him to it; and this allegation will be readily admitted as a full excuse. If upon ejectment brought, he offers to refund the money, and refuses to deliver possession, urging the necessity he lay under, I am afraid this plea will not avail him; for the court will say, his act was free and voluntary, nor was he under any compulsion when he did it, therefore it must stand good.

Let us now vary our circumstances once more, and suppose the man under no confinement or debt at all; but he has taken a fancy to some girl of the town; she wants a sum of money to throw away upon an extravagance, and will leave him for some other gallant, unless he will supply her, which he has no means of doing any other way than by sale of the farm above-mentioned: he is so besotted with her allurements that he cannot live without her; so he executes the conveyance, though sorely against the grain, and against his judgment. He will be apt to plead necessity in excuse for this foolish proceeding; but no indifferent person will admit it for such: here then is a necessity men deem so themselves, though nobody else will call it by that name.

But Necessity being constantly opposed to Freewill, the changeableness of these terms, according to the lights wherein you regard them, gives rise to as notable disputes among us, as those canvassed of old among the philosophers concerning the proper colour of the feathers of a cock-pigeon's neck, which presents a different aspect upon every little motion of the bird.

11. Everybody esteems freedom the basis of morality; for no man deserves praise or blame for doing what he could not help, omitting what he was not at liberty to perform: we are justified in doing things upon the command of a superior, which were blameable had we done them upon our own accord; and it is a received maxim, that necessity has no law. Nevertheless the restraints laid upon us by our vices justify us not, and the slave of sin is always thought answerable for the drudgery he goes through in obedience to his tyrant. On the other hand, we may merit commendation, by complying with the necessary obligations of our religion and our duty.

Oftentimes, as has been already remarked, we blend the idea of impotence with want of liberty, or attribute to the one what proceeds from the other; and indeed the latter in some measure depends upon the former; for whatever obstacle stands in our way, were our strength increased so as greatly to surmount it, would become none, but we should be set at liberty from its opposition. A man bound hand and foot with cords, upon having the strength of Sampson given him, would regain his liberty without being untied: and a cobweb wound about our hands makes no abatement in our freedom, though it destroys that of a fly; not that it does not oppose the same resistance against our fingers as it does against the

legs of the fly, but because that resistance is nothing in comparison with our greater strength.

When some fond passion captivates the heart, and forces us upon actions our present judgment disapproves, we are said to labour under an impotence of mind; and the compliance with such temptations as few or none can resist, is attributed to the weakness of human nature. When honour or duty calls a man to some very painful enterprise, like those of Scævola, Regulus, or the Christian Martyrs, he does not want freedom of action to accomplish it; for his hands will as readily obey the command of the mind to thrust them into burning coals, as into a bason of water, if he can but bring his mind to give the command. Perhaps some of us might resolve upon such an exploit, but should probably flinch in the attempt; and we many times do enter confidently upon undertakings where we find our courage fail in the execution: here then is an effort of the Will directing her own volitions, which yet are forcibly turned a contrary way by the terrors of the pain. So then here, if ever, the Will is not free to follow her own choice and election: nevertheless, when trials of this sort have been undergone, we do not reckon them instances of greater freewill, but greater strength of virtue and extraordinary vigour of mind.

So if a covetous man intends to give money in charity, but when he comes to take his guineas out of the bag, has not the heart to part with them; he has a Will to do a generous deed, and would execute it if not restrained by his fondness for the pelf; yet we do not ordinarily reckon him destitute of Freewill, but that he has not power to give anything away. Thus we esteem the same case a defect of Liberty, or of Power, according as we fix our eye upon the strength of the obstacle, or feebleness of the agent.

12. The Speculative talk much of a free and necessary Agency, terms not in use among the vulgar, nor do they lose anything by the want of them: for if we go to examine what Free Agency is, we shall find it to be no more than the dependency of actions upon volition; therefore man is a free Agent, because his limbs move according to the directions of his Will, but Matter a necessary Agent, as having no Will, and acting solely by virtue of the motion, or impulse imparted to it.

Not but upon a man's being pushed violently down to the ground his fall is necessary, but then it is properly no act of his; for though we are apt to say he hurt himself by the fall, which implies something done by him, yet, upon mature consideration, we never attribute the hurt to him, but to the person who threw him down: for in this case his motion is similar to that of body, which does not properly act, but only transmits the action of something else that moved it. When a stone strikes against a wall it serves only as a channel of conveyance for the force of the engine from whence it was cast; that again of the springs and wheels whereby it was worked; and so backwards in a series of effects and causes, until you come to some voluntary agent giving the first impulse, whose act it is, whether he intend the consequence or no. If a man shoots another, the wound made by the bullet is his act, and he chargeable with the murder; or if he shot at a crow and happened to kill a man, though he be guilty of no crime, still the slaughter is his act; but an undesigned and accidental one. And if we commonly ascribe powers to body, it is because we cannot trace them back to the causes from whence they originally sprung.

Upon this view of the matter, we see that free Agency has nothing to do with questions concerning Liberty, for the one may remain after the other

being taken away. A man shut up in a prison still continues a free agent of such actions as he can perform; if he would gladly go abroad, but sits still in his wicker chair, as knowing the doors are locked, his quiescence is an act of free Agency, not like that of the chair he sits on, for he might have risen from it if he would. Or if he be shoved along by the shoulders, though he must move, being under a force, yet he is a free agent in the motion of his legs; for a statue pushed along in like manner, being a necessary agent, would have fallen upon its face.

Thus how much soever we may be abridged or confined in our powers, while there is anything left that we can do, our free agency subsists entire, for this relates only to our manner of doing those actions we perform, that is, by willing them; and consequently in everything a man does which is properly his act, whether by compulsion or restraint, or free choice, he is in that instance a free agent, or in other words, he is such whenever he is an agent at all.

13. But all this will not satisfy the curious, for they ask further, whether a man have free agency to will such a particular exertion of his power as well as to execute it. Now this is another kind of Agency from that we have been speaking of hitherto; and for distinction sake we shall beg leave to call it free Volency (for the Speculative will allow one another to coin a word upon occasion): so the question is not whether a man be a free Agent but a free Volent; for his agency remains the same, provided his actions follow according to his volition, whatever laws this latter be subject to.

Now in order to raise a question upon this head we must suppose our Volition the effect of some prior or other act of the Will besides the Volition itself under examination: but we have seen in the progress of this work, that the Will is no subject of her own operation, but takes her turns from time to time, according to the present state of the judgment and imagination; therefore the epithet Free can neither be affirmed, nor denied, nor any ways applied to Volency: this not being immediately produced by any exertion of our power. It is true, we do often determine beforehand what we will do, and pursue measures accordingly, which we should have omitted, had it not been for such determination; and in this sense the Will acts upon herself, but then she does it immediately by fixing such ideas, resolutions, or propensities upon the memory and imagination as will serve her for motives by-and-by; and it is plain her agency terminates with the impressing such ideas, because if they slip out of our head, or something happens to render the determination inexpedient, though we act contrary to it, yet no doubts arise concerning our free Agency, either in the first determination or subsequent volition.

Besides, some of our actions leave room for no more than one operation of the Will; a man turning the corner of a street sees somebody come hastily against him, and suddenly starts back; here the first act of his will is that whereby he moves his limbs, so there is no prior Agency whereto the term free may be applied.

There are some who hold two consubsisting Wills, an active and an elective, the latter continually directing the former, how truly I shall not examine; but upon this supposition man is a free Agent, and a free Volent; for free Agency is the dependency of his actions upon volition, and free volency the dependence of volition upon his choice; but you cannot go on further to entitle him a free electant too; for I never heard of anybody spinning the thread so fine as to suppose another election determining that which determines the Will: all who hold an elective power making it either

dependent upon motives, or self-moving independent on all causes whatever, even on any prior, or other act of the Will: so the term Free cannot be applicable to it, because we are free only in such things as will ensue upon some previous act of the Will exerted to produce them.

We do indeed often talk in common conversation of a free, and a forced choice; but this relates to the consequence of our choice not to the manner of making it, and depends not so much upon our being able to choose, as to obtain the thing chosen. We say indeed, a man has not liberty to choose when he knows the thing is not to be had, because he cannot will an impossibility; for how much soever we may wish or desire, we never actually Will without a present apprehension of something feasible: but this proves volition dependent upon final causes occurring to the imagination, for an unattainable end is no end at all, because it is not a thing wherein our efforts may terminate, nor can the mind raise a volition of it by any power she possesses. Besides that choice, in vulgar acceptation, lies undoubtedly liable to constraint, we meet with numberless instances every day of our being confined in our choice; which shows that choice in this sense is a different thing from the elective power spoken of just now; for that the maintainers of it insist upon as a privilege inherent in human nature, which nothing can divest us of, nor any external force, or circumstances of situation control; but that we have always power to will, how much soever we may be restrained from doing.

14. Thus have I endeavoured to point out some of those variations of sense our words are liable to, according to the occasion introducing them, or light wherein they are placed: and it is this fluctuation of language that makes the labyrinth, and throws up the briars and thorns that entangle us in our reasonings upon human Liberty. For men set out with one question, but scarce have gone a few steps before they slide insensibly into another, from thence into a third, and so on without limitation; no wonder then they cannot come to a satisfactory conclusion upon a subject perpetually changing.

I know of none other use in the discussion above attempted of those several changes, unless to warn men against being beguiled by them, for let them keep their ideas steady, and I believe they will find no difficulties. Therefore I hold it wrong to enter upon a debate concerning free Will in general, that being a variable term, as well in our common discourses, as in our abstract speculations; for the Will is always free, that is, always doing something or other while we wake, yet at the same time may be confined to one, or a few ways of exerting herself: but let them take into consideration particular acts of the Will, and they will find her sometimes free, sometimes under force or restraint, and sometimes neither of the three applicable to her, according to the different lights wherein they regard the matter, according to what they understand by the term Will, and what they apprehend to be an act of her's.

But with respect to our main point the consistency of human Freedom with Providence, it is not much matter what notions men entertain of Liberty, of Agency, of Will, or Choice; provided they contemplate each instance singly by itself, and do not blend them together, nor change them, by juggling like a conjuror with cups and balls. For they must discern so much similitude in all cases of Liberty that can be produced, if they will but keep their ideas clear, and under such discipline as not to jostle, or run into one another, that the same consequences will always follow, how

variously soever they may understand Liberty in the several cases proposed.

15. Let us consider a man just enlarged out of prison, who we shall say has regained his liberty, because he can stay at home, or go abroad this way or that, north or south, as he pleases. So his freedom consists in the dependence of his motions upon his Will, in his standing so circumstanced as that nothing hinders but that rest, or motion, or any particular motion he shall direct, shall ensue upon his willing; it does not at all relate to the inducemunts he may have for willing, whether some prudential motive, or sudden start of fancy, or impulse of passion, or whether he put it to the cast of a die; in each case he remains at full liberty to do as he will.

Well, but suppose him under the authority of some master who gives him a holyday to divert himself at home, or go abroad wherever he chooses. I shall not dispute, whether the injunctions of a superior be strictly an abridgment of human Liberty, for that they may be disobeyed by any one who shall disregard the consequences: let us grant for the present, that he could not do the thing whereon his choice shall fall, if any prohibition were given against it, yet there being no such prohibition, leaves him, besides his liberty of action, a liberty of choice in what manner he shall use his other liberty. Now this liberty, like the former, consists in the dependence of his actions upon his choice; for where he has free choice, nobody can doubt he will do as he chooses; and where he has not, he may be forced to do what he does not choose: but it has no concern with the causes of his choice, whether he spend his holyday prudently, or foolishly, according to his own whims, or the persuasions of an acquaintance.

But suppose he has strong reasons either of religion, or duty, or respect to some Relation who may leave him a good legacy, which urge him to go one way, but his companions, or his own jovial disposition, solicit him another, to the alehouse, and nobody has any authority to interpose; so he remains still at liberty to choose between them, because he may take either way as his Will and his choice shall direct. No, you say, it is not clear that he has a freedom of choice; for though I admit he may do as he chooses, yet I doubt his being free to choose; because his evil habit of tippling may force a choice upon him whether he will or no. Beware, my friend, of the mazes in the labyrinth, for we are now striking into another alley, and starting a different question from that we had under contemplation before.

In common usage, we apply Liberty indifferently to the power or act performed thereby; for we say the choice is free when nothing hinders, but that we may do whatever it shall pitch upon, and the act free when it follows in consequence of our choice, and not of any compulsion obliging us to perform it. And one of the most dangerous sources of perplexity arises from the want of distinguishing in our inquiries concerning the freedom of a power, whether we regard it as a cause or an effect; for while we behold it in a double light, as too frequently is done, we shall never see distinctly where to find an issue. According to your present stating the doubt we must consider it as an effect, the proper object of some power the man has to influence his choice, unless the prevalence of habit should give it a contrary bias.

As to cases of restraint they will conduce nothing to our main purpose; therefore we will consider only such cases wherein you may suppose a freedom of choice in our present sense of the Term, that is, as an effect of some power we possess.

16. Suppose a man deliberating in the morning how he shall lay out his afternoon; there are no bolts nor bars in his way, no authority of a superior, nor restraint of law, duty, honour, or obligation, intervening in the matters under deliberation: so we know his afternoon's actions will be such as his Will and Choice shall then direct; but neither is there any strong inclination, or passion at work, which might drive him upon one way of employing him preferable to the rest; so he stands indifferent to choose now in what manner he shall dispose of himself in the afternoon, nor has he any choice until he shall determine it by some present act of his Will.

I do not give this as a philosophical representation of the case, but certain it is, we often do conceive ourselves in a situation (how justly it is no matter) to will or choose what we shall will and do by-and-by; for if upon asking a friend to walk with you in the Park, this afternoon, he should gravely reply, Good Sir, I cannot possibly tell you, for the present moment only is in our power; my future actions depend upon my future volitions, and the Will cannot act upon itself, nor is what I shall do five hours hence the subject of my present option: you would think he bantered you, and be apt to cry, pry'thee cannot you choose either to walk or let it alone, cannot you tell me whether you will or no?

Therefore unless we will talk in a strain contrary to the language and conceptions of all mankind, we must acknowledge that a person in the case before us has a perfect freedom of choice. But wherein does this freedom consist? where, unless in the absence of all impediment, restraint, authority, obligation, or force whatsoever against his power of choosing; so that his choice will continue such as he fixes it, and his afternoon's actions follow precisely according to his present determination; nor has it anything to do with the motives or causes inducing him to choose riding rather than walking or staying at home before both.

But we have not done yet; for some there be who insist upon an elective Power consubsisting with our power of Volition, and determining it as well in giving the preference to what we are to do hereafter, as in the present exercise of our bodily powers. Be it so, since they will have it so. Then the freedom of this elective Power depends upon the removal of all force or impediment against the Will taking such determination as is elected, but not at all upon the cause of such election. Add further, that when we do what we had elected or determined beforehand, nobody will deny our being free in the volitions exerted at the time of execution: which proves Freedom consistent with precaution, for otherwise either our Election and Predetermination must have no avail nor influence upon our future conduct, or else must put a force upon the Will, constraining it to act conformably to them until they were completed.

17. Thus how many powers soever we may conceive in the mind directing one another, the proper and genuine idea of Freedom, with respect to each of them, will be the same: for in order to discuss the point of freedom, we must consider some operating power as the cause, and some exertion of the power operated upon as an effect to be produced thereby: if such effect will follow as may be expected from the cause, then are we free in the operating power, and our exertion of the operated is our own free act; but if a different effect will follow, then are we under force or restraint.

If we inquire further whether we be free to use this operating power, this is a new question which must be discussed in like manner with the former, by considering the operating power as an effect, and some other power not thought of before as a cause.

For let the mind have ever so much power to act upon herself, either by predetermination, or coexistent election, such her acting is an action as much as acting upon the limbs, and the freedom of it must be tried by the same rules: for as I have freedom of action so long as there lies no bar or obstacle against using my bodily powers in such manner as my Will shall direct, whatever causes may incline me to employ them one particular way; so have I freedom of Will while nothing hinders, but that such volition shall take place as I predetermine or elect, whatever may give occasion to my so determining or electing. For liberty bears no connection with anything antecedent to the operation of that power whose liberty we inquire into, but solely with what shall follow after it, and with the removal of all obstruction which might prevent it from taking effect: therefore may well consist with causes prior to such operation, and with the dominion of that Providence whose disposal those causes lie under.

Thus while we can keep a Disputant to any one settled point, one stated case of acting, or willing, we shall manage well enough with him; but men are apt to dodge about the post, alleging, that we may will as we choose, and choose if we will, without understanding themselves in the use of those terms, or settling the distinction between them; but one moment taking them for synonymous, and the next for different acts producing one another. Whereas if we fix the meaning of choice to a predetermination, then in such cases where our determination stands confined to certain limits, or we are compelled to take a course contrary to that we determine, our volitions, and consequently our actions, depend upon the causes applying such force or restraint: but in cases where we remain perfectly free to prosecute whatever we may determine upon, they depend upon the motives occurring to our judgment, or imagination, in making the determination, or upon our former cares in forming the condition of our mind; which cares depended upon the like causes, and so on as far as the Will was concerned, until you come to some first determination, or act of the mind to which there was none other act preceding; which act must depend upon external causes; and consequently so must all subsequent volitions dependent thereon.

18. As to the co-existent elective power, self-moving and independent on all causes, whether of external objects, motives of judgment and imagination, or prior determinations of our own, if this could once be well established, then farewell to all prudence, deliberation, and dependence upon our own conduct, and that of other people: for what avails it to contrive a plan of my measures ever so wisely, to inculcate salutary maxims upon my mind, to nourish sentiments of honour, or duty, or moral senses for my guidance, if I may afterwards chance to elect the wildest and most extravagant actions in defiance of all reason, or inclination, or former resolutions to the contrary? or how can I depend that my best and dearest friend will not murder me, while there is a hazard that he may elect in opposition to all the judgment and discretion in his head, the sentiments and desires in his heart?

But such terrors as these the most zealous devotees of an elective power do not lie under; they depend upon men's acting conformably to their characters; if they know a hardened villain, they make no question of his electing acts of violence, injury, and dishonesty whenever opportunity shall serve, and confide in themselves for making just and wise elections in their future conduct.

What then occasions the difference between man and man? for there must be some cause of the moral character, some account to be given why

we know what use each person will make of his elective power. The difference, say they, lies in the Will itself, which has a peculiar bent, or ply, or I know not what, different from that of another person: the villain has a perverseness of Will, therefore will always choose perversely: and they themselves a rectitude of Will, so of course they will choose rightly and wisely. But whence got they this I know not what in their Will? was it innate? was it the natural constitution of their mind? Then they ought to bless the Author of their nature, who gave them this happy constitution on creating them. But no, this must not be the case; for they will lose all merit of their rectitude, unless it was of their own acquiring; therefore they gave this right Ply to their Wills themselves by their former cares, and industry, and right management of their elective power. Be it so; for we are in the humour to admit everything they please to assume; still we must ask, what moved them to such right management? it could not be the Ply of their Will; for if this were acquired, they could not have it before they acquired it, nor could they derive from thence their choice of the right methods taken in the acquisition. What then, did they light upon those methods by mere chance? I do not suspect they will say this; for this would make Virtue nothing more than a lucky hit, which one Simpleton might stumble upon as well as another. If then their choice had a source, there remains none other we can guess besides education, example, company, the temperament of their body, state of their mental organization, objects surrounding them, events touching their notice, and the like; causes antecedent and external to the mind electing, under the direction of that power whom they must acknowledge to govern all things external.

19. Upon the whole, we may conclude Freedom, in whatever light we place it, or to whatever power, whether real or imaginary, apply it, by no means repugnant to the operation of prior causes moving us to the exercise of that power; nor to the dominion of Providence, having all those causes and their causes at disposal: so that the Plan of Providence may well take effect without infringing a tittle upon our Liberty. Events which neither our judgment nor our appetite would incline us to produce, are placed out of our power, and entrusted in the hands of other agents, so come to pass by necessity with respect to us; the returns of summer and winter do not depend upon our option, because we might be apt to choose a perpetual spring: but wherever God thinks proper to employ us in executing any part of his plan, there needs only to give us the powers, the talents, the opportunities, the judgments, the motives requisite, and we shall complete the lines allotted us by the exercise of our freedom.

So far as you can penetrate into a man's sentiments and desires, and have the proper objects at command, you may put him upon any work you shall require: if money be his idol, and you have enough to bribe him, you may make him do whatever you please; if he make his belly his god, you may draw him from Milbank to Radcliffe-highway by an exquisite entertainment; or if good nature be his ruling principle, you may employ him in any kind office you shall want. Your politicians know how to turn the passions of men independent on their authority to serve their designs: and the Divine Politician may do this more completely, not only as he knows perfectly the secrets of all hearts, but as he gave them that understanding and those appetites, which determine the colour of their actions; and we need not doubt of his having given them such as will effectually answer the purposes intended by them.

In some few instances where we know the hearts of men, we can effect

our purposes with them as surely as we can with any corporeal instruments in our hands: if you want to give a ball, or an entertainment, it is but sending an invitation to persons fond of these diversions, and you will have your company resort to you of their own free choice, nor could you bring them more effectually, if you had the authority of an absolute monarch over them; so that in this instance you govern their motions either to Hickford's, or the Apollo near Temple Bar, or your own dining-room, without the least impeachment of their liberty. And we have a present example before our eyes of a monarch, who having the love of his subjects, can by their free services resist the combined efforts of the mightiest despotic powers upon earth. Nor can despotism itself do any great matters without aid of Free Will: for rewards, honours, and encouragements, those engines of free agency, contribute more to the valour of armies than any scourges of punishment, or peremptory edicts concluding, For such is our Will.

Since then experience testifies, that man can make so much use of liberty towards accomplishing his designs, why should we scruple to think the same of God in a larger extent? for he not only has all the objects in his power which touch the springs of action, but fabricated the springs themselves, and set them to receive what touches they shall take.

20. But we judge of the workings of Providence by our own narrow way of proceeding; we take our measures from time to time as the expedience of them occurs to our thoughts, and then must make what use we can of the materials or instruments before us, be they such as exactly suit our purpose, or not; and even if we had the making of our instruments, yet not always knowing what we should want to do with them, we shall often find them inconvenient for our service: nor is it unfrequent that the works we performed yesterday stand in the way of those we are to perform to-day, because new schemes and new occasions of employing ourselves occur to us perpetually.

In like manner we vulgarly imagine God acting occasionally, and taking up purposes he had not thought of before until a concurrence of circumstances rendered them expedient. We apprehend him as having turned the numerous race of men loose into the wide world, endowed them with various powers, talents, appetites, and characters, without knowing precisely, or without caring what they will produce. We allow him indeed to have formed the main lines of a plan; but left large vacancies between to be filled up by chance, whose wild workings lie under his control to divert their course when they would interfere with the strokes of his pencil. For the eye of Providence watches over the motions of human creatures; when he sees them running counter to his designs, he turns them aside, or guides them by his secret influence to co-operate therewith.

Now, considering the vast variety of humours, the discordant aims and interests among mankind, it must be acknowledged that the government of the world, in this view of it, could not be administered without either continual miraculous interpositions in the motions of matter, or compulsions and restraints upon free Agency, giving our volition another turn than it would take from the motives present before us, or causing other motions to arise in our limbs, and thoughts in our minds, than our present volition would naturally produce.

But when we reflect that even the wanton gambols of chance must result from agents and causes originally set at work by the Almighty, when we

call to mind his infinite Wisdom and Omniscience, which nothing can escape, nothing perplex or overload; it seems more congruous with that boundless attribute to imagine that no single, nor most distant effect of the powers and motions he gave was overlooked, no chasms or empty spaces left in his design: but that upon the formation of the world he laid a full and perfect plan of all the operations that should ensue during the period of its continuance.

And what interpositions there are (for I would leave every one to his own opinion concerning the frequency or rarity of them,) how much soever they may operate secretly to us, were not sudden expedients to answer unforeseen emergencies, but contained in the original plan; which was purposely so framed as to need his interposing hand when, and where, and as often as he predetermined to apply to it. But in those parts wherein he has thought proper to employ us as his instruments for executing them, to control us in the exercise of our powers would be to defeat his own designs, by disturbing the operation of those causes himself had chosen for the accomplishment of them.

Thus he governs all things in heaven and earth by power and wisdom conjointly; matter by necessity and impulse, brutes by sense and instinct, the blessed spirits above by significations of his Will, which they gladly and freely set themselves to fulfil, man partly by necessary agents affecting him, partly by laws, restrictions, apprehensions of mischief and danger controlling him, and partly by leaving him to his free choice in following such portion of understanding and appetites as himself has allotted him.

21. Nor need we fancy ourselves always in shackles, because every moment under the dominion and conduct of Providence; for it has been shown that Liberty has no concern with causes antecedent to the exercise of our power, but solely with what might stand in our way upon such exercise: if I can do what I will, I have freedom of action, no matter how I came to will this or that particular employment: if I can choose as I will, I have freedom of choice, no matter what induced me to make one choice preferable to all others.

What then, are we mere puppets, actuated by springs and wires, because it was given us both to will and to do? By no means; for when they are given us, we have as full and free liberty to use them both, as if they had fallen upon us by chance, or we had made them for ourselves. If my father left me a good portion, I can do the same with it, and have as free disposal of it, as if I had made the gold myself by transmutation with the Philosopher's stone; and if he brought me by the cares of his education from a lavish temper to prudence and economy, this does not impeach my liberty to squander it all away.

Nor have we reason to disturb ourselves with imaginations of a thraldom from secret influences, and unseen springs, when those that are manifest and seen do not work upon us by constraint; for sometimes we may discern the influence that guides us, and yet find no thraldom in following whither it leads.

How much of our employment depends upon the natural appetites of hunger and thirst? You may pretend indeed that these are acts of necessity, because we must eat, or starve: but follow men to their meals, and you will not see one in a thousand that eats because he must, but because he likes it. Which of us ever sits down to table by compulsion, or feels himself constrained to cut the joint before him, or perceives his tongue moved by strings like a puppet when he calls for a glass of wine?

What shall we say to the mutual propensity between the sexes, another main spring in the hand of God, by which he preserves the race of men upon earth? How many under twigs, what fashions, contrivances, amusements, accomplishments, grow from that stem? but wherein does it check or overshadow human liberty? Do boys and girls meet together by compulsion or choice? Is the Miss under a force when she culls among her trinkets with curious toil to tiff herself out in the most engaging manner, or teazes papa for money to buy a new-fashioned silk? Is the Beau compelled against his Will to practise winning airs before the glass, or employ for whole hours all the thought withinside his noddle to bepowder and becurl the outside?

How strongly does parental instinct operate upon us! It is by this channel that God transmits arts and sciences, education, estates, conveniences of life, knowledge, and old experience from generation to generation. In this we see the finger of Providence and feel its potent touches, yet feel no limitation in our liberty therefrom: for what parent does not willingly go about the provisions he makes for his children, or finds himself under any other direction than his own choice and judgment in the application of his cares for their advantage, or perceives himself moved by clock-work to procure any little toy or diversion for them?

22. Our powers of action stand limited to a certain extent of ground, but within the enclosure we may ramble about as we please to take our pasture or our pastime. Sometimes there are restraints hanging over us, which confine us to particular walks; obligations and duties to be fulfilled, authority to be obeyed, wants to be supplied, necessaries of life to be provided, and it behoves us to regard these restrictions, or mischief will ensue; but in many of our hours we have no limitations upon our conduct, and then we may move easily and lightly without the weight of any secret force or impediment encumbering us.

Nor need we fear lest we may defeat the purposes of God, or make any breaches in the plan of his Providence: for he knew what uses we would make of our liberty, and has provided his plan accordingly. Let the Princes run madly into broils, and the Grecians suffer, the Will of Jove is fulfilled by their madness, and will be, whatever conduct man shall pursue. Therefore we have but our own will to take care of; only let us not consult solely our present Will and Fancy, but pay a due regard to what we may will to-morrow; and in our deliberations and execution of the prudential measures for procuring what we shall will to have another time, we may proceed with the same freedom as if there were no superior power able to control us in the exercise of our faculties.

And the most useful deliberation we can enter upon, is how to enlarge our freedom, for all are ready enough to allow that Happiness consists in liberty to do what we will; nor shall I contradict them, so they do not restrain Will to that of the present moment. We commonly understand by our Will what our Judgment represents as most eligible, or our Inclination prompts to as most alluring; and whenever these two coincide, our Will is quite free. Therefore, so far as we can bring desire to tally with reason, we shall enlarge the bounds of our liberty; and if we could do this completely so as to make a virtue of every necessity, and a pleasure of every obligation, we should never have any restraint hanging over us, but attain a perfect liberty; because willing always what was right and feasible, we should always do what we would.

And this perfect liberty would more apparently, though not more really,

coincide with the plan of Providence than that pittance of it we now possess; for then we should fulfil the Will of God knowingly, whereas now we fulfil it, but unknowingly, and many times by setting ourselves most strenuously to oppose it.

23. And now we might think the controversy ended, and all difficulties gotten over, the freedom of Will being fully reconciled with the authority and dominion of God: but the busy mind of man, ingenious in finding new perplexities to involve itself in, will not let us rest quiet so; but seeing light open upon one spot, shifts the scene to some other corner, where it may cover itself with clouds and obscurity; and, as if fond of slavery, endeavours to derive a title thereto from some other quarter, namely, that of Fore-knowledge.

For, say the fine Reasoners, if your actions are foreknown, you can do no otherwise than it is known you will do; so your hands are tied down to one particular manner of proceeding, nor are you at liberty to take any other than that you shall pursue.

But why so? what connection is there between another's knowledge and my behaviour? it may possibly direct his own measures, but has no influence at all upon mine. You allow that while my actions remain unknown to everybody I may be free; what then if after my being in possession of this freedom some shrewd Politician should discover what I will do, how does that divest me of it, in what respect alter my condition, or by what channel of communication does this discovery operate upon me.

No, say they, you must mistake the grounds of our objection; we do not assign his knowledge as a cause of anything you do, nor pretend it lays any restraint upon your liberty; we only produce it as an evidence of another restraint hanging over you; for he could not know how you will behave, unless it were certain; therefore his knowledge is a proof that you will certainly do as he knows; but what will certainly come to pass cannot fall out otherwise; so you have no liberty left, because you cannot do what will never be done.

But how does this alter the case? wherein is the difference between Certainty and Knowledge? Why yes, the difference lies here, that Certainty is the object of Knowledge, though she may not have cast her eye upon it; therefore is a different thing, as having existed before it; for his discovery did not make the certainty, but presupposes it; for the thing was certain before, though he did not know it.

But what sort of thing is this Certainty, to which you ascribe such irresistible force? let us know what rank of Beings to place it under? is it a substance? or if a quality or accident, in what substance does it reside? for we generally apply it to propositions which are only judgments of the mind. It is no agent, it is no power, nor has any efficacy in its state of pre-existence to knowledge; for were it ever so certain the house was on fire, this would influence none of my actions until I know it.

24. If certainties have any active virtue, it is to generate one another; all our rules of logic show that some truths are such in consequence of other truths: if it certainly will rain to-morrow, it is certain there will be clouds in the air; if it be certain the gun I made trial of will go off, then the flint will certainly strike fire; and in general the certainty of Events infers the certainty of all causes operating to produce them; therefore whatever acts of my Freewill are certain, I must certainly have the freedom to do them.

We may indeed frame propositions concerning future events, without

thinking of the manner now they will come to pass; but rememoer your own observation, that knowledge does not make certainty, but finds it; much less can any form of words make, or the omission of them destroy it: therefore whether you speak and think of them or no, the same propositions may be applied, and the same certainty belong to the operating causes, be they Force or Freewill, as to the events, and the certainty of each reciprocally implies the other.

Suppose you under an engagement to meet a person at any particular place, and have a strong inclination to go somewhere else, nevertheless you have too much honour to break your word; but perhaps the man will send five minutes hence to release you from the engagement, and then you will go where you like; now if it be certain you shall go there, must it not be equally certain the restraint will be taken off, and you set at perfect liberty to follow your choice? And if anybody had affirmed both a thousand years ago, he would have spoken truth; for while the one remained fortuitous, the other could not be certain: so likewise in all instances of free Agency, the certainty of the action casts a certainty upon the freedom of the Agent: and the certain Foreknowledge of our voluntary proceedings is so far from overthrowing, that it establishes human liberty upon a firmer bottom than it has really belonging to it.

For we may observe further, that this argument unluckily proves too much; because if whatever shall happen it be absolutely impossible that it should not happen; then in such instances wherein we have our Freedom, the debarring us the use of it was from all eternity an absolute impossibility, insurmountable even by Omnipotence itself; so that instead of being dependent in all our motions upon necessary causes, we shall become independent on the first, the supreme Fountain of all power and action.

And for aught I know, the Devil might have employed this sophism when he rebelled, to prove himself his own master; for feeling himself in possession of freedom, it was always true, that he should be free; nor could Omnipotence itself prevent his being so: or he might have beguiled himself into his fall, and justified his disobedience, by arguing in the following manner. If any one had said before I was made, that I should be, he would have spoken truth; therefore it was certain that I should be, therefore an absolute impossibility that I should not be; so God could not help creating me; nor do I owe any thanks to the Almighty for my existence.

25. What dependence or countenance does this argument deserve? which is such a Drawcansir, as to cut down both friend and foe; or like a swivel-gun, may be pointed upon any quarter, fore and aft, starboard and larboard; and what is worse, we find it generally in the hands of sloth and depravity, turned against the lawful authority of reason and prudence.

For when men are too lazy to bestir themselves, or too fond of a foolish thing to be put aside from it by their clearest judgment, they then catch hold of this idle pretence, what will be, must be; therefore why need I take pains, or deliberate at all? for my actions will have some certain issue, and if certain, it is necessary, and if necessary, the event will work itself out some how or other without my giving myself any trouble to compass it.

But whoever argues in this manner, when they have some favourite passion to gratify? They then can study and contrive, set all their wits to work, and use all their might to accomplish their designs: whereas if they think consistently, there is the same certainty in matters of inclination, as of prudence and duty; whatever they wish, must have some certain issue one way or other, and is either unattainable in spite of their utmost en-

deavours, or will drop into their mouths without their seeking. And thus they may go on to argue themselves out of all activity whatever, so as neither to take up the victuals from their plate, or move away from the fire when it burns their shins.

26. But these fantastical remoras do not obstruct us in the familiar transactions of life, nor do they ever enter into the head of a common man. If a poor fellow has done me some signal service, and I call to him—Hark ye, Tim; do you see that sack of pease in the barn-floor yonder? there are a couple of guineas in it somewhere; if you can find them they are your own. Now I know well enough he will get the money; for he will take out every pea one by one but he will come at it; but I know as well that he cannot find it without a great deal of pains and rummaging.

Suppose one of your profound Speculatists were by, and should tell him, Why, Tim, you need not put yourself in a hurry to go a rummaging; you may as well sit with your nose over the kitchen fire; for Search knows you will get the money; therefore it is a thing certain, and you must have it whether you do anything or no. This logic would hardly prevail upon Tim to stop his speed for a moment.

Or suppose another subtile refiner sets the matter in a different light: Tim, says he, is a mere machine in this case utterly destitute of liberty; for not only his getting the money, but his rummaging the sack is foreknown; so his action is certain and necessary, nor can he help rummaging any more than the great clock can help striking. Tim being an arch fellow replies, Ay, but Master, for all that I could stay here and never meddle with the sack, if I were fool enough to run the hazard of somebody else getting away the money before me: and if you will give me three and forty shillings to try, I will show you what I can do.

How many times a day do we foreknow our own actions, and those of other people, yet feel ourselves and perceive them free in the performance? Our liberty is so apparent that the Philosopher with his microscope, and the Ploughman with his half an eye, can discern it distinctly through the veil of Certainty and Foreknowledge: it is only the half-reasoner, who hangs between both, and uses a glass full of flaws, that hunts for it in vain, or sees it confusedly.

27. It is the crinkles in this glass making objects appear double, and representing each individual as two distinct things, which produces that distinction urged by some people between human Prescience and divine, as if one might be compatible with human Liberty, though the other were repugnant.

But why so? for it is not the party knowing, but the intrinsic certainty of the fact that lays the restraint: now as man cannot know what is uncertain, so neither if there were anything absolutely fortuitous, could it be foreknown even to God: therefore Knowledge, wherever residing, is alike evidence of Certainty.

Very true, say they, where the knowledge is of the same kind; but ours is only conjectural; whereas that of God is absolute: we all confess the human Understanding fallible at best, nor ever so sure of her hits, but there remains a possibility of her being mistaken; and it is this possibility that opens the door to Liberty.

Here, by the way, I cannot help remarking how ready some folks are to blow hot and cold with the same breath, as either serves the turn: if I happen in company to drop a hint like those suggested in my chapter on Judg-

ment, that Certainty, mathematical Certainty, was not made for man, and that we know no more, if so much, than the appearances exhibited this present moment to our senses, and the ideas actually in our thought; I am exclaimed against for an arrant Sceptic, a Visionary, a Trifler, advancing things I do not believe myself. What! cry they, do not we know certainly that the Judges will sit in Westminster-hall this term; that the servant will lay the cloth for dinner; that we ourselves shall go to bed to-night? Yet these very people, like crafty Politicians, now the interests of their argument require it, can take the opposite side, and strike up a coalition with the fallibility of human understanding in its strongest assurances. Perhaps the Judges will not sit, for the hall may be swallowed up by an earthquake; perhaps the Servant will not lay the cloth, for he may be stricken with an apoplexy; perhaps we shall not go to bed, for the house may take fire. Were these casualties, which depend upon external causes, alleged in diminution of Liberty, they might carry some weight; but what efficacy they can have to increase it, I cannot discern with the best use of the microscope.

But waving this, if bare Possibility may give opening enough to set us free, this same Mr. Liberty must be a very slender gentleman, to creep in at such an augur-hole: yet let us consider whether he does get his whole body through, or only thrust in a little finger at most; for we have seen there are degrees of Liberty consistent with a partial Restraint. When I put on my great coat and boots, I can still move my limbs, though not so freely as before: when in town I have not the same liberty as in the country; I must not go out in my cap and slippers; I must not carry a bundle under my arm; if Elizabeth Petrowna, whom I never saw nor cared for, happens to die two thousand miles off, I must not wear a coloured coat, for so the great goddess, Fashion, that Diana of Ephesus, whom all the world worshippeth, ordains: yet she graciously allows me some latitude in my dress and motions; for I may go armed with a sword I know not how to use, and saunter away the day in coffee-houses, or spend the night in tossing about a pack of cards, without offence to her delicacy.

Now I believe my antagonists and I, how slightingly soever we have spoken of human Understanding, shall agree that in some instances our Knowledge grounds upon evidence, which makes it a million to one we are in the right: and since an event may be probable, as well as certain, though we do not know so much, it must then contain an intrinsic probability independent on our knowledge or conjecture. But this probability, being so near of kin to certainty, that the acutest Philosophers could never find a criterion to distinguish them, may be presumed to have the family strength, though not in equal measure; and if one totally overthrows liberty, the other must fasten a clog upon it proportionable to the degree of the probability; so that in cases of the highest assurance we should find ourselves reduced to the condition of a person who should have so many weights hung about him, that one millionth part added more, would render him incapable of stirring at all.

28. But if this will not do, and they insist upon Probability being totally different from Certainty in kind and efficacy, and that one has no force at all, though the other be irresistible, let them contemplate an object, wherein they must needs acknowledge both perpetual Freedom and absolute Foreknowledge; for I hope they will not deny God to be perfectly free in all his proceedings. If there be such a thing in nature as freedom, where can it reside, if not in the supreme Author of all powers to whom there is nothing

superior that might control him? Yet I suppose they will scarce imagine all his measures sudden, and his actions fortuitous, or that he does not know to-day what he will do to-morrow.

But if certainty infers necessity, then either he foresees no better than we do, that is conjecturally, when he will stop the torrents of blood that overwhelm Europe, the distresses, the ruins, the horror and desolation that spread over land and sea, and restore peace to Christendom; or his hands in the interim remain tied to do it at one precise time, nor is he at liberty to advance the happy event one moment sooner. Nay, we shall not stop here; for if a proposition had been affirmed from everlasting concerning any work of Providence that has been performed, it would have been true: therefore God from all eternity was necessitated to create and govern his worlds precisely in the manner he has done: and so, according to the devilish fine reasoning used at the end of § 24, we are not obliged to him, but to the iron-handed goddess, Necessity, for our life, our health, our daily bread, and all the blessings we receive.

Perhaps they will allege the case is different here: for the acts of God are such only as he had determined upon himself, therefore in performing them he executed his own Will: but let them remember, that they placed the necessity in the intrinsic certainty of the fact, not in the causes operating to produce it; for if they admit these, then the cause of our free actions being the freedom we have to perform them, will evidence itself, instead of proving our bondage: but, according to them, when a fact is certain, it is necessary, no matter why, or how, it came to be so; and equally certain, whether proceeding from the agent's own determination, or some external cause: for if what will be, must be, then whatever God foreknows will be done by himself as well as by us, becomes alike certain, nor can even omnipotence prevent it from taking effect. Let them consider further that every pious man esteems it certain, that God will reward the good and punish the evil-doer; that he will maintain the laws of nature, not throw all things into confusion, nor annihilate the Beings he has created. Thus human prescience extends in some cases to the divine agency. But if certainty inferred necessity, then either God must not be free to dispose of us in what manner he judges proper, or it must remain totally uncertain how he will use his power.

Thus we see the same ill luck attends the argument wherever we turn it; for if it proves anything, it proves more than it should; nor can it infringe upon human liberty, without encroaching upon God himself.

Neither let them throw in my teeth what I have reported from Pythagoras concerning the oath of Jove; for this was only a figurative expression, to denote the unchangeableness of the divine nature: if God has sworn, his oath is sacred, because we know he will keep it, being not liable, like man, to change his sentiments, or design one thing to-day and the contrary to-morrow; but nobody imagines him under any compulsion or necessity, in case he could be supposed at any time desirous of violating it; so that when he performs, he acts with the same pure bounty and unlimited freedom as when he promises.

29. When we examine what gave rise to this notable discovery of everything certain being necessary, we shall find it spring from a mere quibble of words. What you will do, say they, you must do; for you cannot do otherwise so long as you are to do that, because you cannot do both. Who doubts it? Therefore I allow this to be a matter of necessity, not of prudence: nor would I recommend it to any man to deliberate, or make trial,

how he shall run and sit still at the same time, or ride on horseback while he goes in a coach: but for all that, what ails him that he might not omit the thing he has resolved upon, or will do, and take a contrary course? How sure soever I am of going to bed, still I may sit up all night, if I please, for neither God nor man hinders me; but I know I shall not, because I know it is in my option, and know what I choose to do: so my knowledge stands upon my freedom; for if I had it not, I might be compelled to do what I do not choose, and my action would be uncertain.

But my knowledge, they say, is only conjectural. What then? does not God know it too? and does not he know likewise, that he has left the issue to my option? and whether he has given me so much discretion as will withhold me from doing a silly thing merely to show what I can do? So these three points of Knowledge, the Discretion, the Liberty to use it, and the Event, are so far from overthrowing that they sustain and strengthen one another.

The difficulties we make spring from our conceiving too narrowly of the divine prescience; we consider God as foreknowing an event separately, without knowing or without contemplating the causes giving it birth: in this case indeed the foreknowledge must have a something, an inexplicable fatality attending it, for else it could not be absolute, because there might some unforeseen cause intervene to render it abortive. But the prescience of God is universal as well as absolute; when he knows what will come to pass, he knows the causes himself has provided for accomplishing it, nor can anybody who considers the matter at all, imagine him ever ignorant or forgetful of either; nay, he knows the one, because he knows the other; for if we could suppose him ignorant of the causes, he would not know their issue. Therefore in such instances where freedom is one of those causes, he foreknows that freedom, the motives inclining us to use it, and how those motives will operate; and consequently by the rule insisted on, it is as necessary we should enjoy that freedom, as in what manner we shall employ it.

30. Nevertheless they go on still to urge, that we cannot do otherwise than we shall do, not only because we cannot do both, but because we cannot omit what we certainly shall do, and take another course: for an event that will certainly happen, cannot fail of coming to pass, nor can the contrary take effect; but the divine prescience is an irrefragable evidence of this certainty, because if the thing were uncertain, the foreknowledge could not be absolute. Now there is no possibility that God should be mistaken; therefore none that anything foreknown by him should not take effect, or the contrary should fall out; then it is not possible for us to omit whatever it is impossible should fail of being done; so our power is gone; or if we have a natural ability either to do or to omit, we have no liberty to use it, bing confined to that particular way which is foreknown.

Now if they will please to throw this curious reasoning into the logical form of a syllogism, we may chance to show them it has four terms, and therefore concludes nothing. Whatever God foreknows, it is impossible the contrary should be done; what is impossible to be done, it is out of my power to do; therefore whatever God foreknows, it is out of my power to do to the contrary.

I shall not deny major nor minor; but if the word impossible should carry different senses as it stands in either, the whole chain will become a rope of sand, and the consequence limp lame behind. In order to canvass this point, let us have recourse to our present patroness, Philology, to mark out the several uses wherein we employ that term, together with

others relative thereto, such as, must, may, can, necessary, and the like, both in our familiar and serious discourses.

Possible, relates originally and most obviously to Power; for things are possible as far as we have power to perform them, but no further: and if it be asked, Whether it is possible to transmute lead into gold? you will understand by the question, whether it is in the power of man, by chymical process, or any other art or contrivance, to effect it.

But we often apply the term where we have nothing of power in our thoughts. Suppose, in playing at whist, I have only two cards left in my hand, but must win both tricks to save the game; my partner leads a trump, and the king was turned up on my left hand; in this case I shall put down the ace with hopes of succeeding, because it is possible the king may be alone. Now by possible, I do not mean in the power of anybody, or anything to make the king alone, or guarded: if chance ever had any power, she has executed it as soon as the cards were shuffled and cut, nor has she now any further concern in the affair. Therefore here the term denotes only the contingency of what other card lies in the same hand with the king, and is relative; for to him who holds the cards it is not possible they should be any other than what he sees them, though to me who do not see them, guarded or not guarded are equally possible.

On the other hand, whoever considers the pains I have taken on this crabbed subject, will think it impossible I should throw my labours into the fire as soon as I have completed them; not that he thinks anything of my powers, or supposes me to plod on until my arm is so benumbed that I cannot extend it to the grate; or that I write upon cloth of Asbetos, which will not consume in the flames; but because he thinks there is no chance I should instantly destroy what I have been so earnest to produce.

Thus Possible sometimes denotes the Power or Liberty we have to do a thing, as Impossible does the want of it, and sometimes only the contingency, or our knowledge or ignorance of an event, without the least reference to the powers producing it. There may be different degrees of possibility in what manner I shall spend my afternoon, according as people know more or less of my character, disposition, or ways of employing my time; but my power and my liberty must be the same, whatever other folks may think of me, or though there should be a hundred different opinions or degrees of knowledge about me. If I am under engagement to go with another whither he wants me, and somebody asks which way I am bound, I may say, it is possible to the Exchange, or it is possible to St. James's; but this leaves me no more at liberty than if it were absolutely impossible that one of them should not be the place. Or if I want to speak with a person whom I know not readily where he is, but am so sure of finding him, that I say it is impossible but I must see him; this does not abridge or any ways alter the liberty I should have to pursue or forbear my inquiries, were it possible my endeavours might prove ineffectual.

It avails nothing to tell us, that our knowledge at best can amount only to the highest probability of conjecture; for our business now lies with the propriety of language, and natural import of those expressions, wherein we use the words Possible or Impossible. Whatever refined notions we may have in our closets, we leave them behind, and take up common conceptions when we go abroad upon our common transactions: be our clearest knowledge ever so conjectural, we esteem it certain upon these occasions. Which of us in setting out upon a visit, a diversion, or an affair of business, apprehends a possibility of not arriving at the place of his destination; yet

at the same time does not apprehend himself at liberty to alter his course in any part of his progress? but if the impossibility of an event failing, implied necessity in the agent, the idea of such impossibility, however erroneous, yet while entertained, must banish the idea of freedom; but whether it does so, I appeal to the judgment and hourly experience of all mankind. And if our Antagonists have found a new sense in the word Impossible, unknown to the rest of the world, they will do well to explain their idea in a manner enabling us to understand their peculiar meaning.

To consider the other words of the like import, we say it may rain, or be fair to-morrow; and when we say this, we think nothing of any choice in the clouds or the air to produce either weather, as the word naturally implies; for what we may do lies in our option to do, or to forbear. And it is one thing when speaking of a prisoner for debt, for whom we have just procured a release, we say, Now he may go home to his family; and quite another, when speaking of a person gone out upon a tour of diversion, we say, He may come home to-day: in one case, May expresses the liberty he has to do as he likes: in the other, it denotes only the chance there is in what manner he will use his liberty; for though I should know the released debtor would not go home, still I shall think he may if he will; but if I know the traveller's intention to stay out longer, I shall not think it possible he may come home to-day.

Nor shall we scruple to use the word Can upon this occasion; for if we judge it not possible that he may come, it is the same thing as believing it certain that he cannot come, yet without idea of any imbecility or restraint to prevent him.

So likewise Must and Necessary, considered by themselves, imply a force compelling to one particular action, or an insurmountable bar against all others: if I must attend upon a trial, I am not at liberty to stay away; if my health renders exercise necessary, I must go abroad some how or other, and in that case am necessitated to walk when debarred the use of all conveyances. But suppose a friend has some business with me, which requires no sort of haste, but I know he loves to take the first convenient opportunity for dispatching whatever he has to do: upon being asked when I expect to see him, I may say, perhaps, not to-day, nor to-morrow, nor all this week; but I think he must necessarily come before the month is out.

Nor do we scruple applying the same terms to things inanimate, which though really necessary agents we generally conceive and speak of as having powers and liberty. Water compressed in a fire engine must necessarily rush through the spout, being forced to mount upwards against its nature, and because it can find none other vent. But if a careless servant does not mind to thrust the spigot fast into the barrel, the beer must necessarily run all away: in using this expression, we think nothing of the force of gravitation impelling bodies downwards, but only the certainty of the mischief ensuing which we apprehend: for that the liquor being left to its liberty will follow the natural propensity it has to descend, and will exert a power to drive away the loose spigot obstructing its passage.

31. Anybody with a little attention, may recollect a thousand instances wherein the impossibility of an event not coming to pass, implies no more than a denial of all hazard that it may not come to pass; which is neither an affirmation nor denial of power or freedom in the causes bringing it forth to produce the contrary. Therefore in cases where we need not, or lie under no necessity of doing a thing, where we can, and may, and it is easily pos-

sible for us to act differently; yet we may be so sure of our measures as that they must necessarily take effect, that they cannot, there is an impossibility they should fail of succeeding, or we should omit to employ them; which latter impossibility is a foundation strong enough to support the highest degree of Foreknowledge, and consequently Foreknowledge may well be absolute without putting a force upon us, or cramping us the least in our liberty.

Thus have I endeavoured to rescue mankind from slavery, from the dread of force, restraint, and control, hanging continually over them, not like Epicurus by pulling Providence from her throne, and setting up the Anarchy of Chance in her stead; but by showing the consistency of her government with the free use of those powers allotted us, and proving human liberty one of the ministers to execute her purposes.

If the foregoing Observations upon this dark and intricate subject shall render it intelligible to others, and shall have the same weight upon them as they seem to me to deserve: then in those seasons wherein, as I may say, God gives them a holyday to follow their own inclinations, they will move briskly and cheerfully, without thought of any other restraint than, what I hope they will never wish to throw aside, Innocence and Propriety; and when he calls them to his services, if they do but manage to bring their minds into a proper disposition, they will find the performance of them a state of perfect Freedom.

32. Nevertheless, we have not done with our Disputants yet, for if we can defend our Liberty against infringement by universal Providence and absolute Foreknowledge, they change their attack upon another quarter, namely, the justice of Reward and Punishment in the situation of mankind we have represented: for, say they, if the Will of God be fulfilled on earth as well as in heaven, who hath ever resisted his Will? why then doth he punish? As to Reward, they find no fault with that being conferred upon them unmerited, so the only difficulty remains with respect to punishment; and in order to answer their question, let us examine what is the proper and natural foundation of Punishment.

Men are apt enough to inflict it for injuries received, with none other view than to wreak their resentment; and the Righteous, when having most completely mastered their passions, still feel an abhorrence rise in their breasts against enormous crimes, although no ways affecting themselves, nor capable of hurting them. What, then, is this Resentment and this Abhorrence innate? Suppose they were, yet we cannot ascribe our passions and aversions to the Almighty, or imagine him punishing in order to remove a loathsome object from his sight which it gives him pain to behold. But Mr. Locke has long since exploded the doctrine of innate ideas, and if the idea of Injury was acquired, those of Resentment and Abhorrence, being its offspring, must be younger.

In our chapter on the Passions we have traced Anger to its origin, and found it derived from Expedience; for children having often relieved themselves from whatever oppressed them by a violent exertion of their power against the cause of it, contract a habit of violence, and practise it afterwards without view to the consequences; satisfaction being translated from the end to the means.

The abhorrence of villany, as well when proposed to ourselves, as practised by others, is one of the moral senses, which we have shown in the proper place, issue from the same fountain; they may indeed be conveyed to particular persons by education, by precept, by example, and sympathy;

but whoever acquired them first, learned them by observation of their necessary tendency to good order and happiness, and by experience of the mischiefs resulting from those practices they would restrain. The frequent view of these good effects casts a value upon the sentiments producing them, and the translation being once completely made, desire fixes upon them as upon its ultimate object.

We find judgment does the same with respect to truth translated from the Postulata to the Problem demonstrated: the equality between the squares of the two sides and hypotenuse in a rectangular triangle, serves for a basis in mathematical and mechanical operations without our running back perpetually through the whole process whereby Euclid convinced us of its being a truth. In like manner when our moral senses are grown vigorous, we follow their impulse without thinking of any higher principle first recommending them, and many of us without acknowledging any such principle.

Now I would not by any means lessen their influence, I rather wish it were stronger than it is, for we very seldom stand in a situation to discern the expedience of our actions, nor, where it lies anything remote, have we strength of mind enough to pursue it; but these moral senses serve as excellent guides to direct, and spurs to stimulate us towards the attainment of happiness that would otherwise escape us. Nevertheless it must be owned they partake of the nature of passion, having the like qualities, the like vehemence and manner of operation, and may be styled virtuous appetites, as being the produce of reason and industry rather than of nature. They are to be ranked among the Scyons which Plato told us Urania grafted upon the wild stocks in Psyche's garden; and which his master afterwards put us in mind were apt to run luxuriant, unless kept within bounds by a proper tendance.

Therefore it is one thing to consult our rules of action for shaping our conduct thereby, and another to examine the rules themselves for determining in what manner we shall establish, or rectify them. For a military discipline consists in the strict subordination of the soldiers to the officers, and the officers to the general; so the little state of man is never so well disciplined as when the moral senses have the entire command of our motions, but lie themselves under control of sober consideration and sound judgment. While in the hurry of action, we have not leisure to consult the general, but must push bravely on whither our immediate officers lead us; nor indeed is consultation the business then, but intrepidity, vigour, and alertness. Therefore the virtuous man acts because it is right and just, becoming and laudable, and forbears what appears wrong and base, unworthy and shocking to his thought; he follows the motions of zeal, honour, shame, decency, natural affection, civility, as he feels them rise in his breast; or if doubts arise he tries the moral senses by one another, and adheres to that which carries the strongest lustre, and highest excellency in his imagination, without considering further why he suffers himself to be guided by their influence, or whence it was derived. For the greatest part of mankind know not a why nor a whence, but take up their principles partly from their parents and tutors, partly from custom and general estimation; and those who do investigate them to the fountain, cannot carry their investigations in their head upon common occasions.

But in seasons of deliberation, when admitted into the general's tent, having the instructions and intelligences laid before us, and sitting in council upon the operations of the campaign, it would be absurd to take an offi-

cer s own testimonial of his merit, or give him his orders because they are such as he is most fond of executing; we are only to regard the public service, what are each man's abilities, and how he may best conduct himself to promote it. So if we have sufficient lights and opportunity to take our moral senses under examination, in order to moderate what extravagancies they may have run into, or determine the rank among them in the command of our powers: it would be no less preposterous to try their rectitude by what themselves suggest to be right, or to settle their degrees of authority upon any other foundation than their several tendencies towards the general happiness, wherein we shall always find our own contained.

33. Now in matters of punishment, when we have it in our power, let us regard the heinousness of the offence, together with all circumstances that may aggravate or abate our abhorrence of it as beheld by our moral sense; but when we are to examine the foundation we have for entertaining this abhorrence, we shall find none other than the expedience and necessity of punishment to preserve order, and good faith, and honesty among mankind. Even those who take private revenge, when called upon to justify their conduct, always plead that otherwise they should lie open to perpetual insults; which shows that the only reasonable excuse for resentment is not strictly the injury received, but the prevention of injuries for the future. Therefore reason, as well as authority, enjoins us to forgive our brother not only seven times, but until seventy times seven, unless where animadversion is necessary either for our own quiet and benefit, or that of others.

And there is a species of punishment called chastisement, which has none other object beside the benefit of the party upon whom it is exercised. Parents and schoolmasters may not be displeased at unlucky tricks played by their lads, as showing a sagacity and sprightliness they delight to behold; yet they will not suffer them to pass with impunity, lest it should generate idleness and other mischiefs; here is no abhorrence striking the moral sense, nor are the boys disliked the worse for their sallies of youth and ingenuity ill applied; so the chastisement is not for miscarriages committed, but for future enormities which might be committed.

It is true the judge passes sentence upon criminals, by stated rules, because he is no more than a minister to speak the sense of the law; but the legislature in establishing the law regards none other rules than those respecting the public utility; therefore equal punishments are appointed for offences of unequal enormity. For the law hangs for stealing the value of five shillings, but does no more for murder; and some go wholly unpunished, such as ingratitude, intemperance, entailing diseases or poverty upon families by gallantries or extravagance, because they cannot be inquired into without causing confusion and worse inconveniences. On the other hand, when the title to a throne is so disputable that many honest well-disposed persons are drawn by mere error of judgment to take part on the unfortunate side; they are adjudged and executed as rebels, because it is necessary to maintain the authority of government, and tranquillity of the state.

34. Should it be objected, that this proves the contrary to what we have laid down, because the law, whose basis is utility, does not govern us in our estimation of Demerit; for we compassionate instead of detesting the deluded malcontent, while we acknowledge the expedience and necessity of the law which condemns him, and think the abandoned debauchee deserving of punishment which the law cannot provide for him; therefore we build our judgment upon other grounds than those of utility. I shall answer,

that as the law is not the sole measure of justice, so neither is it the sole fountain of utility: for be the polity of a nation ever so well regulated, or ever so wisely administered, the people must still do something for themselves in order to complete their happiness; and Providence has reserved to his own management the putting a check upon some enormities which the law cannot reach, nor human sagacity discover or prevent.

Therefore that utility which the provisions of the law cannot totally compass, may still remain for the foundation of private animadversion and censure: nor is it a small argument of its being so, that we naturally look upon the greatness of mischief done as an aggravation of guilt in the perpetrator. If an unwholesome potion be given to make a man sick for a week, it is an injury; if it bring on an incurable disease, it is a more heinous offence; if death ensue, it is a crying sin of murder.

Well, but you say the mischief must be designed, or there will be no crime at all: the greater degree of mischief is only an evidence of deeper blackness in the design: so that properly speaking it is not the damage done, but depravity of heart in the doer, which raises your abhorrence and wishes for vengeance; for when assured of the design, you pronounce the guilt the same, feel the same abhorrence and wish, although its purpose be utterly frustrated, and no damage at all ensue.

Why this is the very thing I have been contending for all along, that the true ground of punishment is not the mischief done, or the crime committed, but the prevention of future enormities, productive of future mischiefs, and this object I think may fairly rank under the class of utility.

We have found in the former part of this work, that the volitions giving birth to our actions depend upon the present motives occurring to our thought, which are either what our judgment represents as most expedient or our imagination as most alluring and desirable; and these motives are suggested by the opinions, the sentiments, the inclinations and habits we have contracted: when desire fixes upon practices of pernicious tendency, this is called a Depravity of mind, or vulgarly, though improperly, a Depravity of Will, by a metonyme of cause for effect, because the state of the mind, and desires in the heart, influence the Will, and of course produce actions conformable thereto; for a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.

Therefore this depravity of heart being productive of bad effects, whenever the season and opportunity serves to bring them to maturity, becomes justly odious upon account of the poisonous fruits it bears. But as punishment, animadversion, and censure, being grievous to the party suffering them, tend to dissociate desire from the sentiments whereto they are annexed, and work amendment, or in other words, to give men a disgust for the vices rendering them obnoxious thereto: or at least to restrain them from breaking forth into act, and discourage others from entertaining the like; it is this use which renders the punishment merited and just: for I appeal to any considerate person, whether he would punish, or ascribe to a depravity of heart, any action or sentiment whatever, which could never do the least hurt either to the owner, or any person in the world beside.

35. For this reason freedom of action, and so much understanding as may make the party sensible for what the punishment was inflicted, are always esteemed necessary requisites to render him obnoxious thereto; because punishment operating upon the imagination, and through that upon the Will, where either of these two channels are wanting, becomes useless, and consequently unjust. Therefore sly revenges which may be mistaken for

accidents, and nobody can know they were the effect of resentment, though sometimes practised by spiteful persons, have never been holden warrantable by the judicious: nor will a righteous man punish where the transgressor had not liberty of choice, nor where the reason of his punishing cannot be understood.

If a brick tumbles down upon you, it would be ridiculous to fall a whipping, or breaking it, because such discipline could contribute nothing towards preventing other bricks afterwards from tumbling upon your own or somebody else's head; but had our treatment with brickbats any influence upon their future motions, we should form rules of justice for our dealings with them as well as with one another. When the puppy dog fouls your parlour, you beat him for it; but then you rub his nose in the filth to make him sensible why he is beaten; and you think this severity justifiable, without discerning any depravity of heart in the beast, only because it secures your rooms against the like disaster for the future: but if he has stolen a woodcock from the larder, and you do not discover the theft till next morning, when your correction can do no good, it would be cruelty to chastise him.

Mischiefs done by mere accident are judged pardonable: but why? because punishment has no influence upon accidents: for in some cases where better care may prevent them, we do not scruple to animadvert in order to spur men to greater vigilance: the statute of Anne lays a heavy penalty upon servants setting a house on fire undesignedly; nor did I ever hear that statute complained of as contrary to natural justice.

Why are military punishments severer than all others? Is there greater depravity in disobedience to an officer, than to a civil magistrate, a parent, or a master? Not so, but because the service requires a stricter discipline and a more implicit obedience. Nor can you pretend the soldiers consent upon enlisting, for many of them are inveigled to enlist by drink, or by the bounty-money, without knowing what they undertake, or considering the rules they submit to: besides that you subject the impressed man to the same severities with the volunteer.

Why is the law of fashion so strict upon little matters that a man would make himself more ignominious by wearing his wig the wrong side outwards, than by corresponding with the Pope, or the Pretender? unless because censure, exclamation, and ridicule, being the only penalties you have to enforce it, you must lay them on the more lustily to keep the thoughtless world to decency in matters wherein they have none other restraint upon them.

Thus whatever species of punishment we fix our eye upon, we shall always find it deducible from utility; but the deduction is too long to carry constantly in our heads, nor can every head trace it out; neither do we upon all occasion stand in a situation to discern the consequences of our punishing, or sparing: therefore the judicious, from their observation of those causes, so far as they can investigate them, strike out rules of justice, and distinguish degrees of wickedness, which they hang up in public as marks, or erect as posts of direction, to guide our steps in the journey of life; and inculcate a moral sense or abhorrence of evil, to serve as a guard to protect us against inordinate desires that might tempt us to injustice, and as a measure to apportion our resentment against the heinousness of an offence, or depravity of an offender.

Such of us as are well disciplined look up to these marks continually, and shape their steps accordingly, both with respect to what they shall avoid

themselves, and what notice they shall take of the proceedings and sentiments of their fellow-travellers, without thinking of anything further; and much the greater part of us without knowing of anything further to be thought of: when these latter get a smattering of philosophy, you hear them declaim incessantly upon the essential and unalterable rules of right and wrong, independent on God himself, having a nature he did not give them, and being an obligation upon him that he must not break through.

36. But the all-seeing eye of God stretches wide and far, beholds all nature and all futurity in one unbounded prospect: therefore needs no marks nor rules to direct his measures, nor moral senses to protect against temptations which cannot approach him: for in every application of second causes he bears his ultimate end constantly in view, and pursues it unerringly and invariably. What this end may be, perhaps it were in vain for us to inquire, but the utmost point beyond which we can conceive nothing further, is the good and happiness of his creatures: this then we must regard as the centre wherein all his dispensations terminate, and by the tendency whereto he regulates his measures of justice.

Now Punishment must be acknowledged an evil to the sufferer while under the lash of it, therefore unless we will suppose the fountain of Goodness sometimes to terminate his views upon evil, we must allow that he never punishes, unless from some greater benefit to redound therefrom, either to the offender or some other part of the creation. What other benefits may arise therefrom we know not, but we know its tendency to check or cure a depravity of heart where it is, to discourage the contracting of it where it is not, and consequently to prevent the mischievous fruits growing from that evil root.

Therefore as men are constituted, this remedy is necessary to restrain enormities from abounding among them, unless you will suppose a miraculous interposition, which is not the usual method of providence; and it is this necessity which justifies the punishment, and ascertains the measure of it. If we go on to inquire further, why men are so constituted, this will involve us in another question, which never was, and perhaps never will be determined by the sons of Adam, namely, why pain, distress, affliction, and uneasiness of all kinds, were permitted at all in the world; for moral evil were no evil if there were no natural; because how could I do wrong, if no hurt or damage could ensue therefrom to anybody? and is no greater than the mischiefs whereof it may be productive. Therefore it is natural evil which creates the difficulty, and the quantity of this evil is the same from whatever causes arising. "Think ye those eighteen, upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, were sinners above all other inhabitants of Jerusalem?" We are told, nay: yet the pain, the loss of life, and other damages they sustained, were the same in quantity as if they had brought down the ruin upon their own heads for their misconduct.

Let any man explain to me clearly how the permission of mischievous accidents is consistent with our ideas of infinite goodness, and I will undertake to show him by the lights he shall afford me, how the permission of moral evil is likewise consistent. The only solution of this difficulty I apprehend must be taken from the imperfection of our understanding, for we have observed in a former place, that infinite Goodness and infinite Power, considered in the abstract, seem incompatible: which shows there is something wrong in our conceptions, and that we are not competent judges of what belongs, and what is repugnant to goodness. But God knows though we do not, and is good and righteous in all his ways; therefore whatever method

he pursues is an evidence of its rectitude beyond all other evidences that can offer to us for the contrary.

37. Justice regards solely the degree of depravity existent, nor has any concern with the manner how it came to exist: a man bribed with a large sum of money is not excused by the guilt of the employer, although perhaps he would never have thought of committing the crime without that temptation; and if evil communication corrupts good manners, the corruption coming through this channel does not exempt it from censure. The perpetration indeed of villanies, without any instigation or inducement, aggravates their heinousness, because it indicates a greater depravity of heart; but the degree of depravity once ascertained, always sets the measure to the detestation and the demerit of the offender, without inquiring into the source from whence it was derived; and we shall find it so in whatever case we consider maturely and candidly.

Suppose you and I delegated by Heaven to govern some little district, with absolute power of life and death over the inhabitants, with perfect knowledge of the secrets of their hearts, and were sitting in council together upon the measures of executing our commission, which we were resolved to do with exact justice and integrity. Suppose further, what has been shown not to be the real fact, but in order to make our case the stronger for our present purpose, let us suppose that men had been hitherto utterly destitute of Freewill, but guided in all their motions by an external influence; and their sentiments and dispositions thrown upon them, without their own act, by the impulse of necessary causes; but at the moment when we entered upon our office, this influence and impulse were taken off, and they were put into the condition of common men, whom we have conversed with in the world: how should we proceed to manage with them?

In the first place, it may be presumed we should agree upon a general amnesty for the past, in consideration of the force they had lain under; and in the next we should contrive measures for their future well-being, and finding them in possession of powers of action, together with liberty to use them, we should study to turn their Freewill into courses most advantageous to the community. If we saw vices and malignity among them, we might probably feel an abhorrence and detestation thereof, for I do not suppose ourselves divested of the moral senses we had acquired before; but this sentiment would be like that aversion we have to spiders, toads, and adders, who did not make themselves what they are, but received their venom and ugliness from the hand of nature; yet I hope we should be too equitable to punish any man merely because we did not like his looks, unless where those looks manifested a badness of heart, productive of mischief to himself or his neighbours, and then we should apply such punishments, notes of infamy, or censures, as we judged most proper for preventing his ill qualities from breaking forth into act, or spreading the contagion elsewhere; thinking our proceedings justifiable by their experience, and regulating the measure of our punishments by their several aptness to answer the purpose intended.

38. If then we find that human reason, when acting most conformably to our ideas of prudence and equity, would restrain depravity, from whatever sources arising, by adequate punishments, why should we arraign the justice of God for proceeding in the like manner? For he beholds the works of his hands, and discerns whereof they are made, nor is he unacquainted with the operations and uses of second causes. He has made moral evil the general, and, as some believe, the sole fountain of natural: He has given man freedom to choose between good and evil: He knows that vices will

abound among them, which will influence them to use their freedom to pernicious purposes, and has appointed punishment as one of the springs to operate upon the human mind for restraining the growth of wickedness, and preventing its bad effects. Can we then doubt that he will employ all the springs of action in those uses, and upon those occasions, wherein he in his wisdom judges them respectively proper? or what rule of justice does he violate by so doing?

Why he permitted moral evil, is a consideration quite foreign to the present subject, and can only produce that entanglement naturally consequent upon blending discussions of different natures together: for whether we can reconcile that permission with our ideas, or no, still evil being once permitted, becomes a foundation for justice to ward off the bad effects that might ensue from it: for justice cannot stand at variance with goodness, nor can one ever forbid what the other recommends.

As the judge passes sentence upon the house-breaker and the assassin, not in animosity to them, but in regard to the honest man, that he may sleep quietly in his bed, and go about his lawful occasions without hazard of his life: so God punishes the wicked not in wrath and detestation, but in mercy and loving-kindness, many times to the delinquent himself, but always either to him or his fellow-creatures.

Therefore to the question, Who hath ever resisted his Will? Why then doth he punish? It may be answered, To secure the further accomplishment of his Will, and to effect his gracious purposes towards those whom he intended to preserve from the like wickedness or the pernicious consequences springing therefrom: views wherein we cannot find the least tincture of injustice or arbitrary proceeding.

39. But it is not enough to justify the ways of God, unless we endeavour likewise to obviate the perverse consequences men sometimes draw from the Will of God being constantly fulfilled. For, say they, if that will always take place, then we have no Will of our own, being pinned down to one particular manner of proceeding, which it is his Will should be taken.

But if human action were necessary, as indeed it is not, we have seen that would not excuse iniquity from punishment, as being an application of the proper cause for preventing the growth and mischiefs of it: and this persuasion sufficiently inculcated, would necessarily, if the operation of motives be necessary, drive them into a course of thinking and acting productive of happiness; and if they attain the possession of this treasure, it is not much matter whether they apprehend themselves procuring it by necessary or voluntary agency: therefore they will do well to contemplate the penalties annexed to evil-doing; for it will do them good one way or other, if not as exhortation to work upon a free agent, at least as a salutary medicine to rectify the disorders in their machine.

But an event being agreeable to the Will of another, does not always hinder it from being the choice of our own Will too: what I do by the command of a superior, while I pay him a cheerful and ready obedience, is done by the Will of both. It is lucky, you say, I stand so disposed, for I must have done the thing had I been ever so desirous of the contrary; so I am in the condition of a man sitting in a room where the doors are locked upon him without his perceiving it; he is actually a prisoner, though he does not feel his confinement, because he happens to choose the only thing he has in his power, that is, to stay where he is.

But what if I do a good office for an acquaintance to whom I owe no obligation, nor have other inducement than good nature? do not I gratify his

Will and my own at the same time? Or what if an artful politician, who can see through and through me, leads me dexterously to co-operate with his designs: although the issue should fall out beside or contrary to my intention, still the steps I am made to take by his management were the work of my own Will. So when God puts in use the proper causes for producing an event, we need not fear but he will adapt them so wisely as that they shall not fail to accomplish his Will; nevertheless, if among these causes there be the motives fit to work upon a free agent, the act performed is as completely the Will of that agent, as if his ideas had derived from any other source, or been thrown up by the fortuitous declination of Epicurus' atoms.

The fallacy here lies in the same equivocation of language taken notice of in the foregoing pages, to which I refer anybody who thinks it needful to revise what has been already offered: for the Will of God must be fulfilled in none other sense than what was absolutely foreknown, or contained in the plan of Providence, must come to pass; not by compulsion or necessity, but by removal of all hazard to the contrary.

40. Another fond imagination may start up in men's heads from the never-failing completion of the divine Will, as if it justified them in all the follies they have been guilty of; for, say they, whatever we have done must have been agreeable to the Will of God, because having taken effect; for nothing has fallen out that was not so; therefore wherein have we done amiss? for who hath ever resisted his will? And they put this question by way of defiance, to give any other than one certain answer.

But they deceive themselves by their manner of wording the question; for had it been asked, who hath defeated his Will? we could not have produced an instance, nor yet would it have served their purpose, nor furnished an excuse for their misconduct, that we could not; but who hath resisted his Will? is no such unanswerable question; for the Will may be resisted without success, and then come to pass notwithstanding; or it may be misunderstood, and in that case accomplished by the very endeavour to do something contrary to it.

Suppose you lend money to a friend upon his note; he being at a distance, and fully confiding in your honour, sends you a letter with the value inclosed, only desiring you will burn the note, that your executors may not find it to charge him with the debt; but before you can fulfil his request, somebody else finds the note, who, having a spite against you, throws it into the fire with intention to disable you from recovering the sum contained in it: here he acts in direct opposition to your Will; his design is nothing else than to cross and thwart you; yet in so doing he does the very thing you will should be done, and would have done yourself, if he had not been beforehand with you. In like manner we may, and too frequently do, resist the Will of God, but by that very resistance accomplish it; for we act in the dark, scarce ever knowing what is his real Will, or that, its constant aim, the good of his creation, with the greatest part whereof we have no visible connection, nor the least suspicion of what concern their interests have with our proceedings.

We have often heard of a distinction between the secret and declared Will; the latter is so much as we can discover by the best use of our understanding, which being fallible, will sometimes discover to us what is not the truth; yet this is the guide God has given us for our direction, and while we act conformably thereto, although the event by disappointing our endeavours should prove the secret Will to have been otherwise, never-

theless our honest, though mistaken zeal for his service, will stand approved in his sight, and engage his bountiful favour towards us.

Whereas on the other hand, if we perversely run counter to the admonitions of this guide, it will avail us nothing that our being permitted to take our course proves it agreeable to the secret Will; for God does not punish in anger, nor for having been disappointed of his purpose; a cause of resentment which can never befall him; but with the view of a physician who prescribes a smart operation necessary to cure a distemper that would destroy the patient, or infect the neighbourhood. And if we regard our vicious dispositions in this light, which is the true one, we must behold them with the same aversion we should a loathsome disease, whether we apprehend it brought upon us by our mismanagement, or inflicted by the hand of heaven; which aversion once become hearty and strong, may be trusted to take its chance for the effect it will have upon our conduct.

41. For it is not so material to give a right judgment upon what is past and cannot be undone, as to take right measures for the future. Therefore lest any should encourage themselves in indolence, or wrong doing, under pretence that since the Will of God is always punctually fulfilled, whatever shall be done, good or bad, must be conformable to that Will, so they need not scruple to take the courses they like, being sure to accomplish it at all events; let them consider, that since that Will shall take effect at all events, they may as well accomplish it by doing right as wrong, being equally sure either way, that what they shall do will be the thing that was to come to pass: if then the Will of God be done in both cases, and they have their choice in what manner they shall accomplish it, had they not better choose the manner most advantageous to themselves, than one pernicious and destructive to them?

For our business is to pursue our own truest interests; we have nothing to do with the secret Will; that will work itself out without our solicitude to complete it; the end assigned us to work out, is none other than our own happiness, to be pursued carefully and industriously, according to the lights afforded us.

Good and evil lie before us; we have powers of action, with liberty to use them: if our powers at any time be limited, we have still some scope to range in; if our passions or evil habits abridge our liberty, still we may strive and struggle against them: in all cases there is something or other wherein we may exert our endeavours: let us then apply them where they may turn most to our benefit; but above all beware of reducing ourselves to such a deplorable condition, as that even mercy and loving kindness must lay a heavy weight of punishment upon us in order to effect its gracious purposes.

42. There is still another quarter of the wilderness we have not yet explored, where the giant Fate stalks along with irresistible strides, bearing down the forest like tender blades of corn before him, forcing his passage through ramparts and rocks: the textures of human contrivance are but as the dewy cobwebs of autumn across his way: nor can Freewill find a place for the sole of her foot among the heapy ruins wherewith he bestrews the ground.

But before we enter into an examination of the courses of Fate, let us, according to our usual custom, endeavour to understand what is properly meant by the word. We find it often confounded with Necessity, or the impulsive operation of necessary causes: for the Stratonic and Democritic Atheists understood it, when they ascribed all events to Fate, that is, to

the actions of matter depending upon one another in a continued series from all eternity: and Homer's Moira crataia, strong-handed Fate, has been generally translated by the Latin poets, dura Necessitas, inflexible Necessity.

But I conceive these two very different things in common understanding, if we may reckon Necessity as here used a common idea, for I rather take necessary agency to be terms belonging to the speculative vocabulary; but apprehend that operations whereto they may be applicable, cannot upon that account be styled the Work of Fate, in propriety of language. The circulation of sap in vegetables, the contraction and dilatation of their fibres, the action of the sun, air, and mould, contributing to make them yield their several fruits, are all necessary agencies: yet when a man plants a peach-tree, can you properly say it is therefore fated that he shall gather peaches and not plums or filberts therefrom? or if he sows oats in his field, does he think anything of a fatality against his reaping wheat or barley? So neither if we knew a collection of atoms having motions among them which must form a regular world, should we esteem everything fatal that might be produced by them.

But Fate, derived from the Latin, Fari, signifying to speak, must denote the word spoken by some intelligent Being, who has power to make his words good: so that whatever he says shall be done, will infallibly come to pass; and does not at all relate to the causes or manner whereby it is accomplished, unless those causes be made to act in consequence of the word spoken.

As to the Parcæ, supposed in heathen mythology to spin the thread of life, and by their scissors to determine the period of it, I should understand this thread only to express the series of events befalling every man, not the series of causes operating to bring them forth. And the Pagans seem unsettled in their notions concerning the author of Fate; sometimes it is their Jove who fixes it by his arbitrary decree, as in the ill successes of the Grecian army; sometimes he is only an executive power, subordinate to the Parcæ, compelled by their spinning to do or permit what he does not like, as in the death of Sarpedon.

However, leaving them to their own imaginations, with us who acknowledge one supreme Governor subordinate in nothing nor controllable by any other Power, Fate, or Destiny, must be the same with the decree of the Almighty; nor can we doubt that whatever he has decreed will not fail of coming to pass.

43. But this decree works no effect of itself, being no efficient cause; for if you order your servant to do a thing, the business is done by the efficacy of his action, not of your's; a command given to a subordinate, we shall acknowledge compulsive; therefore if any man knows of a decree issued from the Almighty concerning something he is to do, I shall never advise him to strive against it, nor think himself at liberty to do the contrary.

But it is not this kind of decrees that are supposed to generate Fatality, which arises from those unknown to us, confining our actions to the course suited for bringing forth the destined event: yet even in this case it is not the word spoken and never heard by us, but something consequent upon it that imposes the Fatality. We are told indeed, that God said, Let there be Light, and there was Light; yet we cannot imagine the Light sprung forth without some exertion of Omnipotence to produce it: for when after-

wards he said, Let us make man after our own image, nevertheless man was not made until he moulded the dust of the earth into a human body, and breathed thereinto the breath of life: therefore when we say God created all things by his word, we do not understand that they produced themselves out of nonentity, in obedience to the order given, nor that this order was an efficient cause of their existence; but intend only to express the facility wherewith the divine operations are performed, similar to that of a man in authority, causing what he pleased to be done upon the word of command.

Very true, you say: nobody imagines the sound of words spoken can work anything. But when God pronounces his decree, he accompanies it with some act of power efficacious and irresistible to enforce the execution: or he watches over the tendency of second causes, and turns them by his secret influence to co-operate towards bringing forth the destined event: in both cases he abridges human liberty; for what is ordained must inevitably come to pass; nor can all the art or power of man turn it aside; for the Fatality hanging over us confines our choice to one certain train of objects, or by privately counteracting us, baffles our utmost endeavours, when turned the contrary way.

44. This seems to be the ordinary way of considering this matter, and the concomitant exertion of power makes the difference between a decree and a command, for both are supposed to proceed from the word of God. We are told, he said, Let there be Light, and there was light: we are likewise told, that he said, Thou shalt not murder; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not commit adultery; nevertheless men do still murder, and steal, and commit adultery, notwithstanding the word spoken. So the word of God operates nothing of itself when delivered as a command, nor unless when delivered as a decree: because in the latter case only, it is accompanied with an exertion of Omnipotence, or a determination to exert it when occasion shall require.

But the idea of a determination, to use power whenever requisite for accomplishing a decree, arises from our narrow conception of the proceedings of God taken from our own manner of proceeding, as observed already in § 20, and the latter part of § 29. For when we resolve upon the compassing of any distant purpose, we can scarce ever lay our measures so surely but that they may fail of the issue intended; so we are forced to watch over and correct them from time to time as we shall find occasion; or accidents may intervene which will require our further endeavours to prevent their defeating our design: or many times we know not what measures are proper until we have seen the tendency of other causes, and conduct of other persons any ways affecting the end we have in view; and then we must employ such power and skill as we are masters of, in order to bring things into the train we would have them take. From this experience of ourselves, we are led to think the same of the Almighty, whom we conceive as having destined certain particular events, but in general left the powers of nature and free agents to take their own course, until they chance to take a tendency contrary to his designs, and then he controls and turns them by his secret influence, so as to make them co-operate therewith.

Now a little reflection may show how injurious this notion is to the wisdom and power of God, representing him as fixing indeed upon certain purposes, but uncertain in what manner they shall be brought to pass until the tendency his second causes shall happen to take points out the measures

necessary for turning them into their destined course; and thus giving chance a share in the government of the world, liable indeed to his control, but working of herself whenever he does not interfere, and even furnishing employment for his wisdom and power, by the errors she commits.

45. But when we consider, that all events, as well those esteemed fortuitous as others, must proceed from certain causes, which derived their existence and efficacy mediately or immediately from the first; and when we contemplate his Omniscience, extending to everything that can be supposed the object of knowledge, we shall find reason to convince us that nothing comes to pass unless in consequence of some act of his; and that whenever he acts, he knows precisely what he does, together with the remotest and minutest consequences to result from his doings.

For what bounds shall we set to his intelligence? If our own lies confined within a small compass, it is owing to the scantiness of our organs, those necessary instruments of our perception. We have but two hands, so can touch no more than they will reach to; we have eyes only before us, so can behold no further than half the circle surrounding us: the tablet of our memory, the chart of our imagination, the line of our reflection, have their appointed measures, so we can recollect, or calculate, or contemplate, no more than the ideas they contain.

But God perceives not by organs, neither meditates by animal spirits, or the little fibres of the brain, nor receives his notices by channels, whose number or contents might be computed, so as to determine the precise quantity they are capable of conveying. What then is there to set the limitation to his knowledge; or by what rule or measure can we ascertain the bounds? Can he comprehend a million of ideas and no more? Does he clearly discover all events to happen within the ensuing century, and no longer? Do the concerns of empires so occupy his thoughts that he has none to spare for the peasant, the labourer, or the beggar? Are the affairs of men so burthensome to his mind, that he has no room to think of the mouse and the wren, the emmet and the mite, and the green myriads of the peopled grass, the many-tribed weeds of the field, or the dancing motes that glitter in the noontide beams?

Since then we know of no boundaries to circumscribe the divine Omniscience, but that it may extend to everything without overlooking anything, and discern remotest consequences in their present causes, why should we scruple to admit that he gave being to those causes with a view to their consequences? and on the formation of a world disposed his substances, material and spiritual, with such properties, powers, situations, motions, and ideas, as should produce the exact series of events he intended to bring forth?

In this case there is no occasion nor room for controlling or altering the operation of second causes, they being already adjusted to answer all the purposes they were destined to complete. And if there be supernatural interpositions (which I neither affirm nor deny) we cannot suppose them made upon unforeseen emergencies to supply defects in the original contrivance; but comprised therein, as being judged proper for manifestation of the divine power and government to intelligent creatures, and worked up into one uniform plan, together with the operations of secondary agents.

46. In this view of the economy of Providence, we see that any absolute decree or secret fatality to enforce the execution of a design against the tendency of second causes to turn it aside, must be superfluous, provision being already made in perfect wisdom for every event, which is to take

effect, by disposition of the causes proper to give it birth. Nor will any of those causes deviate into another tendency than that they were calculated to take.

Thus it appears that all things fall out according to the will and disposition of God, and conformably to the scheme of his Providence, working for the most part, if not always, by the ministry of material or voluntary agents: but the methods whereby this ministry is conducted are various. Some parts of the plan are accomplished by the choice and industry of man, instigated thereto by appetites, judgments, imaginations, desires, obligations, dangers, and other motives; other parts are executed by the stated laws of nature, such as the instinct of brutes, action of the elements, powers of vegetation, qualities of soils, changes of seasons, and vicissitudes of night and day; and others brought about by the courses of fortune dependent upon the situations of substances, and their mutual applications upon one another, to us accidental and uninvestigable.

But what proceeds from the two first of these causes we do not usually ascribe to the hand of Fate: for nobody looks upon it as a Fatality that last winter is now succeeded by summer; that the days are long, the air warm, the corn and fruits begin to ripen, for all these are natural, nor could anybody expect things should have fallen out otherwise. So neither do we think a parent fated to put his son out to school, for it was his desire to give him a good education, and his choice and judgment directed him to the proper methods for effecting it.

Therefore the last class of causes only remains for the province of Fate, to wit, such whose operations are fortuitous and unaccountable, that is beyond the reach of human foresight and sagacity to discover; nevertheless they must have some certain springs and issues, as well as the motions of nature or actions of men.

47. Thus the same events lie under the disposal of Fate and of Fortune and both terms take their rise from our manner of conceiving things. Chance is no agent nor power, but the creature only of imagination, deriving its birth from our ignorance; for when we see causes at work, but know not their tendency, we say it is chance what they will produce: therefore that which is chance to one man may be none to another, who has better information or more judgment to discern the train things are taking.

If a die were to be thrown, the cast would be produced by the motions of the thrower's arm, the shape of the box, inequalities of the table, and other imperceptible circumstances, of which we can make no estimate, therefore we deem it to lie under the power of Chance; but were the cast to determine between two malefactors which of them should suffer, we should then think it a matter worthy referring to the Supreme Disposer of all events, for the lot cometh from the Lord; yet still being uncertain what means he will employ, or what effect they will take, we attribute the decision to his Will or Decree, skipping over that undiscernible chain of causes lying between his first appointment and those now in act.

Therefore Fate and Fortune seem for the most part to claim a concurrent jurisdiction, many tracts lying within the province of both: and under this apprehension we express ourselves upon common occasions; for when we hear of a man falling in battle, we say indifferently, it was his Fate, or his Fortune to be slain; and of a young person intended to be sent abroad, but uncertain in what business, or what place he may find opportunities for settling, we say, it is doubtful where his lot may fall, where fortune may carry him, or his fate or destiny fix him.

But to which of these powers we shall ascribe the influence, depends upon the objects we take into contemplation : while we regard only the secret springs and unforeseen incidents which may affect an event, we deem it in the hand of Fortune : but when we look on further to that intelligent Being, who is the disposer of all events, we conceive that those springs will work, and incidents fall out, according to his direction and decree.

Nevertheless it is obvious, as we observed before, that a decree will work nothing without an application of power to enforce the execution of it ; and when such application has been made by provision of the proper means for bringing an event to pass, a decree or declaration of the purpose intended becomes needless : for the requisite measures being once taken, will have their effect, whether any word be spoken concerning them or no. Therefore the issues of things proceed, and fortune derives her efficacy from the provision, not the decree of the Almighty, from the work of his hand, not the word of his mouth ; and this latter, if any such there were, added nothing to the acts of Omnipotence, but must be delivered for some other purpose than to insure the completion of his design.

48. Hence it appears, that in using the terms Fate, Decree, or Destiny, we speak after the manner of men ; for it being customary with us, whenever we resolve upon some distant work, to declare our intentions to persons under our influence, who may assist in completing it, and to fix a determination in our minds which may render us vigorous, and keep us watchful in the prosecution, we conceive of God as making the like declared or mental determination with regard to every spot he comprises within the plan of his Providence.

Then, again, being sensible this determination cannot operate upon the courses of fortune as a command, yet that something must operate to put them in motion ; and being unable to trace, or even to conceive, a chain of causes extending from the first formation of the plan to all those multifarious events, which we cannot help acknowledging must come to pass by the divine appointment ; we get an obscure idea of an irresistible force, a something we cannot explain nor account for its existence, which we call a Fatality, which perpetually hangs over second causes, constraining their motions, or like an adamantine wall, confining them within their appointed course, from whence they would have a natural propensity to deviate. Thus Fatality becomes disjoined from the decree, and loses the proper import belonging to it by its derivation, being now no longer a fatum or word spoken, but one knows not well what ; an emanation from it, like light from the sunbeams, a power without an agent to exert it ; for when God has spoken his action ceases, and the Fatality is a consequence of what he has said.

That this is the sense, if a sense it may be called, that men ordinarily affix to the term, appears by the Atheists employing it, who acknowledge no intelligent Being who might fari, that is, speak or issue a decree : for being called upon to assign a cause for the laws and establishments of nature, they ascribed them to a blind Fatality, working upon the mass of matter throughout the universe, and driving it into a regular form. But if we regard etymology, a blind fatality is as absurd an expression as that of a dumb decree, or an unintended design. The Epicureans alone discarded Fate upon a most unphilosophical principle, that events may ensue, such as the declinaton of atoms, without any prior cause whatever to produce them ; but all who admitted an eternal First Cause, whether intelligent or unsentient, seem to have entertained a notion of Fatality.

This confused and indeterminate notion opened the door to judicial Astrology, for though the stars were supposed by their positions to affect the lives of men, I never yet heard it attempted to be shown in what manner, or by what mediums they operated: but a conformity being once fancied between the successes of human transactions and aspects of the heavenly bodies, it was a short way to talk of a Fatality, though nobody could tell why, or how, or by what channels the connexion should be effected.

The like may be said of the Parcæ, whose singing answers to the decree uttered, and could have none other effect than to amuse themselves and lighten their task; but it was the thread they spun which determined the duration and colour of men's lives beyond the power of Jove himself to alter: yet we never hear of their having any communication with sublunary affairs or acting as efficient causes upon any moving here; nevertheless, upon their spinning, there instantly arose a sympathetic energy in the causes at work upon earth, drawing them to produce an issue conformable to what was spun.

49. We see from the foregoing observations, how the term Fate has slidden off its original basis, being departed from its first signification, that of a decree or resolve of the Almighty to a something generated thereby, an undefinable influence, residing neither in body nor soul, nor substance, but an abstract force or activity, hovering as it were in the air, and operating upon the causes of things as they severally begin to act.

Nor yet do men keep always steady to this idea of Fate in their common conversation; for we often hear them talk of the Fate of a convict criminal lying in the hand of the Prince who has power to pardon or to order execution; the lover waits for the decision of his mistress to fix his Fate; the poet talks of physicians issuing mandates in arrest of Fate, and an unexpected accident or arrival of a timely succour is thought sometimes to change the Fate of a battle: whereas if we regard the genuine notion of Fate, it was fixed long ago by the decree of Heaven; nor is it in the power of man, nor any natural agent, to determine, or stop, or change, or affect it in any respect.

These variations of language do not disturb us in our ordinary discourses, for the context or occasion introducing them moulds our words into the shape that is proper; but men of thought and abstraction, desirous of affixing constantly the same ideas to their words, find themselves disappointed when they light upon a term of vague and unstable signification: for as we generally think in words, and their sense in the various phrases whereto we join them is determined by custom; we are led insensibly in the progress of our reasonings to understand them differently, from whence great confusion and perplexity must unavoidably ensue.

Therefore the science of language, and exact observation of ideas adhering thereto, would help us greatly in our discoveries of nature; for if men could fix upon terms not liable to variation of sense or misapprehension, their disputes would be shortened, and they might quickly arrive at so much knowledge as is attainable by human understanding. We have found no reason hitherto to disregard the admonitions of our present patroness, Philology, they having been helpful to us upon several occasions; and she informs us, the word Fate carries a very loose and indeterminate signification.

For this reason I wish it were quite expunged from the philosophical vocabulary, and Providence substituted in its room, which I conceive would render our thoughts clearer and less intricate, and give them a freer pro-

gress when turned upon the government of the world; for the provisions of heaven in the original disposition of adequate causes may answer all purposes, as well those accomplished by natural as accidental means, or the motions of free agency.

50. But men find a difficulty in conceiving of absolute dominion, without a coercive authority or compulsion exercised upon the subjects under it; which makes us all so fond of power as a necessary means of bringing our purposes to bear against the opposition of other agents which might attempt to defeat them. Yet in many instances, as has been remarked in § 19, we ourselves can make provision for designs wherein other persons are to concur, and guide their conduct, so far as we know what will move them, and have the proper motives in our hands, without pretending to any authority or compulsive power over them. And if there be always some hazard of a disappointment, it is because we can never see thoroughly the exact state of their desires, nor what external accidents, such as weather, disease, or the like, may disturb the success of our schemes: but were there nothing extraneous to interfere, and had we a perfect knowledge of men's minds, much more were their inclinations and judgments of our framing, we should need no despotic jurisdiction nor controlling power to guide them into what courses of behaviour we pleased.

Now there is nothing external to the work of God. The laws of nature bringing forth her various productions were of his establishment: the workings of chance followed from some determinate causes, though to us unknown; these again from other prior, and so on in a continual channel from the sources first opened by the exertion of his power; for no event, however casual, can happen without something occasioning it to fall out in that manner: the actions of men proceed according to their apprehensions and judgments thrown upon them by their constitution or temperament, by education, by company and occurrences befalling them in life; all which were conveyed by nature or fortune, and therefore must be referred to the origin from whence they derived. For every effect must be produced by the action of some agent, material or spiritual, or the concurrence of several, and must follow according to the manner of that action being exerted; which manner was determined by some impulse or motive impressed from elsewhere; nor can we stop until we arrive at some act of Omnipotence.

Thus the face of things, as well in the moral as natural kingdoms, results from the qualities, positions, and motions God gave to his substances at the formation of a world. It remains only that we ask ourselves the question, whether he extended his plan to a compass larger than he could comprehend himself, or gave birth to causes which might produce events unthought of by him, or more numerous than he could grasp in his Omniscience? If we answer in the negative, we must needs acknowledge that provision was made at the beginning for all that train of events, and accomplishment of those purposes we have seen, or shall hereafter see effected.

But experience testifies, that this provision leaves many things in our power, and circumscribes us in many other respects; we lay schemes, and take measures appearing certain to succeed, but find them fail in the issue, and that by accidents we could not have expected, nor can account for their happening; our reason deserts us in time of need; we commit blunders, and give into follies we could not have thought ourselves capable of: tempests, earthquakes, famines, pestilences, and destructive diseases, arise from no natural causes that we can discern; and our experience of those things give us the notion of Fatality. Therefore Fate, if we will needs employ the

term in our speculations, is that part of the divine provision producing events which would not have ensued by the known laws of nature, nor operation of observable causes, nor contrivances of man, but are rather contrary to his endeavours.

51. Seneca, in Nat. Quæst. Lib. II. cap. 36, defines Fate the necessity of all things and actions, which no force can break through, and he seems herein to have given Fate the import belonging to it in common propriety of language: for the courses of Fate are always deemed irresistible and unalterable; nor do we apply the term unless to cases wherein the Will and power of man has no concern.

Therefore when a person fails in a distemper, we say it was his fate to die, because we suppose his wish and endeavours were bent upon preventing it: but if he escapes, we do not say he was fated to recover, but at most that his fate was not yet come, that is, has not yet operated upon him; for this was the effect of the cares taken to save him.

If we happen to ruin a scheme we were extremely fond of accomplishing, through some palpable misconduct of our own, we think ourselves under a fatal infatuation, because everybody is conceived willing to employ his best judgment for his own benefit: from whence comes the observation, that whom Jove would destroy, he first deprives of their understanding: but if we chance to succeed beyond expectation by a more than ordinary dexterity of management, we think nothing of Fatality, because the unusual clearness of judgment and success consequent thereupon, were things agreeable to our wish, and effects of bestirring ourselves in the exercise of our faculties.

So likewise a fatal accident is that which brings on an event we are extremely averse to: whereas a lucky incident is never termed fatal, because tending to further our advancement towards something we desire.

But if Seneca was right in calling Fate a Necessity, which no force can break through, we cannot think him so in the extent he has given to its dominion, comprehending all things and all actions: for this swallows up the whole province of Freewill, to which Fate and Necessity, in every body's understanding, are counted diametrically opposite: for what is fated to happen does not lie in my power to prevent, and what depends upon my pleasure and option is yet undetermined by any Fatality.

Nor let it be thought we injure him, by taking his expression too strictly; for he goes on, in cap. 38, to particularize in matters belonging directly to human management. If, says he, it be fated that such a young person shall become eloquent, it is likewise fated that he shall study rhetoric; if that he shall grow rich, it is fated that he shall trade to foreign parts. In like manner his brother Stoic, Chrysippus, insists, in Tully de Fato, cap. 13, that when a sick man is fated to recover, it is confated that he shall send for a physician; to which it might be added, and that the doctor shall use his best skill, and the apothecary dispense his recipes properly.

But any common eye may see, that these Fates do not carry such a necessity as the force of man cannot break through: for the scholar, if he pleases, may neglect his studies, the young trader squander away his stock in extravagancies and debaucheries, the sick person persist obstinately in refusing help, the doctor destroy his patient, or the apothecary impose upon both by neglecting to provide good drugs, or mixing up ingredients that will do mischief.

What then! are not eloquence, riches, and health, the blessings of heaven? are they not given to those whom God thinks proper, and withholden from whom he pleases? Or can any, to whom he designs a favour,

ever fail of receiving the effects of his bounty? By no means; nor does this consequence follow from our rejection of Fatality: for though all things are not fated, yet all things are wisely provided, so as to take the train requisite for completing whatever events were contained within his plan. Thus the orator and merchant were provided by education, example, and other natural means, with a disposition for improving the talents and opportunities put into their hands; the sick man is provided with sense to know the value of life, and fondness for its preservation; the medical assistants with compassion to a fellow-creature in distress, with skill and diligence and a desire to maintain their credit in their professions; and these dispositions will infallibly put them upon taking those measures voluntarily, which they had full power and free liberty to have omitted.

Thus the Will of God is done without employing the compulsive force of Fate, or rigid arm of Necessity. But the difficulties that have always perplexed the speculative upon this subject spring from their not observing the double sense of the word possible, as it relates to power or to contingency, remarked in the foregoing passages, § 30, 31; for want of which they could not conceive how anything could be left to the power and opinion of man, without inferring a possibility that he might defeat the purposes of God. But having well settled that distinction in our minds, and taking along with us that the behaviour of men follows upon their apprehensions and sentiments, which result from the seen and unseen springs employed by God in his administration of the moral world, we may easily comprehend how it may be possible, that is, in the power of man, in many instances to frustrate his designs; nevertheless he may so perfectly know what will be the desires and thoughts of their hearts, that there is no possibility, that is, no danger, they should pursue any other than the particular tenor of conduct most conducive thereto.

52. The essence of Fate lying in its unchangeableness and independence on the turns of Freewill, the powers of different persons being various, and coming or going according as opportunity changes, there is no paradox in asserting, that the same event may be under the arbitrary disposal of one man, which is fated and necessary to another, and may be matter of choice to-day, which was esteemed the work of Fate yesterday, and may be so again to-morrow.

Suppose you and I could give evidence against somebody of a capital offence unknown to anybody else; but there being some favourable circumstances in his case, we went into a room together to consult whether we should make the discovery or no: this we should be apt to call sitting to fix his Fate; and anybody upon seeing us come out, and knowing what we had been about, might properly ask, well, what is his Fate? is he doomed to die? But though our decision be reckoned Fate, with respect to the culprit, as being unalterable and inevitable by him, yet we should not esteem ourselves under a Fatality or Necessity to prosecute, because it would still remain in our power to do it or forbear.

Marriages are commonly said to be made in heaven: yet it is of the very essence of marriage to have the free consent of the parties; for the solemnization follows upon their Will and desire; but the causes influencing their choice were not of their own procurement, but extraneous and fortuitous to them. A man determined to settle in the world, but unprovided of his object, may think it in the hand of Fate or Fortune what qualified party he shall meet with; but when the acquaintance is made, the liking fixed, and matters agreed on both sides, things proceed thenceforward under the di-

rection of Choice and Freewill: then again, if afterwards she prove a shrew he may chance to curse his stars for subjecting him to so cruel a Fate.

The fall of Troy was said to be written in the book of Fate before its foundation; yet the parties instrumental thereto, Paris and Helen, the Grecian Princes, the council of Priam refusing restitution, acted by passion, contrivance, design, and deliberation, those springs of free agency: and, during the siege, the poor Trojans used their utmost efforts to ward off the stroke of Fate, which nevertheless fell inevitably upon them.

Thus when Fate has begun his course, it opens at intervals to let in Freewill, who, having played her part, the stream closes again, and involves all before it in irresistible necessity.

From hence it appears, that, in disquisitions upon this subject, our business is to inquire not so much into the nature of things, as the import of expressions and state of ideas under contemplation; and we shall often find that the same event, according to the persons concerned in it, to the light wherein we place it, or to our considering the whole or some part only of the chain whereon it hangs, shall be either the work of Fate, the effect of Chance, or the product of human Industry, Forethought, and Option. For Fate and Necessity being always opposed to free Choice, may be applicable to an Event or not, according to whose choice, or what act of the Will you refer it.

If I lie under the power of a superior in what manner to dispose of me, the determination is Fate to me, though matter of choice and deliberation to him. So I may esteem it in the hand of Fate to determine how I shall dispose of myself seven years hence, if I cannot by any present act of mine certainly direct my future resolves; but when the time of action comes, I shall then have it in my power and option which way to turn myself; then again, after I have executed my choice and fixed my situation, if I run back through the whole chain of causes bringing me thereinto, the opportunities enabling, and inducements prevailing on me to take the part I did, which were not of my own procurement, I may be apt to call it the work of Fate.

No wonder then that so variable and slippery a turn should often present us with double lights, bewildering the most cautious traveller, like an ignis fatuus: wherefore, as I said before, it were better we could do entirely without it; for Providence seems a much clearer and steadier idea; nor are there the like difficulties in understanding how this, by the apt disposition of causes suited to each respective purpose, may generate the laws of nature, shape the windings of fortune, and produce the motives giving the turn to human volition.

53. Let us now consider how far our conduct and condition in life may be cramped and controlled by this universal provision. We find ourselves circumscribed in our powers, our knowledge, and the scope allotted us to exercise them. This nobody doubts. The severities of winter succeed the conveniences of summer; our weight binds us down to the earth, nor can we soar aloft like the swallow. Tempests, diseases, and sinister accidents, come upon us inevitably, and many things fall out beyond our skill or power to prevent them: but want of skill and power is not want of liberty. Bars, obstructions, and restraints confine us in the exercise of those powers we have; but there is a difference between freedom of action and freedom of Will: the latter respects only such things as we have a natural ability to perform, and against which there lies no impediment to prevent the success of our endeavours. But Freewill cannot proceed without inducements to move, and ideas to direct it; therefore that provision

which supplies us with these is so far from overthrowing, that it is the basis and support of our freedom.

Nor would doubts arise concerning our possession of this privilege, if we did not generally extend it beyond its proper object, which, strictly speaking, is none other than the present action in our power; but our present endeavours often have a tendency to distant purposes; and experience teaches us what they have been used to produce; therefore we esteem the consequences to be effected by them as under our power, and subjects of our option: then, if such remote events fall out otherwise than expected, we ascribe it to a Fatality; whereas the failure was really owing to particular circumstances we did not attend to, or the interfering of natural causes we did not take into account.

More especially we conceive ourselves masters of our own ideas, and to have the constant use of that judgment and discretion we possess; therefore if they fail us at any time in some egregious misconduct, we apprehend ourselves as having been under a secret infatuation; because the proceeding being contrary to our present and former Will and judgment, which we can scarce believe could have varied so greatly in the interval, we conclude a force must have been put upon our Will to make it act so opposite to its own designs.

But it is well known, that our apprehensions are not always the same, nor does reason always operate with equal vigour; imagination varies her scenes, discretion falls off her guard, fancies start up, desires intrude, passions beguile, and things present themselves in unusual aspects, owing to the state of our bodily humours, the mechanical play of our organization, prevalency of our habits, and appearance of external objects; all which are natural causes, acting with a regularity undiscernible to ourselves. So there is no occasion for recurring to that unsubstantial Fatality spoken of in § 48; for Fate is so much of the order of second causes, as our Will has no share in carrying on, and our Understanding no light to discover.

Thus Fate and Freewill have their distinct provinces, nor ever appear to clash unless when we happen to mistake the boundaries; but if we esteem events within our power which depend upon other causes, we may find ourselves frustrated, not by a force upon our Will, but by having undertaken more, and carried our expectations further than we were warranted. For the giant Fate, though enormous in strength and stature, never tramples upon Liberty, nor so covers the ground as not to leave some space for human Agency while employed in its proper offices.

54. For we have nothing to do with Events lying within the bosom of Fate, nor are we to take our measures upon any thing we fancy contained there: it may affect the success, but cannot alter the prudence of our conduct, which consists in the conformity of our actions with the best lights of our judgment.

If God has any secret purpose to accomplish, no doubt he has provided causes to work it out; our business lies only with those causes, whose existence and tendency we can discern; while we make the due use of them, so far as we have power and opportunity, we shall perform our little share in the execution of his plan.

When we have determined upon our point ever so wisely, and projected our scheme ever so prudently, perhaps there may be a decree to a contrary effect which will baffle all our endeavours; but this can be no guide to us, nor object of our contemplation, until manifesting itself by the completion: in the mean time, if we find things take a wrong turn unexpectedly, we are

not from thence to infer there is a Fatality upon them, for we cannot expect to penetrate into the secret workings of Fate, which are purposely concealed from us, but must employ our skill and industry to rectify our measures, while there remains any probability of success, that is, until we perceive invincible obstacles standing apparently in the way.

Nor have we the less range of action for the secret springs of events taking their certain course by the divine appointment, neither would our liberty be at all enlarged, if they were set in motion by the fortuitous declination of Epicurus' atoms. Experience teaches that our strongest expectations are liable to be frustrated, and our best projected schemes rendered abortive unaccountably; and we should stand equally at a loss how to ward off the disappointment whether it were to come by chance or by Fate, for we can as little conjecture what the wild workings of chance would produce, as the stated provisions of wisdom: in both cases we can only proceed according to what we see, and put in use those methods which we judge most expedient. Nor would it prove less destructive of care and industry, if we should entertain a notion of luck running against us, than a Fatality.

55. There is one species of Fate respecting the condition of each man in another life dependent on his conduct in this, commonly called Predestination. This, in many people's apprehension, carries with it the idea of a Fatality; for they say the Saint cannot sin, nor the Sinner do right: yet it being obvious there can be nothing right nor wrong, unless in things within our power and option, they suppose that though we have power to perform, we have none to choose; so there lies a force upon the Will constraining it to one particular choice.

But experience does not support this doctrine, for the wicked now and then use their power well, and it is too notorious that the righteous often fail of doing the good they might. Did Peter act right when he thrice denied his master? Or did Pilate act wrong in using endeavours to get Jesus released instead of Barabbas? and does not this manifest that neither were under a constant Fatality, but left sometimes at least at liberty to depart from their general tenor of conduct?

Then if any pretend that this general tenor, so far as requisite to deno minate the party good or bad, is influenced by the fatality of a decree; let them search into the recesses of the human heart, examine the judgments, desires, imaginations harbouring there, understand perfectly all the natural causes anywise affecting them, and clearly discern that none of these are adequate to the effect, before they are warranted to assert this. Nor let them build too hastily upon the dictates of authority, which are best explained by experience of facts, and are delivered in a language accommodated to the common conceptions of men, wherein we often ascribe events to the act of God, which were the result of second causes established by him.

Therefore it may be true that God giveth us both to will and to do, without constraining our Wills by his immediate and irresistible influence; as it is true, that he giveth us our daily bread, though he sends it not by special messengers, as he did to Elias, but by the provisions he made for the fruits of nature in the structure of plants, fertility of soils, kindly warmth of the sun, seasonable refreshments of dews and showers, and by the provisions he made for exerting human industry, and fixing an attachment to their several professions in the farmer, the miller, the mealman, and the baker.

56. It must be acknowledged that the final state of every man, as well as all other events without exception, depends upon causes flowing from springs originally provided by the Almighty; and in this light it may be said that none shall be saved whose names were not written in the book of life: but the writing in this book, if we will employ the figure, has no efficacy, nor can limit our freedom, being no more than a declaration or record of the causes in act, and operations of under-causes flowing from them; which are equally matter of record, whether running in the channel of free-will, or of impulse, force, and necessity.

And the provisions now spoken of encroach least of any upon the province of free agency; a man may have his bones broken, his fortune ruined, his life destroyed by earthquakes, tempests, plagues, or other accidents he cannot possibly guard against nor prevent; but his interests in futurity cannot be hurt, unless by some action he has power and liberty to forbear. Therefore is he free in whatever he does affecting those interests, notwithstanding the entry recorded, or provision pre-ordained; for liberty, as we have seen before, depends upon the act ensuing the exertion of our power, not upon anything antecedent, nor upon the motives or causes inciting us to exert it: if we have talents, opportunities, understanding, and discretion, we have the same freedom to use them by what means soever they came to us, whether by a sudden and accidental good fortune, or by a long series of causes pre-appointed for that purpose.

But men are led by their averseness to trouble to extend the idea of their power beyond its proper bounds; they want to do something to-day whereby to insure an indefeasible title to future happiness, without leaving anything for to-morrow, but to take their pastime in the manner most agreeable to themselves. This is mistaking their province, for they can never do their work so completely but there will always remain something further to do: yet this does not affect their liberty to take such measures as at present are feasible; for whatever be predestined concerning them to-morrow, they may still do as much for themselves as the actions now in their power amount to.

Therefore it behoves us to stand always upon the watch, to observe every succeeding moment what comes into our power, and to employ it so as may turn most for our benefit: for Predestination rightly understood, operates by our hands, and the course we steer is always that it takes upon every particular occasion, unless when it employs external causes not under our control: and these we have no business with: where indeed we could know the success depends solely upon such causes, our cares and endeavours were superfluous, but in matters depending upon ourselves, our opinion or disbelief of their being predestined in the manner above described by a provision of the proper causes for enabling, moving, and directing us, how to bestir ourselves, makes no alteration in the rule of our conduct. For if a merchant breeds up his son to industry, instructs him in the mysteries of trade, and furnishes him a competent stock, with a certain foreknowledge and determination that he shall make a fortune thereby: nevertheless the same diligence, the same circumspection, and the same methods of proceeding will be requisite as if those advantages had fallen upon him accidentally, and the success been absolutely unknown to everybody.

57. But it is not enough to take off the discouragements against deliberation and activity, unless we quiet the apprehensions arising in men's minds concerning their future proceedings: for some disturb themselves with the dread of a predetermination upon all their motions, which may

turn them hereafter into the road of destruction, notwithstanding the best dispositions they find at present in their hearts. But let them consider, that their present actions were as much predestined as any they shall perform hereafter, yet they find themselves at full liberty to shape them in such manner as they judge expedient; therefore they may depend upon having the like freedom at other times.

Well, but they know not what ideas may then start up in their minds urging them to misapply their powers. Is there not the like hazard attending the common affairs of life? for other events, as well as those affecting the moral character, are equally predestined by the provisiom of causes suited to bring them forth. Yet who that lives in peace and plenty ever affrights himself with the thought that there may be secret springs at work which may deprive him of his health, his limbs, or his substance? While things go on in a good train, and no danger discernible to human circumspection threatens, we rest contented with our situation, unmolested by imaginary terrors; and so we may with respect to our spiritual concerns, for virtue improves itself, and good habits grow stronger by exercise: therefore, though our final state remains in the hand of Providence, and we cannot penetrate the secret councils of heaven, yet the right dispositions we feel at present are an evidence that provision is made for a happy issue at last, an evidence sufficient to exclude everything more than a possibility of our failing: nor were it expedient that this should be excluded, as being serviceable to keep us vigilant, and guard us against a supineness of temper that might creep upon us insensibly.

Besides, let us examine wherein it would better our condition, if God were to revoke his Predestination, and undo his provision of causes, so far as relates to ourselves: would this enable us by our present cares so to bind our future conduct as that it could never run amiss? and if not, how would matters be mended with us? There would still remain a possibility that after having begun well we might faint in the midway, and this event would become absolutely fortuitous: but we should hardly find more comfort in thinking that our Fate depended upon the cast of a die than upon a Predetermination.

So then it might fairly be put to men's choice whether they had rather believe themselves in the hand of Chance, or of a wise and gracious Governor; for the proceedings of wisdom are regular, and though we know not perfectly what belongs to goodness, we may form a judgment thereon satisfactory to any reasonable person; but the flighty gambols of chance are objects of no science, nor grounds of any dependence whatever.

Nor should we find greater security in the privilege of indifference so much vaunted by some, for this being controllable by no motives, it would avail us little to have a sober understanding and virtuous inclinations moving us to take a salutary course; for our Freewill of indifference might run counter to them all, nor could we have any assurance what turns it might take: which must throw us again into all the anxieties attendant upon the dominion of chance.

Thus whatever hypothesis we can frame, leaves as much room for apprehensions as that of Predestination above described; for while we conceive it operating, not by a Fatality, but by an apt disposition of second causes, it gives as large a scope to human freedom and forecast, and industry, as we have reason from experience to think ourselves possessed of, and as good ground of expectation from the success of our measures as we are warranted in any light to entertain.

58. Nevertheless, if the mind appears to have taken a wrong turn, are there not just grounds of apprehension? Most assuredly. But this turn manifests itself most evidently in the prevalence of evil habits, and attachment to present pleasures, without regard to the consequences; therefore those who stand in greatest danger are least apt to take the alarm, and whoever could raise it in them, would do them an inestimable kindness. On the contrary, such in whom disquietudes abound, have upon that very account the less reason to entertain them; for an earnest concern for the future being the first and principal spring provided for bringing men into the right way, where this appears strongly it is of itself alone an evidence that provision has been made in their favour.

But despondencies of this kind are often owing to the indiscretion of teachers, who insist too strenuously upon higher perfections of virtue than human nature can attain, and are found to prevail most upon women, or persons of small ability, and in their contemplative hours rather than seasons of action. For the consolation of such persons therefore let it be observed, that righteousness does not consist in the quantity of good we do, but in our doing so much, be it little, or be it much, as lies in our power. There are pegs and pins in a building as well as beams and columns, nor can we doubt that God distributes to every man the talents suited to the task he is to perform; therefore if we attend only to family affairs, or making broths for the sick, provided this be all we have had ability to do, we have completed our part.

Let it next be remarked, that our imagination does not lie under our absolute command to raise ideas there, in what strength and vividness of colour we please: the Poet cannot always fill himself with inspiration, nor the Philosopher with his clear discernment of abstracted truth, nor the religious man with his ardours and transports: therefore the want of a fervent faith and glowing zeal is not so much the mark of reprobation, as of a present indisposition of the organs.

Let it further be remembered, that notwithstanding what may have been inculcated of a constant attention to the duties of religion, our business lies chiefly in action, and the common duties of life: so that when perplexities overcloud us, instead of foreboding melancholy omens from the gloom they cast, we should rather take them as admonitions, that it is not now the season to puzzle our brains with thinking; but to bestir ourselves in some active employment, or pursue some innocent recreation, which may supply us with a flow of spirits for reason to work with to better purpose afterwards.

For if fear and trembling be a duty, a becoming confidence and just repose in the divine Goodness is a duty likewise; nor is fortitude less a virtue than prudence, and the proper province of both is ascertained by their usefulness. Therefore when anxieties arise, it behoves us to consider what purpose they may answer: while they serve to keep us vigilant, and spur on our activity in helping ourselves, we do well to encourage them; but when they tend to no good, nor urge us to anything we should not have done as well without them, we cannot do better than to turn our face from them, and use any expedient at hand to banish them out of our thoughts.

But Predestination, though formerly making much noise in the world, is now grown an unfashionable topic, nor am I sorry that it is so; for though I think it might be so explained as to render it neither formidable nor subversive of diligence, yet I fear such explanation would not take effect with common apprehensions, but they would still annex to it an idea of Fatality,

which must unavoidably nourish despondencies in phlegmatic tempers, presumption and fatal security in the sanguine.

59. I have now rummaged every corner of the wilderness, and left no thicket untried that I could think of: it has been my endeavour to open the passages as I went along, and disentangle the boughs where they had matted themselves together, or been interlaced by persons of an unlucky shrewdness in perplexing; so that the traveller may never be driven against the thorns without finding an opening to escape them, nor bewildered in mazes, without feeling a clue to direct him.

Yet I do not pretend so to have cleared the way, as that he may run carelessly along; for the boughs will still overhang, the paths remain dark rugged, and intricate, and the clue put into his hands be apt to slip away from him; therefore he must not proceed in a hurry, but take every step warily and circumspectly, putting the twigs aside that they may not strike against his eyes, nor intercept his view of the ground as he goes along, and keeping good hold of his several clues while necessary for his guidance.

If I have not done my work completely to the satisfaction of everybody, allowance may be made for the difficulty of the subject; which has foiled so many men of deep thought and learning, that should anything be found here to render it clearer, I should rather look upon it as a lucky hit, than any claim to extraordinary merit. For I have not pretended to manage the same train of argument better than any other people, but have proceeded in a method of my own, which, if pursued imperfectly, may still serve as a hint, that others may improve upon to greater advantage. I have, at least to my own content, effected a perfect reconcilement between Freewill and Universal Providence; and if this could be done to the general content, it would be no small service to the serious part of mankind; for neither of these points can easily be given up, nor has it hitherto been found easy to show them consistent with one another.

For our reason affords us so many grounds of assurance, that affairs as well in the moral as natural world are administered by the power and wisdom of God; and yet so many important events, such as the rise and fall of empires, the lives and deaths, the fortunes and distresses of men, depend upon their behaviour among one another, that we cannot but be persuaded he governs the thoughts and actions of mankind with as full and absolute a dominion as he does the courses of nature. On the other hand, daily experience bears witness that our motions lie under our own control, and we can do this thing or that as we please, without any force constraining, or dominion compelling us to the contrary. Then, upon comparing these two considerations together, while they appear to clash, we are tempted to distrust either our reason or our experience; and, according to which part we take, either are thrown off our discretion and tenor of conduct, by the imagination of a secret influence and compulsion hanging over us, or lose our dependence upon Providence, that truest solace of our minds in time of danger and distress, and surest direction of our conduct in seasons of ease and prosperity.

Whereas, were the inconsistency taken off, we might then allow both human agency and divine government their full extent, because they might co-operate in the same work without interfering with each other: we should see no discouragement against making observations upon the things about us relative to our conduct, and taking our measures accordingly with freedom, and a decent confidence in their success; and we should depend contentedly upon the guidance of Providence for turning the courses of fortune

and actions of persons with whom we have any concern, so as to procure all the good intended to be bestowed upon us.

Nay, further, when we consider that things visible and invisible lie under the dominion of one governor, connecting all in one wisely regulated polity, wherein nothing is established in vain, and reflect how much of our time is lost in sleep and infancy, how many pains, diseases, and troubles fall upon us, how many unavailing hours pass over our heads, and how often we are forced to bestir ourselves to very little purposes of our own; there is a probable presumption that all these things turn some how or other to the account of other Beings. So that our little concerns and transactions may be of greater importance than we imagine, and ourselves made unknowingly to work out the advantage of fellow-creatures, whereof we have not the least knowledge, nor even suspicion. Nor need we want hopes from the goodness of God, that we shall one day reap the benefit of those services wherein we have been made, though undesignedly, instrumental.

But how simple and confined, or how extensive and complicated schemes soever we may conceive contained within the divine plan, the stumbling-block of compulsion upon free Agency being removed, we may conclude that every purpose comprised therein has adequate causes provided for its execution, and every cause in act, whether voluntary or necessary agent, contributes its share towards the completion of some purpose.

Therefore the doctrine of universal Providence being, as it seems to me, well established, I may go on without further scruple to raise what superstructure I can upon this foundation.

CHAP. XXVII.

EQUALITY.

Hail, glorious Liberty! thou choicest privilege of imperial man! the prerogative by which he exercises his dominion over this sublunary kingdom! Inspire a spark of thy spirit into thy votary, who has laboured through thorns and briers to collect evidence of thy charter from all ruling Providence, impowering thee to act as one of her principal ministers in executing her designs; and has produced the divine mandate to irresistible Fate, commanding him to leave an ample province for thee to range in.

But where better delightest thou to dwell than in this my native land, the happy Britain? whose sons in former times have struggled hard for thee, enduring distresses, toils, and bloody conflicts, that they might transmit thy blessings to us their children. Thou hast snapped short the iron rod of despotic sway, broken through the enormous rule of Many made for One, and taught Power wherein its real strength and true glory consist. Thou hast dragged tongue-tyed Superstition at thy chariot wheels, and bound in fetters that dastard slave, implicit Faith, that used to fetter the very thoughts of men. Thou openest the chambers of science, bursting asunder the Ipse dixits that had barred up more than half the avenues. Thou clearest away the films from our eyes, that we may see for ourselves; and strengthenest our feet, that we may walk without the leading-string. O! let us never part with the valuable inheritance our ancestors have left us. Nor, I trust, shall we ever suffer it to be wrested out of our hands; let us only beware

that we be not beguiled by false appearances, nor enticed away from our goddess by a phantom representing her likeness.

For there are counterfeits abroad, pretenders that assume thy robes and gestures. The mimic ape, Licentiousness, imitates thine intrepid air and confident gait. The blatant Beast profanes thy daring language with his unbridled tongue. Conceited pertness teaches the new-loosened school-boy and novel-studied girl thy scorn of tutorage and control. Irreverent Methodism, ill-copier of thine easy carriage before superiors, rushes with saucy familiarity into the council-chamber of heaven. And lion-skinned Free-thinking, safe affector of thy bravery, insults whom thou hast disarmed, ten times slays the slain, and claims to be the sole gatherer up of thy spoils. They range the world with a boisterous rabble tagging at their heels: Clamour, Arrogance, Misrepresentation, Perverseness, Cavil, intemperate Jest, loud-laughing Mockery, and hood-winked Misrule. They spare not things sacred nor profane; but pluck the gray beard of old Experience, tear the prelate's lawn, revile the rulers of the people, nor refrain from the Lord's anointed. The unlucky monkeys toss all about them into confusion, and grin at the wild work they make: they scatter abroad firebrands and arrows, and cry, Are we not in sport? they delight to trip up the unwary, or entangle the feeble in their webby filaments, and then chuckle with joy to see the perplexities they have occasioned.

But thou, genuine Liberty, offspring of all-protecting Jove, and sister of Uranian Venus, who dispenseth his blessings from her horn of plenty; thou lovest order and decency. For thou knowest the world is upholden by order, and the bliss of heaven maintained by free obedience. Therefore thou recommendest regularity and subordination to the sons of men. Thou standest upon law and ordinance as thy basis; rule and authority are thy supporters: sound reason and uniform prudence, the ground thou walkest upon. Discretion and cautious Reserve go before as thy harbingers, and much-enduring Charity departeth not from thy side. The modest virgins warn thee which way to direct thy steps, that thou hurt not the simple; or cover thee with veils, that thou give them not offence. For the weak-sighted cannot sustain thy piercing look, nor the feeble stand against the brush of thy sturdy tread: when thou walkest forth in the fields of speculation, and stretchest thy ken to the distant sources of useful science.

How shall I follow thee in this adventurous course whereto thou callest me? For the deep-thinking mind will not rest satisfied with practical knowledge, unless we trace the channels to the fountain head. But the sources of truth, as of the Nile, lie far concealed in distant regions: we have cataracts to climb, slippery ground to pass over, and stumbling-blocks to remove, before we can investigate them. Give charge to thine attendant virgins that they assist me, while I strew sand upon the icy paths, and work a safe passage over the dangerous rocks of offence. Yet with all their care they cannot so plain the road as that the common traveller shall pass secure: but the steepy precipice will make him giddy, the sliding surface beguile his trembling steps, and unyielding rubs cause his feet to stumble.

O! for the warning voice of sage Pythagoras, Hence, ye profane: That none but the hardy Adept might be admitted to tread the perilous path. But thou, Goddess, in these latter times, ordainest there shall be no concealment of mysteries. The sons of Faustus now are the only priests of thine oracle: they lift up the voice on high, proclaiming everything to everybody: they watch in the streets to gather whoso pleases to accompany us in all our excursions. So we can only caution the too curious traveller

to beware for himself: for we are going upon a dangerous expedition, wherein we cannot insure him against accidents; being to cut a course through unpractised ground from the sources opened before. Wherefore if there be any in this wise generation who knows himself not to be an Adept, he had better let us work for a while by ourselves, and wait for our coming down again to the old rivers lying within his accustomed walks. For the water may run foul and unwholesome through the new-dug channel, until being purified in its passage, he may find it suitable to his taste and digestion. But if the veteran Adept, inured to toils and dangers, to range the fields of contemplation with steady tread and sober boldness, will vouchsafe his company: let him review with us the sources we have explored, and observe which way they first discharge their stream.

2. We have examined the human mind, and found that all our motions depend upon motives, thrown upon her from external objects, or conveyed by the channels of experience, education, and example, or procured by her own cares and industry, whereto she was instigated by former motives. We have surveyed external nature, tracing effects to causes until we arrived at the First Cause, the origin of all activity and efficacy; acting with full intelligence of all he does, and preconcerted design of whatever shall fall out in immediate or remote consequence of his operation: from hence it follows that the whole series of events throughout the world takes precisely the course ordained by Providence: which course was heretofore supposed to run under-ground along the passages of a secret fatality, whose rocky banks dammed up the side bubblings of chance and freewill, drawing them forcibly into its own channel. But we have cleared away the matted weeds that overhung the ground, and laid open the veins from whence those bubblings arise: whereby it appears that Chance is the child of Ignorance, for her workings proceed from certain causes, yet such only whose existence or tendency we want sagacity to discern; that freewill needs no compulsive force to keep her steady, for she communicates, by antecedent and external causes giving birth to her motives, with the fountain whence all the other streams derive.

Thus nature, chance, and industry, become only different channels of the same river; and what virtues, good qualities, and enjoyments men have worked out for themselves, were as much given them as what came without their seeking: so that whatever portion of happiness every man possesses, is such and none other than was allotted him by the divine bounty. We have seen reason likewise to conclude from contemplation of the divine nature, exempt from want or passion or humour or weakness, that God is righteous in all his dealings and equal in all his ways, being no respecter of persons; that his mercy is over all his works, and that equity is the Attribute whereof we can have the clearest conception, as implying nothing more than an impartial distribution of the divine bounty among all creatures capable of receiving it. Since then none of us have anything besides what we received from the divine bounty, and that bounty flows alike upon all, it follows unavoidably that there must be an exact equality of fortunes among us, and the value of each person's existence, computed throughout the whole extent of his Being, precisely the same.

3. This conclusion doubtless will shock the vanity of mankind, to whom happiness itself is not welcome unless they can engross the monopoly of it to themselves: and who esteem the advantages and accomplishments they respectively possess as the only blessings worth receiving. The politician, the soldier, the scholar, the philosopher, the rich merchant, the poet, the

player, and the fiddler, have a sovereign contempt for each other's endowments in comparison with their own: believing themselves the peculiar favourites of fortune with respect to their mental capacities, and claiming an intrinsic merit to be found in none besides. But they will all be scandalized to find themselves put upon a level with the greasy ploughman, the illiterate porter, the contemptible ideot, the unenlightened savage, and the scarce human Hottentot. Nevertheless, let them point out wherein we have been mistaken in our premises or faulty in our deductions. Let them show the single thing they have which they did not receive; or if they worked it out for themselves, that the talents and opportunities enabling, the dispositions inclining them, were not given; and themselves furnished by certain causes as well with inclination and spirit to will as with powers to do.

If there be some characters more agreeable in the sight of God and more deserving of his favours than others, still those characters arose either from a happy constitution and temper bestowed by nature, or from education, company, and example, fallen into by good fortune; or if we suppose a particular effusion of divine grace to make the difference, God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham; so that the same Power being the Author of nature, the Guider of fortune and free Dispenser of grace, was the origin of whatever flowed upon us through either of those channels. When in our state of nonentity, we were all equally devoid of merit or demerit, and were called forth from thence to the stations and properties and springs of action he thought proper to allot us: nor can he see anything to engage his favour in one man rather than another, which was not nearly or remotely the effect of his bounty.

Let them next examine their ideas of the divine nature, and from thence, if they can, assign a cause that should make this bounty flow unequally. I know we are all in the hands of God to give us more or less as he pleases; nor have any of us cause to complain at receiving a smaller portion than his neighbours, for we have no demands upon him whatever: but how is it likely he does so? what attribute is there to require, or even render it probable? if justice requires that the virtuous should fare better than the vicious, yet does justice hinder that the same measure of virtue should be allotted to every one? But our virtues must be of our own acquiring, or they will not deserve the name. Granted. Yet since the Will to make the acquisition derived from above, what rule of justice prohibits the incitements to raise that Will, and opportunities to exercise it, from being distributed to all alike?

Let them further reflect that their talents and accomplishments contribute to the protection, the benefit, or the entertainment of others; their very piety and virtue, to be genuine, must extend their good effects beyond the possessors, to all who come within their reach: so that the rude rabble they despise, have a share in the favours bestowed upon themselves; nor is there a man possessing some extraordinary gift which was given for his own sake alone.

They may likewise consider that happiness is the only thing valuable, all other things being so in proportion as they conduce towards that: but happiness consists in the aggregate of pleasures, or rather in the balance of that above the aggregate of pains; and by pleasure we understand every satisfaction or complacence of mind, as by pain every uneasiness or disturbance. Now it has been observed in a former place that we are very bad arithmeticians in the article of pleasure, nor can keep account of one day's

enjoyments, so as to compute the balance of them with the next, with any thing like the exactness we could do in our money receipts and disbursements. For we fix our eye upon one favourite object, whose value we estimate by the eagerness of desire we feel rising towards it; but desire often proves delusive, or where it does not, yet pursues intense pleasures; whereas it has been shown that those of the gentler kind yield us a larger income upon the whole. That quick sensibility which enhances our joys and enables us to feel what would not touch another, adds pungency likewise to our vexations, and renders us liable to such as would not fall upon persons of duller apprehension. And if a readiness of reflection tends to prolong our enjoyments: so likewise it does to lengthen our grievances. Cares and troubles enter the houses of the great, which the vulgar know nothing of: and comforts take up their abode in the cottage, where the rich man never sees them.

Besides that Pleasure being relative to Taste and Desire, which vary infinitely among mankind, we cannot tell what another feels by what we should feel ourselves in his situation. Many things delight us extremely, that he would not care a rush for: though we should think it dreadful to want them, he may rest fully contented without them. Labour, scarcity, nastiness, ignorance, subjection, and contempt, that would oppress us sorely, may sit light and easy upon his shoulders. And though an exchange of fortunes would be thought grievous to us, and desirable by him, which seems to imply a concession on both sides of ours having the preference; yet is this judgment not to be depended on, as being passed upon the entrance into a new state of life, rather than the continuance in an old one. But the common labourer raised to riches, or man of affluence reduced to poverty, would feel himself affected in another manner than one who had never known the contrary: therefore is not a competent judge of his case. For Nature has established this rule tending greatly towards an equality, that our organs lose their power of affecting us by use, both pleasures and pains abating of their vigour upon frequent repetition. Habit and custom brings us to a liking of the way of life we have long continued in, and desire in some measure conforms itself to the objects usually occurring to gratify it. From all which we may justly infer, there is not such an immense difference between the happiness of men as is commonly apprehended.

4. Could we lay aside for a while our remembrance of the good and evil we have seen befalling mankind, we should be apt to conclude that the pleasures and pains, the successes and disappointments of all were in quantity alike. For though it be certain God may uncontrollably and lawfully deal with his creatures as he pleases, yet can we find no reason in any conceptions we can form of him, to believe he will please to deal with them arbitrarily, or partially: from whence it would follow, that the value of human life must be the same in all. But when we resume our observation of what passes in the world, we find our theory contradicted by experience: yet this does not totally overthrow it. For though our ideas of the divine Nature be so imperfect, that it behoves us to correct them from time to time by experience of facts: nevertheless, in matters whereof we can have no experience, they remain in full vigour. Nor can we judge anything concerning those matters otherwise than from the best conception we can form of the character of that Being under whose disposal they lie. As clearly as we may discover upon a full and fair examination, that the conditions of men differ less in value than ordinarily imagined, there will remain a considerable difference: nor can we help acknowledging that some possess in much

larger measure the good things of the external, the bodily, the mental, and moral kind, than others. And in one respect the difference is too obvious and glaring to be overlooked. The aggregate of pleasures constituting happiness, is made up of their intenseness and duration jointly, and therefore, under the same circumstances of condition, must depend upon the length of life. From whence it follows undeniably, that children cut off in their cradles do not receive the same portion as some persons who hold out their full period.

But then the perceptive Spirit, surviving after dissolution of the Body, remains capable of further enjoyments, which may compensate for those lost by its hasty separation. Thus we find by reasoning from experience, that there must be a difference in the future conditions of men because there is in the present: for Equity requires inequalities hereafter to compensate for inequalities here; and if Dives receive good things now, and Lazarus evil things, the latter must then be comforted, or the other tormented. But Equity requires no greater inequalities than just enough to balance those already passed through: nor have we grounds to expect any greater, unless it should appear by-and-by, in the sequel of these inquiries, that divine Justice requires greater differences in another life than have been made in this. Nevertheless, the Attributes cannot clash with one another, nor can Justice ever run such lengths as to overthrow Equity: therefore the evils inflicted by it cannot be absolutely perpetual; because evil falling all into one scale, the balance can never come even, unless there be time left for good to pour afterwards into the opposite. Therefore it was, that at the end of § 2, I explained an equality of fortunes by an equal value of each person's existence computed throughout the whole extent of his Being. For though Equity may well consist with partiality and favour in particular stages of Being, and with the various distributions of Justice according to the demerits of individuals; yet after Favour has had her Course, and Justice been satisfied, it remains that Equity should be satisfied too; which seems to require there should be a certain period assigned, wherein the accounts of all may rise to the same amount. But how long, or how short this period may be, we cannot pretend to determine: for there lies an Eternity before us, from whereout may be cut an immense length of time to pass before the balance comes even.

5. In what manner this equality shall be effected it may be difficult to conjecture, and impossible to ascertain. If we give a loose imagination in pursuing the old heathen inventions, as sketched out in the Lecture of Pythagoras in the vision, wherein the doctrines of transmigration is extended, beyond this narrow earth with the men and animals crawling thereon, to all the states of immersion into matter throughout the Universe; I think a scheme may be stricken out, which will appear specious, if not too closely scrutinized, and contain some particulars well worth our consideration. For one cannot well conceive a more perfect Equality than is therein represented; because though Existence be divided into many various forms of Being, some containing a mixture of evil and others nothing else, yet the spiritual substance, taking its turn in rotation among the several forms, the fates of all will remain alike upon having passed through the whole.

Nor yet is it necessary the whole must be run through in order to level accounts; although this cannot be accomplished between every migration from the Spiritual Substance, and the return into it again. For if, as holden by all Theists in general the virtuous shall enjoy a life of happiness

in the intermediate state, and pass from thence directly into the final; there must be at least two journeys through matter, to bring the balance even: and this will stretch the balancing period to an immense length; because the interval of abode among the Spiritual Substance must exceed that of the excursion from it, as much as the number of unembodied spirits does that of the embodied. But if natural evil be the consequence of moral, then only those states endowed with imperfect reason, liable to be mastered by passion, and tempted into transgression, will be hazardous states: and those of children dying in the womb, or before arriving at the use of reason, may be reckoned safe states. But Equity seems to require, that after having passed through one hazardous state, the next migrations should be through the safe, in proportion to the number there is of them in nature, which will lengthen the period still further.

6. Nor are these imaginations to be looked upon as matters of mere curiosity, fit only to amuse the speculative in an idle hour; but they may serve to enlarge our conception of our Almighty Governor, to give us a better opinion of his Creation, and render us more regardful of one another, and more attentive in our conduct to the good of our fellow creatures. For what can raise our idea higher of the Glory, the Power, the Greatness, the Magnificence, the Benignity of God, than to imagine his vast Empire, the Universe, fully inhabited, all space, not occupied by matter, being replete with spiritual substance, continually receiving supplies of happiness from his inexhaustible bounty? What can better exemplify his exact Equity, and Impartiality among his children, than to describe him allotting them a like share of abode in all the many mansions throughout their Father's house? What can approach our conception of his goodness nearer to infinitude, or make us better pleased and satisfied with our existence, than that immense disproportion of good to evil dispersed over his boundless dominion?

Many learned men have assigned the corporeal machinery whereto we are vitally united, for the origin, as they call it, of evil, or as I should rather term it, the sole channel by which that odious stream is cast upon us. I know that so far as we may take experience for our guide, we have reason to believe our perceptions of all kinds, our enjoyments, as well as our pains and troubles, come upon us by the action of matter; but there is great difference between a vital union therewith, and a voluntary or occasional application thereto, in such manner and such times as we choose to make it; between perceptions impressed mechanically or necessarily, and those selected by spiritual substance, to be communicated for mutual benefit. Our goods, our utensils, and instruments of diversion, answer our convenience and entertainment, while we can take them up, or lay them aside as we please: but did they grow to our hands, we should find them a great hindrance and trouble to us in all our motions. Our clothes serve us to good purpose for protection and ornament, because we can pull them off, and put on others, as we will; but were they adhering to our skin, we must endure grievous smart and torment to get rid of them when worn ragged. Now if we compare the small quantity of matter existent, with the vast expanse containing it, we must conclude, that for every Spirit imprisoned in some body, or organization, there are many millions of millions lying at large in the voids between. And so great will be the length of our abode in our own country, the spiritual substance, totally exempt from evil, in comparison with our excursion through the vale of mortality.

Nor is it a small confirmation of these suppositions, that our clearest ideas of goodness incline us to believe, that God never terminates his views ulti-

mately upon evil, nor sends it unless for some greater good to be produced thereby. Then if we cast about in our thoughts for the manner how evil may produce good, it must occur that our industry for the most part is employed in the avoidance of mischief, or preservation of what enjoyments, or means of enjoyment, we possess: so that a man without notion of any hurt or damage that could befall him, would have no inducement to bestir himself at all, and thereby lose all the pleasure he feels in the exercise of his activity; and this might probably be the case with all created spirits, however circumstanced. But the bare apprehension of mischief, seen falling upon others, will answer the purpose, yet the mischief must fall somewhere for us to see it; but the sufferings of a few may raise an apprehension of it in multitudes. Therefore gross bodies, and fine corpuscles of matter, are dispersed up and down, at proper distances, throughout the universe, that there may be samples everywhere of actual suffering, or loss of happiness through ignorance and misconduct, among the spirits imprisoned therein, for spurring up the disengaged to activity.

We may remark likewise, upon our own experience, that a small degree of pain and disappointment, like sours and bitters mixed in sauces, gives a zest to our pleasures. So it is in games of chance, where the variations of luck, and opposition of the adversary, furnish the amusement: so it is in sports of the field, where the labours and difficulties of the chase create the diversion: so it is in the common affairs of life where little displeasures and disappointments hold us closer to the engagement; and were there a man who should never meet a cross or rub in his desires, perhaps he would pass his time the most insipidly of any creature breathing. What then should hinder but that the pure spirits, by applying externally to the sensories of the embodied and inorganized, may take such sensations of all disagreeable kinds therefrom, and communicate them among one another, as they find requisite to give a smartness and a poignancy to their own enjoyments? Or if they stand so happily circumstanced as to have nothing to do for promoting or securing their own bliss, they may make it their sole contrivance and employment to lessen, as much as possible, the burdens of their immersed brethren, of the same origin and capacities with themselves. As some people, having nothing else to do, find their whole amusement in the tendency and nurture of birds, or other animals, supplying them constantly with such accommodations and pleasures as they are capable of enjoying equally with themselves. Only with this difference between the two cases, that the former do not their work by occasional or arbitrary operations, but by administering the laws of nature, and courses of fortune ordained by the Almighty.

Now if anybody shall ask the Pythagorean how he knows these things to be as above imagined, the latter will ask in return, how his antagonist knows they cannot be so; and whether, if the phenomena falling under our observation leave an equal uncertainty on both sides, he does not think their congruity with our best ideas of the divine attributes a weight inclining the balance in their favour. Nor need he be afraid of indulging such imaginations, which if a mistake, are a pleasing and innocent, or I may rather say, a lucky and beneficial mistake.

7. For, wherever fully entertained, they must effectually banish all pride, self-sufficiency, contempt, and claim to superior merit, all malice, rancour, revenge, and hardness of heart: there being no intrinsic and personal, but only a circumstantial and temporary, difference between man and man; who are all drawn from the same spiritual substance, but diversely lodged,

and accommodated for the present, and must take their turn in rotation through the several habitations occupied by one another. So that the oppressor and the scorner may actually stand one day in the very place of the persons they injure or despise.

Yet this consideration, taken partially, may be perverted to bad purposes: for the thought of our being intrinsically as good as the nobles and princes above us, will be more apt to engender pride than to mortify it, unless we reflect at the same time, that the black shoe-boy, and the cinder-wench, are as good as ourselves. Neither does this reflection hinder that we should behave differently to different persons, as they stand circumstanced upon earth: for order and public good require us to respect them according to their several stations, situations and endowments. The Senator of ancient Rome, or Alderman of the present times, have always owed an obedience to the Consul, or Mayor, for the time being, whom perhaps they might command in the succeeding year. And in all the changes of state officers, the people are to take their directions successively from those whom they find invested with power; yet perhaps without esteeming them better qualified, or more meritorious, than others whose places they supply. For in reverencing the ministers, we reverence the prince, who lends them his authority, when and how long he judges proper; and in paying the respect and honour severally belonging to power, rank, learning, sagacity, riches, and other favours of Heaven, we respect and honour the supreme Monarch, who giveth and taketh away as he pleases.

Nevertheless, if the value of every one's existence, computed throughout the whole extent of his being, be equal, and the same with our own; we shall retain an inward esteem for the person of every man equally with ourselves, notwithstanding some adventitious temporary difference there may be between us. Just as if we found a person of our own rank and fortune, but at a distance from his estate, struggling with hardship and distress, for want of convenient remittances; or if we saw one of equal understanding and sagacity with ourselves, under some distemper that stupefied him for a while: we should still esteem them both upon a par with ourselves. And as esteem naturally begets love, this will go a great way towards bringing us into obedience to that grand precept, both of natural and revealed Religion, to love our neighbour as ourselves. It will give us a fellow-feeling of all the pains, distresses, vexations, and even little disappointments, or cross accidents, we see; for upon the Hypothesis of a rotation, we shall ourselves stand, some time or other, in the situation wherein we behold another.

Nor can we harbour an inveterate hatred against anybody: for Achilles and Hector, the Pope and Calvin, Charles and Cromwell, our bitterest enemy, if we have one, and ourselves, may chance in some future migration to be intimates, coparceners in interest, father and son, or husband and wife. Or if this should never happen, still during our long abode in the Mundane Soul, we shall become bosom friends, living in perfect uninterrupted harmony, pursuing each other's interests and pleasures alike ardently with our own, and joining in one form of adoration to the Author of our unspeakable happiness. And though we may be forced many times to bring punishment, vexation, and displeasure, upon others, we shall never do it in anger, nor willingly, nor unconcernedly, but as an unavoidable means for attaining some greater good, or in compliance with the rules of prudence and justice, founded upon expedience. For we shall regard vice as a distemper of the mind, and afford what help and comfort to the patient

the circumstances of his case will admit; wishing well to the offender, while we detest the offence, as the symptom of a loathsome and infectious disease.

8. And as we readily think well of those to whom we wish well, we shall not be so forward to censure, and calumniate, and damn one another, as many of us are; but make all fair allowance for errors and miscarriages, and strive to extend the hope of salvation, as far as there can be found any solid ground to support it. Selfishness and insensibility to all around us seem to be made the characteristics of high perfection in Religion: our fellow-creatures of a different language, or make, or way of thinking, or sentiment on some speculative point, are not thought worth our concern; but so we ourselves, together with a few of the same orthodox stamp, be safe, the devil take all the world beside, as deserving victims of a divine wrath never to be appeased. For my part, I cannot help being shocked to hear with what calmness the most pious people will talk of the innumerable multitudes that are to perish in everlasting flames; and with what glee the Methodists regale upon the thought, that at the day of Judgment, the rich and mighty of this world shall be dragged by devils, for Whitefield and his mob of carmen and basket women to trample under foot.

Nor do the Freethinkers less contract the pale of their Church: for though they affect to ridicule Satan and his brimstone, yet they have a damnation of their own, which they spread as liberally, and as unreluctantly, as the fiery Papist, the rigid Presbyterian, or the enthusiastic Methodist. For they tell you that right reason is the only road to happiness in this world and the next; but when you come to examine what right reason is, you will find it confined to their particular notions, or those of a few choice spirits of their own cast: and all the rest of mankind, being infected more or less with bigotry and superstition, must inevitably fall into misery and unhappiness, from which God himself cannot rescue them. For though he be merciful, incapable of revenge, nor ever angry with anybody, yet he durst not interpose, for fear Dame Necessity, enthroned above him in her eternal and unalterable nature of things, should take it amiss.

But if we claim no more than an equality among our brethren, the children of the same Father, and subjects of the same kingdom, we shall look upon the state of suffering as sinks and cesspools of the universe, to drain off the evil therein from all the rest; and the drudgery of wading through them, as a necessary service to be shared in rotation by all alike. This of course will turn our prejudice the contrary way, and set us upon hunting for arguments to contract the number and lessen the misery of them, so far as we can find warrant in calm and impartial reason. And we shall become solicitous to inculcate other incitements to virtue, in order to render the necessity of multiplying terrors among mankind as little as possible. But as Charity covers a multitude of sins and blemishes, so it likewise discovers a world of good qualities and external advantages, that escape the eye of the sordid and narrow-minded. Our idea of equality and rotation will make us glad to find enjoyments, valuable possessions, and excuses for misconduct of others, in cases which may one day become our own: and our desire will quicken our sagacity in finding more of them than could be well imagined before setting out. We shall discern pleasures where we could have tasted none ourselves, comforts under burdens that would have galled us extremely, prudence in measures that we should have esteemed foolish, unavoidable mistake in what we should have judged perverseness, and sources of enjoyment we should never have dreamt of.

This must redound to our own benefit, by opening a more delightful

prospect of Nature than we could otherwise have obtained: for we shall regard ourselves as citizens of the World, interested in everything passing there, though not immediately concerning us; and shall behold with pleasure the various blessings and salves for every sore, diffused everywhere, whereof we are to be partakers in some form of being or other. We shall esteem everything, even vexation, disappointment, and punishment, as useful, and consider the mischiefs and troubles befalling ourselves or our dearest friends, as the purchase of a portion in those scenes of lasting bliss, which they are a necessary foundation to support. And as the pressure of our grievances increases, we may from thence augurate how great must be those treasures of happiness, which our indulgent and tender Father judges worth our purchasing at so high a price. Nor need we be disturbed at the displeasures we are forced sometimes to bring upon one another, every unavoidable evil being a purchase of something more valuable than the payment. I do not know whether I shall give offence by taking notice, that the brutes often end their lives in misery and torment, and inferring from thence, that since God, who never terminates his views upon evil, calls upon them too for their payments, he will find methods of securing to them likewise their purchase. This we may look upon as our warrant for those slaughters, and hard services, we put them to for our necessary occasions: but will not justify us in abusing them wantonly. For whatever evil we bring needlessly either upon man or beast, however it may be a purchase for them, will purchase nothing for ourselves, but what we shall vehemently dislike when we enter upon the possession.

9. Nevertheless, I more than suspect that exceptions have occurred to the Reader against this doctrine of rotation; for, to say the truth, they have occurred to me, and in a formidable aspect: yet the advantages we have found resulting therefrom were the temptation with me to pursue it until I could reach them. And the like purpose may plead my excuse for employing it again hereafter occasionally in the like service: for whatever, whether fable, or hypothesis, gives scope to salutary reflections and opens imagination to the reception of good sentiments, which may find establishment afterwards upon some better foundation, may be allowably applied that way. But notwithstanding that these advantages give the doctrine an inviting look, while holden with their side towards the eye, it will scarce be judged tenable, when turned round for examination on another quarter.

For it supposes a pre-existence, and a future fall, of the blessed spirits into weakness, sin, and misery: both which are contrary to the generally received opinion, That our entrance into human life was the beginning of our existence, and that it is appointed all men once to die, and then to judgment, whereby their fates will be fixed so as never more to change. But the most fatal and invincible objection is this, that it must appear shocking to the thought and what no man can admit the supposition of, that he himself, and the most righteous person ever living, shall, in some future migration, become a reprobate, a thief, a debauchee, a murderer, profane, sacrilegious, atheistical, obnoxious to the utmost severities of divine justice. For though many pious people can think with calmness and indifference on the multitudes of other persons doomed to eternal punishment by an absolute decree, or drawn thereinto by the unlucky circumstances of their birth, education, and company, cast upon them by Providence: yet if you suggest a bare possibility of themselves becoming the objects of vengeance, though at the remotest distance of time, they feel it abhorrent to their thoughts, nor can ever bring it reconcileable with

their idea of infinite goodness. So partial are we to ourselves, that what appears agreeable to righteousness, and mercy, and goodness, in the case of another, we see plainly cannot be so upon supposal of the case being our own! For these imperfections therefore we must reject this scheme of a rotation, and however it may be innocently entertained for a while as an hypothesis, so long as serving any profitable purpose, we can by no means receive it as an article of faith.

10. Let us then look for some other way wherein to account for an equality: and this we have already found in CHAP. XIX. § 18. For the balance may be levelled by an amends made in value to the sufferer, without any other person suffering at all: because an increase of good in one scale will have the like effect with a weight of evil thrown into the other. If Dives receive good things, and Lazarus evil things, the latter must be comforted, or the former tormented. I give this conclusion in the disjunctive, because either branch will answer the purpose: although Dives had not been tormented, yet such ample comforts might have been afforded to Lazarus as would have made his fortune equal upon the whole with that of the other. Nor is it at all impossible that God may have such treasures of mercy in store, that the party receiving them shall see he was not unequally dealt with by the severest degrees of punishment which divine Justice judged fitting to inflict upon him.

Many learned and pious men hold two future states, an intermediate and a final, and though the former be a state of happiness to the virtuous, yet the bliss of the latter will be incomparably greater. Why then may not the balance be evened by the period of suffering being made so much shorter than that of the intermediate happiness, as that the quicker passage obtained thereby into the final may compensate for the evils undergone?

Or it may be, that the reprobate shall, after a length of time which nobody can limit, be brought to a right mind by the extremity of their torments so as to take an utter detestation against the courses which brought them thereinto, to feel a sincere and ardent love of virtue, stronger than can be attained in this life: whereby they may obtain a higher seat of happiness, during the remainder of the intermediate state, and so, like Lazarus, be comforted to a degree that will bring their fortunes equal upon the whole with those who have not been tormented.

Or as suggested in the Vision § 35, the state of punishment may be naturally eternal, as that of fallen man was, and the compensation brought about by a miraculous interposition, or irresistible grace, bringing them to a tenor of mind which may make them become objects of reward, instead of wrath they were before. For we must always bear in mind that virtue is the sole and certain road to happiness, as wickedness is to misery; therefore if a deliverance ever be effected, it must be worked out by a Metanoia, which we translate Repentance; that is, a thorough change of disposition and character: so that there must be an equality of virtues, before there can possibly be an equality of fortunes.

11. It may perhaps be deemed inconsistent with our ideas of goodness to imagine that he who is the fountain of it, and in whom it is inexhaustible, will inflict intolerable torments upon persons who are so far the object of that Attribute, as that he designs them an equal portion of happiness upon the whole with his best and most favoured servants. But let us reflect upon what we have already seen in the Chapter upon that article, how imperfect our ideas of Goodness are, and wrong beyond our skill to rectify them, or discover in what particular point their deficiency lies. Were we

to follow them implicitly, we must conclude there is neither pain, nor distress, nor disappointment, nor uneasiness of any kind in the world: but this conclusion daily experience forbids, and thereby throws us quite off our reckoning. We acknowledge God infinitely good, and the permission of evil forces us likewise to acknowledge a mixture of it consistent with infinite goodness: but what limitation that Attribute must set to the mixture, or what proportion to good it must require, we have no rule to ascertain. The most we can gather with tolerable assurance is this, that the good must greatly preponderate the evil: but we know the riches of God are inexhaustible, so that he may have enjoyments in store for his creatures, sufficient to compensate either by their intenseness, or duration, for the severest sufferings we can imagine.

I know Wollaston lays down, that there are some pains a wise man would not choose to undergo upon any consideration whatsoever; and I am so far from contradicting him, that instead of advising anybody to choose, or even run the hazard of, the pains I have been speaking of, I would exhort him earnestly to use all his wits and diligence to escape them; nor do I believe any man ever did run the hazard deliberately upon the recommendation of such wisdom as our frail nature is capable of, but whenever they are incurred, it is always owing to the prevalence of folly, or corrupt appetite overpowering or perverting the judgment. But may there not likewise be some enjoyments so engaging, that the wise man would not forego them upon any consideration? We see daily how intense pleasures drive men knowingly into grievous mischiefs. For the strongest idea always carries our choice, and it is difficult to raise so lively an imagination of what we have in prospect, as of what we feel. The wise man may bring himself by long practice to do this better than another, yet he is still but a man: and where the impression either of pleasure or pain is very strong, he will scarce be able to find anything in his stores of reflection to overpower it. So all this amounts to no more, than that the present outweighs the future in our estimation.

But the wisdom of God is greater than that of the wise man, and his views more capacious: to him a thousand years are but as one day: for he sees things in their essences, not by their representative ideas, which the strongest of us can raise no higher than the narrowness of his organs will permit. Therefore we cannot judge what he will choose for his creatures by what the wisest of them would choose for himself: for he may discern the greatest evils he inflicts to be no more, compared with the bliss beyond, than the plucking a hair out of a man's beard, to a year of health, and plenty, and pleasure.

Thus much we may rest assured of, that punishment is inflicted by the same God, infinitely good, and gracious, and merciful, who gives rewards to the righteous: therefore there can be nothing in it not consistent with goodness. Neither does he punish in anger, but for the benefit necessarily to result therefrom to the rest of his creation: whence it follows there may be a good redounding to make the punishment appear eligible to infinite wisdom; and if the good of others can render it so, there is less difficulty in comprehending that a compensation to the party himself may weigh with equal force. Besides, the most pious persons, who think themselves most intimately persuaded of God being infinitely good, do not stagger at the doctrine of punishment absolutely eternal inflicted upon far the greater part of mankind, including Children born out of the Christian pale: if then an inveteracy of vengeance, never to be satisfied, nor appeased to all

eternity, be compatible with their idea of infinite goodness, surely a temporary suffering to be followed some time or other, though nobody knows when, by a course of virtue, reconcilement, and happiness, is much more so.

12. Yet there is no encouragement to evil doing upon prospect of the solace to follow after an immeasurable length of misery: for though divine wisdom may discern the compensation to be adequate, yet there are sufferings so shocking to human nature, that no man who does not shut his eyes against them can submit to undergo them willingly upon any account: so there is no ground for the sinner to avail himself of what shall happen after so long an interval. Moralists indeed exhort men continually to regard the future alike with the present, but there is a moderation in all things: one may stretch one's view too far, as well as confine it too near. He that goes along with his eye fixed upon the ground, will be liable to miss his way, or run into danger; so we exhort him to look up, that he may see the windings of the path before him, and take direction from the bearings of the country: but if he keep gaping at the distant horizon, it will be as bad as to keep poring upon the ground. The proper measure of our regards for the future, is their usefulness: for our speculations and our apprehensions, as well as our actions, ought to bear a reference to use. Therefore moral exhortations urge us to consider the remotest consequences of our conduct, but remain indifferent to events whereon that can have no influence. And if we are enjoined against an unavailing solicitude for the morrow, because sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof; much more must it be faulty to stretch our eye to a distant good beyond the reach of mortal ken, when it can only tend to make us careless in guarding against intolerable mischiefs running along the line between to a length which cannot be computed. Since then our condition in the next life will depend upon our behaviour here, it behoves us to hold that object constantly in view for keeping us circumspect and diligent in our proceedings: but what further returns of life may lie beyond the next, will not be affected by anything done now, so we have nothing to do nor to think of with respect to them.

Or if the sinner could be assured that he might purchase an adequate compensation by incurring the utmost severity of torments, there could be no prudence in accepting the terms, because he can get nothing by the bargain, nor have any advantage upon the whole over those who reject it: for the compensation must be barely equal to the suffering, or the equality between him and such as do not purchase it will be destroyed. For my part, I had rather bear a little toothache once a month, than racking pains of the stone once in seven years, though I were assured the quantity of both should be alike: much more had I rather escape such racking pains, than endure them to purchase a pleasure but just equal to their weight.

And I believe he would scarce choose to go through the severe persecutions of the primitive Christians: he had rather content himself without that greater weight of glory they earned thereby. Yet they acted prudently, the purchase being much more valuable than the price demanded, and they being supported under the burden of the payment by their glowing hope in the mercies of God, who was able to recompense them abundantly for their labours. But the sinner will not have this hope to support him, for he will see God only in wrath and vengeance, the amiable parts of his character will be hidden from his eyes; and when the soul is reduced to that worst of agonies, not to be borne by any mere creature, so as to cry out, My God, my God! why hast thou forsaken me? this is a situation that

no wise man, or I may say no man in his senses, having a just apprehension of his danger, but would do his utmost to escape. Therefore we find those who are in these dreadful courses armed with an insensibility that stupefies them against all alarms. They can familiarize themselves with the thought of devils, as of a diverting story, and make merry with their tortures, as with the tricks of a Harlequin: they have no feeling but for the present, and are wholly regardless of what shall befall them in time to come: agreeably to that ancient saying, Whom Jove would destroy he infatuates.

13. There may still lie another exception against the theory of compensation, which will be thought enough to overthrow all arguments whatever that can be produced in its favour; for many will count it heterodox, as contradicting that endless duration of punishment so strongly inculcated in our sacred oracles. But there have been persons of eminent piety, and great knowledge in the holy Scriptures, who have given them a milder construction: such as our learned Archbishop Tillotson, and one of the primitive fathers, Origen, who cannot be suspected of too hasty a temper in departing from the literal sense, since he adhered too closely to it in that text which speaks of some who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven.

And there is one passage in Luke 16, which seems to countenance the doctrine of equity by employing it as a principle of reasoning, in the answer made by Abraham to the rich man, which term we commonly turn into a proper name, and call Dives: for Abraham does not allege the former behaviour of Dives and Lazarus, but their former fortunes, to account for the present difference between them. The commentators in the Synopsis tell us, that "it will add to the torments of the damned to hear and consider the former means and advantages they have been under for salvation, if they have descended from godly parents, or have been members of the Church of Christ:" therefore Abraham called him Son, to increase his vexation by putting him in mind of his godly lineage, and communion with the true Church. I do not know upon what authority they assign the office of a devil to the father of the faithful, making him forward to heighten the torments of the damned: his answer seems rather to bespeak a sentiment of mildness and compassion: the appellation of Son or Child is an expression of fondness: he can give little comfort, it is true, but what he can he gives him, which tends only to teach him patience, by reflecting on the equitableness of his treatment. As if he had said, Be content, my child, you have no hardship done you: remember that Providence cast you into a state of enjoyment in the other world, and Lazarus into wretchedness; it is but reason the tables should now be turned, that you should be the unhappy man, and he comforted. And lest he should be mortified at thinking himself utterly abandoned and neglected by the blessed Spirits, the patriarch takes care to let him know this was not the case, and that it was not for want of Will, but of Power, that he did not hasten to endeavour some relief for him: for, besides all this, there is a great chasm or vacuity between us and you, neither ground to walk upon, water to swim, nor air to fly along, so there is no possibility of passage from one to the other.

From hence we may gather that the glorified Saints, who do the Will of God as it is done in heaven, not as it is done upon earth, that is, invariably and knowingly, still have a tender regard for their unhappy brethren lying under the divine vengeance. And since they enjoy the beatific vision, we may take their sentiments for true copies of the glorious original they con-

template: from whence may be inferred that God himself bears the like tender regard; nor can we doubt whether any to whom he bears such regard shall ever fail of receiving the good effects of it in due time, as soon as the necessary services of the universe, to be worked out by their sufferings, shall be completed.

Observe moreover, that the answer to Dives being framed upon this principle, there was room for him to draw a further consolation from it than was expressed: for the change of conditions between him and Lazarus being put upon the footing of equity, without any notice taken of reward and punishment, if his sufferings were so intense as to cast the balance much lower in his disfavour, than it had ever been raised to his advantage before, he might augurate that the same equity would require there should be an amends kept in store for him, sufficient to bring the balance exactly even between both: for it could hardly consist with equity that, because one had lived in pleasure and the other in wretchedness forty or fifty years, therefore the latter must be comforted and the former tormented to all eternity. Nor would the unnavigable gulph utterly exclude his hopes, for though declared impassable in width, nothing was said to show it im measurable in length: so he might think it not impossible that, by a long journey round the coast, he might arrive at the end of it, where he should find the region of darkness joining with that of light.

I know very well that texts are best interpreted by construing everything with a reference to the principal design for which they were delivered, but that design in the parable before us can scarce be thought having anything to do with equality; it is generally holden to look no further than the persuading such as possess the good things of this world to make such prudent application of them as may improve their interests in futurity. Yet nothing is more common than to draw separate inferences from particular expressions, which have no relation to the main tenor of the context: the Synopsis writers have done it copiously upon this very parable. And there is the better reason for building upon occasional hints in the present case, because it is not a subject proper to be entered upon professedly in a Gospel preached to the poor, nor fit to be ranked among those things which are written in such legible characters, as that he who runs may read: therefore no more could be expected than a slender hint, or by-intimation, for this is enough to the considerate who have ears to hear, and more might have been mischievous to the inconsiderate. Besides, those who believe every part of the Gospels dictated by the Holy Ghost, with a view to the instruction of future ages, as well as of the first disciples, may the more easily admit, there might be something in this parable not convenient to be too strongly insisted upon, because of its being omitted by the other three evangelists.

14. And I am so sensible of the inexpedience there may be in descanting upon these topics of equality and compensation among the generality, that I should gladly have suppressed them, if the course of my argument would have permitted me. For I am of a more timid constitution than Tillotson, nor, had I been authorized to speak from the pulpit, should have ventured so far there as he has gone: yet we do not find his discourse has done mischief in the world, or sapped any part in the foundations of Religion. I have remarked before in § 10 of the Vision, that the ancients had an advantage over us moderns; for dealing out their tenets in parcels by lectures to different companies, they could adapt their discourses to their audience, whereas we who have none other way of communicating our thoughts than by

the press, are forced to pour out all promiscuously before all comers. So can do no more than I have already done in the introductory section of this Chapter, by cautioning the too curious traveller to take that care of himself, which it is not in my power to take for him, and to leave me during my excursions, waiting until he sees me come down again to the old channels running along within his accustomed purlieus. Or should he despise this warning as believing it useless to himself, still it is my comfort to think that I am not in a situation to prove dangerous anywhere: the thinking, who can judge for themselves, will be led by nobody, so I cannot mislead them; and the populace, whenever misled, are drawn by a great name and authority, which I neither expect nor pretend to, nor desire; so they can never be hurt by an obscure man, who has neither title, nor dignity, nor a seat in the House, nor yet those spiritual gifts which make the possessor powerful in utterance, able to draw followers by thousands, to all the several skirts around this great Metropolis.

But though not bounden to such strict guard upon my steps as the eminent and the popular, neither have I thrown out things wantonly and thoughtlessly, nor unless compelled thereto by the necessity of attaining my principal aim: which was effectually to recommend universal Charity, that sum of natural Religion, and grand cardinal virtue, whereon are declared to hang all the law and the prophets. For without an equality I could find no certain means for coming at the mutual connection of interests between all perceptive creatures throughout the universe, intended for the subject of the next ensuing Chapter: because if there be any doomed to miseries absolutely eternal, there can be no participation of interests between them and other creatures. But such connection seemed to me the only medium discernible by the light of nature wherewith Charity might be established on its surest bottom, Self-interest, by showing that it is rather a measure of highest prudence, than an obligation of duty. And none other ways have occurred to me, by which an equality may be effected, besides those suggested above. So that the valuableness of my principal aim may atone for running some little hazard of giving offence in the manner of pursuing it.

I shall add further that my concern lies only with the point of equality: nor have I a fondness for the theory of compensation any longer than while it appears a necessary avenue to that. If another method can be found by which an equality may be made out, or if it shall be ranked among those mysteries which we must admit though we cannot explain them, it will serve my purpose as well.

But the arguments evincing an equality, as set out in § 2, 3, appear to me irrefragable, and whoever would controvert them, ought to prove either that the virtues we possess are entirely our own, not derived from God by the channel of his grace, nor a dispensation of his ordinary providence in our favour, or else that he is partial, creating some to everlasting bliss, and others to everlasting misery. Therefore until one of those two points be clearly made out, I may look upon the doctrine of equality as sufficiently established, and take it for the foundation of what I have next to offer.

CHAP. XXVIII.

GENERAL GOOD.

It has been frequently said, that if horses knew their own strength, they would never submit to all the drudgeries and hardships they are made to undergo. But it might with better justice be said, that if men knew the force of that reason and discretion in their power to exert, they would never submit to all those inconveniences, troubles, and vexations, they might relieve themselves from by a proper application of these talents. For there is industry and contrivance enough in quantity throughout the world, to supply all our wants and desires; they fail only through misapplication. We see daily how indefatigable men are in their several pursuits, how vigilant in watching opportunities to gratify a predominant passion, how attentive and sagacious in practising little artifices to compass a favourite purpose. But the misfortune is, that they spend their industry for the most part upon trifles, or in the service of some fond humour suggested accidentally by fancy, or at best for the accomplishment of narrow views, terminating solely upon themselves. Whereas the most beneficial enterprises can only be achieved by the united endeavours of many, concurring in some work that may redound to the advantage of them all. We see this exemplified in the benefits of society, where the operations of war, the conveniencies of commerce, and regulations of civil policy, are promoted by the persons concerned acting in partnership and concert. The common transactions of life go on more easily, and conversation becomes more agreeable, for a readiness to assist and oblige.

Nature designed the whole species for one society, as we may judge from the variety of productions serviceable to all, the different materials and opportunities for cultivating the arts and sciences, which she has distributed about among the countries upon earth: so that no one of them furnishes the accommodations of life completely without communication with the rest. But folly, selfishness, and passion, have prevented our growing into a vigorous healthy body; we are a disjointed multitude, each caring only for himself, and thereby losing those innumerable advantages we might work out by our unanimity. Whose place is ill supplied by succedaneums, such as the desire of riches or honour, the lash of necessity or dread of dangers too glaring to escape our dull optics: which prove a feeble cement to join us into those partial societies and temporary engagements conveying the blessings we do enjoy. Nay, what is worse, our greediness and ill humour often drive us to endeavour the damage and displeasure of one another: which occasions a double waste of industry, by obliging others, who might employ it better, to apply theirs in relieving or defending themselves against our attacks. But unanimity cannot subsist without universal charity and unreserved good will, which nothing can better promote than the persuasion of there being a real connection of interests and mutual dependence of happiness among mankind, and this persuasion our doctrine of equality seems particularly well suited to propagate.

2. It was with a view to bring men better disposed towards one another that I entered upon my task. For how much soever I may have seemed to trifle and play the wanton sometimes, I have all along had grand designs in my eye, being no less than to contribute so far as in me lay, towards exci-

ting a general concern and mutual benevolence among my fellow creatures. For I cannot help being persuaded that if this could be completely effected, so as that every man should become a friend and hearty well-wisher to every man, this alone would restore a paradise upon earth; although earthquakes should still continue to overthrow, tempests to sweep away, blights to destroy, and wild beasts to devour as usual: for I doubt not that the united skill and labours of mankind might remove all intolerable evils, and teach the art of bearing easily all that could not be avoided. Yet I am not so romantic as to think of completing this design, or even making any large stride towards it. But Rome was not built in a day, nor by the hands of a single laborer: yet years and ages are composed of days, and the most stupendous works performed by numbers made up of single labourers.

The world seems growing more humanized, more enlarged in their notions, and readier to take concern in distant joys and sorrows, than they were in former times: and as these advances are made insensibly by particular persons, each contributing a little towards promoting them, it becomes every one to lend a helping hand to so salutary a work, in such way as he finds himself best suited to take. As I have not much intercourse among mankind, nor acquired an expertness in the management of topics prevailing with the Many: it seemed that I could not do better than address myself to the thinking and studious, by collecting a chain of observations which might serve as a hint for them to improve, towards bringing themselves into a conformity of sentiment and openness of temper. For if, instead of entering the lists as adversaries contending for victory, they would consider one another as persons consulting together upon the methods of accomplishing a purpose they all had at heart: however they might vary for a while, they could not be long without discerning which were the best. And if they would employ their talents sincerely for the public good, in preference to any private views or favorite schemes or pre-contracted prejudices, they must quickly draw the rest of the world after them. For the multitude are ready enough to follow their leaders; nor ever desert them, unless enticed away by opposite leaders.

But to deal with the sagacious and deep-thinking one must go to the bottom of things, for they will not take up with strong assertions nor superficial appearances, how shining soever: but to bring them into one mind one must proceed upon premises they can examine themselves and approve of. Therefore they fail in their transactions among one another by dealing too much in abstractions, ideal differences of right and wrong, of laudable and blamable, and intrinsic value of rules and qualities: which as men's ideas vary infinitely, being modelled according to their several turns of thought, they can never settle to mutual satisfaction. For this reason I have endeavored to dig down to a foundation they will all agree strong enough to bear a superstructure: for I suppose the most righteous and unprejudiced will allow it commendable for a man to do what he can for himself, provided he do no hurt to another thereby, nor thwart any rule of Religion or duty. Therefore self-interest of itself is a proper consideration to put us upon action: and I have taken this for my basis to work upon. It must be owned indeed that all others propose happiness and truest interest, as the ultimate aim to be attained by the several systems: but then they either carry their road through the wilds of abstraction, or take large leaps from stage to stage, by which methods they do not render the continuity visible even to one another. Therefore I have been careful to keep my feet all along upon the solid ground of experience, employing such abstractions and

reasonings from time to time as could be drawn thereupon, and attempting to trace the connection, step by step, from self-interest to the virtues: so that whoever thinks fit to follow me may do it without leaping hedges or flying in the air, and judge for himself in what particulars I have been defective. Only I must desire he will distinguish between excursions I make for illustration or for removing obstructions that would stop my passage or for other particular purposes, and the main parts of my road conducting directly towards the journey's end.

I have examined human nature and found that Satisfaction, every man's own satisfaction, is the spring that actuates all his motions. I have investigated the sources of satisfaction, which is conveyed for the most part through the channel of desire; observed that desire may be turned into new courses by good management; inquired what turns of desire afford the most copious stream; and shown that the ideas exciting desire, derive, nearly or remotely, from external and prior causes. I have then proceeded to the contemplation of external nature; and from thence attempted to rise to the Author of nature, together with so much as can be discovered from his works concerning his attributes and character: wherein there appears no weakness nor humour, no spark of arbitrary or inequitable disposition, but unreserved and unniggardly goodness. From this height I have returned downwards, to show that all causes in act derive their efficacy and destination from the act of the First, exerted with certain foreknowledge and deliberate design of whatever should follow thereupon. I have likewise scrutinized minutely the motions of freewill, explained the difference between necessity and certainty, and shown the consistence of liberty with pre-appointment; whereby it appears that human action is among the causes depending in a chain upon the First. From all this I have concluded that all events, whether yielding enjoyment or trouble, effected as well by the choice and activity of man as by chance or nature, were of the divine provision: and this provision being made in perfect equity, that there is an equality of happiness, upon the whole balance of good and evil, allotted to every creature.

Thus far we have travelled already, and our next step shall be, from this equality to deduce a reciprocal connection of interests among the creation: from whence will naturally flow an universal charity and steady attention to the general good. As to the methods whereby this is most effectually promoted, these are copious enough to supply materials for another work, if we should have strength and opportunity to undertake it: it is enough that we furnish ourselves here with a fundamental and ruling principle of action, in lieu of that we had established before. For we set out at first with the position, that a man has nothing else to do than pursue his own interests in such a way as his judgment shall represent most feasible and effectual: nor need we still recant our opinion, but having found our own interest indissolubly connected with that of others, we may discard our old aim securely, and take up this, as answering the very purpose driven at by the former; keeping our eye constantly upon it as a mark to direct us in all our proceedings.

3. For if the accounts of all are to be set even, we can get nothing by obtaining a little advantage at the expense of greater damage to another; and lose nothing by submitting to some pain for procuring him a greater pleasure. Because in the former case we depress his balance more than we raise our own, and thereby cut ourselves off from so much of the expectations we were entitled to by the rule of equality as the difference amounts to: in the latter we raise his balance more than we depress our own,

and thereby increase our future expectations in like proportion. For so if there be two merchants in partnership, each of them during the course of trade would think himself interested in the balance appearing from time to time upon the other's books: and would judge it prudent to throw any branch of trade into the other's hands, if it would turn to greater profit there than in his own. Nor would it alter his measures, that his partner had a larger balance of cash in hand already; for while he could supply himself by his own industry, he would choose to do it that way rather than draw out of what lay elsewhere in reserve for his future occasions.

Now it is the rule of equality, entitling each adventurer to a share in the whole profits of the business, that constitutes a partnership; whether imposed by the authority of a superior, or settled by mutual compact. For if a merchant sends his sons with a competent stock to trade in different parts of the globe, upon condition that when they return home, the gains of all shall be divided equally among them; this is a partnership as much as if they had entered into it by voluntary agreement: and the King's frigates ordered out upon a joint cruize, are as much partners as a company of privateers.

Therefore the universe may be justly regarded as an innumerable host of partners dealing together in the traffic of happiness: and it is our business to apply all our contrivance and industry towards improving the common stock, and adding to the quantity of enjoyments in nature wherever we can. It is no matter whether we do this in the hands of another or of ourselves, we shall advance our own benefit either way alike; because our share or interest must always rise and fall proportionably with that of the public. But there are disbursements to be made in all traffic: labour, trouble, danger, disappointment, self-denial, pain, and punishment, are the disbursements necessary in the commerce of nature; and the prudent merchant will grudge no expense likely to yield a larger return. Only he will manage parsimoniously, driving his bargains hard, that the cost may not run higher than the occasion absolutely requires; nor yet will he scruple to advance any sums because the returns may fall into other hands, for the common stock will be the object he has constantly at heart, as knowing himself so much the richer man as that can be made to increase.

4. Thus the general good becomes the root whereout all our schemes and contrivances, all our rules of conduct and sentiments of honour are to branch: and the centre whereto all our particular lines of direction are to point. But this general good, although much in men's mouths, seems but little understood, being supposed always to imply something redounding to the benefit of the whole community; whereas we are too inconsiderable to do any good whereof the universe may partake. Nevertheless, let it be remembered that the whole is made up of individuals; so that every pleasure we do our neighbour, is an addition to the quantity of happiness in nature. Just as a merchant, sending goods to one partner, which may be disposed of to great advantage, thereby enlarges the common stock, although the rest of the company should know nothing of the matter. Therefore whatever good we do to any particular creature, we do to the universe: agreeably to that expression of him who represented a community as their head. What ye have done unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done unto me.

But though universal good be promoted by the good of any single person, yet it is more promoted by what redounds to the benefit of numbers; which therefore deserves the preference whenever opportunity serves, or

the two come into competition: and this is so evident, that nobody can doubt of it. Hence the mighty bustle commonly made with public spirit, which as bandied about in the world, is become an empty sound, with nothing of spirit in it; or used as a pretence to varnish over selfish designs; or employed as an artifice to bring others into a disinterested zeal, which those who recommend it laugh at in their sleeve as a weakness. But if such as have abilities would set themselves in earnest to trace the relation between self-interest and general through the channels of nature and Providence, in the manner I have attempted, they might perhaps clear the passage more demonstratively: and by their greater sagacity and skill in casting light upon objects, might render the connection visible to common apprehensions, so as to make them intimately persuaded of its reality, and embrace it as a practical principle of action. Nevertheless, to take off from their trouble as much as I can, since men are remarkably ingenious at starting objections against the best evidenced truths they do not like, I shall endeavour to obviate such as I apprehend may arise against this rule now laid down as the most prudential.

5. It may be alleged that the quantity of good and evil in nature is such and none other than God in his wisdom and bounty nas thought proper to make it: and consequently the portion of each individual must be such precisely as falls to his share, according to the number of creatures existent, beyond the power of any thing to alter it. Therefore it matters not what good or hurt they bring upon their neighbour, because they cannot diminish the portion of either allotted to him, they can only anticipate the times of his receiving it: for if they do the former, he has so much less to expect; if the latter, so much less to fear, in the remainder of his period.

Now this allegation might have some colour of reason, if we knew the precise portion assigned to each creature, or if it were to be ascertained by an unalterable fatality: but we know not the one, and know the other, from our experience, not to be the case. So that whenever we do good, we see the immediate benefit of it; but we cannot see, nor rationally conclude, that some remote loss or damage shall ensue from it. And with respect to the portion, the whole measure of that is secured no otherwise than the several articles composing it, and the times of their being given: that is, not by a fatality, but by a provision of adequate causes. Let but men turn the tables, and they will see the hollowness of their excuse: for if another goes to hurt them, or debar them from taking the pleasures in their power, they will not bear to be told, it is only an anticipation or retardment of what they must receive some time or other. And in gratifications of desire or self-interest, they will not hear of a fatality; whereas in reality these matters are as much under appointment by the provision of causes as anything else whatever. Therefore let them only raise their desire to its proper object to wit, the advancement of good wherever feasible, and their objection will vanish of itself. I have endeavoured to make appear in the last Chapter but one, that the secret Will of God can be no guide to our conduct which we are to form upon the declared Will, evidenced to us by our reason judging upon the consequences of measures, or by rules built upon our former experience or upon the authority of those who know the tendency of actions better than ourselves; therefore we have nothing to do with appointments any further than as manifested to our apprehension. For the decree or determination of God is nothing else than the provision of causes adapted to each particular event; and the operation of those causes is requisite to execute the decree; but in matters within our power, our own deliberation and

industry are among those causes; wherefore we must think and strive for ourselves notwithstanding the decree.

This is apparent in common affairs of life: for who that lives in plenty does not see that he has his daily bread appointed him by having the means in his hands of procuring it, for which he ought to be thankful? yet does not see at the same time that this appointment by no means supersedes his cares in sending to market and ordering his family? Thus, although the portion of happiness be of divine appointment, yet the application of our cares and industry, for conveying the parts of it administered by our own agency, is requisite and advisable. In these instances the Will of God is done by our Will: but that Will orders all things for the best. Yet though whatever we shall do must therefore be agreeable to his Will, and best to be done, because done: still this does not take away the use of judgment and deliberation to direct our choice between the several measures of conduct. If a man having it in his power to do something whereby he should get a thousand pounds seven years hence, should be told that whether he did it or let it alone, either way would be the best he could take: I make no doubt he would prefer that which afforded him a visible gain, rather than depend upon the unknown profit to arise from his rejecting it. So if, however we conduct ourselves, we shall unerringly pursue that unknown Best appointed by divine provision, it behoves us to take the way apparently best to our own judgment.

But men never employ these sophisms unless in justification of their gratifying some present fancy; whereas if they had any weight, they must avail against inclination as well as judgment, the omission of either being alike the best thing could have been done, whenever done: so that all choice and preference of any kind whatever will be taken away, and a total stagnation of activity ensue. But if between things equal in themselves, liking and fancy may cast the balance, surely the weights of reason and prudence are greater. Yet we cannot allow them intrinsically equal, for our fortunes in futurity, as well as present time, are in great measure of our own making: therefore if we hurt them by misconduct, what remains will be the quantity thought best to be allotted us by Divine Wisdom; and if we improve them, the quantity so increased will likewise be that thought best by the same wisdom. Thus the best we may attain by the road of virtue and discretion will be (if I may so speak) a better Best, than any we can arrive at through the paths of folly and indulgence.

6. Another handle may be taken for cavilling, from our having laid down that every evil is to be considered as the payment for a purchase of something more valuable: from whence it may be inferred that by plaguing and hurting another, we do him no injury, for we only compel him thereby to make an advantageous purchase. Or if the value of the estate and the price be settled by divine appointment, we only call upon him for a part of his payment, which it is all one whether he makes to-day or to-morrow, since he must have made it some time or other. But this may be answered in the same manner with the former; for we know not either the certain value of the estate or the price, nor whether one shall be enhanced in proportion to the other: therefore by doing hurt we visibly increase the payment, without knowing whether we shall increase the purchase.

Besides, by this rule it would be incumbent upon every man to make himself as miserable as possible, because by so doing he would purchase a larger fund of happiness: but I believe no man in his sober senses and dispassionate moods, ever run himself wilfully into miseries upon this account;

nor unless called thereto by some rule of duty, which was a particular assurance that the sufferings he submitted to were worth his while to undergo. We know not what proportion of evil is necessary for the services of the universe, therefore ought to use all means in our power for lessening it, being well assured that we cannot reduce it lower than the sum imposed for the necessary services. The public taxes are a payment for the protection afforded by the state: yet he that should compel his neighbour to pay a shilling in the pound more than the law demands, or than he knows the exigencies of the state require, would be deemed to do an injury. So he who puts another to a pain or trouble from whence he sees not the benefit resulting, does him a wrong; by exacting a payment he cannot be assured would ever have been demanded.

7. But the most plausible exception lying against the expedience of labouring for the general good, arises from our inability to contribute so much towards it as to make our share worth the consideration. For it may be urged, if you had it in your power to do something that would make a thousand people happy for fifty years together: though this would seem a vast addition to the common stock of enjoyment, yet when you reflect what prodigious multitudes it is to be divided amongst, your own part will scarce amount to the value of once smelling at a rose. So there is no inducement to bestir yourself, because with your utmost endeavours you cannot make an addition to your own fortune sufficient to be perceived.

But let us consider, that if this doctrine were to prevail, most of the blessings of nature, the benefits of society, and conveniences of life, would be lost: the most valuable of which are procured by the operation of feeble, inconsiderable agents. The planets are holden in their orbits by the attraction of minute particles, undiscernible with a microscope, composing the body of the sun: the earth is clothed with pasture by little seeds, each whereof cannot throw up herbage enough to make a bite for a sheep: if we admit a Mundane Soul, the worlds are formed and the courses of nature kept in order, by spirits which singly could not heave a mote in the Sun beams. What is a single soldier in those armies that have kept the mightiest potentates in awe? If he lag behind you do not stop for him, or if he be slain you do not miss him. What is a private person's quota to those immense supplies supporting our armaments in all quarters of the globe? If he has not wherewithal to pay, the operations go on as before, and none but the collector or his nearest neighbours know anything of his failure. Yet a wise man, finding himself to have courage and ability for the service, would not desert in time of battle although there were no courts martial to overawe him: nor withhold his proportion of the taxes although his goods were liable to no distress. For he would regard what he contributes by his person or his pocket as entitling him to a share of the advantages procured by all the others he joins with: an object well worth his contemplation. Nor let it be made a discouragement that some unreasonable creatures refuse their helping hand: for there are enow concurring some way or other in the public service to render the benefits worked out by them a sufficient inducement to become one of their number.

8. But we need not undervalue our particular services because they yield but little profit: for though the performance of them cannot do much good, yet it may prevent great mischiefs which might have ensued upon the omission. The negligence of a single sentinel may give the enemy an opportunity of surprising a whole camp, and a little carelessness in placing a candle may produce a fire that shall burn down a whole town. There-

fore we can never be too vigilant, because we can never know what waste of destruction may ensue upon the want of it. What though our persons be single and our efforts small, nobody can say what multitudes they may not affect, nor what tides of industry they may not excite. It is notorious of how spreading a nature both the virtues and the vices are: for example and sympathy diffuse the stream to all quarters from a single fountain: and a man may sometimes find that in his power wherein all mankind shall have concern in the consequences. Noah built his ark to save his little family consisting of eight persons: but in so doing he saved all the generations of men that have since overspread the earth. The founders of Religions and sects in philosophy, inventors of arts and sciences, though imparting their thoughts to a few, have thereby opened channels which overflowed whole nations and countries. And as we know not how far the people of the intermediate state stand affected by what passes here, nor what effect their transactions have upon the spiritual substance; it is not impossible nor improbable, that a single person may do that which shall be felt by the whole universe.

It may be said this might happen perhaps to extraordinary persons once in an age, but a private man never stands in a situation to work consequences that can possibly extend beyond the narrow circle of his acquaintance. But I would ask him how he knows that? For we have shown in our Chapter of Providence, that the affairs of the world are all complicated and interwoven among one another into one tissue: that the greatest events depend upon the minutest, and the constitution of the Roman empire, together with that of the kingdoms branched out from thence, might be determined by some such inconsiderable circumstance as the wearing a particular coloured riband upon a certain festival. So that there is no such thing as trifle in nature, every little incident and sudden fancy being provided for by perfect wisdom with a regard to the whole. For how narrow soever the views of creatures may be, God beholds the universe, and directs every little stroke in his all-comprehensive plan, so as to contribute its share towards the general good. Or if there be such things as trifles, they are so intermingled among the imperceptible springs of important events, that the most prying eye cannot distinguish them apart.

Therefore we ought always to stand upon our guard, and shape our minute motions by such discretion and regard to rectitude as is proper upon the occasion, for the chance of effecting what unseen good or escaping what unthought of evil may possibly depend upon them. For the chain of causes and effects runs to such immeasurable lengths and divides into so many unperceivable threads, that no man can be sure his manner of stirring the fire or buttoning his coat shall not be attended with consequences greater than he is aware of. But it would be in vain to take his measures upon consequences that human sagacity cannot investigate: therefore he has nothing to do with them, nor with anything else besides the rules of prudence, charity, propriety, and innocence, so far as in the present circumstances of the case he can discern them. For since the wisest men have always maintained that moral good is the ready road to natural, while he follows the best lights of his judgment, he may trust Providence for leading him unknowingly into all those secret advantages possible in his situation to be attained. For though God no doubt has appointed each of us his certain portion, yet he deals out to us, perhaps the whole, or at least a great part of it, by our own or one another's hands. For we have seen more than once before, that things certain may neverthe-

less depend upon human contrivance and industry. Therefore it behoves us to use the proper degree of circumspection as well in matters of trifle as of moment: because according to our conduct in either, our portion will be better or worse; and that in a measure greater than we think of, and large enough to deserve our notice and overpay the trouble of the acquisition.

9. Yet even supposing this was not the case, but that it were impossible for us, either directly or in consequence, to add so largely to the general fund as may raise the least perceivable difference in each private share; still there would not want encouragement to bestir ourselves: for it is not necessary that every particular profit must be divided among the whole company, because the members may have equal shares, though assigned them out of different funds. Were there a million of traders dispersed up and down in different quarters, and destined to make the same fortunes, they might be divided into distinct partnerships of ten in a company, who might traffic and settle their balances from time to time among themselves, without intercourse among the other decads. Equality might still be preserved, provided there were an able superintendent of the whole, who should take care there were the like opportunities of trade among the several decads, or that particular persons were removed in due order from a less to a more gainful fellowship. And, in fact, we find the creation, so far as our experience reaches, divided into distinct species and limited societies, the effects of whose actions extend no further than to a certain number of those with whom they have intercourse. Nor can we presume otherwise of those unseen consequences depending upon the secret concatenation of causes, which however they may in part extend to innumerable multitudes, are likely to affect some particular class of beings principally, with whom we stand nearest concerned. And upon removal into a new fellowship, the rule of equality will require that the place assigned us should be such as may secure to us the balance due upon our former account. For though these changes be brought about by natural courses, yet God, being the author and disposer of nature, establishes all her provisions in equity; as well those respecting the changes from one state into another, as those regulating accounts in the same. So that by our diligence in the branch of trade before us, we determine what interest we shall have in the branches to be allotted us hereafter. Thus, in every stage of being, the main of what profits we can make will accrue to the benefit of such a competent number as that our proportion shall remain weighty enough to be felt in our hands.

Or even if we suppose all the gains accruing thrown into the general fund upon account of the whole partnership, there is no necessity they should be drawn out again by little fractions from each, so minute as to reduce them below our notice. Could a man raise a profit of a thousand pounds, to receive it again by a farthing a year, he might despise the addition of a farthing to his annual income; but if it came by fifties or hundreds of pounds at a time, he would find the convenience of them for his occasions. So the share of happiness we earn by some effort of our industry, being dealt out to us in serviceable portions, will answer our future wants some time or other, without detriment to our fellow-creatures receiving theirs in like manner. This would evidently be the case upon admitting an universal rotation: for then every person falling in some part of his course into the place of every other, must receive the very same good, both in kind and quantity, as he does to his neighbour; and if he can do that which redounds to many, he will reap the benefit of it so many times as there are persons to whom he has done service. But should there be no

such exact retaliation in kind, yet equity requiring that the good befalling one should likewise befall another, there must be a compensation equal in value. Therefore, though we do not receive just the same sized notes, or the same species of coin we carried in, we shall be sure of receiving the full amount in good negotiable cash.

So that since the allegory of books has been employed by the best authorities, we may consider the provisions of Heaven as an universal bank, wherein accounts are regularly kept, and every man debited or credited for the least farthing he takes out or brings in. All the good we procure to another, the labour and self-denial we go through prudently, and evil we suffer unavoidably, are written down as articles in our favour; all the evil we do, the fond indulgences we give into, or good we receive, entered per contra as so much drawn out of our cash. Perhaps something may be taken out for the public services, but then we have the benefit of this in the public conveniences and protection whereof we partake; but the remainder lies placed to each private account for answering our calls or supplying our occasions.

And this is a better bank than that of England to keep our current cash; I shall not say, for its greater security, because the monied men of this and foreign nations think the other secure enough; but the Bank of England give no interest upon their notes, whereas the Bank of the Universe improve what we have lying there to immense advantage, far beyond what could be made in script by any Jew or clerk in the secretary office let into secrets; and the application to our several occasions lies under wiser management than our own. If I have an account with the Bank of England, and should take it into my head, because other folks are fond of the like, to throw away a large sum in punch and ale for gaining me the huzzas of a drunken mob, and procuring me an opportunity of serving my country which I want abilities to use; or to buy a horse of noble lineage descended from Turkish or Barbarian ancestors to run at Newmarket: upon applying to the cashier in Threadneedle-street for a thousand pounds, he will instantly order payment without asking questions: though I may want the money grievously next year to make up a portion for my Serena or my Sparkler. Or should I chance on some distant journey to be reduced low in pocket, if I have no checked paper along with me, I cannot draw for a single sixpence to buy me a little bread and cheese.

But the directors of the bank above have constant intelligence from all parts of the universe, and their runners traversing to and fro among their customers: so that whatever I have belonging to me there, if I call for a sum to squander away upon some vice or folly, though I beg and pray never so hard, the cashier will not issue me a farthing, because he knows it had better be kept in reserve for more necessary occasions. But if I chance to fall into distress in any disconsolate spot of nature, where a supply would do me real service, though I should not see the danger of my situation, nor have sent advice with the needful per post, I shall have the runner angel privately slip the proper sum into my hand at a time when I least expect it. So we have no need to trouble ourselves about the improvement of our money there, or the laying it out for our particular uses: it is our business to use all our judgment and industry and vigilance for throwing as much as we can continually into bank. Yet this does not hinder us from taking present enjoyments from time to time, where innocent and lying properly within our reach: for though this be a lessening of our future demands, yet the future were of no avail if it were never to be present; nor is money

good for anything but to be spent, provided it be spent prudently, and no more given for things than they are worth.

10. Nor have we concern only with the articles of our own account, but with those likewise of other persons; from whence we may receive a pleasure not to be found in the ordinary course of worldly commerce. If on attending at the earthly accountant office, the eye, while the clerks turn over the leaves of their books, happens to catch upon somebody else's balance, which appears ten times larger than our own, one may be mortified to find oneself so inconsiderable in point of riches, compared with him.

But in the accounts of Providence, a like discovery could prove no such mortification: for we dealing all in partnership, the profits whereof are to be made equal to each in some shape or other in some part of our period, whatever virtues, talents, or successes we see elsewhere, adding more largely to the common stock than we can do ourselves, must become matter of rejoicing rather than vexation. Because the rule of equality insures to us that we shall either immediately partake of the fruits gathered therefrom, or at some future time be instated in a branch of trade we see to be more profitable than that now under our management.

And this consideration, duly attended to, must put an end to that humour of depreciating the characters, the abilities, and the enjoyments of other creatures, so generally prevailing among mankind. For as the more good, so the less evil we can find in others, the better it is for ourselves. For my part, I am so far from any temptation to believe myself the happiest of my species, that I would thank anybody who should prove me the most miserable creature in the universe: I do not mean, who should bring mischief upon me, or discover misfortunes in store which I do not know of, for this would be madness to desire: but should show the condition I now stand in, such as it is, inferior to that of every other being: so that the common labourer, the galley-slave, the negro, the flea, the mite, and every departed soul, possessed greater enjoyments than those within my reach. Such a discovery would afford me a most ravishing prospect of nature, and without hurting me in present, give me more hopeful expectations for the future: for since I am not always to continue in the same state, I could make no change unless for the better.

But I am too sensible of the blessings vouchsafed me, to be persuaded into this imagination: on the contrary, when I behold miseries anywhere appearing far greater than anything I ever underwent, which yet I have found troublesome enough; it raises, besides a fellow feeling for the sufferer, a melancholy reflection to think that the lot of existence is subjected to so severe a condition. However, my partiality to wish it easier makes me ready to embrace every evidence that offers for believing it so: and it is with pleasure I find alleviations, from custom, difference of apprehension or insensibility, for every natural evil; and extenuations from ignorance, inadvertency, and surprise, for every moral. Or if this cannot be done, find benefits resulting therefrom; enjoyments and advantages compensating them.

Thus the doctrine of equality tends directly to nourish benevolence, mutual esteem, good wishes, and favourable judgments, between fellow-creatures; and how much soever it may appear at first sight to encourage indolence, by making men trust to the diligence of their partners, yet when fairly examined, it proves as strong a recommendation and solid ground of care and industry in particular persons, as any principle whatever. Therefore, those who should not admit it, might yet allow it excuse, for sake of the desirable ends aimed at by proposing it to their consideration.

CHAP. XXIX.

DIVINE JUSTICE.

The attentive reader will please to remember, that at the close of my chapters upon the Attributes, I took notice of some others usually placed upon the list, which I there called secondary Attributes, as not arising from contemplation of the Divine nature regarded apart: whereof this of justice was one, which I could not take fully into consideration until I had collected further materials necessary for the purpose. He will now see why I postponed this article, to wit, that I might first go through what observations I had to make upon the manner of God's governing his creatures, whereof the proper distribution of rewards and punishments is one of the engines employed.

We have no means of forming any conception of the moral attributes, unless by analogy with something we have observed among ourselves: and it has been found at several times in the course of these inquiries, that a wise man would never punish for punishing sake; nor unless driven into it by the necessity of attaining some greater good which could not be procured without it. For true wisdom always includes goodness, and goodness will never put a man upon any measure that is not beneficial: it may urge him sometimes to hurt another for preventing greater mischief, or reaping good fruits that will overpay the hurt; as in cases of medicine or surgery, or forcing a child into the discipline of a school, or drudgeries of an apprenticeship; but wherever it takes the road of severity, there is always some benefit lying in prospect beyond.

Now, we have shown in the proper place, that the motive of action is that end occurring to view at the time of acting: the intermediate steps have no weight in the scale, being only ideal causes directing us how to proceed. Therefore, whenever the suffering of an offender is the real motive or sole object in contemplation, it proceeds from passion, ill-nature, or weakness. Not but that the best men often punish without looking to the good fruits resulting therefrom; but then they do it in compliance with their rules of justice, which are to them an evidence of good they cannot discern. For human reason is so short sighted as seldom to see to the end of her road, therefore we should lose our way perpetually, if we had not rules to direct us, and though our rules branch and receive evidence from one another, yet it is the expedience of following rules that gives them their sanction, and begets the general idea of rectitude. For what else is right, unless that which had better be done than let alone? and what can we understand by better, unless more beneficial and more productive of good?

But when we turn our thoughts upon the Divine nature, we shall find nothing of passion or malice, or weakness there: nor are the views of God so narrow as to want those helps to direct him in the course of his proceeding, which are necessary to weak-sighted mortals. For he sees the whole immensity of space and shoreless ocean of eternity in one unbounded prospect: he discerns distinctly the fullest length of chain and most complicated tissue of causes requisite to complete his every purpose: nor follows other rule in taking measures for conferring what blessings he judges proper for his creatures, than his own gracious bounty and the constitution of universal nature he established from everlasting. Therefore we have no reason to be-

lieve he ever terminates his views upon evil, or has nothing further in his thought, when he takes vengeance, than the sufferings of the sinner.

2. Were there an immediate and necessary connection between offence and punishment, there could be no place for mercy; much less could the exercise of it deserve commendation, but must rather be deemed an erroneous and unnatural proceeding. Yet we find, that in the judgment of the wisest, an aptness to show mercy, and to forgive or forget injuries, is always regarded as one of the brightest jewels in a man's character: which shows there is some medium making the connection, which when wanting in the circumstances of the case, mercy may laudably interpose. And this medium can be none other than the necessity or expedience of punishing; in order to prevent the mischiefs expectant upon future enormities. Therefore it is that repentance sheathes the sword of justice, which it could not do if demerit was essential to transgression; because nothing subsequent can alter the quality or essence of a deed already perpetrated: but the thorough amendment of the party preventing his ever offending again, renders punishment needless, by answering the purpose intended thereby, and so removing the medium of necessity, destroys the connection. Therefore when punishment is necessary for example to others, repentance will not be accepted: because there the medium consisting of many strings, though one be cut asunder, the rest remain entire, to shut out the entrance of mercy.

Nor can we conceive the matter beholden otherwise by the all-seeing eye of God, with whom is mercy as well as judgment: but if in his original constitution of nature, he had established an immediate and essential connection between offence and punishment, we cannot suppose he would ever have broken through his own constitutions. Yet Mercy has always been counted his favourite Attribute: and when, in condescension to our weakness, he has been represented by figures taken from human sentiments, we find him described as being uneasy and anxious to have the sinner escape. As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that he should turn from his evil ways and live. But neither God nor man can be supposed to submit to a thing they have no pleasure in, unless for some greater benefit to redound therefrom: and in such case act upon a motive of necessity.

But necessity, when operating as a motive, always weighs by the idea of advantage, which the thing we do is necessary to attain, and which renders it more beneficial to be done than omitted. Therefore since God is no respecter of persons, nor consequently entertains a personal hatred or grudging against any one, but his mercy is over all his works and he would not that any should perish: we may rationally conclude, that whenever he executes vengeance, he does it not in wrath, but in wisdom, as a means to work out some good that shall overbalance the sufferings of the delinquent. For his mercy never sleeps, but would always interpose whenever justice goes to lift the thunder, unless goodness and wisdom did sometimes withhold her, by showing the greater profit redounding from punishment. Which profit equity enters in her books of account, apportioning to the sinner his share of whatever is earned by his sufferings. For God orders all things for the best, whereby must be meant, not the best for himself, because he wants nothing from us, nor can his riches or happiness receive addition by anything passing among us, but the best for his creatures: whose interests we have already seen are so involved together, that whatever promotes the general good of the Universe or of any community comprehended therein, must promote that of every particular.

3. Thus punishment follows the rule directing all other evil, which our idea of infinite goodness may convince us always terminates in some event more desirable than the escaping it. It will not be amiss in the next place to trace the origin of vengeance, which we shall not find arising immediately from the divine nature, as goodness and equity do, but from the constitution of the creatures, rendering it a necessary spring in the hand of Providence for working out its gracious purposes and securing the accomplishment of its plan. We know by experience that God has been pleased to intermingle a portion of evil among his works, and this may be distinguished into three kinds: first, labour, self-denial, and inconveniences, we are instructed to submit to voluntarily for the good fruits to be gathered from them, or by rules established by others upon the knowledge of their expedience; next, diseases, sinister accidents and infirmities of old age, brought upon us by the courses of nature or fortune; and thirdly, punishment inflicted by the act of some superior power, to drive us into a tenor of conduct we should not have pursued without.

I know some have holden all the trouble, laboriousness, and disasters of life, to be conditions annexed to human nature, in consequence of offences committed in a former state: but if so, they fall within our definition of punishment above given, for though they cannot have the proper effect here, they may make us examples to some other Beings, or to ourselves in some future state, wherein we may have faculties given to discern the causes of them. Yet we cannot regard them as such now, because we cannot know for what misbehaviour they are inflicted; and therefore they can be no warning to us what practices to avoid. I know likewise that man too often punishes the fellow-creatures in his power, for disobedience of his commands given without any regard to their benefit, but solely for his own advantage or humour. As when the lordly West-Indian tortures his poor Negroes for not doing more than they could do in cultivating his plantations; whose produce he never means to share among his slaves, but sends it all to market, to raise wealth for supplying his own wanton and wasteful luxury. But God, as we observed before, has no advantage of his own, nor humour to consult: so can give his commands for none other end than the advantage and happiness of his creatures, nor punish upon other motive than to enforce obedience to those commands, and thereby secure the benefits consequent thereupon.

4. Therefore the divine commands may be regarded as the advices of an indulgent, tender parent or unerring monitor, instead of the injunctions of an Almighty Governor; and must operate as strongly in one light as the other upon a prudent man, having an earnest attachment to his own interests. If I had never heard of the Decalogue, nor had other rule to go by beside that left with the Reader at the end of my first Volume, of taking care of myself whenever reduced to a condition wherein I could not be the better for any good befalling others; yet suppose an Angel were sent from Heaven to stand before me, with authentic and undoubted credentials of his mission, and delivered his message in the following tenor:—

Thus saith the Lord Almighty, the Creator and Governor of all things visible and invisible, Behold, I have given thee powers of action to do this or that as thou pleasest: I have given thee freedom of Will, to choose between the things before thee; and I have given thee desire, to quicken thee up to activity, that thou lose not the use of thy powers. What hast thou now to do, but to fulfil thy heart's desire in any way whereto thou canst

turn thy hand? For I have bound thee by no law, nor hung any restriction over thee, which might withhold thee from doing the thing that is in thy mind. Because I am mild and gracious, and my mercy endureth for ever: neither is there wrath or vengeance before me. Am I a man, that I should suffer passion? or the son of man, that I should resent or be angry? Can injury approach me, that I should be vexed? or damage be done, that I should retaliate? Therefore fear not my terrors, for there are none with me; nor my judgments, for I do not execute them. For I delight to do good, and not evil. My beloved office which I have chosen for myself is to guide, not to rule; to admonish, not to punish.

I behold the present and future: the issues of events are before me; and I alone know unerringly what is good. Have not I, the Lord, created the heavens and the earth? Are they not interwoven together in one universal tissue, connecting all natures, visible and invisible, by one indissoluble chain of causes and effects? But have I done more work than mine eye can survey? Are there any limits to my intelligence, or any line in my plan so minute as to escape me? Do not I then know the means of gratifying the desire of happiness implanted in my creatures, and all the turnings in the road of expedience? or want I loving kindness and bowels of compassion, to lead them thereinto by proper directions, according to their several natures? To man I have given reason and forecast to discern the things at a distance, and guide him into the way that leadeth to his peace. And if I have not bestowed these in sufficient measure to answer all his occasions, I will vouchsafe him other lights to supply the deficiency, that nothing needful be withholden from him. For this cause have I sent my messenger to declare unto thee what thou wast not able to discern by thine own sagacity. Hearken unto his admonition, for I have put into his mouth the words of wisdom and truth.

Know, then, that if thou shalt worship Chance, or Necessity, an uncreated Nature, or any other God besides me.

If thou shalt rest thy dependence upon anything in the visible heavens above, or on the earth beneath, or that cometh forth from the bowels of the earth.

If thou shalt cast aside thy reverence of my Majesty, or swear by my name to the thing that is not, or use it lightly, until it become an empty sound in thy mouth.

If thou shalt lay out thy whole time upon thy worldly concerns, thy pleasures, and thy fancies; or, trusting to the strength of thy reason, shall neglect those expedients necessary for preserving alive the remembrance of me in thine imagination.

If thou shalt withhold due honour from thy superiors whom I have set over thee, whether of thy house or of thy people, to preserve order and economy therein.

If thou shalt destroy or hurt thy brother without lawful warrant.

If thou shalt indulge the lusts of thy flesh, which thou sharest in common with the beasts.

If thou shalt purloin thy neighbour's goods, or overreach him when ye commune together in your dealings.

If thou shalt charge him falsely with that for which the judge will give sentence, or asperse his character in the streets, or calumniate him in secret.

If thou shalt harbour a desire of getting away from him his possessions, or his reputation, or the thing wherein he delighteth, or whatsoever is valuable unto him.

Know that in so doing thou actest foolishly, for by all these things thou wilt lose far greater enjoyment than thou canst gain for the present, and bring down intolerable mischiefs upon thy head: which shall afflict thee sorely, and make thy heart sicken with desire to be delivered from them, but in vain; for thy desire shall no where find gratification. Because the order of nature is so established, and the chains of connection between thy present and thy future state so carried on, that the issue will surely fall out as I have forewarned thee.

See, now, I have set good and evil before thee this day: choose therefore whether of the twain liketh thee best. Nor murmur against me as a hard master: for I set thee no task, lay thee under no commands, nor turn thee from the path thou wouldst go by my threatenings; but leave thee to thine own judgment and prudence to conduct thee into the course they shall represent to thee the most desirable.

Now upon supposition of such a declaration coming from the fountain of knowledge and truth, I appeal to any man of common sense and the least forethought of anything beyond the present moment, whether it would not be as incumbent upon me to follow the admonition, as if I had seen a visible appearance descending upon mount Sinai, surrounded with thunders and lightnings and ineffable glories, engraving the same with a finger upon two tables of stone, and subjoining a denunciation underneath, The soul that keepeth not all the words of this writing shall surely be cut off. So there needs no more than to enlighten our understandings, that we might discern the natural consequences of our actions, to make the paths of righteousness eligible: for we should see her so closely embraced by prudence and interest, that we could not know which was which: nor would any other road be the right, were there no future judgment, than that we are driven into by the terrors of it.

5. Nevertheless I should be very averse against persuading mankind, if I could do it, into a belief that such a message had ever been really delivered: and very sorry to have such a delusion gain credit upon myself. For though it would make no alteration in what is right, nor render other measures expedient to be pursued than are so already; yet I fear it would make a fatal alteration in our conduct. For how much soever we may fancy ourselves guided by reason and prudence, it is too notorious by every day's experience, that they have not strength enough to influence our actions. Mr. Locke, although misled at first by the notion prevailing among learned men, yet discovered upon second thoughts, and proved demonstrably by many instances drawn from common life, that good, the greater good, acknowledged and apprehended to be such, does not determine the Will: which constantly follows satisfaction upon whatever object appearing in the thought. For while the mind can satisfy herself completely with a present pleasure, she never stirs a step towards the attainment of distant good; nor unless she apprehends a present uneasiness would accompany the missing her opportunity. But it is the resting of satisfaction upon an object, that makes it our desire, or raises an appetite towards it, and renders it an aim of our pursuit.

Therefore our desires and appetites are the officers having the leading of our powers, nor can reason do anything unless by their ministry: her office being only to put such of them into command as will do their duty well. The virtues have no avail upon us while remaining in theory, nor become practical until grown into appetites: so derive their very name and essence

from being incorporated into that family. Therefore the bare knowledge of what makes for our happiness would help us but little forward towards it, unless there was a desire which should afford us an immediate satisfaction or uneasiness, according as we found ourselves in the way. But the general idea of good is of too thin and abstracted a nature to catch hold on desire, without a view of some particular good, similar to those we have experienced, and a clear exposition of the manner or chain of consequences, whereby our conduct should produce it. For though the love of rectitude for itself has been cried up as capable of everything, and perhaps justly supposing the attainment of it were feasible, it has never yet been found among the sons of men. But should the particular benefits resulting from our good works be manifested, and the manner of their growing from thence ever so clearly explained, still we might find them so remote as that the prospect would be too hazy to excite our desire. For were it to accrue by rotation, casting every man at some time or other into the places of those to whom he does service, he might not think it worth his while to concern himself with what shall happen millions of millions of years hence. Or which is more probable, we might find them dependent upon the joint endeavours of such innumerable multitudes that our own would appear not to deserve the pains of applying them. For if the principal branches of the general good he worked out by the concurrence of all the creatures, contributing thereto in their several stations, we might think our share of the contribution could never be missed, and our own loss upon withholding it too small to be perceived.

6. Since then we are so constituted as that good, not clearly apprehended, or lying at a distance very remote from us, or requiring vast numbers to concur in procuring it, does not influence us to action: there needs something more prevalent to be annexed for giving it activity and vigour. And this we cannot doubt but God has provided in his constitutions of nature: for he established them in wisdom, and adapts his causes respectively to the subjects whereon they are to operate. To matter he has given the capacity of impulse and agency, directed by such well-policied laws, as that every atom performs its office in carrying on the stupendous courses of nature, and preparing for events to fall out many ages to come: to brutes he has given appetites and instinct, guiding them to do all the little services required at their hands: to man he has given freedom of Will, determined by motives urging him to the choice of such actions within his narrow sphere of power, as conduce most effectually to the general good of the creation. But since he has not afforded him understanding large enough to discern this good, and the way by which he contributes towards it: nor sensibility to be touched with objects removed to a great distance; nor penetration to see the value of small powers in conjunction with those of other agents: he has supplied the deficiency by providing other incitements to turn his steps into the way that full intelligence and unslackening prudence would have led. Whereof this of punishment is one, which drives him into measures whose good fruits he does not know, creates an expedience nearer to his view, and holds up an object strong enough to engage his desire.

Nor do we want experience enough to teach us the use of this engine in our dealings with one another: I do not mean only by that lash of punishment which the law holds over villains for the peace and security of honest men, but in those few instances wherein we imitate our heavenly Father, by exercising our government for the benefit of those under our power.

We bring children, by threatening them with the rod, into those little arts of managing their limbs and into the rudiments of learning, whose necessary uses they are not sensible of. We keep young lads, by restrictions and penalties, from idleness, excesses and indulgencies, whose pernicious consequences, though not ignorant of, they are not touched with. And when an army or a naval armament is sent out upon some enterprise, the whole plunder whereof is to be divided among them: yet there are courts martial binding each man to his duty, which otherwise he would think might be spared for that the work would go on as well without him.

7. Hence we see the origin of vengeance, when found in the breast of any wise and beneficent Governor: namely, from the imperfection of understanding, which cannot discover the consequences of every course of behaviour; and from the weakness of reason, which has not colours lively enough to paint a strong representation of distant objects upon imagination, nor force enough to urge desire to the prosecution of advantages she does discern. Thus divine justice springs, not from the nature of God, but of his creatures; and is a branch of wisdom discerning and providing the proper springs for actuating them in their motions. Therefore we may rest assured that God will take vengeance whenever necessary, and will not take it in greater measure than necessary for the purpose intended thereby.

Hence likewise we may learn the proper idea of punishment, which is that species of evil annexed by the act of a superior to some kind of behaviour, as a motive to deter from behaving in the like manner for the future. And herein it differs from labour and mere misfortune, which though often attendant upon our actions, are not, or ought not to be, a discouragement to a repetition of them. For though ill success may justly induce us to alter our conduct, it operates as an information to our judgment, not as an adventitious help to assist where it was too weak. Nevertheless this does not hinder, but that the punisment may follow by natural consequence; it will still retain its essence because the work of nature is the work of God: only then we must conceive that God, in so constituting nature as to bring it on, had a view to that particular consequence, without which he would not have comprised it in his original plan.

8. But we may observe, it is not so much actual suffering, as the terror of it, that operates upon freewill, wherefore it is not necessary that punishment should be universal or perpetual: because a severity gone through may dwell upon the remembrance of the sufferer, and spread a terror among multitudes, so as to answer the effect wanted upon their minds.

In this light of punishment it appears, that the party undergoing it does a signal service to his fellow-creatures, by exhibiting to them an example of the utmost importance, and necessary to preserve them in happiness: for which service, I see nothing in our ideas of our gracious Governor, that should hinder his making him amends; I do not say reward him, for this would be against reason, because he underwent it not willingly nor for the public good; but repay him the cost he has been put to compulsorily. If punishment be necessary, offences must needs come, to make that punishment just: and though wo be to them by whom they come, yet this wo may be taken into account as an article in the portion of evil thought proper to be allotted them in the length of their period.

We are told it was expedient for manifestation of the divine glory to the Israelites, and through them to the other nations upon earth, that Pharaoh and his host should be overwhelmed in the Red Sea: for which cause God hardened the heart of Pharaoh and of his servants that they should pursue.

Shall then the righteous judge of all the earth exact so rigorous a service without any wages to compensate for the severity of it? Let any man make the case his own, and then answer me, what he would not be ready to hope from the fountain of goodness and righteousness. Nor let him fancy the case could not have been his own: for who caused him to be born lately, instead of three thousand years ago? or cast his lot in England, rather than Egypt? If his father begat a child, had his father the option of what particular Spirit should inhabit the body of his child? Neither let him harbour such an overweening conceit of his own ungiven strength, as to imagine that he should not have acted just as Pharaoh did, if God had hardened his heart in like manner. And it is all one whether he apprehends this hardening effected by a supernatural act or by nature, education, and the popish artifices of the magicians: for there is nothing in nature or her productions or the occurrences passing among them, unless by divine appointment or permission.

But if what has been here argued in favour of hardened sinners shall seem to him an encouragement to list himself in the number, let him reflect upon the considerations on that head in the last Chapter: where he will find, that although my notion of the compensation should be right, (which I will not ensure him, as never pretending to infallibility) yet does it give no encouragement to run himself upon intolerable sufferings; because at best he will have no more than a bare compensation, nor gain the least tittle of advantage in a bargain over us, who think it deserving our most strenuous and uninterrupted endeavours to escape them.

9. This idea of punishment being a beneficial provision, established for preserving order and good rule in the world, may explain the justice of punishing children for the faults of their parents. For justice being an offspring of wisdom, will always shape her course wherever necessity and experience lead. But when the parents are dead and gone, their personal punishment, being unseen here, can have no effect upon mankind: therefore if an example be necessary, it must be upon their descendants. Or if they were known to suffer in their own persons, still the terror is greater, when the mischief spreads to their whole family and dependants. Accordingly the civil laws often confer good and evil upon the children for their father's sake: and nature entails diseases, poverty, and impotence, upon the descendants of debauched and vicious ancestors. Nor will it avail to allege, that this comes to pass by natural consequence, for nature is the work of God: and if in making this provision we will allow him to have had in view the good we see resulting from it, this will bring it under our definition of punishment.

But those who raise this objection conceive of God as punishing in anger: and then indeed it would be an unbecoming thought, to imagine him angry with the innocent for offences committed by the guilty. Therefore one would think our experience, that sometimes he does involve the innocent in his punishments, might convince them that neither anger, nor any intrinsic essence of guilt, is his motive in punishing. Another basis they build their objection upon is, the injury done to the innocent: but this basis stands upon none other ground than their apprehending him to act occasionally, and that he never thought of punishing the children until roused to vengeance by the wickedness of the father. But surely those who pretend to a larger compass of reason than other people, might comprehend that God, at the formation of a world, may have his whole plan lying distinctly before him and determine every good or evil event to befal his creatures.

Now whether they hold a pre-existent state, in which case there will be none other evil than that of punishment, they may take for granted that the child deserved what it suffers, by some former misbehaviour. Or whether they believe every birth an original creation, in which case there will be prudential evils, such as hard labour, self-denial, poverty, and disaster, sent for some good ends to be produced by them; they may trust the divine wisdom, which often works out many ends by one and the same means, to contrive that the same evil shall prove both prudential and punitory. In either case there is no injury done the child, whose concern lies only with the quantity of evil he undergoes: it is no matter of what species it is, or by what channel derived, so long as it is no greater in measure than was judged proper to be allotted him upon his own account. The Jews crushed under the tower of Siloam, felt the same pain and sustained the same damage as if they had been sinners above all other Jews: or as if an Angel had overthrown it upon their heads, declaring he came down to take vengeance for the idolatries of their ancestors. So a child, allotted a certain portion of pain or distress, or infirmities, receives no injury, whether they be brought upon him by nature, by accident, or the wicked courses of his father: nor is he hurt by their serving for an example, to deter other parents from bringing the like misery upon their children.

10. But since offence must needs come, this suggests a reason for the unequal distribution of justice here on earth, for the slowness of vengeance, and why some notorious villains pass their whole lives in a course of uninterrupted success and security. For were punishment to follow close upon the heels of transgression, and the difference between good and bad made obvious to every eye, it must totally put a stop to offence: duty would become instinct, and rectitude the object of sense. So we should have no use for habits of virtue or exercises of reason: which seem growing powers within us, destined for greater services than we can perform with them in these gloomy tabernacles and clumsy bodies we inhabit. And though offences must needs come, there are other uses of their coming besides that of making punishment just: for God produces good out of evil, which good must then be lost, unless the evil productive of it were permitted.

It is true, as we have observed before, that God often causes one provision to answer several purposes, and so may make moral evil, as well as natural, at the same time both prudential and punitory: but it is not apparent from experience that he always does so. And indeed, if offence were not necessary, it would not have been permitted, and consequently there would have been no necessity for punishment; whose use being only to restrain offence within due bounds, could have been none had there been nothing to restrain. Hence it follows there is a difference made between offences which, though all equally obnoxious to justice, do not all draw after them their respective adequate punishment. For when wisdom has adjudged the proper bounds to be set to offence, mercy withholds the arm of justice from taking vengeance where it is not necessary. But what else can we conceive to make the difference between pardonable and punishable offences better than repentance? For this, if it does not take away, yet certainly lessens the necessity of punishment, by rendering it needless with respect to the party himself: because his amendment works the same effect upon his future conduct as was intended by punishing him. But if the first offence were constantly forgiven, it would be looked upon as a general license to offend once: or if repentance were admitted at any time to wipe off old scores, it would encourage mankind, as we find the notion of it does

many of them, to sin on without scruple, presuming upon the sponge of a distant repentance. For we see that neither God nor man will accept of repentance in all cases indiscriminately: let the debauchee or the lecher repent never so sincerely, he shall not presently deliver himself from the diseases which God, by his laws of nature, has annexed as a punishment to his vices. And I think it cannot do either hurt to Religion, or violence to reason, if we were to suppose that repentance, however it may abate, does never wholly take off, the punishment due to sins already committed: so that the principal, and that no contemptible, benefit accruing from it is to prevent the heaping up further stores of vengeance by future offences.

If this be so, we have no reason to be grieved at anything we suffer here for our misbehaviour: because then we have paid our penalty, which would have been exacted from us some time or other. This opinion, while it leaves the expedience even of a death-bed repentance, shows it less valuable than an earlier, or than a life spent in piety and virtue: so that, without cutting off all hopes from any, it removes the common excuse for delay, under pretence that the business may be done as well at another time; for, though it might be done another time, if you were sure of having another time to do it in, yet it can never be done so well, nor to so good effect, as now. Therefore it seems not improbable that no man carries with him out of the world so great a load of sins as to merit intolerable sufferings: nevertheless, the difference is very material between man and man. For the wicked, besides the long list of debts already contracted, carries with him an inveteracy of evil habits, that will prompt him to contract more: so that he can never clear his score, because new articles will multiply as fast as he pays off the old ones. And this is agreeable to the general belief, that the reprobate shall abound in moral evil as much as in natural. On the other hand, the righteous and truly penitent, carrying with them a disposition to act rightly, wherein they may persevere after being delivered from the temptations of the body, will have nothing wanting to complete their happiness, but to fetch up their old arrears.

11. The same origin we have assigned for vengeance gives birth to the other branch of justice respecting rewards. But it is not every good, nor the thousandth part of that abounding throughout the universe, proceeds from justice; for we must distinguish between reward and bounty. That ample portion of happiness allotted the creatures in some part or other of their Being, we can ascribe to nothing else than pure unmerited bounty; and is itself the ultimate end, or at least the ultimate we can conceive, causing that bounty to flow; being not given as a means of effecting anything subsequent, nor in consideration of any former behaviour. Nevertheless, it is not poured upon us by an immediate act of omnipotence, but powers are given us to work it out for ourselves and one another by our own activity, duly exerted in our several stations. And this alone might suffice to make us bestir ourselves effectually, if we had largeness of understanding to discern, and strength of mind to pursue it before present gratification. But since we have not always a knowledge of the good effects of our measures, nor feel them weigh with us when removed too far, nor can distinguish the avail of our industry in conjunction with many fellow-labourers, it becomes necessary that some part of the blessings assigned us should be brought nearer to our view, and annexed to certain actions in such measure as may touch our desire, in order to serve as incitements to pursue the courses of behaviour most beneficial to our interests. And these encouragements are what we may properly understand by rewards; which are the

provisions of wisdom rather than the largesses of bounty, and given not so much for their own sakes as for something they are calculated to produce.

Thus justice in both her branches springs from the narrowness and weakness of our faculties: for, though expedience be the foundation of merit, nevertheless, as we have said in our Chapter upon honour, which is one species of reward, so every other species in general belongs to things, not always where they are useful, but where it may be usefully conferred upon them. For where we have prudence enough to discern the usefulness of measures, and to pursue them, there needs no encouragement of reward: whose use is only to supply the deficiencies of prudence, and conduct us along a road of expedience we wanted light or vigour to travel through.

Nor can we fail to see this idea confirmed, if we look into the common transactions of life: while a man can attend properly to the management of his family, his estate, or his business, upon contemplation of the expedience, or by a habit he has acquired, he wants nothing more for his benefit; but if he finds himself grow remiss and indolent, what can he do better than consider what the world will say of him, or he shall think of himself, according as he amends or persists in his negligence? thus giving a spring to his industry by the terror of shame and compunction, or the prospect of general or self-approbation. We invite children to their task by rewards, which, when they have gotten a liking, or seen the expedience of their learning, we lay aside, or turn to some other beneficial acquisition, whereto they have no propensity. Privileges and immunities are granted to persons of a particular profession wanted in some country; but after the success of these first adventurers is become notorious, those encouragements are no longer needful. Public honours and emoluments may be regarded as engines of state, serviceable to actuate men's endeavours in promoting the public service. Nor might it be amiss if those in power would consider them in this light, as matters of reward, not of favour, under the disposal of justice, not of ambition or personal liking, and to be bestowed accordingly where most conducive to the general good. Nor would it save them a little trouble, if they could infuse the like notion into such as teaze them perpetually at their levees; so as not to think themselves entitled to ask for honour or preferment, unless when the conferring it would prove an example encouraging to some useful conduct.

12. It is remarkable that generosity gains greater applause than frugality, although equally a virtue, insomuch that noble and generous are become synonymous terms: the reason of which is, because applause is necessary to the one, to overcome that greediness of temper inclining men to engross everything to themselves; whereas the expedience and convenience visible to every considerate person are sufficient inducements to the other. Hence we may learn that virtue is not laudable in herself, her value arising from the good fruits she bears; but approbation, whether of others or our own, is annexed to stimulate us in the pursuit of her. And this approbation resting sometimes upon a phantom assuming her likeness, nothing can better cure the delusion than to examine what fruits we may expect to gather from the conduct we follow. Therefore it is mischievous to fix our eye too strongly upon the beauties of virtue, or more than necessary to keep up our spirit in running her courses vigorously; because it will be rather apt to engender pride and vanity, than to promote her interests.

Hence we may account for the peculiarities of the Stoics, who, placing the goodness of virtue solely in her intrinsic laudableness, became the most presumptuous and arrogant of mortals, and entertained the most whimsical

notions of virtue that ever were invented. But the expression so current among them of virtue being her own reward, which relates to the self-approbation she constantly draws after her, might show that approbation is not the thing which first makes her recommendable; for reward, in the nature of it, is something annexed arbitrarily to gain our estimation to a procedure which had a value before, grounded upon some other bottom.

Nor can I find the Stoics less romantic upon the article of happiness than the Epicureans; which latter placed it wholly in sensitive pleasure, and insisted that the wise man might make any sensation pleasant merely by willing it: so that when roasting in Phalaris's bull, he had nothing else to do than cry out, How delightful is this warmth to my senses! and the pain would instantly vanish. But the Stoic utterly despises pleasure and pain, as having no existence, unless in the opinion of fools and madmen; and places his happiness in the amiableness of rectitude. What then has he to do when thrust into the burning bull? Only to cry in like manner, How delightfully lovely is rectitude, whose charms I now possess! for I certainly act right in staying here, because I cannot get out.

13. Now if we turn to the administration of affairs in this world by the government of Providence, we shall find there are rewards annexed to several courses of proceeding. Health is the natural reward of temperance, plenty of industry, content of humility, hope of piety. Men often find profits when they least expected it, arising visibly from their having acted right: and whoso casteth his bread upon the waters shall sometimes find it again after many days. It cannot be denied that these things prove an encouragement to well doing; and it can as little be denied that the provisions of heaven are made with a view to those effects we see them produce. And perhaps most of the good things we enjoy may be intended to work the effect of rewards, by leading into practices and dispositions of mind, whose uses extend to distant regions and times, whither we cannot trace them; and so given primarily for our future benefit, rather than our present enjoyment. Yet we may esteem the latter consideration likewise to have a share in the provision; for it is not incongruous for bounty to join in the same work with justice. Or if the latter must take her course, since there are two roads by which she may pass, to turn her upon the flowery turf of reward, rather than the rocky-pointed causey of punishment.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the distribution of reward, as well as punishment, is very unequal in this world: and that of equal good deeds, as well as equal offences, some meet with their desert, while others pass unnoticed. But this need not prove a stumbling-block: for justice having always a respect to future expedience, will neither reward nor punish, unless where necessary for example sake. If she were to do otherwise she would overthrow her own purpose. For did the adequate reward constantly attend every good deed, virtue must lose her essence and become self-interest: because the eye fixing always upon the profit, satisfaction and desire could not be translated to the conduct obtaining it. Man indeed must follow his rules of justice implicitly or else he would lose his way, because he seldom stands in a situation to discern the reasons of them: but whenever he can proceed upon discretion, he apportions his rewards according to the services he expects resulting from them, not according to the intrinsic goodness of the deed; as we have seen already in the instances produced a little while ago.

14. Divines have always made the unequal distribution of rewards and punishments a proof of a future life, that there may be room for justice to

settle the accounts she leaves unfinished here. Now it must needs be owned that the view of justice we have exhibited deprives them the benefit of that argument in the manner they handle it. For justice respecting only example, when she has made her distribution sufficient to restrain offence within proper bounds, and nourish virtue to the proper degree of maturity, has executed her task; nor has anything further to do with the balancing of accounts. Yet they need not be angry with me too hastily, for when we come to confer notes together, provided we do it in the amicable calmness of Christian charity, the difference will be found merely nominal, not real. For the distinction I make between the Attributes of Equity and Justice, I believe is a new one; the latter being currently understood as a general term, comprehending them both. So that I may hope to satisfy my complainants, only by changing my style without changing my sentiments: for I have employed a whole Chapter to show that justice, taken in this comprehensive latitude, requires a balancing of accounts in some future form of Being; and that with greater exactness and more universal equality, than I fear some of them will forgive me for.

But if they would examine distributive justice apart, it would puzzle them to make out any demand upon that; for though God will not punish unless for offence, yet nobody can deny him a right to pardon where there has been offence: therefore if I suffer no more than my deserts, I have no injury done me, although the like should be remitted to another, nor would it do me any service to have him receive them in another life. As to reward, the most orthodox can hardly lay claim to that upon the score of justice, for when we have done our best, we are still unprofitable servants: therefore it is of pure unmerited bounty that God gives any reward at all, and if he withhold it from me, shall my eye be evil because he is good and gracious to another? or what damage does his being so gracious do me, for which I should be entitled to receive amends in another life?

Nevertheless the unequal distribution of good and evil upon earth has been constantly thought evidence of a future account, by all religious and considerate persons; which shows plainly that the persuasion of a divine equity is more generally entertained and more strongly rivetted in men's minds than they themselves are aware of: or than they care to own, when they would set up a title to peculiar privileges, or justify their contempt of inferior creatures, or their detestation of heretics and of their delinquent brethren. And this general consent I may take as no small confirmation of what has been delivered in former Chapters: for I am never so well satisfied with my own thoughts as when I find them coincide with those of other people.

Thus our future expectations rest upon the goodness and equity, not the justice of God: his goodness affording the prospect of much greater proportion of good than evil in the universe, and his equity ensuring us our particular share of it. Nor does this lessen their strength, for so our hopes be well grounded, it is no matter whether they stand upon one Attribute or another: or rather they will stand firmer and securer when placed upon their proper solid foundation, than upon one that with fair examination may be found hollow and unstable.

15. But though distributive justice alone cannot ensure us any future fruits of our well or evil doing here, yet it may lead into a train of consequences that may bring us to the expectation of them. For since provision has been made for deterring from vice and inviting to virtue, we cannot doubt but there are some important uses for which so much care has been

taken: and since we find the dispositions of mind generated by these provisions often tend little or nothing to the advantage of mankind, or improving the accommodations of life, we can as little doubt they yield more plentiful fruits elsewhere. Then reflecting on our own individuality and unperishable nature, together with our two primary properties of perceptivity and activity, whereby we shall remain for ever capable of good and evil; and contemplating the divine wisdom which does nothing in vain: we cannot suppose our existence and faculties given us for no purpose, but that we shall have an interest in the provisions made for future uses. But what likelier uses can we imagine of the dispositions contracted in our present course, than to fit ourselves for that we are to run hereafter? And how can we imagine ourselves fitted for any particular course, after being totally disunited from all corporeal mixture?

But men deceive themselves, as we have observed formerly, in their distinctions between body and mind, for want of making their separation clean, but taking some part of the former into their idea of the latter: and so place the talents, the genius, the habits, and stores of knowledge, in the mind itself. Whereas we have found upon a careful examination in the course of these inquiries, that our perceptions are according to the state of our judgment or fancy, being nothing else than the discernment of objects, expedient or pleasing or striking to our notice. But the mind or purely spiritual part, being an individual, has no parts, one whereof might discern the other, yet the object discerned must be distinct from that which discerns: so that what she discerns can be neither herself nor part of her, nor anything contained in her, but something corporeal presenting different objects according as diversely moved or modified. Thus we have no ground in experience, nor any reasoning we can draw from thence, to conclude that the mind can receive any habit or quality or alteration from what passes with us in life: nor that there is any essential and intrinsic difference between one mind and another. Therefore if there be a difference between departed souls, it must arise from some remains of their material organization carried with them.

Far be it from me to deny, that it lies in the power of God to confer good or evil by his own immediate act: but far be it from any other to deny, that it lies also in his power to do it by certain stated laws of nature; for nature with her whole host of second causes, take direction in their every movement from his word. Nor can we plead authority to determine the point; for that only tells us he will deal differently with the good and with the wicked, but tells not the manner otherwise than by figurative descriptions, to make sensible to our imagination so much as it imports us to know concerning the event: which whether produced directly by the hand of God, or brought to pass by the ministry of second causes, is equally his dealing. So the former manner is mere hypothesis, supported by no positive proof, but the latter stands confirmed by experience of his usual manner of dealing here below: where we see all events brought about by the operation of nature, or chance, or free agents. And for the supernatural works recorded, they appear to have been performed for manifestation of his power to dull and stiff-necked mortals: nor can we suppose them employed out of necessity, for want of other means in his hand to have accomplished his purposes.

16. Thus if we examine all our stores of experience, we shall find no evidence of a variation of power or quality or character among minds; nor that any one of them is not capable of perceptions received, and using cor-

poreal instruments employed, by any other; nor yet that their union with body must be necessary and perpetual. For though we know of no perceptions unless received by impression from matter, yet matter may serve their uses by occasional application without a vital conjunction. From whence it appears there is no ground in natural reason to imagine, that if ever they get wholly disengaged from all corporeal mixtures, there shall be any difference of condition among them, either in respect of their endowments, or their enjoyments, or their offices: unless as they may employ themselves to assist occasionally in particular services for carrying on the general good.

There is no doubt but God can make a difference to what degree he pleases: but what evidence is there that he will? or what can we conceive that should incline him to do so? Not bounty, for that extends to all alike, being no respecter of persons. Nor resentment, for he harbours none. Nor damage sustained, for he can receive none, neither hath any defeated his Will. Nor yet justice, for that respects not the past as its ultimate point of view, but aims in all her measures at working alterations of habit and disposition; which have no place in naked spirit, being seated in that part of our material composition vulgarly made a part of the mind. Or if there be a communication of perceptions and mutual intercourse between spirits, what should induce them to behave variously to one another? What resentment or favour can there be, where there is no passion? What dislike or partiality among brethren, where there is no diversity of character? all children of the same father, between whom there is no claim of primogeniture, nor division of separate portions, but all tenants in common of the same inexhaustible estate.

Now if anybody shall still insist that there is an essential and characteristic difference between mind and mind, because there may be so for anything that we can demonstrate to the contrary: or that God deals arbitrarily with his creatures, having his elect and his reprobates, because he has full power and authority to deal with them as he pleases: or that a communication between spirits cannot subsist, because we cannot try the experiment to ascertain it: or that there cannot be sense, intelligence, activity, and enjoyment, in a body too minute to touch our senses, because we cannot produce an instance of any such thing: I shall beg leave to put him in mind, that it is he who builds upon hypothesis and negative proofs, not I. For I endeavour to take experience for my guide, while I can have her assistance; and with respect to things invisible, where she fails me, or teaches that they must be different from the scenes she exhibits, I try to build my conceptions upon the best ideas I can form of the divine Attributes, and the proceedings of Providence lying within my observation, as the surest and only stable ground I have to rest them upon in these matters.

17. From all that has been observed it seems a natural conclusion, that the difference of condition between particular persons shall subsist no longer than while enclosed in some material composition: and that we shall not get quite clear of all corporeal integuments upon dissolution of this gross body: because provision is made in this life for uses that could not take place without them. How many various stages we have to pass through, or how long our continuance among matter is to last, we have no ground even of conjecture to ascertain. But since all these things lie under the disposal of wisdom, and goodness, and equity, we may rest assured that, wherever our lot be cast, it will be such as shall conduce most to the general good, wherein we shall share our due proportion: that whatever pain or trouble or

inconvenience shall befall us, will be no more than the exigencies of public service require: and that all the comfort and enjoyment shall be afforded and tenderness shown us, that the nature of our occupation will admit. Nor can we suppose otherwise than that, how fine composition soever our future bodies may consist of, we shall still be no more than sensitivo-rational animals: and while enclosed within any corporeal integument, although our faculties may be larger and our sight more piercing than now, still we shall want that full discernment of the general interest, and ardency of desire towards it, sufficient to actuate us in all parts of our conduct; therefore shall need nearer and more striking incitements to keep us in the pursuit of it.

Hence it may be presumed the province of justice extends throughout all the stages of animal life: but though we can find no use for her proceeding to settle accounts of former behaviour unless we knew the transactions of this life were remembered exactly in the next, yet the provisions of nature seem to indicate, that the same event shall follow as if there were an impartial and rigorous reckoning. For the habits and acquisitions we get here, being preparatives to fit us for our several functions hereafter, though we leave the habits and acquisitions themselves behind, and enter into our new Being a blank paper, yet they must have worked such an alteration in our texture and constitution, as shall give us an aptness to renew the old courses by which we first acquired them. So that the wicked will carry with him an obduracy of temper, productive of actions obnoxious to severer punishments than any executed upon him here: and the righteous a pliancy of nature obedient to the command of reason, which will lead him to merit more glorious rewards than he ever earned here. And the degree of either will correspond exactly to the course of life they have respectively followed in their present state. Nor do I see anything that should hinder, but that the obduracy may have grown so strong in some, as to render them incapable of being touched unless by the extremity of suffering: so that they will continue always objects of vengeance, and always serve as an example and warning to the rest of their compatriots.

18. Nor do there want reasons to persuade us that the pleasures and pains of the next world will be much intenser than any we have experienced in this, if we carefully examine what experience affords us concerning the process whereby they are brought upon us here. When a man receives a blow with a stick across his shoulders, the stick strikes only upon his clothes, they propagate the blow to the skin, the skin to his nerves, and the nerves to his sensory; which last alone gives him perception of the smart, all the rest being no more than channels conveying a mechanical impulse to one another. Had he had no clothes on, the stick would have hurt him more upon his naked back, and had his skin been stripped off by a blister, he must have felt severer smart from a blow upon the raw flesh: nor is it an unreasonable consequence, that if the like stroke could be made upon any nearer channel, it would create a more pungent anguish. For we receive all our perceptions from the action of the sensory or mental organization: whatever stages the impulse of objects passes through, there is no perception until it puts this in play. From whence it may be presumed that whenever this shall be laid bare to the stroke of things external, it must take a far stronger impulse therefrom, than while enwrapped within the load of clothes composing this mortal body. And with respect to our acuteness of discernment, we stand much in the situation of a man at the further end of a long range of rooms, divided from each other by sash

doors: who seeing nothing of objects without doors unless through a dozen glasses, cannot expect to have so distinct or clear a view of them as when presented to his naked eye.

Nor is it an objection that ideas of reflection, operating immediately upon the mental organs, and wherein they alone are supposed to be concerned, are less strong and vivid than those of sensation: for when I think of a person just gone out of the room, I cannot paint so lively a picture of his features upon my fancy, as while he stood before me. But this is not always the case: for sometimes a grievous smart, or violent terror, will occur afterwards to the mind more powerfully than it did upon the sensation. Besides that we find our sensitive pleasures and pains increased by the concomitant reflection attending them: insomuch that some have denied pain to be an evil, unless made so by opinion, which is the work of reflection; nor can it be denied that many pains do not touch us, so long as we can keep our reflection intent on something else.

But though ideas of sensation, when recalled to the thought, were constantly, without exception, fainter than upon their first entrance by the senses, yet these are only copies of impressions made by external objects, and it is no wonder the copy should fall short of the original. Therefore let us make the comparison with ideas of reflection, strictly so called, being not materials imparted from without; but new productions worked from them in the mind, such as our judgments, passions, and persuasions: and we shall sometimes find them rising to so high a pitch as to overpower the action of our senses. A strong fit of desperation, or resentment, or love, or jealousy will make men despise pains and labours, and the most terrifying objects standing in their way: and a violent affliction stupefies the mind against pains and pleasures and the notice of everything around her. Since then our mental organization can affect us so vehemently without aid of the senses, and when laid open to external objects, without grosser covering to intervene, is likely to receive more vigorous impulses: we may expect a much quicker sensibility and stronger perceptions, when receiving them by that alone, without other channel beyond. Wherefore it is of greater importance to make good provision for the health and constitution of our future bodies, than of our present.

19. How intense the sufferings of another life may be, there is nobody can pretend to guess: for experience furnishes no rule to measure them by, nor can we gather anything concerning things unseen unless from the Attributes. But our idea of goodness, which alone can set bounds to the necessity of justice, is so imperfect that it fails us upon this occasion. We know that God is good and will do nothing inconsistent with goodness: but what is or is not inconsistent therewith, we have no certain measure to ascertain. For the permission of evil forcing us to acknowledge some mixture of it compatible with this Attribute, we know not where to stop in our estimation of the quantity. Reason indeed may convince us that every evil is inflicted as a necessary means to bring forth some greater good, yet this leaves us still in the dark: for we know neither the precise quantity of good, nor proportion of one to the other, so can find no rule of admeasurement to compute either the sum or the degree of evil necessary to answer the services of the universe. The enjoyments of this world exceed the troubles and vexations to so visible a degree, that the most miserable wretches upon earth still set a value upon life: nor does death cease to be the king of terrors, even to such as have no apprehension of anything to come after. And those few who destroy themselves do it rather to escape from some present pressing

uneasiness, than upon a fair computation of the good and evil they might expect. Nor could Epicurus, who was no favourer of Providence, avoid setting down among his list of observations, That pain, if long, was light: if grievous, short.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged there are evils in life, shocking to human nature in the contemplation, horrid to think, how horrible to feel! racking pains of rheumatism and stone, and all that long catalogue of diseases described in Milton's lazar house; terrors and lingering destructions under the ruins of earthquakes; painful perishings by fire; tearings of ravenous beasts; stings of venomous serpents; miserable exits upon the bite of a mad dog; fractures, dislocations or inward bruises, by wars or accidents. What barbarities do not savage nations exercise upon their enemies! What tortures and piecemeal executions have not been practised by tyrants and persecutors! Or what can the wit of man invent more devilish than the ingenious cruelties of a popish inquisition!

Nor are there less terrible roads in the journeys through life than in the passage out of it. The distresses of extreme poverty, hunger, nakedness, cold and scorching heat, the mischiefs of vice and debauchery; the fatal errors of folly and inconsiderateness; the sufferings of bodily infirmity and constitutional disease; the vexations of injury, oppression, and ingratitude; the desolations of war and invasion; the pressure of afflictions, losses, and ruin; the miseries of shipwreck and comfortless lengths of time passed on desolate shores, or in an open boat, without covering, or provisions, or respite from labour; the wretchedness of slavery, where the unhappy negro, perhaps a king in his own country, is thrown into a stinking hold, kept upon rotten pease besmeared over with tallow grease, and then delivered up to the inhuman Spaniard, who works him beyond his strength, and every now and then fells him to the ground with a hatchet, to show his power by way of entertainment to his visitors.

When such as do not think the negro worth their concern because his skin is black, he cannot talk English, and never was christened, it would avail little to put them in mind of the miseries among the brute creation; whom nature has not only subjected to the hard services, severe usage and wanton cruelties of man, but has likewise instructed them to worry, destroy and torment one another. The cat plays with the mouse, cheats him continually with pretences of letting him escape, pats him when fainting to make him exert himself, a long while before she devours him. The water-snake pursues the shrieking frog through all his turnings, till she gets his head into her mouth, then swallows him by slow degrees into her stomach, where he lies digesting for some days before he dies. The spider has a long struggle to entangle the fly, till at last he wraps her up close in his web, and sits at leisure sucking out her vitals. The beetle, whose characteristic is stupidity and unwieldiness of limbs, beats himself down against a tree, or overturns himself in crawling, and lies sprawling upon his back; until the little tit-mouse comes, pecks a hole in his side, scoops out his entrails, and leaves the hollow carcass to crawl about alive.

But to return to those of our own species with whom we daily converse and for whom we have a consideration: they have their private troubles and anxieties, more than they discover to us, for nobody knows where the shoe pinches so well as he that wears it. When men appear together in a company, they put on a cheerfulness upon their countenance, but who knows what grinding disquietude they have at home? Unnatural parents, faithless wives, disobedient children, ungrateful friends, deceitful patrons, ap-

proach of ruin in their fortunes, disappointment of schemes they had set their hearts upon, resentment of cutting affronts, animosities against persons they cannot hurt, slights of the world upon their supposed merit. Add to this the terrors of complexional fear and superstition: apprehensions of fires or robbers, dread of the small-pox or infectious airs, frights of apparitions, prognostics and dreams, doubts about predestination, desperations of a future state, aridities and despondencies of Methodism, misgivings of Free-thinking. We may laugh at these grievances as fantastical, but how fantastical soever in their causes, they are real in their effects; nor are the pains of disorders in the mind less pungent than of those in the body, or of afflictions and disasters coming from external causes; and perhaps if we could look into the hearts of mankind, we should see them suffer more from imaginary evils than from real.

Thus we see by experience how great a weight and variety of evils are consistent with infinite goodness: and may gather from thence how strong must be that necessity which could introduce them into a plan contrived in mercy and loving kindness. Yet as we know not the grounds of this necessity, we cannot tell how much stronger it may prevail in other stages of our existence: nor to what acuter sensations, more grievous distempers of mind, and more tormenting delusions, our naked organizations may be liable. So that although we should not think an elementary fire, or a corporeal worm, reconcileable with our philosophical notions, there may well be punishments, if not similar in kind, yet equal in degree, to the scorchings of unextinguishable flames and gnawings of the never dying worm. Therefore notwithstanding God be good and gracious, there are terrors of the Lord alarming enough, if justly apprehended, to excite our contrivance and industry in providing for the health and good condition of our future bodies: that when reduced to them, we may not want activity and disposition to steer safe from the purlieus of vengeance, and keep under protection of the wide spreading wings of mercy.

But there is an art and discretion to be used in the application of those terrors; for if we dwell upon them only in our retirements, they will generate nothing but a dismal and unavailing affright. Therefore it behoves us to inculcate them then upon our minds in such colours and figures, as may rise readily again in seasons of action and attacks of temptation, and may then be most affecting to our imagination upon a single glance. For I have all along maintained, that use and expedience is the point to be driven at, as well in the conducting of our thoughts as of our outward behaviour.

20. Neither can anybody tell precisely of what kind the enjoyments of another life shall consist: but those who go about to paint them by figurative representations seem not always to have chosen such as are proper to strike upon the imagination. They tell us the righteous shall live exempt from all pain, labour, hardship, oppression, infirmity, or disappointment, and all tears shall be wiped from their eyes. So far it is well: but this is only a negative happiness, such as may be found in annihilation: but what actual enjoyment are they to have? Why, they shall sing psalms all day long and every day. This may be vast pleasure, for aught I know, to a mind rightly tuned, but as our minds are strung at present, I believe there is scarce anybody who would not be tired of singing psalms before half the day was out, or after having sung out the whole week would have much stomach to sing again on Sunday.

But then they shall sit in white robes, with crowns on their heads and

all be kings. This may weigh much with such as are fond of fine clothes, and would be prodigiously delighted to hear themselves called, Your Majesty: but if we are all to be kings, where are your subjects? Oh! the toils of government would be troublesome: but we shall be called to the bench to sit as assessors in judging the wicked, and triumph over all our enemies. This may have charms with the Methodists and others of an ill-natured religion: but for my part I should esteem the condemnation of malefactors a burden rather than an amusement; I never sign a mittimus to the house of correction, but had much rather it were done by somebody else; and if I had any enemies I think I should not wish to insult and triumph over them, or if I did take vengeance upon them, should do it as a matter of necessity not of gratification. Besides, all this will furnish employment only for the day of judgment: when that day is ended, there will be nothing further to do.

Well, but their enjoyment of the beatific vision will not cease. I can imagine there may be an extreme delight in the full and clear display of the divine Attributes, particularly that of goodness: for I have experienced a proportionable degree of satisfaction in the contemplation, so far as I have been able to comprehend them. But this is only in my retirements, when I can bring my thoughts to a proper pitch by long and careful meditation: when I go abroad into the world upon my common transactions, I do not find this idea attend me in full vigour and complexion; and believe those who want incitements most will be scarce feebly touched with the hope of seeing God as he is. Besides, as I have powers of action as well as of reflection, I cannot readily conceive that in a state of bliss one of them should remain useless, nor how enjoyment can be complete which rests in speculation alone. In short, all propounded to us in the common harangues upon this subject, seems to be no more than an Epicurean heaven, a monastic happiness, an undisturbed pious idleness.

But give me for my incitements, a life of activity and business; a constant succession of purposes worthy a reasonable creature's pursuit; unwearied vigour of mind; instruments obedient to command; exemption from passion, which might lead me astray: unsatiating desires of the noble and generous kind; clearness of judgment to secure me against mistake or disappointment; company of persons ready to assist me with their lights and their helping hand, so that we may join together with perfect harmony in that best of services, the exercise of universal charity, in administering the laws of God and executing his commands. And if I have therewith a largeness of understanding, these occupations need not hinder but that, while busied in them, I may feast upon the contemplation of whatever glorious objects shall be afforded me, either in the works of nature or the Author and contriver of them.

Some Religions propound rewards alluring enough to human sense: a Mahometan paradise may suit very well with Asiatic luxury: but then such incitements are worse than none, as being mischievous to practise. For as one is naturally inclined to inure one's self to the way of living one expects to follow, they are better calculated to lead into the road of destruction than of happiness. Nor are our modern enthusiasts less blameable in flattering their mob with the privilege of insulting and ill using their betters: for of the two, a man is not drawn so far aside from the spirit of piety by the thought of possessing a Seraglio of beautiful wenches, as of having a Lord or a Bishop bound hand and foot for him to kick and cuff about as he pleases.

Therefore in the figures employed to describe the things unseen, care should be taken to admit nothing gross or sensual, vindictive or spiteful: but the business is to employ such as may be possible, innocent, and inviting. This is what I have attempted in three Chapters of the Vehicular and Mundane states and of the Vision: endeavouring to exhibit a scene of things possible, so as nobody can certainly disprove them; innocent, so as to contain nothing offensive to good manners or charity; and inviting, so as to present striking images that may dwell upon the imagination. And I have so far succeeded, that upon reading them to a very sensible man, his remark at the end was, Well, I wish all this may be true. Now this was what I intended, and if my Readers shall be ready to say too, Well, I wish all this may be true, my purpose is answered. I do not desire them to believe it true, they may use their judgment or pleasure upon this point; but meant only to present them with an encouraging prospect they can hold in their eye: and they may find solid and substantial reasons elsewhere to convince them, and if they take the due method for attaining it, they shall enter upon a scene of things which will be as well or better for them than if all this were true.

21. As to the punishments commonly described, they are alarming enough to human nature: perpetual burnings, inconsolable remorse, continual tormenting by devils, incessant quarrels and mutual outrages amongst the damned. To which are added, for taking stronger hold upon the imagination, the ideas of darkness, howlings, scourges, pincers, claws, horns, and cloven feet. But these things operate strongest upon the phlegmatic, the weakly and the low spirited, who want encouragements rather than terrors: which are more apt to dismay and stupefy than rouse them up to activity, and therefore are most plentifully laid on by Popish priests and leaders among sectaries, who have their private ends to answer by the dismay.

Nor is it always safe to follow the best authorities too closely, for a man may do very wrong by imitating another who has done very right: wherefore human nature, manners, and sentiments must be considered, and regard had to particular times and countries, congregations and persons. The Jews, and primitive Christians derived from them or incorporated among them, seem to have been a serious solemn generation, accustomed to a pinguid, turgid style, as Tully calls the Asiatic rhetoric, abounding in extravagant metaphors, far-fetched illusions, hard-featured images, mysterious and enigmatical allegories, requiring painful attention to understand or misunderstand them. Their tempers were soured by oppression and public contempt: for it is not in human nature to preserve an easiness and benignity of mind under continual opposition and indignities; therefore they could see no reward inviting which had not a mixture of retaliation and triumph, nor was the bliss of heaven complete without the satisfaction of beholding their persecutors swallowed up in the devouring flames of hell. And being inured to look for something of latent importance in words and syllables, might be trusted with any figures, without hazard of turning them into ridicule, for which they had no inclination nor promptitude

But we moderns living in ease and plenty, for the most part better fed than taught, affect the lively and amusing rather than the pompous and the perplexing: instead of labouring to find mysteries in everything, we divert ourselves with turning everything into jest; and have gotten the knack of making a trifle of whatever would naturally be most affecting to the imagination. And because our forefathers multiplied words until they confounded

themselves, we are so afraid of falling into their dulness that we place reason in smartness of expression, and expect to have every difficult point decided in a single sentence. Those to whom terrors would be most serviceable, being persons of strong spirits, sanguine complexions, and hardy constitutions, able to bear a bang or a burn without flinching, are little touched with bodily pains: and being generally of unlucky dispositions, they delight in broils and squabbles, finding themselves able to make their party good whatever adversary they have to cope with, and being used to abuse others and receive abuse themselves, care not what company they fall into. By foisting in the word Little, they can reduce any pain to a bearable size; for what signifies a little scorching or a little flogging? and by familiarizing themselves to the term Damnation, they can wear away all meaning belonging to it, so that it becomes a harmless sound, like the chirping of a sparrow. Then for the worm of conscience, they have provided an effectual remedy against him, for they have seared up his mouth with a hot iron that he cannot bite. And the sooty countenance, horns, and cloven feet of Satan, make him the odder figure; so he passes for an arch comical droll, that hates to be confined by rules, and plays any mischievous tricks for fun and merriment: therefore he and his imps bear a part in our pantomimes, and we can sit an hour together to divert ourselves with their surprising cunning and feats of dexterity.

22. But if we could once catch those people in a sober mood, and prevail on them to lay aside for a moment their all-healing epithet Little, they might then learn to see a difference between the sharpest pains they have experienced, and the violence of unquenchable flames; between temporary squabbles they can laugh at when over, and endless contests with a superior adversary who will leave them no respite nor inclination for laughing. And if they have a thought of the divine power, in whose hand all the sources of good and evil lie, they must see that, besides outward hurts and injuries they may be tormented with inward pains of stone, or joint-racking rheums, or other excruciating distempers; with intolerable thirsts, insatiable cravings, the horrors of melancholy, and all dreadful disorders of mind. Nor are they sure of carrying with them that hardiness of constitution they so much depend upon: for they must leave their solid bones, their tough-strung muscles, their strong-bounding blood, that vigorous flow of animal spirits, the support of their present bravery, to perish in the grave; and may be born into new life with the fearful weakness of a woman or helpless tenderness of a child, apt to be terrified at a word, or shudder at a shadow, and unable to bear the scratch of a needle.

But if they be so immersed in sensitive ideas of what they see and feel, that they cannot conceive themselves ever to become different creatures from what they are; let us suppose, for argument's sake, they shall preserve the same sturdy constitution and temper they possess at present; and as they have little notion of God, we may talk to them more intelligibly of the Devil. Perhaps they may have been taught by some of those who are singly wiser than convocations and synods, that there is no such species of Beings in nature: but this will avail them little, for they may have met or heard of characters among the human species excellently well qualified for the office of a tormentor; and it will not much mend the matter, if they be put into the hands of a savage Canadian, a barbarous Algerine, or unrelenting Spanish inquisitor bred up in the science of torturing and taking cruelty for his ruling principle of action.

But whatever race the Arch-fiend be descended from, they must not ex-

pect to find him the frolic gamesome droll they have seen upon Covent Garden theatre: but a solemn melancholy tormentor loving mischief for mischief's sake, going to work with deliberate malice, inveterate rancour, and insatiable cruelty. Nor will he show them fair play in boxing, but take all cowardly advantages, not letting them get up when fallen, nor giving them time to breathe when fainting, but calling in his imps to hold their arms while he pommels them. And if he have horns or cloven hoofs, they are not for the oddity of his figure, but to punch their eyes or mouths or other tender parts.

And even supposing what cannot well be supposed, that they are so stout as to value all this no more than a flea bite, he will then take some other course with them: for he is a devilish cunning fellow, knows how to find every one's weak side, and what will plague them effectually. Therefore if he perceives them insensible of pain, he will not throw away his brimstone and his scourges upon them, but take some other method that shall make them heartily sick of his company. He will tantalize them with scenes of exquisite viands and delicious liquors, frothing in the pot or sparkling in the glass, raise intolerable thirsts and cravings, and not suffer them to touch a drop or a morsel. With a whirl of his Faustus wand, he will conjure up a bevy of buxom lasses, to tempt them with all lascivious allurements, and cram them with apples from the tree of knowledge, which shall raise desire to its utmost pitch of burning fury, but take especial care that it shall meet with no gratification. He will lay in their way treasures of gold and jewels carried by helpless children, whom they go to murder for the booty; their arm shall wither up, so that they may strike and strike again without effect. He will represent the Deity as an angry revengeful tyrant, resolved to have his Will upon them for trifling offences; foreshow them the particular sufferings it is his Will to inflict, and how themselves are continually made instrumental to bring on those sufferings; whereby he will raise a worm of resentment, vexation, and despair, whose bite is severer than that of conscience they had stifled. If he finds them of delicate tempers, he will plunge them into filth and ordure: if courtly, he will consort them among savages and Hottentots: if musical, he will din their ears all day long with shrieks and howlings, scratching of knives upon one another, and the crash of broken beams: if proud, he will force them to servile drudgeries, under command of persons they despised, and to receive insults, contemptuous language, and cutting reproaches. Or if they have antipathies against particular animals or things, he will accordingly tie them round with knots of vipers, wrap them up in webs for a prey to monstrous spiders, shut them close among enormous toads or cats, or stuff their mouths with carrion or rotten cheese.

I do not recommend these last images to be used in assemblies, because what might affect one man strongly, might appear a joke to others who have not the same antipathy. But there is no man without some distates and aversions he cannot think on without horror. let him then figure to himself the situation he should most vehemently dislike, and he may be assured there are punishments in nature which would afflict him as sorely. But there is no doubt they will be sharp enough to overcome his obduracy at last: therefore he had better get rid of it while he can upon cheaper terms, for the more inveterate it grows, the severer remedies will be requisite. Or if they be applied just below the measure sufficient for working a cure, this will be an increase of vengeance, by prolonging the continuance of that evil disposition whose removal would render punishment needless.

CHAP. XXX.

DURATION OF PUNISHMENT.

If the doctrine of equality maintained in the foregoing Chapters shall appear a novel and heterodox opinion, I hope the candid Reader will do me the justice to believe, it was not upon that account I offered it to his consideration. For I have constantly professed, and I think have all along preserved, a tenderness for prevailing sentiments; and though, in the exercise of that sober freedom which is the natural right of every thinking man, I may have departed from them for awhile, it has been only to return again into the beaten road, and to take what seemed to me the surest method of arriving at the practical conclusions commonly drawn from them. Nor am I so fond of novelty, or the credit of making discoveries that have escaped others, as to purchase it at the expense of Religion or good manners. If I have any desire of reputation, it is that arising from the character of a discreet and well-applied industry in the service of mankind. Therefore, notwithstanding this equality appears to me to follow as demonstratively as any conclusion we can draw concerning things invisible, from experience of human nature acting constantly upon motives suggested, from the universal dominion of Providence, governing even free-will by means of those motives, and from the unlimited mercy and bounty of God, extending over all his creatures without partiality or arbitrary proceeding, which I hope will be counted orthodox tenets: nevertheless, I should have kept it concealed within myself, for fear of disgusting the weakly righteous, whether great scholars or illiterate, if I had not found it a necessary foundation, and, indeed, the only one I could discern by the light of reason, whereon to place that general interest from whence I apprehend may be deduced the practical rules of life, as well those relating to religion as to morality or common prudence.

For how much soever we may flatter ourselves with the notion of noble and generous innate principles, there always lies Self at bottom in everything we do; and all men constantly pursue their own happiness, though by very various ways. One places it in distant good, another in present pleasure, another in riches, or title, or superiority, or humour, or self-approbation; but whatever, whether real or fantastical, each man apprehends for the present most satisfactory to him, that is the object to which he directs his powers. Therefore if we could touch this universal spring of action, by showing clearly to every one's apprehension that his private interest stands connected with the general, nothing could more effectually inspire men with a hearty zeal for promoting one another's benefit, or help to rectify their sentiments of virtue. Because the Generality consisting of individuals, whatever proves beneficial to any one is an addition of good among the Whole; and because every genuine virtue tends to procure benefit to the whole, or a part of it, or some individual contained therein, without more endamaging any other; and whatever does not do so, either immediately of remotely, is no virtue, but may be pronounced spurious. Yet it must by owned, our equality, which we have laboured to cultivate in hopes of bearing such excellent fruits, has one inconvenience attending it: that it is incompatible with an absolute perpetuity of punishment. But as this may by

thought of pernicious tendency, by taking off the discouragement against evil-doing, a consequence I should be very sorry to have given a handle for drawing, I have appropriated this Chapter to obviate the mischief, by showing that nothing before contained can be justly construed to lessen the discouragement.

2. But before I enter upon this task, I shall take the liberty to observe an objection that lies against the perpetuity of punishment, in the phenomena whereof we have experience. Justice, in the received idea of it, requires an exact distribution according to the character of every individual. It is not enough that reward be given to the good, and punishment to the wicked, but the proportion of each must be measured out among the persons of either class, according to their respective degree of goodness or badness. Accordingly we are taught to expect a difference, not only between the good and the bad, but between the good and the better, the bad and the worse: for that the righteous shall rise above one another, as one star differeth from another star in glory; and of disobedient servants, he that offendeth much shall be beaten with many stripes, and he that offendeth little, with fewer stripes. Since, then, there is an exact proportion observed, corresponding with every little variation among individuals, and the difference between everlasting bliss and everlasting misery is immense, it follows that there must be the like immense difference of character between the good and the wicked; for else the rule of justice would be violated. But this we do not find true in experience: for there are all gradations of character, falling by imperceptible degrees from the most perfect man that ever lived down to the most abandoned villain.

It may be said we cannot penetrate into the secrets of the heart, nor discern all the depravity lurking there. This I acknowledge we cannot do with any exactness, yet there are none of us who do not undertake to pronounce some persons righteous and others wicked: so that we can make a judgment where the case is glaring, though we cannot always do it critically. Therefore it would be no wonder if we were only puzzled in comparing two good men, to determine which was the best, or two bad men, which was the worst: but we are often egregiously deceived in our opinion of good and bad, taking the one for the other, nor can we pronounce upon many persons we know to which class they belong; that is, we cannot distinguish between characters as wide asunder as heaven is from hell. For the smallest portion of eternal happiness is infinitely preferable to the mildest of eternal sufferings; and the step from the topmost summit of hell to the lowest seat in heaven infinitely greater than from thence to the seat immediately above, or, perhaps I might say, to any seat reserved for human soul. Nor would it much mend the matter if we were to suppose a purgatory; for any finite punishment followed by endless bliss is still infinitely more desirable than endless torment.

Thus there is an exact proportion of justice between the individuals of either class, but between the two classes there lies an immeasurable gap; which would destroy all proportion, unless there be the like immeasurable gap somewhere among the characters of mankind, which we may presume must be so obvious as to strike every eye; so that none could ever fail in distinguishing the classes, however they might mistake in the particular centuries under each. Nor does the fallibility of human judgment concerning the real character of particular persons remove our objection: for I defy any man to draw, much more any two men to agree in drawing, the character of a sinner, whether real or fictitious who, if he were ever so little

better, would be admitted to a portion in eternal glory; or of a righteous person, who, if he were one degree less righteous, would become a sinner reserved to eternal sufferings. Besides, as the best among us have their failings, and we are all sinners, for there is none that doeth good, no, not one, there cannot be that vast difference between the most opposite characters upon earth, between the greatest of sinners and the least, as is supposed to be made in the recompenses respectively allotted them.

3. And those who place salvation in faith alone remain liable to the same difficulty: for a saving faith must be right, and it must be strong: but there are degrees of rectitude and of strength in faith, as well as any other virtue. Will any man assert that every little error in matters of belief, and every falling short of the invincible confidence of a tortured martyr, shall exclude from heaven: or every faint and inconsiderate assent to the orthodox faith secure a place in it? Thus there are degrees of faith and infidelity as well as of morality and immorality. Yet how have doctors differed upon the articles of faith? what endless disputes have they carried on in settling the list of fundamentals? And one of the most sensible among them, Chillingworth, has shown that fundamentals are relative; that article being such to one man which is not so to another, according to their several lights and capacities. And I think it very happy for the world this matter was never settled; because if men knew what was just enough to carry them to heaven, they would not do a stitch more than absolutely necessary: whereas being left in uncertainty they must use all their diligence, for fear a part of it should not be sufficient to make them safe.

But supposing the articles settled, there would still continue the like uncertainty with respect to the strength of persuasion in them, requisite to make a saving faith. How many pious Christians labour under cruel anxieties upon this head? They receive all the doctrines of their Church without reserve, so their doubt is not upon the rectitude but the liveliness of their faith. If they go to the Protestant Vicar or Popish Confessor, the latter may give them absolution upon their paying for it, or the former tell them they want no absolution upon this account: but neither can instruct them how to know at all times, when they have proved deficient and when not. For who can assign the just measure of assent that distinguishes between a dead and a lively faith? or mark out the exact line of separation between the believer and the infidel? so that whoso passes it, enters the state of salvation; and whoso falls a hair's breadth short, remains a child of perdition. Which yet, if we regard the distribution made by justice between the two, ought to be, not a mathematical line, but a spacious gulph, like that which separated Dives from Abraham.

But it is said that justice has no concern in this part of the distribution: for all have sinned and all become obnoxious to her never-ending severity, until mercy interposed to rescue a certain number. What, then, are not all the Attributes infinite? Is the arm of mercy shorter or weaker than that of justice? Or does our God, as was fabled of the heathen Jupiter, distribute his mercies out of a gaugeable tun, which when empty, he must stop at the next man standing close to him who last received invaluable treasures therefrom? No, but justice is a debt, therefore requires an exact apportionment to the desert of every particular person: whereas mercy is matter of mere favour, therefore subject to no rules; for God may extend his favours as far as he pleases and stop where he pleases, and consequently by the interposition of his free mercy, may throw an immeasurable gap between persons whom justice would have treated nearly alike. I shall not

deny he may do so, for who can hinder him? but if it be inferred from thence alone, that he does do so, this is building upon hypothesis; for what may be, may as well not be: nor have we reason to conclude for either branch of the disjunction unless we can find something in our idea of the Attributes to cast the balance between two things equally possible.

Therefore nothing can be gathered from what he may do, until it be known in what sense the word is understood: for it has been shown in CHAP. XXVI. that May, Can, and Possible, are equivocal terms, as relating either to power or contingency. In the former sense it is certain God may show mercy to whom he will, and withhold it from whom he will. This nobody doubts: for we are all in his hands, and he has full right and authority to deal with us as he pleases. But so he may distribute justice too without rule or measure: for who shall withstand his power? what restraint or obligation hangs over him? or who shall say to him, Why dost thou this? If then we say he cannot deal unjustly by his creatures, we found the assertion upon our idea of his nature, inclining him to govern invariably with perfect righteousness: and what we say, amounts to no more than an assurance that he never will.

Now let us apply the expression the same way to mercy, and we shall find it hard to comprehend that he may show infinite mercy to whom he pleases, and withhold every spark of it from whom he pleases, without any other rule or reason than his own mere pleasure. For mercy is as much in his nature as justice, nor is one less infinite than the other is perfect: neither does he proceed arbitrarily in either, but both are guided by the rules of infinite wisdom. Therefore mercy never tires in dispensing her inexhaustible treasures, nor ever stops when come to a certain point of delinquency, until wisdom represents that the offender could not be spared without damage to the creation: and then it would be mischief, not mercy, to pass the line of separation. Thus we find the sinner who wants the just measure of righteousness or saving faith, is doomed to everlasting flames, while another but little better is rewarded with everlasting bliss: not because God has not mercy enough to save both, but because it is expedient that one should perish for the benefit of the creation.

Can we then persuade ourselves that the common father of all should so severely sacrifice some of his children to the good of the rest, without reserving to himself a time wherein his mercy may make a compensation? Or what rule of reason will permit that the heaviest burdens of public service should lie for ever upon the same persons? Nor does there want an argument that they do not, taken from facts within the reach of our observation; which are, the daily departure of persons dying in their sins. For where any collection or number receive a continual increase, it is a presumptive evidence of their having continually a proportionable discharge. To what purpose then are fresh additions made, unless to supply fresh vacancies, where the number is already full? as we must conclude it always to have been ever since there were creatures existent. For can we conceive that God would permit the requisite examples of suffering ever to be wanting in the universe? or that he will permit them ever to abound more than wanting? or what ground have we to imagine a greater quantity of evil necessary now than was two thousand years ago? What then shall we say to those countless multitudes that your pious Christians assert have been cast into everlasting flames in that time? Have they all perished gratis, without any benefit to the world, which might have done as well without their punishment, having samples enow of it before? Is it not more natural to con-

clude they go to occupy the places of others, who from time to time have obtained their deliverance? Thus we see the doctrine of endless punishment has no foundation in human reason, and we must have recourse to the inspired writings for proofs to support it: if such proofs are there to be found, which I shall offer some reasons to question.

4. If I were to imitate some of our profound doctors, who run to the original text for a word wherein they may find a sense unthought of before, to support their particular opinions: I might insist that the term translated Everlasting ought to be preserved untranslated, as a kind of technical term and called Aionian. I might then lay down that as the age of man contains that space of time passing between his birth and his death, so the Aion, or greater age, contains the whole length of his journey through matter. Therefore Aionian punishment is a state of suffering to last from his death until he shall get wholly clear of all corporeal organization. I might observe likewise it is remarkable that in speaking of God, whose eternity everybody must allow to be absolute, it is said that he shall endure, not simply to the Aion, that is, for ever, but to the Aion of Aions, that is, for ever and ever: which marks a visible difference between the duration of punishment and absolute eternity.

But I am not fond of this kind of argumentation, which is better calculated to stop an adversary's mouth than to convince him. I hold it more expedient to consider fairly what are the ideas intended to be conveyed by the expressions in the text. Now we are told the gospel was preached to the poor, that is, the ignorant and unrefined, therefore is best expounded in the sense wherein such would naturally understand it: nor are we warranted to look for scholastic or philosophical notions in anything contained there. Mankind in the earliest stages, of which we know little more than what stands recorded in the books of Moses, seem to have had no notion of any thing beyond this world: therefore the rewards and punishments proposed to them were all of the temporal kind, or at most such as related to their posterity and the remembrance of their names here upon earth. I shall not deny that some thinking persons did very early entertain an opinion of a life to come, and by degrees introduced it among the vulgar. But in the latter at least it amounted to no more than a persuasion that the soul should survive the body, without considering for how long continuance, yet without setting any limitation to it or thinking of anything beyond; wherefore they applied to it the epithet Everlasting. And so in common discourse we speak of an immense desert, a boundless ocean, and endless prospect; because neither the eye nor the imagination can find an end: and we talk of a man purchasing an estate to him and his heirs forever; not that we believe the earth, or the lands whereinto it is apportioned, eternal; but because no limitation is set to the possession.

In these cases we are something like those Indians of whom it is said they can count no further than twenty, and for all higher numbers point to the hairs of their head: so if you were to tell them of a flock of a hundred sheep you can only point to the hairs: if of a thousand, it is the same; or if you talk of the immensity of space or infinitude of time, still you can do no more than refer to the hairs. In like manner we use the term Forever to express every length of time whereto we set no measure, nor consider any thing beyond. Nor is it denied the Scripture sometimes employs this term for durations which cannot be supposed endless, and if it employs the same for such as are so, it is because none other of higher import was to found in common language: therefore this being an equivocal term, requires

something else to determine which way it is to be understood upon every particular occasion.

It has been alleged indeed that there is this something else: because the continuance of punishment is expressed in the same tenor of language with that of the reward promised the righteous, which everybody allows to be endless. But why everybody should allow this, I do not know; unless for want of distinguishing that the blessings of God are of two sorts: those which are given as a reward of obedience, and those which are given of his pure unmerited bounty, without regard to anything past, but flowing directly from infinite goodness. The bliss of the final state I have all along supposed eternal in the utmost extent of the word: which it may well be, notwithstanding a few excursions into mortality, that make little gaps, or rather imperceptible crevices in it, but do not limit its duration. Just as if a man were promised immortality and perpetual happiness here upon earth, he would not think it a falsification of the prophecy that he lost a part of every night in sleep, or passed an uneasy day once in twenty years. Now this bliss is the free gift and sole effect of bounty, extending to all alike, and requiring none other qualification than the capacity of receiving it. But it is the Aionian life and Aionian death, to continue during the journey through matter, that makes the conditions of men different, and depends upon their behaviour here below. Therefore this Aionian difference of conditions was all needful to be inculcated for serving the purposes of Religion and morality: and this the vulgar would naturally understand of an unlimited duration, the utmost extent of their ideas, beyond which they would not think of looking for anything further.

For the distinction between a time whereto the thought can set no bounds and an absolute eternity, between the words Indefinite and Infinite, attempted in our Chapter on the divisibility of matter, were the refinements of modern ages; wherein men have dived deeper into the abyss of thought than their forefathers could do, by improving upon their labours. Now it would have done mischief to the vulgar to have perplexed them with these subtilties, which therefore are left open to the decision of human reason: nor would it have done service to anybody to have decided them; because reason, with all her refinements, cannot lessen the discouragement there lies against evil doing. As I shall now endeavour to manifest, by resuming the main purpose of this Chapter, from which I have hitherto digressed.

5. Whoever will take pains in practising the method recommended at the close of the last Chapter, by figuring to himself a situation he should most vehemently dislike; whether of scorching flames, cruel scourgings, slavish drudgeries, ghastly spectres, dreadful casualties, inward pains, nauseous diseases, intolerable thirsts, cutting affronts, contemptuous insults, incessant vexations, or whatever else he finds most shocking to his thought, and from thence taking his estimation of future punishments, which however different in kind, we have given reasons to show, will exceed them in degree; may presently see that nothing in this world can make it worth his while to incur them. For let him compute all the pleasures of vice and folly that the longest life, with the most uninterrupted success, and his most sanguine hopes can promise him, and he will find the utmost amount of them immeasurably outweighed by an extremity of torment, though it were to last no longer than for a twelvemonth: and yet he must not expect to come off for so short a reckoning.

If he flatter himself that he shall become familiarized to his sufferings by long durance until they lose their anguish; because the like sometimes

happens here; this is a vain imagination which he has no ground to build upon. Pain and labour abate of their grievousness here; because our bodily organs abate of their sensibility by frequent use, as our flesh becomes callous by continual pressing: but we do not find the like relief in disorders of the mind, unless those whereon the body has an immediate influence. Time may cure them by introducing other habits giving imagination a contrary turn, but can never cure an old habit merely by wearing it out. Boys begin to want money as soon as they know the use of it, and this want grows with their years; so that covetousness is observed to be the predominant vice of old age. Those who have given way to anger and resentment in their youth, grow more touchy and revengeful the longer they live. And though carnal concupiscence take rise from the body, yet when the infection has been suffered to catch strong hold on the mental organization, it continues to plague the old lecher with the cravings and filthiness of debauchery, after he is past all capacity of the pleasures. Insomuch that Plato and many others have supposed the punishment of the wicked to consist of such insatiable desires as cannot find gratification for want of the corporeal instruments left behind. However this be, we have no reason, from anything within our own experience, but to think whatever pains or inconveniences arise from a disorder or infirmity in our mental organization, when disjoined from the body, shall continue so long as the mind continues in that Aion, or form of Being, and so shall be properly an Aionian punishment.

6. How long this continuance may be, there is nobody can undertake to determine: for we have no light from the Attributes, because we know not what limitation must be set to evil to bring it consistent with infinite goodness. It seems not unlikely, what some have imagined before, that the mind does not get clear of all corporeal mixture ever the sooner for obtaining a quick discharge from her present habitation; but there is a certain length of passage assigned her through matter. Wherefore, as a man who is to perform a journey in a certain time, if he makes his first stage very short, must travel so many more miles the next; so if she stays but a little while in this life, she must abide so much the longer in that which is to follow, that the sum of both added together may complete the appointed length. Upon this supposition we must conclude that every man's Aion exceeds the difference between the age at which he died, and that of the oldest man who ever lived: I say, exceeds, because there must have been an Aion reserved for the longest liver, both of the righteous and of the wicked, wherein they might receive the respective recompense of their deeds. Now if we can take Moses' word, the human body was built originally to stand near a thousand years: so that all the deaths appearing upon our present bills of mortality must be counted hasty and premature; nor can we, such men as live in these degenerate days, expect a shorter Aion than that space of time.

But since it is not the fashion with everybody to take Moses' word, let us argue with them, by parity of reason, from facts obvious to their experience, whose word it may be hoped they will take. The acorn lies ripening in the tree a part only of the summer, but the oak to grow from thence may last for ages. The embryo animal grows in the dam a few weeks or a few months, but comes from thence to live for years. The child is formed and fashioned in three quarters of a year, but when born may hold out to fourscore or a hundred. Thus we see that state, whether of animal or vegetative life, which nature employs as the introduction to another, bears a small proportion to the date of that whereto it is introductory. But it has been shown upon several former occasions, that our present life is

preparatory to the next; that the mental organization, vulgarly called the rational soul, lies like a fœtus within us, continually forming and fashioning by our behaviour and the occurrences befalling us here; from whence it may be presumed that all this provision is not made for effects of a short continuance, but the state for which we are preparing shall exceed our present in as high proportion as our date of life, barring accidents, would have exceeded our time of gestation in the womb: which will extend the Aion far beyond the thousand years before assumed.

7. Let us suppose then we could know for certain that the duration of future punishment were precisely one thousand years: what encouragement could this give to the sinner? Is not this length far greater than that of any enjoyment he can expect to get by sinning? Let him consider what it is to pass a day, a week, a month, in exquisite tortures, and he will soon find a less time than that we have specified sufficient to discourage him effectually from running the hazard. Suppose a wicked man talked to by the Parson of the parish, who terrifies him with the dread of everlasting flames, into the resolution of amendment. You come in afterwards and bid him not mind the parson, for you know better than all of them put together, and can assure him there is no such thing as everlasting flames. Ay! says the man, I am heartily glad of that, for then I may take my pleasure without fear of an after-reckoning. No, no, you say, I cannot engage for so much neither; you must expect to smart, but it will be but for a while, only a thousand years and all will be well again. What comfort could this give him? Must it not rather damp his spirits, and the naming so vast a length increase his terrors more than the limitation to that term abate them?

For both choice and evidence have their certain weight to render them complete: while below this pitch, you may increase them by adding to the weights; but when once arrived at it, all further addition is superfluous. For in moral arithmetic, as observed before under the article of pleasure, the same rules do not hold good as in the common; nor does two and two always make four. If I hear an unlikely fact related by somebody I know little of, I shall not heed him much: if another confirms what he said, I may begin to doubt: two or three more agreeing in the same story may make me think it probable: but if twenty persons of approved honour and veracity assert it upon their own knowledge, I should give an unreserved assent: nor could I do more though a hundred of the same character were to come in. So were a man offered a long life of pleasure for a month's future sufferings, perhaps he might be stout enough to accept the condition: were they increased to a year, he might hesitate: but were they multiplied to a thousand years, he could not delay his choice a moment, if he had any consideration at all. Where demonstration will not convince, nor things beyond all comparison determine the choice, it proves an insensibility in the mind which no further outward application can cure. If those who hear not Moses and the Prophets would not believe though one rose from the dead; neither would he that is not touched with a thousand years of severest punishment, be moved with an eternity. For it is plain the present wholly engrosses his imagination: he has no regard for the future: and you may as well make a blind man see by lighting up more candles, or a mortified limb, that has utterly lost its sensation, feel by laying on more stripes, as affect him by any future sufferings whatsoever.

Therefore since a mind that has any feeling of futurity will be filled with as much terror by the length above specified as it is capable of receiving,

you cannot lessen the discouragement by paring off what lies beyond: and one that has no sense of anything further than this present life, will not be affected by all you can say concerning an Hereafter; so you cannot lessen the discouragement where there was none. Besides, for a man to pretend he should have paid a due regard to his future state if I had not persuaded him it was finite, would be contradicting himself in the same breath: for why does he make nothing of a limited term, unless because he conceives it fifty or threescore years distant? How absurd then is it to tell me he sets no value upon a reversion after threescore years, yet should value one extremely after a thousand years? He that makes this excuse either is not in earnest or deceives himself egregiously, and only catches hold of a specious argument to cover his thorough attachment to present pleasures.

8. Nevertheless, if any think a longer duration will work more upon men's minds, let them please to remember that though I have offered considerations to make it probable the punishment will continue so long, I have not offered a single one to prove it will continue no longer. It may be rather inferred from the second argument I have employed, drawn from the analogy of seeds and embryos, that the length ought to be extended much further: for if you fix the life of man at seventy years, that term will be the mean proportion between the time of his gestation in the womb, and his Aion: then seek that proportion by the Rule of Three, and you will find that as nine months are to seventy years, so are seventy years to six thousand five hundred thirty-three years and four months. But I do not pretend to ascertain this matter by arithmetical calculations, nor indeed to set any certain limitation whatever thereto; all I can say with assurance is this, that it will be for so long as to answer the purpose intended by it: if a thousand years will not do, it shall be for ten thousand: if ten thousand will not do, it shall be for a hundred thousand. Be sure the unrepenting sinner shall suffer long enough to make it strikingly clear to the dullest apprehension and most stony heart, that he has made a foolish and a fatal bargain. And as it may be presumed one intention is to overcome his obduracy, if ever he shall be permitted to deliver himself, it must be by the same self-denial by which he might have escaped his punishment; therefore he had better practise them voluntarily now, than stay till compelled to it by extremity of tortures.

After all that has been suggested, if any considerate person should happen to come into my notion upon this article, I think he could not be induced thereby to become a whit the less careful of his future concerns: and for the inconsiderate, they are not likely to meddle with my speculations. But if any of them should be hurt, it may be attributed to the common practice of expatiating with all the powers of Oratory upon the word Eternal: which carries a tacit implication, that if punishment were not eternal, it would not be worth minding. This seems to be inuring men never to stir unless upon the strongest inducement: perhaps it might be more expedient to bring them into a habit of answering the gentlest call of judgment. It has been remarked that a trader never grows rich who despises little gains: and it might as justly be said, that a man never grows happy or prudent who despises little advantages, although large enough to be visible. The mind has been often compared to a fine balance, and we know the excellence of a balance lies in its turning with a hair: so the excellence of judgment lies in discerning the minutest difference; and the excellence of disposition, in pursuing measures readily upon view of the slightest preference.

Yet every innovation, even of a word, in the received form of doctrine, though not affecting the main purpose of Religion, that of making men better, is looked upon as dangerous; and I cannot help owning, with reason. Because the bulk of mankind, too lazy to think for themselves, take what they do take, upon the credit of their teachers; and if they find that credit shaken in any single instance, very hastily infer that everything else taught them was mere invention or mistake. Therefore to avoid giving a handle whereby such pernicious consequence might be drawn, I shall proceed to make out, that the punishments of a future life may still be eternal. I doubt not this will be thought a contradiction to that equality I have been labouring to establish: but before men pronounce things contradictory, let them be sure they have a clear and adequate notion of the terms whereby they are expressed.

9. What else is eternity besides an infinite length of time? and this we may think we have a clear apprehension of because we know what we say when we use the epithet Infinite; but the consequence does not follow; for though we have a clear idea of infinity, we have none of an infinite quantity. I need not be at the pains to prove this paradox too, Mr. Locke having done it before me: for he tells us the idea of infinity is that of being able to add perpetually without ever coming to an end. So that the infinitude of a quantity is its exceeding all our methods of computation, a circumstance we can easily comprehend belonging to it: but what does so exceed them cannot be the object of our comprehension, because whatever number we can clearly conceive, we might express exactly by figures; therefore it is no rule that there can be nothing beyond what is infinite, nor that all infinite must be equal. To the Indians mentioned some time ago, who could count no further than twenty, number twenty-one must be infinite, so must fifty, so must a hundred, and a thousand: yet we who can count further, know these are different numbers, which may be subtracted from one another and still leave what to those savages shall remain infinite, expressible only by the hairs of their head. Much the same it is with ourselves, we can run prodigious lengths with our millions and billions and trillions, but we cannot run on for ever: our powers of numeration have their certain bounds, which whatever surpasses, so that we might add and add without end yet without ever reaching it, we call infinite; nor have we any other name for all quantities surpassing our utmost numeration. So because we call them all by one name, we suppose them all the same thing. Yet there may be great varieties among them, and they may contain one another many times over without our being able to find a difference between them; for they rank under the class of incomprehensibles, concerning which we can form no clear or adequate conception.

But I am gotten into the wilds of abstraction, and shall be better understood by recurring to cases where we may have sensible objects to assist us. Draw two lines across one another at right angles; describe circles as many as you please, upon the point of intersection, whose centres lie behind each other upon one of the lines; then turn the central foot of your compass to the opposite side of the same line, and draw the like number of circles respectively equal to the former, all touching in the same point. Now mathematicians will tell you that the external angles between all the circles, and those made by the transverse line with them all, are infinitely small; that the same transverse or tangential line cut the angle between each pair of equal circles into two halves; and the angle between the two least

circles contains all the rest as parts of a whole. So you see here is one infinite which contains many others within it, each of them divisible into two infinites a piece.

Lay down a shilling upon the table, and there lies an infinite space directly over it; for all the Solar and Stellar vortices, all the vast expanse containing the visible universe, if squeezed into the diameter of the shilling, would not fill up the cylinder; they could raise it only to a determinate height computable by the rules of arithmetic. Place another shilling close to the former, and there stands the like infinite space over that too. Draw a line across the two shillings through their point of contact and produce it in imagination as far as you can to the right hand; as it passes along it will continually cut superficies capable of containing other shillings, each having the like cylinder over it: but as you can never find an end of your line, you must conclude there runs an infinite row of columns on the right side of your shillings. So here we have the square of infinitude, that is, an infinite number of infinite spaces. You may likewise imagine another row running side by side beyond the former, another beyond that, and so on without limitation: which gives you an infinite number of rows, or the cube of infinitude. Then we may consider that there hangs the like cylinder under each shilling as rises above it; that the line might be produced on the left hand as well as on the right: and rows run along on the hither side of the first row as endlessly as on the further side: so that we have double infinities, quadruple squares, and octuple cubes of infinitude; and all these together compose the immensity of space, which we can express by no higher term than still to call it infinite.

With respect to infinite time, or eternity, we cannot find squares and cubes there; yet every common eye may see that it consists of two eternities, that which is past and that which is still to come: the one continually receiving addition, yet without increase of quantity, the other continually perishing, yet without diminution, by the successive efflux of years and ages. This cannot happen in finite periods, where the part behind constantly gathers ground in proportion upon the part before: Methusaleh at the age of thirty, was ten years older and had ten less to live than at the age of twenty: but who will say God is older now than in the beginning, when the earth was without form and void? or that either he, or the human soul, has less time to exist now, than at the instant when he called her forth into Being?

Thus we see that infinites elude all our rules of arithmetic; if we add, multiply, square or cube, we cannot increase them: if we subtract, divide, extract the square or cube root, we cannot diminish them. Whatever we do, we can make no change from what they were before; for in every process where one quantity is infinite, what other soever we may work it with, still the sum, remainder, product, and quotient will always be infinite. But the Divine mathematician proceeds not by our arithmetic: he wants not comprehension to grasp the immensity of space, nor line of intelligence to measure the abyss of eternity. He sees distinctly what varieties of infinites lie contained within one another, and what proportion each bears to other. Nor can we take upon us to deny that he may know there have been many eternities already past, and many still reserved in the bosom of futurity; whereof he may assign one for the distribution of rewards and punishments, leaving ample room beyond for restoring equality by provisions made to bring the balance even between his particular creatures. If we cannot

comprehend this, tell me what there is we can comprehend upon the article of Infinites; and then I shall admit our non-comprehension a proof of the thing not being so.

And yet I think we may gather some illustration of this matter from a case put upon the two eternities whereof we have an idea. Nobody can deny that God has had the power of creating from everlasting, nor that, whatever has been done, he might have exercised that power from everlasting: therefore there might have been creatures who had existed eternally. Suppose then there were two men, one of whom had passed an eternity in a certain degree of uneasiness, the other in an equal degree of enjoyment; and both were called to judgment to show cause why there should not be a change of conditions between them, to be never altered again. I doubt not the former would be ready enough to allege the equity of the exchange; for that it was but reasonable that he who had been holden from all eternity in a state worse than nonentity, should be allotted a like continuance in state as much better; and if he prevailed, would think himself made amends for the unbeginning suffering he had endured, by the endless enjoyment he expected. Hence it appears an idea may be framed in speculation, of the weights hanging eternally on one side, yet the balance being brought even, and an equality subsisting if computed throughout the whole extent of existence.

10. Yet whatever limits be really set to the duration of future punishment, it will be the same to the sinner at his entrance upon it as if there were none: for if not endless it will be hopeless. For the future can affect us no otherwise than by our knowledge or idea of it: whatever good or evil fortune is to befall me to-morrow, whatever end shall then be put to my pleasures or afflictions will give me neither joy nor sorrow, while I have no suspicion of it. A man cast into a loathsome dungeon, or put on board a ship to be sent into banishment, while lamenting that he shall never see the light again, or his friends and country again, can receive no comfort from the Prince having resolved to revoke his doom, unless he be told it. In like manner, when the wicked lies engulphed in the dreadful abyss of darkness, what consolation can he receive from a deliverance, however near, whereof he can have no knowledge? Does he think to retain his present sanguine expectations? They sprung from his partiality to sensual pleasures, flattering him with the belief of whatever might prove an encouragement to follow them; therefore must necessarily vanish together with the root whereout they grew. Or even supposing them founded on clearest and calmest reasonings, is he sure of carrying with him his present ideas, or the remembrance of anything he has discovered here? Or what room will there be for clear and calm reasoning in the midst of tortures? Or will not the Devils and his companions in misery, have cunning enough to frame crafty sophisms, that shall overthrow all his reasonings, and confound his understanding? If they see souls delivered every day, be sure they will let him know nothing of the matter; but urge all their topics, and use all their artifices, to aggravate his despair. And as men are here too apt to murmur against God, and charge him foolishly, when things go very much amiss with them, so the reprobate, who as such must have a perverse turn of mind, when fallen under the weight of divine vengeance, will behold in God a cruel oppressor, a furious, irresistible monster, having no spark of mercy in his nature, and as incapable of relenting as time is of running backwards.

And here we may observe by the way, of how great importance it is to form our notions of the divine Attributes aright, and found them upon solid and consistent reason: they will then remain unshaken in all changes of situation, and stand the test of adversity, to be our comfort when we need it most. Whereas if we flatter ourselves with an injudicious and ill-grounded idea of justice, and goodness, and indulgence, because it suits our present convenience, we shall see it wrested out of our hands some time or other, and then that will become an object of horror and despondency, which we used to look upon as our protection and license to take our pleasures without scruple.

11. As I should be very sorry to have my speculations do hurt to anybody, I shall not content myself with removing objections against them, but likewise endeavour to guard against every vain imagination that I can conceive might arise in men's minds from anything before offered, and might have a bad influence upon their conduct. Perhaps some, who are ready to catch hold of any pretence to justify them in following their own inclinations, may allege that, since the periods and the several stages contained in them are fixed by divine appointment, they need not trouble themselves to be careful of their conduct; for whatever they do, they must run the course assigned them, and cannot alter what has been appointed by the Will of Heaven. Or possibly some, too selfishly righteous, may be backward in reclaiming others whom they see travelling the road of destruction, because, since there are suffering states which must be borne by somebody, they will be glad to find others ready to undertake them, as rendering their own chance of escaping the stronger. But there would be no room for these surmises if it were remembered that I have all along disclaimed a fatality, compulsorily and unalterably fixing events dependent upon human agency; and that there being a secret Will makes no alteration in the justness and expedience of our measures, that Will being constantly fulfilled by the free choice of our own Wills in matters lying under our power, which remain as much the proper object of our deliberation and industry, as if there were no foreknowledge or pre-appointment concerning them.

Yet the ideas of precausation and fatality, of certainty and necessity, are so strongly rivetted together in men's minds by custom, that it is not easy to keep them asunder, when once disjoined, without repeated efforts, and placing things in various lights, one of which may chance to succeed where the others have failed. Wherefore it may not be amiss to make one more attempt for breaking the association; though what I have to offer will be little else in substance than what I have offered before. The appointment of all events, both great and small, being made no otherwise than by the provision of adequate causes to bring them forth, the most important and momentous will fall under the same rules with the most familiar and trifling. Let us consider then how the case stands with respect to the common transactions of life. If I have friends to dine with me to-morrow, and have settled my bill of fare of things I know are to be had in the house, or the yard, or the market, I may look upon the appearance of the dishes upon my table as a certain event comprised in the list of appointments, because I know all the causes are ready at hand requisite to produce it; and it was certain seven years ago, though I did not know it then, nor could anybody have foretold it. Nevertheless, how is it unalterable, but that how strongly soever I have resolved to have a turkey, it is still in my power to exchange it for a goose? What compulsion was I under either in making my determination, or in keeping it? Wherein does it render my cares unnecessary

in giving orders to my servants for providing and preparing the meats?—Or what alteration does the opinion of a pre-appointment make, so much as of a lettuce in the sallad, or a garnish upon the dish?

Perhaps I design to buy a horse for my riding, but have not any particular one in my eye: I know there are enow to be had in town, and the jockeys will cheat one egregiously; yet I am resolved to deal with them as well as I can. This, too, stands upon the roll of appointments; for there are causes in being, dependent in a chain upon the operations of the First, which will direct me to one certain purchase: though I know not what will be the issue, yet I know it will depend partly upon my own management. Therefore what have I else to do than take the best care and get the best advice I can in the matter? And what could I do better if all things lay under the disposal of Chance, and there were neither order nor government in the universe?

So every man's future state, whether of reward or punishment, depends upon his tenor of behaviour in life, and the provision of causes influencing him to hold it. He cannot indeed foresee the issue with absolute certainty, because he cannot certainly know what trials he may be put to, nor examine all the recesses of his own heart, to see precisely what degrees of strength or weakness lie latent there; yet so far as he can discern these, he may rise to a proportionable degree of assurance; and for what uncertainties remain, he may know that a constant application of his judgment, and vigilance, and industry, will diminish the hazard and add to his security. And what better could he augurate, or more effectual could he do, supposing God himself did not know what would become of him, or had made no appointment concerning him?

Then for the quantity of evil being ascertained, we may argue by the like parity of reason between greater evils and smaller. All the troubles, misfortunes, and disappointments of this world, are owing to a concurrence of circumstances and particular causes deriving their efficacy from the First: nor when he began the chain, can we suppose him ignorant or thoughtless of every minute effect that would ensue from his operation, even to the falling of a sparrow to the ground, or the shedding of a hair upon our heads. Neither can we imagine him so ill a contriver as not to have provided for as many of those casualties as were necessary for his wise and gracious purposes, or so regardless of his creatures as to permit a single one more to happen than were so necessary: for he ordains all things by number, weight, and measure.

Therefore we must conclude there is a certain number of bruises, broken bones, fires, losses, vexations and other sinister accidents, appointed to befall on earth. But what rule of conduct can we gather from hence, since we know not the number? For this belongs to the secret Will, which is no guide of our proceedings. Shall I foolishly run down a precipice, where it is a hundred to one but I fall and hurt myself grievously, because all things are appointed in number, weight, and measure? If I knew that I must have one tumble in my life and no more, I might as well take it now as another time: or if I knew that some one, and but one, out of twenty of us, must have a tumble, it might be thought a fit of romantic generosity to venture my own neck to save the rest. But by what rule of logic can you prove, that I shall hurt myself ever the more or less hereafter for my falling now? or that it shall any ways affect the good or bad fortune of other people?

What disasters hang over us from causes out of our power, cannot be altered by anything we do; and what we may either bring upon ourselves or avoid, depends upon the causes suited to produce it, which in this case are our own actions. Here then we have it in our option to determine what shall be the appointed event lying in the secret Will: to add or subtract one among the number of disasters requisite, because we have the causes of it under command. Therefore if I can escape an impending danger by my care and good management, I shall look upon it as a clear gain, equally with those who hold the reality and dominion of chance: for the advantage is visible, but the damage to ensue I cannot discover upon any of my principles. In like manner the future states of men depend, not upon a fatality, but upon the natural causes, to wit, their respective manners of behaviour here upon earth: and the number of either sort upon the number of persons who shall choose either course of life. Therefore he that saves himself or his neighbour from destruction, is so far from hurting anybody, that he does a signal service to the universe; by making one fewer suffering state requisite therein, than there would have been had he omitted his endeavours.

12. Now to conclude this whole article of equality, I hope nobody will take offence merely upon account of its novelty: for however novel it may be, it hurts none of the old tenets and precepts that have been employed to keep the world in order; nor lessens the expedience of being careful of our conduct in a single point. It leaves justice to proceed as before in the distribution of reward and punishment according to every man's deserts: particular care has been taken to provide against every notion that might be engrafted upon it, of dangerous consequence either to Religion or good morals: it has been applied as persuasive to that humility and lowliness of mind, so strongly inculcated in our Sacred Writings: and as an encouragement, drawn from the fund of natural reason, to that unreserved and universal charity which is the grand precept both of sound philosophy and revealed Religion.

If it be said these doctrines are sufficiently recommended already upon the authority of the sacred oracles and interpretations of them by the Church, and that to lead men into another course of evidence would only be drawing aside their attention from a surer guidance: I shall answer, that those who are so happy as to follow steadily this sure guidance, and find it supply all their uses, and satisfy every difficulty arising in their minds, will do well to adhere to it still, without heeding my speculations, as being not intended for them. But it has happened somehow, whether by an unlucky constitution of mind or a faulty education, or bad company, or injudicious management of some preachers, or absurdities engrafted by crafty pretenders to sanctity, that this surest guidance does not obtain the reserved credit with everybody. Is it not then acting agreeably to Christian charity, and the example of him who became all things to all men, if by any means he might gain some, to address these people in the way they will listen to, and attempt leading them into the same points whereto their proper guide would have conducted them, though by a different road wherein they may be prevailed upon to travel. And if they will be pleased to consider maturely what has been here suggested from experience and reason, together with what further their own thoughts may suggest, concerning the nature of the mind acting constantly upon motives, the dependence of effects upon causes, the universal government of Providence, the dispassionate and impartial nature of God: it seems to me as if they could not fail of seeing a solid

foundation for this equality, and inferring from thence that there is no intrinsic excellence of one man above another, nor other than was the gift of Heaven; and that there is a mutual connection of interests among the several members, as well of the creation as of every community contained in it, so that whoever procures any good for his neighbour, does in effect procure it for himself.

Should I be thought in some places to have run on too finespun argumentations, or in others drawn too strong-coloured figures, for anybody's liking: let him be good-natured enough to suppose, that were we to discourse over this subject in private, and he would let me know his taste, I should endeavour to conform myself thereto. But as I know not who may deign to cast an eye upon my labours, I must accommodate them the best I can to different tastes, and provide against all attacks, as well of the subtle miner as the open assailant. If he be already intimately persuaded of the general interest being his own upon any other grounds whatever, he has my consent to think no more of the equality; which I urged with none other aim than to work this persuasion. But whether self-interest be the real foundation of all our rules of conduct or not, it has certainly a powerful influence upon our motions: therefore it must be no small service to Religion and virtue, to set this spring so as that it may assist in their operations. This is the point I have been driving at, and if we both agree in the same point, we need not quarrel about the different ways whereby we arrived at it: but may go on amicably the remainder of our journey, consulting together, as often as there may be occasion, upon the most effectual methods of pursuing what we have agreed to be the truest road to our own interest.

CHAP XXXI.

RE-ENLARGEMENT OF VIRTUE.

In order to understand the title of this Chapter, we may recollect that of Chapter XXXVI. [p. 267, Vol. I. of this edition], which was entitled the Limitation of Virtue. I doubt not as many good people as have had patience to go through the argument pursued there, have condemned me for limiting her within shamefully narrow bounds: it is well if they were quieted for a while by the hint dropped in the two closing Sections, of what I am now going to do; which is to restore her to her ancient splendour, and the full glory she merits by her most arduous trials and most noble sacrifices. If they still blame me for leaving her so long under a cloud, let it be alleged in my excuse, that I could not clear up her rights sooner, having not gotten together the materials requisite for that purpose. If they urge that I ought to have prepared all my materials before I proceeded to build upon them: they may please to consider that my case is different from that of the divines. They are to make the proper use of an old science: I to lay the foundation of a new one.

For though Religion and morality be an ancient science, yet it has been placed upon so many various bottoms, the main supports of it made to bear so differently upon one another, and the whole fabric so disfigured with the additions of injudicious or ill-designing workmen, that it seemed no blameable attempt to reconstruct the whole afresh from the very ground: not with design to make alterations in the chambers or apartments, but to

dispose them upon a more consistent plan, and render the passages of communication less intricate and abrupt between them. In prosecution of this scheme I could take nothing for known or acknowledged, but must work my way step by step as I could, and deduce my principles anew from the materials furnished by common experience. But it is the general and allowed practice of those who trace other sciences from the beginning, to build what they can upon some of their first principles considered alone, before they proceed to collect other principles; though they know well enough their building will not stand in all its parts when these latter come to be employed likewise.

Your professors of natural philosophy do so in their lectures upon the five mechanical powers: if you go to apply their rules to common use you will not find them answer: but why? Because there is a roughness in all your instruments, that will hinder their operation in the manner you was taught to expect. This the professor was not ignorant of, but would not burden you with too many things at once, judging it expedient to instruct you thoroughly in all that his engines would perform supposing them perfectly smooth; and reserve for other lectures to examine the nature of friction, and what alteration that will make according to the degrees of it. Or if he be to read upon gravitation, he will tell you that falling bodies pass through spaces in their descent bearing a duplicate ratio to the times of their descending: that projectiles move in a regular parabola, forming exactly the same angle in their fall to the plane of the horizon, with which they were thrown up. Try the truth of this theory with a stone or whatever comes next to hand, and you will find it prove defective: but he will afterwards explain to you how, and in what proportion, this must necessarily happen from the resistance of air.

Now the foundation which seemed to me the first to be laid, as the only sure and stable one whereon the building I had taken in hand could be erected, was the knowledge of ourselves and of our own nature. For it has been asked, how can a man love God whom he hath not seen, if he hate his brother whom he hath seen: so by parity of reason it might be asked, what can a man know of God or things invisible, which he cannot see, who knows nothing of himself, his own manner of acting and thinking, or operation of the things wherewith he is daily conversant? For the ideas we can frame of God are none other than what we gather by analogy from something found among ourselves: and Religion being designed for the uses of man, cannot be so explained nor applied as to serve his uses, without a knowledge of human nature. The want of this reflection, I am apt to think, has given rise to those involuntary errors which have been fallen into in the expositions and interpretations of it: as to the designed perversions, they were made by men who had studied human nature but too well, and served their own ends upon its weaknesses. So that in this respect the children of this world, the sons of ambition and avarice, have proved wiser than the children of light: because the latter chose to remain always children, confining themselves to the tenets and abstractions taught them in their schools, without extending their observation to other things requisite to complete the perfect manhood of knowledge.

Such then being my principal foundation, it behoved me to work it well, before I proceeded to mark out any other ground, which would only interrupt our progress by dividing our attention: and having gathered what observations I could make upon the motions of the mind, and the manner wherein she stands affected by the common occurrences of life, I conceived it not

inexpedient to try what scheme of conduct might be constructed upon this narrow basis alone. Induced thereto partly by what we often hear asserted from the pulpit, That if we regard the happiness of this life only, still the good will be found greatly to have the advantage over the wicked: which, though agreeing with my own sentiments, I resolved to give it a full and fair examination. Accordingly I pursued a train of consequences naturally resulting from the premises then in hand, whereby I found that virtue might be raised to a flourishing height, though planted upon none other ground than a due regard to our temporal happiness. And I flatter myself the divines will not think their assertion at all invalidated by what has been there done: for it has been made appear, that while we have a prospect of years to come, and which of us does not persuade himself he has such a prospect? the surest road to a happy life lies through the practice of virtue.

But if I have failed in supporting her interests to the end, they need not be offended with me for an event, which, rightly considered, terminates more in their favour than if I had succeeded; for there is not a word of God or another world to be found in the first Volume: therefore the doctrine there contained may be called the religion of an Atheist; at least such unless I have been somewhere faulty in my deductions, as an Atheist might subscribe to. Now had it been possible to have framed a complete system of behaviour upon Atheistical principles, it must have lessened the recommendation of Theology: which might then have been regarded as a matter fit only to amuse the curious in their leisure hours; but of no avail in practice nor making any alteration in the duties of life.

2. Having apologized for my limitation of virtue, I may with better grace desire the like caution may be observed in perusing several other parts of my work: and that men will not be scandalized at anything they find in a single passage or a few pages detached from the rest, nor until they see what uses will be afterwards made of it. For the laws of philosophical disquisitions and of sermons are very different: the latter being addressed to the populace, whose inattention seldom permits them to carry away more than a few separate scraps, care must be taken to deliver nothing that is not perfectly innocent to the tenderest digestion. The preacher must not dislike our physicians, who often mingle antimony, mercury, solanum, opium, and other poisonous drugs in their prescriptions: because mankind is so perverse, they will be sure to pick up the poison and leave the correcting ingredients behind; if not to swallow it, at least to throw in his face, or bespatter his character.

But the former are addressed to the studious, who can follow a train of reasoning throughout, and distinguish between what is asserted as a certain truth, or only as a necessary consequence from the argument at present in hand. They will not be like the politely learned, reading only to shine in conversation: whose aversion to trouble makes them expect to have all difficulties cleared up in a single page, or a whole system explained while one sits prattling over a dish of tea. These are unreasonable expectations which I am sure I cannot, and believe no man alive can, undertake to answer. Therefore must beg leave to except against the procedure of all, who shall cite a passage or two, or give an abstract of some Chapter, and then with a confident air ask the gay circle around them, what they must think of that; as also against the judgment of any who shall pass it without hearing me through, or without having cognizance of the cause whereon they pronounce.

3. Had I been withholden by the awe of these partial examiners and hasty judges from concluding my last book in the manner I did, I could not have made it so apparent as I think it must be to every one who considers the arguments urged there, of how necessary importance Religion is, not only for keeping the vulgar and the giddy in order, but likewise for the refined and the deep-thinking. The glittering hopes and formidable terrors of another life might still have been thought useful to play off as engines, upon those who consulted only their passions, and had no further concern than for present pleasures: but wholly needless for such as had discernment enough to see, that a decent and orderly behaviour was the proper way to attain serenity of mind, health of body, prosperity and security among mankind.

Nor indeed can it be denied there have been those who have passed through life very comfortably and even with applause, without looking at anything beyond. Epicurus, the grand apostle of infidelity, stands recorded in history for his exemplary sobriety and friendliness. Atticus appears to have been the most prudent man among the Romans in his time, and to have possessed a large share even of Christian charity, doing service to all without distinction or mixture of party zeal, which then ran at the highest. And for the politicians of ancient days, many of whom proved excellent legislators and governors, it is pretty certain they did not believe in their country religion, nor does it appear what other religion or philosophy most of them had.

But we cannot conclude upon the tendency of principles from the practice of single persons; for no man can wrap himself up so entirely in his own notions, as not to take a tincture from others among whom he converses. For having from his childhood been used to hear the virtues constantly spoken of with honour, he will insensibly imbibe an esteem of them without knowing why: for though I cannot allow them innate, they are perhaps generally the growth of custom, our second nature. But were there a nation of Atheists, I apprehend they could not flourish long: for though they might find it expedient to bring up their children in sentiments of honour and probity, yet the thinking persons among them would quickly see so far into human nature as to discover that each man's own happiness is the proper foundation whereon all his schemes of conduct are to be ultimately placed; that honour, justice, public spirit, benevolence and the like, are but props employed to strengthen the superstructure, where the visible connection with its original basis is wanting; that the fame of their names, after themselves have fallen into annihilation, is no object deserving their regard. Therefore upon finding themselves approach near their end, when by their long experience they are become most capable of contriving for the public, they will be most careless of her interests. Nay, it is well if they stay so long before they find occasions happen wherein they will persuade themselves they may serve their private ends without ever being discovered, though to great damage of others or of the community: in which cases they will be sure to prefer their own advantage, whereby things must soon run to decay and ruin. Therefore it is incumbent upon every state to discourage the beginnings of infidelity, by all means consistent with humanity and the just rights of civil liberty.

4. And perhaps the world might still go on better, if the politicians of all countries would, as I hope those of our own already do, extend their views beyond this scene of sublunary affairs, and consider themselves as citizens of the universe. That they would not lay out their whole sagacity

upon the methods of bringing their schemes to bear, but bestow a little of it upon the schemes themselves; examining why they esteem power, credit, honour, riches, desirable at all: and if they can find none other Why than to make them happy, whether it becomes persons of their extensive understandings to think no further than the happiness to be had during the twenty or thirty years of their continuance in splendour here. I do not expect they will suffer themselves to be guided in their opinions by authority, nor put aside from their aims by the general estimation, nor does it behove them so to do: but then let them be sure they did not take any of them up upon the estimation of others, and those not of the soundest judgment, only because they were always told from their childhood by their nurse or their mother or everybody else they met with, how fine a thing it was to be great. For it becomes persons of their extraordinary abilities to judge for themselves, to cast aside youthful prejudices, to draw a plan of life upon the solid ground of reason, and go to the bottom of things for their foundation.

But because this is a science of itself, which those who are busied in other occupations may want leisure to pursue minutely; I have attempted in this second Volume to trace a train of consequences from the contemplation of nature, which any one may judge of without aid of tradition or received tenets: whereby it appears that the universe lies under one completely regulated policy; that the properties of bodies, the powers of animals, the talents of men, and all other provisions, are made with regard to the whole; that the good of each particular depends upon the good of all: and whoever adds to the happiness of another, adds thereby to his own. From hence it follows that honesty is the best policy, and an unreserved attachment to the public benefit, the surest road to self-interest: and since persons whose judgment far exceeds others, have reason to prize the approbation of that above all popular applause, that the most noble sacrifice they can make, and for which they may most deservedly applaud themselves is, when they have preferred the public good before their own private interests, or whatever they had set their hearts upon most strongly.

5. Therefore now we may do ample justice to Regulus, whom we left under a sentence of folly for throwing away life with all its enjoyments for a phantom of honour. For he may allege that he had not a fair trial before, his principal evidence being out of the way, which having since collected in the course of his second book, he moves for a rehearing. For he will now plead that it was not a fantastic joy in the transports of rectitude, nor the stoical rhodomontade of a day spent in virtue containing more enjoyment than an age of bodily delights, nor is his inability to bear a life of general odium and contempt, had his duty so required, which fixed him in his resolution: but the prudence of the thing upon a full and calm deliberation. Because he considered himself as a citizen of the universe, whose interests are promoted and maintained by the particular members contributing their endeavours towards increasing the quantity of happiness, wherever possible, among others with whom they have connection and intercourse.

He saw that his business lay with his fellow-creatures of the same species, among whom a strict attachment to faith and honour was the principal bulwark of order and happiness, that a shameful conduct in his present conflict would tend to make a general weakening of this attachment, which might introduce disorders, rapines, violences, and injuries among multitudes, to far greater amount than his temporary tortures; that if he behaved manfully, he should set a glorious example, which might occasion prosperities to be gained to his country and all belonging to her, overbalancing the

weight of his sufferings, especially when alleviated by the balmy consciousness of acting right. He was persuaded likewise, that all the good a man does, stands placed to his account, to be repaid him in full value when it will be most useful to him: so that whoever works for another, works for himself; and by working for numbers, earns more than he could possibly do by working for himself alone. Therefore he acted like a thrifty merchant, who scruples not to advance considerable sums, and even to exhaust his coffers, for gaining a large profit to the common stock in partnership. Upon these allegations, supported by the testimony of far-sighted philosophy and confirmed in the material parts by heaven-born Religion, I doubt not the jury will acquit him with flying colours, and the judge grant him a copy of the record, to make his proper use of, whenever he might be impeached or slandered hereafter.

6. It is not unlikely here that somebody may put me in mind of Saint Evremont, who attempted to write a tragedy, wherein Hippolitus was to be the principal character, but had not gone on far before he found his hero dwindled insensibly into a very Monsieur Saint Evremont, having the Frenchman's sentiments, making his reflections, and talking exactly in the same strain. And then ask me by what authority of history I prove that Regulus had any notion of the vehicles, the Aions, the balancing periods, the all-space-filling Mundane soul, the unessential nature of justice, her generation from expedience, the purchase of estates by unavoidable or virtuous suffering, the general partnership and universal bank of Ned Search. To this question I shall reply that it is not my business to make critical remarks upon history, nor have I anything to do with the person of Regulus, nor to penetrate the real motives of his conduct. He stands with me as an ideal character, the representative of all persons who might come into his situation: and I was to show that prudential motives of true self-interest might be suggested to them, upon solid and substantial reasons, for acting in the manner he did.

Yet it is not necessary that whoever practises the like firmness of behaviour should be led into it by just the same train of reasoning as I have drawn out: for I am not so narrow-minded as to pronounce everything no more than a shining sin, which does not proceed precisely from the principles appearing truest to me. It is enough we have shown the action to be prudent, and whoever performs it as being right, deserves our approbation, though he may not discern wherein the prudence of it consists. Had it indeed been undertaken out of vanity, resentment, fondness of fame or any other selfish motive, though being beneficial to the universe, the performer might have shared the fruits in common with others; yet this would have been an accidental benefit, nor would he have merited reward or commendation: but must have stood in the case of that Roman Master of the horse, who being strictly enjoined to avoid a battle during his Dictator's absence, nevertheless attacked the enemy and gained a complete victory; for which the Dictator on his return gave him the honours usually conferred on a conqueror, and then punished him severely for his disobedience. But he who practises a self-denial, or goes through a painful or perilous undertaking, which is beneficial, because esteeming it his duty, or recommended by all persons of approved judgment, or dictated by the moral sense, or upon any other of those motives comprehended under the name of conscience; does, besides the accidental benefit he knows nothing of, bring himself within the verge of justice, and the stream of those rewards she distributes to well-doing.

7. For it is not to be expected that every one should trace the rectitude of his measures quite up to the fountain head. Some persons have not the talents, most conditions of life do not afford the leisure, nor do some ages or countries furnish the lights, necessary for that purpose. But God gives to every man the talents, the opportunities, the lights, sufficient for the work whereto he calls him: it is the creature's business to answer the call, whether coming by the voice of his own reason, or the general recommendation of the judicious, or the admonitions of his moral sense, or whatever other channel of conveyance his best judgment shall satisfy him brings it genuine. For by following steadily the best guidance he can get against the opposition of passion, danger, pain, and affliction, he shall become an object of the Divine favour. And for such as can discern what courses of conduct are most extensively beneficial, they will act prudently by leading others into them by such methods as they can, whether of persuasion or exhortation or example or applause; which last we have already seen is there most deservedly belonging where it be most usefully applied. For in so doing, they not only procure a general advantage, but place themselves and those they prevail upon within reach of that arm of justice wherewith she distributes her rewards.

Nor need they despise those expedients for their own private use; for no man, how much soever he may see in his closet, can carry the whole chart of it abroad with him when he enters upon action: therefore it behoves him to nourish up vigorous moral senses, and fix a strong approbation upon proper objects, to direct and actuate him upon every particular occasion; and what he does by their instigation will answer all purposes as effectually as if he could have run his eye along the whole line of expedience. And, after all, though one man may look further than another, there is none so piercing sighted as to see to the very end of the line: for it has been shown before, that the effect of our actions extends to distant times and regions, far beyond the reach of mortal ken. So that the wisest man can proceed only by rule and guidance, not by knowledge: taking the expedience of his conduct to the welfare of mankind, as an evidence of its being expedient to the visible world.

8. But the necessity of rules and principles for our direction gives rise to a new species of prudence, which could not have had Being, were we capable of taking all our measures upon a full knowledge of their expedience: for it is not enough to consider the usefulness of an action, but we must likewise take into account how far it may either confirm or weaken the influence of some wholesome rule; because more good or harm may be done that way than by any direct consequences of the thing we do. For there is a degree of sacredness belonging to all rules, proportionable to their importance and the authority whereon they rest, which must not be violated without very cogent and evident cause. Yet on the other hand, since no rule is without exception, there may be too strict an adherence to them, especially when some one becomes predominant, so as to work a disregard of all the rest: which is the case with your sectaries and very violent people of all denominations, who are so terrified at the barking dogs of Scylla that they run headlong upon Charibdis. Therefore this necessity we have been speaking of, does not supersede the use of private judgment, which may find employment enough in comparing rules and principles, in choosing whose guidance we shall trust to, in understanding the directions and applying them to particular occasions.

For it is not enough to follow the best authority without some caution

had of the channels through which it passes, because these have been known sometimes totally to change the quality of the stream. It is reported of him who boasted of being the oldest and I trow the wisest king in Europe, that upon somebody humbly representing to him that he could not alter the laws without Parliament, Prithee! man, says he: do not I make the judges? Then I make the law. So there have been interpreters who have made the law, and the Gospel, and philosophy, and right reason, to be just what they pleased. Therefore it behoves us to be circumspect, not depending upon zeal alone without discretion, nor imitating the Papists, who if they get rid of so much money in what they call charity, no matter how applied, esteem it a sure draught on St. Peter: but though there be an universal Bank, unless we take the best care we can in our ability and the circumstances of the situation, that what we throw in be real sterling Good, it will make no figure upon our account. Yet no man need disturb himself for unavoidable errors or misguidings; but may trust the wisdom of Providence to bring good profit out of his foolishness.

9. But though invincible ignorance will justify an error, hastiness and passion will not: for there are religious passions as well as sensual and worldly, and the former are more dangerous than the latter by how much the best things corrupted become the worst. The most noble enterprises have been achieved by a sedate and steady courage, not by a boisterous impetuosity. Especially when such sacrifices as that of Regulus are to be made, it requires the greatest calmness of judgment to examine and weigh all the motives for offering it. For life, health, ease, and fortune, are not to be thrown away lightly nor wantonly; they are the blessings of Heaven, well deserving our value and care to preserve them, nor is it justifiable to part with them unless on very weighty considerations; because the larger the price is to be paid, the more needful it becomes to examine well the value of the purchase and security of the title. Wherefore there is a due caution to be had in seeing that we have a warrant for what we undertake: because else, after putting ourselves to vast expense of toil and trouble, we may earn nothing beside reproof for having omitted a task we might have performed more easily.

When young people first acquire a liking to virtue, the fire of their blood sometimes lights up an ambition of attempting the most arduous exercises, and gaining the topmost summit of it at once. But let them remember how they were led by degrees into the learning or profession they have knowledge of, being taught the rudiments completely first, and instructed in the lower branches before they were permitted to assist in the grand performances of art: in like manner let them study the duties of life lying every day in their way, and make themselves perfect in the common virtues, before they undertake the shining. But this knight-errant humour of seeking adventures and perilous encounters, quickly subsides, unless where fomented by enthusiasts with their incessant rantings; whereby they fright or teaze their followers into painful austerities, dangerous abstinences, tedious and fatiguing devotions, no ways conducive to make them more useful in their stations. Which is just as absurd as if a tailor or a shoemaker should live in a boat upon the salt water, to inure himself to the hardships of a sea voyage: or lie out whole nights in a ditch by way of using himself to a campaign or a siege, to neither of which services he is ever likely to be called. For Providence appoints to every man his station in this world: it is his business to consider what are the duties of it, and furnish himself with such qualifications as may carry him through those duties completely;

because this will carry him surest to all the happiness within his power to attain.

For even if faith be the saving principle, yet no man can have solid grounds to believe that he has a saving faith, otherwise than by the fruits it bears: so that good works are either the one thing needful, or the sole evidence of that which is so. But good works are such only as may prove good for something, or from whence good may redound to mankind: and those are the best which tend to the most beneficial consequences in our power to produce, or in our skill to contrive. But whenever duty calls, provided all possible care and consideration be taken to know its voice, no man need fear that he shall be a loser by answering the call, whatever hard service or costly sacrifice he be put to: for if the fruits of his labour hang too remote to touch his notice, they will be brought nearer by the reward annexed to the performance.

10. Thus have I brought matters at last to an issue that I hope will scandalize nobody: and this may atone for the liberties taken in arriving at it by an unusual road; for there is a Latin proverb which says, the end crowns the work. If I have seemed to deviate sometimes into the paths of freethinking, the orthodox know well there are persons who have an utter aversion against travelling in the beaten track: then they cannot take it amiss that, by mingling amongst travellers, I have attempted to bring some into the very point whereto they would lead them. Nor can the latter charge me with playing booty, or practising artifices upon them: for they may see I have proceeded all along with an unawed freedom, doing my utmost to cast all prejudices aside, and take every step in the way my best judgment should direct. I did indeed suspect at setting out that the roads of reason and Religion, rightly pursued, would conduct to the same end. For if God has given us any commands, as he has no ends of his own to answer by them, they must have been given for our benefit: therefore we are taught they all terminate in two principal aims: to bring us into a hearty desire of one another's happiness equally with our own, and to inspire us with such just sentiments of himself as conduce most to our happiness.

And though reason, whose office lies not in giving us an ultimate end of action, but in contriving the surest methods of attaining that suggested by appetite, can set out upon none other bottom than our own interest: yet we have seen how self-interest leads into disinterestedness, into an unreserved attachment to the general good, and into a constant dependence upon Providence; because were that away, we could find no certain cause of all we see happen around us; and if we lose sight of goodness, or esteem anything left to chance, the success of our best endeavours will be uncertain, and our hopes become like castles in the air. So that whether we use the daylight or the candle of the Lord, provided we can keep our eyes clear from the films of passion and prejudice, we shall find objects presented in the same shapes and the same colours, though not always with equal lustre.

11. This consideration may rescue philosophy from the imputation she has lain under with some righteous persons of being dangerous to Religion and piety: it was not uncommon for whoever professed to pursue the light of nature to be presently suspected of unsoundness in his principles, of a secret design to undermine the belief of a Providence, if not that fundamental article of all religion, the Being of a God. Nor can it be denied there have been grounds for such suspicion: at least, we must acknowledge that those who had such evil designs have proceeded by undertaking to explain all

phenomena around us by the powers of nature, and attempting to confine the attention of mankind to them alone. But the state of natural philosophy is not the same now as formerly: it is become an innocent, inoffensive science, an useful minister in the temple of the Lord. In ancient times, nature was esteemed an original source of Being, distinct from the Almighty; matter was thought possessed of an existence which he never gave it, and even the elements to have their differences and qualities independent on him; the only province left him being that of gathering them into forms and assortments, in order to generate thereby such habitable earths, and plants, and animals, as they were respectively capable of producing. And though these notions have been since exploded, God being generally acknowledged the Creator as well as Maker of all things visible and invisible; yet there still remains an opinion with many of an abstract, eternal, uncreated nature of things, which controls the measures and directs the wisdom of God, as well in the exercises of his creative power as in the administration of sublunary affairs. Thus, while there were two First Causes supposed to have a joint share in the production of all events, it is no wonder that such as were zealous for the glory of God looked with a jealous eye upon every attempt to extend the province of nature, as being an encroachment upon the Divine prerogative, and a certain mark of disloyalty.

But I have endeavoured to exhibit nature in another aspect, not as an original cause, but an establishment of the Almighty: her abstract as well as sensible essences receiving their permanency, and her courses their stability, from the covenant or immutable Will of God; her substances, both material and spiritual, together with their primary as well as secondary qualities, their applications to one another, their mutual affections, all effects and events resulting therefrom, deriving primarily from none other source than the power, the wisdom, the goodness, the equity, and good pleasure of their Maker: and the chain of second causes producing them, being planned out with certain foreknowledge and exact intention of every particular it should bring forth. Therefore I may hope to stand absolved from all suspicion of impiety, nor need I scruple the hazard of adding too largely to nature, for by giving to her I take nothing from God: because nature is the work of God, her acts are his acts, her productions his gifts, her every operation, as well necessary as fortuitous, an execution of his Will. I have no where denied that he may sometimes act immediately without the intervention of second causes, or to alter their courses; on the contrary, have offered arguments in support of that opinion. Yet this does not hinder, but that we may strive to account for everything we can by natural causes, and retain an averseness against multiplying interpositions: as believing that, whenever made, they are made solely for manifestation of the Divine power to intelligent creatures, not from a necessity to correct errors in the first design, which were unforeseen, or could not be provided against. Wherefore it may be presumed they happen very rarely, and then are so striking, that all endeavours to avoid them will but convince us the more strongly of a divine operation.

12. Neither was the study of human nature regarded with a more favourable eye than that of the external: for there being a great deal of machinery in the human composition, those who applied to a close examination into the structure and workings of that were apt to think too slightly of the spiritual part; insomuch that it was a current saying within these two hundred years, Wherever you see three physicians, you see two Atheists,

But I do not apprehend them in the same sentiments now: I have dipped into some of their works to gather from thence materials suitable to my own science, and they appear to me as orthodox as any other class of people among us; nor do I seem at a loss to account for the change. The zeal of the spiritualists urged them to ascribe more to the spiritual part than belonged to it singly: this could not escape the observation of such whose studies had brought them intimately acquainted with the body. They saw that understanding might sometimes be restored to madmen by medicine: they knew their drugs and chymical preparations had a powerful effect upon the imagination, so as to warm with sanguine hope, or chill with melancholy and despondency: they found that a delicacy of texture in the fibres of the brain, a briskness of circulation, a purity of the circulating juices, gave birth to the natural talents, and a predominancy in some one of the principal humours, distinguished the characters of men: that an unnatural pressure, or a little heterogeneous mixture in the medullary substance within the head, disabled the soul from exercising her functions; and that in general the tenor and colour of our thoughts depended very much upon the present disposition of the body. From hence they thought it demonstrable that powers had been ascribed to the soul which really resided in the body, and might be tempted too hastily to conclude that she had none at all belonging to her, but that thought itself, with all its varieties, were nothing more than a lucky configuration and diversity of motions in matter.

But this temptation is now removed, for an exacter scrutiny into the properties of matter and motion has now convinced the world, that no assortment of corporeal particles, how nicely soever arranged, can form an intelligent Being. And the conviction is so general and so strong, that a late noble writer, whose ruling passion, after ambition had been torn from him, being that of running down the clergy, and everything they taught, he would, in mere spite to them, have been an Atheist if he could, and did bring himself to be a thorough corporealist, ridiculing the doctrine of spiritual substance with the vile pun of calling it the pneumatic philosophy; yet could never bring himself to believe sense and understanding a necessary result from the human machinery; but, taking hold of an expression dropped by Mr. Locke, insisted that the faculty of thinking was annexed by Almighty Power to the system of matter contained in our several compositions.

Thus the indiscretion of zealots has hurt the credit of the spiritual soul, by claiming more for her than was her due: and her interests are best supported by examining fairly what is her lawful property, and distinguishing it from those powers which he derives by conjunction with her partner the body. Under this apprehension I set out in my first Chapter with observing that there are faculties of the mind and faculties of the man. I have since proceeded to show that percipience, rationality, cogitation, study, and all species of thought, are faculties of the compound: the mind, or purely spiritual part, having only a capacity of receiving such perceptions as shall from time to time be excited in her, but what perceptions shall be so excited depends entirely upon the action of corporeal substance wherewith she stands vitally united. Now the action and qualities of the corporeal agent must result from the position or arrangement and motion of the component particles whereof it consists: so that the thoughts and perceptions of the mind follow precisely according to the position and motion of the material corpuscles affecting her; yet are they her own thoughts and perceptions, never having place in the matter which produced them.

The case here seems something similar to that of letters in a book; a

printer with the very same types can run ye off a bible, a Virgil, Newton's Optics, Lisle's Husbandry, Joe Miller's Jests, or Rochester's Poems. Those books will raise very different sentiments in the mind; and the ideas of him that opens them follow precisely according to the position of the four-and-twenty letters in the page before him. Nevertheless the sentiments and perceptions are in the mind alone: the books themselves as they lie closed upon the shelves, have neither piety nor poetry nor philosophy nor ribaldry nor other sentiment belonging to them, nor can they produce any understanding or apprehension without a reader. In like manner the colours of bodies are holden to depend upon the pores in their surfaces, and their shapes upon the order and disposition of their parts; so that you have the sight of red or blue, of round or square, according to the texture of pores or situation of parts in the objects you successively look upon: yet all the colours and figures in the world shut up by themselves, can never produce a sense of vision without an eye to behold them.

Thus let the corporealists insist as strongly as they please that the characters and thoughts of men result from their machinery and organization, we have a ready answer, that such result could not take place unless there were a perceptive spirit to receive the action of the machine: and for anybody to imagine otherwise would be as absurd as to suppose that a bible might raise a sentiment of Religion without a reader to peruse it, or the grass a sensation of green without an eye to discern it. Then as the mind has an activity too, by which we can turn to any page or object within her reach, fitted to exhibit particular ideas and appearances before her, and likewise some command over her mental organs to put them upon exciting particular trains of thought and meditation: there is no less room for prudence and good management in the exercise of this power than if, as formerly apprehended, she performed her cogitative functions wholly retired within herself, without aid of any material instrument whatever.

13. There are some particulars not usually taken notice of, which I have been led to consider in my inquiry into the nature of the mind: as substance, individuality, an extent of presence, and the co-existence or contiguity of agent and patient in all immediate action. It is the fashion to pass over such subjects slightly as matters of mere curiosity and wanton speculation, to be remembered no further than for entertaining the company in conversation with the peculiar notions of such an author, without caring whether there is any truth in them or no. But I humbly conceive them to be matters of some moment: therefore wish they might be maturely weighed and ruminated upon by persons who have a talent that way. For I am not so confident of my own decisions as to desire they should be taken upon trust: I had rather every one would satisfy himself by the careful exercise of his own understanding, and discover any latent fallacy that may have escaped my penetration. To me it seems no trifling discovery to know that we are real substances, not merely qualities, either necessarily resulting from certain systems of organized matter, or annexed thereto by the arbitrary Will of our Maker. For our being substances seems the strongest evidence that can be had from natural reason, of our perpetual duration: because substances can never be destroyed by any operation of second causes, whereas secondary qualities resulting from composition cannot survive the dissolution of their compounds, and a quality annexed miraculously to some system must be presumed to cease as soon as the system is broken up. Then if the mind be substance it must be an individual: because if it were not, it would be a system of so many distinct

substances as the parts it contains, and the perceptive and active faculties would be resulting or annexed qualities belonging to the system.

But the mind being a true individual, not consisting of parts whose various disposition among one another might produce a change of form or quality, must be always the same in herself that she ever was. And this individuality of the mind will help us to a clearer and steadier idea of personality, the identity of person constantly accompanying that of the perceptive individual: for though we vulgarly apprehend our whole human composition to be ourselves, and the body continually changes both in form and substance from the cradle to the grave, yet we esteem ourselves the same person all along; and whatever composition of quite different substance, size, and make, it may please God to cast us into in some future stage of our existence, while it serves for organs of perception and instruments of action to the same individual, we shall apprehend it to be our own persons. Nor, provided we remember our present state and know that we have been for some time disunited, shall doubt of its being a resurrection of the same body; as likewise its aptness of organization to serve for higher uses of intelligence and activity, will denominate it a spiritual body, in contradistinction to our present, which is styled the natural or carnal. Add further that this individuality affords a strong presumption of our intrinsic equality, because all the difference of powers, faculties, understanding, and character, we know of among perceptive Beings, results from the compounds whereof they are respectively made ingredients, or the changes worked in them by the action of external objects: and every one is capable of exchanging conditions with every other, upon being vitally united to the same material organization and furnished with the same provision of externals.

The sphere of presence occupied by the mind, and contiguity in immediate action, depend upon one another: and here it will be proper to consider whether, in the most distant operation, there must not be a contact or coexistence in the same place, of the several media as they transmit the action; or whether the Postulatum I have assumed may be denied, to wit, that nothing can act or be acted upon while there is the least hair-breadth distance intervening, unless there be some medium passing between them, and then the medium must be contiguous to the agent on receiving, and to the patient on transmitting the impulse. A tower twenty miles off may strike a sensation upon us; but then the rays must fall upon the tower and be reflected from thence to our eyes, stopping at the retina: the vibrations they excite there are propagated along the optic nerves to some corpuscles lying within, or contiguous to, the mind herself, from whose immediate action alone she receives her sensation. But since we receive sensations from more corpuscles together than can possibly come in contact with a mathematical point, it seems to follow demonstrably that the mind exists or is toti-present throughout a distinguishable portion of space, large enough for all those corpuscles to enter or stand round. Then, as the perceptions of the mind depend solely upon the action and modification of these corpuscles, it will be worth while to consider whether the like action and modification may not be produced by other objects than those fitted to strike upon our present gross corporeal organs, and shorter channels than those employed in our animal machinery: or nature may not have other ways of exciting perceptions in us than those we now experience.

14. As to the hypotheses, I never propounded them for articles of faith, therefore am under no temptation to think the less favourably of anybody

for rejecting them; they are intended only to illustrate the possibility of a mutual relation between things seen and unseen, to the imaginations of such persons who are not thoroughly reconciled to the idea of heavy bodies like our own, of fleeting shadows, of winged angels and an eternity of psalm-singing, which have been so successfully employed upon the many as to render any other representation needless for common use; and who have so full a persuasion of the divine wisdom and entire command over all the powers of nature, as to believe that the sentences of the last judgment may be executed, reward and punishment administered, by certain stated laws established for governing the operation of second causes. Nevertheless, I must confess myself fond enough to fancy those hypotheses not confined to bare possibility, nor without a considerable degree of probability too: but then I would desire not to be mistaken in the grounds which this probability is built upon. I do not pretend to prove the reality of the little fœtus, forming and fashioning within us, by any experience of my own: I never felt it move nor had other sensible evidence of its existence, for I have not the knack of inward feelings, like the Methodists and the Quakers, though perhaps I have passed as many hours in silence and retirement within myself as either of them. Thus much, indeed, I think appears from the lectures of anatomists, that the last action of the machine traceable by their science, that is, the inner ends of our nerves, stretch over a much larger compass than the sphere of the mind's presence can be supposed to extend to: from whence it necessarily follows there must be some fine material organization, minuter than all the contrivances of anatomy can discover, between the nerves and the mind, for transmitting their action onwards to her. And constant experience of our habits, our passions, inclinations, tastes, and various ways of thinking contracted by custom may convince us that our daily actions, discourses, and thoughts, have an effect upon the most internal part of our composition, so as to work a permanent change of form and disposition there.

But whether this organization be drawn out in such an ethereal cobweb as represented in the Chapter on the Vehicles, or whether upon death it shall detach from the nerves and fly off together with the spiritual inhabitant enclosed therein, or shall still continue diversely disposed in make and texture, according to what has passed with it during life, I do not undertake to decide by any branch of physiology: what I have offered upon those points I give only as hypotheses, whose probability must rest entirely upon such evidence as can be drawn in its favour from that sole fountain whence we can gather any conclusion concerning things unseen, namely, our idea of the divine Attributes and Administration of affairs throughout the moral world. But it being a generally received tenet that this life is a preparation for the next, the soul of the wicked going forth in a condition utterly unfit for heaven, so as that if admitted there, it could find no relish in the joys of the place; one cannot easily imagine how this could be the case, unless the soul, were understood of an organized compound which might receive alteration by the habits contracted upon earth. For if there be an intrinsic difference among individuals, it must have been made in them at their creation, and continue in them so long as they continue in being: because a perceptive individual is capable of no change in form or quality, or other alteration than that momentary one of successive perceptions excited by the action of objects upon it. The same reason, joined to the belief that a good man may fall from his goodness and the wicked sincerely repent, will evince that the virtues and vices reside in the organization, not

in the individual: and that the perceptive spirit of a reprobate is as fit to animate a glorified body, if divine justice could permit it entrance therein, as that of the most exemplary Christian.

The supposition of a Mundane Soul seems to fill imagination with the highest idea it can contain of the divine power and magnificence, leaving no part in the boundless empire uninhabited: to connect the whole host of material and spiritual Beings under one all-comprehensive polity: to suggest uses for the most distant bodies discoverable, and minutest particles conceivable: and best to reconcile the existence of evil with our notions of infinite goodness, by reducing it to a scarce perceptible proportion in comparison with the vast profusion of happiness abounding everywhere. All this I think might carry the force of demonstration, if it were not for one weak link in the chain, which is, that the plan of universal government must be executed by methods which we are capable of laying down upon the chart of our imagination: but I am so sensible of the narrowness of our faculties that I cannot lay any stress upon this assumption. Nevertheless, we are encouraged upon the best authorities to frame such ideas of the things unseen as we can imagine: and the good effects resulting from the hypotheses may plead excuse for a favourable propensity towards them. For if any man should happen to entertain a strong persuasion of their being real truths, it must give him a grand opinion of the lot of his existence; abate his fondness for the paltry pleasures of this world; make him sensible of the intrinsic equality between fellow-creatures and mutual connexion of interests among them, that strongest cement of union and firmest support of universal hearty charity.

15. These consequences may serve for my apology with such as might charge me with drawing off men's attention from the light of the Gospel, by fixing it upon that of nature: for an endeavour to profit by the one does by no means imply a slight of the other, because both, rightly pursued, will for the most part conduct to the same points. I have introduced several texts in the course of my progress, to show the conformity of their dictates with the decisions of human reason: and the conclusions of the last section, which appear resulting from the main tenor of my design, are strongly inculcated in the sacred Scriptures. If that of intrinsic equality be thought otherwise at first sight, yet upon mature consideration it will be found to follow necessarily from that which I take to be a favourite doctrine of Scripture, namely, that it is God who giveth us both to will and to do: and whether he give them by his second causes of formation in the womb, of education, good examples and conversation, or by supernatural grace, all these lie under his absolute disposal and were settled by his eternal purpose before the foundation of the world. So that we are nothing in ourselves, no better one than another; our faith, our holiness, our zeal to good works end our virtues, being not originally our own, nor created with us, but derived solely from his bounty: and he could as easily have given them to Judas or Simon Magus as to John or Paul.

The study of nature is so far from being a mark of hostile disposition to the sacred records, that we cannot receive the full benefit from them, nor even enter into their true spirit without it: they must have some interpreter, and if human reason be not employed, passion, or prejudice, or vanity, or peculiarity, or whimsy, or private interest, will intrude into the office, and what wild work they can make stands sufficiently manifested by fatal experience. There is scarce an absurdity that has not been proved by

the Gospel. Papal tyranny stood upon the donation of the keys to Peter: the cruelties of persecution were authorized by the order, compel them to come in: the Romish legends, the rantings of methodism, Barclay's apology for the Quakers, the dreams of the Moravians, the treatises of all sectaries, appear thick stuck with texts: even Mahomet could find a prophecy of himself in the Comforter, who was to come and show us all things. Every one of these pretend that theirs is the genuine sense and all other interpretations a perversion of Scripture: but what likelier method can be taken for deciding among them, than by comparing them with that other code which God has written in legible characters upon his works? which comparison cannot be made without a careful, attentive perusal and competent knowledge of both.

The professed design of the whole Jewish and Christian dispensation was to restore Man to that perfection of his nature wherein he was created: therefore the doctrines, the precepts, the examples, the institutions recorded there, must be regarded as the materia medica proper for a distempered constitution. For the commands of God are not arbitrary: he has made nothing our duty by his authority, which he had not before made our interest, by the circumstances of that nature, whereof he has permitted us to partake. Hence his rules of government for the brutes are often contrary to those enjoined to Man, because their natures are so: to the former he has said by his laws of instinct, Thou shalt do murder, Thou shalt commit adultery; so the wolf makes it his business to worry the harmless sheep, the pike is taught to prey upon his own species, the bull has commerce with his mother, his sisters, and his daughters, he breaks fence into a neighbouring farm, to drive away a weaker bull and seize upon his seraglio. But these practices must introduce continual disorder and confusion among men, and lose them the most valuable benefits of society: yet some might not see those consequences in particular instances, and more would be so intent upon present gratification as not to mind consequences at all. Therefore, God has issued his commands to Man, saying, Thou shalt do no murder, Thou shalt not commit adultery, and enforced them with rewards and punishments for a remedy against the shortsightedness and weakness of human nature: that they may serve as an instruction to the prudent to warn him of an evil tendency he did not discern, and a powerful restraint upon the sensual to withhold him from running into mischiefs he would not have heeded at a distance.

Nor yet does it suffice that we have a complete dispensary of remedies without knowing how to apply them in particular cases: and for gaining the art of making proper application it behoves the physician to study, not only the materia medica, but likewise the constitution, the disorders incident thereto, the present habit of body in the patient, and in what condition of solids and humours a soundness of health consists. Now in the science of medicine respecting the mind, our foundation must be taken from the sensitivo-rational constitution of Man, by contemplation of which it will presently occur, that the perfection of our nature lies in an entire subjection of the sensitive faculties to the rational: it will then appear upon due consideration of the matter, that the rational faculty constantly prompts to pursue the general or greater good, in all actions which may anywise affect another person or number of persons; and though many of our actions concern nobody beside ourselves, yet even here it will recommend our own general good, in preference to any particular pleasure that stands at present uppermost in the fancy.

This then is the perfect soundness of health and ought to be made the ultimate intention of all applications, namely, to have the inferior faculties so well disciplined as that they may stand always ready to assist the superior in a steady prosecution of that aim, the attainment of greater good preferably to the less. It will be requisite further to examine what particular disorders of the mind upon any occasion prevent the due subordination of her powers, to which of them the remedies prescribed are respectively applicable, what is their natural efficacy, and in what manner they operate: taking our measures from the nature of the medicine and nature of the distemper, not looking for an ideal abstract goodness or secret virtue transferable from the one to the other, nor supernatural powers annexed arbitrarily by the Will of God. Whereby we shall best learn how to administer the proper quantity and vary the several species according to the circumstances of the case: escaping the extravagance of zealots who think to do everything with one recipe, which like Tar water, is to cure all maladies and can never be poured down in too copious draughts.

16. But this general good for the most part lies too remote to be seen distinctly at a single glance, and the paths leading to it are too intricate and too much involved among one another for us to discern which is the properest to be pursued upon every present occasion: for our own subsequent actions, those of other people, and the uncertain workings of external causes, will often interfere to change the effect of those we undertake, and render that inexpedient which appears eligible to our present apprehension. Therefore to make the wilderness practicable there must be passages worked out, particular rules and directions framed, by which a common man may find his way in every situation wherein he happens to stand; and under-aims branched out conducting to the principal, which must be varied from time to time, according to the variation of circumstances occurring. For the greater good is sometimes attained by a close attention to ourselves and our private advantages, to making provision for the body as well as the mind, to divertisements and pleasures for the recreation of both, to rivalship, contention, and artifice, to opposition, censure, and punishment of such as would bring damage upon ourselves or our neighbours.

But pleasures cannot be well enjoyed, nor contention and opposition carried on successfully, without a thorough engagement to the objects before us: for if the mind be drawn off by contemplation of distant prospects and consequences, she never can exert her efforts sufficiently to compass the business in hand. Now this occasional attachment to private emolument, to divertisement, and present pleasure, to the means of disappointing, displeasing and hurting other persons, has a tendency to draw men from their principal aim; induces many, who see the necessity of such attachment, to think a steady pursuit of the general good a romantic, impracticable scheme; and raises the greatest difficulties to a scholar in the science of morality. Which difficulties must be removed, and the grounds laid down whereupon the general interest requires that we should turn our back upon it for a while, before a system can be stricken out that shall be practical or fit for common use: that shall neither mislead the serious into a plan of life utterly unfit for the world, nor the sanguine into an aversion against virtue as debarring them from all innocent enjoyment and the prosecution of their allowable desires.

This is what I do not pretend to have done, as being too much for one undertaking. My address is made to the few, and my aim extends no further than to suggest a clue by help whereof a performance, intended for

the many, may be better calculated to answer its purpose. Which it seems likeliest to be when the operator abstains from the ideal world of abstract unsubstantial Beings, essential rectitude in rules, intrinsic goodness, holiness or merit in opinions or practices, and secret energies passing from things external into the mind itself; whereby Religion and philosophy have sometimes been made a mystery throughout, a tissue of unmeaning words filling the ear and raising whirlwinds in the imagination, but never touching the understanding, or turned into systems of occult quality and magic: but when instead of taking this rout, he bends his whole thoughts to examine everything by its natural tendency to the greater good, so as to explain when and why it is better that a man should turn the right cheek to him that has smitten the left, deny himself innocent pleasures, forego his private advantages, hazard his life, his health, and all his valuables, for the sake of other persons; and when it is more for the general good that he should follow his pleasures or profit, take care of his health, his family, his estate, oppose or rival, thwart, censure, or punish; for if none of these things were ever done by the virtuous, how would the world be the better as human nature stands circumstanced at present? or if he cannot explain these points to every capacity, yet let him take care to understand them himself, and recommend nothing to another which he cannot explain the reasons of to his own satisfaction.

Therefore as I have not been able to run these profitable lengths, I cannot boast of great services to the public: but shall found my contentment upon the hope that my labours may prove the remote occasion of more extensive good being done to my compatriots, or perphaps to mankind in general.

END OF VOL. I.

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